

BRN  
IRS

18

19

14

ED  
TL  
95

VES

2



Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(16611)

## Further Correspondence

respecting

## EASTERN AFFAIRS

### PART 56

January to March 1944



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
<b>Chapter I.—AFGHANISTAN.</b>			
1 Mr. Squire ... No. 9	1944. Jan. 28 (Kabul)	Political situation in Afghanistan ... Political review of Afghanistan for the year 1943	1
<b>Chapter II.—IRAQ.</b>			
2 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 20	1944. Jan. 13 (Bagdad)	Political situation in Iraq ... Review of chief events which have taken place in Iraq during the period 13th November, 1943, to 12th January, 1944	5
3 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 57	Feb. 1	Situation in Barzan ... Report to the Cabinet by Majid Mustafa on the Barzan question. His recommendations for improving the situation	10
4 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 68	Feb. 8	Political and economic situation in Iraq ... Review of the major political and economic events in 1943	14
5 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 111	Mar. 14	Political situation in Iraq... Summary of document drawn up by H.R.H. the Amir setting out the lines on which he wished the Government to work. Observation thereon	22
<b>Chapter III.—PERSIA.</b>			
<b>(A) Miscellaneous.</b>			
6 Report ...	1944. Jan. 6	Situation in Persia ... Report on tour in Bakhtiari, Chehar Mahal, Fereidan, Khumain, Ali Gudarz and Gulpaigon by the 12th Indian Division mobile dispensary	26
7 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 10	Jan. 7 (Tehran)	Situation in Persia ... Review of the events in Persia during period 24th November, 1943, to 7th January, 1944. All other events were overshadowed by the Tehran Conference	33
8 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 111	Mar. 10	Anglo-Persian relations ... Report on ceremonies in connexion with the presentation of his credentials as His Majesty's Ambassador	43
9 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 120	Mar. 17	Situation in East Persia ... Report by Consul-General Skrine, Meshed, on situation in East Persia, July to December 1943	45
<b>(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.</b>			
10 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 1	1944. Jan. 3	Summary No. 1, period ending 2nd January ...	50
11 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 32	Jan. 17	Summary No. 2, period ending 16th January ...	53
12 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 38	Jan. 24	Summary No. 3, period ending 23rd January ...	56
13 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 46	Jan. 31	Summary No. 4, period ending 30th January ...	58
14 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 54	Feb. 7	Summary No. 5, period ending 6th February ...	61

12432 [27851]

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
15 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 68	1944. Feb. 14	Summary No. 6, period ending 13th February ...	62
16 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 79	Feb. 21	Summary No. 7, period ending 20th February ...	66
17 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 92	Feb. 28	Summary No. 8, period ending 27th February ...	68
18 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 116	Mar. 13	Summary No. 10, period ending 12th March ...	71
19 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 125	Mar. 20	Summary No. 11, period ending 19th March ...	73
<b>Chapter IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.</b>			
20 Mr. Jordan ... No. 21	1944. Feb. 15 (Jedda)	Political situation in Saudi Arabia ... Annual report for the year 1943	75
<b>Chapter V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.</b>			
21 Sir E. Spears ... (Beirut)	1943. Dec. 22	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	80
22 Sir E. Spears ... No. 85	Dec. 17	Syrian Constitution ... Observations on the debate in the Syrian Chamber on the terms of the Constitution. Demand for complete sovereignty of the Syrian people. Refusal to recognise the mandate	83
23 To Sir E. Spears ... No. 7	1944. Jan. 12	Lebanese independence ... Instructions to His Majesty's Representative regarding the views of His Majesty's Government on this question	85
24 Sir E. Spears ...	1943. Dec. 29	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	87
25 Sir E. Spears ...	1944. Jan. 5	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	90
26 Sir E. Spears ...	Jan. 12	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	93
27 Sir E. Spears ...	Jan. 19	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	95
28 Sir E. Spears ...	Jan. 26	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	98
29 Sir E. Spears ...	Feb. 2	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	102
30 Sir E. Spears ...	Feb. 9	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	103
31 Sir E. Spears ...	Feb. 16	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	107
32 Sir E. Spears ...	Feb. 23	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	111
33 Sir E. Spears ...	Mar. 1	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	115
34 Sir E. Spears ...	Mar. 8	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon ... Weekly political summary	119



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
Chapter VI.—GENERAL.			
35 Sir E. Spears No. 5	1944. Jan. 21	Lebanese attitude towards Arab Federation ... Text of Consul-General Furlonge's despatch to Sir E. Spears. Conversation with Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding his recent visit to Egypt. Identity of views of Egypt and the Lebanon towards question of Arab Federation	123
36 Sir E. Spears No. 10	Feb. 8	Frontiers of the Lebanon... Memorandum by Col. G. W. Furlonge	124

## SUBJECT INDEX.

(The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.)

AFGHANISTAN— Political situation.—1.	SAUDIA ARABIA— Political situation.—20.
IRAQ— Internal situation: Barzan.—3. Political situation.—2, 4, 5.	SYRIA AND THE LEBANON— Constitution, The.—22. Lebanese independence.—23. Weekly political summaries.—21, 24-34.
PERSIA— Foreign policy and relations: Great Britain.—8. Political situation.—6, 7, 9. Trade: Weekly political summaries.—10-19.	GENERAL— Lebanese attitude towards Arab Federation.—35. Frontiers of the Lebanon.—36.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

## CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 56.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1944.

## CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 951/951/97]

No. 1.

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th February.)*(No. 9. Confidential.)  
Sir,

Kabul, 28th January, 1944.

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch, dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a political review of Afghanistan during the year 1943.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration, and to His Majesty's Consuls, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &amp;c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Political Review for 1943.*

THE year 1942 left the Afghan Government in a state of perplexity. Reports had it that they, or at least the younger members of the Government, had been making overtures to our enemies as a reinsurance against an Axis victory which seemed not impossible. The closing months of the year, however, brought the defeat of Rommel in Libya and the German disaster at Stalingrad with the probability forecast for 1943 by Sir Francis Wylie "that the Afghan Government would resume their rôle of careful if somewhat nervous spectators of events." And they needed to be watchful, for our enemies were busy intriguing to cause us and our Russian Allies embarrassment on our frontiers as soon as the psychological moment should arrive. We know now that intrigues against Russia were in the hands of the German Legation while those being carried on on the Indian border were mainly the responsibility of the Italians. The German intrigues involved an attempt to use certain refugees from Bukhara to stir up trouble in Soviet Turkestan. The conspiracy was, however, discovered in early April by the Afghan Government and was broken up by numerous arrests. At the same time, the Italian Legation was sending considerable sums of money to the Faqir of Ipi in order to encourage him to create trouble for us on the Indian frontier. As it was felt that these conspiracies were not being handled sufficiently firmly by the Afghan Government in spite of their knowledge of what was going on, it was decided that the British Legation, in conjunction with the Soviet Embassy, should make a joint *démarche* demanding the arrest of certain individuals and *inter alia* the gradual reduction in the personnel of the



offending legations. These demands were made at the end of May and accepted, though with a very bad grace, by the Afghan Government. It was not, however, until the end of October that they were complied with sufficiently to enable the case to be considered closed.

2. Meanwhile, the German offensive against the Caucasus had made no progress. The Axis had been driven out of North Africa and Sicily, and early in October Italy collapsed. By this time it was clear that the Axis had lost all chance of winning the war. The Italian Government became co-belligerent with the Allies and the Italian Legation in Kabul was directed by the Badoglio Government to give us any information regarding its former activities which we might require. These revelations threw much light on the Axis intrigues and it is interesting to compare the statement made by the Prime Minister to Sir Francis Wylie at an interview on the 18th February (Kabul Express Letter No. C-22/41 of the 20th February, 1943) with the information given later by the Italian Minister. The Prime Minister had assured Sir Francis Wylie that "he had done his level best to discourage anti-British movements of every sort on the frontier; as soon as he detected any Afghan intriguing against Britain he had put him straight into jail. He had, at the present moment, practically every single individual who might be of the slightest danger to us in safe custody. The Axis Ministers, even though they might have diplomatic privilege, were in little better shape." Signor Quaroni has stated that, despite his best efforts, he failed to achieve anything on account of the consistent and determined opposition of the Prime Minister, that whenever he had, with difficulty, established contact with the Faqir of Ipi his links had been arrested and his efforts frustrated. His one success had been the despatch of his secretary, Signor Anzilotti, to interview the Faqir of Ipi in June 1942, an escapade for which the Prime Minister had never forgiven him.

3. But the certainty that the United Nations would now win the war brought fresh anxiety to the Afghan Government. What would be the fate of Afghanistan in the post-war world with a victorious Russia on her northern border and a Britain, friendly with Russia, to the south. Already on the banks of the Oxus River there were signs of increased Russian activities. What did this portend? It was too much to hope that Britain would intervene. Was there any chance of America doing so? At any rate America was worth cultivating; but as the United States and Great Britain seemed especially in Afghanistan to be working in the closest harmony a policy of playing off one country against the other was unlikely to succeed and a policy of cultivating them both equally seemed to be the most likely to produce good results. The Tehran Conference of December, with its Three-Power guarantee of the integrity of Persia, was a good augury and showed clearly that this policy was right, and the year ended on a rising note of confidence in the future.

4. 1943 has, in fact, brought about in Afghanistan, in its own small way, as complete a change as has come over the face of the world war. The year began in doubt and anxiety with reports of flirtations with the Axis and of the supply to them of information on a small scale, as a reinsurance against their possible victory. Protestations of friendship for Britain were, indeed, made, but there was a marked unwillingness to give any concrete evidence of trust. Gradually, however, with the increased certainty of an Allied victory these fears were dispelled and the Afghans are now no longer afraid to show their friendship in deeds as well as in words. The crew of a British aircraft, which made a forced landing near Jalalabad in June, were, after friendly negotiations, released from internment in the middle of October; new commercial regulations, which were aimed against Indian traders, have been recently modified; and two British textile experts have been engaged and are at work in Kabul and at Kandahar. There is an increasing demand to learn English. The Prime Minister and the Afghan Government are taking a great interest in Basic English and three English professors have now been asked for to teach in one of the principal colleges in Kabul. Even more significant perhaps is the conclusion, through the intermediary of the U.K.C.C., of a contract to supply 10,000 tons of Afghan wool to the U.S.S.R., a transaction at which the Afghan Government might well have boggled earlier in the year, as the wool will, in fact, replace an equivalent amount which His Majesty's Government were previously under an obligation to supply to Russia. Never, in fact, in all its relations with Great Britain has the Afghan Government been so forthcoming.

5. There are still questions to be settled before relations between His Majesty's Government and Afghanistan can be placed upon a basis of real friendship and mutual trust. These must, for the most part, await the end of the

war. There is a long road to be travelled before the Afghan people can be brought to share the friendly sentiments of their Government. But the Government realise their obligations in the matter and are believed, as a beginning, to be now taking one of the most essential steps which is to free their educational curriculum from any undue anti-British bias. In the interests of neutrality and in order to prevent Afghans from being drawn into either belligerent camp, severe restrictions have been placed on their contacts with foreign legations, which may be visited by only a very limited number of senior officials. The British Legation has suffered with the rest and the legation hospital is still out-of-bounds to Afghan subjects. The treatment of deserters from the Indian Army and of Indian prisoners in Afghan jails is still far from satisfactory, though the Afghan attitude to this troublesome question is showing a slight improvement and discussions are still continuing. The two British Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad suffer from the same restrictions that have been the rule with foreign legations in Kabul. But in both places conditions, as a result of the war situation, have been reported to be much improved.

6. Afghan relations with foreign Powers show further developments during the year. The first Afghan Minister to Washington was appointed in February and left soon after with, it is believed, instructions to arrange for the engagement of American technicians, especially engineers, for the exploitation of Afghanistan's oil and other mineral resources, and for the extension generally of commercial relations. Negotiations with China which had been hanging fire since early in 1942 were brought to a conclusion in Angora in October 1943 and will involve in due course a treaty of friendship between the two countries, the opening of legations in Chungking and Kabul and the establishment of an Afghan Consulate in Sinkiang. Their relations with Turkey have always been of special importance to the Afghan Government who have always watched with close attention the Turkish attitude towards the war. In 1942 when it looked as if Russia might possibly collapse the Afghan Government despatched F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) as a special representative to Angora, probably to act as an additional observer of events and possibly to negotiate with the Germans should they succeed in breaking through the Russian defences. He was withdrawn in April 1943 when a German advance into the Middle East seemed no longer likely.

7. In Kabul relations with the Axis Missions have remained correct but not too cordial. The Afghans dislike the Italian Minister and were highly incensed at the discovery of the Axis intrigues to which I have already referred. As a result of these intrigues and of our subsequent *démarche*, three members of the German Legation have already been repatriated and a fourth is under orders to go, as is also Signor Anzilotti of the Italian Legation. The Japanese have been more careful and appear to be confining their activities, which are considerable, to the collection of information, but there is little doubt that the Afghan Government are fully aware of what is going on and are keeping a very close watch on their doings. Four Japanese engineers who were undoubtedly engaged in espionage were also returned, at our request, to their own country, their contracts having expired.

8. Except for the three Axis Legations, there has been an almost complete change in the heads of foreign missions in Afghanistan, and Mr. Engert, the American Minister, is the only one who has remained throughout the year. His enthusiasm for Anglo-American collaboration has been of the greatest help to us. M. Koprulu, the Turkish Ambassador and doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, left Kabul in August on leave and has not yet returned. It is a pity that Turkish representatives in this country are at the moment of such inferior quality. The Soviet Ambassador left at the end of July and it is not known when his successor, M. Bakulin, will arrive. The Persian Embassy was for the first half of the year in charge of M. Ghadimi as *chargé d'affaires*, and M. Najm, the new Ambassador, only arrived at the same time as myself at the end of July. General Khalid Al Zahawi took up his appointment as Iraqi Minister in January and M. Fouad Bey as Minister for Egypt in March. They have all been consistently friendly. M. Chataigneau, the French Minister, departed in January leaving M. Cassin in charge. M. Cassin in turn left for Beirut in May and the French Archaeological Mission under M. Ghirshman was closed in September. It must be admitted that Kabul is a more peaceful place since the departure of the Fighting French.

9. There have been few changes in the Government itself during the year. In January Muhammad Nauroz Khan was brought back from Tehran, where he was Ambassador, and appointed Minister of the Interior, probably in order to relieve the Prime Minister of work. In spite of a somewhat unprepossessing



appearance the new Minister is reported to have some ability for office work. Abdul Majid Khan (W.W. 73), Minister of National Economy, is still abroad though he has moved from Berlin to Switzerland. His Ministry is in temporary charge of Sirdar Muhammad Naim Khan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, who is apparently being trained to become Prime Minister in due course in succession to his uncle. In pursuance of this policy Muhammad Naim Khan carried out an important and extensive tour of the country during the autumn. But his tour was cut short by the sudden illness of the Prime Minister in November, which for a time caused acute anxiety. Fortunately the Prime Minister is now on the road to recovery, and though until the end of the year he had not left his room the administration of the country does not appear to have been much affected.

10. Internal peace has on the whole been well maintained. In spite of the Axis intrigues with the Faqir of Ipi, the Indian frontier has remained unusually quiet though the Afghan Government sought to secure themselves against hostility from Ipi by maintaining friendly relations with him and avoiding interference with his activities on the British side of the border. There have been sporadic tribal quarrels in the Southern Province which the Afghan Government have failed to control, but these had only local significance. In the autumn there was a spate of robberies on the roads which are usually so safe. Stern action was successful in restoring security, and the close of the year seems to have found the Yahya Khel at least as firmly in control of the country as ever before. The Amanullah party seem to be losing what little importance they ever had, and Axis intrigues in Europe with the ex-King (which incidentally were quite incompatible with those set on foot by their own legations in Afghanistan) seem to have done his cause and that of his sponsors more harm than good. In fact, in the absence of any rival claimant to authority in the country and of serious tribal disturbances on either side of the Indo-Afghan border the barometer for 1944 seems to be set fair. The economic condition of the country, thanks largely to the forethought and generosity of the Government of India in maintaining as large a flow of supplies as possible has remained surprisingly stable, and the inevitable dearth and scarcity of imported articles is to some extent off-set by the abundance of cheap grain as a result of a bumper harvest. On the whole the Afghan Government can congratulate themselves on having safely weathered a difficult year.

11. The fair outlook for 1944 must not of course blind us to the possibilities of trouble which are ever present in this country. The Prime Minister's health is precarious and that of his brother, the Minister of Defence, is none too good. Nor are the Royal Family a happy team, and reports of differences of opinion between the Minister of Defence and his nephew, Sirdar Muhammad Daud Khan, are too persistent to be entirely ignored. In spite of their fourteen years of power the present dynasty have not succeeded in acquiring the loyalty and affection of the country, though recent efforts to achieve this object, such as Sirdar Muhammad Naim Khan's tour to which I have already referred, seem to have met with some measure of success. A single bad harvest or the failure of His Majesty's Government and Government of India to ensure the punctual arrival of essential supplies might cause a serious and rapid deterioration in the economic condition leading to tribal unrest and widespread disturbances. The end of the war may well see also the end of the unusual docility of the border tribes, causing trouble which may spread beyond tribal limits. We have still to maintain a careful watch against the unforeseen, but never altogether unexpected, in Afghanistan, while endeavouring to encourage any tendencies which make for stability and ordered progress.

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 519/37/93]

No. 2.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th January.)*

(No. 20.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, 13th January, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 12th November, 1943, an account of the chief events that have taken place in Iraq during the last two months.

2. The Regent returned on the 12th December from his official visit to the United Kingdom. His Royal Highness was delighted with the kindly welcome which he received everywhere he went, and especially pleased with the gracious friendship shown to him by the King and Queen while he was Their Majesties' guest at Buckingham Palace. On his arrival in Bagdad he was given a very hearty reception by the people of the capital, who thronged both sides of the streets through which he drove from the airport to the palace in company with the young King and the Amir Said.

3. The extraordinary session of Parliament which began on the 9th October was prorogued on the 30th November and the ordinary session for 1943/44 was opened by the Acting Regent on the 1st December. I have already reported by telegram the chief points of the unusually long speech from the throne, and need not recapitulate them here. The ambitious programme of administrative activity which it contained was well received in the press and by the public, though the latter, with some reason, are reported to have voiced doubts whether any considerable portion of the programme would, in fact, be carried out. The promises of a new electoral law and of encouragement for the setting up of responsible political parties aroused especial interest. The young men of the Left wing were pleased with the prospect of greater scope for political ability and have hopes of stronger representation when the next elections are held.

4. The arrest of the Lebanese President, Prime Minister and Cabinet on the 11th November by the French authorities in the Levant provoked a strong reaction in Iraq. All classes resented this action as an attack on the established liberties of the Lebanese State and despised it as an exhibition of clumsy brutality by a nation which, with its own country still occupied by an enemy army, is in their view little fitted to lord it over others. There was at once a demand for action to support the Lebanese Government. The Senate and the Chamber held special meetings on the 13th November, at which resolutions were passed and communicated to all the Allied and neutral Governments, protesting against the suspension of the Lebanese Constitution and the arrest of the President and members of the Government. At the same time the newspapers called upon the Allied Governments to intervene to compel the French National Committee to respect the pledges given to Syria and the Lebanon and to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Acting Regent also made formal protests to myself and the United States Chargé d'Affaires.

5. The release and reinstatement of the President, the freeing of the arrested Cabinet Ministers on the 22nd November and their subsequent resumption of office brought tension to an end, but profound mistrust of French motives and methods remains. What is known of the part played by His Majesty's Government and what is guessed of what went on behind the scenes has generally redounded to the credit of Britain, but there are always a few people who are too clever to accept the obvious and who have ascribed a variety of Machiavellian motives to our policy during the Lebanese crisis.

6. The Iraqi Government were wise enough to restrain, rather than excite, public opinion. Demonstrations were prohibited and the exuberance of the press checked, but both the Government and thinking people have found in the Lebanese struggle with the French new and cogent reasons for closer political co-operation among the Arab States.

7. The Colonial Secretary's statement on the 10th November, that the 31,000 Jewish immigrants who could legally enter Palestine before the end of March 1944 will be allowed to enter after the expiry of the time-limit, was received in Iraq without adverse comment. I must emphasise that the reactions here, in Egypt and elsewhere to the Lebanese crisis illustrate clearly what is to be expected on a far graver scale if or when trouble starts in Palestine.



8. Soon after the Regent's return from his visit to the United Kingdom the Prime Minister took up with His Royal Highness the question of reforming his Cabinet. The discussions continued for some time, but the many permutations and combinations that were considered had only ephemeral interest and need no permanent record. The new Cabinet was eventually formed on the 26th December with the following members:—

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence: Nuri al Said.  
Deputy Prime Minister: Taufiq Suwaidi.  
Foreign Affairs: Mahmud Subhi al Daftari.  
Interior: Umar Nadhmi.  
Finance: Ali Mumtaz.  
Justice: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.  
Communications and Works: Sadiq al Bassam.  
Education: Abdul Illah Hafidh.  
Economics: Salman al Barrak.  
Social Affairs: Muhammad Hassan Kubbi.  
Minister without Portfolio: Majid Mustafa.

9. The novel features of the new Cabinet, made possible by the recent amendment to the Organic Law, are the inclusion of a Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister without Portfolio. I think Nuri Pasha chose Taufiq Suwaidi in the hope that he would relieve him of a lot of parliamentary work, but I fear that Taufiq will prove to be an uneasy colleague and I shall be surprised if he does not, before long, try to squeeze Nuri out. There are others, too, in the Cabinet who would be willing to take part in an intrigue of this kind. Majid Mustafa is a genuine Kurd and has the special task of appeasing the Kurdish areas and redressing their administrative grievances. Most of the other members have been chosen for their former experience, or for their skill in debate, while Mohammad Hassan Kubba is a new recruit to fill the usual Shiah quota of three Ministers. He has won a good reputation as a judge. No progressive men have been introduced and as a whole the Cabinet represents the old ruling class of established families rather than any of the new elements now knocking at the door of public life. The return of Salman al Barrak to the Cabinet left the office of President of the Chamber vacant. It was filled a few days later when a large majority of the Deputies voted for the Shiah Deputy, Saiyid Ridha Shababi. Only a few days after the new Cabinet had been got together the Prime Minister told me that the Regent had been criticising its members. His Royal Highness was in particular dissatisfied with the inclusion of Taufiq Suwadi, Ali Mumtaz and to a lesser extent Muhammad Hassan Kubba. In reply Nuri Pasha had, he said, suggested that it was only fair to give the new Ministers a chance until, say, the end of March when, if His Royal Highness was not satisfied, the Cabinet could resign. He had, however, begged the Regent to be sure that a better Cabinet could be formed before he broke up the existing combination.

10. The public reception given to the new Cabinet was far from good, though the reasons for its immediate unpopularity are not easy to see. In make up it is hardly distinguishable from innumerable earlier Cabinets and its promise, if no better, is no worse than the average of its predecessors. I am left to suppose that political enlightenment is spreading and that the Iraqi public are now applying more exacting tests to their Cabinets than were customary in the past. This in some ways is all to the good, but I fear that they will find it difficult to discover a body of Ministers who will come up to these new standards.

11. In Parliament, too, the Cabinet have had to face much criticism. The assault was launched during the debate on the reply to the Speech from the Throne which opened on the 3rd January and ended on the 6th January. In the Chamber bitter personal attacks were made on members of the Cabinet and every point of the Speech from the Throne was hotly discussed. In the Senate the constitutional legality of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister was the chief bone of contention, but there also many members found the opportunity convenient to mount their own particular hobby-horses and tilt at the Government. It is too early yet to assess what, if any, serious damage the Cabinet have sustained by these onslaughts, but with the Regent ill-disposed towards them and determined opponents in both Houses of Parliament the immediate outlook for the Administration is not bright. The continued indisposition of the Prime Minister is an additional handicap. He left for sanatorium treatment at Haifa on the 10th January and in his absence Taufiq Suwaidi, who has none of Nuri's personal popularity, will probably find his position as head of the Government anything but easy. In conversation with the Regent and other local personalities I have urged

that the country needs more than anything a period of political stability enabling Ministers to grasp the work of their departments and so get down to constructive action on the many problems awaiting attention. While His Royal Highness has reluctantly agreed to give the present Cabinet a trial, I fear it will be many years before Iraqis as a whole acquire sufficient public spirit to place country before self.

12. Three new Senators were appointed on the 30th December, Muhammad Amin Zaki, the veteran Kurdish politician, who has frequently held a Cabinet position; Muhammad Saihud, a wealthy tribal leader of Kut; and Abdul Razzaq al Mir, a notable of Basra.

13. In my despatch No. 397 of November 1943, I reported the frank talk that I had had with the Prime Minister about the deplorable decline in the administration of the country. Since then I have lost no opportunity of impressing upon his Excellency and other Iraqi personalities the urgent need of improving this state of affairs. The necessity for remedial measures with outside help is now widely accepted, but Nuri Pasha has been confronted, when considering bringing about reforms through the employment of British officers in the administrative inspectorate, by the very real difficulty of finding suitable men. To overcome this obstacle I proposed in early January that the existing political advisory staff created in 1941 might carry out in addition to its ordinary duties those of administrative inspection under the Ministry of the Interior for a provisional period of six months. The Cabinet are now studying this offer.

14. The Edmonds Committee on internees finished their work early in December. Their recommendations were adopted and on the 6th December, two days before the great festival of 'Id al Adha, it was officially announced that fifty-one men had been released from the internment camp at Amara. I should perhaps mention here that the publicity attending the release from prison in the United Kingdom of the Moseley couple will not make it easier for me to resist the importunities of local politicians who would like to open the gates of Amara.

15. I am pleased to be able to report that on this occasion no untoward incidents attended the committee's work and no attempt was made by any highly placed persons to influence the committee's recommendations.

16. During November the Prime Minister discussed with me the question of the return to Iraq of the Iraqi internees now in Southern Rhodesia. The upshot of our talks was that the Iraqi Government formally renewed their request for the surrender of all of these internees and gave me a written assurance that those not tried and sentenced for their offences would be interned again in Iraq. The Prime Minister also confirmed to me orally that all his colleagues agreed to this policy. When the Cabinet was changed at the end of December the Prime Minister again obtained the agreement of all the Ministers to the resolution adopted by their predecessors concerning these men.

17. For nearly a month after the fighting that ended on the 11th November there were no further engagements with the tribesmen in the Barzan area. The Iraqi army detachments remained in their camps and the tribesmen took no offensive action. On the 7th December, however, a strong tribal force opened an attack on a police post at Shaitana, situated about 3 miles off the Ruwanduz-Mergasur road, just to the north of Mazna. The post surrendered after holding out for only three days, though the garrison had suffered no casualties. The tribesmen are reported to have obtained twenty-three rifles, one light automatic and 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition from this post.

18. On the 8th December a small body of about ten to twelve policemen under an inspector was ambushed while moving from Sideka police post to Diyana. Most of them were killed after a spirited fight and about two days later the Barzani tribesmen began an attack on Kani Rash, the nahiyah headquarters of the Baradost nahiyah. About the same time sporadic attacks were started on the Iraqi Army camp at Mergasur.

19. In the meanwhile, the Assyrians who make up the bulk of the inhabitants of the village of Diyana, situated near Ruwanduz, had become anxious for their safety, and on the 10th December it was arranged in agreement with the Prime Minister, the Air Officer Commanding and General Headquarters, Persia/Iraq Force, that the Area Liaison Officer at Arbil should proceed to Diyana with four Royal Air Force armoured cars to give them confidence. A week later a small force consisting of four more Royal Air Force armoured cars, a company of British-Indian infantry, one mortar platoon and one Bren-carrier platoon was sent up to provide protection for both Diyana and the neighbouring village of Balikian. The arrival of these troops had an immediately steadying effect, and they were warmly welcomed by the inhabitants.



20. On the 14th December the Prime Minister, anxious to be conciliatory, persuaded Shaikh Ahmad Barzan (brother of Mulla Mustafa) to send his own son with a message informing Mulla Mustafa that if he would leave the area of hostilities and go elsewhere to live quietly until next spring, he would then be pardoned and permitted to return to live in his own villages. The reply received a week later was a refusal, and it was evident that Mulla Mustafa's recent successes had put him into an exalted mood. I thereupon thought it well with your authority to send him a warning that the situation in the Barzan area was becoming an embarrassment to the war effort of His Majesty's Government, and that if he continued his present disorderly activities, they would be obliged to consider his intentions as unfriendly and act accordingly. I received a reply on the 29th December. After reiterating his readiness at all times to obey the British Government, for whom he expressed his deep affection in eloquent terms, he went on to refer to his grievances and to appeal to me to "instruct" the Iraqi Government to pardon him and to release the other Barzan Chieftains and their followers now detained at Hilla. If this were done he pledged himself to keep the peace and maintain order. The composition of his letter was involved, but it was clear Mulla Mustafa sought to be left in undisturbed control of the Barzan tribal area. For the present I have thought it best not to continue the correspondence, but in a long talk which I had with Majid Mustafa, the new Kurdish Minister without Portfolio, on the 31st December, I explained Mulla Mustafa's attitude and discussed at length the chief aspects of the tribal situation in the North. Majid Mustafa indicated that his first aim would be to try to conclude an agreement which would end hostilities. He set out from Bagdad on the 1st January with the intention of going to Arbil to study the situation and to get into touch with many Kurdish Chiefs who are personal friends and thus to make direct contact with Mulla Mustafa. On the 5th January the officer commanding at Mergasur reported the receipt of a letter, in which Mulla Mustafa had stated that he would withdraw his men from the vicinity of Kani Rash and Mergasur, and would be pleased to meet Majid Mustafa at the latter place.

21. Colonel Bayliss (formerly of the Middle East Supply Centre) was appointed Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council and Director-General of Imports on the 22nd November with a staff of five officers, each of whom is in charge of a section of the reorganised Directorate-General of Imports with the title of Controller and with executive powers. At the instigation of Colonel Bayliss several new committees have been established including a Price Control Committee and a Traders Co-ordination Committee, Colonel Bayliss being chairman in each case. The second committee reflects the policy of the new directorate to keep in close touch with merchants, and to use trade channels as far as possible for distribution. The formation of a Joint Anglo-American-Iraqi Committee for the Co-ordination of Importing Supplies is under consideration, and may shortly be approved by the Government despite some opposition. Such a committee would, of course, facilitate tasks such as the screening of import requirements and the supervision of controls over imported goods. A further contemplated development is the establishment of a Ministry of Supply, in which supply organisations at present scattered over several Ministries will be concentrated. The further steps taken, since Colonel Bayliss's appointment, to control the prices of imported goods are best set out chronologically.

22. On the 25th November the Ministry of Finance published a notification calling upon all importers and wholesale and retail dealers in cotton and wollen goods of all kinds, both new and second hand, to register their stocks, and ordering the suspension of all wholesale dealing in those goods until further notice. A similar notification was published on the same day concerning tea and coffee.

23. On the 15th December a notification was published by the Price Control Committee fixing retail prices for the principal varieties of cotton cloth, grey cloth, white cloth, prints and flannelettes. This was followed soon afterwards by similar notifications fixing the prices of tea and coffee, second-hand clothing, certain steel building materials, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons and electric bulbs. Explanatory statements accompanied these notifications, making it clear in simple language their intention and scope, and calling upon the public to co-operate with the authorities in giving effect to the steps that were being taken to bring down prices. Heavy penalties were prescribed for retailers who refused to sell at the official prices.

24. At the same time the Ministry of Finance put out notifications subjecting all commercial imports, whether by land or sea (other than those of the Oil Companies holding concessions from the Iraqi Government) to licences and making it in addition necessary to obtain from the Director-General of Imports a

special permit for the release from Customs of all imported goods. The intention is to issue permits only when the Director-General is satisfied that the goods in question will be distributed at reasonable prices.

25. Tea and coffee were rationed with effect from the 1st January, the allowance being a monthly total of 90 grammes of both with a maximum of 60 grammes of tea for each member of a town family and 70 grammes a month for each member of a family living in the country with a maximum of 40 grammes of tea. It is too early yet to assess the efficacy of the scheme, but the first reaction of the public has been severe criticism of the small ration and the difficulty of securing rationed supplies immediately.

26. The general effect of these measures was, firstly to cause a large number of retailers to hide their stocks of controlled price goods, and secondly to bring about a run on those shops where the fixed prices were decently observed. In a few days tea, coffee and cloth of the controlled varieties were unobtainable in the bazaars of most towns and dealing was soon restricted to the black market where the prices rose rapidly. This state of affairs will, it may be hoped, be relieved so soon as arrangements are made for the proper distribution and sale of existing wholesale stocks which at present remain frozen. The most difficult problem will be equitable and efficient distribution especially in the provinces owing to the deterioration in the administrative machine mentioned in paragraph 13 above and the lack of experienced and honest supply officials. Despite directives to Mutasarrifs and explanatory statements in the press, there is inevitably much confusion over the rationing schemes, and it is being demonstrated once again that a scheme which is logical and carefully worked out on paper encounters many pitfalls and much obstruction in application in this country. Nevertheless Colonel Bayliss and his staff are tackling their difficult task with great energy and resource, so much so that their pace is at times proving too fast for the local tempo. It is, of course, highly important that they should be successful since we have to all intents and purposes imposed them on the Iraqis, and any failures on their part will reflect on British prestige here. Partly for this reason I am particularly glad to see that assistance is likely to be forthcoming over supplies of textiles from the United Kingdom and the United States to supplement the depleted local stocks and to facilitate the proposed rationing scheme. For the rest, neither I nor my staff have hesitated to advise Colonel Bayliss of the danger of "blitz" tactics in matters of this complexity and have at all times urged him to cultivate the assistance of the British advisers, the political advisory staff and other co-operative elements.

27. There is now more transport available for the movement of grain in the northern areas. On the Kurkuk-Sulaimani line progress has however been slow, largely owing to inadequate co-ordination between the supply and transport departments. Remedies are being applied, but it is to be feared that the available supplies of grain in these northern villages of the Sulaimani Liwa is far from sufficient for food and winter sowings.

28. The purchases of barley by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and their agents at the end of November, amounted to about 183,000 tons, and no further purchases have since been made pending conclusion of negotiations with one of the agents regarding additional purchases. At present, therefore, there is a balance of only 17,000 tons to make up the first target of 200,000 tons. Negotiations are proceeding on the assumption that substantial quantities can be bought at considerably lower prices than the present price of L.D. 20/500 per ton. Opinion is conflicting on this point. If, however, the time factor is disregarded and supply requirements permit the U.K.C.C. and/or the grain firms to play a waiting game it seems to be generally agreed that more barley could be secured at lower, but not drastically reduced, prices.

29. An official delegation representing the Syrian Government arrived in Bagdad on the 29th December. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Janil Mardam, led the delegation; the members were Abdul Rahman Kaiyali, Minister of Justice, Adnam Atassi, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Syrian Chamber, Ali Haidar al Rikabi, secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After a week's stay, during which they were the guests of honour at a large number of official and private functions, the delegation left Bagdad on the 7th January by rail to return home via Mosul and Aleppo.

30. According to Nuri Pasha his discussions with Jamil Mardam on Arab unity resulted in agreement between the two Premiers to work for the realisation of the Arab League envisaged in Nuri Pasha's letter to Mr. Casey last summer. I myself very much doubt, however, whether the Syrian Government are yet ready to go anything like so far towards federation as is contemplated in that document.



31. Mr. Loy W. Henderson presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States on the 20th November. He is the first American Minister of this rank accredited to the Iraqi Government. His predecessors were only Ministers Resident. Relations with the American Legation continue to be most friendly and helpful.

32. Christmas provided numberless Iraqis with a new opportunity to express their good will towards their British Ally. Many subscribed handsomely to the fund which my wife and I opened to provide presents for the sailors, soldiers, airmen and merchant navy seamen in this command, hundreds sent telegrams and cards of greeting and good wishes to myself and members of my staff and official friendship was symbolised by a huge party given by the Prime Minister and the Iraqi Government to seven hundred British soldiers at the Town Hall, Bagdad. Addressing his guests the Prime Minister said "This happy gathering will I trust be a symbol of the unity and mutual understanding of our peoples which will endure long after this war has been brought to an end." The King and the Regent sent greetings and good wishes to the guests, and the Queen-Mother gave beautifully iced cakes for the Christmas party at Noah's Ark, one of the troops' restaurants run by voluntary workers from the British civil community. All these gestures were spontaneous expressions of friendly feeling, and make a happy contrast with the state of public opinion in this country at the beginning of 1941. At the same time, and while I do not doubt that Anglophobia is now at a heavy discount in educated circles, it may perhaps be wise to temper our satisfaction over this gratifying state of affairs by not forgetting that anxiety to be on the winning side is a striking feature of the Arab character.

33. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Angora, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, General Headquarters India, General Headquarters, Middle East, Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 1047/26/93]

No. 3.

*Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th February.)*

(No. 57.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 1st February, 1944.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of the 27th January, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of Majid Mustafa's report to the Cabinet on the situation in Barzan, a copy of which he left with me after a recent visit.

2. His "Recommendations for Improving Conditions" have, he tells me, been accepted by the Cabinet in all essentials and he is himself ready to go back to the north in a few days' time to give personal attention to putting them into effect.

3. The somewhat difficult questions of the pardoning of Mulla Mustafa's followers and the surrender of the arms taken by them from the police are, as you will see from paragraph (e) of the Minister's paper, in effect left for future settlement. He himself is confident, however, of being able to recover in due course a considerable number of the weapons lost to the tribesmen. The subordinate leaders he hopes, I think, to have treated individually and sympathetically on their merits, after he has had time to study their records and sort out the sheep from the goats.

4. Meanwhile, he is thinking hard about what general measures are necessary to improve social and economic conditions in the Kurdish districts and is consulting the opinion of the Kurdish Deputies, the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, the Political Adviser, Northern Iraq, and others having special knowledge of Kurdish affairs.

5. If the vicissitudes of Iraq's political life allow him to remain at his post for a reasonable period, I hope that at least some measure of success will attend his efforts.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, Cairo.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 3.

*Majid Mustafa's report to the Council of Ministers.*

*Barzan Question.*

(Translation.)

I HAVE already orally communicated to the Council the result of my personal observations and my views as to how best to deal with the Barzan question. In my oral statements I pointed out that my exposition of the question did not cover all the problems and matters which called for examination and remedy throughout the north. Similarly, my present report is confined to a discussion of the Barzan question only. If required, I can on some other occasion submit another report dealing with other problems of the north.

Information available with certain official departments and other obtained from persons, other than officials, interested in or associated with the events (? in Barzan) indicate that the latest Barzan incident arose and developed as follows:—

1. Some time after the end of the first Barzan movement Mulla Mustafa al Barzani and the rest of Barzan leaders were removed to Sulaimani to reside there. Throughout their stay in Sulaimani they were so badly treated that the Government itself eventually felt that it was necessary to improve their condition. Owing to the smallness of their allowances and to the high cost of commodities the Mulla and his companions were in a state of extreme need. The Government, however, failed to do anything to improve their lot. Both the Government and most of those who came into contact with the exiles were aware that the latter had reached such a state of needfulness and financial hardship as was likely to induce them to resort to criminal acts. That such was the case is confirmed by certain statements of Mulla Mustafa himself in his numerous and strong representations and by certain reports. It was realised that failing any result to his representations Mulla Mustafa would be sure to attempt escape. At the same time fear from the Government and doubt of his succeeding in regaining personal control of his district, on one hand, and his brothers' opposition to his views, on the other hand, were among the stronger factors which at the time restrained Mulla Mustafa from carrying out his project. Eventually, however, bad administration in the northern liwas and the underlying factors afforded opportunity to many, including Mulla Mustafa, to decide their future by themselves. Feeling confident of the success of his contemplated attempt and having fallen into despair, Mulla Mustafa eventually made his escape.

2. Mulla Mustafa succeeded in reaching the Barzan district within a short time of his escape from Sulaimani. For some time he kept moving about the district, avoiding armed clashes and at the same time seeking to get into touch with the administrative authorities for the purpose of obtaining what he had been seeking to obtain while in exile. To that end he made threats with his ability to raise a force with which to offer resistance to the Government and with the harm that would follow if no attention was paid to his representations.

3. In their inability to appreciate the situation and the likely consequences, the administrative and police authorities in the Mosul and Arbil liwas did not attach due importance to the matter, nor did they take preparatory steps for the suppression of Mulla Mustafa's movement before assuming serious proportions.

The administrative authorities also failed to take into due account factors of which advantage was taken by Mulla Mustafa, and which proved helpful to him, such as the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with the Government and with the acts and conduct of officials. As a result, the prestige of Mulla Mustafa grew and he gained general support. It was established to me that throughout his period of office and throughout the operations in their various stages the Mutassarif of Mosul never made one single visit to Barzan district. The same



is true in the case of the Mutessarif of Arbil. It is natural that other officials and the police should copy the example of these two mutessarifs. Strange as it may seem, I found out that grain allotted for the inhabitants of hill districts, as assistance for food and cultivation purposes, remained undistributed; whereas this grain could have been distributed as means for stopping a no small number of tribes from joining the movement. Moreover, I came to understand that the usual allotments of grain and sugar for that district were not reaching those to whom they are intended, except, however, in the case of certain favoured persons. I do not relate these facts by way of criticising any person in particular, but do so only in order to prove the neglect on the part of officials, in the liwas and districts, in matters of State administration and supervision of the conduct of junior officials and matters concerning the condition of the inhabitants. Many other factors and also considerable propaganda exist which have considerably helped to increase the followers of Mulla Mustafa and sympathy with his cause, and encouraged the Mulla and his followers to persist in their rebel activities. I must here point out in particular one strong factor which has worked to strengthen the determination of the Mulla and his followers to resist. This was the initial failure on the part of the police to prove themselves an organised Government force.

4. Both at the outbreak of the movement and in the course of its development the central Government failed to establish unity of command and responsibility (? in the force detailed to suppress the movement—translator), and as a result confusion characterised actions and views.

5. To summarise, the present conditions in the north in general and in the Barzan district in particular are bad. That the case is so is the result of misconduct, careless thinking and lack of sense of responsibility on the part of responsible "Government men" (? statesmen) and Government officials in the liwas and at headquarters. Therefore, I suggest that it would be wise for the Government to deal with the present situation by stopping further errors and rectifying old ones, and in their conduct of affairs to seek radical reforms calculated to yield for them results such as would not force upon them difficulties and sacrifices both moral and material. Before making any recommendations I give the Government below a concise general idea of present conditions in the Barzan district:—

- (a) Villages are empty of their inhabitants, some being in a state of ruin.
- (b) No trace of cultivation is to be found throughout the whole district.
- (c) Famine and destitution prevail among the inhabitants on a horrible scale.
- (d) Roads and means of communication are destroyed. So also are most Government buildings. The few undestroyed buildings are occupied by the army.
- (e) Sympathy with the exiled chiefs is considerable. This sympathy is among the main factors rallying the tribes to Mulla Mustafa and his leadership.
- (f) The complaints of the population are numerous. The people constantly enumerate the misdeeds of officials and their mishandling of situations.
- (g) I met Mulla Mustafa and the other chiefs clung to him. I found them (? still intent on) keeping themselves armed and not confident in the promises of the Government on account of their past experience of mal-administration and violation of promises. They told me that they had embarked on their rough course only because they had felt compelled to do so. They assured me of their loyalty to the Throne and the Government and of their willingness faithfully and devotedly to serve both. They said they placed their fate with the Government and her justice. I promised them that all would be well for them if they surrendered themselves unconditionally. Thereupon they gave in and went out to the Merga Sur garrison (house) and surrendered themselves, as verbally reported to you by me. I then called upon them to carry out the following terms:—

*Firstly.*—Armed clashes to be given up and the siege of posts and garrisons to be raised.

*Secondly.*—Quick co-operation to be given to the Government for the repair of roads and telephone lines.

*Thirdly.*—They, together with their families and livestock, to go back to their villages, there to engage in their normal vocations.

*Fourthly.*—Good relations should be established with army commanders and other officials in the district.

*Fifthly.*—They are to co-operate with the Government for the expeditious restoration of such posts as it may be decided to re-establish.

*Sixthly.*—Mulla Mustafa to keep away from the zone of operations; to calmly pursue his normal work, refraining from meddling in matters which are not his concern; to proceed to Bagdad, there to give himself up to His Highness the Regent in person, as soon as I shall be able to obtain the assent of His Highness to this arrangement.

I detailed three officers belonging to tribes of the district to observe the working of things and submit reports to me about the district pending a Cabinet decision in the affair. Information received hitherto confirms that the terms set out above have been observed and no action in contravention of them has taken place. It is likely for us to be confronted with some future difficulties. I, however, believe that any likely future difficulties could be overcome and peace established throughout the district if regard is had to my previous statements and the following recommendations which I make:—

#### *Recommendations for Improving Conditions.*

It may be suggested that disciplinary action against the district and re-establishment of tranquillity in it by force of arms and through imposition of fines on ringleaders might be advantageous and would serve to restore Government prestige. Ordinarily, such suggestions would appeal to me, but conditions in the district are at present such as make me opposed to it in principle. Other considerations to be taken account of are the rugged nature of the district, the impossibility of the Government attaining the object sought by them through the use of force, the unavailability of forces for the purpose, and the considerable number of the rebels, the unity of leadership they enjoy and their noticeable determination and preparedness to fight at present in view of their having evacuated their villages.

The idea may be put forward that the use of armed force might be conveniently put off to spring time. To this I would say that such postponement will make the matter more difficult, as it will enable the tribes to secure shelters and food and climatic conditions suitable for them, besides a likely increase in the number of rebels, an expansion of the rebel movement and a more complicated situation arising. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that the following steps should be taken even in the event of a decision to settle the affair by force of arms:—

- (a) The exiled Barzan chiefs to be set free, regardless of the rebel movement and the present situation. Such step is calculated to benefit the Government in two directions as follows:—

*Firstly.*—It will create dissension among their ranks and undermine the leadership. For, although Mulla Mustafa, Shaikh Ahmad and Mulla Sadiq are brothers and although the first-mentioned openly pleads the cause of the latter two and exerts himself on their behalf, at no time the three were agreed in their views and they are constantly at dispute, each seeking exclusive power for himself.

*Secondly.*—With the return (home) of the exiled chiefs no common object to claim or seek will remain.

- (b) Immediate steps to be taken for the re-establishment of civil administration in the localities affected by the rebel movement, and suitable officials appointed to these localities. This will serve to re-establish (? Government) relations with tribes with no allegiance to the Shaikhs of Barzan and the influence of the latter will shrink in consequence.
- (c) Funds as necessary and on a liberal scale to be allotted for the repair of existing telephone lines and roads, the laying of telephone lines and roads from Belleh to Amadiyah and Aqra, and the construction of strong posts along these roads, in order to ensure Government control and the association of the inhabitants of the district with the larger towns. Labour for the purpose to be obtained from the district itself with the initial object of establishing connexions of material benefit between the Government and the local population.
- (d) Food supplies already decided upon for distribution to be distributed expeditiously free of cost or at reduced prices, and also further quantities of such supplies to be allotted, in order that the inhabitants should feel the benefits of the presence of Government organisations in their midst.



- (e) With the above steps taken and with officials behaving properly, acting with justice and mixing with the inhabitants directly, the civil administration would be able to control the district, pursue offenders, collect arms, and remove, either temporarily or permanently, such persons as it may be necessary to remove.
- (f) Mulla Mustafa to be directed to come over to Bagdad, where his surrender to His Highness the Regent should be accepted. Some time after which the Mulla to be allowed to return in order to remove suspicions held by the people on account of previous violation by the Government of her promises and pledges to the people.

I feel confident that, if the carrying out of the above recommendations should fail to secure our object in full within a limited space of time, it will not fail to lay open for us wider opportunity for future action for the suppression of the spirit of rebellion, on one hand, and the establishment of orderly and just administration, on the other hand. Rebellion will be eventually confined to certain specific localities and we shall be able to ensure the co-operation of neighbouring localities.

MAJID MUSTAFA,  
*Minister without Portfolio.*

18th January, 1944.

[E 1143/37/93]

No. 4.

*Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th February.)*

(No. 68.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 8th February, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with standing instructions, a review of the major political and economic events in Iraq in 1943, which has been prepared by Mr. G. H. Thompson, counsellor to this embassy.

2. I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Thompson in the concluding two paragraphs of the enclosed paper.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Political Review, 1943.*

*General.*

IRAQ provided little material for sensational head-lines in 1943. With the exception of the Barzan troubles, to which further reference will be made, and the usual minor (but sometimes murderous) inter-tribal affrays of no political importance, internal order was well maintained. Relations between the British and Indian troops and the local population remained satisfactory. Although steadily rising prices imposed considerable difficulties on the urban populations especially, and upon officials and others in receipt of fixed incomes, a plentiful harvest and continued British war expenditures led the country as a whole to a remarkable level of domestic prosperity. Except in neglected and remote Kurdish areas there was no unemployment and no starvation. The sudden accumulation of wealth, coupled with restricted imports, inevitably resulted in widespread speculation and soaring prices, and, owing to the impact of the high cost of living on the fixed income groups, corruption attained an all-time high. The persistent political squabbling and intrigues in high places reacted seriously upon an administrative machine insufficiently geared, in any case, to cope with unforeseen and novel economic problems arising from the war. As the months passed these problems of supply and distribution became more acute. In June the Administration, who in the previous October, under the influence of the then Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, had refused to contemplate such action, officially sought our help in recruiting a British expert who would function as Director-General of Imports and Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council,

it being understood that he and his staff would enjoy executive powers. Unfortunately, serious delays occurred in finding a candidate for this important post, and it was not until towards the end of the year that Colonel Bayliss was obtained from the Middle East Supply Centre. A British officer, Colonel Le Blanc, had already earlier in the year been appointed Director-General of Transport and is still at work. In the summer a British official (Mr. Grice) became Director-General of Local Products, one of his most important tasks being the application of the Cereals Control Scheme. In the purely political sphere General Nuri al Said remained Prime Minister throughout the year, and in doing so presided over several different Cabinets, each of which, however, contained personnel common to its predecessors. As the year waned his Excellency was being subjected to greater criticism than at any time since 1941, and the political horizon was distinctly clouded, with the Regent showing every sign of wanting a new deal not only in Iraqi politicians, but also in British advisers. Fortified by new and increased powers conferred upon the throne by the new Organic Law enacted in the autumn, His Royal Highness, invigorated by a highly successful official visit to the United Kingdom, seemed anxious to participate actively in the breaking and making of Cabinets. There is much to be admired in an attitude that reflects the Regent's patriotism and public spirit, but unfortunately His Royal Highness's judgment of men does not always inspire confidence. In all these varied circumstances, the rôle of His Majesty's Embassy has been to act as a brake in matters political, advising steadiness and caution rather than rash experimentation, and as an accelerator in things economic, urging consistently the need for constructive action in lieu of *laissez-faire*. As 1943 passed into history, no dispute ruffled the placid surface of Anglo-Iraqi relations, Anglophobia in the country and among the people as a whole appeared to be at a heavy discount, Iraq's produce needed for the war effort had been acquired to the limits specified, and the policy of the Iraqi Royal House and Administration, headed by Nuri Pasha, continued to be one of full co-operation with the British ally in all essential directions.

#### *Iraq Enters the War.*

2. At midnight on the 16th January Iraq became an active participant in the Allied struggle against Nazi-Fascist world revolution. A few days later she acceded to the United Nations Pact signed at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942.

3. Nuri Pasha would have liked to have taken these steps a year or so earlier. Allied reverses in 1942, and the general uncertainty of the situation until the tide turned against the Axis at El Alamein and Stalingrad, made it desirable to wait and see. When the moment finally came, the decision to enter the war aroused no opposition, but small enthusiasm. It was preceded by ten days or more of a press and radio campaign stressing the great benefits certain to accrue to Iraq from belligerency, and there was much ado, in particular, about the Atlantic Charter. Nothing was said in all this propaganda about the new obligations Iraq assumed as a member of the United Nations, so that in ensuing weeks it proved necessary to remind the Prime Minister and other personalities of realities in this connexion, the columns of the *Iraq Times* and *Basra Times* also being used for this purpose. Once the masses in the towns, and particularly in Bagdad, had grown accustomed to the idea of involvement in the war—which, in the absence of any reaction on the part of the enemy, they did fairly rapidly—they probably gave the subject but few thoughts. To a great many other persons, however, including tribal leaders and the more solid elements who had remained quiescent in 1941, so that Rashid Ali then failed to enjoy anything like the majority support he had expected, Nuri's policy was welcome as at least a partial atonement for the tragic errors of two years previously. It would be too much to expect that this feeling should make the idea of loss and sacrifice in the cause attractive, and it is, in fact, fortunate that, except for minor discomforts, the country has not so far been called upon to bear a very grave burden. Few men or women who are normal beings like war, and it would be unnatural, indeed, if people as a whole here failed to register satisfaction that the threat of invasion, which in the summer of 1942 was so acute, has since receded almost to vanishing-point.

4. While in certain unthinking quarters Iraq's declaration of war was greeted with the "loud guffaw that bespeaks the vacant mind," the event in fact caused a considerable impression throughout the Middle East and certainly redounded to our credit. In Egypt it created considerable surprise and annoyance for a time, chiefly because it seemed that somehow Iraq had stolen a



march on the remainder of the Arab world. In practice, Iraqi belligerency has been of considerable use in various ways and should continue to prove of value, perhaps especially when the time comes for the United Nations to turn their attention seriously towards Japan.

5. Inspired by his dreams about Iraq's place at the peace table as well as by his desire to keep in the van of the Arab States, Nuri Pasha sought more than once to despatch Iraqi troops abroad for service in some sphere of operations under British command. Preparations for the formation of a special brigade, composed mainly of volunteers, were in fact actually begun. His Excellency's most serious attempt—and also his last for the time being—was made in the late summer, when he offered this brigade for service in Syria to assist in the maintenance of "internal order." He was naturally warned at once that there would be grave political objections to the presence of Iraqi troops in Syria, and in due course the proposal was courteously rejected by His Majesty's Government, who, however, had previously examined the possibility of employing the brigade on occupational duties in liberated North African territory. By the time the scheme was finally dropped many of the elements of the brigade had been sent north to cope with the rebel tribesmen of Mulla Mustafa, a task which proved completely beyond their capacity. It was found that the men were quite untrained for mountain operations and, furthermore, that they had no heart in the business. The truth is that the Iraqi army, the reorganisation of which continues to hang fire, has never recovered from the sad events of 1941. Its morale is shot to pieces, all too many of its officers are lazy, arrogant and inefficient, and it is unpopular in the country. It is possibly at the time of writing the last focus of anti-British infection. Powerless at the moment, it remains a potential but remote menace to the domestic peace of the country.

#### *Enemy Propaganda and Action.*

6. The former has dwindled steadily and may scarcely be said to exist and enemy sympathisers find it wise to lie very low. Of the latter, the only noticeable manifestation was the dropping in June in the north of three German parachutists, accompanied by a young Iraqi. Their objectives appear to have been espionage, sabotage and subversive activities among the Kurdish tribes. All were apprehended after a week or two, since when they have been extensively examined by the British authorities. It is expected that they will in due course be tried by the Iraqi authorities. During the year a considerable number of political internees were released from the Amarah concentration camp, but only in one case was a really dangerous character set at provisional liberty, and he was shortly afterwards reinterned. At the end of the year arrangements were under consideration for the return to Iraq for trial of the internees in Southern Rhodesia.

#### *Internal Politics.*

7. It was not until the 23rd June that the Cabinet formed by Nuri Pasha in October 1942 was reshuffled after a life of about eight months. This was a fairly long run as Cabinets go in Iraq and, in retrospect, it may be said that the period of this particular Administration was not altogether barren of achievement. It passed the new "Law for the Regulation of Economic Life," which conferred wide powers upon the Government, it fixed the price of cereals, it embarked on and largely carried through arduous negotiations for the sale of 200,000 tons of barley to His Majesty's Government, it appointed a British officer as Director-General of Transport, and it made considerable progress in various other directions which need not be described in detail. It fell for the reason that the great majority of Iraqi Cabinets fall, namely, as the result of quarrels between certain of its members. In this particular instance it was Saleh Jabr, the Minister of Finance, who upset the apple-cart. He resented the Prime Minister's opposition to his proposed grant of several thousand acres of Government land to an old friend, and for other reasons he fell out with the Minister of Justice and quarrelled with the Minister of Education, a coarse and stupid personality, who unluckily then became Rais of the Royal Diwan. But there were other and more unfortunate consequences. Saleh Jabr went back to the Ministry of the Interior, in which he had previously been a great success, and was succeeded in Finance by Jalal Baban. This appointment, which turned out to be a catastrophic failure, since the new Minister proceeded to sabotage the Government's policy of economic control, was a typical example of General Nuri's apparently irresistible tendency to "appease" critics and opponents in the usually illusory belief that they will be tamed by the responsibilities of office.

From the moment that new and "reformed" Cabinet was announced the political horizon began to grow hazy with the mists of personal intrigue and obstruction, which the approach of the elections scheduled for September did nothing to dissipate.

8. Early in July, after a brief bout of pneumonia rapidly and effectively dealt with by "693," the Prime Minister proceeded to the Lebanon to recuperate and later visited Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan. On his return on the 10th August his Excellency found renewed Cabinet trouble awaiting him. This time the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Ministers were resentful because they had not been consulted in advance about General Nuri's conversations in Egypt and elsewhere on Arab unity. This difficulty was patched up, but five weeks later—by which date the Prime Minister was again indisposed and on the point of leaving for the Mount Carmel Sanatorium in Palestine—a much more serious squall blew up. This was a dispute with the Regent over the lists of candidates for election to Parliament. On the 28th September His Royal Highness was sufficiently worked up to be contemplating dismissing the Cabinet lock, stock and barrel, but his choice of a new team headed by the Lord Mayor of Bagdad left so much to be desired that His Majesty's Ambassador felt compelled to counsel caution. Discussions between the Regent and the Prime Minister continued until the 4th October, when agreement was reached through the acceptance by the Cabinet of 99 out of 105 names on the Palace electoral list. The Ministers of Finance and Interior, however, immediately resigned and so followed their colleague of Foreign Affairs, who had already gone out of office. The vacancy in Interior was at once filled by a newcomer to Cabinet rank (the comparatively youthful Abdulla Qassab, Mutessarif of Diwaniyah), the other two posts being left vacant for the time being, and the elections duly took place without incident throughout the country on the 5th and 6th October.

9. The newly-elected legislature did not differ materially from the old, some sixty-five members of which were returned. While many of these had, under duress, supported Rashid Ali in 1941, all convinced adherents of the latter's Anglophobe policy were eliminated. In a country where life counts for little, and where nepotism and the more elementary and obvious forms of corruption are viewed with greater toleration than in Britain, it was no surprise to find in the new Parliament one or two murderers and a few other dubious characters.

10. On the 28th October the Regent, accompanied by the Iraqi Acting Chief of the General Staff, Dr. Sinderson and an aide-de-camp, left by air on an official visit to the United Kingdom. Arrangements had previously been made for his uncle, the Amir Zaid, to return from Istanbul to function as Acting Regent during His Royal Highness's absence. This is not the place to describe the Regent's stay in Britain. It will suffice to say that, arriving on the 4th November, he found an excellent programme awaiting him, had the honour of being entertained by Their Majesties The King and Queen for two days at Buckingham Palace and left on the 2nd December. His Royal Highness returned safely to Bagdad on the 13th December, having greatly enjoyed, and been impressed by, his weeks in England, which enabled him to form a personal appreciation of the extent and scope of the British war effort.

11. It is perhaps worth recording that the Regent had hoped to combine the above visit with one to the United States. After mature consideration over a period of months, however, the United States Government regretted their inability to receive him and mentioned as an excuse the perils of a trans-Atlantic air passage in winter. Actually, it seems likely that they wished to concentrate on more potentially-valuable game in the persons of two sons of Ibn Saud, whose oil-bearing kingdom is now arousing much interest in America. The two Saudi Arabian Princes arrived in London on their way home from the United States while the Regent was still there. Cards were exchanged, but no other contacts occurred.

12. Nuri Pasha was resting in Palestine between the 11th and 23rd October. On his return and after the departure of the Regent, it at last became possible to pin his Excellency down for a frank and lengthy discussion of the problems of the hour, and this took place on the 30th October. His Majesty's Ambassador, who spoke in no uncertain terms, complained particularly of the persistent failure of the Government to deal with the economic crisis and of the steady deterioration in the morale and capabilities of the administrative services. Reference was also made to the low tone of public life and to the mishandling of the Kurdish question. The Prime Minister was strongly urged to get down



to brass tacks without delay, for now was the time for reform and modernisation. He took these blunt remonstrances well, gave assurances of his anxiety to improve matters and intimated his desire to call upon the services of an additional number of British experts in general administration, agriculture, forestry, co-operative societies and geology.

13. Parliament opened on the 9th October and soon passed the new Organic Law. Notice was also given of the coming introduction of a new electoral law permitting the establishment of political parties. For some weeks nothing particular happened and it was only after the Regent's return in mid-December that Nuri Pasha again tackled the problem of the Cabinet. His discussions with the Regent were difficult and two attempts to secure the co-operation of Ibrahim Kemal failed. Finally, after many false starts and alarms, a new Cabinet was announced on Christmas Day. It contained an innovation in the appointment of Taufiq Suwaidi as Deputy Prime Minister and two new acquisitions in the persons of Majid Mustafa, a Kurd, selected for the special purpose of restoring order in the Kurdish districts and redressing their administrative grievances, and Muhammad Hassan Kubba, a Shiah judge of good reputation. Ali Mumtaz, who had left the Administration in October 1942, under something of a cloud, returned as Minister of Finance.

14. Although the new Cabinet undoubtedly included men of ability, it contained no progressive elements and was representative of the old ruling class of established families. It aroused a storm of criticism throughout the country, while the Regent made no concealment of his dislike. As the year closed, Nuri Pasha was once more indisposed and contemplating yet another period of recuperation in Palestine, and the general political outlook was confused and uncertain in the extreme.

15. All observers of the Iraqi political scene are agreed that there is a crying need for new blood in the councils of State. The difficulty, however, is to find it. It is unhappily a fact that, even in normal times, there are only a limited number of men in this country at all suitable for the responsibilities of high office, and since 1941 their number has been reduced by the absence in enemy territory or concentration camps of keen-witted but mistaken men who, in that year, took the wrong turning. Under existing conditions it is very difficult for promising young men to come to the fore and, as it were, catch the Speaker's eye. The proposed new electoral law is being framed with a view to removing the obstacles that to-day impede the advance of the rising generation, and it may be hoped that, if or when passed, this measure will live up to the hopes it enshrines. If it proves a failure, then it can only be a matter of time and opportunity before trouble occurs. There is undoubtedly growing weariness of the "old gang," which one day is likely to find violent expression in some form or another.

#### *Arab Unity.*

16. This is the darling ambition of General Nuri, and much was heard about it during the first half of the year particularly. Since then, and apart from constant references to the subject in the vernacular press—which has also displayed concern over the Arab population of North Africa, to which area it is desired that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be applied—there has not been so much activity. The idea of a general conference to plan the future of the Arab world did not go down in Egypt and elsewhere as well as was anticipated, and in March and April, when Jamil Madfai visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt as the Prime Minister's special envoy, he was rather disappointed by his reception. Later, in the summer, Nuri himself went to Cairo and conferred with Nahas Pasha. He hoped to visit North Africa as well, but this plan was discouraged by the Fighting French and came to nothing.

17. While there is, therefore, but little in the way of concrete achievement on Pan-Arabism to report, this does not mean that the question is by any manner of means moribund. Far from it. The Lebanese crisis in the late autumn powerfully stimulated the growing feeling of fellowship among Arabs and if, in Iraq, the Government, press and people behaved with restraint, it was primarily owing to the widespread conviction that British policy and British opinion were on the Arab side. That the repressive and even violent attitude of the French aroused so unanimous an outcry throughout the Arab world is a significant illustration of the reaction to be expected if or when the Palestine problem becomes acute. At the moment, Arab hopes centre in the maintenance of the White Paper policy, any drastic modification of which would have the most serious repercussions in this country.

18. Feeling against militant Zionism is strong, and there are no illusions about the subversive preparations of extremist groups in Palestine and the Fascist methods of organisation enforced by them. In September Nuri Pasha, angered by reports of extensive anti-Arab propaganda developed by Zionists in the United States, inspired an anti-Zionist campaign by the Bagdad press and radio. His Majesty's Embassy at once made representations, and after about ten days this rather vicious publicity was called off. It caused much anxiety to Bagdad's large Jewish population of some 70,000 souls and was exploited by not a few of these as an indication of British hostility towards their race, since it was argued that the campaign could never have been instituted without our approval. It was also widely noised around by interested persons that, while Britain supported the Arabs, American sympathy lay with the Jews.

#### *Relations with Russia.*

19. In Iraq as elsewhere the victories of the Red Army have aroused wonder and admiration. They have also caused many people to think that the Soviet will become the colossus of the post-war world, a prospect not entirely relished by the ruling elements in this country, who are decidedly allergic to anything savouring of "Communism." The news that Egypt was to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet came, therefore, as rather a shock, and on hearing it Nuri Pasha was at pains to stress that this would in no way influence Iraq's policy of keeping Russia at arm's length.

20. In July M. Maisky, who was on his way to Moscow by air, spent a few hours in Bagdad attired in a sports jacket and grey flannel trousers, with the result that he came near to collapsing from the heat. In October his Excellency, accompanied by Mme. Maisky, spent two days here on his way to Tabriz by road via Tehran. On this occasion he tackled the Prime Minister about the establishment of relations with Iraq and found him reasonably accommodating. While General Nuri declined to follow the Egyptian precedent of a written request for the exchange of representatives, he agreed to this idea in principle, and later, when Parliament was opened, the Speech from the Throne contained a brief statement that the establishment of relations might be expected in due course. This statement aroused much interest, but no opposition.

21. In conversations at His Majesty's Embassy M. Maisky spoke with remarkable frankness. *Inter alia* he said he envisaged a Regional Council for the Middle East with Soviet membership. He also viewed American oil enterprise in Arabia with some concern, and in general rather gave the impression that the Russian mind is yet suspicious of the right wing in Britain and "big business" in the United States.

#### *The Barzan Tribal Disorders.*

22. In July Mulla Mustafa, a well-known Barzani tribal leader, who for some years had been residing under compulsion at Sulaimani on a meagre Government allowance, escaped and made his way back to his remote and mountainous native area in Kurdistan. His advent led to an armed outbreak which provided forceful evidence of the discontent which had long been simmering in these neglected districts. In September the Mulla was joined by the Turkish outlaw Said Birokhi and a number of Iraqi fugitives. Towards the end of the month attacks were made on a number of police posts in the vicinity of Mergasur, north-west of Rowanduz. Police reinforcements fared ill at the hands of the tribesmen, and withdrew in some confusion after suffering losses in men and arms. This was the beginning of a series of attacks on isolated Government posts, a number of which were evacuated, while others surrendered. Drastic action was taken on the Turkish side, and before the end of October Said Birokhi had been killed and his followers dispersed. On the Iraqi side preparations for punitive military action went forward, and a force of about one mixed brigade was concentrated round Rowanduz and to the north-west.

23. These events apparently led Mulla Mustafa to think, and he contacted the Iraqi officer commanding troops in a conciliatory manner. Various exchanges followed, and, after His Majesty's Ambassador had secured from Nuri Pasha certain assurances concerning the future treatment of the Barzani chiefs, his Excellency advised the Mulla to surrender. His reply was a categorical refusal.

24. On the 6th November Iraqi troops embarked on what was described as a "reconnaissance in force" from Mergasur in the direction of the Greater Zab River, the head of the British Military Mission and the Iraqi Chief of the General Staff being with the column, which soon met with such resistance that it retired with loss to its starting point. Two days later a similar initiative was



also repulsed, while on the 10th November a military convoy was only extricated with difficulty and at some cost from a serious ambush. It became painfully clear that the Iraqi military and police, who revealed themselves as ill-led, ill-trained and of low morale, were incapable of restoring the situation, which continued to deteriorate. In December it proved necessary, to calm the apprehensions of Iraqi Royal Air Force Levy families isolated in Diana and another village north of Rowanduz, to despatch a company of Indian infantry, a mortar company and a Bren carrier company, plus a section of Royal Air Force armoured cars, for their protection.

25. In Bagdad there was some alarm in political circles. His Majesty's Ambassador pointed out to the Regent, the Prime Minister and others that, since the Iraqi Government were clearly incapable of bringing Mulla Mustafa to heel by force, they would have to exploit conciliatory political action to the full. This attitude met with the approval of His Majesty's Government, who in December suggested that Mulla Mustafa might be warned in emphatic terms that his antics were becoming an embarrassment to the British war effort. This warning was issued on the 21st December and extracted a conciliatory reply six days later, in which the Mulla undertook to keep the peace, &c., if he were pardoned, his imprisoned followers released and his grievances investigated.

26. Meanwhile, the latest of General Nuri's Cabinets, containing a Kurdish Minister without portfolio, Majid Mustafa, had been formed on the 25th December. The whole position was discussed with him at length and in detail. On the 1st January, 1944, he proceeded north, accompanied by two Kurdish officers, to meet Mulla Mustafa in person for further negotiations and to convert the truce already ordered by the latter into a complete cessation of hostilities. By the end of the year, therefore, events were taking a promising turn with reasonably bright prospects not only of the restoration of order in the affected areas, but also of a serious attempt being made to cope with long-ignored but legitimate tribal grievances.

#### *Economics.*

27. Iraq is caught between the devil of major British military and other war expenditure in the country and the deep sea of drastically curtailed imports. As a result, not only has the currency in circulation expanded from 6 million dinars in 1941 to 34 million dinars at the end of 1943, but the general cost of living has risen most drastically. The consequence has been a form of inflation which, as it began to develop seriously in 1942, not unnaturally caused grave concern in Cairo and London, especially as it was accompanied by the evils of speculation, profiteering, corruption and hoarding. Great pressure has therefore been exerted, not altogether without success, to persuade the Iraqi Government to put their house in order, especially with regard to the control of prices and the distribution of imported material, produce and commodities. At the same time, it has been necessary to secure, on the most favourable terms possible, vitally needed quantities of Iraqi cereals—chiefly barley—dates, &c., for the war effort.

28. As regards grains, there was finally concluded on the 23rd July a formal contract between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq for purchase of 200,000 tons of barley at 20½ dinars per ton. The negotiation of this contract took many weeks of arduous labour, involving long hours of discussion, chiefly with the Prime Minister and Ministers of Finance and Interior, whose opening bids on price had been 24 dinars or more. The final result was considered satisfactory in London and Cairo, and by the end of the year the contract had been largely if not entirely fulfilled, over 100,000 tons having been despatched to India in relief of famine conditions in Bengal. For the rest, the establishment of a ceiling for cereal prices in Iraq was undoubtedly a most important steadying factor in the general economic situation, for it cannot be doubted that in the absence of any such fixed price the internal cost level would have soared. A further restraining factor on the rise of commodity prices was the conclusion of an arrangement in the summer, whereby a British firm purchased for account of the Ministry of Food the entire surplus of Basra dates at fixed prices considerably lower than those ruling in other parts of the country.

29. As regards imports and internal distribution, the Government—armed with ample powers by the new "Law for the Regulation of Economic Life"—finally agreed in June to recruit the services of an outside expert, who would be granted executive powers as Director-General of Imports and Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council. Unfortunately, months of delay occurred before a candidate for this post was obtained by the release from the Middle East Supply

Centre of Colonel Bayliss, who, with a staff of five other officers, took up his appointment in November. He was accorded the fullest possible support by the Iraqi authorities and all others concerned, including the British advisers, and at once set about his task with the utmost energy. Indeed, he went a trifle too fast and, being at the same time disinclined to seek or follow advice, met with certain difficulties that might have been avoided. Nevertheless, by the end of the year Colonel Bayliss was still pushing on at speed, and if on occasion his methods seemed a shade theoretical—e.g., the rationing of tea and coffee, which were in fair supply and not too expensive, in minute amounts per head—he had already accomplished most valuable progress in drawing up Iraq's requirements for 1944 and in controlling the cost of a wide variety of articles. Furthermore, his obvious determination to check profiteering had a beneficial effect on the general prices of imported goods, many of which showed declines by the end of the year ranging from 15 to 40 per cent.; and the cost of living index fell from 405 in November to 376 in early January. Certainly his most difficult task will be to ensure an adequate supply and distribution at reasonable prices of cotton piece-goods, the shortage of which formed a constant subject of Iraqi complaint throughout the year.

30. Having regard to the fundamental nature of the two factors mentioned in the first sentence of paragraph 27, it is hard to resist the conclusion that such initiatives as the sale of gold as a commodity to absorb surplus purchasing power can be but palliatives. Gold sales opened in Iraq at the beginning of August and have proceeded ever since to the accompaniment of daily telegrams to Beirut, Bombay, Cairo, Jerusalem, London and Tehran. These sales have earned the Treasury in Whitehall a useful profit. But here in Iraq they have had no discernible effect on the price level and but a negative one on the currency in circulation, the total of which might to-day be a million or so more than it actually is if no gold had been sold. At the time of writing the Minister of Finance is said to be seriously considering lottery or other loans, in which he hopes the public may be tempted to invest surplus funds. The sale of Government loans is also under consideration with the same object, but this is a matter which will require to be handled very carefully indeed in view of the tribal interests involved.

#### *Conclusion.*

31. The experience of the past year has once again proved the high value of British policy towards this country. Iraq, indeed, to-day represents a political experiment the success of which has been so great up to date that it passes well nigh unnoticed, and so there is danger of its being taken as a matter of course. This is much to be deprecated. Although there is at present no demand for any revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, nor any wilful obstruction of British wishes by the Iraqi Government or people, it would be a grave error to suppose that we can safely sit back and relax either our constant political or economic watchfulness or our effective public relations work. The scene in this country can change with startling rapidity and complacency is not consequently to be desired. Indeed, as the events of 1943 tend to show, problems in Iraq will increase in number and complexity as the war recedes farther and farther from the Middle East. In the circumstances it may be hoped that there will be no tendency to assume that, because for the last three years Iraq has given no trouble, she may safely be discriminated against in favour of more tiresome or more powerful or more noisy neighbours. The Iraqis watch very carefully what goes on in Egypt, in Persia, even in Turkey and Syria, and they easily resent others receiving greater apparent benefits at British hands than they seem to do. Rightly or wrongly, there was in 1943 a disposition—not altogether confined to Iraqis—to feel that, in comparison with Egypt and Persia in particular, this kingdom did less well than she had a right to expect. Although it has not yet become known here, the fact that twelve Persian officers are, for example, being trained by the Royal Air Force in the United Kingdom free, gratis and for nothing cheek by jowl with six young Iraqi brothers-in-arms who will each cost their Government £5,000, may one day be hard to explain convincingly. It is essential, if we are to retain and develop our valuable stake in this country, which is important to us politically and strategically and economically, to lose no opportunity of convincing its inhabitants that their close associations with Britain redound to their own concrete and material benefit.

32. Iraq is likely to emerge from the present world war in a prosperous condition and, from our point of view, with a more healthy outlook than ever before. The latter will be in part due to the fact that it is becoming more and more widely appreciated here that small countries incapable of defending



themselves must have powerful friends if their independence is to endure and their politico-economic development to go forward. This must not, however, be taken to imply that Iraq will be prepared to play the humble rôle of an uncomplaining poor relation. The country is rich in undeveloped resources, especially agricultural, and should provide a valuable post-war market for manufactured goods, engineering products, &c. It ought to be possible for us to take full advantage of many new opportunities for British enterprise. But initiative and investment will be necessary, and some risks will also have to be run. Now that post-war planning has actually begun in Iraq (projected railway developments, the proposed Bekhme dam, the establishment of new local industries such as, for example, modern tanneries), we should lose no time in studying possibilities. Others are already doing so, and in this connexion it is perhaps worth adding that the Americans particularly are carefully surveying the whole position. Moreover, they are not blind to the importance of securing goodwill in advance. In 1943 much interest was aroused in Bagdad by a rumour that some United States foundation was contemplating building a new hospital and medical research institute in Iraq. We cannot exclude American or other foreign competition, but it may at least be hoped that we will not allow ourselves to be left at the post through some mistaken and shortsighted notion that this land of wide but neglected spaces can never be anything but desert.

[E 1903/37/93]

No. 5.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th March.)*

(No. 111.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 14th March, 1944.*

IN the fourth paragraph of my telegram No. 187 of the 6th March I mentioned that the Regent had drawn up a long document setting out the lines on which he wished the Government to work.

2. I have since had time to study this paper and to discuss it with His Royal Highness. It is divided into twelve principal paragraphs, each containing proposals for the improvement of a particular defect of the administration or in the political customs of the country. It is not a succinctly drafted paper and its obscure phrasing often leaves His Royal Highness's precise meaning somewhat in doubt. I am not therefore troubling you, Sir, with the full text, which would be tedious to read, but instead I shall endeavour to give you an outline of its principal points, together with a summary of the comments which I have made thereon in discussion with the Amir.

3. The first three paragraphs of His Royal Highness's paper deal respectively with Iraq's relations with Great Britain, her foreign policy and her attitude towards Arab union. These are, by comparison with most of the later paragraphs, clear and brief, and I enclose a full translation of them as an appendix to this despatch. It will be seen that the Regent gives first place to the consolidation of the present happy relations between Iraq and her "great British ally" and envisages their growth into a "solid brotherly friendship" uniting the two peoples. He expects this country to benefit from the services of British experts employed by the Iraqi Government, and emphasises that these officials will, in the new atmosphere of Anglo-Iraqi goodwill, realise that their labours are appreciated locally. His Royal Highness then pays tribute to the maintenance of good relations with limitrophe States and to the necessity of leaving nothing undone to that end and, finally, declares that he regards the policy of Arab Unity not as a limitation upon Iraqi sovereignty nor upon the rights of minorities in this country, but as a means of promoting solidarity among all the Arab peoples. I see nothing to criticise in these three paragraphs—on the contrary, they impress me as being admirably constructive and sound.

4. The fourth paragraph discusses the improvement of the public services, including the army and the police. His Royal Highness deplores the corruption and inefficiency which now discredit these services, and makes detailed remedial proposals. These include the repeal of the Civil Service Cadre Law, the Civil Service Law, the Officials' Discipline Law and the Judges and Qadhis Law, and the substitution for a period of five years of special laws giving extensive powers to the Council of Ministers and to individual ministers. At the end of this period fresh laws were to be introduced. He further discusses at length the manner in which ministers should use these powers and the objects which they should seek to gain.

5. I pointed out to His Royal Highness in the course of my audience on the 11th March the dislocation which the adoption of his proposals would cause. I agreed that the laws in question stood in need of revision, but their defects were already well known, and it appeared unnecessary, and indeed most undesirable, to have a period of five years' uncertainty. I therefore suggested that a strong committee should be appointed to study each of these laws and that he, himself, in making known his wishes, should abstain from entering into unnecessary detail. It would, I thought, be enough for him to state shortly the ills affecting the public services and to propose the setting up of strong official committees to study remedies. His Royal Highness seemed disposed to accept this idea.

6. The Regent's fifth paragraph proposes the equalising of army and civil service pensions. The army at present enjoy better terms. The scheme is sound enough in principle, but I have warned His Royal Highness that there will be trouble if any reductions in army pensions are made retrospective.

7. Paragraph 6 calls for more control over the army to be given to the King in order to stop political activity among the officers. His Royal Highness explained to me that it was not his idea to alter in any way the Constitution, nor does he hanker at all for dictatorial powers, but he feels that Royal agreement should be sought in many matters concerning which decisions now lay within the power of the Ministry of Defence. He thought that this end could be secured by a suitable amendment of the Regulations of the Ministry. He said that he wanted to keep in close touch with the head of the British Military Mission, and to ensure that the latter's advice were followed.

8. Paragraphs 7 and 8 cover important principles of land policy. His Royal Highness wants capricious grants of State property to influential people to be ended and all such alienations of land to be controlled by regulations safeguarding the rights of the cultivators and bringing distribution under the light of full publicity. He also urges that a constructive financial policy should be laid down for the development and exploitation of State lands. I regard both proposals as good and well-timed, and I also note with pleasure that His Royal Highness advocates the improvement and expansion of urban and inter-urban transportation, and the promotion of industrial enterprise, in each case with State assistance. In a neglected and primitive country such as this it is useless to rely upon private initiative and investment for internal development of this nature. The State must show the way and, at any rate in the beginning, provide much of the capital, which in turn implies official planning and control. The ninth paragraph of the Regent's paper advocates the creation of a Supply Ministry and a Ministry of Agriculture. The Cabinet are already studying a law creating a Ministry of Supply but, regarding a Ministry of Agriculture, I have pointed out to the Amir that although this idea is all right in principle, such a Ministry should not, I consider, be set up before the Ministry of Supply had got into its stride. Even then the plan would need careful consideration from the point of view of staff, since I doubted whether the requisite officials were at present available, and a Ministry of Agriculture staffed with incompetent and inexperienced men could do great harm. The paper goes on to propose a "five-year plan" for irrigation, to be accompanied by the encouragement of the immigration of Arab settlers from neighbouring countries to provide labour for the new areas to be brought under cultivation. This idea appears to me excellent, and I have encouraged the Regent to go ahead with it.

9. Paragraph 11 discusses the reorganisation of elementary, primary and secondary education. The Regent's ideas are, I fear, ill-digested and amateurish, but I believe I can persuade him not to press them on the Cabinet before he and I have had time to consult Mr. Ritchie, the newly-appointed British adviser to the Ministry of Education.

10. The paper concludes with a somewhat jejune advocacy of the advantages of political parties in a democratic State. A promise that encouragement would be given to the formation of such parties was included in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present Parliament, but none have yet been formed and His Royal Highness has, I think, the idea that Nuri is being obstructive. This may be so, but on the other hand it does not appear that any of the more reputable or responsible people in public life have yet sought permission to form parties. I should perhaps make it clear that His Royal Highness was at pains to assure me that he is not in favour of the single party State, as in Turkey. In this I believe his views to be well-founded.

11. Taking the programme as a whole, there is much sound sense in it, and I have told the Regent so. It is a good sign that he should take an interest in all



these things. I have pointed out to him, however, that it covers a great deal of ground and warned him that he must not expect any Cabinet to be able to put all of it into effect. The best results would, I suggested, probably be achieved if it were taken up piece-meal and thoroughly.

12. There are at least two subjects of importance which to my regret found no place in the Regent's draft, namely—

(a) public health, and (b) decentralisation.

As regards the former, an early improvement in the Ministry of Social Affairs is vitally necessary. If there were adequate medical facilities within reach of all and if more attention could be devoted to maternity and infant welfare especially, the population would increase to provide the labour reserve so urgently required if the country is to advance as it should. As a beginning there ought, in my view, to be a dresser in every village, a clinic in each "nahiya" and a small hospital in all "qadhas." Doctors—now reluctant to settle in the provinces—should be properly housed, better disciplined and subjected to inspection from headquarters. I have already urged such reforms in conversation with the Iraqi Prime Minister and others, and I repeated them to His Royal Highness. But I would like to stress that in the realm of public health there is a striking opportunity for British assistance to Iraq which I trust will not be neglected in the post-war era. Apart from any other consideration, this land of mysterious fevers offers great scope for research and I would like to see Britain taking the lead in this respect, for greater facilities for scientific investigation, &c., are greatly needed. I recall that some years back the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury found it possible to contribute £10,000 towards the establishment of a girls' school in Alexandria. I can think of no more beneficial investment in Iraqi goodwill, nor one more likely to assist our influence, than some generous British gift aimed at the betterment of public health in this country.

13. As regards decentralisation, which I also discussed with His Royal Highness, there is to-day far too great a tendency to concentrate everything in Bagdad. There is need to develop the provincial towns. The new Liwa administration law which has just been passed by Parliament should help in this connexion, but much preparatory work will be necessary. I would like to see engineering schools founded in Basra and in the north, where the port directorate and the oil company could provide the necessary opportunities for practical training and in turn indent on the schools for trained personnel. Similarly, primary teachers' training colleges could be established in Amara, Diwaniyah and Sulaimania, and schools for medical dressers in Kut, Nasiriyah and Arbil. No doubt all these ideas may be regarded as ambitious, but I mention them to illustrate how great is the scope for domestic progress of one sort or another, and to indicate that there are many directions in which progressive action is possible. It will continue to be my aim to direct the attention of the Regent and his advisers to these and other opportunities for constructive endeavour.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East, Cairo, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit, the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, the Government of India, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 5.

1. Iraq must make her primary object the consolidation of the good relations subsisting between herself and her great British ally, the alliance between the two nations should grow to a degree such as shall make the existing understanding and co-operation between the two Governments to develop into a solid brotherly friendship between the two peoples, the Iraqi and the British. Iraq will thereby be able to benefit from the special nature of the resulting position, while the Iraqi people will feel confident that they will obtain through the British experts to be employed by the Iraqi Government all such benefits as they might hope to obtain from their own sons and countrymen. Such British experts will similarly feel confident that they are giving their services to a country appreciative of these services and one which they hold as a second country of theirs. Such feeling will produce a vitally new situation (or outlook) in this country.

2. Foreign policy, in so far as it concerns the Anglo-Iraqi alliance, rests on three fundamental factors:—

*Firstly.*—The development of good relations between Iraq and her allies with whom Iraq is bound by the Atlantic Charter.

*Secondly.*—The establishment and maintenance of friendship between Iraq and limitrophe States and the removal of obstructions which limit (the scope of) these relations.

*Thirdly.*—The combatting of any tyranny established, or to be established, by the Axis Powers, the wiping out of any (remaining) influence of such tyranny in Iraq and the continued exercise of caution, even after peace, against such Powers or their agents in order to prevent their penetration into Iraq to disturb its peace or corrupt the spirit and morals of its people.

3. The Arab alliance policy is not held by Iraq merely as a (plank of) foreign policy, but as the very essence of common action among all Arabs—a special policy above all considerations with distinctive features of its own. This, however, does not affect the independence or unity of Iraq, nor does it infringe or affect the rights of any individual living in Iraq and enjoying Iraqi nationality, regardless of the language such individual speaks or his race or his religion. On the contrary, this conception of the Arab alliance should serve to promote solidarity and co-operation among the inhabitants of Iraq and make for equality of rights among them and equal enjoyment of all the benefits conferred by the Constitution, without preferential treatment of any form for any race or any individual. Acting on such principles Iraq will assume a position of distinction such as will effectively help ensuring formation of the Arab alliance and the defence of the rights of the Arabs.



## CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 117/35/34]

No. 6.

*Tour in Bakhtiari, Chehar Mahal, Fereidan, Khumain, Ali Gudarz and Gulpaigan.—(Received 6th January, 1944.)*

## 12th Indian Division Mobile Dispensary Report No. 4.

(Secret.)

*General.*—During the first half of September the officer commanding accompanied His Majesty's consul, Isfahan, on a horseback tour in Western Chehar Mahal and in Bakhtiari country north of the Zardeh Kuh. Travelling as guests of Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, the party was accompanied by his third son, Amir Bahman Khan, and by the Kalantar of the Bakhtiarwand, Baversat, Baba Ahmedi and Babadi tribes, and by Dr. Feylessoufi, a Persian irrigation engineer.

Sick were treated among the Babadi and Baba Ahmedi, and in several Cheharmahal villages. A visit was paid to the Karkunan cutting, the site of Shah Abbas's attempt to divert the headwaters of the Karun river into the Zayنده Rud, and to the Tang-i-Gazzi, where it is proposed to construct a dam on the latter river to increase the water supply of Isfahan. The Karsostan Pass (Zardeh Kuh) was climbed to see the wreckage of a R.A.F. Vincent plane which crashed last January, but attempts to locate the bodies of the missing crew were unsuccessful.

During the third week of September the unit was delayed in Isfahan awaiting the arrival of winter clothing and rations, which were finally found and collected at Qum.

During late September and October the unit accompanied His Majesty's vice-consul, Isfahan, on a twenty-five-day tour by motor transport of the Khumain, Ali Gudarz, Gulpaigan and Khunsar districts and of Fereidan. Government officials, doctors and the more important landowners were contacted and sick were treated in twenty-five villages on thirty different occasions. Six days were spent with part of the Mahmud Saleh and Moghui tribes of the Chehar Lang, and a number of the latter khans were received or visited.

*General Conditions Encountered.*—Coming into this country from Southern Kurdistan and Kermanshah, one is impressed among other things by its greater prosperity, its larger and less dilapidated villages, and by the sturdiness of its people. The absence or paucity of malaria consequent on the higher altitudes and on the lower rainfall which has led to the Ghanat system of irrigation is an important factor in determining these differences. Also only tough mountain races are able to withstand the extreme rigours of winter, a fact which must have influenced Shah Abbas when he organised a mass migration of Armenians, Georgians and Turki races into the then depopulated Fereidan.

The degree of prosperity or destitution varies from village to village and is determined by a number of factors, among which are the accidents of geography and water supply, the presence or absence of Persian troops and gendarmerie, and more important, the way in which the village and its surrounding lands are owned. The best villages are often those in the hands of an hereditary "lord of the manor" who lives there in feudal style and concerns himself in the welfare of his people, protecting them by his influence from outside extortion and violence. He will provide them with such amenities as a public bath, will take an interest in the sick and pay their expenses to hospital, will obtain for them their entitlement of monopoly goods, such as tea and sugar at Government rates, and will feed them in time of famine by loans or from his own pocket. The upkeep of the Ghanat system, its extensions and renewals, is also his responsibility. In return he will take his third of the wheat and his proportion of the other produce, and when he appears in public he will be treated with all the outward signs of respect by the villagers. Whether he increases his wealth will depend largely on the expenses of his household (which are usually very great) and the number of other properties which he owns.

Unfortunately the feudal ideal is seldom approached. The majority of privately-owned villages are in the hands of part-time or whole-time absentee

landlords who appoint an agent to look after their interests, who extorts a handsome share of the profits for himself or sublets his duties to a third party. Absentee landlordism is seen at its worst in the neighbourhood of the big towns like Sultanabad where the more easily accessible villages are bought up like stocks and shares by *nouveaux-riches* contractors and officials who have profited from present instability and unbridled corruption. Conditions in these villages can be terrible.

In Fereidan most are owned either by the leading villagers themselves or by a number of outside parties. Such villages may be fairly wealthy and prosperous, but unless a major share is owned by someone of influence they may suffer from the lack of a protector to push forward their interests. The Armenians in Fereidan with their remarkable corporate spirit are fairly well capable of looking after themselves.

*Corruption.*—So much does bribery enter into every transaction that an honest man finds no place in public affairs. A "straight" official is "a spoke in the wheel" because he interrupts the whole mechanism of bribery, both above him and below him, and every attempt is made by false accusations to remove him. Hence the majority, whether they like it or not, and however good their intentions, are forced to succumb to the system. Pages could be filled with the ways in which a Bakshdar is able to feather his nest from those under him, and one hears of quite minor officials, such as a corporal of the gendarmerie, acquiring large fortunes in the space of less than a year. Some of the best people refuse to engage in public affairs, retiring to their villages and perhaps hoping for an opportunity to quit the country, for which they see no future after the war.

The false accusation is used by the unscrupulous as a means of removing rivals in office or of damaging the interests of enemies or neighbouring landowners. Small fortunes will be spent on telegrams to high officials and on scurrilous pamphlets and propaganda, there being no law of libel whereby the unfortunate accused can clear his name. Genuine complaints become lost in a sea of lies, and arrival at the truth is a problem for the judicial expert.

*The Army.*

The army in the Chehar Mahal and Fereidan is demoralised and finished as a fighting force. Officials like Morteza Quli Khan and his Bakshdars rely upon their own tofangchis and sowars to enforce their will, with a nominal force of Persian army in the background. In villages like Akhureh Bala, until recently the headquarters of a battalion, the army drained the population of supplies without payment, spread venereal disease by the habit of taking temporary wives and gave no security to neighbouring villages against Bakhtiari thieves and raiders. The general opinion is that nowadays military operations against the tribes serve only to arm the latter at the expense of the soldiery.

The state of the army is not surprising in the light of the iniquitous methods by which conscription is enforced, and the way in which the wretched conscripts are maintained. The sick and infirm are bullied into paying bribes to avoid being called up. If they refuse they may be ordered to proceed to Tehran for medical examination (although a doctor is available on the spot) in the hope that the prospect of the cost and discomfort of the journey will extract the necessary money. If they die on the way no one will care or worry. Lucky the conscript who receives his 12 rials a month, and hungry the one who refuses to steal for his meals. Eventually he will be discharged, dirty, disillusioned and cynical, and as likely as not sick from venereal disease.

*Gendarmerie.*

What little was seen of the gendarmerie was sufficient to confirm all previous impressions about them. Whether it be their slovenly untidiness or the men themselves, one feels that they have been recruited from the dirtiest scallywags and scoundrels that could be found.

*Description of Areas Visited.*(a) *Bakhtiari.*

Several tribes were visited north of the great mountain barrier which separates the Bakhtiari Pusht-i-Kuh to the south from the Chehar Mahal, Fereidan and Ali Gudarz districts to the north. Following upon cruel and unsympathetic military governorships, the two rival septs of Haft Lang and Chehar Lang are now joined together for the first time since Reza Shah under the experienced rule of Morteza Quli Khan of the Ilkhani family of Haft Lang.



With him are a number of his sons, two of whom he has appointed Bakhshdars over different tribal groups. Many of the old khans, softened by the comforts and excesses of town life, have returned to their estates in the Chahar Mahal and Fereidan from which the jealousies and fears of the late Shah had caused them to be banished, but in which they are now sharing in the reascendancy of their family to something like its former grandeur.

Of the *Haft Lang* tribes, the Babadi and Baba Ahmedi camp on the high grasslands and valleys north of the Zardeh Kuh, where they pass the summer in the shadow of splendid snow-capped peaks. Their lands are watered by vast springs, the source of the Karun and Zayandeh Rud rivers, and have agricultural possibilities beyond those which are now exploited. The wilder tribesman merely scratches the earth and sows sufficient for his family needs, depending on his flocks for the fats and wool and hides which he barter for what he cannot produce himself.

During October when the harvest is gathered in and stored away and the coming summer's crop has been sown, most families pack up and cross the mountains with their flocks, moving by short stages through forest and gorge and by raft across river to their winter quarters north of the oilfields. Each tribe has its own jealously guarded routes, some of which are only passable for animals with great difficulty, and one of which zig-zags over a 13,000 foot pass on the Zardeh Kuh. The parallel movement of tribes is necessary so that the flocks of each may find sufficient pasture for the journey, the weaker ones having to be content with the more difficult and therefore less easily grazable tracks.

Each family has its sheep, goats, an ass or two and perhaps a horse, and lives in archaic simplicity in the rudest of tents. Most of the day's work falls upon the women, but the men when not talking, smoking or guarding the flocks from predatory neighbours are magnificent horsemen, firing from the saddle with graceful ease whilst travelling at speed over boulder strewn country. The Babadi horses are unshod and are remarkable for their mountaineering agility and path-finding qualities, which rival those of mules. The latter, for the breeding of which the Bakhtiari used to be famous, are now found only in very small numbers, the growth of motor transport having killed outside demands for them.

Each tribe has its Kalantar appointed or recognised by the Governor and responsible to him through the Bakhshdars. Previously both the Ilkhani and Haji Ilkhani families of Haft Lang appointed their own Kalantars, but this duality is being done away with by Morteza Quli Khan. A family connexion between the tribes and the Khans is maintained by some of the Kalantars marrying the daughters of the khans, usually those from concubines or temporary wives, whilst the khans themselves may take a wife from the tribes. The average tribesman, swarthy, of good physique and rugged in appearance, is simple and childlike in his ways, is potentially ferocious and loves showing off his prowess at arms, and is shy of coming into the villages or towns. If frightened, he may slip away into the mountains like a wild deer. It is doubtful if his loyalties extend much beyond his sub-tribe, but through the Kadkhodas and Kalantars a veneration is still shown towards the khans, which is all the more remarkable as the latter have long ceased to dwell or move with their people except in time of rebellion or when travelling on tour.

The *Chehar Lang* sept, some tribes of which enter into the Fereidan and spread northwards from the Pusht-i-Kuh into the Ali Gudarz district over the great barrier formed by the Shahin, Qaleh and Ushteran mountains, lacks the solidarity of the Haft Lang, and has no ancient ruling family of khans to which all tribes are subservient. Of the two tribes visited the settled section of the Mahmud Saleh has woven itself into the fabric of Fereidan and extends south and south-east towards the border of the Haft Lang. Morteza Quli Khan has appointed Mardani, a lesser khan, from one of its families, as Bakhshdar of the Chehar Lang summer quarters, whilst the ambitious and jealous Salar Shuja from another family has been given the wheat contract for the Darun area of Fereidan, and is being made Bakhshdar for the winter quarters of the Chehar Lang.

The Moghul tribe of 5,000 families are entirely settled in the Pusht-i-Kuh, where they are accessible only by horse, and in the south-east Ali Gudarz district bordering on the Georgian villages of Fereidan. Their wealthy chief, Haji Mehdi Quli Khan, whose lice-ridden qaleh at Ab-Barik is barely accessible by car, is a genial old rascal, heavily addicted to the opium pipe, and has a powerful backing of sowars, some armed with stolen American rifles (Remington) purchased from other tribes of the Chehar Lang. His men do not participate in the wealth of their chief, but seem happy so long as they are on a horse and have a rifle in

their hands. His extensive lands are well watered and produce a rich crop of wheat, of which he has contracted to sell a large share to the Government this year. Among his villagers are a number of Armenians whom he respects and tolerates for their industry and skill as cultivators.

Whilst it is necessary for him to have an armed force to protect himself from more predatory tribes, he acknowledges neither Morteza Quli Khan nor any of the Chehar Lang officials, and he and his men may well be a source of trouble in the future as he can always slip away with his sowars to his properties in the Pusht-i-Kuh, even though this would expose him to considerable losses in the Ali Gudarz area.

The problem of settling and disarming the nomadic tribes is one both of political and sociological importance. So long as virile and well armed sections of the community are allowed to roam over vast tracts of country, picturesque only to the traveller who is fortunate enough not to be robbed, there will always be trouble. Apart from inter-tribal skirmishes and raids on settled villages which may have no political significance, the simplicity of the average tribesman allows him to fall easily under the influence of unscrupulous leaders and adventurers who, promising loot and arms, will use him for their own political or acquisitive ends. This is especially so in times of national demoralisation and confusion such as exist to-day. Moreover important trade routes will be harassed or closed and potentially valuable country lost to development.

So long as he is a nomad he has little to lose and much to gain from lawlessness, and can always take refuge in mountain fastnesses and "diz" whence only major military operations can dislodge him. Complete disarmament can only follow complete settlement, and so long as one or two tribes remain armed and unsettled then others will need arms for self-protection.

The problem was tackled by Morteza Quli Khan during Shah Pahlevi's reign, before the imposition of a military governorship, and most of the tribes were settled either in their winter or summer quarters. However, the oppression of military governors and the chaos that followed the late Shah's departure combined to drive most families back to their nomadic way of living.

The chief problem of settlement, apart from that of breaking immemorial independence, is that of maintaining the flocks. As a first stage, some are allowed to proceed to the winter quarters with the flocks whilst the remainder stay in the hills, building themselves villages and engaging in cultivation, which will offset the loss of the fields in their summer quarters and the diminution of the size of their flocks. It is important that women should accompany them so that the sheep and goats may be milked during the long journey and the produce stored in goatskin bags. At a later stage it has been found possible to do away altogether with the migration of the flocks which, instead, are sheltered over winter and fed upon dried grasses when the snow lies deep on the ground.

It is important that the settlement be organised by their own khans, who understand the problems involved and allot territory and define boundaries for each of the tribes, and not by Government officials or the military, some of whose efforts in the past have savoured more of annihilation than of settlement. Again, it is necessary that they be allotted healthy areas or they will soon degenerate from the effects of malaria as has happened to many of the Lur tribes around Khorramabad and Alishtar. This and the added effects of heat are more likely to take their toll in the summer quarters than in the healthy winter quarters north of the Zardeh Kuh.

Unfortunately settled tribesmen fall easy victims to opium and other vices, like their khans, many of whom are now emasculated from over-indulgence, opium and disease. But this is a price that will have to be paid so long as conditions in Persia remain as they are.

#### (b) *Fereidan*.

Fereidan, which is entered from the north through a gap in the mountains at Damineh, contains some of the highest permanently settled villages in Persia. In winter the snow piles high and drives both men and beasts into a hibernation from which it is difficult for them to emerge. The cattle and pack animals find shelter in underground tunnels, whilst the villagers lie huddled together in an oppressive atmosphere of burning dung in which lice thrive and the threat of typhus is ever present.

The variety of races which it harbours and their virility makes this one of the most interesting districts in Persia. The bulk of the people is Turki with a large Bakhtiari element which has crept up from the south. Bakhtiari influence had declined under Reza Shah, but is rising again and shows itself in the number



of sowars and tofangchis, who swagger about armed in the villages, and in the attempts their Khans are making to restore their old properties, some of which were bought by Khunsaris.

Scattered among Turki and Bakhtiari are twenty-four Armenian and nine Georgian villages, whilst at the northern gateway there is a sprinkling of Persian. The Turks and Caucasians were transplanted there by Shah Abbas at the beginning of the 17th century. The Turks, who still speak Turki, impress one as being taller, "rosier" and healthier than nearby Persians, especially the women, although in other ways they are little different from their neighbours. The easy-going Georgians, whose nine villages centre round Akhureh Bala in the west, were converted two centuries ago by the Mullahs of Shah Sultan Hussein, since when, whilst retaining their language, they have lost much of their individuality by inter-marriage with Moslems of other races. However, many are rosy-faced with a sprinkling of fair and blue-eyed, and some of their carpets are distinctly Caucasian in design. Their homes are substantially built and well embellished with woodwork, some of which is carved. Some of their Khans are men of influence and have a backing of sowars. Akhureh Bala serves as a market centre for the Bakhtiari tribes to the south, and has until recently harboured a Bakhshdar and a large garrison. An account of the Armenians in the Fereidan is being appended to the next report.

Fereidan is a rich granary and supplies Isfahan with part of its needs. The Government share of the crop is being collected by contractors, all of whom are local landowners, some with an armed backing like the Salar Shuja and Mohamed Ali Mardani; hence the usual tales of injustice and partiality are heard. By bribing the collectors some owners are able to retain most of their wheat, hoarding and selling it at a handsome profit in the bazaars if it can be smuggled to Nejafabad or Isfahan. To offset this tendency those who bring forward their wheat are rewarded by a proportionate allotment of monopoly goods such as tea and sugar at the more reasonable Government prices, and illicitly retained wheat (in theory) is confiscated by the Government without payment.

Carpets are woven in every village, and a high quality arak is distilled by the Armenians from sour green grapes and exported as far as India. Excellent potatoes are cultivated and consumed by the well-to-do and by Armenians, but the Moslem population is prejudiced against them, which is a pity as any amount could be grown. A similar reluctance is shown by Moslems to adopt oxen for drawing carts, a system of transport which is successfully exploited in most Armenian villages.

#### (c) *Gulpaigan and Khunsar.*

Although Gulpaigan is the seat of a farmandar who governs a small district in which Khunsar is included, the latter is more important both in size of population and in the influence and power of its merchant landowners. The Khunsaris, who resent being governed from Gulpaigan, point out that their affinities lie more with Isfahan than with Gulpaigan and Sultanabad, as the bulk of their trade is with the East and with Northern Fereidan, for which Khunsar is the chief market centre. Rivalry between the two had reached its height at the time of our arrival, the election findings having just been announced with the result that Dr. Shahidi, sore from the defeat at the hands of his opponent from Gulpaigan, was comforting himself with the usual complaints that the votes had been tampered with.

Gulpaigan and its satellite villages lie among fruit gardens in an otherwise exposed plain which suffers from a shortage of water which an elaborate system of ghanaats is unable to offset. Besides wheat, opium and fruit, some cotton is grown. Malaria, the outcome of neglected ditches, levies a toll on the inhabitants which is greater than a 6,000-foot altitude would suggest.

Khunsar, the centre of a Bakhshdar, is strung out amidst orchards and greenery, in one of the most beautiful and well-watered valleys in Persia, separated from Fereidan by the great Khunsar range through a gap in which a well-trodden trade route passes. Among its exports are dried fruits, nuts, timber, gaz, wooden spoons, carpets, honey and castor oil. The gaz, a form of manna, is collected from the leaves of a wild tamarisk bush from which it exudes and is shaken off in autumn. Mixed with sugar, pistachios and a little white of egg, it is made into a sweetmeat which is exported to other parts of Persia. The sherbet spoons, carved from pear-wood, for which Khunsar used to be famed, are now of the crudest workmanship. Wood carving and painting, like other arts, has degenerated and can only now be seen in the fine wooden ceilings of the older houses, whose panels are gaily painted with a variety of floral and animal designs.

To invest wealth and to offset the local shortage of corn, enough of which cannot be cultivated in so narrow a valley, a number of Khunsar merchants acquired land in Fereidan, bought cheaply from Bakhtiari and other exiles during the late Shah's reign. They are now finding difficulty in removing their corn, Bakhtiari rifles proving more powerful than their protests, and are inclined to sell back properties to their former owners.

#### (d) *Khumain.*

The broad mountain valleys of Khumain would largely be desert were it not for the ghanaats on the upkeep of which the whole fertility of the land depends. The people are a mixture of Turki and Persian with a few Armenian villages scattered about. They are hardy and have to struggle for a living in a climate only less severe than that of Fereidan, but largely free from malaria. A big proportion of the villages is privately owned, many by absentee landlords whose interests lie in Sultanabad, rather than in the country. Oppression from officials is extreme.

#### (e) *Ali Gudarz.*

This district, which comes under Sultanabad for administrative and under Khorramabad for military purposes, was visited in its northern, eastern and south-western portions. In the north, around Dum-i-Siah, is some of the richest "daim" land in Persia. As one follows the railway from Azna towards Doroud along the Marbora River the water supply is swelled by springs from the Ushteran massif and allows the growing of rice. This is the eastern border of the "red" malaria belt which extends west across Luristan. Many of the villages in this part are peopled by settled Sagwand Lurs and are neighbours of Chehar Lang tribesmen, who raid them at intervals from their summer quarters in the uplands north of Ushteran Kuh.

Treatment was given in one of these Lur villages owned by Hamid Khan Bakhtiari of the Haji Ilkhani family of Haft Lang. Only since the departure of Reza Shah have he and others of his family been allowed to return to their villages, which have been subjected to unrestrained oppression during their absence, with a consequent falling off in the area under cultivation. In our party was the son of a Minister in the late Cabinet with whom the Kadkhuda had an amusing altercation. "It is not often," said the latter, "that such an important person comes to visit us. We will hold you as hostage until you give back the money and property which your father and the Government have stolen from us. Where is it? Look at the misery into which you have plunged us!" To which the wretched boy could find no answer, whilst our host, Hamid Khan, tactfully changed the conversation.

The eastern Ali Gudarz area has been mentioned under the Chehar Lang Bakhtiari. If the numerous complaints we heard can be believed, oppression from the Bakhshdar and Government officials at Ali Gudarz rests heavily upon the whole of their area, whilst the Government wheat collector has acquired a stupendous fortune.

#### (f) *Chehar Mahal.*

As this district is being visited again, it will be described in the next report.

### *Public Relations and Propaganda Value.*

There is no doubt that, until fairly recently, the majority of Persians were committed against the British cause and that, though much of this feeling has now been neutralised or driven underground by the recent changes in the fortunes of the war, a very appreciable anti-British feeling still exists. From conversation with friendly and enlightened Persians it is borne out that our initial support of Rhez Shah has been distorted among the people into an idea that we approved of all his later doings and are therefore the cause of all the suffering which he brought about. This idea has found general acceptance among the masses, and has been skilfully played upon by enemy propagandists, both before and during the war. Again, when we entered the country in 1941 the release of the late Shah's restrictions gave rise to short-lived hopes that the millenium was at hand, instead of which conditions have steadily deteriorated. The people cannot believe that we are not directly responsible for this state of affairs, holding to a fixed opinion that, as we have entered the country, we are therefore, behind the scenes, if not openly, the approvers of all that goes on.



Such subtleties as the occupation of a country without interference in its internal affairs are not easily grasped by the oriental mind. It is therefore easy for corrupt officials and others to blame us to the people for any unfortunate situation that may result from their own malpractices, such as an undue extortion of wheat from some village or a local shortage of supplies or transport; and the Persians are very skilful at shifting the blame onto others. The small part which we do play in their internal affairs is all the more evidence to them that we really play a major part. Exactly the same feelings with regard to Iraq were encountered by the officer commanding early this year when staying with Arab tribes along the Zab rivers.

So certain are they that the British are the hidden masters behind the scene that everything we do is apt to be regarded as having an ulterior motive. One's smallest actions and statements are carefully watched and recorded and fantastic suspicions lurk behind many a polite reception. These may in part be due to the guilty consciences which are the possession of so many and to a suspicion that one has come to remove or punish them for their misdeeds perhaps under a cloak of giving medical treatment. Why so many trucks and personnel if one is only a doctor! Amusing situations sometimes arise, such as when we arrived at the village of Hasan Nabi Zadi, son of the Nabi Zadi who was arrested by us in 1941 and unfortunately died soon afterwards at the Ahwaz concentration camp. At first he was in his house, then he had departed just before our arrival for Ali Gudarz. During the next quarter of an hour conflicting reports came in of his presence. Finally, when we had started to give medical treatment he came in rather abashed and confused. We parted on good terms. A more elaborate scene was enacted on our arrival at Haji Mehdi Quli Khan's place.

As everything one utters is regarded as being official and as they are always hoping one will take sides in their personal quarrels, one's relations with them must be governed by considerable prudence.

One of the circumstances on which enemy propaganda thrives is the ignorance of world affairs and lack of education of even quite high officials and officers, a condition which is not improved by the lack of radios and news in outlying parts. Working in this fertile medium it is possible for enemy agents or sympathisers to spread stories which gain a certain credence, such as that the German defeat in Russia is a deliberate strategic withdrawal which is leading the Russians into a gigantic trap. Again, rumours that the Germans are coming, although seldom heard these days, may still find a home in some feeble brain. If the more educated can be so easily misled, the possible effects of propaganda in the villages where utter ignorance and illiteracy are the rule can well be imagined. However, the average villager is not really interested in politics unless it concerns his immediate welfare or some local scandal. He regards propaganda posters as colourful decorations for his walls and frequently fixes them upside-down.

The Persians' feelings are so hidden under a veneer of oaths and politeness that it is not easy to discern their real attitude in a short acquaintance. However, their distrust of the British may take the form of an obstructive politeness which, if firmly encountered, will break down into an unwilling co-operation. One of their favourite weapons nowadays is to accuse their enemies of being anti-British, information which, owing to their propensities for making false accusations, should be treated with reserve. Armenians delight in telling one that all Persian Moslems are Nazis, which becomes rather tiring after a time and does the Armenian community no good.

One meets quite a number of educated Persians, such as Gharaman Khan Bakhtiar and Reza Quli Khan Naseeri, who are genuinely friendly and spare no pains to prove it. Many of them are of good character by our standards, but, unfortunately, through disillusionment and horror at conditions in their own country, are loath to take part in public affairs. Their influence is therefore correspondingly small.

Much misunderstanding can be dispelled by merely going around and meeting people in out-of-the-way places. When such contacts are reinforced by the giving of medical treatment the effect is greatly enhanced. Many officials and landowners, inspired partly by curiosity, come out of their way to call on one and profess their pro-British sentiments, whatever their actions may have been in the recent past. There seems to be no fear these days of expressing such sentiments in public. If they can persuade one to stay with them they gain a great kudos locally, which they may use to further their own ends.

There is no doubt that both villagers and tribesmen respond at once to opportunities of free medical treatment. Their gratitude is sometimes a matter for doubt, but a desire for further treatment is evident whenever one returns to them,

although much of this is inspired by the prospect of getting something for nothing, a phenomenon which they seldom encounter with their own countrymen. In privately owned villages and among the tribes the expression of public opinion, when it exists, is determined largely by the landowners and chiefs, which is evident from the latter's power to induce them to vote one way or another in the elections. It is therefore inadvisable to deal with them other than through their heads, who are, moreover, usually delighted that someone should help their people even though they may do little or nothing in this direction themselves. One hopes that the visits of the dispensary may spur them on to do something, however small, to improve the local welfare.

Villages owned by absentee landlords or by the villagers themselves present a different problem. If conditions are bad, nothing is done by the officer commanding to conceal from them the causes of their misery. In the country districts the opinion of the subjected masses has not yet found a voice, as it has among the industrial workers and operatives of the big cities like Isfahan, through the Tudeh party. Until such opinion is fostered and strongly represented in a unified organisation, it is unlikely that much will be done to oppose the avaricious tendencies of landlords and officials. Such events as the visit of a free dispensary should in time excite a demand from the people for social betterment and reforms, but it is feared that progress will be very slow. Russian social propaganda hasn't yet penetrated the area covered by this report.

[E 602/189/34]

No. 7.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th January.)*

(No. 10. Confidential.)  
Sir,

*Tehran, 7th January, 1944.*

SINCE my despatch No. 462 of the 23rd November, 1943, all other events from that date to the end of the year were overshadowed by the Tehran Conference, which excited the interest and flattered the vanity of the Persian people, who, had they been permitted, would have exhibited their feelings in demonstrations, receptions and gifts. The repression of these manifestations under pressure of secrecy caused some slight resentment, but this was quickly dissipated when the Anglo-Russian-American declaration about Persia was issued.

2. An indiscretion by Tehran radio during the passage of Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull through Tehran in October, which revealed their presence to the world, and might possibly have endangered their safety on their way to Moscow, led to the adoption of the severest measures of secrecy on the occasion of the Tehran Conference. Until Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt were about to arrive no hint was given to the Persian Government. We did not know that some days earlier the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, on instructions from Moscow, had informed the Prime Minister that it was proposed to hold a conference in Tehran and had asked the Prime Minister how this would be viewed by the Persian Government—a question to which he received an enthusiastic approval. He even informed M. Soheily (though he subsequently induced the Prime Minister to deny this in the press) that M. Stalin would be present. The Shah is said to have been greatly flattered by this "courtesy" on the part of Stalin. Security for the British and Soviet representatives was easy to ensure, since the two missions, each of which is surrounded by a high wall, are separated only by a street, which was blocked so as to cover the connecting-gates. To ensure the safety of Mr. Roosevelt was more difficult, as the American Legation is half a mile away from the Soviet Embassy, in which, it being the senior of the three missions, the meetings of the conference were necessarily held. After first having quarters arranged for him in His Majesty's Legation and then establishing himself in the American Legation, Mr. Roosevelt finally moved into a house in the compound of the Soviet Embassy. He revealed to the press in the United States that he did this on being informed by Marshal Stalin that there was a plot against the lives of the three chief representatives and that there were in Tehran over 100 German agents. The publication of this report annoyed the Persian Government, who rightly considered that it gave a false picture of conditions in their capital. They published a *démenti*, in which they rightly pointed out that during the conference none of the Allied authorities had said anything about the plot to the Persian authorities, who had, in fact, been thanked by them for the security measures taken. His Majesty's Legation are convinced that, if the tale



was not made up to induce the President to leave his own mission for that of the Soviets, it was invented by the Soviet security authorities to show that it is not only the British security authorities who can discover plots. The latter, it is true, discovered not only a plot but the plotters as well, but you can't always have everything.

3. At the Moscow Conference the British and American representatives had made a great effort to secure agreement on the issue of a declaration which would reassure Persia as to the intentions of the Allies, but it was wrecked by the determined opposition of the Soviet delegates. This became known to the Shah and the Prime Minister apparently through the Americans here, who, however, also stated that in the course of the conference the Russians had made known their intention to remove their troops after the war in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of January 1942. On the 29th November, when Mr. Eden called on the Prime Minister, M. Soheily stated that Tehran was expecting that some communiqué relating to Persia would appear as a result of the conference. The communiqué, he suggested, should (1) recognise that Persia had done her best to help the Allies; (2) confirm the assurances in the Tripartite Treaty of January 1942 as to the integrity and independence of Persia; and (3) say something about economic assistance. A similar appeal was made by the Shah when Mr. Churchill called on him. The Persians already knew that the British and the Americans were both sympathetic, and that all they had to do was to secure the assent of the Russians. In the cordial atmosphere of the conference this assent was obtained, and a declaration embodying the three points was eventually issued. This declaration gave the greatest satisfaction to the Shah, the Persian Government and the Persian people, who seemed to attach almost as much importance to the recognition of their services (mainly afforded grudgingly under pressure) and their sufferings (largely the result of Persian incompetence and venality) as to the renewed guarantee by the British and Russians of Persian territorial integrity and political independence and its endorsement by the Americans, though there was certainly a feeling of relief that the Allies, who had been half expected to "carve up" Persia, should have, on the contrary, given the most specific assurances to the contrary.

4. It was agreed that the declaration about Persia should be published at the same time as the main declaration drawn up at the conference, viz., 2000 hours Moscow time (2030 hours Tehran time) on the 6th December, and every copy held by the Allies, whether in English or in Russian, was headed by a warning in that sense. In the event, a Persian translation of the declaration appeared early on the morning of the 5th December in the Persian newspaper, *Friend of Persia*, which is published by the Soviet Embassy. The embassy, who failed to inform either the British or the United States Legation beforehand, declared that publication was forced upon them by the news that the Persian Government were about to issue the declaration. This is untrue. On the 4th December the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he intended to publish the declaration next day, promised at least to delay the appearance of the Soviet newspaper until midday to give the Government time to announce the declaration at a meeting of Ministers, Deputies and officials at 1030, and then had the newspaper in the hands of the public by 0900 o'clock. This piece of sharp practice was presumably intended to counteract the general impression that the Russians, and the Russians alone, had been opposed to the issue of the declaration.

5. The Shah had wished to entertain the three delegations as guests of the State and had offered three palaces for the purpose, and he was rather ruffled that the demands of security made it impossible for the offer to be accepted. The success of the conference from the Persian point of view dissipated this feeling, but he felt some resentment that he was only able to see President Roosevelt by calling on him in the Soviet Embassy, and he was therefore the more flattered when Stalin paid him a visit at his palace and talked to him for over an hour. Fortunately, Mr. Churchill's long talk with the Shah as long ago as September 1942 and Mr. Eden's talk with him in October 1943 gave us a long priority, but, on the other hand, the Shah found a particular pleasure in his interview with Marshal Stalin, partly because if the Russian bear purrs instead of growling the Persian is always ravished with relief, and partly because of the sympathy which the Shah thought he found in Marshal Stalin for his personal ambitions. According to reliable reports from persons to whom the Shah spoke about the interview, the Shah claims that Stalin advised him to keep a strong hold over his people and to maintain a strong army to defend his country's independence, and offered to give him twenty tanks and twenty aeroplanes and to lend him

officers to teach the Persians how to use them. The Shah seems to have taken all this at its face value. A more sceptical listener would have said to himself that, if the Russians had tanks and aircraft to spare, they might reduce by that number their demands on Great Britain and the United States; that for the only kind of warfare that the Persian army has to face, viz., the suppression of tribal disorder, there is no need for tanks, of which, indeed, Persia already possesses 100; that the despatch by the Russians of a military mission with the promised tanks and aircraft would cut across the scheme for the reorganisation of the army by American advisers and also to some extent the practice by which Persia has looked to Great Britain (and not in vain) for aircraft and for assistance in the training of pilots; and, finally, that there is something phoney, i.e., "funny peculiar," about advice in favour of strong personal rule and a large army from a ruler whose local embassy is openly backing the Tudeh party, whose members are violently opposed to both.

6. The declaration about Persia gave a filip to the reputation of the Shah as well as to that of M. Soheily. It is natural that the Prime Minister in power at the time should share in the glory. The attribution to the Shah of a share in the success is perhaps due to a communiqué by His Majesty's Legation devised in the first place to silence malicious rumours that Mr. Churchill had not called on the Shah. It stated that "it could now be revealed" that Mr. Churchill had called on the Shah in September 1942 and had a long and friendly conversation with him about the war and interests of Persia; similarly, Mr. Eden, who had had discussions with the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on his way to the Moscow Conference, had also been received in audience by the Shah, who during the course of the conversation spoke of the expectations and interests of his country. Let us hope that this revelation of the Shah's influence will not increase his determination to run the country himself. Like his talks with parties of Deputies at the time of the Millsparagh crisis, it should rather remind him of the considerable influence he can exert by constitutional means. The short cut to the perfect State must, however, be very attractive to the son of Reza Shah. A worshipper of his father, the Shah does not realise that, whatever the people of Persia want, they do not want a dictatorship resting on the hated army, and if he fails to take that into account he will fall into difficulties. He probably feels that, like his father, he can rule the army and through the army the country; but his practice of suspecting the honest critic and encouraging the flatterer, however corrupt, is discouraging to the well-wishers of Persia, and he has not yet shown the strength of character which he will need if he is to be the master of the army and not its tool.

7. The 69th birthday of Mr. Churchill was celebrated by a dinner which he gave in His Majesty's Legation on the 30th November. Mr. Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin were present with the leading members of their conference staffs—but without the diplomatic representatives of their respective countries. The occasion was remarkable, in particular for the geniality of Marshal Stalin and his tributes to Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, especially to the latter, his "fighting friend." In the interests of history it is worth while to record this short conversation which occurred before dinner:—

Voroshilov: "Whose portrait is that?"

His Majesty's Minister: "Our King, George V."

Voroshilov: "He's very much like Nicholas II."

His Majesty's Minister: "Yes, they were cousins and much alike, though not in character."

Stalin: "No, indeed. Your King even allowed us to hold our conference in London in 1907." (This was, of course, King Edward VII, but never mind.)

His Majesty's Minister: "Were you in London in 1907?"

Stalin: "Yes, I lived in Whitechapel."

It would be interesting to know whether this statement is true or merely part of the Stalin legend which is being built up. The general belief is that Stalin never left Russia before the revolution except perhaps to slip over the border into Persian Azerbaijan when things became too hot for him in the Caucasus in 1905. A remark which Voroshilov made at dinner may also be recorded. After the speech in which Mr. Churchill proposed the health of Marshal Stalin, Voroshilov said to me, pointing across the table at his chief: "And in the civil war he was my commissar." This was said not enviously but thoughtfully. Perhaps Voroshilov was thinking of the official school of Soviet historians, which is doing



its best to prove that Trotsky played an insignificant part in the civil war as compared with the cardinal rôle of Stalin.

8. Carried away by enthusiasm after the conference, the Tehran municipality decided to give the names Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin to three streets in the capital. The idea was good, but the choice of streets was bound to cause trouble. "Churchill" Street is a main thoroughfare running between two important avenues, the Firdausi (in front of His Majesty's Legation) and the Pahlevi, whereas "Stalin" Street is a minor thoroughfare to the north of the Soviet Embassy, with no outlet on the Firdausi except a narrow lane. Moreover, "Churchill" Street serves the two main gates of the Soviet Embassy, but only the back door of the British Legation. His Majesty's Legation, therefore, kept quiet awaiting developments. The Soviet Embassy have protested, and the Persian Government are trying to fit them out with a street that will satisfy them. They have found one which is suitable as to position and importance, but the embassy want a longer stretch than is offered them, regardless of the fact that this would eat up Raphael Street, which was so named as a fair swap for a Firdausi Street in Rome. The Persian Government are now saying that, if no agreement is arrived at on this point, no individual names will be given, but to satisfy everyone "Churchill Street" will be called "Tehran Conference Street." There is also a plan to erect a monument in the Shah Reza Avenue to the north of the Soviet and British Missions, with a suitable inscription. M. Soheily, peeping out of perhaps the last wisp of the cloud of glory which he trails, wants to say it with angels. His Majesty's Legation will do their best to see that the monument, if built, shall be as worthy of the occasion as is possible, for if some of the Persian suggestions are carried out, the monument will be a serious rival to a plaster nymph-and-champignon monstrosity near by, which serves as a landmark to the British community under the name of the "Slut and Mushroom."

#### *Visit of President Beneš.*

9. Dr. Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, stayed in Tehran for two days on his way back from Moscow to London. He was the guest of the Shah and the object of a display of official regard which is attributed partly to gratitude for the services to Persia which Dr. Beneš is supposed by Persians to have performed when appointed arbitrator by the League of Nations in the Anglo-Persian dispute about the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and partly to a desire on the part of the Persians to show that they know how to treat State visitors when they are not frustrated as they think they were at the time of the recent conference. Dr. Beneš was given an honorary degree, and was fêted at a dinner at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at which the Shah and the Queen were present. He made a good impression, and his visit may well have served a cause which he and other Czechs have much in mind, viz., the consolidation of the position of Skoda and other Czech enterprises in this country against the day of material development which is expected to set in after the war.

#### *Internal Affairs.*

10. The 13th Majlis came to an end on the 23rd November, 1943, in a torrent of insincere oratory. The Prime Minister and others pointed out that not only had the treaty of alliance with the Allies been signed during the 13th legislative assembly's period, but war had also been declared on Germany. The speakers omitted to mention the failure of the Majlis to deal with the major administrative problems of the country, nor the fact that so many of its members were greedy hoarders. The aged President of the Majlis, Hassan Isfandiari, was voted a life pension of 10,000 rials per month.

11. Taking advantage of the fact that the 13th Majlis had come to an end and that the 14th would not be convened for some time, the Shah forced a reconstruction of the Cabinet upon the Prime Minister. M. Soheily and the members of his Cabinet resigned on the 14th December and a new Cabinet, more satisfactory to the Shah, was formed the next day. The members of the new Government are:—

Ali Soheily: Prime Minister.  
Muhammad Sa'id Maragha'i: Foreign Minister.  
Amanullah Ardalan: Minister of Finance.  
Muhsin Sadr: Minister of Justice.  
Hamid Sayyah: Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.  
Dr. Isa Sadiq: Minister of Education.  
Mustafa Adl: Minister of State.

Abdul Hussein Hajhir: Minister of the Interior.  
Nasrullah Intizam: Minister of Communications.  
Nuri Isfandiari: Minister of Agriculture.  
Ibrahim Zand: Minister of War.  
Brigadier Ismail Shafa'i: Minister of Commerce and Industry.  
Dr. Ghani: Minister of Health.

M. Hajhir is still in London, so the Prime Minister keeps the Ministry of the Interior in his own hands. Four of the Ministers have never held Cabinet office before, viz., Nuri Isfandiari, a professional diplomat; Zand, military cadet (in Russia), lawyer, banker, and more recently comptroller of the Shah's finances; Dr. Ghani, a savant rather than a doctor and certainly no administrator; and General Shafa'i, manager of the machine-gun factory that is now making machine-pistols for the Russians. The Shah's main object was to get rid of Ahmedi and to replace him by one of his own men and so be able to run the army himself. It was suspected at the time that a desire to please the Russians by getting rid of Ahmedi and also of Tadayyun played a considerable part in the reconstruction of the Government, and this suspicion has been confirmed by the Soviet Consul-General who informed His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz that the removal of these two Ministers was decided upon during Marshal Stalin's visit because they were not favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union. The Shah, too, may have been eager to act at once on the advice which he says he received from Marshal Stalin, to govern with a firm hand.

12. My advice to the Prime Minister, who asked for my views beforehand, was to wait until the new Majlis assembled, and not to reconstruct the Cabinet in the interregnum and thereby arouse strong criticism and perhaps cause a barren constitutional struggle. It was not, I said, that I had ever held a high opinion of the Majlis; but a new House had been elected, and now that the major difficulties in the supply of currency, the income tax and foreign policy had been got out of the way, the Majlis would have an easier task, and it would be better to give the Deputies a chance to behave reasonably. The Prime Minister affected to agree, but it is unlikely that he offered serious resistance to the Shah's resolve to get in his own nominees. The Shah is perhaps regretting already that he acted hastily, for one of his protégés is already in trouble. The workmen of the Saltanatabad powder factory made a demonstration, demanding that increases in wages should be granted to workmen in State factories such as had already been accorded to officials. It appears that the new Minister of Commerce and Industry, General Shafa'i, who went to the factory to try to settle the dispute, lost his head and fired a revolver, and that a bullet hit the ground and killed one of the workmen by a ricochet. It should have been quite easy to hold an enquiry and exonerate Shafa'i, who perhaps had some justification for firing a warning shot; but Shafa'i was foolish enough to deny that he had fired at all, and the Shah, in a panic lest blame should fall on himself, who had pushed Shafa'i into the Cabinet, has tried to suppress or to rig the enquiry.

13. There being no Majlis to which to present the Cabinet, Soheily contented himself with making a short statement instead of publishing the usual formal programme. The statement said that as foreign affairs were now established on a firm basis, the Government hoped to pay more attention to home affairs; all were invited to assist the Government, especially the press. There will certainly be questions in the Majlis, when it meets, about Shafa'i and the man who was killed, and it does not at present seem likely that a Cabinet which includes Shafa'i will be approved by the Majlis, which may also interest itself in the obvious attempt of the Shah to run the army. The date of the opening of the Majlis has been officially given as the 22nd January, but none of the preliminary steps to that end have been taken and there are signs that attempts will be made from above to postpone the opening still longer. When it is remembered that the Deputy's pay does not begin to run until the new Majlis has met and his credentials have been verified, the opposition to any attempt to postpone the opening of the Majlis can be easily calculated.

14. Not much progress has been made in the elections, except those of Tehran, which came to an end on the 28th December, after a good deal of confused electioneering, in which the most vocal agents were those of the Tudeh party. The intervention of the municipality was denounced by the Government and the president of the municipality, Fazlullah Bahramy, and his assistant, Usanlou, were suspended from their functions until the 3rd January, by which time the voting was finished. The Tehran votes have not yet been fully counted, but a disturbing feature of the votes which have so far been



counted is that the pro-German mulla, Abul-Qasim Kashani, wanted by us for fifth-column activities, occupies quite a high place in the list. Dr. Matin Daftary, arrested at the instigation of the Russians, is also in the running. Elsewhere, particularly in Azerbaijan, and in Fars, the elections are mostly in suspense. Enough Deputies have been elected to form the quorum of sixty-nine sufficient for the opening of the new assembly, but not more than sixty-two have yet reached Tehran.

15. There are definite signs that the Russians are taking a much greater interest in the elections in the northern area. It appears that Kambakhsh, the Communist, is after all going to be returned for Kazvin; Parvin Gunabadi for Sabzevar; Iraj Iskandari for Sari, and perhaps two or three similar representatives of the extreme left for Tabriz. Dr. Radmanish and Dr. Kishavarz, both active members of the Tudeh party, have already been elected for Lahijan and Pahlevi respectively. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, M. Maximov, appears to have adroitly obtained the election of most of these candidates by various manipulations. The Shah is taking an active interest in the elections also; his candidate at Bandar Abbas, Dr. Misbahzadeh, is being supported by certain officials and officers under royal instructions, and other candidates, such as Sheikh Ali Dashti, are evidently being backed by His Majesty. Seyyid Zia has had a two hours' interview with the Shah at which there was some plain speaking. It appears possible that Seyyid Zia will be one of the candidates for the presidency of the Majlis, but his insistence on retaining his old-fashioned, un-European sheepskin hat, and his unyielding attitude on other points, have alienated some of his erstwhile supporters; he seems to have very definite ideas, but the definiteness seems to merge into an obstinacy which some find irritating.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

16. There is little change since my last despatch. In Fars the Germans are still at large; the Qashgai remain in possession of the arms taken from the Persian forces; and the Government has done little or nothing to increase its own prestige or to persuade any of the tribes that any advantage is to be gained by loyalty to the Government. There is little reason to hope that by the time of the spring migration the Government will have established any authority over the Qashgai tribes or that its forces will be able to suppress the lawlessness that is liable to accompany the migration and to continue through the summer if unchecked. The only alternative open to the Government may be to give more open recognition to Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai as the leaders of the tribe and to charge them with the responsibility for maintaining order—a responsibility which they would be willing to accept on their own terms. The result would inevitably be to increase greatly the difficulty of the task of disarming the tribes which the Government must eventually undertake if peace is ever to rest on a stable basis. The situation is causing some concern to the Shah and some members of the Government, and this may result in some restriction on General Jahanbani's easy-going policy of appeasement. But the Government is far from being in a position to dictate terms to the Qashgai and Boir Ahmadi leaders.

17. The operations that were to have been undertaken against the Taiyyibi and Bahmai tribes of Kuh-i-Galu have been virtually cancelled. General Amir Ahmedi, before he was dropped from the Cabinet, discovered circumstances that necessitated a modification of his original plans, and it is now unlikely that even the modified plans will be put into effect, although some show of force may be made to induce the tribal leaders to surrender sufficient arms to save the Government's face.

#### *Security.*

18. The tussle regarding the handing over to the Russians of the suspects detained at Sultanabad, who are on the Russian list, continued during the period under review. As foreshadowed in my despatch under reference, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires wrote to me agreeing with my proposal that these suspects should be released unless the Soviet authorities either took part in their interrogation or took them over for such action as they might think fit, but he asked that their release should be once again postponed. He added, orally, that the reason why the Soviet authorities could not take over their suspects was the slackness of the Persian Governor at Resht, who was supposed to be preparing accommodation for the suspects. In my reply I said that I agreed to a postponement until the 2nd December, but that it was contrary to the terms of the British agreement with the Persian Government regarding the arrest of

these suspects that we should detain any against whom we had no evidence, so we could not wait indefinitely. The Tehran Conference caused a further delay, but the Soviet Embassy expressed willingness to take over their suspects on or after the 8th December.

19. Early in December the British security officials decided that the evidence against some of the suspects on our list was not serious and I therefore suggested that any who would probably qualify for release shortly should be released at once, both as means of calming the rest and because I was not sure that the Soviet security authorities might not make a magnificent gesture—perhaps to signalise the conclusion of the Tehran Conference—and release some or all of the suspects on their list to avoid revealing the fact that the Russian evidence was of the most flimsy character. In their telegram No. 1178 of the 23rd December, the Foreign Office approved—subject to the views of the head of Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq—the proposal that those Persians should be released whose detention was not considered essential for security reasons.

20. The position at the end of December was still unsatisfactory. The suspects on the Russian list had not left Sultanabad, their transfer to Resht being still the subject of a wrangle between the Russians and the Persian Government as to accommodation, with a more fundamental but at first unacknowledged dispute as to whether the suspects should be transferred at all. The conclusion of the examination by the Anglo-Persian commission revealed to the remaining suspects that they were the prisoners not of the British but of the Russians, and while this diverted criticism from His Majesty's Government, it also raised such a howl of terror from the suspects affected and from their friends, that the Persian Government eventually instructed their ambassador in Moscow to ask that the suspects should be examined by a Russo-Persian commission at Sultanabad (a procedure which we had always stated our readiness to accept) instead of being sent to Resht in the Russian zone. The delay was so unreasonable that His Majesty's Minister had to speak to the Prime Minister in the strongest terms, asking why he was so solicitous of the feelings of a group of Persians who are accused of plotting against the Allies and against the State and so indifferent to the interests of His Majesty's Government; and warning him that the enquiry into the conduct of the suspects on our list would be suspended until the suspects on the Russian list were removed from Sultanabad or their examination at Sultanabad by a Russo-Persian commission began. In point of fact, the examination of evidence by the British security authorities continued, but their projected meeting with the Persian commissioners with a view to the production of a joint report was cancelled and the prospect of release for the less guilty of the suspects was delayed. This does not matter to us now as there no longer seems any risk that the Russians will release their suspects. On the contrary, the Soviet Embassy seems to have become more intransigent, though there are indications that it is not the plot against the Allies that they are after so much as evidence of Armenian or Caucasian activities.

#### *Economics and Finance.*

21. There has been no marked improvement in the general economic situation, but there are grounds for hope that the collections of cereals and other crops will be in excess of last year.

22. The slight weakening in wholesale prices which was evident in November was not maintained in the following month. The wholesale price index, which stood at 669 in October, fell to 651 in November, but rose to 665 on the 23rd December. Similarly, the cost of living index in Tehran fell to 1,054 in November, from 1,088 the previous month, only to increase to 1,076 in December. The regular arrival of goods by rail from the Persian Gulf ports was largely responsible for the temporary lowering of prices.

23. Currency notes in circulation rose between the 23rd October and the 14th December, 1943, by 280.90 million rials to 5,195.07 million rials. This compares with a rise of 527 million rials between August and October, and although the continued need for "new money" must be considered serious, this reduction during the past two months in the ratio of circulation increase is satisfactory.

Gold sales in the open market on behalf of His Majesty's Government continues, in the form of Persian pahlavis and 5-tola gold bars. On the 30th December, 1943, the price of the pahlavi was 590 rials, and the 5-tola bar 4,300 rials. During the five weeks ended the 30th December gold sales realised 60,576,790 rials, and were made at an average price of 2,358 rials (about £18 8s. 5d.) per fine ounce.



### Civil Supplies (including Cereals).

24. The tea position is satisfactory. Stocks are adequate, and purchases against quotas in India are proceeding. Merchants, who had tea lying at Nokkundi, have now been instructed to rail their stocks to the customs at Zahidan by the 1st January, 1944, where the Government will take over all tea which is fit for consumption at a fixed price.

25. Stocks of sugar are also adequate. The collection of the sugar beet harvest is proceeding very much more satisfactorily than had been expected, animal transport being extensively employed. Up to the 31st December, 125,000 tons of beet had been collected—78,000 tons had been consumed and 12,500 tons of sugar had been refined. It is hoped to collect another 80,000 or 90,000 tons, which should bring the total production of sugar for the 1943-44 campaign to 22,000 tons.

26. The stocks of cotton piece-goods held in the country by the Iranian Government Cotton Monopoly are given as 28,520 bales. It is probable, however, that private merchants have an equal amount in shops, stores and custom houses. The Iranian cotton crop is now being gathered, but it is not yet possible to say what the total collected will amount to. There are no indications than any pest or other harmful influence has reduced the estimated yield, and a figure of approximately 14,000 tons of ginned cotton is expected.

27. Stocks of oil in Tehran on the 31st December were as follows:—

	Days.
Benzine	36.8
Kerosene	47.6
Gas Oil	31.3
Fuel Oil	30.5

28. During the month the Persian Government were able to supply detailed inventories of stocks held at Gulf ports. These will greatly assist the Allied supply authorities in Persia, particularly in regard to granting of future supplies for Persia by the supply authorities in London and Washington, who have hitherto been reluctant to commit themselves to forward planning without knowing exactly what stocks were lying at Persian ports.

29. The question of supplying ships' bunkers in the Persian Gulf area with North Persian coal is once again being re-examined. This time the examination is being carried out, at our request, by the American military authorities, with a view to obviating the political difficulties which prevented any progress being made when the project was first attempted over a year ago. Supplies of pit timber are now adequate, and good stocks of coal are to be had at the majority of pit-heads. The main difficulty, however, is still transport.

30. On the 31st December contracts had been made for 326,859 tons of food supplies, of which 230,691 tons of cereals had been collected. In comparison with the previous month, contracts and undertakings showed an increase of 52,856 tons, and collections an increase of 90,268 tons. The present stocks in the Tehran silo amounted to 16,507 on that date, although almost 10,000 tons of this were adulterants. Collections in the northern zone have now started, and about 9,000 tons have been received out of the 40,000 tons promised, while the transport of grain from the southern zone is proceeding satisfactorily.

31. Most of the grain from the north has come from Gurgan. Only a small quantity has been received from Khorassan, where the Governor-General and the Finance Department are evidently playing a double game. Tabriz results are even more disappointing; not one ton has been sent from there to Tehran. The Soviet Embassy profess to be concerned and complain about the slackness of the officials, but it is impossible to believe in the sincerity of their professions, especially when one remembers how last year the Soviet Government, without warning to its Allies, produced 25,000 tons of wheat for Tehran at the moment when the delivery of wheat from North America had begun to relieve the shortage of bread and to improve its quality.

32. Road transport and the collection of cereals were the two main problems engaging the attention of the authorities in Persia during December. Several officials, both British and American, whose task it will be to assist in solving these two problems, arriving in Tehran during the month. The collection of grain continues fairly satisfactorily, and is being materially assisted through the supply of trucks by the British military authorities.

33. During the month negotiations were begun about the procurement of the 1944 paper requirements for Persia from the United States. No final

decisions have yet been reached, but the possibility of part of the paper supplies being imported by reliable importers on behalf of the Government is being considered.

### Transport.

34. The targets for rail allocations for December were 6,000 tons of civil goods from the south and 9,600 tons of cereals from Sultanabad and other near-by stations. Against these target figures, approximately 4,000 tons of goods were moved from the south, and 7,400 tons of cereals from intermediate stations. The total Aid-to-Russia tonnage carried during November (*i.e.*, latest available figures), excluding the East Persia route, was:—

	Tons daily.
Rail	4,920
Road	3,034

or about 239,000 tons a month.

### Industry.

35. Mining and industrial enterprises in general continue to suffer from the shortage of road transport, which is undoubtedly having a restricting effect on both Government and private enterprises. There has also been a very noticeable tendency towards labour unrest in various factories throughout the country. A further cause for disquiet is the acute shortage of sulphur. There has been no production of this important raw material for the last five months and one factory, the Parchin Acid Factory, has been closed down in consequence, while the shortage of sulphuric acid is gradually making itself felt throughout the majority of the main Persian industries. The sulphur mine at Semnan has now been restarted, but to date it has only produced half a ton per day, instead of the five or six tons which is necessary.

36. The sardine factory at Bandar Abbas is in full production, and the problem now is that of maintaining an adequate supply of olive oil and of transporting the output.

### Imports and Exports.

37. The latest available official figures for imports and exports are for the month from the 22nd April to the 22nd May, 1943. They show that imports totalled 95.1 million rials, or 7,023 tons (exclusive of duty-free goods); and that imports admitted in franchise at Customs amounted to 68.1 million rials, or 7,205 tons. The total exports for the same period, exclusive of oil, were 55.8 million rials, or 11,329 tons.

### Anti-Locust Campaign.

38. There has been quite a substantial change in the locust situation. In the summer an international conference in Tehran decided to set up defence in South-East Persia against swarms from India. It has now transpired, however, that very few swarms are likely to emanate from that quarter, and that the invasion is most likely to come from Arabia. The British anti-locust units between Jask and Lingeh will probably have a hard campaign ahead, as the swarms from Arabia will be more difficult to kill by contact dust from aeroplanes since they are expected to enter on a wide front.

### Persian Army.

39. In the reshuffle of the Cabinet General Amir Ahmedi was dropped from the Ministry for War and replaced by the Shah's nominee, a civilian official of his court, Ibrahim Zand. During his tour of office General Ahmedi had given to us whole-hearted, if not always effective, co-operation, and to the American Military Mission a measure of support with which General Ridley was well satisfied. Thereby he incurred the hostility of the Russians, and by his energetic, if not always tactful, exercise of authority over the army he aroused the suspicion and jealousy of the Shah, who accused him of attempting to be commander-in-chief as well as Minister for War. The Shah does not weaken in his determination to be the effective commander of the army and to allow no authority to be established there that is not completely subservient to himself. In this, as has been mentioned above, he claims to have found encouragement in his private interview with Marshal Stalin. The Shah is now acting as the commander of the army. He issues orders direct to the Chief of Staff without reference to the



Minister for War, and to the Minister for War and even to individual officers through his military secretary. It is the Shah's desire that the General Staff should again be independent of the Ministry for War and that the functions of the latter should be limited to supply and administration.

40. On the other hand, the Shah, according to General Ridley, has recently shown a more sympathetic attitude towards the American Military Mission and has insisted that an urgent request should be sent to the American Government for at least nine more officers. I fear that this enthusiasm for the American mission is inspired mainly by the Shah's realisation of the fact that equipment and supplies for the army are not likely to be forthcoming from America unless it is evident to the British and American authorities that the American advisers are being given support in their task. In the decree he recently signed defining the duties and responsibilities of General Ridley and the officers of his mission he was, however, careful to limit their functions to the giving of advice in matters of administration without investing them with any authority to ensure compliance with that advice.

41. The central administrative and recruit training depots, which are an essential part of the scheme of administrative reorganisation, have now been established at each of the divisional headquarters outside the Russian zone of occupation, with an American officer in an advisory capacity to every two depots. They are, as was to be expected, meeting with much obstruction from divisional commanders, since matters of supply and finance, from which they have been accustomed to derive considerable profits, have now been taken out of their hands and centralised in the administrative depots. In the face of this obstruction it is not surprising that General Ridley's administrative reforms have not yet shown convincingly good results.

#### *Persian Gendarmerie.*

42. Colonel Schwarzkopf has been given in the gendarmerie a position of greater authority than has General Ridley in the army, and he appears to intend to exploit it to the full. He may come into conflict with the Shah, since all present gendarmerie officers hold army commissions from the Shah, who wishes to retain their undivided loyalty and arrogates to himself alone the right of making promotions. Colonel Schwarzkopf is also likely to find that financial stringency, to which he appears to have given little consideration, may impose important restrictions on the plans he has in mind, but to which no visible effect has yet been given.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

43. The reorganisation of the Persian Air Force continues, particularly in the maintenance and supply branches. Lieutenant-Colonel Siah Poosh, previously liaison officer with the Royal Air Force at Doshan Tappeh, is being recalled to take charge of these activities, and has with this in view paid a visit to the appropriate Royal Air Force establishments in the Middle East. An R.A.F. officer has meanwhile been advising the Persians in Tehran. This assistance has been valuable and the Persians have expressed appreciation of it. The adaptation of the Persian Air Force to something more like Royal Air Force procedure should not only increase the serviceability of their aircraft but make easier and more economical the supply to them of the British material on which they mainly rely.

44. Colonel Stodakh, who is designated for the post of Chief of the Persian Air Staff, has also been on attachment to the Royal Air Force in Egypt, East Africa and Aden, and is about to attend the next course at the Middle East Staff College.

45. The offer of His Majesty's Government to supply Anson aircraft to the Persian Air Force as alternatives to Hurricanes or Oxforths has been accepted. The type is generally considered to be the best for the Persians' present requirements.

#### *Press.*

46. After bearing with patience the restrictions which were placed on it during the conference, the Tehran press, as soon as it was allowed to do so, expressed great satisfaction that the conference had been held in Tehran and that it had had such a happy outcome for Persia in the form of the Three-Power Declaration. All sections of the press welcomed the declaration and considered that it clarified Persia's international position and would leave the Government free to devote its entire energies to the much-needed improvement of internal

affairs. Much credit was given to the Shah and to Mr. Soheily for their skilful conduct of foreign affairs.

47. Comment on the Tehran elections consisted mostly of complaints of corruption, Government interference and public apathy. The papers of the Left were pessimistic about the results and saw little hope of any real reform as long as the present governing classes remained in power. There was increasing emphasis on the need for unity and personal sacrifice and several papers called for the formation of two or three strong political parties who would put aside private interests and work for the good of the nation.

#### *British Council.*

48. In Tehran teaching of English in the institute, university, schools and technical college by British Council staff is limited only by the capacity of the staff provided. English is being indifferently or badly taught by many private individuals (Persians) in various parts of the town and it is obvious that the institute must open branches to provide lessons for those who find the main building inaccessible. This cannot be done until more staff are appointed. In the National Bank 400 members of the staff have applied to the Council for English lessons but it is impossible to do more than supervise teaching given by Persians and provide text-books. A British professor was offered to and accepted by the university in December but his arrival has subsequently been cancelled. This is the sixth time during the past year that a professor has been proposed, accepted and withdrawn.

49. In Isfahan the new institute was formally opened on the 22nd December. About 250 students are being taught English and 200 have joined as members for club activities only. Lectures, concerts and exhibitions of films are held every week as in the Tehran Institute. English in place of German is now taught in the technical college by the institute staff.

50. In Shiraz all necessary preparations have been made for an institute to be opened. Work will start immediately staff can be found.

51. The institute directors are making regular inspections of secondary schools in Tehran and Isfahan and giving advice on the teaching of English. A new Minister of Education has recently been appointed who desires to promote the British system of education and would gladly accept British teachers in all secondary schools. Advantage of this attitude should be taken while it exists.

52. A lecture was delivered to a large audience of doctors by Dr. Florey, professor of pathology at Oxford, on the new drug penicillin. Miss Irene Ward, M.P., gave lectures and met many Persians in Tehran and Isfahan. Her tour had an excellent effect and similar tours by British visitors would be welcomed. A number of Persians of both sexes have asked to be sent to England for study purposes and the matter is under consideration.

53. The proposed Russian Institute in Tehran, to which reference was made in my despatch under reference, has not yet materialised.

54. I am sending copies of this despatch to the office of the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow, to the Government of India and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1809/97/34]

No. 8.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st March.)*

(No. 111.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 10th March, 1944.*

AS I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 229, dated the 9th March, I presented to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on that date the credentials appointing me His Majesty's Ambassador at this post. The ceremonial on our side was unusual in that several of the fourteen members of the staff whom I took with me had no uniforms, either because they had lost their property by bombing or because they had come to Tehran by air and could not bring uniforms; they wore evening dress, and thereby imparted a slightly international colour to our general appearance. His Majesty's Ambassador was himself rather below the standard for such an occasion, having a uniform without gold lace on the chest, the Scotch friend in London charged with the conversion of the coat from consul-general's to Minister's having convinced even Messrs. Moss Brothers that gold braid on the chest is not *de rigueur* for a



Minister of (I think) the third class. The Persian Court officials made up, however, for any drabness in our appearance by wearing gold braid wherever it could be sewn on—breastplates, backpieces, stomachers and all; to such an extent that I could not deprecate the comment of the additional military attaché, Colonel Pybus, who quoted from Bishop Blougram's Apology:—

"... his back brave with the needlework of Noodledom."

2. The ceremony took place at the Gulistan Palace, whither we were conducted by the head of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I was eventually shown into an inner room; my own staff was left behind, but I found His Imperial Majesty the Shah backed by a line of Court officials. It had been agreed that there should be no speeches, but, after I had made a formal statement about my new appointment and presented the letters, the Shah made a speech of welcome, which could not be left without reply. To this the Shah, seeming to be too nervous to stop, retorted in words which again could not be left in the air. I began to feel as one does in greeting an Iraqi, where one has at least eleven ways of saying good morning and each is met by a crisp reply. In the end the Shah put an end to the exchange of compliments by desperately shaking my hand. One remark of mine was not an empty compliment: I could say with sincerity that, having been here through so many bad days, I was very happy to remain with the hope that better times would come. On the other hand, the Shah was certainly sincere in expressing deep gratification at the raising of the status of His Majesty's representative at the Court of Tehran.

3. I now presented to His Majesty the members of the staff, several of whom were already known to him. He then put into execution a procedure recently devised to distinguish between ambassadors and ministers at the presentation of credentials, whereby ambassadors are to have a private interview with the Shah, which is not to be granted to ministers. This enabled the embassy staff to enjoy tea and conversation for three-quarters of an hour while I had a rather inconclusive talk with the Shah and the Minister for Foreign Affairs which might have gone on for twice as long if, warned by experience, I had not picked up my gloves one by one and finally laid my hand on my hat. His Majesty began by referring to my approaching visit to the United Kingdom, and I said that I hoped that he and his ministers would raise before I left any questions which they would like me to discuss in London. At this the Minister for Foreign Affairs grinned, remembering, I think, the desiderata of the Persian Government as conveyed to the Foreign Office by M. Hajir in a memorandum which I had described as the same length as the Shah Reza Avenue, a thoroughfare several miles in length. The Minister for Foreign Affairs talked a great deal about the difficulty of dealing with the Russians, who blamed the Persians if there was insecurity in the Russian area, and yet haggled for months about posting another hundred soldiers there or sending in a few more rifles and rounds of ammunition. The effect of this discourse was to show (what is perfectly true) that the British behave towards the Persians with greater consideration than the Russians. I spoke of our hope that the war would not last very much longer; that the retirement of the foreign troops would relieve the Persian Government of many problems, particularly a psychological problem of great importance; and that the assumption of entire responsibility for security by the Persians would be effected smoothly and effectively.

4. At one point the Shah said that Persians—army officers included—were still inclined to run either to the British or the Russians, while the British and the Russians would say that one officer was this and another that. This, he said, was bad. I agreed that to try to play one ally off against another was undesirable as well as useless, but said that we were not to be blamed if in the interests of Persia we preferred honest Persians to corrupt ones. I was thinking of the chief of the Shah's military cabinet, whom no one believes to be honest, and the Shah was probably thinking of him too.

5. The Shah said that he thought that the British ought to have a more constructive policy. I recited some of the items in our programme for Persia—help in feeding the country and in making the most of its transport and other resources, support for the American advisers, and so on, and asked whether His Majesty could mention anything more constructive that we could do. His Majesty could not, and I do not know what he was thinking of.

6. When speaking of possible ways of absorbing the skilled Persian labour which will be set free when Persia ceases to be a road to Russia, the Shah said that some might be employed in the Persian navy, "if we have a navy." This

was said with genuine and unconscious sadness. I have reported before how deeply the Persians feel the almost total loss of their infant navy at our hands, partly by destruction during the invasion of August 1941, and partly by requisitioning.

7. At my suggestion, a signed portrait of His Majesty King George was sent out for the Shah after the Tehran Conference. Unfortunately, the glass was broken in transit, and, although I was able to replace the glass, it was not possible to repair properly the slight damage done to the frame and the portrait by the splinters. I had informed the Minister of Court beforehand that I hoped the frame, and if possible the portrait, would be replaced, and had asked whether the Shah would perhaps like to receive the portrait unframed. This proposal had been accepted, and I therefore handed the portrait to His Majesty, who expressed great gratification at the gift and remarked on the excellence of the portrait as a likeness.

8. The Shah was wearing two Persian decorations, but not the G.C.B.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 1981/187/34]

No. 9.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th March.)*

(No. 120. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Tehran despatch No. 331 of the 11th August, 1943, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a report from His Majesty's Consul-General, Meshed, on the political situation, covering the period from July to December 1943.

*Tehran, 17th March, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 9.

(Secret.)

*Six-monthly Political Situation Report, July–December 1943.*

SUPERFICIALLY, the period under review was the best half-year since the occupation. Thanks to the abundant harvest and to the Provincial Government's successful evasion of their duty to help feed the capital, there was more than enough to eat for all except the lowest classes; raiding on the main roads practically disappeared; there was no rioting in the towns, and the public health suffered from no serious epidemics. The Shah's visit with a large cortège to Meshed in October passed off well. On the other hand, the cost of living index maintained its high level in spite of all the factors which might have been expected to lower it; Dr. Millspaugh and his efforts to make Persians good by rule and regulation were ignored or sabotaged; the mechanism of internal distribution of consumer goods further deteriorated; profiteering and official corruption became even more rampant, and the disparity between the ever-increasing wealth of the "haves" and the abject poverty of the "have-nots" still further widened. In other words, behind a typically Persian façade of peace and prosperity the political and economic structure of the province continued steadily to disintegrate.

*Security.*

2. The improvement in security along the Zahidan–Meshed road was undoubtedly due in part to the appearance of British Indian forces in connexion with the anti-locust operations near Birjand in July and again in September, when armed convoys of supplies for China went up the road as far as Turbat-i-Haidari. Credit, however, must also be given to his Excellency Amir Alam (Shaukat-ul-Mulk) who issued rifles and ammunition to the inhabitants of certain strategically-situated villages in the southern Qainat and encouraged them to engage the raiders, also to Captain Baloch of the Turbat-i-Haidari gendarmerie, who in November finally liquidated the Kurkheli Baluch gangs which had been



operating from the wild hill country of Jangal and the Perso-Afghan no-man's land east of Rui Khaf. The assistance afforded by the Government of India in the shape of three 15-cwt. trucks and a new telephone line was much appreciated and went far to deprive the gendarmerie officers of their best excuse for failing to catch raiders, namely, the difficulty of communication between posts and headquarters.

3. Elsewhere in the province the only serious disturbance was in the Kuchan-Shirvan area, where Ali Khan Bicharanlu and Hussain Khan Nigahban, rival Kurd chieftains, carried on a small private war in July and August. The despatch of troops and gendarmerie from Meshed was delayed by the Russians, who regard any Persian military move with the utmost suspicion, but a small force eventually restored order and collected a few rifles. A reconciliation between the rival headman has since been effected by the Governor-General during a tour of the district. There is every prospect, however, of further fighting unless the tribes can be disarmed, and this depends on a change in the Russian attitude.

#### *Political Affairs.*

4. Events and developments of political importance during the period included the elections for the Majlis, increased activity on the part of political associations, and the reappearance of a certain amount of religious fanaticism centring on the Shrine.

#### *Elections.*

5. The representation of Khorasan in the Majlis consists of four seats for Meshed and district, two for Sabzawar, and nine for the rest of the province including Birjand. After voting had commenced and then been suspended for a month on the excuse of the Muharram fast—one wondered why they had not thought of this before—elections were completed by the end of the year except in Sabzawar, where the results were not announced till early in February. As was to be expected, with Persia's grotesquely unsuitable election law and procedure, the voting everywhere was a farce. Even at Meshed four-fifths of the voters are illiterate; collection and counting of votes is done by a committee nominated by the Governor-General and responsible in practice only to him: small wonder that candidates hold no meetings, make no speeches, and confine their canvassing to members of the election committee, wealthy wirepullers, and persons who have influence with the authorities. The result depends on the will and authority of the Governor-General acting either in his own discretion or under orders from the capital. In Meshed and district a great show was made of closely-contested results. The published figures, swollen by the alternative vote system which in a four-seat constituency gives every voter four votes, showed Amir Taimur Kalali top of the poll with only 1,181 votes in the city itself (population 175,000) but 30,784 from the rural area, in which most of the "electorate" live in primitive villages and isolated farms tucked away among rugged hills and inaccessible by car; Ali Iqbal came second with 1,760 urban and 30,174 rural votes, and so on. Of the fifteen successful candidates all but two had official backing; eight had been Deputies before; six were landowners; six of the landless remainder were helped by wealthy supporters; only Parvin Gunabadi, who failed for Meshed but was returned later for Sabzavar, was definitely a Tudeh party candidate. Six, including the last-mentioned, are believed to have been recommended to the authorities though in no sense actively supported, by the Russians.

6. On the whole the results might have been worse; a satisfactory feature was that all but two of the Deputies "elected" are of local origin and connexions, and several of them are men of substance and standing, not mere carpet-baggers. But they represent powerful groups or individuals, in no sense a majority of the electorate as a whole.

#### *Political Associations.*

7. Of the political associations which existed at the beginning of the period the Hizb-i-Tudeh or People's party alone was active. Its paper, *Rasti*, continued to publish well-deserved diatribes against official corruption and capitalistic exploitation of the masses and the speeches at its meetings usually dealt with the same themes. Its leaders are men of no particular standing or personality and they rely chiefly for their influence on the popular belief, sedulously fostered by themselves that the Russians secretly protect the Hizb-i-Tudeh and have marked it out as the Communist party of the future Soviet Persia. Another

"Opposition" party, the Hizb-i-Paikar, which brought itself into the limelight last winter by a series of pamphlets pillorying the notorious Dehimi, has since subsided into obscurity bought off or terrorised no doubt by the official clique. A more promising development is the foundation towards the end of the year of a new association called the Guruh-i-Dadgustaran, or Justice party. The founder and "leader" of this society, Agha Sajjadi (better known as Tamaddun-ul-Mulk) was formerly in the employ of this consulate-general and between 1941 and last autumn was working for the Central Publicity Bureau, New Delhi. He resigned his post there to take up a political career in his mother-country, and the Hizb-i-Dadgustaran is the chariot upon which he hopes to ride to power. He has evidently studied the technique of political organisation in India, and the title he has chosen for his party clearly shows its political complexion. Membership is strictly limited to men of substance and good reputation, and so far as can be seen up to date, Sajjadi has succeeded in getting together a body of influential moderate, and respectable men, mostly of the propertied and professional classes. Their programme is to reform Persia from within in close co-operation with the Allies and thus cut the ground from under the feet of the Tudeh party. The society is elaborately organised with committees dealing with various subjects such as publicity, charity and the investigation of popular grievances. Sajjadi keeps His Majesty's Consul-General fully informed of all his activities and doubtless uses his British connexion to gain adherents, but he also keeps in touch with the Soviet Consul-General, whose informal approval he obtained before launching his publicity campaign. A licence for the publication of the society's newspaper has at last been obtained and the first issue is to appear with a flourish of trumpets on the 27th February. It remains to be seen whether Sajjadi's undoubted zeal, honesty and skill are sufficient to make his party a constructive force and its paper a pillory for greedy officialdom.

#### *Religious Matters.*

8. The visit to Meshed of Haji Agha Qumi, a noted Shia mujtahid of Kerbela, in July raised apprehensions of religious agitation. Signs of reaction against the anti-clerical policy of the late Shah had been evident for some time, and it was known that the object of the Haji's visit to Persia was to obtain certain concessions from the civil power concerning the management of the waqf property religious teaching in Government schools, the wearing of the veil, and other such controversial matters. The Governor-General, however, handled Qumi and the local mullahs very cleverly—doubtless the Russian bogey helped him—and there were no untoward incidents. But the Haji's visit undoubtedly gave a fillip to the clerical reaction mentioned above. Veiled women are now quite a common sight in the streets; during Muharram and on days of mourning, processions have been on a larger scale than at any time since 1930; and the Governor-General has been obliged to restore the functions and privileges of the *khadims* or "Servants of the Shrine" who take pilgrims round the Holy Place. He is adamant, however, about letting the mullahs have anything to do with the management of the Shrine's huge revenues.

#### *Economic and General Situation.*

9. Behind the façade of improved security and functioning administrative machinery the state of the middle and lower classes is little better than in the dark latter years of Reza Shah. Public Bandit No. 1 has gone, only to make way for a coterie of officials who, taken as a whole, exploit the masses nearly as thoroughly as he did. Not only is the man in the street and at the plough looted direct by local officials, police and gendarmerie in the good old way, but a new technique has been evolved by which he is squeezed dry by "big business" in the shape of the Monopoly Departments and officially-protected private racketeers. During the long months of scarcity before the last harvest we saw "bread" consisting chiefly of barley-bran and poppy-seed meal being retailed in strictly limited quantities at the controlled shops to half-starved queues, while tons of good bread made from hoarded wheat were hawked through the streets under their noses or retailed at "free rates" to the well-to-do at neighbouring bakeries. Another scandalous racket is the distribution of sugar. The province has its own officially-controlled sugar refinery and the beet crop, last season, was exceptionally heavy; at least 60,000 tons of beet went into the factory, enough to make 7,000 tons of sugar; yet we see a few tons here a few tons there being dished out by the Finance Department at the controlled rate of Rials 20 per kilog. on a basis of 400 grammes a head monthly to the people of the towns, while the rest of the population either go without or pay Rials 110 (17s. 6d.) a kilog. in the fully-stocked "free" market.



Again, the Khusravi ginning, spinning, and weaving mills at Meshed turn out half the quantity of cotton piece-goods they could produce and sell them at scarcity prices while the people go in rags. The "black transport" racket is perhaps the most blatant of all. Hundreds of lorries are on the roads, many of them lease-lend to Persia complete, others privately-owned but fitted with Indian or American tyres worth in Persia thirty or forty times the price at which they are delivered. The Edarah-i-Barbari Rah (Road Transport Department) is supposed to control the running of these trucks for the benefit of the civil population. But instead of carrying consumer goods, grain, fuel, &c., at the schedule rates (recently raised to Rials 2.4 per ton/km.) the drivers have been getting Rials 10 or more by private negotiation and sharing the proceeds with the officials and police who let them do it. In a country of great distances and no railways mechanical transport is the main economic bottle-neck, and there is no doubt that this racket is one of the chief factors in the disastrous inflation from which East Persia is suffering.

10. In the jungle of official corruption it would be surprising if the biggest lion of them all, the Governor-General, starved. After two years in office Ali Mansur's position is stronger than ever. His appearance is deceptive; his puny physique, muddy complexion and receding chin conceal a will of iron. His talk also is deceptive; to visitors he gives the impression of a patriotic statesman, voluntarily exiled from his beloved Tehran for Khorasan's good, striving with some success. In spite of untrustworthy subordinates and muddle-headed interference from Tehran to protect the people of his province from exploitation and want. It is possible indeed that present power and future career mean more to Ali Mansur than wealth, and that he condones the various rackets that go on without sharing in their proceeds, simply because the racketeers are too strong for him. However this may be, the result is the same; a small coterie of trading officials and officially-assisted merchants and landowners run the province for which he is responsible entirely for their own benefit. They either control or can influence the Finance and Agricultural Departments; the Municipality; the law courts; the police; the vastly wealthy Shrine of which the Governor-General is *ex officio* Naib-ut-Taulia or manager under the Shah; the valuable estates of the late Shah; the monopoly companies which handle Government stocks of sugar, tea, cloth, tobacco, and opium, the sugar refinery and the spinning and weaving factory in which the Shrine is the chief shareholder.

11. The vast majority of the people fatalistically accept this situation. Among the lower classes a few hundred members of the Hizb-i-Tudeh rail against official corruption and high prices without understanding what is going on. In the upper classes a small but much better-informed group of European- and American-educated youngish men doctors, teachers, and officials with consciences writhe under the yoke of what they call "the Gang." But they do nothing. The gang in fact brook no opposition. Criticism on the platform or in the press they tolerate up to a point, but if it becomes dangerous they suppress it. Inconvenient enquiries or instructions from the capital are ignored as long as possible if powerfully pressed they are outwardly deferred to, inwardly sabotaged.

The gang are fully aware of the disapproval of the British and American representatives in Persia, and of their part in the said inconvenient enquiries and instructions. For this reason, while outwardly they profess friendship and pay lip-service to our democratic ideas, inwardly they hate us and long for the day of our departure. They think themselves clever enough in the meantime to maintain in spite of us their stranglehold on the country. In this province their only serious fear is of a popular uprising, engineered perhaps by the Tudeh party with secret Russian support. But this is a long-term anxiety, not an immediate one, for there is little doubt that the Governor-General has long had a secret understanding with the Russians, that they will support him and keep him here in return for his services in keeping order along their line of communications and assisting their trade agency and military supply service in large-scale local purchases.

12. This seemingly cynical alliance with capitalism is characteristic of present-day Soviet policy. The Russians in this province seem to be preoccupied entirely with military and commercial expediency, and scarcely even interested in Communist or even democratic ideologies. In fact, they sorely disappoint their followers by playing only half-heartedly, if at all, the time-honoured game of bear versus lion. If they plan, as everyone hitherto has taken for granted, the ultimate absorption of Khorasan in the Union, it must be admitted that they are doing remarkably little to prepare the ground. It is not so much the Soviet Consul-General or the officers of the garrison who support the half-baked communism of

the Hizb-i-Tudeh, it is the large non-official "Russian party" of Armenians, Caucasians, Jews *muhajirs* (émigrés) and would-be quislings in the future Soviet Khorasan. The Russians themselves certainly do not oppose British interests, though there is a certain amount of quite friendly rivalry in public matters. M. V. Kozlov, who continued to be consul-general throughout the half year, was definitely co-operative within the narrow limits of his discretion. Such trouble as we had, *e.g.*, over road permits, was due to faulty liaison between civil and military. Social relations with the consulate-general officials and their families continued to be thoroughly cordial.

#### Future Prospects.

13. To sum up: Khorasan has for the last two years been ruled firmly but selfishly by a clique of officials under a Governor-General backed by the Russians, whose military and commercial (but not political) ends he serves. What hope is there of reform?

14. The gang have ranged against them the Tudeh party, the younger western-trained *intelligentsia*, Sajjadi's Dadgustaran, or Justice party, and other ill-assorted "opposition" elements; but they have also in far Tehran the growing power of the American advisers, backed by the Allied Higher Command, to reckon with. The influence of the Hizb-i-Tudeh is discounted by the reflection that if and when the Red Army evacuates Persia after the war that party's main support will be removed. It is too early yet to foresee the fate of the Guru-i-Dadgustaran; their meetings and newspaper may one day be a power in the land, but they also rely rather too openly on an Ally—ourselves—and there is always the danger that they may slip into the respectable but ineffective rôle of a Moderate party of the Indian type, especially if their ambitious "leader" migrates to higher spheres. The younger *intelligentsia* are perhaps Khorasan's least forlorn hope. They too look to us; in fact, they bitterly regret that we did not seize "the golden opportunity of Shahrivar," as they call it,<sup>(1)</sup> and fill the political vacuum we ourselves created by ejecting the Pahlevi tyrant. If these men were to join Sajjadi's organisation, or start a better one, and set themselves to educate public opinion—if a new spirit of courageous patriotism and sympathy with the masses, their despised and exploited compatriots, were one day to move them to unite against the gang they hate, Khorasan might give the rest of Persia a lead towards real democracy. But this class, though as quick and intelligent as any in Asia, lacks courage and the capacity to unite. As a member of it said sorrowfully to the writer not long ago, "No sooner do we get together and begin to do something than we start squabbling among ourselves." Even if they found themselves in power they would not stay there a fortnight without powerful support and strong guidance. But whose?

15. Recent developments in the policy and activities of the American advisers, the M.E.S.C., and other Allied authorities at the Centra have given reason to hope that the guidance and help needed to bring the best and most progressive elements in Persia to the top may be forthcoming. Hitherto, it must be confessed, that policy has seemed, from the point of view of a remote but not unimportant province, somewhat over-centralised. The multiplicity of sections and bureaux and boards and secretariat and centres at Tehran and the man- (and woman-) power deployed in them has been impressive but somewhat bewildering, contrasted with the thin red line of British and American representation in the provinces. Moreover, some of the advisers, like other distinguished newcomers, have seemed perhaps unduly impressed by the façade of Reza Pahlevi's capital and its magnificently-housed bureaucracy. Dr. Millspaugh, remembering maybe the success of his former mission but forgetting that he then had a dictator at his back, seems to have thought that he could make Persia good by Act of Parliament. During the year and a half since the first of them arrived not one of the civilian American advisers has found time to study on the spot the problems of Persia's eastern provinces. In May last (a year and a half too late, but that was not his fault) Dr. Millspaugh secured the enactment of a long series of laws and regulations. They give the impression of having been framed by someone with very little first-hand knowledge of present-day Persia. In this country an ounce of enforcement is worth a ton of enactment, yet the whole series contains about half a dozen perfunctory penal clauses, mostly threatening mere "confiscation

<sup>(1)</sup> The occupation of Persia by British and Russian troops began on the 1st Shahrivar, 1320, in the Persian calendar (25th August, 1941).



without compensation" of the goods or means of transport concerned. Only in the Special Powers Act of the 4th May, 1943, is the possibility of official non-co-operation envisaged; erring Government servants are threatened vaguely with "dismissal" and "punishment according to the law." For the rest, Dr. Millspaugh, in drafting his regulations, relied on his investiture by the Special Powers Act with certain "powers" granted by earlier Acts, including the Anti-Hoarding Law of the 18th March, 1942. He was probably unaware that in most provinces even that law, with its commendably explicit and draconian penal clause, had been a dead letter from the outset. The provision that the Penal Procedure Regulations have to be followed in all their leisurely detail make it in practice unenforceable anywhere except under the nose of a fully-powered American or British official. It has at most a nuisance value in the nation's struggle against its profiteers. In Khorasan it is doubtful whether Dr. Millspaugh's regulations have even a nuisance value. They are ignored alike by official, police, law-courts, hoarders, and the general public, and will continue to be so until American or British assistant advisers, inspectors, or departmental directors are sent to the main centres with strong staffs and full powers, and until the Allied Higher Command is prepared to demand and enforce removal of any official whatever, from the Governor-General downwards, who tries to sabotage their work.

16. The recent deputation by the British and American authorities of a number of experienced and energetic officers to East Persia to report on local problems connected with food-stuffs and other necessities augurs well for the future. We have had visits from Lieut.-Colonel A. Macann, I.P.S., additional counsellor; Lieut.-Colonel Ataullah Khan, I.M.S., Inspector-General of Food-stuffs; and two Persians of integrity and ability, Messrs. Salmon Asadi and Shaibani, of the Finance Department. Better still, the Road Transport Board have sent two very able Danes, Messrs. Von Stemmann and Kahr, to clean up the Barbari Rah black transport racket at Meshed, and Captain Coupland on a similar mission to Zahidan, while the M.E.S.C. have lent the services of Lieutenant Joel to the Finance Ministry for work at Zabul in connexion with the collection and transport to Zahidan of the surplus from last year's wheat and barley crop, some 12,000 tons. Best of all, a full-fledged American Director of Finance for Khorasan has been promised us, though his arrival is being unaccountably delayed. These appointments, especially the last, are bound sooner or later to bring matters to a head with the gang, and provided the officers are given sufficient staff and funds and supported strongly from the Centre, there is real hope of a new era of prosperity and decent administration dawning for Persia's eastern provinces.

C. P. SKRINE.

3rd March, 1944.

#### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 422/422/34]

No. 10.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th January.)

(No. 1.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period of the 20th December, 1943, to the 2nd January, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 3rd January, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 10.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the Period 20th December, 1943, to 2nd January, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

1. The appointment of the new Cabinet has been on the whole received with apathy in the country, and the general expectation seems to be that it will not last long after the opening of the new Parliament. That has been announced for the 22nd January. The results of the Tehran elections should soon be available as voting has closed. In Azerbaijan voting has been suspended owing to the strong interference of the Soviet authorities on behalf of candidates of the Tudeh party.

2. Dr. Beneš arrived in Tehran from Moscow on the 28th December for a short visit, during which he was the guest of the Shah. Both the Shah and the Government laid themselves out to demonstrate how admirably they could entertain an important State guest. The University of Tehran conferred on Dr. Beneš the degree of Doctor *honoris causa*.

3. There is some unrest among manual workers in Tehran. There were threatened strikes of railway workers and of employees in the wireless station of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs and an actual strike in the ammunition factory at Sultanabad near Tehran. In all cases the cause of the discontent was alleged to be insufficiency of pay. Conditions of the working classes are generally sufficiently bad to make easy the work of the agitator. That agitators are at work there is no doubt, nor that the long-suffering Persian working classes are being awakened to a knowledge of their power. The Minister of Finance and Dr. Millspaugh have issued a communiqué informing the workers that a commission has been formed to investigate and report on the pay of manual workers in Government employ.

4. There is no longer any doubt that the Tudeh party is directly supported by the Soviet authorities. The mere fact that it had achieved the distinction, unique in Persia, of having existed for over a year as an organised and disciplined party with a consistent programme was sufficient to arouse suspicions that it was being held together and directed by outside influence, and during the elections Russian support of Tudeh candidates has been unconcealed.

5. The statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Roosevelt on his return to the United States to the effect that Marshal Stalin had informed him that there were 100 German agents in Tehran during the conference and that a plot to murder the three statesmen had been discovered, called forth a denial in the press from the Persian Government. They stated that nothing had been said to the Persian authorities by any representative of the three Allies of the existence of any such plot either before or during the conference, and that high officials of all three Allies had thanked the Persian Government for their efficient security measures.

##### Appointments—Civil.

6.—(i) Ma'sud Muazid to be Persian representative at Beirut with the rank of Minister.

(ii) Abdullah Ashrafi to be Farmandar of Shahreza.

(iii) Sadiq Vasiqi to be director of the Mortgage Bank.

(iv) Abbas Quli Isfandiari (retired general officer) (F.O. 93-M.A. 122) to be Director-General of the Department of Rationing in the Ministry of Finance.

7. A personality note on the present Minister for War, Ibrahim Zand, is appended to this summary.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Army.

8. The recruit training and administrative depots, which are part of the reorganisation plan of the American advisers (see Summary No. 42/49/43, paragraph 9), have now been inaugurated at all divisional headquarters outside the Russian zone. An American officer has been allotted to every two divisions—one to the 1st and 2nd, one to the 4th and 5th, one to the 6th and 10th, and one to the 7th and 9th Divisions.

[27851]



9. General Ridley states that he has recently found the Shah more sympathetic to the work of the American Mission, and even insisting that more officers should be obtained from America. An urgent request for at least nine more—making with the eleven already here twenty in all—has been made to Washington by the Persian Government.

10. The transport situation of the Persian army has considerably improved with the arrival of some 600 trucks from America. These have been organised into units under the supervision of one of the American advisers. Although the standard of driving and maintenance is low and the misuse of transport is rampant, General Ridley is not dissatisfied with the progress made in the circumstances that existed.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

11. *Army.*—Sartip Rohulla Keikavusi to be Military Governor of Tehran. *Gendarmerie.*—Sarhang Yamini to be commander of the 7th (Western) Gendarmerie District.

*Retirements.*—Sarhangs: Yazdanfar, Muhammad Nawaz Safari, Hassan Khadivi, Muhammad Ali Sadari, Yadullah Azam Zanganeh (Air Force), Ali Reza Mansumi, Mustafa Mansur, Ibrahim Timurian.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

12. The situation remains outwardly calm, largely because the Persian authorities are careful to do nothing that might irritate Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai. Persian Government arms in the possession of the Qashgai tribes have not yet been handed back; nor has Khosrow Qashgai implemented his promise to apprehend and surrender the Germans, five of whom are known to be just outside the borders of Qashgai territory. The Mamassand tribes, who have hitherto refused to ally themselves with Nasir and who might have formed a loyal pro-Government *bloc* in the middle of Qashgai territory, are reported to have been alienated by the Government's rejection of their claim to the ownership of certain lands. As far as can be judged the position of the Government grows weaker and that of the tribes grows stronger.

##### *Khuzistan.*

13. A band of brigands, variously reported to be Boir Ahmadi or Taiyyibi, has been operating in the vicinity of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's field at Pazanun. Company property and employees have not yet suffered, but travellers have been looted and several gendarmes have been killed.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

14. The Shah has presented a medal to the Russian Colonel, Bourseiv, as a token of appreciation of the assistance he gave in the work of completing the machine-gun factory for the manufacture of machine pistols.

15. Two Russian officers have arrived in Fars for the alleged purpose of investigating agricultural possibilities.

#### *Appendix to Summary No. 1.*

(Reference: Paragraph 7.)

#### *Personality Note: Zand, Ibrahim (Ebrahim), Minister for War.*

Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France, where he was a contemporary and friend of Jawad Amery. Towards the end of the last war became an active member of the Musawat party in Azerbaijan, and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia, where Davar employed him in the Ministry of Justice as an advisor. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Ebtehaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed

at Court as Comptroller of the Royal Accounts. Minister of War in Soheily's third Cabinet, December 1943. Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahramy. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian. A harmless but weak man, who has not succeeded in making his mark in either politics, law or banking, and has obtained the post of Minister of War in order that he should enable others to run that Ministry.

[E 601/422/34]

No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th January.)*

(No. 32.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period of the 3rd to 16th January, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 17th January, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 11.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the Period  
3rd–16th January, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE Majlis is due to be opened on the 22nd January; invitations for the opening ceremony have been issued, and it seems probable that by that date there will be present in Tehran more than the sixty-nine Deputies necessary to form a quorum. The total number of Deputies elected to date is seventy-five. About one-third of the votes cast in the Tehran elections have been counted, and a list of the leading candidates is published daily in the press. These for some days included the names of Saiyyid Abul Qasim Kashani and Matin Daftari, against whom charges are pending of having abetted German plots in Persia. The impropriety of advertising to the world the extent of the esteem in which these notorious Germanophiles are held by the voters of Tehran and the bad impression that would thereby be made on Persia's allies was reluctantly recognised by the Government, and their names no longer appear in the lists of favourites.

2. Suleiman Muhsin Iskandari (Suleiman Mirza), leader of the Tudeh party, and for some years a professing Communist, has died. His funeral was attended by representatives of the Soviet Embassy.

##### *Economic.*

3. In his monthly report for the month the 24th October–22nd November Dr. Millspaugh discusses the principles that should guide the framing of the budget for the coming year, and particularly the conflicting demands of agricultural development, public education, public health and security. He makes some pertinent remarks about the army and gendarmerie which will meet with no approval from the Shah. The army, he says, has no task except that of internal policing; he encourages the Government and the Deputies to resist demands for an increased budget allotment for the army and urges them to consider the possibility of reducing its size in order to make funds available for its better equipment and its greater contentment. The Shah, as is well known, is demanding an increased budget for a larger army, whose task, he likes to think, is to maintain the independence of Persia and add to his own importance. The army is likely to be a first-class issue in the new Majlis, both as regards the share it consumes of the national revenue with very little benefit to the nation, and as regards the Shah's pretensions to make it the instrument of his personal policy.

4. Probably as a result of the influence of American advisers in various administrations, investigations are being made into large-scale embezzlements and frauds. Officials of the Road Transport Department, of the Cereals and Bread Department and other departments of the Ministry of Finance, and army officers have been in some cases dismissed and in others arrested for corrupt practices. Even a few convictions will have a good effect.

[27851]

E 3



5. Unrest among workers continues to show itself. In Isfahan telephone operators went on strike for some days for higher wages. In accordance with the promise made to workers in Government employ after the disturbances reported in Summary No. 1/44, paragraph 3, an interdepartmental commission was appointed to fix minimum wages for unskilled workers. It recommended for the approval of the Council of Ministers that unmarried men should draw 9 rials a day, married men without families 12, and with families 15 rials.

6. Throughout the rural districts the people suffer from a shortage of tea, sugar and cloth. The Chief Administrator of the Price Stabilisation Section has recently published the fact that there are in Government stores 28 million yards of cloth and ample stocks of sugar. It is solely due to corruption and to the inefficiency of distribution that supplies do not reach the people who so badly need them.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

7.—(i) Ghulam Hussein Ashrafi, formerly Director-General in the Ministry of Industry and Mines, to be Under-Secretary of State in the office of the President of the Council of Ministers.

(ii) Muhammad Saruri to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior.

(iii) Saiyyid Ali Nassr to be Persian Minister to China.

(iv) Mubassir Roshani to be Farmandar of Tabriz.

(v) Fathullah Nuri Isfandiari (F.O. 96) to be Persian Minister with the Polish Government in London.

(vi) Lissan Sepehr to be Inspector-General in the Ministry of the Interior.

(vii) Qasim Hakimia to be Director of the Mortgage Bank.

(viii) Fazlullah Bahrami has resumed the appointment of Chief of the Municipality.

(ix) Khosrow Panah (Sardar Mufakham) to be Farmandar of Qasvin.

#### *Persian Forces.*

8. It seems possible that the new Minister for War will not be content to be the cypher he was intended to be by the Shah. He has already made formal protest against the conduct of General Razmara, the Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat, who in one case passed the Shah's orders to him in discourteous terms, and in another issued orders for the dismissal and replacement of the Military Governor of Tehran without reference to the Minister or the Government. He has invited the American advisers generally to take a more active part in the reform and supervision of administration, has authorised General Ridley to appoint an American officer to take executive charge of the administration of the Isfahan Division, where the divisional commander was being obstructive, and has demanded from the American advisers within ten days a scheme for the reorganisation of the Finance Branch of the War Office, to include a 50 per cent. reduction in its staff.

9. Increases of pay have been sanctioned for military officers and civilian officials of the Ministry for War on the scale already approved for other Government servants (see Summary No. 44/43, paragraph 5). According to the Minister for War, these increases are "sufficient to enable officers to live on their pay." He now intends to insist that corruption shall no longer be condoned and that all officers guilty of dishonesty shall be brought to trial.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *North Khorassan.*

10. Quarrels have again broken out between the leaders of the Zaaferanlu and Bicharanlu Kurds in the neighbourhood of Shirvan, but no reports have yet been received of inter-tribal fighting. Hold-ups of U.K.C.C. lorries have occurred between Quchan and the Russian frontier, which may be connected with these tribal disturbances.

##### *Fars.*

11. General Jahanbani has been expressing some anxiety regarding the possibility of disturbances arising from the hostility existing between Abdullah Zarghampur on the one hand and his brother Khosrow and Muzaffar Aru, another Boir Ahmadi chief, on the other. He has asked for reinforcements to be sent to

Behbahan to guard against possible threats to the area of the oil-fields, and it is probable that three battalions will be sent from Tehran. Khosrow Qashgai is now with Abdullah Zarghampur in Western Kuh-i-Galu, ostensibly to discuss the surrender of the Germans who are now in Boir Ahmadi territory. It is doubtful whether this is more than a pretence, and it is probable that the real purpose of his visit is rather to re-establish the alliance between Abdullah Zarghampur and himself and his brother Nasir.

12. General Jahanbani is also proposing to move a force through Mamassinni country to Basht for the purpose, he pretends, of exercising a restraining influence on Abdullah Zarghampur. It seems, however, that his real object may be to coerce the Mamassinni, who are refusing to accept a recent decision of the Government on claims to tribal lands made by the Mamassinni chiefs. The Government may yet realise that they cannot afford to antagonise the Mamassinni and may forbid a move that might lead to hostilities.

#### *Khuzestan.*

13. Some of the Bahmai and Jancki chiefs, against whom it was intended to carry out operations (see Summary No. 48/43, paragraph 11), have visited the Persian commander in Khuzestan to make submission. They have promised to surrender some arms, and the Persian commander hopes that the show of force which he will be able to make if he receives the reinforcements referred to in paragraph 11 above will be sufficient to induce the fulfilment of this promise.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

14. M. Mikailov, the new Soviet Ambassador in Persia, arrived in Tehran on the 11th January.

15. M. Kozlov, Soviet Consul-General in Meshed, has been appointed a member of the Inter-Allied European Commission.

16. The Russian officers who, as reported in Summary No. 1/44, paragraph 15, had arrived in Fars for the alleged purpose of investigating agricultural possibilities, were in the neighbourhood of Bandar Abbas on the 7th January. The Ministry of Agriculture denies knowledge of these officers, and the real purpose of their journey is unknown.

17. An Irano-Soviet Cultural Society has been formed in Tehran as a counterblast to the British Council. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs figure on the committee, which includes several prominent Persians. Telegrams of mutual felicitation have been exchanged with the Soviet Society for Foreign Cultural Relations (VOKS).

18. For some months a strong drive has been in progress throughout Persia for the collection of funds for Soviet sufferers from the war. The methods used under the spur of Soviet representatives have savoured of blackmail. They have resulted in the collection of quite substantial sums and in bringing Russia prominently to the notice of many Persians.

#### *Iraqi Affairs.*

19. Khadim-al-Dujaili has arrived in Tabriz as Iraqi Consul. He was formerly lecturer in Arabic at the London School of Oriental Studies.

#### *Abyssinian Affairs.*

20. Dr. Tourenzo has arrived in Tehran to take up his post as Abyssinian Minister in Moscow.

#### *French Affairs.*

21. M. Pierre Lafond has arrived in Tehran as representative of the National Committee of Free France.

22. A society for the study of French literature has been formed in Tehran. The French have been for some time concerned about the decrease of their long-established cultural influence in Persia, and this step may be an attempt to revive it.

*Tehran, 16th January, 1944.*



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th February.)*

(No. 38.)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the period of the 17th to 23rd January 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 24th January, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 12.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the Period  
17th to 23rd January, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

1. All arrangements had been made for the opening of the Majlis on the 22nd January; invitations and programmes had been issued and the streets sanded for the Royal procession. On the 21st January it was announced that the opening had been postponed. This came as no surprise to many people as it was well known that the Shah, the Russians and certain Deputies were in favour of delaying the opening for various reasons. The pretext given was that there were insufficient Deputies present to form a quorum. Sufficient Deputies could, in fact, have been collected, but some were induced to absent themselves from Tehran. For some days previous it had been evident that the Majlis would not be opened if the Shah could prevent it. He had disquieting reports of the temper of a number of the Deputies in Tehran; he feared criticism of the changes, well known to have been due to his insistence, made in the Cabinet during the interregnum, and questions regarding the shooting of a striker at the munitions factory by General Shafai, the Shah's nominee to the Ministry of the Interior, an incident about which the public is exercised because no public enquiry has been allowed. He is obsessed by fear of Seyyed Zia and the possibility of his forming a strong constitutional group of Deputies in the new Parliament that might be obstructive to his aspirations to autocracy. The Shah has been investigating the possibilities of finding pretexts for invalidating the election of Seyyed Zia, and he had seriously considered appointing in the place of Soheily, with whom he is very discontented, a new Prime Minister or a Council of State who would declare all the elections to be illegal because of official interference and other malpractices. He proposed then to issue by decree a new Electoral Law which would govern the new elections. Elated as he still is by his own evaluation of Stalin's sentiments towards him, he was with some difficulty persuaded that there was too much danger in this unconstitutional procedure. Following so soon on the enforced inclusion in the Cabinet of his own nominees it would inevitably have been interpreted, possibly correctly, as an attempt on the Shah's part to secure a subservient Majlis on the pattern so skilfully elected by his father.

2. To the Russian Seyyed Zia is still a bogey—the chosen instrument of British Imperialism. It is difficult to see where they find the smallest evidence to support this belief. His professions seem revolutionary enough to satisfy extreme Socialists, but the Tudeh press continues to attack him and the Russians to frighten the Shah with his alleged ambitions.

3. The public and press are much excited by the publication of the news that a Persian pilgrim was decapitated by the authorities of Saudi Arabia at Mecca after being charged with defiling the shrine. The Government has issued a communiqué giving details and announcing that a strong protest had been made to the Government of Saudi Arabia, who had been informed that unless adequate compensation was made and guarantees given for the future safety of Persian subjects the Government of Persia would prohibit the pilgrimage to Mecca for all Persians.

*Economic.*

4. Dr. Millsbaugh finds that revenue is coming in better than he expected. He publishes the following figures:—

	<i>Ordinary account.</i>	<i>Commercial account.</i>
	<i>Rials.</i>	<i>Rials.</i>
Receipts to 22nd November ...	2,504,728,801	1,944,075,741
Disbursements to 22nd November...	1,773,840,271	1,835,370,753

5. An official announcement in the press gives the following figures as regards cereals:—

	<i>Tons.</i>
Undertakings to 15th January ...	330,000
Deliveries ...	250,000
Stocks in Tehran ...	17,000

*Appointments—Civil.*

6.—(i) Ghulam Reza Nurzad to be a Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(ii) Hassan Pirnazar (F.O. 155-M.A. 210) to be a Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(iii) Muhammad Zand Neapur to be Farmandar of Qum.

*Persian Forces.*

*Appointments—Military.*

7. The following officers have been retired:—

Sarlashkar Abdul Majid Firuz.

Colonels: Hussein Shaibani; Qasim Vujdani; Amanullah Jalveh (Medical).

*Internal Security.*

*Fars and Kuhigalu.*

8. A meeting recently took place near Behbahan of Khosrow Qashgai and Abdullah Zarghampur which was attended by His Majesty's Consul-General for Khuzistan and Colonel Humayuni, the officer commanding the Persian troops in Khuzistan. Ostensibly the purpose was to discuss with Abdullah Zarghampur the surrender of the Germans known to be in his territory. He denied that they were there, but also promised that he would expel them within twenty-twenty-five days. He gave assurances to the Persian commander of his desire for peace and promised to surrender some of the arms taken from Persian troops at Semirum. There is no particular reason to believe any of these assurances.

9. It does not appear that General Jahanbani's fears that Abdullah Zarghampur may create trouble in the vicinity of the oil-fields area have any substantial justification at present. His Majesty's Consul-General considers that the reinforcements of three battalions which are being sent will exercise a sufficiently steady influence.

10. In Fars the Mamassani are unsettled and will remain so until a settlement is made of their land claims. Jahanbani has been discussing with Nasir Qashgai the question of the latter's lands. He says he told Nasir that an essential condition of settlement was Nasir's submission to Government and the disarmament of the tribe.

*Bakhtiari.*

11. It was feared that the long-standing jealousy between the two branches of the family of the Bakhtiari Khans—the Ilkhani and the Haji Ilkhani—might lead to trouble. Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor, has been appointing his own relatives to all available positions in the Bakhtiari to the exclusion of the other branch of the family who were beginning to show signs of restlessness. Morteza Quli, not content with the present boundaries of his governorship, tried to persuade the Government to extend them to include Feraidan and the territories of the Bahmai and Western Janeki. This has been refused, but he has managed to get one of his sons, a military officer, appointed as Governor of Feraidan and to have the two Chahar Lang Khans of influence in that area, Muhammad Jawad Shujai and Muhammad Ali Mardani, detained in Isfahan. Morteza Quli Khan claims that during a visit to Tehran he placated the senior khans of the other branch of the family by promises of benefits to come.



*Polish Affairs.*

12. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 18th January was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	815	2,732	792	4,339
Isfahan ...	94	611	1,705	2,410
Ahwaz ...	333	1,529	907	2,769
Meshed ...	5	9	53	67
	1,247	4,881	3,457	9,585

The total number of Poles in Persia in January 1943 was 21,691.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. Kuznetsov, the Soviet Consul-General at Tabriz, has informed His Majesty's Consul-General that he is being transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

Tehran, 23rd January, 1944.

[E 890/422/34]

No. 13.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th February.)*

(No. 46.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the period of the 24th to 30th January, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 31st January, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the Period 24th-30th January, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

IT has now been officially announced that the Shah will open the new Majlis on the 22nd February. There appears to be a fairly common belief that the Government will not survive many encounters with the Deputies. This uncertainty does not conduce to the co-operation of Government officials with their responsible Ministers.

2. The Military Governor of Tehran has issued a warning to the press and publishers that the following offences are triable without jury:—

- (i) Crimes attributable to any manifesto, declaration or any published matter other than books.
- (ii) *Lèse-majesté*.
- (iii) Insult to the head of a foreign State or its diplomatic representative.
- (iv) Publications insulting to or defamatory of any representative of the nation; Ministers or their deputies; officials of the Court, Government, Parliament or municipalities; judicial officers; members of municipal councils, chambers of commerce or electoral colleges; provided that the slander has no connexion with the office or function of the person concerned.
- (v) Libels or slanders against any individual.

*Appointments—Civil.*

3.—(i) Ibrahim Khajeh Nuri, Director of Press and Propaganda, to be Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

(ii) Abdul Vahid to the Farmandar of Qasr-i-Shirin.

(iii) Abbas Quli Gulshayan to the Mayor of Tehran *vice* Bahrami, resigned.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

4. The Soviet Ambassador has now informed the Shah that the tanks and aircraft promised by Stalin are now ready for delivery (see Summary dated the 5th December, 1943, paragraph 8). The numbers have been increased to 35 tanks and 30 aircraft—20 bombers and 10 fighters. The Russians suggest that a tank regiment should be formed at Qasvin and an air regiment at Meshed, each to have a strength of 600-700, of which one-third would be Russians, provided and paid for by the Soviet Government. This proposal has caused some alarm, since it might well be the foundation of a force partially officered by Russians and wholly under Russian influence to be used, as was the old Russian-officered Persian Cossack Division, for the furtherance of Russian policy in Persia. The Shah has, however, decided that, since the tanks and aircraft are a gift, the Russian suggestions must be agreed to. The Persian Government is to inform the Russians that the Persian army cannot at present find more than 100-150 officers and other ranks of a type suitable to undergo training in each regiment. According to a statement made by the Shah to a reliable informant, the tanks are 28-tonners. These will not only be a useless encumbrance to the Persian army, but are likely to be expensive toys. The above information should be treated for the present as most secret.

5. The Shah recently paid a visit of inspection to the Mechanised Brigade. This brigade has been a bone of contention for some time between him and the American advisers. The latter rightly regard it as a useless expense in present circumstances and recommended its disbandment. The Shah, on the other hand, wishes to expand it by the addition of armoured cars (which he has not got) and mechanised infantry. Its present constitution is—

One anti-aircraft artillery regiment of eight 75-mm. Bofors A.A. guns.

One battalion of four searchlights.

One mixed artillery regiment of—

Eight 105-mm. long Skoda guns.

Four 150-mm. long Skoda guns.

Four 150-mm. short Skoda guns.

One battalion of anti-aircraft machine guns of 18, 15-mm. Besa machine guns.

6. At the annual ceremony for the presentation by the Shah of epaulettes to first-year cadets of the Military School the commandant announced that there were 336 cadets in the school.

*Police.*

7. Mr. Timmerman, the American Director-General of Police, who has for some time been criticised in private, has recently been subjected to some criticism in the press. The number of thefts, assaults and robberies with violence in Tehran has been increasing, and Mr. Timmerman, who has powers that carry responsibility, is being accused of laxness in his task of reorganising the police. In an interview given to the press he stated that on the present wages of 1,000 rials a month it was impossible to obtain recruits for the police force; that in Tehran alone there was a deficiency of 800 constables; that the police force was seriously deficient in means of communication and means of rapid locomotion, and that he had demanded jeeps, motor cycles and telephones from the United States, so far without success. He went on to say that one of the greatest handicaps to the suppression of crime was the extreme leniency of the courts. He had also during the eight months of his official work in Persia had to deal with two Prime Ministers, seven Ministers of the Interior and three chiefs of police. Each change had meant that he had to get agreement all over again for his proposals.

*Appointments—Military.*

8.—(i) Sarhang Gulshayan to command the 5th (Luristan and Kermanshah) Division *vice* Sartip Iravani, recalled.

(ii) Sarhang Hoshmand Afshar to command the 4th (Kurdistan) Division *vice* Sarhang Gulshayan, transferred.

(iii) Sarhang Deihimi to be Chief of Staff of the Southern Forces *vice* Sarhang Muqbeli, relieved.



(iv) Sarhang Siassi to be Head of the 2nd Bureau General Staff *vice* Sarhang Deihimi.

(v) Sarlashgar Ali Asghar Naqdi (M.A. 196) to be Director of Conscription *vice* Sartip Khosrow Panah, relieved.

#### *Internal Security.*

9. Tribal areas remain quiet. In Fars the main interest centres around the elections and Nasir Qashgai's manoeuvres to secure the election of candidates favourable to himself. He is endeavouring, by the expenditure of money and hints of his nuisance value to merchants and landowners, to persuade the people of Shiraz to elect him from that town. In this he has two objects: one to prove that he has influence outside the Qashgai tribe; the other, to make sure of the election of at least two Qashgai candidates, since no one disapproved of by the Qashgai is likely to get elected from Firuzabad. The Shah has, however, sent orders to General Jahanbani that he is to prevent at all costs the election of Nasir from Shiraz and to tell him that he will be accepted as a candidate for Firuzabad, the centre of his influence, only after he has handed over the Germans and surrendered Persian Government arms in possession of the tribe.

#### *Western Azerbaijan.*

10. Kurdish chiefs of Western Azerbaijan were recently summoned to Rezaieh by the Governor-General and admonished to keep the peace. The advice of the Governor-General was supported by the local Soviet authorities. There is little disorder at present beyond occasional pillaging of villages, particularly by the Jalali Kurds of the Maku district.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

11. Reports have been current in Tehran for some days of large increases in Russian garrisons in North Persia and of the impending arrival in Qasvin of several Russian general officers. No confirmation has yet been received of these reports. The Russian authorities say that fresh troops have arrived in Persia, but that they are in relief of the troops now here.

12. The elections in Tabriz are still in suspense owing to the continued manoeuvres by the Russians to secure the election of their approved candidates. His Majesty's Consul-General considers that these candidates would have no success in free elections against the candidates put up by the landed and merchant classes, since Azerbaijan is still essentially conservative, but that, if the Russians were really determined on the election of their nominees, they might be successful, such is the fear of possible Russian reprisals. Azerbaijan still remains without a Governor-General owing to Russian opposition to every official suggested by the Persian Government.

13. Two prominent members of the Armenian Dashnak party have recently been arrested in Tabriz, one by the Persian police at the request of the Russians, the other by the Russians themselves.

14. The committee that was formed by the order of the Shah under the presidency of Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi for the collection of funds to relieve distress in Russia has announced that no further collections are to be made and that the committee will be dissolved as soon as the money collected and accounts have been received from the provinces. See also Summary No. 2, paragraph 18.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

15. M. Henryk Strasburger, Polish Minister of State in the Middle East, has arrived in Tehran on a visit to the Polish refugees.

#### *Free French Affairs.*

16. The report in paragraph 21 of Summary No. 2/44 that M. Pierre Lafond has arrived in Tehran is premature.

*Tehran, 30th January, 1944.*

[E 1070/422/34]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th February.)*

(No. 54.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the period of 31st January, to 6th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 7th February, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 14.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the Period  
31st January to 6th February, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The date announced for the opening of the Majlis is the 26th February and not the 22nd as stated in paragraph 1 of Summary No. 4/44. Meanwhile, there is much preliminary intriguing going on among the Deputies and by the Court.

2. The Tudeh press has published protests signed by supporters of Nasir Qashgai against alleged Government interference in the elections of Fars. It was reported in Summary No. 4, paragraph 9, that Nasir was endeavouring to secure the election in Fars of candidates favourable to himself. The Government has its own list of candidates besides being opposed to Fars being represented only in the Qashgai interest. The reason for the Tudeh, that is, Russian, encouragement of Qashgai candidates is not clear. It is certainly not helpful to British interests in Fars.

3. Several police officials have been put on trial on charges of having been concerned in the death of certain prominent Persians during the reign of Reza Shah. They include Colonel Radsar, lately chief of police and Mukhtari, his predecessor, who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. Defending counsel demanded that Reza Shah, who he alleged was the man really responsible for these deaths, should be brought to trial.

4. The Central Committee of the Tudeh party has announced that every member of the party is to pay 10 per cent. of his income for one month to the party office as a contribution to the fund for the relief of distress in Russia.

##### *Economic.*

5. Dr. Millspaugh has published a regulation which calls attention to the fact that the Government has been put to heavy loss through contracts and agreements concluded by various departments of Government. He therefore orders that no convention or agreement involving Government revenues, financial commitments or the cession or use of Government property shall be concluded without the approval of himself as Administrator-General of Finance.

Two contracts where the Persian Government has lost heavily are those for the sale to the Russians of rice and of arms and ammunition manufactured in the Government factories.

6. It is stated in the press that in accordance with the terms of the Soviet-Persia Commercial Agreement the Soviet has delivered in exchange for rice:—

1,485,000 metres of cloth.  
55,000 metres of silk textiles.  
Knitted goods to the value of 1,723,000 rials.  
Crockery and earthenware to the value of 2,075,000 rials.  
Bottles to the value of 850,000 rials.  
Newsprint to the value of 1,757,000 rials.  
Thread to the value of 612,000 rials.

7. The Anti-Hoarding Department announces that 2,000 charges of offences against anti-hoarding laws have been laid before the courts. There have been forty-eight convictions and 127 acquittals.



8. In the autumn of 1943 certain measures were taken by Russian and British authorities to deal with an expected invasion of locusts from Indian Baluchistan and from Arabia. For this purpose the Government of India provided a mechanised battalion of Indian infantry and G.H.Q., Mideast, lent the Transjordan Frontier Force. The former was located near the Persian Gulf close to the Indian frontier and the latter in the Bandar Abbas-Jask area. In addition, a flight of R.A.F. machines, specially fitted for the spraying of swarms, was allotted to Jask and ten Russian aircraft to the area nearer the Indian frontier, to operate from Jiwani (G-41 N. (1941) B. 5248). As, however, later conditions showed that an invasion from India was unlikely, in December the Soviet aircraft and Soviet specialists returned to Russia and the Indian infantry battalion was withdrawn to India. The Transjordan Frontier Force will remain in the Bandar Abbas-Jask area for some time longer.

9. The following statistics regarding education in Persia were given by the Minister of Education at a recent ceremony where the Shah was present :—

(i) Number of schools in Persia—Primary	...	...	2,392
	Secondary	...	267
(ii) Number of pupils who received certificates during the past year from primary schools	...	...	17,158
(iii) Number of pupils who presented themselves for the final examination at secondary schools	...	...	26,501

*Appointments—Civil.*

10. (i) Kazim Sayyah to be Director-General of the Ministry of Industry;  
(ii) Ali Maulavizadeh to be Farmandar of Burujird;  
(iii) Sartip Mirjalali to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce;  
(iv) Baqir Kazemi (F.O. 105; M.A. 142) to be Persian Minister in Sweden;  
(v) Mr. Pixley (American adviser) to be Director-General of Accounts and Audit.

*Corrigendum.*—In Summary No. 4, paragraph 3 (ii), the appointment of Abdul Wahid should be Bakshdar and not Farmandar.

*Addendum.*—In Summary No. 4, paragraph 3 (i), add at end—in addition to his other duties.

*Tehran, 6th February, 1944.*

[E 1219/422/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd February.)*

(No. 68.)

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 6, for the period of the 7th February to the 13th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 14th February, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 15.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the period 7th February to the 13th February, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

1. As the opening of the Majlis approaches the Shah shows increasing nervousness. He has been seeing a number of the Deputies, and it seems that these interviews have not increased his confidence in his own wisdom but have aroused anxieties as to the attitude the Majlis is likely to adopt towards his recent unconstitutional attempts to influence the course of events. It is also

said that reflection and the views of others have raised fears of the possible consequences of his acceptance of the Russian offer to form Persian Tank and Aviation Units, with a strong framework of Russian personnel, from the tanks and aircraft which Stalin is presenting—see Summary No. 4/44, paragraph 4. He is likely to attempt to divert attention from himself by encouraging the growing hostility to Soheily, who is not expected to survive for long the opening of the Majlis. Saeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, seems to be his most likely successor.

2. The Tehran elections are now over, and the names of eleven successful candidates have been published in the press. The twelfth has not yet been announced. It is perhaps noteworthy that the three who have easily topped the poll, Dr. Musaddiq, Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, and Hussein Pirnia, have been genuinely elected on the merits of the esteem in which they are held and not as a result of bribery or the usual electioneering methods of candidates. No Tudeh candidate has been successful and only three of those especially favoured by the Shah.

3. Investigation into the charges against the suspects interned at Sultanabad is now finished as far as concerns those against whom the British have evidence. Thirty-two against whom the Russians claimed to have evidence, which they have not yet produced, have been handed over to the Persian Government for custody pending investigation by the Russians.

*Communications.*

4. Attempts are now being made to exercise more effective control over the motor transport at the disposal of the Road Transport Department of the Persian Government. This amounts to 900 Lease-Lend trucks and 685 trucks under contract. Owing to lack of supervision many of these have been employed in carrying illicit loads at large profits. Eighteen British officers and nine British n.c.o.s have now been lent to the American director of the department to supervise the operation of the transport. The Persian Government has also issued regulations setting up a Department of Transport. The functions of this department are those of Movement Control. All applications for the transport of goods by road or rail must be made to the department, who will allot priorities and inform the Iranian State Railways or the Road Transport Board. The department will also allot priorities to demands by Government officials for cars or accommodation in other means of transport. It will be in charge of a director responsible to the Administrator-General of Finance.

*Appointments—Civil.*

5. (i) Mehdi Davar (Vossuq es Sultaneh) (F.O. 57; M.A. 73) to be Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan.  
(ii) Ahmad Muqbil to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.

*Persian Forces.*

*Army.*

6. The Soviet Government has invited a mission of Persian officers to visit Russia. They suggested that fifty might be sent, but the Persian Government has pleaded that it could not, in present circumstances, afford to send so many, especially as it has to find officers for training in the tanks and aircraft to be presented by the Soviet Government. It is probable that General Yazdan Panah will head the mission to Russia and that the number to accompany him will not exceed fifteen. It is proposed to detail about thirty officers for training in the tanks and fifteen for training in the aircraft with about 100 other ranks in each case.

7. Colonel Atapur, C.B.E., lately Persian Military Attaché in London, has returned to Persia.

*Appointments—Military.*

8. Colonel Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami to be head of the Second Bureau of the General Staff.

*Internal Security.*

*Fars.*

9. Nasir Qashgai may be realising that both the Shah and the Persian Government (some members of it) are considering measures to prevent him from



having it all his own way in Fars. He is aware that General Jahanbani has been ordered to oppose his election for Shiraz and the election of his nominees. It is also likely that he is aware that General Jahanbani is reporting to Government that peaceful negotiations cannot succeed with Nasir and Khosrow. Nasir has been making overtures to His Majesty's Consul, but there is no reason to believe that they are any more genuine than previous advances. His Majesty's Consul maintains his attitude that he will have no discussion with Nasir until the Germans have been handed over. The Government is considering the appointment to Fars of Farajullah Bahrami (Dabir i Azam), the present Governor-General of Isfahan, a relatively strong and disinterested official, in place of Qavam ul Mulk, who is unwilling to return except on terms unacceptable to the Shah and the Persian Government. General Jahanbani says that he intends to propose to the Government a plan for the disarmament of the Qashgai by force, but it is probable that his demands for troops and arms will be more than the Government can find. The Persian army is not fit to carry out the protracted operations necessary for the effective disarmament of the Qashgai, and the political handling of the tribes since the Government withdrew its support from Qavam ul Mulk's policy has not been such as to create allies for the Government or dissidence in the possible combination against the Government.

10. The situation is likely to increase unrest in Fars. A band of robbers alleged to have been assisted by Qashgai tribesmen attacked a village near Kazerun, whose inhabitants had been expressing loyalty to Government. On the 8th February a punitive party of troops and gendarmerie attacked the robbers, who are reported to have been reinforced by Farsimadan Qashgais. The Government forces lost six killed and claim to have killed sixteen robbers, but His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz does not consider that the encounter ended in a victory for the Government forces.

11. It has been decided not to proceed with the operations for the disarmament of Dashti—see Summary No. 48/43, paragraph 10; Ali Ismail, the rebel leader, and his armed men have escaped into the hills and are probably being protected by the Qashgai. General Jahanbani has decided that he must reduce his commitments so he is withdrawing his troops from Dashti and leaving a garrison 100 strong and a Military Governor at Khurmuj and a small garrison at Ahram. This is the third time within the last two years that troops who entered Dashti for the purpose of carrying out a disarmament have been withdrawn without achieving their object.

#### *Kuh i Galu.*

12. Discussions are still going on about operations for the disarmament of the Bahmai and Janeki tribes. General Jahanbani wishes to carry out the operation with troops supported by Bakhtiari levies. Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari, refuses to co-operate in an operation controlled by the army, but guarantees to secure the disarmament and submission of these two tribes if Bahmai is included in his governorship and he is promised the support of troops if necessary. Colonel Humayun, the officer commanding the troops who would have to carry out the operation, is content to do it with troops alone.

#### *Khorassan.*

13. Trouble looked like breaking out between the Turkomans and the Kurdish tribes of the Shirwan district of Bujnurd. Farajullah Khan of the Zafaranlu Kurds had abducted a Turkoman girl and the Turkomans gathered to attack Kuchan. There were unconfirmed reports that there had been some fighting, but it is now reported that the dispute has been settled by the intervention of Ardishir Khan of the Shahdillu Kurds.

14. Seyyid Ismail of the Zaidaranlu Kurds, a notorious robber of the Kuchan Bajgiran area, is reported to have been killed in a fight with Persian gendarmes on the 27th January.

#### *Western Azerbaijan.*

15. In the latter half of January Kurds from Persia raided a Turkish village of the Barmish district, killed three villagers and carried off 3,000 sheep. Representations by the Turkish Consul to the Persian authorities were without result as the latter were powerless. The Turkish Consul then appealed to the Russians, who arrested the culprits and handed them over to the Persians.

#### *British Affairs.*

16. His Majesty's Legation in Tehran has been raised to an Embassy, as also has the American Legation.

17. Lord Knollys, chairman of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and other officials of the company visited Tehran from the 10th to the 12th February.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

18. Reports regarding alleged large increases in the number of Soviet troops in Persia continue to be circulated with so much assiduity and wealth of detail that it is natural to suspect that these reports are being deliberately put about for some definite purpose. Those who believe them attribute these increases to a Soviet desire to bring pressure on either Persia or Turkey. They have created some alarm in Persian circles and there is information that the Turkish Embassy has been showing some concern about them. The Soviet military attaché has stated that there is no truth in them; there have been some reliefs and exchanges of garrisons, but the only increase is a Pioneer Regiment for work on the roads. From other sources it is known that there has been no noticeable increase at Meshed, Tabriz or Kazvin.

19. The announcement recently made by the Soviet Government to the effect that the republics of the Union would in future be free to conduct their own foreign relations and to maintain their own armies has awakened gloomy forebodings in Persian minds. They foresee that in the near future Soviet representation in Persia will be reinforced by Ministers from Soviet Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Turkmenistan. They expect to find Soviet Azerbaijan plotting to encourage the secession from Persia of Persian Azerbaijan, and Soviet Turkmenistan holding out open arms to Persian Turkomans.

20. A formal meeting of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society (see Summary No. 2/44, paragraph 17) was held on the 6th February. The Soviet Ambassador, who is honorary president of the society, said that its purpose was to bring together the savants and intellectuals of the two countries with a view to increasing friendship and understanding between Persia and Russia. The Executive Committee of the society includes Saeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs; Hamid Sayyah, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; Zand, Minister for War; General Yazdan Panah.

21. The Soviet Embassy recently introduced to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a colonel of the Red Army as liaison officer with the Persian gendarmerie. This officer asked the commandant of the gendarmerie to provide him with office accommodation in gendarmerie headquarters to ensure that liaison was constant and intimate. The real purpose presumably was to offset the influence of the American Chief of Gendarmerie. The request was politely refused.

22. For some months past a Russian officer with a staff has been stationed at Turbat i Sheikh Jam (75 miles south-east of Meshed) where he has been buying horses. A reliable source estimates the number of horses bought and sent to Russia as 1,600-1,700. Another source says that 800 of these were smuggled into Persia from Afghanistan.

23. Queen Fowzieh attended the final meeting of the committee organised to raise funds for the relief of distress in Russia (see Summary No. 4, paragraph 14). The President, Sipahbod Ahmadi, announced that 6 million rials had been collected and the Queen authorised the remittance of that amount to the Soviet Embassy.

#### *American Affairs.*

24. On the 11th February the Shah was flown via Isfahan and Abadeh to Abadan in General Connolly's aircraft. At Abadan he visited the American Aircraft Assembly Plant and lunched with the staff before returning to Tehran. He was accompanied by General Connolly, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Communications, Generals Yazdan Panah and Razmara and some American officers. This is only the Shah's second flight. His first was also in an American machine, with Mr. Wendell Wilkie.

*Tehran, 13th February, 1944.*



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th March).*

(No. 79.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the period of the 14th to 20th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 21st February, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 16.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period  
14th to 20th February, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

1. The Shah continues to discuss the political situation with all and sundry and to perplex himself with the conflicting advice that results. Aspirants to the premiership are endeavouring to create for themselves supporting groups in the Majlis. Seyyed Zia is building up a party, so far without name or programme, outside the Majlis. The Shah gave an audience to some members of the Majlis on the 16th February—representatives of parties, including the Tudeh, and independent members. They assured him of their disinterested devotion to the welfare of the country and of their insistence that the law should be upheld. The Shah urged that plans for the betterment of the country should be made on a programme of two or three years and insisted on the special importance of security, public health and education.

2. The Shah is reported to be giving people to understand that the Russians have guaranteed his throne. On the other hand it is said that his most trusted adviser, General Yazdan Panah, frequently reminds him that the British have already brought about the abdication of three Shahs—Muhammad Ali, Ahmad Shah and Reza Shah.

3. Dr. Millspaugh, who greatly objects to the contract made with the Russians for the manufacture of arms and ammunition in Persian factories since it entails expenditure from Persian finances without any repayment by the Russians, has refused credits to the factories and consequently the workmen cannot be paid. The Minister of Commerce has offered his resignation and the workmen are threatening to strike and to take refuge in the Soviet Embassy.

4. Hajhir, the recently-appointed Minister of the Interior, who has been on a visit to London, has returned to Tehran.

*Economic.*

5. The Treasury Bonds, whose issue was approved by the Majlis—see Summary No. 38/43, paragraph 7—are shortly to be on sale. They are to be of the value of 1,000, 10,000, 100,000 and 1,000,000 rials and of two series—one maturing in three months the other in six. The rate of interest has not yet been announced.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 6.—(i) Muhammad Hussein Mirza Jahanbani to be Chief of Police, Tehran. He is a civilian, lately a director-general in the Ministry of the Interior and formerly in the army;
- (ii) Police Lieutenant-Colonel Turaj Amin to be Chief of Police, Meshed.
- (iii) Ghulam Reza Nurzad to be Comptroller of the Court.

*Persian Forces.*

*Army.*

7. Without consulting the Chief of Staff the Shah ordered certain changes in military appointments, which are detailed in paragraph 11 below. The result is the removal from the Ministry of War and from the command of the 1st Division of two supporters of the Chief of Staff and of the American military mission and their relegation to less important positions. Into the

Ministry of War is now introduced an officer who, together with General Razmara of the Shah's military secretariat, has for some time past been in close contact with the Russians and who is regarded in the army as the Russians' man. He is perhaps only so to the extent that he hopes for Russian support against the American advisers, of whom he has always disapproved.

8. These appointments will undoubtedly be interpreted as an indication of Russian influence in the army and of the Shah's intention to acquiesce in Russian opposition to the American advisers. One object is probably to force the resignation of General Riazi, the Chief of Staff. The Shah has already informed His Majesty's Embassy that he wishes to replace him by General Yazdan Panah and was told that in the opinion of His Majesty's Embassy he would be ill-advised to do so. General Yazdan Panah showed few good qualities except financial honesty and some ineffective patriotism during his previous tenure of the appointment of Chief of Staff. He makes no concealment of his disagreement with the plans of the American advisers and he has always maintained that Persia needs an army in present circumstances of at least 110,000.

9. The Shah has again been expressing to the Chief of Staff his discontent with the American Military Mission. The real cause of his discontent probably is that General Ridley does not champion *vis-à-vis* Dr. Millspaugh the cause of a large army.

10. General Ridley says that the American Government has agreed to send nine more officers for his mission, making twenty in all.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 11.—(i) Sartip Ansari (Ghulam Ali) from Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry for War to be Director of the Military Tribunals (Judge Advocate General's) Department of the Army.
- (ii) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet from Commandant of the Officers' Cadet School to be Under-Secretary of State for War;
- (iii) Sartip Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30, M.A. 37) from command of the 1st Division to be Commandant of the Officers' Cadet School;
- (iv) Sarlashkar Shafaqi (Hadi) F.O. 196, M.A. 270) from Director of Military Tribunals to command the 1st Division.

*Internal Security.*

*Fars.*

12. General Jahanbani has been in Tehran discussing the situation in Fars. He has given to the Government his definite opinion that negotiation will not secure the submission of Nasir Qashgai. Plans for military operations were discussed with the Minister for War and Chief of Staff. Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari, was asked if Bakhtiari co-operation against the Qashgai could be counted on and he replied, "Only to the extent of benevolent neutrality." It was decided that the spring was not a suitable occasion for military action against the tribes; the summer, when the tribes were settled in their summer quarters, offered more favourable opportunities. It is understood that the Shah has approved in principle that operations for the disarmament of the Qashgai should take place in the summer. There is little chance of this happening.

13. The choice of a Governor-General to succeed Qavam ul Mulk in Shiraz has not yet been made. Farajullah Bahrami—see Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 9—like Qavam ul Mulk, has demanded authority and a free hand to an extent which the Government is unwilling to give.

*Kuh i Galu.*

14. It is unlikely that any military operations will take place for the disarmament of Bahmai—see Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 12. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, may be allowed to try and see what he can do with his political influence with some troops in the background.

*British Affairs.*

15. On the invitation of the Government of India a mission of three Persian savants is shortly to visit universities and other educational institutions in India. The mission will consist of Ali Asghar Hikmat (F.O. 85, M.A. 111), Rashid Yasimi and Pur Daoud.



16. Largely through the inspiration of officers of the Indian Army Medical Services a medical society has been formed in Tehran which includes British, American, Indian, Russian, Persian and Polish doctors. They hold periodical meetings to the great benefit of Persian doctors.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

17. There is still no confirmation of the rumours of large increases of Russian troops in North Persia referred to in Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 18. The Turkish Vice-Consul at Rezaieh, who may be relied on to have investigated the matter carefully, has informed His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz that there has been no increase west of Lake Rezaieh (Urumieh). He estimates the present Russian garrison at Rezaieh at 500-600 and approximately similar numbers at Shahpur, Khoi, Maku, Bazirgan. He states that from the junction of the Turkish and Iraq frontiers to Shahpur there are not more than five Russian posts of thirty to forty men each in the vicinity of the Persian-Turkish frontier. An unusually large number of junior officers has, however, been noticed in both Tabriz and Qazvin.

18. General Yusefovich has relieved General Gaidukov at Tabriz in command of Soviet troops in North-West Persia.

19. M. Nikolai Klimov has arrived in Kermanshah as Soviet Consul.

20. The Soviet Civil Hospital in Tehran, to which reference was made in Summary No. 41/43, paragraph 13, is now advertising daily in the Persian press. In addition to the usual medical attention it offers physiotherapy, dentistry, treatment of venereal diseases (with a private door), bacteriological examination, beauty treatment, mud baths with mud from Lake Urumieh and private "luxe" maternity wards.

#### *American Affairs.*

21. Following on his trip by American aircraft to the American aircraft assembly plant at Abadan, reported in Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 24, the Shah, who was accompanied by the Queen, visited on the 16th February the very well-equipped camp of American troops at Amirabad near Tehran.

*Tehran, 20th February, 1944.*

[E 1525/422/34]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th March.)*

(No. 92.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period of the 21st to 27th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 28th February, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 17.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the Period  
21st-27th February, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE Shah opened the Majlis on the 26th February. In his speech, after referring to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, to Persia's declaration of war and to the Tehran Declaration, he stated that his first object was that the Constitutional Law should reign supreme throughout the whole structure of the country and that each of the three "powers" (he presumably referred to the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary) should within the spheres allotted to them by the Fundamental Law spare no effort to fulfil the duties legally imposed on them so that the Government could devote all its energies to the improvement of social and economic conditions, with particular regard to

public health and education. To this end it would be necessary to endeavour to develop the resources of the country, particularly its agriculture and its mines. His second object was to improve general security and to establish order throughout the country. This required the strengthening and increase of the security forces. It was also his object to ensure the independence of the Judiciary. These objects could only be achieved by fruitful collaboration between the Majlis and the Government. He, for his part, would always support progressive and patriotic parties and all those who strove for the happiness of the nation.

2. Amir Jang Bakhtiari was elected temporary President of the Majlis. A new election will be held as soon as the credentials of two-thirds of the Deputies have been accepted. This will probably take three to four weeks, and no legislation can be effected until it is completed.

3. The Soviet announcement that republics of the U.S.S.R. would in future have freedom in their foreign relations has aroused particular interest in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that Moslem opinion generally regards it not as a change of heart, but as a move of political expediency. Always sensitive to any sign of increasing Soviet penetration, the Azerbaijan Moslems fear that the new principle opens up possibilities of a greater Azerbaijan; Armenians, on the other hand, welcome the step. They are generally anxious to see the stabilisation of Soviet influence in Azerbaijan in the hope that it will protect them against possible Persian reprisals.

4. The Ministry of the Interior has announced the release after investigation of twenty-three of the *détenues* arrested at the request of the Allies (see Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 3).

5. The absconding priest, Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, got enough votes in the Tehran elections to put him among the successful candidates. In order to give the Persian Government good grounds for declaring him ineligible for election, if they wish to make use of them, the British Embassy has published a statement showing Kashani's intimate connexion with Mayer and with German plots in Persia.

6. The trial of certain officials of the police for complicity in the murder of certain Persian notables in the reign of Reza Shah is finished (see Summary No. 5/44, paragraph 3). One of the accused has been sentenced to death, three others to imprisonment for life, ten and nine years respectively.

##### *Economic.*

7. Dr. Millspaugh has issued a circular to all officials of the Finance Department in the provinces stressing the Finance Ministry's concern that monopoly goods—that is, cloth, tea and sugar—should be distributed regularly and impartially. Where stocks are available, distribution should continue or begin at once. Demands should be forwarded to the Ministry for Supplies necessary to maintain at all times stocks sufficient for six months' consumption. In each distribution centre a commission is to be formed of the Finance Agent, the Bakshdar and reliable local notabilities to control distribution among the villages and in tribal areas. The distribution within the village or the tribe is to be entrusted to a committee of local notabilities. These local committees will prepare a list of the inhabitants of their village or tribal units, with the number of their identity cards, which will form the basis for the supply of monopoly goods. Finance agents are to see that the people are aware of the quantity of goods issued for distribution and their prices.

8. Dr. Millspaugh has created a special section in the Ministry of Finance which will control the Departments of Transport, Rationing and Distribution, formerly controlled by the Price Stabilisation Section. The duties of this section are: the rationing of all monopoly goods except grain and bread; the transport of such goods for distribution to the appropriate centres; their distribution to the consumer; and the administration of Government markets. The section will control all monopoly goods from the time they are released from customs, if imported, or from the time they are notified by the Procurements Department to be available, if produced locally.

9. The Minister of Commerce and Industry (General Shafai) has resigned on the ostensible grounds that the Administrator-General of Finance has refused funds for the payment of the wages of employees of the munition factories working for the Russians (see Summary No. 7/44, paragraph 3). Dr. Millspaugh, in an interview given to the press, said he would shortly authorise the payment of wages to employees of the factories of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the month that ended on the 21st February, but he considered that State



factories should be self-supporting and should not be dependent on subsidies, as were the munition factories. He hoped shortly to make arrangements that would render these subsidies unnecessary. The necessity for the subsidising of the State munition factories arises from the omission of the Russians to pay for any of the products they take.

10. The interest to be paid on the Treasury bonds, whose impending issue was reported in Summary No. 7/44, paragraph 5, is 4 per cent. per annum on the three-month bonds and 4½ per cent. on the six-month bonds.

11. His Majesty's Consul at Bandar Abbas reports that 25,000 tons of red oxide have accumulated at Hormuz awaiting buyers.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

12.—(i) Rahmat Atabegi to the Persian Consul at Beirut.

(ii) The new chief of police, Muhammad Hussein Mirza Jahanbani, has been given the police rank of Sarpas, equivalent to brigadier.

#### *Army.*

##### *Persian Forces.*

13. One of the Russian-inspired Persian papers recently commented on the alleged decision of the Soviet Government to present to the Persian army the full equipment for a motorised formation, consisting of aircraft, artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and motor vehicles. One of the defects, it said, of the Persian army of to-day was that it had no experience of fighting or knowledge of modern weapons. If the news was true, then the gift would do much to remedy these defects and to inspire the officers with a new spirit. But officers should remember that, although discipline should inspire the army, it should never be allowed to develop into blind obedience. An officer was first a citizen, and he must not allow himself to be used against the interests of the nation. The training that personnel of the Persian army would receive from the Russians in these new arms would teach them the real spirit of soldiering and enable them to found a well-trained military organisation.

14. There is as yet no reason to believe that the Russians have offered anything more than the thirty-five tanks and thirty aircraft mentioned in Summary No. 4/44, paragraph 4. It would be a mistake to read too much into the presumably inspired press article referred to above. It may be calculated to have the effect of inclining ambitious Persian officers to look to Russia for assistance in equipping a modern army. It may also be interpreted as an incitement to refuse to accept the authority of the American advisers should the Government decide to invest them with authority.

15. As far as is known, no definite answer has yet been given to the Russian offer to establish mixed Russo-Persian regiments of tanks and aircraft. There is already opposition among the Deputies to the acceptance of the gift of tanks and aircraft even without conditions. It is likely that there would be violent opposition to the formation of mixed regiments if the suggestion were known to the public.

#### *Gendarmerie.*

16. The contract for the engagement of Colonel Schwarzkopf and a mission of American officers for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie includes the following conditions:—

- (i) The task of the mission is to advise and assist the Persian Ministry of the Interior in reorganising the gendarmerie.
- (ii) The period of the engagement of the mission shall be for a minimum of two years, *i.e.*, until the 1st October, 1945. It can be cancelled at three months' notice on either side and it may be renewed after the expiry of two years.
- (iii) Officers of the mission will serve in the rank they hold in the American army or in any higher rank they may be given by the Persian Government. They will take precedence over all Persian officers of equivalent rank.
- (iv) The head of the mission shall have "control of gendarmerie organisation for the duration of this contract and he will take precedence over all officers of the Imperial Gendarmerie. He is in direct charge of the control and organisation (of the gendarmerie) and has the right to make proposals to the Shah, through the Minister of the Interior, for the promotion, appointment, degrading or dismissal of all ranks of the gendarmerie. No other person has the right to interfere."

- (v) The Persian Government agrees that during the period of this contract it will not engage officers of any other Power for work with the gendarmerie.
- (vi) All members of the mission undertake not to disclose to any national of a foreign Power official secrets learnt in the course of their duties.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

17. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, and General Jahanbani are now in Khuzestan concerting politico-military measures to induce the Bahmai to surrender some arms. Meanwhile, Persian troops have been concentrated at Rud-i-Zard. It is likely that the Bahmai will surrender sufficient arms to save the face of the Government authorities and avert military operations.

18. The Persian commander in Khuzestan reports that Abdullah Zarghampur Boir Ahmadi has handed over fifteen light machine guns, one mortar and some other equipment taken at Semirum, but only one rifle. In return, he was asking to be given authority over the Dushmanziari and one section of the Taiyibi. He also reported that the Boir Ahmadi were handing the Germans back to the Qashgai.

#### *British Affairs.*

19. During the last ten months a mobile dispensary, provided by Persia and Iraq Force, under a British officer, has been touring tribal areas. The result of this evidence of the interest of the British authorities in the welfare of the tribes has been wholly good. The visits of the dispensary have been everywhere welcomed and it has been hospitably received; genuine gratitude has been shown for the attentions of the medical officer. Much valuable information about conditions in the tribes has been obtained. The tribes visited include Arabs, Lurs, Kurds, Bakhtiari, Qashgai, Mamassanni and some sections of the Boir Ahmadi. Many more of these dispensaries could be employed with advantage.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

20. In Tabriz there are many rumours of the impending arrival of large numbers of Russian civilians who, it is alleged, will be sent to Persia to take advantage of the plentiful supplies of food in the north. Some officers' families have arrived, and His Majesty's Consul-General reports that the Russians are renting and requisitioning additional accommodation. There are large quantities of surplus grain, which should be, but are not, sent to Tehran, and of dried fruits, whose export from the province is prevented by the Russians. The latter are buying large numbers of animals and quantities of butter and vegetables for export, with the result that the prices of these commodities are rising.

21. M. Kruskov has arrived in Isfahan as Russian Consul.

#### *Chinese Affairs.*

22. A Chinese goodwill mission, which has been in England and Turkey, has arrived in Tehran as guests of the Persian Government.

*Tehran, 27th February, 1944.*

[E 1862/422/34]

No. 18.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th March.)*

(No. 116.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the period the 6th to the 12th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 13th March, 1944.*



Enclosure in No. 18.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the period the 6th March to 12th March, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The expected attack in the Majlis on the credentials of Seyyid Zia ed Din was made not by the Tudeh party Deputies, but by Dr. Musaddiq (Musaddiq es Sultaneh—F.O. 135; M.A. 184). It was based not on the legality of his recent election for Yezd, but on his unfitness to be a Deputy owing to his having acted against the legally constituted Government of Persia by his participation in the *coup d'Etat* of 1921, which brought Reza Khan to power. Dr. Musaddiq at that time was Governor-General of Fars, and refused to recognise the Government formed by Seyyid Zia. In the course of his speech and Seyyid Zia's reply much old history was retold, not always accurately. The old story, which finds, and perhaps always will find, many believers, that the *coup d'Etat* was engineered by the British, was brought out to show that Seyyid Zia must then have been a British tool and to support the suggestion that he had been brought back to Persia in the interests of British policy. In his reply Seyyid Zia made a good impression on the Deputies, and the result of the debate is to improve his standing in political circles. He was supported by fifty-seven Deputies of eighty-six present. Dr. Musaddiq maintained his old reputation as an emotional demagogue, possibly well-intentioned but certainly misguided.

2. Attempts were made during the two days' debate on Seyyid Zia's credentials to organise demonstrations against him by crowds assembled outside the Parliament buildings. The Tudeh party is accused of having been the organisers. Seyyid Zia's supporters are also accused of having taken counter-measures.

3. Certain recent events have tended to disturb public opinion and to shake public confidence in Great Britain's ability to guarantee the fulfilment of the Tehran Declaration regarding Persia's post-war status. They are, firstly, the announcement of the departure of the British Military Mission from Turkey and the knowledge that Turkey had refused to commit herself to the side of the Allies; secondly, Mr. Churchill's statement that the end of the European War might not come this year; and, thirdly, the British attitude to Poland and Yugoslavia, which is interpreted as an indignation of British subservience to Russian wishes.

*Economic.*

4. Reports from the provinces of Isfahan and Fars indicate anxiety about the coming harvest owing to shortage of snow and rain. In areas of South-East Fars the crops are already considered to have failed and famine conditions to be imminent. See also Summary No. 9/44, paragraph 6.

*Appointments—Civil.*

5. Afkham Saadlu to be Farmandar of Khorramabad.

*Internal Security.**Kuh-i-galu.*

6. A column of Persian troops, some 1,500 strong, has marched peacefully through the Bahmai country and was to go on to Izeh (Malamir) in Janeki, the scene of a minor disaster to Persian troops in May 1943, since when the area has not known them. The column was accompanied by General Jahanbani and Morteza Quli Bakhtiari. The Bahmai surrendered some arms and the military commanders have brought to notice at an appropriate moment, the Noruz promotions being under consideration, that they dare venture into tribal country. Honour is satisfied, although the Bahmai are not Boir Ahmadi nor even Qashgai.

*Fars.*

7. There is further reliable evidence of the increase of Nasir Qashgai's influence throughout Fars. In addition to the Mamassani, whose inclination towards Nasir was reported in last week's summary, the Khamseh tribes are now reported to be drifting into his orbit. It is true that General Jahanbani's policy, which is partly imposed on him by the weakness of the Government and partly by his own propensity to seek the immediate easy way, is keeping the peace for the

moment, but it is creating a serious problem which the Government will have to tackle some day. And if the tribes do not create disturbances during the spring migration it will be a proof of the strength of Nasir's influence over them rather than of their fear of reprisals by Government. It is a reasonable hope that Nasir will endeavour to show that he can keep the tribes in order.

*Russian Affairs.*

8. The report in Summary No. 9/44, paragraph 17, to the effect that there is now to be a unified Soviet command in Persia has been confirmed. An officer, Lieutenant-General Sovietnikov, senior to Lieutenant-General Gaidukov, has arrived to take up this command. Gaidukov remains as deputy Commander-in-chief and Major-General Erishkevitch has been appointed Chief of Staff. It is understood that the Transportation command under General Kargin remains independent and continues to be under the direct orders of Moscow.

9. More authentic reports than the rumours recently circulating have been received of an increase of Russian troops along the Persian-Turkish frontier, notably at Shahpur, Khoi and Bazirgan. The reports come from two sources and speak of considerable numbers, but it should not yet be accepted that these are more than normal reliefs.

*British Affairs.*

10. The Commander-in-chief, Persia and Iraq Force, visited Tehran during the week.

11. On the 9th March Sir Reader Bullard presented his Letters of Credence to the Shah on his appointment as ambassador.

*Tehran, 12th March, 1944.*

[E 1984/422/34]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th March.)*

(No. 125.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the period of the 13th to 19th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 20th March, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 19.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the Period 13th–19th March, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

IN accordance with custom, the Government resigned as soon as the new Majlis was legally constituted. At a secret session a majority of the Deputies decided to recommend to the Shah that Muhammad Sa'ed, Minister for Foreign Affairs since June 1942, should be asked to form a new Cabinet. The Shah has accepted this advice. It is expected that the new Cabinet will not differ greatly from the old. Sa'ed is an honest and well-meaning gentleman, without initiative, ambition or power of organisation or leadership. He, however, starts with one unusual advantage: having had no desire to be Prime Minister, he has not had to make promises for the future to Deputies and others to secure their support.

2. Mirza Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai has been elected President of the Majlis, narrowly defeating Dr. Musaddiq. Malikmadani and Amir Taimur have been elected Vice-Presidents.

3. The Tudeh press in a series of violent articles is venting the disappointment felt by the party at the failure of the attempt to unseat Seyyid Zia. Popular opinion regards Seyyid Zia's success as a defeat for the Shah and the Russians and a victory for the British.



*Economic.*

4. Increases of pay have been sanctioned by the Government to sugar factory employees of 30 per cent., and to telephone workers, who were recently on strike, of 70 per cent. on salaries up to 1,000 rials per mensem with, in addition, a cost-of-living allowance. The workers in the Tehran Silo have now gone on strike as a protest against the delay in giving them certain promised concessions. They are preventing access to the Silo and the unloading of lorries bringing in wheat, thus dislocating the programme of the collection of grain.

5. The Persian press announces the arrival in Tehran of American and British oil concession-hunters interested in that part of Persia not covered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession.

*Appointments—Civil.*

6. Shibab-ud-Douleh (Shams-ul-Mulk Ara) (F.O. 195; M.A. 31) to be Farmandar of Kurdistan.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

7. Abdullah Zarghampur, Boir Ahmadi, has written to Nasir Qashgai informing him that the Taiyibi and Bahmai tribes have appealed to him for help against the Persian military operations for their disarmament (see Summary No. 10/44, paragraph 6). He wanted Nasir's advice and to be assured of his support. A British officer was visiting Nasir when this message was received, and he reports that Nasir was greatly upset. He accused the British of instigating these operations as preliminary steps for the disarmament of the tribes; he threatened danger to the oil-fields and fire and sword from Khuzestan to Persian Baluchistan. There is, in fact, no present intention of attempting to disarm the Taiyibi, but it is perhaps significant that the report that the Persian forces had even the hardihood to venture to challenge these relatively weak tribes was sufficient to cause Nasir so much concern. He may not be so confident of his position as recent reports have indicated.

*Luristan.*

8. By agreement between Persian and Iraq authorities, Bani Lam tribesmen, suffering from a shortage of grazing in Iraq, were allowed to move their flocks into the Pusht-i-Kuh area of Persian territory. Some clashes occurred with Persian gendarmes who attempted to confiscate the rifles which the Arab tribes had brought with them.

*Western Azerbaijan.*

9. The disturbances near Shahpur, referred to in Summary No. 9/44, paragraph 15, were created by Shikak Kurds as a protest against the levy from them of 800 sheep to be delivered to the Turkish authorities as compensation for a recent sheep-stealing raid by Persian Kurds in Turkish territory. The Shikak pleaded that they were not the culprits. They, however, obeyed the order of the Soviet Consul to return to their homes.

*Russian Affairs.*

10. Further reports have been received which tend to confirm that increases have recently been made in Russian garrisons in Khoi, Shahpur and Bazirgan, on the Perso-Turkish frontier. Moreover, the Persian authorities have been asked to deliver urgently additional quantities of barley, much of which is being despatched to Khoi. If increases have taken place, they do not necessarily have any particular significance. The Russians frequently change their troops in Persia, and there are sometimes more, sometimes less. At the present moment there is a tendency to attach undue significance to any reports of Russian movements near the Turkish frontier.

*American Affairs.*

11. The Government has sanctioned the engagement of an American with two assistants as expert advisers to the Tehran Municipality.

Tehran, 19th March, 1944.

## CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 1293/1293/25]

No. 20.

Mr. Jordan to Mr. Euen.—(Received 28th February.)

(No 21.)

Sir,

Jedda, 15th February, 1944.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1943.

I am indebted to Mr. T. Wikeley for his assistance in the preparation of this report.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, and to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 20.

*Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1943.**Introduction.*

HIS Majesty's Government's relations with the King and Government of Saudi Arabia were most cordial throughout the year, and Ibn Saud gave multiple evidence of his friendship and complete trust in His Majesty's Government.

2. The high lights of the year were the departure of the Vichy Minister and the withdrawal of the Saudi Minister from Vichy, the departure of the German and Italian internees, both military and civil, Ibn Saud's attitude over the question of Arab unity, the greater interest being shown in this country by the United States, and, finally, a successful pilgrimage of some 42,000 persons, marred only by one unhappy incident mentioned in the body of this report.

3. Mr. Stonehewer-Bird left Jedda on the 15th December, 1942, and Mr. T. Wikeley acted as His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires until the 2nd September, 1943, when Mr. Jordan arrived. The latter left for Riyadh soon after his arrival and presented his credentials to His Majesty the King in person on the 19th September, 1943.

*Arab Affairs.*

4. The Arabs probably made more noise and caused more ink to flow (activities in which they are highly proficient) during 1943 than in any recent year. The ball of Arab unity, more or less quiescent at the opening of the year, was given a hefty kick in February by the Prime Minister of Iraq. The rest of the year was spent by the Arab leaders in pushing the ball back and forth in an indecisive and unco-ordinated manner. Never once did a team emerge capable of planting the ball firmly between the goal posts. Ibn Saud was, naturally, interested in the game, but his efforts were largely confined to pushing the ball, of which he has lively suspicions, away from him whenever it threatened to approach. If, in spite of his efforts, it came too close, he appealed to the referee (His Majesty's Government) either to take it away from him or to tell him how and where to kick it. If other Arab leaders had shown the same faith in the referee's honour and wisdom, much unnecessary trouble would have been avoided.

5. Ibn Saud believes that Arab countries should be independent, but he is far too wise and knows the Arabs far too well to hope that they will be able to sink their petty jealousies to form a strong federation for a long time to come. Until that distant day he considers that His Majesty's Government must continue to guide and control the destinies of the Arab world.

6. Ibn Saud is deeply suspicious of the rulers of Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt, and he realises they feel the same about him. This suspicion coloured all the King's reactions to the various proposals put forward during the year regarding Arab unity and allied matters. General Nuri's proposal, early in the year, for a joint *démarche* of the Arab States to His Majesty's Government and the United States Government regarding Palestine was coldly received by Ibn Saud, who refused to move unless given a lead by His Majesty's Government.



In particular, he was reluctant to bring the United States into the picture, though he eventually approached the United States Government himself in the shape of a personal letter to President Roosevelt (see paragraph 13 below). The various proposals for an Arab conference which were produced by several Arab leaders throughout the year found Ibn Saud equally reluctant, especially as, at one stage, he thought Nuri Pasha and Nahas Pasha were trying to leave him out in the cold. Apart from his innate suspicions of Nuri and Nahas, he thought, and no doubt rightly, that such a conference would achieve nothing except general confusion and possible embarrassment to His Majesty's Government and the Allies in their war effort. It was only when the idea of a full conference was abandoned in favour of a series of confidential talks between Arab leaders in Cairo, and then only after repeated reassurances from His Majesty's Government, that Ibn Saud consented to move. In September he received an envoy from Nahas, and, later, he sent Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to Cairo to confer with the Egyptian Prime Minister.

7. The general question of the future of the Arab States could not, of course, be discussed without particular reference to Syria and Palestine. Ibn Saud is particularly interested in Syria, in the hope, possibly, that a strong and independent Syria will provide him with a useful ally against Iraq and Egypt. Nuri's proposals for a "greater Syria," including Palestine and Transjordan, were regarded by Ibn Saud as a device to advance the fortunes of the Hashimite family, and were in consequence very distasteful to him. Throughout the year, however, he watched the course of events in Syria with the greatest care, and gave valuable advice to the Syrian leaders. In particular, during the Lebanese crisis at the end of the year, he warned the Syrians and Lebanese to watch their step and to proceed only with the greatest circumspection in order to avoid providing the French with a lever for further oppressive action.

8. Palestine received its share of Ibn Saud's attention. He submitted to His Majesty's Government his fears regarding Zionist activities, and he received reassurances regarding His Majesty's Government's policy. He objected to Nuri Pasha's proposal to include Palestine in a "greater Syria," and he made his views regarding the Palestine question clear to the United States Government. The hope, which seems to have been held in some quarters in America, that Ibn Saud would receive Dr. Weizmann and settle the Palestine question with him, was shattered once and for all when Colonel Hoskins, President Roosevelt's personal representative, visited Riyadh in August and enquired whether the King would receive Dr. Weizmann. The answer was in the categorical negative, and it revealed that, early in the war, Ibn Saud had been approached by the Zionists through the intermediary of Mr. Philby with an offer of £20 million if he would disinterest himself in the fate of Palestine. The King had considered himself insulted by such an offer, and his answer had been scathing. It later transpired that this money was not intended wholly as a bribe to Ibn Saud, but rather to go towards the rehabilitation of Arabs who would be transferred from Palestine to areas under purely Arab control.

#### *Relations with Foreign Powers.*

9. In all the mass of Arab intrigues, jealousies and mutual recriminations which were such a pronounced feature of the year, Ibn Saud took no step without consulting His Majesty's Government and following their advice. The same is true of his increasingly important contacts with the United States of America. Indeed, far from trying to play the United States off against Britain, a bait that any ordinary Arab would have swallowed with glee, he was reluctant to commit himself too far with the United States, and he had, sometimes, to be gently pushed by His Majesty's Government along the road to greater understanding and co-operation with that country. After Iraq's declaration of war against the Axis, a step which Ibn Saud regarded with an ironical eye, he enquired whether His Majesty's Government would like him to change his own attitude (*cf.* report for 1942, second paragraph), and he would no doubt have declared war against the Axis if His Majesty's Government had so wished, but they did not. He sent warm and undoubtedly sincere congratulations to His Majesty's Government on the capture of Tunis and the capitulation of Italy, events which vindicated the faith he has always shown in an ultimate Allied victory, and which increased his already great reputation as a statesman in the Arab world. His speech to notable pilgrims assembled at Mecca at the end of the year was full of praise for Britain and it will no doubt have beneficial effects far beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia. He behaved very well when, at the beginning of the year, a British army contingent entered Saudi Arabia from Transjordan

without permission or previous warning, in order to carry out certain observations in connexion with the survey of Transjordan. He waited patiently for an explanation and accepted it without demur. The activities of the survey party were called off by General Headquarters. He also permitted a locust mission composed chiefly of large army units to operate throughout his domains.

10. Ibn Saud's relations with other Powers were, on the whole, fairly good. He had various squabbles with Iraq which resulted in long wails to His Majesty's Government regarding the way in which he was being treated by the Iraqi Government. He was particularly incensed by the institution in the summer of a zone along the Saudi-Iraqi frontier within which severe restrictions were imposed upon the movements of tribesmen and their livestock. He considered this an infringement of his treaty rights, which, *inter alia*, stipulate that Saudi tribesmen shall be free to move across and in the area in question. The other causes of friction were minor matters in themselves, but the continued failure of the Iraqi Government to pay any attention to any of Ibn Saud's protests produced an angry outburst in which the King even mentioned the possibility of resorting to force if he did not obtain satisfaction.

11. Relations with Syria were close, Ibn Saud playing the part of mentor to the Syrian leaders, who are just beginners in the hard school of politics and world affairs. Egypt and Transjordan, with whom in the past Ibn Saud's relations have not been happy, gave him little cause for complaint in 1943. In particular there was a pleasing absence of recriminations with Transjordan about frontier violations, &c. The Amir Abdulla, however, by his ill-considered manifesto concerning Arab federation in April caused Ibn Saud great offence, though he said very little about it. Relations with the Yemen were peaceful, but Ibn Saud is watching the situation in that country with great care. There were some signs that the Imam is beginning to realise the value to the Arab world of Ibn Saud's prestige and statesmanship. Relations with the Persian Gulf States were normal and amicable. The ratification of the Koweit Agreements were exchanged at Jedda on the 1st May.

12. Ibn Saud's relations with the United States took a big step forward during the year. The King has all along been reluctant to travel either fast or far along the road leading to closer contact with the United States. The United States Government is still rather an unknown quantity for him, and he is anxious concerning the possible repercussions of extensive American activities in the Near East. He expressed his fears in at least one message to His Majesty's Government in which he said bluntly that he preferred Britain to guide the destinies of the Arab States rather than America. He considers Britain, with her long record of co-operation with and friendship for the Arabs, can manage the Near East quite well by herself and that there is no need for America to butt in. There is some evidence to show that he fears His Majesty's Government may decide to disinterest themselves in the Near East and allow their place to be taken by America.

13. Saudi Arabia has been declared eligible for Lend-Lease. The announcement of this was made to Ibn Saud in Riyadh by Mr. Kirk in April, and the King immediately asked His Majesty's Government what it all meant and whether he should agree. He was reassured, and by the end of the year, after a certain quantity of badly needed Lend-Lease material had arrived, his anxiety at this new, and to him strange, development seemed to have worn off. United States interest in Saudi Arabia, which is, of course, based on the need for oil, was also shown by the promotion of their representative in Jedda to the rank of Minister Resident, and by the unprecedented flow of American visitors, most of them official. Mr. Kirk, who was then the United States Minister to this country, visited Riyadh in April. He was followed by General Hurley and by Colonel Hoskins. These three questioned the King exhaustively on many subjects, but the main object of their visit was to discover the King's views on Arab questions, Palestine, Syria, &c. Ibn Saud made his views quite clear in many talks with these visitors and in a special message and a letter to President Roosevelt. The United States Government should therefore be fully informed of the King's views, and they have no further excuse for the ignorance which was displayed by the President's message to Ibn Saud regarding Weizmann (see paragraph 8).

14. Other American visitors were less important. They included, in the spring, a delegation from *Life* who eventually produced a long article about Saudi Arabia in their magazine which was notable for its inaccuracies and for the offence it gave by its references to the King's connubial affairs. Mr. Gunter, of the United States Treasury, visited the country in October to investigate



the financial position. An American Military Mission visited the country at the end of the year (see paragraph 28). During the year the United States pressed for permission to create a consulate at Dhahran, but Ibn Saud would go no further than allowing them to appoint a commercial agent with no representative capacity.

15. The Vichy Legation was closed by the departure of M. Ballereau on the 19th June. The Italian and German internees left on the 14th March to be exchanged for an equal number of British in a Turkish port. The Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires was promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary and presented his new credentials on 5th November. A new Iraqi Minister arrived to take over the Iraqi Legation in Jedda in March after a long interregnum during which Iraq was represented by a succession of chargés d'affaires. The Saudi Arabian Minister at Vichy was transferred to Ankara in April.

#### Finance.

16. The proposal to establish a Saudi Arabian Currency Board in London had not produced any definite results by the end of the year. A good deal of preparatory work was done, however, principally by Mr. Peters, Accountant-General of Palestine, who visited Jedda in March and had lengthy discussions with His Majesty's Representative and with the competent Saudi Arabian officials. Captain France, of the Minister of State's staff, also discussed this project when he visited Jedda in July.

17. His Majesty's Government subsidised Ibn Saud to the extent of £225,000 a month throughout the year (a total of £2,700,000), which was used for purchasing supplies from the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and other sources. In addition to the above, the following amounts of currency were granted to Saudi Arabia by His Majesty's Government.

Riyals	...	...	...	...	5,000,000
Sovereigns	...	...	...	...	400,000

A further 8 million riyals were supplied at the end of the year by the United States under Lend-Lease, and another 7 million riyals are expected to be forthcoming from the same source early in 1944. The Lend-Lease riyals which have arrived to date were minted in India and the United Kingdom from silver loaned by these countries subject to replacement from the United States.

18. The Saudi budget for 1943 showed a deficit of 30 million riyals, approximately £2,250,000 sterling, despite the subsidy, gold, and riyals given to the country, and despite a small pilgrimage of 30,000 persons at the end of 1942.

19. During the year the Saudi Government received an advance of 1 million dollars from the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which approximates to the amount of rental and oil subsidies accruing to the Saudi Government from the operations of the company in Saudi territory.

#### Supplies.

20. During the year adequate supplies of foodstuffs, transport and essential commodities were sent to Saudi Arabia by the Middle East Supply Centre, which supplied practically the whole of the Saudi requirements. No acute shortage of foodstuffs was at any time evident and the Saudi Government are most appreciative of His Majesty's Government's efforts in this direction. The world shortage of cotton piece-goods had its inevitable reaction on this country towards the end of the year and led to urgent demands from the King for supplies from India.

#### Pilgrimage.

21. The pilgrimage was on the whole satisfactory. Some 42,000 pilgrims arrived in the country, of which approximately 37,000 came from overseas and 5,000 overland. The Saudi Government co-operated closely with His Majesty's Legation and all transport and supply arrangements worked smoothly. The financial and transport arrangements made by the office of the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, acting in co-operation with His Majesty's Representatives in the territories concerned, were excellent and greatly contributed towards the success of the pilgrimage.

22. No Indian pilgrims made the pilgrimage, and Ibn Saud at the usual banquet given to leading personalities in Mecca during the pilgrimage stated, whilst regretting the absence of Indians, this absence was readily understandable and was due to war conditions and His Majesty's Government's solicitude for the

safety of the Indian Moslems. He also made warm reference to the assistance given to the pilgrimage and to the Holy Land of Islam by His Majesty's Government.

23. Only one unfortunate incident marked an otherwise successful pilgrimage and this was due to the religious animosity existing between the Shia and Sunni Mohammedan sects. Several fanatical Persians of the Shia sect, as a protest against Sunni domination in the Holy Places, defiled the Haram in various disgusting manners. One of these caught in the act was tried by the Ulema under Sharia law and executed. This salutary punishment has led to repercussions in Shia countries and the Persian Government recently protested to Ibn Saud and threatened to break off diplomatic relations with this country if a satisfactory explanation is not forthcoming.

#### Miscellaneous.

24. *Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate.*—It was decided that the value to the war effort of this company's production of gold did not justify the utilisation of the large amount of shipping space required to provide them with materials and to take their products back to the United States. Ibn Saud was informed of this by His Majesty's Government in May, and was told that only sufficient space would be provided to carry materials essential for maintenance of the company's machinery. The King quite understood the position and made no protests. At the end of the year the company was still functioning at a reduced tempo, but it is now hoped that sufficient supplies and spares will be forthcoming to permit the company to continue production. The present production is valued at about £30,000 monthly.

25. *Netherlands Trading Society.*—This firm, who act as bankers in Jedda, and are indeed the only real bank in the country, have for some years only been able to carry on with the assistance of the Government of India who allowed them to obtain in India and export to Saudi Arabia gold sovereigns. At the end of the year the Government of India announced that they would be forced to stop the supply of gold. It is not yet known whether the bank will be closed or not.

26. *Meteorological.*—Ibn Saud gave permission for a party operating under the control of the Royal Air Force to establish meteorological stations at Jauif, Lina and Boreida and to teach the local officials to work them. The fullest assistance was given to the party while in Saudi Arabia and they were able to accomplish their mission in a satisfactory manner.

27. *Locusts.*—A greatly extended anti-locust campaign was planned and is being carried out in Saudi Arabia with the permission of Ibn Saud and the co-operation of the British army. In all about 1,000 men were working at the end of the year in different areas throughout the country.

28. *Arms.*—Ibn Saud has requested to be supplied with certain quantities of arms and ammunition for his soldiers. A great part of the year was spent in trying to ascertain how much he needed, how much he should be given and who should supply it. By the end of the year no arms had arrived, but a decision was within sight. The United States sent a military mission to Jedda in December to ascertain Saudi requirements. The mission, which was headed by General Royce, made itself unpopular with the Saudis by asking too many and irrelevant questions. The mission was not a great success, nor did the Saudis appreciate their arrival in full military uniforms.

29. *Royal Family.*—The King continued in good health throughout the year and kept firm control of all his vast dominions. There was some trouble amongst the tribes around Hail in May, but it appears to have been suppressed without much difficulty. Ibn Saud, of course, saw in this yet another instance of Hashimite intrigue. The King's younger brother, the Amir Mohammed bin Abdurrahman, died in July. One of the younger sons, the Amir Tallal, went to Egypt for medical treatment in August, while the Amirs Mohammed and Mansur had a joyful holiday in India, during which they spent large sums of money and indulged generally in the fleshpots. The Amir Mansur also visited Palestine and Egypt in the latter part of the year. The Amir Feisal, accompanied by his brother Khalid, visited the United States in October and returned via the United Kingdom. The Amir Saud, the Crown Prince, gave a useful indication of his attachment to His Majesty's Government at Riyadh in September, when he caused His Majesty's Minister to be informed that he was just as keen on the British connexion as his father, and that we could count on him when he succeeded to the throne of Saudi Arabia.



## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 98/23/89]

No. 21.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 90, Syria and the Lebanon, 22nd December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th January, 1944.)*

(Secret.)

## 1. General.

GENERAL CATROUX arrived in Beirut on the 16th December. He immediately visited the President of the Republic, who returned his call the following day. During the brief conversations which took place, he is understood to have confirmed the statement previously made by M. Chataigneau to both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, foreshadowing the consent of the French National Committee to the early cession of most of the powers at present in French hands.

Formal conversations between the French and Lebanese authorities began on the 20th December. Amongst the subjects discussed are reported to have been the transfer of the Funds of Common Interest, the control of the *Sûreté Générale*, the functions of the Mixed Courts, and the future position of the French officials employed in the Administration. No details were settled, but, at the request of the Lebanese, General Catroux agreed to arrange for tripartite discussions (French, Syrian and Lebanese) to take place regarding the cession of the Funds of Common Interest. The Lebanese representatives professed themselves to be extremely satisfied at the conciliatory attitude adopted by General Catroux, especially since he appeared to have dropped the treaty question. For their own part, the Lebanese appear to have been at pains to show themselves reasonable, notably on such matters as the retention of French experts in Government employ and the Mixed Courts. Both they and the Syrian Government had been informed that the British authorities expected them to negotiate with the French in a conciliatory spirit. They would appear to have taken this exhortation to heart, thereby rendering easier General Catroux's first task, which was to re-establish cordial relations.

General Catroux is now at Damascus, where, according to preliminary reports, he has taken an equally reasonable and encouraging line. He is known to be willing to concede the *Contrôle Bédouin* (see below under "Tribal").

The Syrian and Lebanese Presidents have sent messages to Mr. Winston Churchill, on behalf of their Governments and people, expressing sincere wishes for his prompt recovery.

An Egyptian delegation is at present in Beirut, having brought the President messages of congratulation from King Farouk and an invitation to the forthcoming conference in Cairo on Arab federation. They have been received with the greatest enthusiasm, and have been so pleased with their reception that they have twice postponed their departure (see also under "The Lebanon" below).

## 2. Wheat.

The work of the O.C.P. continues to be seriously handicapped by lack of funds, although the French say funds are now available, and daily purchases have necessarily been on a reduced scale. In the Aleppo region speculators are already taking advantage of the situation to buy at cut prices from needy cultivators, who are being persuaded that the O.C.P. will soon cease purchasing. The intention is probably to resell to the O.C.P. if large-scale purchases are resumed. Many regions where large quantities of grain could have been collected will very soon be inaccessible owing to the winter rains, and the year's working is therefore likely to yield a considerably smaller surplus than was anticipated a month ago. The French are unwilling to continue purchases unless they can dispose of the surpluses in North Africa, which is contrary to M.E.S.C. policy. On the other hand, as M.E.S.C. has not yet made a firm offer for available surpluses, it is difficult to expect the French to provide funds for cereals which may be left in the hands of the O.C.P. without a purchaser.

Fairly heavy rain has been falling in the Lebanon and West Syria during the past few days, and there is consequently less anxiety about the prospects for next year's crop. There has, however, been very little rain as yet in North-East Syria, and the outlook in that region is still gloomy.

A member of the Syrian Chamber has placed before the House a written interpellation addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his capacity as president of the Cereals Commission, requesting him to submit to Parliament a report on his activities. The Minister is asked to define his powers and to state whether the regulations of the O.C.P. may be communicated to the Chamber; to inform the House whether the O.C.P. makes a profit, and, if so, how it is employed; and to give some indication of the expected duration of the cereals monopoly.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

The reprint of the Constitution, comprising only 115 articles (see Summary No. 87), has now been completed and copies have been distributed to the Deputies. No date has, however, yet been fixed for the ceremony at which the President and the Chamber are to take the oath on it.

The Syrian Government are becoming very apprehensive about attempts which the French authorities are known to be making to sow discord between the minorities and the Syrian Administration. They view with grave misgiving visits which Generals Monclar and François have been making to the provinces, and are doing everything possible to demonstrate their desire for wider Syrian unity. Thus, considerable prominence has been given in the press to a visit paid to the President of the Republic by Khaled Bagdash and other members of the Communist party, who gave assurances of support for the Government and its policy of independence. Similar publicity has also been given to telegrams approving the Government's policy which the President has received from Aleppo and Deir ez Zor.

The question of public health is at last receiving much-needed attention. At the parliamentary session of the 15th December a number of Deputies spoke with some heat of the scandalous lack of attention to the problem of combating malaria, and, as a result, the Minister of the Interior announced two days later that the Government would earmark a credit of £Syr. 200,000 to be spent on an anti-malaria campaign. At the same time, he called upon local doctors to volunteer to assist, but so far hardly any doctors appear to have responded to his appeal. It is therefore now being suggested that the Government may requisition their services.

## 4. Aleppo.

Further celebrations which took place on the 12th December in connexion with the anniversary of the foundation of the Armenian Soviet Republic were noticeable for the fact that the four main Armenian factions—the Tashnags, Hinchaks, Communists and Ramgawars—combined to stage a joint gathering. (The Tashnags admitted more or less openly that they had found it expedient to swim with the current.) The attendance was large and representative, speeches were unobjectionable and a motion of loyalty to the Syrian State was passed. Russian military successes came in for warm praise.

Certain Syrian Nationalists have been suggesting that such a large Christian *bloc* as the Armenians represents a possible danger owing to its foreign ties; this sentiment may be no more than a psychological reaction to the nervousness—real or inspired—which is being frequently expressed among the minorities about their future under an independent Moslem Government.

It should not be assumed that this disharmony yet constitutes any serious threat to the Syrian Government's influence in this area, but it does provide the French authorities with an opportunity to stimulate opposition to the Government, and there is, unfortunately, good reason to believe they are making the most of it. Even among some of the Moslems, enthusiasm for Syrian nationalism has somewhat cooled owing to talk of heavy taxation and the possibility of conscription.

General de Lavalade has been visiting Aleppo, and is believed to have been planning to bring certain functions of the *Sûreté Générale* more closely under military control.

## 9. Tribal.

The Syrian Parliament have appointed a Tribal Committee of twelve members to watch over tribal affairs. In this connexion it is worth mentioning that the Mohafez of Aleppo, in conversation with the Political Officer recently, expressed doubt as to the Syrian Government's ability to control the tribes, who had in the past been allowed by the French authorities to retain a dangerously large quantity of arms. The Government have undoubtedly much to learn in



this respect; but a beginning must be made some time, and in conversation with His Majesty's Minister General Catroux has indicated his readiness to make over the Contrôle Bédouin to the Syrian Administration subject to certain reasonable safeguards concerning the conditions of service of the existing French military personnel.

Light rain has now fallen in the tribal area and winter migration may be expected to begin.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

Lebanese optimism over the outcome of their discussions with the French remains undiminished. The unexpected absence of French opposition to their progress towards full independence has, however, allowed play to their natural tendency to internal dissensions. The Chamber has not met since the 1st December, and in the interval many of the Deputies have been engaged in constant intrigue with a view to improving either their own or their followers' fortunes, or to enhancing their personal prestige at the expense of the Government. The Opposition groups are still nebulous in character, but fall roughly into three main factions. These are:—

- (a) A number of North Lebanon Deputies, who are nettled at the non-inclusion of at least one of their number in the Ministry, and are convinced that the interests of their region are being neglected;
- (b) A group headed by Dr. Ayoub Tabet and Alfred Naccache, which comprises most of the pro-Eddé Deputies and is looking for any occasion to oppose the Government upon any issue; and
- (c) A number of South Lebanon Deputies headed by Ahmad el Assad, a man with a bad record, whose chief cause for complaint is at present the personality of the newly appointed Mohafez of South Lebanon.

The Government presented this opposition with a target for attack in the only noteworthy administrative act which has been performed during the past week, namely, the reshuffle of the Mohafezin and Directors. This measure, finally promulgated on the 16th December, had been delayed by disagreement within the Ministry as regards several of the posts. The Government's task was, as always, rendered infinitely more difficult by the tradition which has grown up, resulting from the confessional basis of the Constitution, that each community has a right to be represented in a certain proportion in each grade of administrative post; thus, when the excellent Greek Orthodox Mohafez of Sidon received well-deserved promotion and became Director of the Ministry of the Interior, it was considered essential to replace him by another member of the same community; as no really suitable candidate was available, the choice fell on a nonentity, who is said to have already proved a failure in two minor judicial posts. But, even after making due allowance for this traditional handicap, it cannot be said that the majority of the Government's choices were good ones; and strong criticism of the appointments is widespread amongst all Opposition groups, centring particularly on the choice of an obscure cousin of the Minister of Defence for the important post of Mohafez of Beirut.

Opposition to the Government is thus concentrated solely on matters of personal or regional interest, since no questions of principle have yet been tackled by them. On the subject of the negotiations with the French, virtually all the Deputies, and, indeed, the population as a whole, are united; but, unless checked, these squabbles over less ideal issues are liable at any time to cause serious trouble. The Prime Minister has, in fact, already become so impatient of the criticism which is being directed at him as to talk privately of resigning when the Franco-Lebanese discussions have been concluded.

The Government have taken no steps in the matter of the punishment of Emil Eddé, regarding which a motion was presented in the Chamber at its last sitting. Some sixteen Deputies, mostly belonging to group (b) mentioned above, are understood to have petitioned the Government to take no action against him; on the other hand, the better elements of the population generally consider that failure at least to deprive him of his membership of the Chamber will merely expose the Government's weakness and encourage similar treasonable actions in the future.

An official Egyptian delegation under Omar Fathi Pasha arrived in Beirut on the 16th December bearing a message of greeting from King Farouk to the Lebanese President and an invitation to the Lebanese Government to send a delegation to Cairo to discuss Arab federation. Immense efforts were made by the Lebanese authorities to make them welcome; the streets were beflagged with

the Lebanese and Egyptian colours, an endless round of functions was arranged, and the elaborate precautions for the safety of the delegation made by the newly appointed Director of the Defence Services might have given the impression that their lives were in danger from an incensed population.

Three prominent Egyptian journalists accompanied the mission. All three had written strongly critical articles on the Lebanese crisis, and the French authorities committed the tactical blunder of refusing them entry visas, maintaining their refusal even after the President of the Republic had personally intervened on their behalf. The journalists were thereupon attached officially to the delegation, and only arrived with it. Public knowledge of this incident has still further lowered French prestige, and has also made the Lebanese authorities more determined than ever to achieve a measure of independence in regard to the control of their own frontiers.

The French S.S.O. at Tripoli, another notoriously bad official, has now been replaced.

Three days' heavy rain over the week-end have somewhat improved the prospects for the cereal crops.

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

*Internal.*—There has been an outcry on the part of a considerable number of Beirut Arabic sheets against the quotas of newsprint allotted to them by the Lebanese Government, and one or two have gone so far as to threaten to cease publication. These protests are, without doubt, inspired by the French Press Bureau—it is significant that the most vehement and vociferous of them come from pro-French papers. On the suggestion of the press attaché, steps have been taken temporarily by the Lebanese Government to satisfy demands on condition that the newspapers accept an announced inspection of their circulation at any time. In this connexion it is worth noting that, if the circulation figures provided by the various sheets were accepted, it would indicate a wider reading public in Beirut than in any other town in the Middle East.

[E 140/23/89]

No. 22.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 6th January, 1944.)

(No. 85.)  
Sir,

Beirut, 17th December, 1943.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 773 and 778 of the 26th and 28th November respectively regarding the debates in the Syrian Chamber on the terms of the Constitution, I have the honour to submit the following report, compiled from accounts of the two sessions which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus:—

2. Towards the close of the session on the 25th November the question of a revision of the Constitution was raised by Ahmed Sharabati, a Deputy for Damascus, who referred to the French Committee's communiqué (see Algiers telegram No. 2438 to Foreign Office) regarding negotiations to "reconcile the mandate of France and the independent régime promised to the Levant States by the proclamations of 1941." He demanded a special sitting of the Chamber for the purpose of discussing whether article 116 should continue to be recognised as forming part of the Constitution. This article reads as follows:—

"Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations.

"Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien de l'ordre, de la sécurité et à la défense du pays, et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures.

"Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements français et syrien.

"En conséquence, les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord.

[27851]



"Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du Gouvernement français ne pourront être modifiées qu'après entente entre les deux Gouvernements."

Ahmed Sharabati's demand received the support of other Deputies, and the Speaker therefore enquired whether it was his intention to submit a motion in writing. Ahmed Sharabati thereupon produced a written motion from his pocket and handed it to the Speaker.

The terms of the motion were:—

"The Chamber of Deputies request the Syrian Government to take decisive action with a view to taking over immediately the powers, with their attributes in full, in accordance with the provisions of the entire 115 articles of the Syrian Constitution, in order that we ourselves may administer our country and be able to make an effective contribution in aid of the Allies."

Several Deputies spoke in support of the motion, emphasising that the mandate had never been recognised by the Syrians; that the French National Committee of Liberation had no right to speak in the name of France; that the Committee, which existed only to secure the liberation of France, could not assume any responsibility towards the League of Nations; and that, in any event, the withdrawal of Vichy France from the League of Nations had vitiated France's mandate. A report of the speech made by Fakhri Barudi, a Deputy for Damascus and one of the most eloquent speakers in the present Chamber, is enclosed herein.<sup>(1)</sup>

In view of the insistent demand of the Deputies, the Speaker adjourned the discussion of the question to a special session which was held on the 27th November.

At that session the first speaker was Adnan Bey Atassi, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, who urged the Government to assume forthwith all the attributes necessary to complete independence. He was followed by others who discussed Syrian recognition of article 116 and of the mandate from the legal point of view.

The report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber was then read. It stated that the reservations included in article 116 were not part of the Syrian Constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly in 1928, but were unilateral reservations made by the French High Commissioner in 1930. They were, therefore, no concern of the Syrians and imposed no obligation on them. It was accordingly recommended that article 116 should be judged not to form an integral part of the Constitution. The Foreign Affairs Committee advocated also the full implementation of the Constitution, including articles 46 and 70, regarding the taking of the oath to the Constitution by the President of the Republic and all the Deputies, and urged that a special session should be held, at which the oath on the Constitution, consisting of 115 articles only, would be taken.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then spoke. He claimed that the Government shared the views expressed by the Deputies, that they did not, and never would, recognise the existence of the mandate. They demanded complete sovereignty for the Syrian people. He agreed that article 116, being a unilateral reservation made by the French, imposed no obligations on the Syrians. He added that the Syrian Government were proceeding towards the realisation of independence more rapidly than many of the Deputies appeared to believe.

The Speaker, in summing up, emphasised that negotiations between France and Syria could only be on the basis of complete independence and equality. There could be no doubt that, legally, the Constitution comprised 115 articles only. He proposed, therefore, to have it printed in this form, and, when it was ready, to arrange for a special session, at which he would invite the President and members of the House to take the oath. The date of this session has not yet been fixed.

The House then approved the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and the Resident Minister at Algiers.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[E 7712/27/89]

No. 23.

Mr. Eden to Sir E. Spears (Beirut).

(No. 7.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 12th January, 1944.

I HAVE studied your despatch No. 79 of the 26th November last. I think you may be assured that, having read this despatch and the various telegrams which you have sent me, I am now fully apprised of the Lebanese case. But the Lebanese case, however strong and ably presented, must inevitably be an *ex parte* view. Just as there is a Lebanese case, there is also a French case. I have not, of course, had the French case so fully presented to me and must consequently form from such information as I have the best idea of the French case that I can. I think, therefore, it will be well if I now formulate the legal view of the whole position which, I am advised, is the correct one. Taking major events and documents into account, I desire you to regard the following paragraphs as in the nature of instructions. I do not feel it is fruitful or necessary to continue the argument further with regard to this matter.

2. First of all, I wish to recall that it is His Majesty's Government's policy that the two Levant States should achieve independence in fact as well as in name either as the result of an agreement between them and the French or, at any rate, as the result of concessions by the French to these Governments, subject to the necessities of the war situation. General Catroux is now very wisely following this course, and in the circumstances it may be hoped that the question "mandate or no mandate" need no longer be a subject of constant discussion between the French and the Levant States. I do not propose, therefore, to answer and deal with every point which you raise in your despatch.

3. The mandate for the Levant was vested in the French State. The French State, like any other State, must exercise its powers and duties through certain organs of government. At the beginning of May 1941 the French mandate was being exercised on behalf of France by the Vichy Government and by General Dentz, its High Commissioner in the Levant. After the conclusion of the British military operations in the Levant by the British forces assisted by certain French forces, the mandate remained vested in the French State, and only the organs through which it was exercised were changed. The Free French Committee replaced the French Government and General Catroux replaced General Dentz. There had been no change in the Power possessing the mandate and no formal recognition by the League of Nations was required if one French organ were substituted for another as the organ through which the mandate was exercised. France was at that time in a position similar to that of a State in civil war; there was no body recognised by His Majesty's Government as the *de jure* Government of France; the Vichy Government was recognised as the *de facto* Government of the territory which it controlled (though diplomatic relations were broken) and the Free French Committee was recognised as an organisation exercising governmental functions over the French territories which it controlled. The two bodies were at issue and the Free French Committee were our Allies. In their desire to remove the Levant from the control of Vichy and bring it within the Allied area, His Majesty's Government took action to substitute one French contending party for the other.

4. In General Catroux's proclamations of the 8th June, 1941, and the 26th November, 1941 (regarding the Lebanon) two promises were made by the French to the Levant States: (a) that a course would be set which would eventually lead to the termination of the mandate; (b) that the Levant States should become independent and sovereign immediately. His Majesty's Government associated themselves with these promises, and it became part of His Majesty's Government's policy that they should be honoured. It was also stated in both proclamations that (b) should be consecrated by treaties between France and the States. Pending the conclusion of the treaties, which presumably were to put an end to the mandate, the States were to enjoy substantial independence, and in the case of the Lebanon it was specified that this would be based upon the draft treaty drawn up in 1936, but subject to the limitations necessary for defence and security in war-time. It was not made clear at that time, and has never been made clear, at what time precisely these treaties were to be concluded. It was, however, clear that the continuance of the mandate was not to be an obstacle to the enjoyment of substantial independence promised to them immediately by the Levant States.

5. There is, of course, no inconsistency between the existence of a mandate and the enjoyment by the mandated State of sovereignty and independence subject only to certain qualifications. There is also no inconsistency in the existence of an



alliance between the mandatory and mandated State. Iraq called herself, and was recognised by His Majesty's Government as, independent and sovereign and, in fact, enjoyed substantial independence under a Treaty of Alliance with His Majesty's Government from 1922 to 1931, when she was still under mandate. Egypt was also independent and sovereign from 1922-36, when His Majesty's Government still retained many rights under the reserved points of 1922. Therefore, the promise of immediate independence and sovereignty did not mean the immediate end of the mandate nor did it mean the absence of all limitations and removal of *all* French reserved powers.

6. It is, of course, unfortunately true that the French were unjustifiably slow in implementing their promise of immediate substantial independence; and for that blame must rest upon them just as the French will now have to put up with the unfavourable position in which they have been placed as a result of the unjustified delay in fulfilling their promise. His Majesty's Government have exerted constant pressure upon the French authorities to persuade them to meet their obligations in this respect.

7. It is quite clear that there was legal continuity as regards the French position under the mandate before and after the military operations. General Catroux stepped into the shoes of General Dentz and proceeded to act under the legal powers which General Dentz had exercised under the mandate. All the French decrees for the governance of the country and those bringing the Lebanese and Syrian Governments into existence were issued in the exercise of these powers, and the last parties who in the ultimate analysis are in a position to dispute this are those Governments which have only come into existence in virtue of these decrees. General Catroux was only in a position to make his proclamations promising independence because he was claiming to represent France as mandatory and His Majesty's Government could associate themselves with that promise only because they recognised him as having that position.

8. The British position in the Levant States was never that of conquerors or military occupants of enemy territory. They were in the position of having assisted one French authority to displace another in territory under French mandate. Having achieved their object, the position of British troops in the Levant States was promptly legalised for the future, and their rights and powers there defined by the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements, *i.e.*, agreements between His Majesty's Government and the Free French, whom His Majesty's Government now recognised as exercising French rights under the mandate. These agreements specifically stated that the territorial command was vested in the French, and this is only consistent with the view that the French were recognised as the supreme Power in the Levant. No other view of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements is possible, and the existence of these agreements renders it impossible for His Majesty's Government to put forward any view different from that indicated above as to the French position.

9. The above view of the legal position is based upon the principal documents and instruments, and cannot be displaced by statements in letters such as those now quoted in paragraph 10 of your despatch, even if the statements are inconsistent with this position. The extract from General Catroux's letter of the 23rd June, 1941, which I had not seen before, seems to have contemplated an immediate treaty and an immediate termination of the mandatory régime. In any case, I have not the whole text of the letter before me.

10. As you state in your despatch, the word "mandate" has always been the most invidious expression to Arab peoples. It is understood that one of the explanations of this is an original unfortunate translation of the word into Arabic. It was on account of this that, in the case of Iraq, His Majesty's Government did not insist on any Iraq Government committing itself to a formal admission of the mandate during the whole period of years when the mandate for Iraq was in existence. The French did not pursue the same course, though there now seems some sign that they may be doing so, but it was in deference to this dislike of the word that references to the mandate were avoided in the proclamations of Syrian and Lebanese independence in the autumn of 1941, and His Majesty's Government have always advised that the French should make as little public reference to it as possible. But while subsequent references to the mandate by the French have been tactless and unfortunate, this deliberate abstention from stressing a feature which was unpopular after May 1941 did not mean that it had ceased to exist or was obsolete when, for the reasons indicated above, it was in fact the foundation of the whole position.

11. So much for the legal aspects of the question. As regards its practical application while the mandate remains legally in force the French cannot now

use it as an excuse for refraining from giving the Governments of the States substantial independence in accordance with their promises. It is not in accordance with our policy or interests that the French should have used it as justification for the day-to-day conduct of Levant States affairs, as they did in recent months, still less of course did it provide any excuse for the arrest of the Lebanese Ministers last November. I am very pleased to see that General Catroux has wisely reverted to the policy which appeared to be agreed when he made his proclamations of independence in 1941. From every point of view I hope that he will proceed effectively to carry out this policy of making the provisional independence of the States a reality, and that if either side shows any tendency again to argue about the technicalities of the mandate, you will be able to persuade them not to do so. The mandate remains, however, the basis of any reserved powers, including our own position under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements, but for the reasons given in paragraph 10 public references to it should be avoided.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident, Cairo, His Majesty's representative with the French Committee of National Liberation, Algiers, His Majesty's representatives at Jedda, Cairo and Bagdad, and the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.  
ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 344/23/89]

No. 24.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 91, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th January, 1944.)*

#### 1. General.

ON the 22nd December discussions took place in Damascus between General Catroux and the States Governments regarding the transfer of powers. The two Governments were represented by their respective Prime Ministers, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance and the Syrian President was also present. General Catroux was assisted by M. Chataigneau and Count Ostrorog. The general attempted at the outset to negotiate on the basis of France's mandatory rights, but both Governments refused to discuss matters on this basis, and thereafter he appears to have shown a most liberal and accommodating spirit. The discussions, which lasted upwards of five hours, resulted in the issue of a communiqué announcing that the services known as the "Common Interests" would be transferred to the control of the two Governments as from the 1st January, 1944. The Syrian and Lebanese authorities agreed for their part to safeguard the position of the Frenchmen employed in these services. Detailed provisions regarding the actual transfer of control will form the subject of special agreements.

These discussions also covered the question of the transfer of other powers and services, notably the Sûreté Générale, the Contrôle Bédouin and the native levies (Troupes Spéciales and Gardes Mobiles). General Catroux is understood to have expressed in principle his readiness to cede all these services within the limitations imposed by war conditions, but no final agreement has yet been reached, and negotiations will be continued when he returns from Algiers towards the middle of January. Meanwhile the two Prime Ministers have made public pronouncements foreshadowing the early acquisition by their Governments of the attributions in question.

The communiqué regarding the transfer of the Common Interests, together with these pronouncements, caused great rejoicing throughout the two States. The public recognises in General Catroux's action not only the final liquidation of the Lebanese crisis, but also the beginning of that new era of real independence for which it has waited so long. Tributes to the general's statesmanship, it is satisfactory to record, have been ungrudging and numerous. Damascus and other Syrian cities have been beflagged and illuminated, and there have been many orderly demonstrations.

As regards the proposed transfer of the native levies, it is generally realised that this would involve the States in heavy expenditure at present borne by the French. The Syrian Prime Minister, in his speech to the Chamber, intimated that the whole question would have to be debated at a later stage; and there are



signs that the two Governments may prefer to leave matters as they are for the duration of the war or to take over control of small "token" forces only.

The Egyptian delegation, after visits to Damascus and Tripoli and an unbroken round of festivities, returned to Cairo on the 27th December. The Lebanese delegation to Egypt is expected to leave early in the New Year.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases for the period the 18th-25th December were 759 tons, an average of 108 tons a day.

A serious situation has been created as a result of the delay in reaching a decision in London with regard to the purchase of surplus cereals held by the O.C.P. Encouraged by this delay, the French authorities have been attempting to acquire the surpluses for North Africa, and an application by them to this effect was turned down by the responsible Allied authorities, the policy being to supply North Africa, if need be, with cereals brought from areas other than the Middle East. The French then tried to circumvent the control of the M.E.S.C. by inducing the O.C.P. to sell them 7,000 tons of barley for shipment on board a vessel which—for reasons as yet unexplained—was allowed to come to Beirut from Algiers; and arrangements were made for loading to be carried out by French military personnel. It was alleged by the French that the Syrian president of the Cereals Commission had specifically authorised export to North Africa; and the minutes of the relevant sitting of the Commission were actually "cooked" to confirm this assertion. In fact, however, the president had merely authorised the sale and export of the surplus, leaving it to the French and British co-directors to settle between them who should be the purchaser. On his attention having been drawn to this falsification, Jamil Mardam Bey agreed to prohibit the export of Syrian cereals to any country outside the Middle East; and the minutes of the sitting have been duly corrected.

The whole manoeuvre is unfortunately typical of the French failure to co-operate willingly in economic matters, and of their hard-dying delusion that the Levant States can be treated as part of the French Empire. A protest has been lodged with M. Chataigneau. The surplus in question will almost certainly be absorbed eventually by Palestine, which is in need of it, and has already made preliminary soundings with a view to its purchase.

## 3. Syria-Damascus.

The announcement that agreement had been reached between the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and General Catroux for the transfer to the States Governments of the Funds of Common Interest evoked great enthusiasm. Damascus was beflagged and illuminated, and deputations besieged the President's palace to express their satisfaction. The Government gave a banquet in honour of General Catroux, who was warmly thanked by the Prime Minister for the part which he had played in helping to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

On the following day, the Prime Minister informed the Chamber, amidst applause, of the outcome of the negotiations, and enumerated the powers which would be acquired by the Government. One minute's silence was observed in remembrance of those who lost their lives fighting for the independence which has now been achieved. There was a slight passage of arms between the Emir Hassan el-Atrash and Said el-Ghazzi, a deputy for Damascus, who, whilst calling upon the Chamber to express their thanks to the other Arab States for their support, and referring to Hashim Atassi and the late Ibrahim Hanano, made no mention of Soltan Pasha el Atrash.

The Greek Consulate has been raised to the status of a consulate-general.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam Bey, left Damascus on the 29th December, accompanied by the Iraqi Minister, on an official visit to Bagdad. In his absence, the Prime Minister will act as president of the Cereals Commission.

## 4. Aleppo.

Reactions in responsible political circles to the announcement of the forthcoming transfer of powers to the Syrian Government are not yet known, but the successful outcome of the negotiations will almost certainly be regarded as a personal triumph for the Prime Minister. The town has been beflagged—on instructions telephoned by the Prime Minister to the Mohafez—and there have been orderly crowds of cheerful Nationalists, but no demonstrations. Local Christians hope that the change-over will not be too precipitate.

M. Dementque, the unsatisfactory conseiller who was recently removed from Tripoli, has arrived in Aleppo to resume, at least temporarily, the post of assistant to the délégué, which he occupied two years ago.

Colonel d'Assonville, Commander of the French Forces in this area, is to be transferred, at his own request.

## 5. Homs and Hama.

Joyful demonstrations took place in Homs when the news of the agreement reached between the French and Syrian and Lebanese Governments became known. Unfortunately, the first public manifestations appear to have been staged by the Moslems only, and the Christians were therefore accused of "sulking in their homes." With a view to countering this accusation, a large deputation representing the Christian community subsequently visited the Mohafez to offer him their congratulations, but the effect of this gesture of solidarity was marred by an incident in the course of which a pistol was fired. Two members of the Christian delegation were shot and seriously wounded, and others slightly hurt. The man who fired the pistol fled, and has not yet been traced, but he is known to be a Moslem, and though the shooting is now stated to have been accidental, the worst possible impression has been caused. The Moslems are showing great concern for the wounded men, and deputations are continually visiting the hospital. The Mohafez is doing everything possible to prevent this incident from developing into a Moslem-Christian feud.

In Hama also demonstrations were held, but were supported by Christians and Moslems alike, and no incidents took place.

The persistence of malaria is causing anxiety to both Syrian and British authorities, and the Syrian Government, in response to an appeal by the Mohafez, have supplied some quantities of quinine and other medicaments.

## 7. Alaouite territory.

The recent visit to this area of Generals Monclar and François is reported to have given rise to serious apprehension. It was reported to the Mohafez that these officers were urging Nosairi tribal leaders to close their ranks and show a united front against the Syrian Government; but only one individual, namely, Munir Abbas, brother of the late Mohafez, was induced to give support to the French cause. He is reported to have attempted, but without success, to induce the Nosairis to petition for the separation of this province from the rest of the Syrian State. On the other hand, counter-efforts made by the Syrian Government to induce Nosairi Deputies to petition the Government to annul an *arrêté* issued in January 1942, whereby the semi-autonomy of this province was perpetuated, likewise failed.

The Mohafez states that he protested to the Délégué Adjoint about these activities, but was told that the French generals had visited the area against his advice. If this is true it reveals a curious state of affairs, in which the délégué is compelled to permit colleagues senior to him in rank to indulge in subversive activities in a territory for the security of which he is responsible. It is not therefore surprising to learn that the délégué has asked to be relieved of his duties on the grounds of ill-health.

Other French officers whose activities have been causing concern to the Syrian authorities in this area are the inspector of S.S. and the S.S.O. at Jeble. The former's intrigues in favour of separatism are now so flagrant that the Mohafez has ceased to have any official relations with him. In the case of the S.S.O. at Jeble, the Mohafez appears to have taken strong action, as a result of which this officer has been sent elsewhere.

The news of the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese agreement, regarding the transfer of the "Common Interests" caused jubilation. Throughout the area towns were beflagged, and for several days there was a succession of orderly demonstrations by all classes of the community. In Lattakia, Christian and Sunni youths carrying Syrian and British flags paraded before the Sérail and British military administrative offices. No single instance has been reported of anti-French feeling having been manifested.

## 11. The Lebanon.

On the 22nd December the Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs went to Damascus for the meeting described under "General" above. They returned on the 23rd December, and the same afternoon the



Chamber, hastily convened, was informed by the Prime Minister that full agreement had been reached with the French for the Intérêts Communs to be taken over as from the 1st January, 1944. Riad es-Sulh referred to his success in "glorifying" the Arab language and altering the Lebanese flag and Constitution, and paid tribute to the President's wisdom and firmness and to General Catroux for his statesmanship and comprehension. Various speakers, including the Government's arch-opponent, Dr. Ayoub Tabet, congratulated the Government on the successful outcome of the negotiations, and the Chamber unanimously passed a motion of thanks to the Government.

Signs of unrest amongst the workmen employed in large industrial concerns in the Lebanese towns have been increasingly evident for some time, and many of them have been demanding substantial wage increases and a shortening of hours of work. The "black-coated" workers of the D.H.P. Railway are at present on strike; and the Kadisha Electricity Company, which supplies power to North Lebanon, has been successfully held to ransom by its employees, who, by threatening a sit-down strike and sending deputations to the Prime Minister, have now, it is reported, forced the company to agree to all their demands. The unrest seems likely to spread, and may cause a serious problem in the future. It is not thought to be entirely caused, as the employees claim, by the cost of living, and is by some ascribed to the machinations of Communist agitators. Another, and perhaps more plausible, explanation is that it is an aftermath of the Lebanese political crisis of November, the outcome of which gave the workers the impression that their Government was now strong enough to squeeze the French concessionary companies. The result of the Kadisha strike will certainly reinforce this view. It is noteworthy that no unrest amongst employees of Lebanese firms has been reported, although the latter, in general, pay substantially lower rates than foreign concerns.

The holidays, the visit of the Egyptian delegation and the Damascus negotiations have held up all important administrative work.

[E 344/23/89]

No. 25.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 92, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th January, 1944.)*

#### 1. General.

THE formal transfer to the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of two of the services of "common interest," namely, the Customs Administration and the Tobacco Monopoly, took place on the 3rd January at a ceremony held in Beirut. The protocols were signed in the presence of the Lebanese President by the acting Delegate-General, the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Syrian Minister of Finance. Immediately afterwards a joint commission comprising three Syrian and three Lebanese members visited the Customs Department and formally assumed control. This commission, over which the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers of Finance will preside alternately, will administer the services in question and determine the proportion in which expenditure and income are to be allocated to the two Governments.

Several meetings have been held between the French and Lebanese authorities to discuss the question of the transfer of other services, notably the control of concessionary companies and the Sûreté Générale. The French authorities did not invite British participation in any of the discussions, merely informing them on one occasion of the progress made. In view of the importance to the British military authorities of certain of the services under discussion, notably those concerned with security and transport, it was found necessary on the 31st December to inform both French and Lebanese authorities that the British expected their views on these questions to be heard and taken into account before any definite agreements on the subject were made. A written notification in this sense has now been sent to both Syrian and Lebanese Governments. Staff talks have also been arranged between the British and French military authorities on certain technical aspects of the problems involved, in order that the point of view of each may be clarified and if possible harmonised before negotiations with the States Government are begun. The Lebanese Government, for their part, have shown every desire to meet any demands which the British authorities may put forward, so soon as they are informed of exactly what is required.

#### 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period the 26th–30th December were 182 tons, a daily average of 36 tons.

The French co-director of the O.C.P. has made a written offer to sell cereals for North Africa at prices averaging £Syr. 9 per ton higher than those offered to M.E.S.C. in November last. He has been informed that his offer cannot be considered as binding on the O.C.P., and that sales can only be made through the M.E.S.C.

It has been decided in London that surplus cereals are to be bought by the M.E.S.C. Buying of available quantities by the O.C.P. will be resumed as soon as the M.E.S.C. confirms the conditions of purchase.

#### 3. Syria–Damascus.

On the 30th December the Prime Minister announced to the Chamber, which was not in official session since no quorum was present, that as from the 3rd January the Syrian Government would take over from the French the Customs, the Sûreté Générale and Frontier control. Since no definite agreement had been reached with General Catroux about the transfer to Syrian control of the Sûreté Générale and Frontier control and, moreover, these matters were known to be of interest, not only to the Syrians and the French but to the British authorities as well, this statement caused some surprise.

In private conversation with the Political Officer some days later, the Prime Minister explained that what he had meant to say was that the French were in agreement in principle to hand over these powers, but that the question of modalities would still have to be worked out. Some time would therefore elapse before the Syrians could begin to exercise real control.

The Syrian Parliament has, meanwhile, passed a resolution to the effect that financial considerations shall not be allowed to be an obstacle to the taking over of the native levies. The press, too, is urging the question of a national army and encouraging the opening of public subscriptions to maintain it at the outset.

On the 28th December the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by the Minister of Justice, the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber and the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires left on an official visit to Bagdad.

Two Frenchmen of some standing have been in Damascus during the past week, namely, M. Astier, an ex-Senator and a member of the French Consultative Committee in Algiers, and M. Boyé, Professor of Law in Cairo University. Both made allusion to a change of French policy in Syria, M. Astier saying that the mandate had never suited the French and that he believed that French contact with the Islamic world would be strengthened by the increasingly important rôle played by the Syrians of French culture in Arab affairs. M. Boyé, quoting the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, maintained that in respecting the rights of small nations (Syria and the Lebanon) the French called upon others to respect their rights.

A delegation of Lebanese gendarmes is in Damascus to study ways and means of unifying the regulations and policy governing the Corps of Gendarmerie in Syria and the Lebanon.

On the occasion of the Moslem New Year (28th December), and again on the 1st January, the Syrian administrations were closed. On the former date, the President of the Republic had a message of goodwill to Moslems broadcast from the Damascus station. On New Year's eve the French delegate broadcast to Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, resident in Syria, a short message in which he alluded to the pending cession of powers to the Syrians by France and France alone, and reminded his French hearers that they were now guests in Syria who should aid and not hinder the new recruit to the concert of free nations.

#### 4. Aleppo.

There are no political developments to report.

The New Year opens with this area largely contented, both economically and politically. Money-making is the principal preoccupation; and though trade is restricted in volume and prices are high, money, food and work are fairly plentiful, and the majority of people realise their good fortune. Opinion generally is favourable to the Allied cause, and optimistic about an early end to the war in Europe. There is much gratitude for the greater measure of independence which has been achieved; only a minority of Christians, who are



unable to shake off their inborn fear of Moslem control, and others who have in the past opposed the Nationalists are nervous about the future. Practically all leading Nationalists and heads of various religious communities called on the Political Officer on New Year's Day to express their appreciation of the help which they have received from the British authorities.

#### 7. *Alaouite Territory.*

The visits to this area of Generals François and Monclar reported in last week's Summary have led to a revival of talk about Alaouite autonomy, but it is not yet possible to judge how far this issue, which had recently appeared to be moribund, is likely to be revived in an acute form.

The Mohafez has been informed by the Délégué Adjoint that all S.S. officers will shortly be recalled to Lattakia.

A speech made by the Délégué Adjoint at a New Year's Day reception held at the Residence was remarkable for the virulence with which the Délégué attacked Field-Marshal Smuts. Despite the presence of British officers, the speech was loudly applauded by the Frenchmen present.

#### 9. *Tribal.*

Reports continue to come in of the distribution of arms by the French authorities. Investigation has shown that in certain cases the arms concerned are rifles which had previously been confiscated and have now been restored to their owners, and in other instances presents of rifles not exceeding four in number have been made to sheikhs. No confirmation has been received of any reports of alleged large-scale distributions.

Generally speaking the tribes in the area appear quiet. Reports of abnormal concentrations of Shammar in the Jezireh are being investigated, but are probably due to lack of rain, which is hindering migration.

#### 10. *Frontier.*

Turkish frontier and customs guards have been increased but no incidents have been reported. The Délégué has proposed, with the provisional agreement of the Mohafez, that as a first step towards Syrian participation in frontier control the local gendarmerie officer shall attend Frontier Commission meetings with the Turks.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese Minister of the Interior has now taken in hand the general question of discontent amongst workers in concessionary companies. He considers that it will be necessary to arrive at some sort of uniformity of practice in order to prevent strikes caused by the envy of one set of workers of the more favourable treatment given to others. While this lack of uniformity is undoubtedly one of the causes of unrest, the solution proposed seems likely to involve a scaling-up of salaries and will therefore tend to produce further inflation. Measures to tackle the problem by reducing the cost of living are under consideration by the British authorities. The workers in the Tobacco Monopoly went on strike for higher pay at the beginning of the week, but there has been no further unrest in either the D.H.P. Railway or the Kadisha Electricity Company.

Prior to the departure of the Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs for Egypt, the Lebanese Government disposed of certain arrears of business on the 31st December, amongst them a number of judicial appointments. The budget, a new rent law, and the Minister of Justice's new draft law on judicial reform were, however, amongst other measures left incomplete.

On the previous day a somewhat acrimonious debate had been held in the Chamber on a motion to announce a complete amnesty on criminals in honour of the transfer of the Intérêts Communs. After a long debate the Government managed to shelve the proposal by raising the issue of persons condemned for breaking O.C.P. regulations, who, they maintained, could not be released without reference to the Allied authorities. The motion was finally passed to the Judicial Commission for further study.

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

*Internal.*—The Syrian press, both Arabic and French, has devoted much space to the question of a National Army. All papers argue that the question of cost should not be allowed to stand in the way of what they argue is an essential corollary of independence.

The agreement for the transfer of the Funds of Common Interest has filled the columns of the press ever since its conclusion, and great emphasis is laid on the necessity for their proper handling from the outset.

Irritation has been betrayed following a declaration made in responsible French circles in Algiers to the effect that the conclusion of the agreement for the transfer of "Common Interests" does not affect the legal aspect of the French mandate. The Lebanese and Syrian Governments have given the assurance that the negotiations were carried out on the basis of absolute equality.

The first open Communist party conference in the Levant States is taken as an indication that the party is confident of the soundness of its policy.

*External.*—Russian successes have been given prominence. The choice of the invasion chiefs has been taken as an indication that big events are imminent.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Nothing of importance to report.

[E 344/23/89]

No. 26.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary (No. 93), Syria and the Lebanon, 12th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th January.)*

(Secret.)

#### 1. *General.*

NEGOTIATIONS continue between the French and the States' Governments for the transfer to the latter of further powers and attributions. The control of the electricity and water companies have now been made over, and that of other concessionary companies is under discussion. The commission which has been formed to administer the Funds of Common Interest has been in frequent session.

Agitation is increasing for the acquisition by the States' Governments of control over the armed forces. There is a profound mistrust of French intentions, and both Governments desire to obtain control of sufficient forces to checkmate any eventual attempt on the part of the French to reimpose the old régime. In view of General Catroux's recent statement in Algiers that the *Troupes Spéciales* would not be handed over before the end of the war, the creation of an independent army is now being urged by the Syrians. The latter are determined that financial considerations shall not stand in the way, but the Lebanese are more inclined to count the cost.

#### 2. *Wheat.*

Total purchases during the period the 31st December–7th January were 703 tons, a daily average of 88 tons.

The Resident Minister at Algiers has asked the French to refrain from competition with the M.E.S.C. in purchasing Syrian cereals.

Further explanatory telegrams were sent to London on the subject of the cereals surpluses, and authority to buy was received on the 11th instant. Even then the M.E.S.C. did not feel that they could give a firm order to recommence buying on a large scale. Consequently, in view of the urgency of the matter, His Majesty's Minister decided to take the responsibility of authorising the resumption of purchases. The French will now provide necessary funds and purchases will be in full swing in a few days.

#### 3. *Syria-Damascus.*

The question of the control of the national armed forces has been much discussed both in public and in the Chamber. The suggestion which has found most favour is that a new army should be formed (see under "General" above). On the other hand, it is reported that French officers in the entourage of the Delegate are in a measure reconciled to the idea of the transfer to the Syrian Government of the control of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

At the Parliamentary sitting of the 3rd January, a Damascus Deputy brought up the question of the Mixed Courts. A statement by the Minister of Justice was read explaining that the Courts were in effect Syrian tribunals, specialising in cases concerning foreigners, and that judgments were issued in the name of the Syrian people. It was pointed out that the President, although a Frenchman, was employed on contract by the Syrian Government, and that his two assistants were Syrians. The Deputy who had raised the question then asked whether the



judges employed by the Syrian Government would be chosen from France or from French colonies, and also whether it might not be opportune to begin discussions now with the Allies for the eventual abolition of the Courts. The Speaker undertook to draw the attention of the Minister of Justice to these points.

Attendance in Parliament has recently been so bad that on one occasion there was no quorum. A strong article prepared by a French-language paper suggesting certain means of remedying this state of affairs was however stopped by the Syrian censor.

#### 4. Aleppo.

There are no political developments of importance to report. A further procession in celebration of the promised transfer of powers toured Aleppo town on the 2nd January, but there was no undue excitement.

No changes have yet taken place in the local administration, though the Syrian flag now appears over the customs offices. It is reported that a new French information service is being organised, and that of the seven S.S.Os. in this area, five are to be retained on the frontier, and that the others will be employed in different capacities.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

There are no political developments to report.

Popular feeling is solidly behind the Government and eager to see further advances made along the road towards complete independence. Local Nationalists are giving full support to the Government's efforts to gain control of the armed forces. The Christians are, perhaps not unnaturally, less enthusiastic about these developments, but are being careful not to show their sentiments in public. It is however satisfactory to record that the Moslems appear to realise that the Christians are apprehensive and that they are showing every desire to maintain good relations.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Complaints continue to be received about the political activities of the Inspector of S.S. He is now reported to have been seeking support amongst Alaouite Deputies in Damascus for the continuance of the present régime of financial autonomy in the Alaouite province. Local Nationalists have protested to the Délégué Adjoint about this improper interference in matters of internal administration.

The Mohafez has now gone to Damascus to lay before the Government his proposals for administrative reform. He has hinted to the Political Officer that he may resign if his recommendations are not accepted.

The Syrian Government have sent a senior official of the Ministry of Justice to inspect and report on all courts in this province. It is hoped that the Government will avail themselves of the powers conferred upon them by the law recently passed raising the immunity of judges (see paragraph 3, Summary No. 88 of the 8th December) to remove a number of corrupt judges (especially in the Lattakia Court of Appeal) and creatures of the late Mohafez.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The Labour unrest reported in previous summaries continues. A strike of typesetters, which would have deprived Beirut of newspapers, has been averted by the employers acceding to certain of the workers' demands, but the tramway employees are threatening to cease work, and the employees of the Tobacco Monopoly are still on strike. Alone among the members of the Government, Habib Abi Shahla, Vice-President of the Council and Acting Prime Minister (in the absence of Riad es-Sulh, who has gone to Cairo to discuss Arab Federation), seems convinced of the necessity for firmness in dealing with these disputes if they are not to become widespread. After making an unsuccessful attempt to pacify the employees of the Tobacco Monopoly, he has now refused to negotiate further until the strikers return to their work; but he nevertheless clearly fears that when the Prime Minister returns he will reverse this decision and give way on all points rather than risk incurring unpopularity.

The formation of a so-called "liberal Opposition Party" has been announced. It appears to be composed of the group of Deputies headed by Ayoub Tabet, Alfred Naccache and Sami es-Sulh, with Emil Eddé exercising a paramount

influence in the background, which is the nearest approach to an official Opposition which the present Chamber can produce. The President and the acting Prime Minister complain, however, that their chief difficulties arise not from the activities of this open opposition, but from those of Deputies who are regarded as their supporters, notably Yusef Istéphan of North Lebanon, Henri Pharaon of the Bekaa and Saib Slam of Beirut. Similar complaints are voiced by the new Commandant of the Lebanese Gendarmerie, who alleges that his attempts to improve his service are being systematically frustrated by interventions which the Government appears to be all too prone to listen to.

There is considerable controversy about the proposed new rents law, which has not yet been drafted. The landlords, basing themselves on the decree recently published (but not yet promulgated) in Damascus are claiming increases up to 100 per cent. on residential and 200 per cent. on commercial premises; the tenants claim that their situation is already so bad as a result of the high cost of living that they cannot afford to pay any increase whatever. Habib Abi Shahla is apparently hoping to steer a middle course by granting the landlords a small increase, but is waiting to see what happens in Damascus, where the new rent law has been severely criticised.

The Lebanese Chamber is now in extraordinary session for the purpose of passing the 1944 Budget, after which it will go into recess. A parliamentary commission, under Hamid Bey Franjeh, which is at present studying the Budget, is meeting with difficulties on account of the grossly swollen estimates of some of the Departments; an item of £Syr. 6,000 for "the purchase of two typewriters" is given as an example.

It is reported in the press that a delegation of Greek Orthodox archbishops, headed by M. Saliby of Beirut, will shortly pay a visit to the Patriarch of Moscow, thus re-establishing relations between the Russian and Oriental Churches, which were suspended after the Russian Revolution.

The press reports that on the 10th January a Consumers' Association, under the presidency of a prominent Beirut lawyer and apparently composed largely of lawyers, was formed in Beirut for the purpose of combating the cost of living. The association, if it comes to anything, deserves every support, since one of the primary causes of the fantastic prices ruling in the Lebanon clearly lies in the inability of the public to combine against the rapacity of shopkeepers.

The murder of a Druze policeman by a Christian outside the President's house on the 1st January threatened to cause a disturbance amongst the Druze, who, there is some reason to believe, were impelled by certain French elements to magnify the incident into a communal issue. A plain hint conveyed to the Druze leader chiefly responsible, Kamal Jumblatt, that the British authorities would not tolerate any disorder, assisted the Government to find a solution to the question on tribal lines, and it is thought that the matter is now closed.

An "Association for promoting Better Relations between Religious Communities," the foundation of which was recently announced, in asking for Government recognition of their activities, which are stated to be non-political. The association may well be destined to share the fate of many other enterprises in the Lebanon and come to nothing; but it is clear that the events of last November have given considerable impulse to the sentiments held in some circles, particularly amongst the youth of the Lebanon, that communal barriers must be broken down if the Lebanon is to emerge as an independent State; the present enterprise is therefore of some significance.

[E 764/23/89]

No. 27.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary (No. 94), Syria and the Lebanon, 19th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 3rd February.)

(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

THERE are no political developments of importance to report. In Syria public agitation continues on the question of the acquisition of control of the armed forces. This question has attracted less attention in the Lebanon, owing to the lower proportion of the Lebanese element involved; but the Government



are, nevertheless, persisting in their desire to take over at least a contingent of the native levies, partly in order to have at their disposal sufficient forces to enable them to maintain internal security, but principally to prevent their use by the French for political purposes either during or after the war.

The recent agreements of principle for the transfer of powers to the States Governments have not yet been followed by any radical administrative changes, and for the time being the French officials in the various services concerned continue to exercise much the same functions as before. General Catroux returned to the Levant States on the 16th January, and has had preliminary talks with the Presidents of both Republics.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Public agitation continues for the transfer of the native levies to Syrian control. On the 10th January schools were closed and students demonstrated demanding conscription, the introduction of military training in schools and the institution of a national army day when subscriptions would be collected for the maintenance of the national forces. The demonstrators returned peaceably to their schools after being assured by the Prime Minister that the State would indeed take over the army; but the date when this event was to take place was left unspecified.

This question has also been discussed again in the Chamber; in fact, a vote had to be taken on it to enable the discussions on the present budget to be continued, since certain Deputies demanded the withdrawal of the present estimates and their replacement by a new budget which should include estimates for the army. On the vote being taken, however, the majority were for continuing discussions on the present proposals.

Government circles continue to express the desire—and indeed the determination—to take over the levies, or at least a substantial proportion of them; and to declare that the necessary funds will somehow be forthcoming. It is, however, evident that the numerous practical difficulties of the transfer have not yet been fully realised, and that no detailed plan has yet been worked out. The Prime Minister has stated in Parliament that his Government have no official cognisance of General Catroux's alleged statement in Algiers that the *Troupes Spéciales* would not be handed over before the end of the war, and that even if the French publish an official communiqué to that effect, the Government will not consider themselves bound by it. The matter is now under discussion with General Catroux.

At a recent parliamentary sitting, Nejib Rayess, a Deputy for Damascus, objected to the continued censorship by the Allied military authorities of Syrian mail. He was sharply rebuked by the Prime Minister, who said that this was a restriction of sovereignty to which Syria should gladly submit as part of the country's contribution to the Allied war effort.

### 4. Aleppo.

The passage through Aleppo of the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice on their return from Bagdad was made the occasion for various banquets, to one of which French and British representatives were invited. The Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently called on the Political Officer. He showed a satisfactory understanding of local minority problems.

Articles continue to be submitted to local newspapers urging the advantages of the early creation of a Syrian army, but many have been suppressed by the censor, and it would appear that the Government now wish to play down this topic. A deputation of students of the Government school visited the Mohafez to offer themselves for recruitment, but no general enthusiasm has been aroused, and other processions have been discouraged by the Syrian authorities.

The French officials employed in the Customs administration and those in charge of Bedouin affairs have called on the Mohafez to inform him that they now regard themselves as officials of the Syrian Government, and to ask for instructions. The Mohafez has, however, so far received no instructions from Damascus about the transfer of these or other administrations.

The S.S.Os. in the frontier districts are now to be known as *Officiers Frontaliers*. Their functions have not yet been defined, and for the time being they will continue to deal with security matters as before.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

The question of the creation of a Syrian army still monopolises public interest. A further deputation of students has visited the Mohafez of Homs to urge him to press the Government to take action, and notables of Hama have sent telegrams to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Speaker of the House, requesting them to complete the independence of the country by the formation of an army.

There have been a number of demonstrations during the week to welcome pilgrims returning from Mecca. Gratitude has been expressed to the British authorities for making transport facilities available for the pilgrimage.

The Christians who were wounded during the demonstrations which took place in Homs (see Summary No. 91) have now returned to their homes. They continue to receive numerous Moslem visitors.

### 11. The Lebanon.

Labour troubles have continued to occupy the Government. The strike amongst the employees of the tobacco régime ended on the 14th January, when the Government induced the employees to return to work on the promise of a bonus of fifteen days' salary, an advance of a month's salary and an understanding that their other grievances would be sympathetically considered. Government employees have now presented a memorandum of grievances, and certain O.C.P. employees are threatening to strike for higher pay.

The question whether sanctions are to be taken against Emil Eddé for his action during the November crisis has again engaged attention. The President and four of the Ministers are more or less strongly in favour of his being unseated, on the grounds that failure to take such action will merely encourage him to intrigue against the Government. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice are inclined, on the other hand, to believe that a motion to this effect in the Chamber would not now receive the necessary two-thirds majority, as some of the Deputies have since rallied to Eddé and many others now feel that the issue has now been left in suspense too long and would split the country if brought up at this juncture. It is also argued that the motion would alienate certain Christian elements such as the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut and the Phalange party, who supported the Government during the crisis but are now nervous of its allegedly pro-Moslem policy, whereas Eddé is held to be the champion of the Christians. General Catroux is also understood to have undertaken after the crisis to induce Eddé to resign; as he has clearly failed to do so, the question will be taken up with him again.

Examination of the 1944 budget is still not completed. Revelations of extravagances, amounting to fraud, in the purchase of office supplies by the Petro Trad administration have caused a scandal, and a commission of enquiry has been set up to examine the matter. Petro Trad has disclaimed all knowledge of the proceedings.

The Minister of Supply has published the first of a series of measures designed by him to decrease the cost of living. They consist of the purchase by his department of the stocks of yarns, soap, oil, &c., at present in the Customs, in order that they may be sold to the population at fixed prices. He is still working on his schemes for purveying meat, vegetables and fruit to the population through official subsidised chain stores, and has been consulting with his Syrian colleague on the best means of exercising adequate control over the sale of other imported goods. The attention of the public has also been drawn to the existence of the Anti-Profitteering Service, the activities of which are praiseworthy but too little known and too little supported by the public.

Ten Deputies have presented a motion, to be put before the Chamber at its next session, extending the suffrage of women and throwing open all Government posts (except those of President, Prime Minister and Speaker) to women. This initiative, in what is generally regarded as an Arab country, is significant, and was doubtless inspired by the prominent part taken by Lebanese women in the protests which followed the November crisis.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The Beirut press decided on the 17th January to suspend publication of all newspapers forthwith on the grounds that the Lebanese Government's distribution of newsprint was being made to a number of unauthorised journalists and that established newspapers were thus receiving less than their due.



Considerable criticism was voiced in the Syrian Chamber recently of the censorship of political news by the Government censor. The Prime Minister agreed that the censorship of purely political news was undesirable, but condemned some newspapers as being parasites living by political and personal blackmail. He stated that the Government hoped shortly to introduce legislation to improve the quality of the press and to reduce the number of papers published in Damascus. This is a much-needed reform.

[E 876/23/89]

No. 28.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 95, Syria and the Lebanon, 26th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 8th February.)*

(Secret.)

## 1. General.

OUTSTANDING political events of the week have been, first, the taking of the oath of allegiance to the revised Syrian Constitution of 115 articles by the President, Government and Deputies at a special meeting of the Syrian Chamber; and, secondly, the formal approval by the two States Governments of the Lebanese-Syrian Common Interests Agreement, which provides for the administration of the Common Interest Services by a Supreme Council.

In the Lebanon the political opposition to the Government, encouraged by the failure to deal with Emil Eddé, is growing gradually stronger, though it is not yet at all formidable. Apparently with French assistance, it has bought up the newspaper *Ahrar* and has acquired large office premises. The President complained to General Catroux concerning these alleged French activities, which, he said, appeared to have as their object to nullify the concessions made. The Lebanese are particularly anxious concerning the activities of a French stooge, Taufiq Awad, who is spending large sums in an endeavour to excite opposition to the Government by setting the Christians against the Moslems. The Prime Minister, Riadh Sulh, told General Catroux that Awad appeared to be drawing large sums from the French. General Catroux told him that the French were not now financing him, but added that M. Helleu had given him large sums from the *Intérêts Communs*. The Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Minister that the sum in question is believed to amount to as much as £Syr. 150,000, but no trace of any such payment figures in the accounts, so that the entries must have been falsified. Criticism of the Government, and of Riadh es Sulh in particular, for failing to cope adequately with the numerous administrative problems outstanding, has also contributed to the growth of opposition tendencies. Realising that the Prime Minister cannot usefully continue to function as head of the Ministry of Finance, the President is said to have decided to entrust the work of that department to the Minister of the Interior, leaving Riadh es Sulh as its titular head only. Since, however, Camille Shamoun already has his hands full, it is likely that before long it will be necessary to call in Hamid Franjeh, who is an able and experienced administrator, to run the Ministry of Finance. This will, however, necessitate the inclusion of another Moslem in the Government.

General Catroux left Beirut for Algiers on the 26th January after a visit to the Levant States lasting ten days. Nothing positive in the way of further agreements appears to have emerged from his discussions with the two Governments in regard to the transfer of powers, but this is chiefly attributable to the fact that the Anglo-French staff talks have not yet been completed and that the local Governments are consequently still awaiting an indication of the British minimum military requirements. The general found the Syrian authorities eager to take over control of the Troupes Spéciales, but without any concrete plan. They asked him to put up proposals himself, and before his departure he handed them a document, the gist of which was that the local levies should be formally placed under the control of the Syrian Government, in the person of the Minister of Defence, but should immediately thereafter be made over with equal formality for service under the French Territorial Command for the duration of the war. The Syrian Government were to pay for these troops within the limits

of their capacity, the residue being paid by the French, who would continue to provide equipment. A French Military Mission would be entrusted with the task of elaborating, in concert with the Syrian Ministry of Defence, "the measures required for increasing the fighting value of the levies and improving their material conditions," and with studying plans for "the organisation of a national army in time of peace." General Catroux made it clear in conversation that, failing acceptance of this proposal—which is, in fact, unlikely to appeal to the local Governments—the French could and would render the efficient functioning of the native levies impossible by withdrawing certain essential elements, at present staffed by French personnel, such as hospital and veterinary services, the artillery, the engineers, &c. He has also talked of denying the use of the existing barracks, claiming that these form part of what he vaguely describes as "le domaine français"; but the Syrians contest that these barracks, which were originally the property of the Turks, ever passed legally into French hands. However that may be, it is clear that the French are in an extremely strong bargaining position, since it is essential from the British military point of view that the transfer of control should not impair the efficiency of the levies.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period the 8th–20th January were 620 tons, a daily average of 56 tons. The news that the O.C.P. is purchasing is spreading to the villages, so that purchases from now on should increase considerably.

At the meeting of the Cereals Commission on the 20th January the President (who is also the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs) stated that General Catroux had asked him if 40,000 tons of cereals could be exported to North Africa. He had replied that, while in principle he was not opposed to exports, the general should address himself to the M.E.S.C., which was the co-ordinating centre for the trade of the Middle East countries.

The recent rains have much improved the prospects for the 1944 harvest. The Syrian representative has agreed to the sale to M.E.S.C. of 15,000 tons of wheat and 35,000 tons of black barley, maize and sorgho, as well as of all future purchases from the 1943 harvest.

In the debate in the Syrian Parliament on the budget of the Ministry of Supply, the question of the relation of the O.C.P. to the Syrian Government was discussed. Several members took the view that the O.C.P. should become a Syrian organisation. There is, of course, no question whatever of permitting this.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

General Catroux arrived in Damascus on the 18th January and immediately began discussions with the Syrian Government, who entertained him at various official dinners (see under "General" above).

In Parliament, after various attempts to shipwreck the budget had been foiled, the Chamber approved the estimates for 1944 in its sitting of the 18th January. The budget amounts to £Syr. 49,895,000. The Chamber then turned its attention to the Ministry of *Ravitaillement*, whose budget is special and separate. In the ensuing debate this department was bitterly attacked, some members calling for its abolition and re-creation as a directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Agreement was eventually reached that it should continue to be a separate Ministry; but the Chamber refused to ratify its budget until certain conditions had been fulfilled, viz.: (a) the introduction of organic legislation and a proper establishment law to cover the Ministry; (b) the submission to tender and adjudication of bulk imports and exports of commodities where necessary in the interests of the country; (c) the submission of a new budget based on the establishment and organic law referred to above. The Chamber, in addition, requested the Government to put an end to the losses incurred in bread sales.

At a special meeting of the Chamber on the 24th January the President of the Syrian Republic and all the Deputies and members of the Government took the oath of allegiance to the revised Constitution of 115 articles (see Weekly Summary No. 87 of the 1st December), swearing also to maintain the independence of their country and its territorial integrity.

## 5. Homs and Hama.

The merchants of Homs are on strike as a result of attempts on the part of the authorities to collect income tax. Book-keeping being almost unknown, the assessments imposed were necessarily arbitrary. The merchants demand a return



to the old method, whereby a total of £Syr. 35,000 was fixed for the whole town and apportioned amongst them by the local Chamber of Commerce.

As a result of this situation, enthusiasm for the taking over of the native levies has waned in Homs; the merchants, who a short while ago were offering to contribute all they had for the upkeep of a national army, would seem to regard the collection of income tax as an unsuitable method of preparing for the transfer. In Hama, on the other hand, there has been no apparent falling off of enthusiasm, and the Mohafez, an ardent nationalist, has been informed by the Délégué that France is prepared to hand over the levies "whenever the Syrians are ready to receive them."

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

As a result of the proposals of the Mohafez for administrative reforms (see paragraph 7, Summary No. 93 of the 12th January), four of the eight kaïmakams have been removed. Two are retired for corruption, another is suspended and will be tried for selling sugar sent to him for official distribution, and the fourth is transferred to another district. Here, as in the Lebanon, confessional rivalries are a permanent bar to reform; each community is jealous of its own preserves, and tends to be more concerned with keeping its members in office than with improving the public services. Fortunately, however, the officials recently removed from office included representatives of each of the religious communities.

As regards the Judiciary, which is in even greater need of reform, it is understood that the recommendations of the Inspector of Justice are still under consideration by the responsible Minister, who has recently returned from Bagdad.

The Mohafez has stated that the Syrian Government intend to increase the gendarmerie force by 1,500 men. This would indicate a possible increase of 300 to 400 men for the Alaouite gendarmerie, the sanctioned strength of which is at present 210 mounted and 180 foot.

Colonel des Essars, the Délégué Adjoint, states that his transfer to Deir ez Zor is held up owing to the intervention of the President, who is anxious that he should remain where he is for the time being.

#### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Local uncertainty as to the extent of the agreement already reached in regard to the transfer of powers has been a contributory factor in an incident at Abu Kemal which threatened at one moment to assume serious proportions. The local kaïmakam, a hot-headed official with a reputation for xenophobia, assumed without instructions the responsibility for endorsing the passes of Iraqis from the neighbouring frontier area. The Sûreté maintained that, in the absence of any agreement, this was still a function within their exclusive competence. The local Sûreté inspector seems to have behaved with unnecessary tactlessness on his side, and his refusal to recognise the kaïmakam's signature resulted in a brawl and the arrest of the former by the latter. Friction developed between the Gardes Mobiles and the gendarmerie, and serious trouble was only averted by the combined efforts of the Mohafez and the French Chief of the Sûreté at Deir ez Zor, both of whom behaved with tact and good sense. The question of the removal of the kaïmakam is under consideration; the Sûreté Inspector has already been relieved of his functions.

M. Cassin, the Délégué Adjoint, left Deir ez Zor on the 15th January and does not expect to return. He is a sick and nervous man, and ever since the Lebanese crisis last November has shown himself very anti-British, notwithstanding his excellent start at Deir ez Zor only a few months ago. He took a highly coloured view of the incident described above, and his departure is clearly in the general interest. Commandant Aubeire, Inspecteur des S.S., is temporarily acting as Délégué Adjoint in his stead.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister, in a declaration made to the press on the 19th January, stated that, in their discussions with the Egyptians, the Lebanese delegation had exactly followed the lines of the Government's policy, which were to cultivate close relations with other Arab States without entering into any

engagement prejudicial to the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon. In private conversation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed the view that Egypt, like the Lebanon, is determined to keep clear of any consortium of Asiatic Arab States.

During the delegation's absence numerous rumours, probably emanating from ambitious Deputies, had been circulating to the effect that the Prime Minister intended to resign and to form a new Government on his return. These reports, combined with the volume of destructive criticism of the Government heard on all sides, had led to a general impression that some change was, in fact, imminent. The President, however, informed the Political Officer on the 20th January that he considered any change would be disastrous at present; and Riadh es Sulh, at the same interview, said that, although he had thought of resigning to make way for someone better versed in administration, he was prepared to agree that the moment was not opportune. The President told the Cabinet on the 19th January that the time had come to get down to the work of administration, particularly in the domain of finance, and it was agreed that the Minister of the Interior should, in addition to his already heavy burdens, take over the work of the Finance Ministry, although Riadh es Sulh would remain the titular Minister. This arrangement has the desired effect of relieving the inexperienced Riadh es Sulh of all administrative responsibility, but is not otherwise conducive to efficiency; and it seems likely that the President will before long have to call in an experienced administrator, such as Hamid Franjeh, to run the Ministry of Finance.

General Catroux has informed the President that Emil Eddé has refused to resign his seat in the Chamber (see Weekly Summary for the 19th January, paragraph 11), and consequently the Government must now decide for themselves whether or not to pursue the idea of expelling him.

Some interest has been aroused by the activities of a new group, headed by Taoufik Awad and Charles Amoun, who have formed an organisation with the avowed object of preserving the Lebanon's ties with France and its predominantly Christian character. The promoters, both notoriously creatures of the French, appear to be in close touch with the Délégation Générale through its oriental counsellor, Rozek; and their propaganda follows the lines currently believed to be adopted by Sûreté agents amongst the Christians, namely, that the present Government, under British pressure, are adopting a policy destined to place the Lebanon under Moslem domination, from which only French support can save the Christians. The Government view these activities with some concern, and are more than ever anxious to obtain control of the Sûreté at the earliest possible moment, thus putting an end to its subversive activities.

The Minister of *Ravitaillement*, in his attempts to bring down the cost of living, has had to meet a brisk fire of criticism from local commercial circles, by whom he is accused of favouring a few merchants at the expense of their competitors. On the 24th January he published a long apologia, but criticisms of him are rife, largely on account of his testiness and unnecessary rudeness towards petitioners, and the President has expressed anxiety lest his attitude should bring disrepute upon the Government.

The Government published a communiqué on the 19th January stating that the conditions of service of all officials were to be examined by a commission, and that, pending the findings, all promotions of more than two grades made since the 1st October, 1943, would be suspended. This measure is an attempt to meet widespread criticism of the wholesale promotions of their favourites in which the Government are alleged to have indulged since taking office, and has been well received by all except the officials immediately affected.

The Bekaa is at present without any effective administration. The Mohafez appointed by the Government in December last almost immediately threw up his job and returned to Beirut, and the Government have failed to find a suitable Greek Orthodox (to which community, under the unfortunate confessional system still prevailing, the post must be allotted) to replace him. The attention of the Government is being drawn to the undesirability of leaving this important area without a Governor at the present juncture.



Extracts from weekly Political Summary (No. 96), Syria and the Lebanon, 2nd February, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th February.)

(Secret.)

### 1. General.

LITTLE of importance has occurred either in Syria or in the Lebanon. The Governments of both States are still awaiting the results of the Anglo-French staff talks, without which it is not possible to proceed further in the negotiations for the transfer of the Sûreté and the Troupes Spéciales.

The Lebanese Government are adopting a firmer attitude towards the activities of Opposition elements led by Taoufik Awad, and have banned the second meeting of his organisation. The successful handling by the Prime Minister of a petition from the Maronite Patriarch against the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement, and later of an attempted strike in Beirut, both evidently inspired by Taoufik Awad, has further strengthened the Government's position.

Tahsin Qadri, hitherto Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut and Damascus, has been promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. The Syrian Government have declined to accept a letter from the Polish Government appointing the Polish Consul-General (who has the personal rank of Minister) as diplomatic agent in Syria, since that rank—held by the United States representative—implies partial recognition only. They have similarly refused to recognise the newly-arrived Persian representative as a "délégué," though his predecessor was recognised in that capacity.

### 2. Wheat.

Purchases for the period the 23rd–29th January were 277 tons, a daily average of 39 tons. Collection is being hampered by the bad condition of roads and tracks between the villages and purchasing centres due to the rainy weather.

For a long time past the Lebanese Supply Department has been selling flour in Beirut at a loss, whereas in other parts of the country where cereals are sold the sale price covers costs. The Minister of Supply has put forward a scheme to abolish this anomaly, but his proposals are open to considerable objection, and the question is still under consideration.

The Syrian Parliament has voted a law which extends to a great number of Government and municipal employees the right to purchase bread at the low price fixed for the poor. This measure, which would have the effect of greatly increasing the bread subsidy, is likely to lead to a further rise in the cost of living, and alternative proposals have been put forward.

### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government showed some anxiety during the week at the activities of Taoufik Awad's organisation (see last week's summary under "General" and "The Lebanon"). They consider that while the promoters are in themselves of little importance, their political danger is increased by the fact, seen against the background of known Sûreté propaganda, that they are subsidised by the French—a natural deduction being that these activities form part of a French-directed plan to overthrow the Government and to restore French influence. The Government, therefore, while impatiently awaiting the result of the Anglo-French staff talks and the resumption of discussions with the French on the handing over of the Sûreté, have at last decided to take direct action against their opponents, and begun by banning a second meeting of the organisation, which was to have been held on the 30th January.

In the meantime, the Maronite Patriarch, presumably inspired by Taoufik Awad (who is his nephew), had on the 26th January addressed a letter to the President protesting against the Syro-Lebanese Agreement on the "intérêts communs"; he appeared to think that the article of the agreement conferring on the Higher Committee of the "intérêts communs" the right to legislate would bind both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments without the consent of the respective Chambers, and would ultimately lead to a federation of the two countries. The Lebanese President on the 29th January replied, admitting that the text of the agreement was not altogether clear on this point, and stated that the Government were proposing to prepare a law giving them the right to legislate in matters connected with the common interests.

On the 30th January, Riad-es-Sulh proceeded alone to the Maronite Patriarch's residence, where he found a number of deputations, including one composed of Opposition Deputies headed by Alfred Naccache, all apparently come to protest on the same point. He ignored the deputations, and in the course of a long interview with the Patriarch, in which there were some spirited exchanges, appears to have convinced him, at least for the moment, that the Government was pursuing the policy which the Patriarch had already proclaimed as his own, namely, the realisation of Lebanese independence; and that the Moslems were at least no more fanatical against the Christians than the Christians were against the Moslems.

In order to ensure a parliamentary majority and to obviate the necessity of placating the Deputies by granting them administrative favours, the Government are contemplating the formation of a "Lebanese Independence Party," the title of which, they hope, will be sufficiently attractive to secure the support, not only of those Deputies generally favourable to the Government, but also of some of the better elements at present in Opposition. They have not yet decided whether or not to expel Eddé from the Chamber, but have at any rate reached the stage of preparing a draft motion on the point.

The Opposition, pursuing its attempts to embarrass the Government, succeeded in enforcing a partial strike in Beirut on the 29th January under the guise of a tenants' protest against the Rent Bill, which has yet to be submitted to the Chamber. The Government envisaged repressive measures against the promoters of this artificial strike, but Riad es-Sulh persuaded them to allow him to handle it; which he did successfully, and the town reopened by midday. The Bill is to be submitted to the Chamber this week in its present form.

The Chamber met on the 27th January, but confined its activities to a long discussion on the proposed amnesty, which was finally voted in the form recommended by the Judicial Commission, and to voting a provisional sum to enable the administration to be carried on pending the passing of the Budget.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The Beirut newspaper *L'Orient* (see last week's summary) was allowed to appear again after three days of its *sine die* suspension, the Government having given way to pressure from the Press Syndicate and other bodies.

The greater part of the Lebanese press has shown, in varying degree, approval of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement. A few newspapers, mainly French-inspired, see in the powers vested in the Joint Administrative Committee an anomaly incompatible with national sovereignty, and have used to advantage the Maronite Patriarch's letter of protest to the President of the Lebanese Republic (see under "The Lebanon" above). The Syrian press has so far made no comment.

The Lebanese newspapers have protested unanimously against the Rents Bill, declaring that it would merely benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. They have appealed to the Chamber to reject the motion in its present form. There is also unanimous and bitter criticism of the two Governments' failure to cope with the high cost of living, which in the opinion of the press is the root cause of labour unrest.

The Beirut Communist newspaper *Saut ash-Shaab* of the 29th January quoted an article from the Cairo paper *al-Masri* of the 22nd January. The article, which was stated to be a quotation from the London *Times* correspondent writing in Damascus, asserted that Syria could not acknowledge the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon as a separate nation. The Syrian Press Office subsequently issued a denial of this statement, pointing out that Syria had officially recognised the Lebanon as an independent State.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 97, Syria and the Lebanon, 9th February, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 19th February.)

(Secret.)

### 1. General.

BOTH Governments continue to await with anxiety and impatience the result of the Anglo-French staff talks, pending the completion of which no progress is possible in regard to the further transfer of powers. The Syrian Government



are chiefly concerned about the transfer of the "Troupes Spéciales," the Prime Minister in particular having been subjected to much criticism on the score of his failure to implement the promise of the creation of a Syrian national army. The Lebanese are more preoccupied with the problem of the *Sûreté*, which, pending its partial transfer to governmental control, continues to serve as an instrument of French reactionary propaganda and subversive activities.

Owing to this and other causes, there are signs of a definite weakening in the position of the Syrian Cabinet, amongst which there are numerous internal dissensions. The Lebanese Cabinet, on the other hand, has succeeded in restoring its prestige to some extent by maintaining a relatively firm attitude towards the Opposition parties. The Government's failure to secure the passage of the new Rent Law has been offset by the almost unanimous passage, despite much artificial agitation, of the Syro-Lebanese Protocol regarding the *intérêts communs*, and of a draft decree law giving the Government the right to legislate in matters relating to these services.

The most important external development affecting the two States has been the signature at Algiers, on the 8th February, of an Anglo-French Financial Agreement designed to replace that concluded by His Majesty's Government with General de Gaulle in August 1940. The new agreement, necessitated by the conquest of North Africa and the consequent need for unifying the rate of exchange within the whole area now controlled by the French National Committee of Liberation, contains special arrangements designed to safeguard the financial position of the Levant States. Although reducing the rate of the franc in terms of sterling from francs 176.625 to 200 to the pound sterling, it provides that sterling may still be freely purchased in the Levant States at the old rate of 883 Syrian or Lebanese piastres. It further lays down that no change in this rate of exchange will be made in future without prior consultation with the States. The French National Committee have also agreed to re-value certain franc assets of the States and to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie and removed by General Dentz. Lastly, in the event of any future devaluation of the franc, the Syrian and Lebanese currencies are guaranteed against loss.

This important development was announced by the Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers respectively at interviews with journalists and bankers. The first public reactions have on the whole been very good.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period the 30th January-5th February were 628 tons, a daily average of 90 tons.

The French are still hoping to be allowed to export to North Africa, and have made enquiries through the French co-director of the O.C.P. as to the possibility of shipping 1,000 tons of bran. They have been told that permission will not be granted.

## 3. Syria-Damascus.

There are signs of rising discontent with the Government and of dissension in its ranks. On the one hand the merchants, already critical of the Government's lavish expenditure on entertainment, fear an increase in taxation to meet the needs of the Syrian army. On the other, the politically-minded, particularly the students, are attacking the Prime Minister for his failure to make good his promises concerning the creation of the army. The Minister of Defence is reported to have tendered his resignation on the same grounds, but it was not accepted. The Minister of Supply has been attacked both in Parliament and in the press for his blatant favouritism in the allocation of contracts, and his failure to defend himself against these attacks has annoyed his colleagues. Finally, the Minister of Justice is resentful of his exclusion from the political conversations which took place during the recent ministerial visit to Bagdad. There is thus much talk of the creation of a new Cabinet from which Saadullah Jabri would be excluded in favour of Lutfi Haffar, Jamil Mardam or Khaled Azm.

General Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East, arrived in Damascus on the 7th February, where he met Nuri Pasha, who was on his way back to Iraq from Palestine.

First reactions in Damascus to the announcement of the Anglo-French Financial Agreement (see under "General" above) have been very favourable.

## 4. Aleppo.

The Mohafez has returned from Damascus fortified with promises of greater support from the central Government. He is capable and honest, but the local

Nationalists are unlikely ever to work whole-heartedly with one who was a member of the Council of Directors in 1939.

Returning pilgrims from Mecca have warmly praised the arrangements made by the British for their journey. A good impression has also been created locally by the announcement of the impending return of several wheat-hoarders deported last year to an island in the Red Sea.

## 7. Alaouite Territory.

The Mohafed has notified all Mudirs of Nahiyehs that they will shortly be required to pass a written examination in the laws connected with their duties. He estimates that the necessary educational qualifications for this class of civil servant are possessed by only one out of the eight kaïmakams in office, and by only one Mudir out of twenty-five.

Judicial proceedings against Suleiman Murshid are still hanging fire, the central Government being evidently afraid to take action against this ruffian.

Colonel des Essars, the French délégué, is reported to be at last preparing to leave for his new post at Deir ez-Zor. He is not, after all, to be replaced by Colonel d'Assonville, but by a Colonel Gossaud. Colonel des Essars has on the whole shown comprehension of the new Nationalist spirit and of the resulting need for political adjustment. This comprehension is not, however, shared by his subordinates, some of whom, and notably Capitaine Boussiquet, have shown a regrettable tendency to follow the reactionary lead of General Monclar.

## 9. Tribal.

A number of small tribal clashes have been reported. Such quarrels are always fairly common at this season of the year, but there is undoubtedly a dangerous tendency on the part of the tribes to find out by experiment just how far they can safely flout the authority of the Damascus Government in view of the changed status of the Bedouin Control.

It is reported that no steps have yet been taken in this area to disband the Gardes Mobiles.

A fight has occurred between two sub-sections of the Abu Saraya (Agaidat) in the Jebel Bishri west of Deir ez-Zor. One side lost five killed and two wounded, the other three killed and two wounded. The dispute concerns a land claim. Normally such internal feuds are of little importance, but both parties are reported to have been buying up ammunition at exorbitant prices since the affray took place.

The president of the new Committee for Tribal Affairs, which is composed of nineteen members from among the more important tribal Deputies, is Haj Mohammed Ayesb, an influential merchant and landowner from Deir ez-Zor. He states that he has suggested to the committee the abolition of tribal law; but that a large majority of members are opposed to changing a system which has brought them arms and many concessions from the French, and that they prefer to wait until they know whether Syria really is to be independent. The representatives of the semi-sedentary tribes, which are at present partly under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts, have demanded that if the nomads are to remain under tribal law they, too, should receive the same privilege.

## 10. Frontier.

The Turkish authorities have introduced new visa regulations, by virtue of which, with the exception of transit visas for direct travel over the Turkish sections of the Bagdad Railway, all applications, including those of diplomats other than heads of missions and couriers, must be referred to Angora. This has caused considerable inconvenience to official British travellers, and the question of retaliatory measures is under consideration.

## 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 3rd February to discuss the ratification of the Syro-Lebanese protocol on the *intérêts communs* and a draft decree-law giving the Government the right to legislate in matters concerning these services. After a long debate, during which Riad es-Sulh trounced the Opposition, the



protocol and law were put to the vote together and passed by 43 votes to 1. The Prime Minister again showed on this occasion that, when sufficiently roused, he is a most effective debater, and the victory undoubtedly restored some of the Government's slightly waning prestige. The Maronite Patriarch, after Riad Bey's interview with him on the 30th January, had declared himself reassured about the protocol and had given it his blessing.

Local satisfaction was also caused by the announcement that protocols for the transfer to the States Government of the economic and financial services and of the A.R.P. had been signed with the French authorities.

The Government, pursuing its policy of suppressing Taufiq Awad's organisation, has now suspended its newspaper, *Saut el-Ahrar*, *sine die*.

On the other hand, the Government suffered a setback when its draft rent law, which had allowed a certain percentage of increases in rents, was rejected *in toto* by the parliamentary commission examining it. The Government had tried to steer a middle course between the claims of the landlords, which were largely based on the enormous rent increases recently decreed in Syria, and those of the tenants, who maintained that no increase of rents was justifiable in view of the straitened circumstances to which the high cost of living had reduced them. The commission, however, took the tenants' view and recommended that the 1943 law should be prolonged for another year. The draft law is now to be referred back to the Chamber.

Another sit-down strike has broken out amongst the office staff of the Kadisha Electricity Works, on the grounds that the French director has failed to implement the agreement recently made between the company and the employees through the intermediary of the Government. The directors and representatives of the employees have now been summoned to Beirut to interview the Prime Minister. The unpopularity of the French director, M. Calmette, whose security record is bad, is undoubtedly one of the causes of the trouble.

The Minister of Supply has been showing considerable activity. At a press conference on the 4th February he defended himself vigorously against charges levelled against him in regard to alleged irregularities in the grant of export licences to some of his friends. He then explained his plans for reducing the cost of living; these included the arrangement of barter transactions with neighbouring countries which would secure the importation of cheap food-stuffs and the sale to the public at Government-controlled prices of certain important commodities, such as cloth, which he was obtaining through the Office Economique de Guerre and by purchasing stocks in the Customs. He referred also to the Government's intention to increase the activity and effectiveness of the Anti-Profitteering Department, which has now been put under the Ministry of Justice instead of the Ministry of Supply. He is understood to have had conversations with his Syrian opposite number, Mazhar Pasha Reslan, with a view to co-ordinating the efforts of the two Governments in the economic field.

The Prime Minister of Iraq arrived in Beirut on the 3rd February by air from Palestine and left for Damascus on the 4th February. He was entertained by the Lebanese Prime Minister to a banquet, to which foreign representatives, Deputies and journalists were invited.

## 12. Press and Propaganda.

The newspapers have expressed almost unanimous approval of the ratification of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement. The one exception, *al-Bairaq*, made a feeble attempt to justify the motives of the single Lebanese Deputy who voted against it. The changed attitude of the Maronite Patriarch was also welcomed.

*L'Orient*, on its reappearance, accused the Lebanese Censorship Service of dictatorial methods, and protested that if free comment on matters of internal policy were not to be allowed, the continued existence of the press would become unnecessary. There is some truth in these accusations; the Lebanese censorship, run by a thoroughly incompetent official with much interference by Cabinet Ministers, is proving both arbitrary and inefficient.

[E 1486/23/89]

No. 31.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 98, Syria and the Lebanon, 16th February.—(Received in Foreign Office, 7th March.)

(Secret.)

## 1. General.

BOTH Lebanese and Syrian Governments have reacted strongly against the announcement of the appointment of General Beynet in the dual rôle of Commander-in-chief of French Forces and Delegate-General. Their view is that the title of Delegate-General is no longer compatible with the independent status of Syria and the Lebanon, and that an Ambassador should be appointed, by *agrément*, in accordance with normal diplomatic practice. The two Prime Ministers have met to discuss the presentation to the French of protests in identical terms. While the attitude of the two Governments has apparently been fortified by encouragement from several members of the Diplomatic Corps, efforts are being made on the British side to prevent any unduly violent reaction.

The Franco-British staff talks on pending questions, such as security and the disposal of the native levies, are now practically completed; and it is hoped that within the next few days it will be possible to acquaint the two Governments in detail with the minimum British military requirements, thus enabling further progress to be made in regard to the negotiations for the transfer of powers. The long delay caused by these talks, though inevitable, has given much discouragement to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, and this in turn has led to a certain laxity and confusion in the provincial administration, which have been fully exploited by disaffected French elements.

Rumours that the British troops are withdrawing from the Levant States in the near future and being replaced by large numbers of French troops from North Africa have been circulating freely and increasingly for the past few days, and appear to form part of an organised campaign designed to restore the French position. An official *démenti* will be issued by Ninth Army Headquarters, and other measures are under examination to check this move, which is causing unnecessary alarm without doing the French themselves any good.

General Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East (see Weekly Summary No. 97, paragraph 3), who was presented with a gold sword by the Syrian President before he left Damascus, is stated by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to have had a conversation with the Lebanese President during which he suggested that the Arab States should address a joint request to the Allied Nations, urging that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be applied to the settlement of their affairs. With regard to the future status of the Lebanon, he is reported by the same source as having proposed that in view of the large Christian element in the population, the country's independence and sovereignty should be especially guaranteed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, as was done in the case of Persia during the Tehran Conference. A rather different account of this conversation has been given by the United States Diplomatic Agent, according to whom General Hurley's suggestion was that all the Arab States, at their forthcoming conference on Arab unity, might make a declaration expressing their determination to respect each other's sovereign rights and territorial integrity; following this up with a joint request to the United Nations to make in respect of all of them a declaration on the lines of that issued at Tehran in regard to Persia. According to Mr. Wadsworth, he added as a further tentative suggestion that the Arab States might declare their intention of themselves applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter to their relations with each other. The first of these suggestions, but not the second, was apparently made to the Syrian President also. Neither Shukri Quwatli nor Beshara Khuri is reported to have returned any definite reply. It seems possible that the Lebanese President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who are both Christians and who understand little English, may have genuinely misunderstood the General's suggestions; or alternatively that they interpreted them in accordance with their own wishes.

The Lebanese Government have improved their position in regard to hostile elements, and are now showing increased activity in the field of administration, largely owing to the encouraging efforts of the Prime Minister.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period 6th to 13th February amounted to 783 tons, a daily average of 98 tons.



The Syrian Council of Ministers are considering a reduction in cereals prices, which has been suggested by the Economic Adviser to Spears Mission. The Syrian President of the Cereals Commission, however, does not believe that this reduction is possible without a simultaneous decrease in the prices of cotton and other goods used by agriculturists. When informed recently that the present price of barley ought to be reduced to a level more nearly in proportion to that of wheat, he suggested that the monopoly on barley should be removed. This, of course, is out of the question.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Prime Minister of Iraq, during his stay in Damascus (see Weekly Summary No. 97, paragraph 11), made a statement to the Syrian press to the effect that discussions on the question of Arab unity had been proceeding well and had reached a stage which should permit the early convening of a congress to determine the precise form of collaboration to be adopted. He alluded also to the possibility of creating a Greater Syria, composed of Syria proper, the Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, adding that the nature of its constitution should be left to the decision of the inhabitants of its component States. (It is significant that Nuri Pasha's reference to the Lebanon in this connexion was deleted in all Syrian papers by the Government censor, who replaced it by an "&c., &c.") As regards Palestine's co-operation in schemes of Arab unity, he stated that the Palestine Arabs were wholly in agreement with the trend of the conversations which had taken place, and—rather cryptically—that the decision on the fate of "regions of Palestine having an international character" concerned the interested Powers. "We, for our part," he said, "are concerned with those having connexion with us."

In contrast with these vague statements to the Syrian press is the account of the results of his visit which Nuri Pasha gave to His Majesty's Ambassador on his return to Bagdad. He told Sir K. Cornwallis, *inter alia*, that he had reached agreement with the Syrian Government for the "federation" of Syria and Iraq, who would adopt a common policy in regard to defence and foreign affairs. It has not yet been possible to obtain confirmation of this from the Syrian side; and in view of the firm attachment of the Syrian President to Ibn Saud it would appear somewhat improbable that any such agreement was actually reached, though it may well have been mooted.

A number of further minor attributions have now been transferred by the French, and this will enable the Government to proceed further in the development of their administration, though the important question of the Troupes Spéciales still remains outstanding. The control of concessionary companies has been transferred from the Ministry of National Economy to the Ministry of Public Works.

A representative deputation of Shia Moslems of Damascus, including a member of the British Indian Community, called on His Majesty's Consul to protest against what they described as the harsh and unmerited execution, by the Saudi Arabian authorities, of a Persian Shia pilgrim at Mecca during the recent pilgrimage.

The favourable reactions to the Anglo-French Financial Agreement (see last week's Summary) have been maintained, and there is general satisfaction in both Government and mercantile circles.

### 4. Aleppo.

The recent Opposition success in the election for the Chamber of Agriculture (see Summary No. 96 of the 2nd February) was repeated in the subsequent election of a president for the Medical Society, when the successful candidate, a supporter of Rushdi Kekhia, who is one of the chief critics of the Government among local Deputies, defeated a close friend of the Prime Minister's.

The Government's position in this area is not seriously challenged, but rumours of dissensions are prompting local supporters of the Nationalist *bloc* to try to gain friends outside its ranks. For example, when a small Moslem demonstration was arranged by the Jabris, care was taken to invite Rushdi Kekhia, while leading Nationalist supporters were excluded.

The Syrian authorities have officially announced that the French *officiers frontaliers* may continue to work in the Sérails, but the relevant instruction states that frontier commission meetings will be held in the kaïmakam's office, and in his presence. These arrangements are unlikely to prove workable, as it is unsuitable that a kaïmakam should sit as assistant to a junior French officer, and on

the other hand the Turkish representatives would not, it is believed, agree to the President being a Syrian even if this were desired by the French.

The large Armenian community in Aleppo has shown much interest in the Soviet constitutional changes, which are locally regarded as a move to extend Russian influence. There is a good deal of speculation as to the possibility of an Armenian Consul being appointed to Aleppo from Erivan.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

M. Chataigneau, accompanied by Colonel Oliva-Roget, has visited Soueida, where he reviewed the squadrons of the *Groupement Druze*. Opinion among officers and men of the *Groupement* on the question of the transfer of control of the armed forces to the Syrian Government appears to be divided into three sections. The majority are said to favour the maintenance of French command; an indeterminate number are apathetic, provided there is no danger of their losing their pay if a change is made; and only a minority is believed to desire control of the *Groupement* to pass to the Syrian Government. Officers of the *Groupement Druze* are being told by the French that the present Syrian régime is only temporary, that it will prove to be as transitory as was the rule of King Feisal, and that after the war the mandate will be reimposed, with the consent of the Great Powers. Steps are being taken to counteract this mischievous propaganda.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

This area has remained quiet except for an incident between the rival factions of Kinj and Nassour, of the Haddadin tribe of the Jebel qadha. A quarrel arose over the bidding for a piece of land at a sale, and developed into sporadic fighting in which there were a few casualties. It appears that the action of the Kinj had been provocative.

The rule of the brothers Kinj in the Jebel district has been almost as despotic during the last two decades as that of Suleiman Murshid in Haffe, and Alaouite opinion will judge the new Government by their ability to put an end to the activities of these tyrants.

The rumour that the British are evacuating Syria forthwith and will be relieved by French troops from North Africa (see under "General" above) is being circulated assiduously in Lattakia.

Colonel des Essars has now been replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Gaussot (not "Gossaud," as stated in last week's Summary)—an officer of whom little is known except that he is a newcomer to the Levant States and has no administrative experience.

### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

These areas remain relatively calm, but there is an undercurrent of uncertainty and uneasiness, particularly amongst the minorities. This is undoubtedly due in part to the delay in completing the transfer of powers (see under "General" above). It is also, however, caused by factors which the transfer is not likely to remove for some time to come, if at all. The Syrian authorities at Damascus have always shown a lack of interest in these backward outlying areas; and the provincial administration is inadequate in point of numbers, besides being on the whole somewhat biased against the minorities.

### 9. Tribal.

No further developments are reported in the Abu Saraya quarrel (see last week's Summary).

The land dispute between the Jubbour and the Messinieh (see Summary No. 96 of the 2nd February) has been settled temporarily by the withdrawal of Abdul Aziz Muslat from the property in question at the instance of the commandant of the gendarmerie.

On the 7th February the Mohafez of the Jezireh received an urgent message from the Mudir of Shaddadeh informing him that the Jubbour were gathering in large numbers about 25 kilom. north of Shaddadeh to attack the Feddagha in revenge for previous raids. The Mohafez, exasperated by the apparent inaction of the Contrôle Bédouin, to whom the matter had been reported a week before, wrote officially explaining his inability to quell the Jubbour with the insufficient gendarmerie force at his disposal, and disclaiming responsibility if the French authorities did not take action to expel the Feddagha to their normal



pasturage area in Iraq. In this dispute the Feddagha are undoubtedly supported by the Agaidat, who have long-standing differences with the Jubbour.

On his return from a tour of the Duck's Bill, Mgr. Kyriakos, the Syrian Orthodox bishop, who is described as level-headed and exceptionally intelligent, has expressed apprehension of possible trouble between Arab, Kurdish and Christian elements, owing to the lack of adequate representation of Government authority in that area. The Mohafez alleges, moreover, that much of the insecurity is due to a French whispering campaign concerning Turkish claims to the Duck's Bill and to French encouragement of separatist leaders.

A deputation of Assyrians from the Khabour Settlement has gone to Damascus to claim the Government's protection against the raids of neighbouring Arab tribesmen, particularly the Baggara and Sharabiyin. Their complaint is that, there being no longer British troops in that area, and the Gardes Mobiles having been withdrawn, they must now rely on a few ill-equipped gendarmes, with the possible support of Méharistes, or, alternatively, must take the law into their own hands. These Assyrians have undoubtedly suffered more than usual in recent weeks from the depredations of their Arab neighbours; and the fact that a large proportion of their men-folk are serving with the British forces gives them a strong claim to British sympathy and support.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The Prime Minister made a statement in the Chamber on the 10th February on the financial agreement signed between the French, British, Syrian and Lebanese authorities, saying that the agreement provided a new and firm basis for the Lebanese currency and was a guarantee of the nation's independence. The House unanimously adopted a motion of thanks to the Government for negotiating and concluding the agreement.

The Prime Minister, who had previously defended his lack of interest in administrative matters as being merely a disinclination to "fight on two fronts" (i.e., with the French regarding the transfer of powers to the Government and with the Opposition regarding internal matters), has recently been showing a greater disposition to spur on the other Ministers in their departmental duties, and the Government has been showing much more activity than hitherto, though little in the way of concrete results has yet emerged. The Ministers of Justice and Interior, who are apparently now dividing the work of the Finance Department between them, are at last getting ahead with the preparation of the budget, which is much overdue, and have been examining the stillborn War Profits Tax with a view to applying it, though so far they have found the difficulties unsurmountable. The Rent Law, which was to have been debated in the Chamber on the 10th February, has been referred back to the committee which rejected it, with instructions to study it afresh. The Minister of Supply is still elaborating his plans for reducing the cost of living, and the statute for the new Supreme Advisory Board has at last been drawn up and passed. The services of common interest recently taken over from the French have now been allocated to the various departments. The Anti-Profiteering Service has been attached to the Ministry of Justice, and the Government intend to increase its activities.

The elements hostile to the Government have for the moment been put to rout by the Prime Minister's several victories over the Opposition in the Chamber and by the Government's repressive measures against the Taufiq Awad organisation outside it. Riad-es-Sulh is said to be still studying ways and means of ensuring a majority in his favour if and when he decides to introduce a motion for the unseating of Emil Eddé. In the meantime, Emil Eddé is becoming rather more active behind the scenes, although he has not yet dared to appear in public; and it is noticeable that Moussa Namour, a formerly prominent politician who failed in the last elections and who is short of money, is now bidding fair to displace Taufiq Awad, whose unpopularity outweighs his cleverness, as a leader of the extra-parliamentary Opposition group.

The sit-down strike in the Kadisha electricity works became a full-dress strike on the 8th February, when the unpopular French director went back on his undertakings to the Government and endeavoured to coerce the employees into accepting his terms under threat of dismissal. On the 12th February the Prime Minister curtly informed him that, if he did not succeed in ending the strike by the 14th February, the Government would take over the works and dismiss him. M. Calmette at once came to heel, and the strike ended on the afternoon of the 14th February. The Government are now proposing to send a

commission of enquiry into the works, and to demand M. Calmette's dismissal if the commission's report holds him responsible for the unrest.

A number of small strikes amongst various types of workers in the Beirut area, including joiners, hairdressers' assistants and tanners, have been settled by the Government.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The Anglo-French Financial Agreement recently concluded has been well received in the local press, which anticipates that it will have a stabilising effect on local currency and constitute a check on speculation. It will consequently be an important contributory factor to the success of the campaign against profiteering. The agreement was published in the entire press, side by side with a commentary issued by the press attaché's office.

Disappointment is evident in press comments on the Chamber's failure to ratify the decision of the Judicial Committee to reject the Rent Law motion, as it had been fully expected that the Chamber would approve the recommendation.

Complaints against the high cost of living continue throughout the press.

*External.*—Much space is devoted to news of the American oil project in the Arabian Peninsula. Comment is confined to one paper, which believes that the project will be an important factor in shaping the destiny of the Middle East, and considers that it will not prove a danger to Arab independence provided the Allies live up to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—No significant change has been observed.

[E 1487/23/89]

No. 32.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 99, Syria and the Lebanon, 23rd February, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 7th March.)*

(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

WHILE the Lebanese Government continue to consolidate their position against the forces of the opposition, there is increasing speculation in Syrian parliamentary circles as to the possibility of the Damascus Government's surviving the next session of the Chamber. Much depends on the achievement of a satisfactory settlement of the problem of the native levies; but, apart from this, the rifts within the Cabinet will in all probability necessitate at least a reshuffle before long.

The Syrian Government have now handed the French a detailed counter-project concerning the transfer of the levies (see Weekly Summary No. 95, paragraph 1, for a summary of General Catroux's proposals). The text of this counter-project has not yet been received by the British authorities, but the French appear to regard it as unlikely to provide the basis for a satisfactory solution, and have referred the question to Algiers. They still expect General Catroux to arrive in the Levant towards the end of the month, but have no definite information about his plans. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a solution of this important question will be reached in time to save the present Syrian Cabinet from hostile parliamentary criticism which may well lead to its downfall.

On the 25th February, after inevitable but unfortunate delays, both Governments were given a paper showing the requirements of the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, on two of the most important questions relating to the transfer of powers.

The first section covers *inter alia* the procedure to be followed in future for the implementation of the army commander's military requirements on specific points. Hitherto the Délégué Général promulgated the necessary decrees: in future any orders affecting the civil population will be passed by the army commander to the French Commander-in-chief as the territorial commander, and the latter will arrange for the States Governments to issue the requisite decrees. Adequate safeguards are provided against a possible breakdown of the new procedure in practice.

The second section of the paper covers the whole field of military security: it envisages the establishment of *Sûretés Générales* under control of the States



Governments, and the transfer to these services of a considerable number of functions hitherto exercised by the French Sûreté Générale; but inevitably it stipulates for the retention under Allied military control of a number of security subjects. The main instrument for dealing with these will be the French Sûreté aux Armées, which replaces the old French Sûreté Générale; but an important innovation is the creation of a Joint Franco-British Security Council which will make recommendations to the British and French commanders on general security policy. This innovation should go far to remove the fears of the local Governments lest in practice their nationals should be left exclusively at the mercy of the French security services, from whom they have suffered much in the past.

Although the paper was drafted with the primary purpose of indicating to the local Governments the precise extent of the British military requirements in respect of the subjects covered, in order to enable the Governments to negotiate a settlement with the French *en connaissance de cause*, it is satisfactory to record that the French for their part accepted it in every detail while it was still in draft form. The Governments will, however, probably require explanations on a number of points before they feel it possible to get down to the business of detailed negotiations with the French.

Papers covering the remaining subjects of interest to the Ninth Army, viz., the future of the native levies, the trial of crimes and offences having a military aspect and "administration" (including requisitioning, communications and the concessionary companies) are in course of preparation.

On the 22nd February the two Governments delivered identically-worded notes of protest to the French on the subject of General Beynet's appointment in the dual rôle of Délégué Général and French Commander-in-chief. Largely as a result of British advice, given both in Damascus and Beirut, these notes were much milder and less uncompromising than the two Governments—and particularly the Lebanese—had originally intended to make them. The Lebanese Prime Minister had resolved to state categorically that the appointment was unacceptable, but in their final form the notes held out the possibility of an amicable agreement, provided that on the French side the necessary explanations and assurances were forthcoming. Furthermore, while the notes recorded the concern of the two Governments that they had not been consulted in advance, a passage was deleted which referred to the necessity for the Governments' actual *agrément*—which would inevitably have raised in an acute form the vexed question of the extent to which, notwithstanding the technical continuance of the mandate, the representative of the French National Committee of Liberation can henceforth be regarded as possessing in his civil capacity a purely diplomatic status.

M. Chataigneau, though embarrassed by the connexion between this controversy and his own personal position, is known to have reported to Algiers in a sense sympathetic to the local point of view; and it is much to be hoped that this, coupled with informal representations which may be made on the British side at Algiers, will eventually lead to a satisfactory compromise on a question about which the local Governments undoubtedly feel very strongly. Nevertheless, the problem of General Beynet's dual rôle is a very thorny one, and it may prove difficult to devise an acceptable formula. The local Governments have emphasised that this arrangement is far too reminiscent of the days when a French High Commissioner was also commander-in-chief of the troops stationed in the Levant. The French on their side have put forward the argument, in private conversation, that only a commander-in-chief possessing in addition full political authority to act in the name of the Algiers Committee would be capable of forcing disgruntled French officers to accept the new and highly unpalatable situation arising out of the transfer of powers. Whether or not this argument is wholly ingenuous, it cannot, unfortunately, be denied that neither the well-meaning M. Chataigneau nor the present light-weight Commander-in-chief of the French forces has been able adequately to control such disaffected elements, which represent a real danger.

The Contrôle Bédouin has now been handed over finally and completely to the Syrian authorities, and the Mohafezin have been informed that it is henceforth under their orders. This development had long been foreshadowed. Since, however, it involves the retention, under Syrian management, of a number of French officers, it provides an excellent example of the sort of field in which goodwill and positive co-operation are essential in the interests of efficiency.

It now seems fairly certain that, as suggested in last week's summary, Nuri Pasha did not, in fact, achieve any positive agreement concerning Syro-Iraqi co-operation during his stay in Damascus. It appears, moreover, that even the comparatively anodyne and non-committal remarks on the subject of Arab unity

which were attributed to him in the Syrian press have caused a certain amount of resentment in official circles. The Government are wholeheartedly in favour of a Greater Syria of their own choosing, i.e., ruled from Damascus by themselves. But most members of the Cabinet are convinced republicans; and it seems they did not much relish Nuri Pasha's remark that the component States of the Greater Syria of the future should be free to decide amongst themselves the nature of its constitution. Monarchist sentiment is believed to be strong among the Bedouin, and is also becoming increasingly marked in the Jebel Druze, where members of the preponderant Atrash clan are in close touch with the agents of the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, whose claim to the Syrian throne they openly espouse.

In most districts the rumour campaign concerning the "impending withdrawal of the British from the Levant States" continues unabated, and is causing a good deal of despondency. Reinforcing it, and possibly not unconnected with it in origin, is a rumour campaign designed to exploit the recent deterioration in Anglo-Turkish relations as a major diplomatic triumph for the enemy. Information and guidance on this latter question was sought from London with a view to counter-propaganda, but was not forthcoming.

In both States the general satisfaction created by the announcement of the new Anglo-French Financial Agreement was considerably diminished by the reproduction in the press of a Palestine Government communiqué, from which it was clear that the Levant States were no longer in the sterling area. This fact, which had not been generally realised, caused a good deal of disappointment, and resulted in a rise in the prices of gold and textiles. Further reflection has however convinced most people that the financial position of the States, if not quite what they had supposed, is still very advantageous.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Jamil Marden, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Khaled el-Azm, the Finance Minister, have left by rail, via Aleppo and Bagdad, on their long-projected visit to Ibn Saud at Riyadh. In a statement to the press before he left, Jamil Bey said that he had been charged with conveying the thanks of the President for the congratulations received from King Abdul Aziz on the restitution of Syrian constitutional life. Naturally, too, he would pursue with the King the discussions already started in Cairo on the subject of Arab unity. He would be absent about a fortnight, and after a short stay in Damascus would leave again for Algiers.

Jamil Bey added that on his return from Riyadh he would proceed with the installation of embassies or legations at Cairo, Bagdad, Riyadh, Algiers, London and Washington, and of consulates-general at Jerusalem, Amman and Bombay. In addition, the Government were studying the question of opening several consulates in South America, beginning with Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

In reply to questions concerning the state of Syro-Turkish relations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated somewhat surprisingly that these were exceedingly cordial, and that "if certain conditions which have yet to be fulfilled" had so far prevented the Turkish Government from recognising Syria *de jure*, *de facto* recognition was already accorded. Negotiations had even been started for the establishment of Syrian consulates at Angora, Istanbul and Adana. The creation of Syrian consulates in Turkey—particularly at Adana—might well complicate the already difficult problem of frontier security. In all probability, however, the negotiations to this end, if indeed they have really been started at all, are still a long way from fruition. They can only have been conducted in Damascus, where the Turkish Consul appears to have been having difficulties with the Syrian authorities over newspaper articles criticising Turkish foreign policy, and over the fulsome attention paid to Tefik Rüstü Aras, the former Turkish Ambassador in London, who was equally critical of his Government's "tergiversations." It is possible, indeed, that Jamil Bey's optimistic description of Syro-Turkish relations is attributable to conversations with the ex-ambassador; but the latter seems to have visited Damascus in a purely private capacity despite the suggestions of the Damascus press to the contrary. In this connexion it is relevant to recall that only a very short while ago the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora that his Government did not propose to recognise any new States while the war lasted.



Dr. Kayali, the Syrian Minister of Justice, and Dr. Aractinji, the head of the Department of Health, were due to accompany Jamil Mardam as far as the Jezireh, in order to study respectively the malaria problem and the replacement of judges—two matters which have long needed drastic action.

#### 4. Aleppo.

The area remains quiet and there have been good rains. The reconciliation reached between the Jabri and Mudarres factions has caused a good deal of perturbation amongst the local Nationalists, who foresee that there will be fewer bones for them to pick. The Prime Minister's brother, Ihsan Jabri, has on this account been subjected to much criticism—which should benefit him, as ever since his release from *résidence forcée* some months ago he has lived well up to his reputation for throwing his weight about.

As stated under "General" above, recent developments in Anglo-Turkish relations have given rise to a crop of damaging rumours, which have naturally been most prevalent in the Aleppo area. Frontier contacts with the Turks have however remained normal. Amongst the questions down for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the "second degree" frontier commission, which will be attended by the Vali of Urfa, is that of the contraband trade in Turkish cattle, which is connived at by the authorities on this side of the frontier in the interests of the Ninth Army.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The trouble at Jebel has now subsided. There are no signs of any general disorder in the Alaouite Territory, but the present stage in the evolution of local government is fraught with difficulties. The gendarmerie force is small, the area is disunited, and unscrupulous tribal chiefs still hold great power. The French, moreover, have for some time been working for unity among the Alaouites, but not for unity with the rest of Syria. The Mohafez is endeavouring to check reactionary propaganda and to improve the standard of efficiency and integrity in the administration, and hopes by so doing to bring the Alaouites into line with the rest of Syria. Since his arrival, however, the Sunni element has shown a regrettable tendency to assert itself at the expense of the other communities. The future peace of the territory depends on the repression of this tendency, on the degree of support lent by the Central Government in curbing the tribal chieftains, and most of all on the attitude of the local French officials. The new Délégué Adjoint appears to have made a good start, but some of his subordinates leave much to be desired.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

Some prominence has been given in the press to the activities of a group of Lebanese ladies who have instituted a campaign to boycott retailers in order to force down the prices of unessential commodities. Reports of the formation of commercial groups, whose object is to import and retail commodities at a fixed margin of profit, have contributed to alarm the merchants, as have also communiqués from the Minister of Supply announcing his intention to retail food-stuffs direct to the public at Government-controlled prices. It is, however, as yet far too soon to say whether any of these initiatives will have a more lasting effect on the cost of living than have various short-lived schemes propounded in the past.

The preparation of the Lebanese budget is likely to be much delayed by the transfer to the Government of the various common interests services, as no department can submit its estimates until it has been able to include those of the additional services now attached to it.

The Parliamentary Committee to examine the Rent Law has now reversed its previous conclusions, and has recommended increases of from 25 per cent. to 100 per cent. on 1939 rents; the division of premises according to tenants' professions is also to be suppressed. The Bill is to be debated on the 24th February.

The Lebanese Government's announcement of a five-year plan of public works has been received with scepticism by a public accustomed to the promulgation of grandiose schemes which come to nothing.

The Lebanese members of the Supreme Supply Council and of the seven Advisory Boards have now been named, and the boards are now functioning.

On the 18th February the "Association of Friends of the Soviet Union" opened an exhibition in Beirut entitled, "The U.S.S.R. at War," to which considerable publicity was given. The Communist party also announced a public lecture on its new organisation in the Levant States.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The press has commented extensively on the reports now circulating to the effect that Syrian and Lebanese business circles propose to form a large trust for the purpose of monopolising imports and controlling their sale at a profit of 15–20 per cent. With the exception of *al-Qabas*, of Damascus, which considers the scheme to be a satisfactory step towards the control of prices, the press in general maintains that its effect would be harmful, in that it would destroy a system of free trade and competition which is alleged to be in the interest of the consumer. On the other hand, the press approves the decision of the Supply Ministry to offer in the open market large quantities of woollen yarn at low prices, and supports the organisation of Lebanese ladies to force down the prices of unessential commodities (see under "The Lebanon" above).

There are still many complaints about the unfair distribution of newsprint and recurrent suspension of certain newspapers. Amongst those recently suspended have been *al-Ansaar*, *Assia*, *al-Ahwar*, *al-Hadaf*, *al-Ahd*, and *al-Massa*. *Al-Ahwar* has reappeared under the direction of Tawfiq Awad, whose connexion with the Emil Eddé faction is well known. The first issue on reappearance was censored extensively.

*External.*—A section of the local press, in referring to the American oil project in the Arabian Peninsula, suggests that the Arab Governments should now realise the international importance of their countries' resources, and should obtain full measure of benefit from concessions granted to other Powers.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—No significant change has been observed.

[E 1674/23/89]

No. 33.

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 100, Syria and the Lebanon*, 1st March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th March.)

(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

The Syrian authorities have reacted unfavourably to the Ninth Army paper (see last week's summary under "General") concerning military security in relation to the transfer of powers. They maintain that its practical effect would be to saddle them indefinitely with a thinly-camouflaged variant of the old French régime, under which the country was misruled by the S.S.Os. with their Gardes Mobiles and by the Sûreté Générale. In their view the paper shows mistrust of their willingness to co-operate, and is wounding to their national *amour-propre*.

The first reactions of the Lebanese Government were apparently far less strong, but they cannot afford to get out of step with the Syrians in a matter of this sort. Various suggestions for rendering the paper more palatable, while preserving its essential features, are now under examination.

A copy of the Syrian counter-project concerning the transfer of the native levies (see last week's summary) has now been received. It is a badly drafted document, and contains several points which at first sight appear to render it unsuitable as a basis for negotiation. The Syrians maintain, however, that it was only communicated after explanations had been given verbally to the French military authorities regarding its contents; and these explanations, as repeated privately to His Majesty's Minister, do, in fact, show the counter-project to have misrepresented their attitude, which is essentially reasonable.

There have been no further positive developments in regard to the appointment of General Beynet in the dual rôle of Délégué Général and Commander-in-chief, French troops: The French National Committee of Liberation is apparently still considering the protests of the two Governments and nothing is known here of the general's plans. Meanwhile the Lebanese Prime Minister, in the course of a somewhat provocative speech in the Chamber, has declared that "the general who is coming amongst us" can only be received as a friendly ambassador.

Rumours evidently inspired by the French concerning the coming of French troops and the evacuation of the British are still reported throughout Syria and



the Lebanon, and there is now a new and more dangerous rumour that it is the British who have forbidden the French to hand over the army to Syria.

In response to suggestions from Bagdad, both Syria and the Lebanon have protested vigorously against the proposal, put forward by Senators Wagner and Taft in the American Senate, to lift the restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine. The protests have taken the form of telegrams addressed by the Syrian and Lebanese speakers and chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Commissions to their opposite numbers in Washington, but the two Governments have associated themselves with this action in official notes to the United States diplomatic representatives in Beirut and Damascus and have asked for reassurances on the subject.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period from the 21st to the 27th February were 1,808 tons, a daily average of 258 tons.

The Lebanese Government offered to buy the surplus which the Cereals Commission had approved for export, but when it was pointed out that this surplus was needed for the Allied war effort the proposal was withdrawn.

The Supply Department sells flour in Beirut at a lower price than grain in the provinces. The Government have therefore decided to reduce the selling price of grain, to reduce the cost of flour by the substitution of millet for barley, and to increase the revenue by raising the price of sugar and by imposing a charge for the issue of import and export licences.

After protracted agitation against the continuance of the O.C.P. monopoly, certain cereals merchants in Syria have proposed that they should be allowed to buy from producers at uncontrolled prices and recompense themselves by delivering to the O.C.P. at a fixed rate. They claim to be able to reduce operating costs; but, on the other hand, producers would lose the benefit of stable prices for their crops. The Syrian press has approved the rejection by the Cereals Commission of these proposals and has launched vigorous attacks against the merchants. Some strong leading articles have appeared which, in a country where public opinion is slow to give approval, constitute a considerable tribute to the O.C.P.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

Public opinion in Damascus now seems to regard it as almost certain that there will be changes in the Government before the next session of Parliament, and that Taufiq Shamieh, Mazhar Reslan and Nasouhi Bukhari, the three least important members of the Cabinet, will be amongst those to go. Jamil Mardam and Khaled el-Azm, the two most likely rivals of Saadullah Jabri for the office of Prime Minister, are now the guests of Ibn Saud at Riyadh; but in view of the latter's influence over the President, this does not by any means signify that Saadullah Bey has been relieved, even temporarily, of their intrigues to supplant him. Unlike Jamil Mardam, Khaled el-Azm has yet to make his mark abroad, though he is intellectually the toughest and most outstanding member of the Cabinet. It is thought probable that his rôle is to keep an eye on Jamil Mardam, who is a born intriguer and of doubtful loyalty to Shukri Quwatli. He may also have been attached to the mission with a view to obtaining first-hand information of the American plans for oil development in Saudi Arabia, since he is the only member of the Government who understands anything of finance. The Government are known to be preoccupied with the political and financial implications of this question, and to be hoping that it may be found more practical to bring a pipe-line up to Rutba (whence it would follow the existing alignment to the Mediterranean) rather than to construct a new one across the whole breadth of the Arabian peninsula to the Red Sea. They are also showing a renewed interest in the possibility of reviving the Hejaz Railway.

The two itinerant Ministers were accompanied by Fakhri Barudi, a Damascus Deputy with a reputation for demagogic oratory. The Minister of Justice did not, after all, go with them as far as the Jezireh; but a start appears to have been made with the long overdue rehaul of the provincial administration.

## 4. Aleppo.

There have been "second degree" Frontier Commission meetings in Aleppo attended by the Vali of Urfa. For the first time these were, at the request of the Syrian Government, held in the Sérail, and the Mohafez officially presided, though he is reported to have taken but little part in the discussions. Some fifty outstanding cases were settled, and the Turks do not appear to have given undue

prominence to the question of the contraband trade in Turkish cattle for the British army.

With very little prompting, and as a result of canvassing which was left wholly in Syrian hands, the people of Aleppo have during the past week contributed a sum sufficient to purchase at least four Spitfires for the R.A.F. The Mohafez was the principal organiser, assisted by Ihsan Jabri, and three of the leading textile merchants contributed large sums. The R.A.F. gave exhibition flights over the town and there was a display of parachute jumping in the neighbourhood. The presence of the British forces has of course brought wealth to many of the inhabitants, but in view of the general reputation of the Aleppine for being tight-fisted and provincial in his outlook, the results achieved has surpassed all expectations and are a striking tribute to the growing popularity of the Allied cause.

The prevalence of alarmist rumours based on the withdrawal of British military officers from Turkey (see last week's Summary) has been increased locally by reports in the Syrian press to the effect that M. Saracoğlu, in an interview with a correspondent of the United Press, had spoken of the desire of his Government for frontier rectification in Syria. An official *démenti* was later published at the instance of the Turkish Consul at Damascus, but probably carried little conviction. On the other hand, reports which have appeared in the Palestine press of the escape of Gestapo officials from the German Embassy at Angora, and their unconditional surrender to the British authorities, have tended to reassure the population that things must be going badly for the enemy.

## 7. Alaouite Territory.

The area remains quiet, and such minor local quarrels as have occurred were settled satisfactorily by the local gendarmerie.

Frontier administration remains virtually unchanged, security matters being now the responsibility of the Officier Frontalier. (Incidentally, this "change without a difference" constitutes one of the main objections of the Syrian Government to the security arrangements now under consideration—see under "General" above.)

The present status of the *Gardes Mobiles* is obscure. Some have been dismissed and others sent home to await orders. French officers of the Service Politique employ a certain number, as did the S.S.Os. in the past, and it is presumed that the rest have been transferred to the *Troupes Spéciales*.

## 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The Mohafez of the Euphrates has returned from Damascus with increased confidence, having apparently succeeded in thwarting those in the Central Government who planned to transfer him.

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has brought upon the Government and upon himself some loss of prestige through an abortive attempt to banish certain minority leaders from the Mohafezat. Having received a telegram from the Prime Minister instructing him to take all necessary measures to ensure local security, he saw the opportunity to rid himself of a number of his political opponents who were inclined to flout authority. On his orders, Michel Dom, a Syrian Catholic, who is president of the Kamichlie Municipality and an old opponent of Syrian independence; a Chaldean Catholic landowner named Habid Meriamo, who is alleged to have spoken against the Government; and a certain Kurdish notable, Saleh Sheikhmus of Amouda, were arrested and taken under armed escort to Deir ez-Zor, but were there told by the Mohafez of the Euphrates, on instructions from the Prime Minister, that their arrest had been a mistake and that they were free to return to their homes. The Mohafez of the Jezireh has now gone to Damascus to have it out with the Central Government. It is rumoured that he may not return. In his defence it must be said that all the three arrested men are well known as protégés of the French, and that Michel Dom, in particular, has long been a fomenter of separatist tendencies. There is reason to believe that the Prime Minister would have supported the Mohafez but for the violent opposition of the Minister of the Interior, who complained that Saadullah Bey was poaching on his preserves. Having gained his point, Lutfi Haffar departed to Palestine, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, and is still sulking there.

Colonel des Essars has arrived in Deir ez-Zor to take up the dual appointment of Délégué Adjoint for the Euphrates and the Jezireh and Military



Commander in East Syria. He brought with him his Chief of Staff, Commandant Clapeau, and several changes are expected. The local reactions to this dual appointment are not yet known.

#### 9. Tribal.

The Bedouin Control, together with local gendarmerie, have forced the Baggara to give back a proportion of the sheep which they recently stole from the Assyrians, and have also taken action to settle the dispute between the Feddagha and the Jubbour (see Summary No. 98 of the 16th February). More rain has fallen, which should keep the farmers busy and contented.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The position of the Lebanese Government remains relatively secure. Opposition outside the Chamber, routed by the Government's recent repressive measures, shows no signs of re-forming, whilst the Prime Minister's forcefulness in dealing with all opponents during the parliamentary debates has so far sufficed to give the Government an overwhelming majority on every issue put to the vote.

Nevertheless, while it is recognised that the Ministers are all trying hard in their respective spheres, the Government are being increasingly criticised for their dilatoriness in dealing with the many administrative problems confronting them, notably the cost of living and financial matters. The Minister of Supply's various schemes have still not matured. The budget has not been presented, and the War Profits Tax remains uncollected; whilst the Administration in general is functioning little, if any, better than in the past, partly owing to the lack of suitable personnel to fill important posts, but at least as much owing to the Government's inability to resist interventions by their supporters in favour of protégés. It is, in fact, clear that the Government's strength derives not from their administrative record, but from the belief that they are sincerely trying to shake themselves free of the mandatory shackles. The Government are thus obliged to give periodical proof of their determination to pursue a policy of independence, lest their popularity in and out of the Chamber sink to a dangerously low level.

It was clearly with this consideration in mind that the Prime Minister, in reply to a question in the Chamber on the 24th February, made a bold and, indeed, provocative speech which earned him much applause at the time and has been well received since. He first stated, very prematurely, that the Lebanon would soon have its army under its own command, since the French had admitted the principle of the transfer of the Lebanese *Troupes Spéciales* to the Lebanon. He then referred to "another army which was said to be coming to take away Lebanese independence" (obviously referring to the recent rumour campaign to the effect that the British forces were leaving the Levant States and being replaced by many thousands of French troops), and declared his intention to defend the country against all odds. Finally, he dropped a strong hint that "the general who was coming amongst us" (referring to General Beynet, against the manner of whose appointment the Lebanese Government had protested), could only be received as a friendly ambassador. "The newspapers," said Riad-es-Sulh, "say he is quick and energetic; I hope that he will be, so that he may hand over as quickly as possible the rest of our powers."

Meantime, the Government still cannot make up their minds to expel Emil Eddé from the Chamber. Their present pretext for inactivity is that they are in process of forming a pro-Government party amongst the Deputies and do not wish to raise this controversial issue until they can be sure of support. Emil Eddé himself, after weeks of underground activities, recently informed one of the Maronite archbishops that he had received secret intelligence proving that the Lebanese President had agreed with His Majesty's Minister to absorb the Lebanon in Syria. This the archbishop, after conversation with His Majesty's Minister, was able to refute, and the incident did not redound to Eddé's prestige.

While security in the country as a whole is satisfactory, the situation in the Bekaa is giving grounds for anxiety. This turbulent region, composed partly of a few feudal Shia chieftains and their followers and partly of a Christian aggregation round Zahlé, has always been difficult to rule; since December it has had no Mohafez, so that the Government's writ has hardly run in the outlying districts, which, in addition, have been subjected to some particularly intense French propaganda. A violent inter-family feud near Baalbek has caused the Government to make an investigation, and they are now urgently considering how

to restore their authority in the area. Disorders would undoubtedly be worse were it not that the region is fertile and comparatively prosperous, so that the normal incentives to disturbances are lacking.

The 1944 Rent Law, after being for a second time examined by a Parliamentary Committee, was passed in an amended form on the 24th February. The Bill divides accommodation into three classes, residential, professional and commercial, and allows increases of from 30 per cent. to 100 per cent. on 1939 rents, according to the class of accommodation and the amount of rent paid. Premises occupied by Allied military personnel are exempt from all increases.

The Government's commission of enquiry on the strike at the Kadisha Electricity Works has concluded its work. It is understood that its report, which has not yet been presented, confirms that the manager, M. Calmette, was the prime cause of the trouble.

The Minister of Supply, on the 22nd February, appointed four commissions to study the possibility of fixing tariffs for woollen goods, cotton goods, building materials, and fruit and vegetables.

The Iraqi Minister, Tahsin Qadri, presented his credentials to the Lebanese President on the 24th February, thus becoming the first full diplomatic representative of an Arab State to be accredited to the Lebanon.

[E 1951/23/89]

No. 34.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 101, Syria and the Lebanon, 8th March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 28th March.)

(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

NEGOTIATIONS for the transfer of powers (see last week's summary, "General") continue. The details of Ninth Army's paper regarding military security and the Syrian Government's counter-project regarding native levies are still under consideration by the British authorities.

No reply has been received from the French to the protests made by both Governments regarding the manner of General Beynet's appointment, and they see in it a possible move by the French to introduce a policy of retraction and retrogression while these negotiations are still held up. The general is due in Beirut on the 9th March, and the solution of an awkward state of affairs now appears to rest with M. Chataigneau, who may be able to induce him to adopt a reasonably conciliatory attitude.

Meanwhile the better French elements are extremely worried by the general situation. There are many undesirable French officers in the country, and an unconfirmed report has been received of an impending *coup*, involving artificially created disorders as an excuse for French intervention. Before this report was received, steps had been taken to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to replace a French battalion in the Levant States before the outgoing troops had departed. It is felt that the presence of both at the same time would be harmful to security, particularly in view of the rumours, reported in last week's summary, that French troops in the Levant were being increased.

The Lebanese for their part are particularly anxious, in view of increasing subversive propaganda, to avoid delay in the handing over of the *sûreté*. They fear that if this service remains free to conduct political propaganda on behalf of the French after General Beynet's arrival, they may find themselves faced with a pro-French opposition throughout the country with which they will be unable to cope.

The newly appointed Persian delegate to the Levant States has sent his Government a report on the political situation in Syria and the Lebanon, and has apparently recommended that the time is now ripe for the Persian Government to recognise the two States.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The statements made to the Damascus press recently by the Syrian Foreign Minister regarding Turkey's recognition *de facto* of Syria (see Summary No. 99)



require some explanation. No written communication appears to have been conveyed by the Turkish to the Syrian Government on the subject, but the Turkish Consul, with the authorisation of his Government, informed the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government recognised, and would recognise, an "état de fait" as regards any attributions transferred, or to be transferred, by the French to the Syrians. In all matters arising out of the transfer of any particular attribution the Turks would deal direct with the Syrian authority, and not, as hitherto, with the representative of the mandatory Power.

The latest manifestation of dissonance in the Cabinet is an alleged quarrel between the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior. After a somewhat prolonged absence in Tripoli in connexion with the death of his son-in-law, Lutfi Haffar returned to Damascus but not to his ministry. Allegedly confined to bed by a heart attack, he was nevertheless on one occasion at least seen driving his car in the town. He has since left for Jerusalem to see a specialist. There seems little doubt, however, that Lutfi Haffar did not appreciate the Prime Minister's intervention in the affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, and that recent administrative changes in the Jezireh and Euphrates districts were not to his liking.

A commission has been formed to examine, and where necessary to revise, legislative decrees passed by all former Governments.

There are several indications of Druze aspirations to the establishment of a King in Syria, in the person either of the Amir Abdulla or the Prince Regent of Iraq. On several occasions attempts have been made by various Atrash personalities, and by other Druze notables, to sound the political officer at Damascus as to the extent to which His Majesty's Government would favour such a turn of events. A report from a reasonably reliable source has also been received to the effect that Subhi al Omeri (a recently released internee) is canvassing persons known to be in opposition to the present régime, with a view to setting up a headquarters in the Leja Mountain region north of Soueida in which to rally adherents to the Monarchist faction.

The President of the Republic, at an inspection of a newly built gendarmerie post, addressed the company of gendarmes on parade in a speech in which he referred to them as the precursors of the Syrian army, and called upon them to be worthy upholders of Syria's new-found independence. A new decree provides for increases in the Syrian security forces by 1,000 police and 2,500 gendarmes.

One of two anonymous tracts displayed on Damascus walls, put out by the "Arab Youth and Labour party" (so far unidentified) warns the Syrian Arabs against the snares and machinations of the British in Palestine. Syrian police authorities are investigating, and in the meantime they suspect the Communist party of taking this action at the instigation of the French.

#### 4. Aleppo.

When the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance were in Aleppo on their way to Riyadh they saw by arrangement the Mudarres brothers and Edmund Homsî, but scarcely any of the Deputies or *bloc* supporters made any effort to meet them. This is thought to be due to rumours that these two Ministers are not working loyally with Saadullah Jabri, whose popularity in Aleppo is still considerable; and in fact the Mudarres brothers and Homsî took care to send a special message to Damascus assuring the Prime Minister that this visit had not affected their loyalty to him. The Ministers apparently tried to dissuade Fakhri Barudi from accompanying them further, but Barudi is said to have protested that he had already started to grow a beard in honour of Ibn Saud, and that his tongue would be kept under control during the visit.

Jamil Mardam is reported to have caused some difficulty about the Frontier Commission meeting reported in last week's summary. Claiming that Syria had been recognised *de facto* by Turkey, he requested the *délégué* to let the Mohafez sign the *procès-verbal* as well as himself, and told the Mohafez that he should insist on signing as president of the commission. The Mohafez, however, had attended the meeting as a spectator, though it was held in his office, and French and Turkish enquiries by telephone from Damascus and Beirut produced no confirmation of any sort of Turkish recognition of Syria. After this awkward interlude the Turks agreed that the unfortunate Mohafez should add his signature to the *procès-verbal*, though that of the *délégué* should remain the official one.

The Turkish party left on the 27th February, crossing to Turkey at Tel Abiad after a visit to the tomb of Suleiman Pasha.

The subscriptions collected for the Spitfire Fund are now sufficient for the purchase of five aircraft. This excellent result reflects great credit on the Mohafez, and it is possible that his initiative may be imitated in other towns.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

The area is quiet, but there is widespread discontent over the inefficiency of the local administration. With few exceptions, officials are accused of incompetence, apathy and dishonesty; and of concerning themselves more with furthering their own interests by political intrigues than with carrying out their duties. The blame for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is generally laid on the Acting Mohafez, who, even by his own kinsmen, is severely criticised for his weak and vacillating policy. In his efforts to enlist support for his continuance in office he seems to have adopted a policy of conciliation in all disputes, and to have condoned peculation and abuses; with the result that he is despised by all. He is not, of course, ignorant of the lack of esteem with which he is regarded, and it was probably with a view to seeking the support of the Syrian Government that he recently visited the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in Damascus.

The views of the Government on the matter are not known, but if, as at one time seemed likely, the Emir Hassan el-Atrash were to be appointed to the post of Mohafez, it is believed that such a step would be generally welcomed in the Jebel.

#### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

A tour by the political officer has further revealed the need for improvement in the administration of this area. At Tel Abiad, on the frontier north of Raqqa, there has been no mudir for over a year. The work is done by the officer commanding gendarmerie, a man of low calibre. He has thirty-four gendarmes for an area as large as Wales with 50 kilom. of frontier, no transport, no telephone and no authority. At Ras el-Ain much the same situation prevails. It can almost be said that there is no government in the northern areas of this part of Syria. This is in marked contrast to the state of affairs on the Turkish side (see under "Frontier" below).<sup>(1)</sup>

Lieutenant-Colonel Roux has left Deir ez-Zor to be second-in-command of the coastal region. A new second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel Rikart, has arrived.

#### 9. Tribal.

There are strong indications that a state of tension is developing among the important tribes in Northern Syria. This is partly due to a state of uncertainty as to who is supposed to be looking after them and partly to certain specific grievances. The chief of these is the amount of power and prestige acquired, largely through French support, by the Fedaan (Emir Mujhim Muhaid) and in particular by the section under Nuri Ibn Mujhim, who live north of Euphrates in the Raqqa qadha. Their expansion, with the approval of the Bedouin control, has affected their southern and eastern neighbours, the Wulda and the Afadla, who have a long-standing dispute with the Fedaan over a fertile wadi known as the Fadyh. This state of affairs is not improved by the apparent incapacity of the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa. A reported example of his methods is that when Nuri Ibn Mujhim shot up a solitary tent, wounding the owner, and carried off 400 sheep, the Bedouin control officer forced the man's brother to go and live among Nuri's tents to show that his sheep had not been taken away from him. The location of the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa, instead of Deir ez-Zor alongside the Mohafez under whom he is now supposed to work, has displeased the Syrian authorities and the sheikhs other than the Fedaan. A neutral committee is being formed in Damascus to examine on the spot the various outstanding claims between the Fedaan and the Wulda.

The Assyrian leaders who went to Damascus to ask for protection against neighbouring tribes (see Summary No. 98) have now returned, apparently satisfied with the assurances of the Prime Minister, and hopeful of better protection in the future.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



11. *The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese Government have still not been able to screw up their courage to bring before the Chamber the motion for the unseating of Emil Eddé. They have been assured by Abdul Hamid Kerami, of whose attitude they professed to be doubtful, that he and at least the majority of the North Lebanon Deputies would support the motion, and have similar promises of support from all other districts; but they still appear unconvinced that Eddé's expulsion from the Chamber would not provoke an unmanageable reaction from the various groups throughout the country through which the French normally work.

In the field of administration the Government have achieved nothing concrete during the week, and criticisms of their apparent ineffectiveness are becoming more insistent.

The Chamber met on the 6th March and, after some discussion, voted the necessary credits to the Government to enable it to continue the administration until the presentation of the budget, which is still far from complete.

The motion presented to the American Senate regarding the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine has been widely discussed throughout the Lebanon, where strong approval has been voiced of the Government's protest to the American representative in Beirut and to Washington. The Christians of the Lebanon, whose minority status in the Arab world in some respects parallels that of the Jews, might have been expected to show less hostility to them than the Moslems, but this is by no means the case, the Christians as a whole being solidly at one with the Moslems on this question.

The recently-formed Consumers' Association of Beirut is still pursuing its efforts to rally the public in opposition to the exorbitant cost of living, but is having little success, since it is generally recognised that it is not the shopkeepers but the middlemen who are profiteering, and these the Association cannot touch. The Minister of Supply's various schemes for reducing the cost of living have still not materialised.

The Government appear to have decided that Camille Bey Shamoun shall be their diplomatic representative in London, and there is talk of his proceeding there at a comparatively early date, his place in the Ministry being filled by Hamid Frangieh.

M. Chabert, hitherto known as Conseiller Législatif, is now to be known as Conseiller Juridique de la Délégation Générale, which indicates that the French are no longer concerned with the promulgation of decrees.

12. *Press and Propaganda.*

The protests made by all Arab countries against the proposal submitted to the American Senate concerning the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine have been widely reported, and confidence is expressed that the American nation will not repudiate the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Britain, it is confidently stated, will not fail the Arabs, and will carry into effect the solution indicated in the British White Paper.

Comment on Anglo-Turkish relations is restricted to foreign quotations, but it is hinted that the tension is not so superficial as it is given out to be.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda* has made play with American interference in the Palestine question. Reference was also made to the demonstrations taking place in North Africa.

## CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 871/41/65]

No. 35.

*Consul-General Furlonge to Sir E. Spears (Damascus).—(Received as enclosure to Beirut despatch No. 5.)—(Received in Foreign Office 8th February.)*

Sir,

Beirut, 21st January, 1944.

THE Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day gave me an account of the recent visit of the Lebanese Delegation to Egypt. He said that they had had three interviews with Nahas Pasha, and had also returned replies to a questionnaire he presented to them on the various subjects connected with the Arab Federation. At the Egyptians' suggestion, both he and Riad es-Solh, as representing the Christian and Moslem Lebanon, had signed the document embodying these replies.

2. They had found, to their great satisfaction, that the Egyptian point of view towards Arab Federation was exactly the same as what Selim Tacla described as the Lebanese. The Egyptians were determined not to be drawn into the orbit of a pan-Arab consortium of Asiatic States, probably under Iraqi leadership, but thought that Egypt should have towards these States something of the same attitude as the South American Republics had to the United States: that is to say, Egypt might participate in a yearly conference of Arab States (on the lines of the pan-American Conference) to exchange ideas on subjects of mutual interest, but would not form part of any Arab Federation or Confederation even if one eventually came about. They found also that the Egyptians, unlike the Iraqis and Syrians, were uninterested in the Palestine problem.

3. Riad es-Solh had had a brief conversation with King Farouk, in which he observed that the King's views towards Arab Federation were even more moderate than those of Nahas Pasha. The whole delegation had commented on the obvious bitterness existing between King Farouk and Nahas; Hassanein Pasha had even attempted to describe Nahas as "the Egyptian Emile Eddé," apparently on the grounds that Nahas had taken office on the 4th February, 1941, "under the guns of the British tanks." The Lebanese had had to point out to him the difference between the two cases.

4. On the return journey the delegation had seen Nuri Pasha in hospital at Haifa. They described his ideas on the future of the Arab States as vague and inchoate; he had, for example, expounded a scheme for the establishment of a Greater Syria without frontiers, but had seemed taken aback when Selim Tacla suggested that this meant that Jewish citizens of this Greater Syria would obviously have the right to circulate or reside in any part of it they chose.

5. One reason for Egypt's attitude towards the question of Arab Federation was perhaps provided by the action of the Turkish Government who, according to what their Consul-General in Beirut told Selim Tacla yesterday, had informed the Egyptian Government that they would raise no objection to the formation of an Arab Federation provided that it was on a political basis, but would oppose any attempt to drag in the caliphate question or to give the federation a pan-Islamic, as opposed to a pan-Arab, character.

6. The above account lends colour to the theory recently expressed in some quarters that, as regards their relations with other Arab States, Syria and the Lebanon were tending to go different ways, the former aligning themselves more with Iraq and the latter with Egypt. It is clear in any case that the Lebanese visit to Cairo produced no tangible results. The Lebanese clearly think that a general Conference of Arab States, which it is understood may be held in April, will be equally unfruitful.

I have, &amp;c.

G. W. FURLONGE, Colonel,  
Political Officer.



[WITH MAP.]

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th February.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Beirut, 8th February, 1944.

WITH reference to Eastern Department's note of the 30th November, 1943, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum on the frontiers of the Lebanon which has been compiled by Colonel G. W. Furlonge.

2. The delay in furnishing this report is regretted; it is due partly to great pressure of work and partly to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information. It is noteworthy that, in the course of his enquiries, Colonel Furlonge discovered that most Lebanese had no definite ideas as to the historical or political implications of the question, and were indeed by no means clear as to what was meant by "the four *cazas*" to which such frequent reference is made.

I have, &amp;c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 36.

*The Boundaries of the Lebanon.*

THE present frontiers of the Lebanon were originally defined by article 2 of Arrêté No. 318, issued on the 31st August, 1920, by General Gouraud, at that time French High Commissioner in Syria and Cilicia. Copies of the text of this Arrêté, and of Arrêté No. 299 of the 3rd August, 1920, which is referred to in its article 1, are attached. The definitions given in its article 2 were adopted word for word in the amended text of article 1 of the Lebanese Constitution, which was promulgated by the Constitutional Law of the 7th December, 1943.

2. The effect of General Gouraud's arrêté was to incorporate in the Greater Lebanon one complete *sanjak* (Beirut) and parts of two others (Tripoli and Sidon), all taken from the former *vilayet* of Beirut; together with four *cazas* (Baalbek, Bekaa, Rashaya and Hasbeya) taken from the *vilayet* of Syria. The first of these, Baalbek, was by Arrêté No. 960 of the 27th July, 1921, divided into the present *cazas* of Baalbek and Hermel, the latter region, formerly a *mudiriyyeh*, being elevated to the status of a *kaimakamat* (i.e., *caza*). The *caza* of Bekaa, or Bekaa-Moallaka, is now part of the present *caza* of Zahlé, as the town and immediate environs of Zahlé, which formed part of the pre-1914 "Little Lebanon," have been added to the former *caza* of Bekaa to form the present *caza*. The former *caza* of Hasbeya, to which was added by Arrêté No. 336 of the 1st September, 1920, the area of Merdjeyoun, now forms part of the *caza* of Merdjeyoun (province of South Lebanon).

3. The "four *cazas*," which are referred to by Syrians when putting forward claims for the "return of the four *cazas*" to Syria are, therefore, the present *cazas* of Hermel, Baalbek and Rashaya, the *caza* of Zahlé less the town and immediate neighbourhood of Zahlé, and that part of the present *caza* of Merdjeyoun which constituted the former *caza* of Hasbeya. Some Syrians also claim the *cazas* of Tripoli and Akkar, chiefly on the grounds of promises alleged to have been made at the time of the Peace Conference, to the effect that Syria should have Tripoli as a port.

4. On the attached map, the former autonomous province of the Lebanon has been shaded in red, the *vilayet* of Beirut in blue, and the portion of the *vilayet* of Syria added to the Greater Lebanon in 1920 in brown. The boundaries cannot be traced with absolute accuracy on the only map available. Reference is invited to the map opposite to page 19 of the 1937 Peel Report on Palestine (Cmd. 5479), which shows roughly the pre-1914 Turkish administrative divisions of the country.

5. Syrians have always claimed that the present frontiers of the Lebanon have no historical justification, and that the French authorities, when defining them in 1920, were moved purely by political and strategic considerations. Certain Lebanese Christians have, however, contended that the French in so doing were merely restoring to the Lebanon the territories traditionally belonging to it.

6. Examination of these conflicting claims is difficult in view of the paucity of official records. The following appreciation is based partly on the documents available here, but chiefly on the researches of Dr. Assad Rustum, the eminent historian of the American University, Beirut.

7. It will be sufficient for present purposes to consider the position as from 1516 A.D., the date of the Ottoman occupation. From that time until 1841 the impression to be gathered from existing records is that the Lebanon *massif*, extending from just south of Tripoli to just north of Sidon, and including the town and immediate environs of Zahlé but excluding the town of Beirut, constituted a recognised geographical entity commonly referred to as "the Mountain," which was populated almost entirely by Druzes and Christians (chiefly Maronites, with some Greek Orthodox). Over this Mountain a series of hereditary Amirs held uncontested feudal sway, by special dispensation from the Porte. Their suzerainty had, however, no juridical basis other than tradition and personal privilege, and during the period under review the Mountain was not regarded by the Porte as having any separate administrative existence, its northern portion being considered as forming part of the Pashalik of Tripoli, and its southern portion part of the Pashalik of Sidon; the present Bekaa *cazas*, excluding Zahlé and its neighbourhood, in general depended from the Pasha of Damascus. The Amirs may thus be considered to have held their powers by delegation from the Pashas of Tripoli and Sidon; under the terms of the special privileges accorded to them by the Porte, the office of Amir of Mount Lebanon was reserved to a particular family (from 1516 to 1710 the Maanids and from 1710 until 1841 the Shehabs), but the ruling Amir could always be deposed by the Pashas providing that another member of the family was put in his place. An exception to the general rule was provided by the Maanid Amir Fakhr-ud-Din II (1610 to 1635), who by dint of personal prestige succeeded in extending his sway well beyond the boundaries of the Mountain, and in fact ruled much of Syria and Palestine; but after his defeat in battle and subsequent death the authority of his successors appears again to have receded to within the boundaries of the Mountain.

8. In 1789 the Shehab Amir Bashir II acceded to power, and, like Fakhr-ud-Din before him, succeeded in extending his rule, until it covered most of the area of the present Lebanon. In 1841, as a result of his support of Ibrahim Pasha, the British authorities deposed and deported him. His cousin Bashir Kassem (Bashir III), who succeeded him, was soon afterwards deposed by the Turks and replaced by one of their generals, Omar Pasha. The line of hereditary Amirs thus came to an end, but as against this the Mountain (shorn of the Amir Bashir's accretions) was first recognised as an administrative entity. It was subsequently divided into two *kaimakamats*, which in 1846 were endowed with consultative councils. In 1861, after the massacres of Christians by Druzes in 1860 had provoked European intervention, the international Statute which governed the administration of the Lebanon until 1914 was signed between Turkey, France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia. The boundaries of the territory to which the Statute applied were not geographically defined in it, but its article 3 laid down administrative divisions which show clearly that the "Mountain" referred to in it corresponded, at least very closely, to the historical conception referred to above. It is this area which, shaded in red on the accompanying map, formed the "Little Lebanon" existing in 1914.

9. It seems thus clear that Lebanese claims to the territories now comprised within the Lebanon but which lie outside the boundaries of the Mountain are based on nothing more substantial than the almost accidental fact that the last effective hereditary Amir, Bashir II, had succeeded in bringing these territories under his suzerainty, contrary to the precedent of the previous three centuries.

10. The conflict regarding the boundaries of the Lebanon being largely based on confessional grounds, it is of some interest to examine the distribution of the various religious communities in the present Lebanon. The following table, based on the figures of the 1932 census, shows roughly this distribution, small minorities being ignored:—

District.	Population (in thousands).					
	Maronites.	Christians. Greek Orthodox.	Greek Catholics.	Sunnis.	Shias.	Druzes.
Mount Lebanon ...	120	17	11	14	13	42
North Lebanon ...	58	31	...	77	...	...
Bekaa ...	16	10	17	24	42	...
South Lebanon ...	19	...	12	17	92	...
Beirut ...	12	14	...	43	...	...

It will be observed that the present province of Mount Lebanon, which roughly corresponds with the "Mountain" or "Little Lebanon" (Zahlé excluded), contains an overwhelming preponderance of Maronites and Druzes. The Bekaa







*Art. 3.* Les dispositions du présent arrêté entreront en vigueur à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> septembre 1920.

*Art. 4.* Le Secrétaire général, le Chef du Contrôle administratif sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Le Haut-Commissaire :

GOURAUD.

*Beyrouth, le 31 août 1920.*

---

*Arrêté No. 299.*

LE Général Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la République Française en Syrie et Cilicie,

Vu le décret présidentiel du 8 octobre 1919;

Considérant qu'il y a lieu de donner satisfaction aux vœux des populations librement exprimés en rattachant les cazas de Hasbaya, Rachaya, Baalbek et Moallaka au territoire autonome du Liban pour pourvoir à leur organisation administrative et en vue de la constitution future du Grand-Liban;

Sur la proposition du Délégué administratif de la Zone ouest,

Arrête :

*Article 1<sup>er</sup>.* Les cazas de Hasbaya, Rachaya, Moallaka et Baalbek sont rattachés en ce qui concerne leur statut administratif au territoire autonome du Liban.

*Art. 2.* L'administrateur du Liban prendra toutes les dispositions utiles pour rattacher administrativement les cazas susmentionnés à l'Administration centrale de son territoire. Il adressera d'urgence au Délégué administratif toutes propositions, tant au point de vue de l'organisation administrative, financière et judiciaire des cazas rattachés, qu'au point de vue des postes à pourvoir, pour assurer la bonne marche immédiate des services locaux.

*Art. 3.* Le Secrétaire général, les Conseillers financier et judiciaire, le Délégué administratif de la Zone ouest sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République  
Française :

GOURAUD.

*Zahlé, le 3 août 1920.*



Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(16702)

File Number:

**T**

**TREATY.**

**Further Correspondence**

respecting

**EASTERN AFFAIRS**

**PART 57**

**April to June 1944**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
<b>Chapter I.—AFGHANISTAN.</b>			
1 Mr. Squire ... No. 35	1944 May 5	Political situation in Afghanistan ... Report on developments during the latter part of 1943	1
<b>Chapter II.—IRAQ.</b>			
2 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 124	1944 Mar. 23	Events in Iraq ... Report on events since the 19th January	5
3 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 225	June 8	Events in Iraq ... Report on events during the last two or more months	11
4 Sir K. Cornwallis ... No. 229	June 10	Leading personalities of Iraq ... Report on leading personalities of Iraq for 1943	17
<b>Chapter III.—PALESTINE.</b>			
5 Viscount Halifax ... No. 478. Tel.	1944 Jan. 30	Jewish immigration into Palestine ... Proposal that good offices of United States should be used to ensure for the Jews unlimited entry into Palestine and establishment of Jewish Commonwealth there. Congress resolutions	51
6 Viscount Halifax ... No. 1117. Tel.	Mar. 5	Jewish immigration into Palestine ... Forces in favour of the shelving of the Wagner Resolution. Arab reactions to it	51
7 Viscount Halifax ... No. 1208. Tel.	Mar. 9	Jewish immigration into Palestine ... Statement attributed to President Roosevelt by Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver, of American Zionist Emergency Council, re immigration of Jewish refugees into Palestine, and the White Paper of 1939	52
8 Viscount Halifax ... No. 1381. Tel.	Mar. 19	Jewish immigration into Palestine ... Decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, on the 17th March, to defer action on the resolutions	52
9 Viscount Halifax ... No. 344	April 28	Jewish immigration into Palestine ... Report on recent course of events in Congress in connexion with the resolutions urging the use of American good offices in opening the doors of Palestine for free entry of Jews	52
<b>Chapter IV.—PERSIA.</b>			
10 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 118	1944 Mar. 14	Leading personalities in Persia ... Transmits revised list	56
11 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 127	Mar. 20	Political events in Persia ... Report for the year 1943	119
12 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 137	Mar. 27	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period of the 20th to the 26th March, 1944	143

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT	Page
13 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 147	1944 April 3	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period from the 27th March to the 2nd April	145
14 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 148	April 3	Composition of the 14th Majlis ... Preliminary report based on results so far received of the elections	147
15 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 156	April 6	Events in Persia ... Report on events during the first three months of 1944	148
16 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 160	April 10	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the period from the 3rd April to the 9th April	159
17 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 171	April 17	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the period from the 10th April to the 16th April, 1944	161
18 Communicated by British Embassy, Tehran.	...	Conditions among the Fars tribes ... Report by Captain Garrod, R.A.M.C., on tour by 12th Indian Division Mobile Dispensary in Fars	164
19 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 182	April 24	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period from the 17th to the 23rd April, 1944	182
20 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 195	May 1	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the period from the 24th April to the 30th April, 1944	184
21 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 204	May 8	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period from the 1st May to the 7th May, 1944	186
22 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 210	May 15	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period from the 7th May to the 14th May, 1944	188
23 Consul Gardener ... (Shiraz)	May 14	Situation in Shiraz ... Diary No. 9 regarding events in Shiraz for the period from the 1st May to the 14th May, 1944, with particular attention to visits by Nasir Khan and the Shah	190
24 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 221	May 22	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the period from the 15th to the 21st May, 1944	193
25 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 231	May 29	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the period from the 22nd May to the 28th May, 1944	195
26 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 240	June 5	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period from the 29th May to the 4th June, 1944	199
27 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 247	June 10	His Majesty's Government's post-war policy towards Persia Circular to all consuls in Persia regarding preparation of Persian officials for entire responsibility after the war for establishment and maintenance of that security which is necessary to British interests in Persia	202
28 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 248	June 10	Tribal situation in Fars ... Appreciation of situation, and suggested principles of British policy, by Consul Gardener, Shiraz. Policy which His Majesty's Minister is endeavouring to induce the Persian Government to adopt	202
29 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 250	June 12	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period from the 5th to the 11th June, 1944	208
30 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 255	June 19	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period from the 12th to the 18th June, 1944	211



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
<b>Chapter V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.</b>			
31 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	1944	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 103, dated the 22nd March, 1944	212
32 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 104, dated the 29th March, 1944	213
33 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 105, dated the 5th April, 1944	216
34 Sir E. Spears (Beirut) No. 30	April 12	Expulsion of M. Eddé from the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies ... M. Eddé was expelled from the Chamber on the 31st March for accepting office from the French after the <i>putsch</i> of the 11th November, 1943. Political background	218
35 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 106, dated the 12th April, 1944	219
36 Sir E. Spears No. 29	April 5	Supplies to the Levant States ... Origin, constitution and powers of the Supreme Supply Council and its dependent advisory boards	221
37 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 107, dated the 19th April, 1944	222
38 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 108, dated the 26th April, 1944	223
39 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 109, dated the 3rd May, 1944	224
40 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 110, dated the 10th May, 1944	227
41 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 111, dated the 17th May, 1944	228
42 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 112, dated the 24th May, 1944	231
43 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 113, dated the 31st May, 1944	233
44 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 114, dated the 7th June, 1944	235
45 Communicated by British Legation, Beirut	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 115, dated the 14th June, 1944	236
46 Mr. Duff Cooper (Algiers) No. 1191. Tel.	June 22	Arming of the Syrian gendarmerie ... Protest by M. Massigli against British decision to provide the Syrian gendarmerie with arms and equipment	237
47 To Mr. Duff Cooper No. 972. Tel.	June 29	Arming of the Syrian gendarmerie ... Distinction between the gendarmerie and the <i>troupes spéciales</i> . Proposal that an Anglo-French committee in the Levant States should consider further the need for supply of arms and equipment to the Syrian gendarmerie	238

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
48 To Mr. Duff Cooper No. 259	1944 June 29	Arming of the Syrian gendarmerie ... Conversation with M. Viénot who made representations regarding British decision to furnish arms for the Syrian gendarmerie. His reception of suggestion that an Anglo-French committee should consider the question in Beirut	238
<b>Chapter VI.—GENERAL.</b>			
49 To Lord Moyne (Cairo) No. 36	1944 April 18	British policy in the Middle East ... Memorandum handed to Mr. Wallace Murray of the United States State Department at the opening of his informal conversations with Sir M. Peterson at the Foreign Office on the 11th April	240
50 To Lord Killearn (Cairo) No. 220	May 5	Arab unity ... Conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador who handed Mr. Eden a note regarding the submission to the French of a proposal that she should recognise the independence of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia	247

## SUBJECT INDEX.

(The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.)

AFGHANISTAN— Political situation.—1.	PERSIA (continued)— Composition of the 14th Majlis.—14. Leading personalities.—10. Tribal situation in Fars.—18, 28. Situation in Shiraz.—23. British post-war policy towards Persia.—27.
IRAQ— Events.—2, 3. Leading personalities.—4.	SYRIA AND THE LEBANON— Political and general situation.—31-35, 37-45. Supply Boards.—36. Arming of the Syrian gendarmerie.—46-48.
LEVANT STATES—See "Syria and the Lebanon."	GENERAL— British policy in the Middle East.—49. Arab unity (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia).—50.
PALESTINE— United States Congress resolutions <i>re</i> Jewish immigration.—5-9.	
PERSIA— Political and general situation.—11-17, 19-22, 24-26, 29, 30.	



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 57.—APRIL TO JUNE 1944.

**CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.**

[E 3052/7/97]

No. 1.

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)*

(No. 35.)  
Sir,

Kabul, 5th May, 1944.

IN paragraphs 1-7 of my despatch No. 66 of the 11th November, 1943, I endeavoured to give some outline of the political developments in Afghanistan during the earlier part of that year. I propose now to describe briefly those that have taken place since that despatch was written.

2. For the greater part of this period the country has been peaceful and the position of the Government has remained satisfactory. The Prime Minister has to a great extent recovered from his illness of November last and is back at work again, but he seems to have surrendered the detailed work which formerly he retained in his own hands to his nephew and deputy, Sardar Mohammad Naim Khan. There have been no outward signs of any rift in the family, which has apparently drawn closer together as a result of trouble which has recently arisen in the Southern Province. This was caused partly by the Government's determination to put a check on the smuggling that has been such a permanent feature of conditions in that province for so long, and partly by the tactless handling of the situation, especially in regard to road building in tribal areas and to conscription, by F.M. Faiz Muhammad Khan, the Governor of Khost. In an attempt to intercept a party of smugglers a minor official lost his life, and in order to reassert their authority the Afghan Government moved troops into the area. The move was purely precautionary, but their presence seems to have aggravated the situation and Mazrak, a Zadran tribal leader, has now taken to the hills. There has been a clash with the Government troops in which Mazrak's party suffered a set-back. But though the Government intentions are moderate and their position is apparently strong, the situation is still uncertain and the possibility of serious developments cannot be ignored. The situation in the Eastern Province has not been very satisfactory, and the Government has maintained outward tranquillity only by giving way on the subject of recruitment. There has also been minor trouble on the Baluchistan border where certain sections of the Badinzi tribe under Daru Khan have attempted to interfere with road construction on the British side of the frontier. The Afghan Government at one time showed an unusual readiness to co-operate in attempting to arrive at a satisfactory settlement, and sent special representatives to Chaman to discuss the case with the British Frontier Authorities. Unfortunately this experiment in co-operation seems to have proved abortive as the Afghan Government were in the end unwilling to consider any compromise which implied an admission that Daru Khan was in any way in the wrong. The case is therefore still unsettled.



3. Until the trouble in the Southern Province, the Government's chief preoccupation had been with the economic situation. Recent sales of karakul to the United States and of wool to Soviet Russia have added to their reserves of foreign exchange, and though no reliable information is available as to the total of their foreign holdings, it is well known that they are considerable. I recently learnt that when the Germans occupied Luxemburg they were surprised to find that the Afghan Government had in that country a credit of no less than 18 million Belgian francs. The transfer of this sum to a Swiss bank was permitted. The Afghans have also large dollar holdings in the United States, but they do not seem to be satisfied with these, and it is reported that they have recently been attempting to convert them into gold. In this they have probably been influenced partly by German propaganda to the effect that the war, especially with Japan, will be ruinous to American credit, and partly by the example set in India where, as a result of the Japanese threat of invasion, endeavours have apparently been made to exchange bank credits into some more tangible form of security.

4. In their internal finances the considerable drop in the Customs receipts which used to bring them in nearly £2 million sterling a year has caused the Government some anxiety. To make good the deficiency, a new Income Tax Law has recently been introduced which, although it is only being applied to commercial concerns, is estimated to bring in as much as £2 million in the current year, though it is most unlikely that it will yield more than half that amount. A further measure of importance has been the introduction of anti-profiteering regulations which are being rigorously enforced. The real reason for their introduction is not clear. Government supporters claim that the measure is what it appears to be and has been designed to stabilise the economic position of the country generally and specially to assist the poorer classes. Its critics maintain that it is nothing but a bid for popularity by the Government and an attempt to strengthen their position in the country. They affirm that there is no intention of applying the law except against a few petty traders, and that the big concerns in which the Government are themselves interested will in no way be affected.

5. The successful conclusion through the medium of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation of the negotiations for the sale of 10,000 tons of Afghan wool to Russia in January was warmly welcomed alike by the Afghan Government and the Russian commercial representatives in Kabul and has encouraged the Afghans to further approaches to the Soviet in trade matters. Hopes of improving trade relations have apparently been encouraged by M. Bakoulin, the new Soviet Ambassador. The principal Afghan requirements are said to be petrol, cement, sugar and textiles. M. Bakoulin is reported to have said that the supply of the first two items was out of the question at the present time, but to have been more hopeful about the latter two. It is also believed that M. Bakoulin's attitude to the subject of difficulties on the River Oxus has been more sympathetic than that of his unpopular predecessor, M. Mikhailov. As a result Afghan anxieties on the score of Soviet Russian policy appear to have been slightly mitigated, and they permit themselves an anxious hope that a better future for their country may after all be in store.

6. Afghanistan, however, still looks mainly for help to America and Great Britain. General Hurley's visit in January greatly flattered the Government, and the fact that the bulk of their imported supplies of necessity comes from the United States is a further factor inclining them to look to that country for support. Encouraged by the former American Military Attaché, they have undoubtedly been turning their attention to the possibility of obtaining military equipment, including aircraft, from the United States and of sending Afghan officers for training to America. It is rumoured that they are even contemplating the replacement of the present Turkish Military Mission by one from the United States in about three years' time when the contracts of the Turkish officers now in the country will have expired. But no decision on the subject is immediately probable. The Afghans are also looking to America to supply the engineers needed to carry out the many irrigation and other works of construction that are necessary if the country is to make any real progress in the immediate post-war period.

7. In both these spheres of activity His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are really better qualified than America to help, both because of their greater stake in the country's stability and by reason of their more intimate knowledge of Afghan conditions, so similar in many ways to those of India. Fear of Russia's reactions and unwillingness to trust the country entirely

to British guidance are no doubt the principal reasons which cause the Afghan Government to look elsewhere. The old suspicions with which the Government of India have traditionally been regarded can only be eradicated very slowly. There have, however, recently been many welcome signs of greater confidence and goodwill than have been evinced in the past, and it is by no means to America alone that the Government have been looking for help. Requests have recently been made to the Government of India for assistance in training officers in survey work, and enquiries are on foot for advanced air training for certain Afghan pilots. There has also been a suggestion that an Afghan military mission should be invited to India principally with the object of viewing and purchasing military equipment needed for the army. Attempts to discriminate against Indian traders have been dropped. The old British cemetery which has long lain neglected for lack of water has now been granted a regular supply by order of the Prime Minister. A Swiss surveying instrument which the Government of India recently expressed a desire to hire or purchase has been readily offered on loan. A number of deserters from India who, in spite of protests, had been held for several months in Afghan jails, have recently been released and there is a definite advance in the matter of the treatment of Indian prisoners in Afghan jails. It is true that the right of our consular officers to interview such prisoners has not yet been accorded, but orders have been given that the British legation or consulates should be immediately informed when British subjects are imprisoned.

8. An even more significant proof of growing confidence has been the recent request for three English professors for the Ghazi College. The Afghan Government are taking a great interest in education and are encouraging the learning of English. They are interested in Basic English, and I am hopeful that they may try the experiment of introducing this generally into their school curriculum. Afghanistan, with its limited contacts with the outside world, would be an ideal field for such an experiment, and there seems to be a good chance that it may be given a trial. The Afghan Government are also endeavouring to obtain copies of English Histories of Afghanistan, it is hoped with the idea of rewriting their own history on more reasonable lines. I am endeavouring to stimulate interest in cultural relations by arranging a visit from a British Council representative in the near future and also by encouraging direct correspondence between the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Kabul Literary Academy. Cultural relations through the medium of propaganda are a more difficult subject. The Afghans are very suspicious of propaganda in all its forms, and, though India now produces literature well suited to Afghan tastes, far better in fact than anything produced in the country, and very popular with the few persons who are able to receive it, there is still no relaxation of the attitude officially adopted towards it. This is partly due to the opposition aroused by the over-enthusiasm which marked our early efforts in this direction and partly to the fear of having to afford similar opportunities for Russian propaganda from the north. It must not be forgotten that too open co-operation with the British Government may well arouse the hostility of the Pathan tribes on whose support the stability of the Government still so largely depends. And indeed anti-Government propaganda in the Southern Province is already taking this theme as an inducement to the tribes to take up arms against the so-called puppets of the British Government.

9. Axis intrigues may also find the charge of such co-operation a useful weapon. The German Legation in Kabul is, however, comparatively inactive. Rasmuss, the commercial attaché, who was formerly engaged in secret intrigues, has been withdrawn, and the Germans have, it is believed, surrendered their interests in this part of the world to the Japanese; but the latter are undoubtedly very active, and, though we have as yet little definite proof that they are doing more than establishing intelligence organisations and channels of communication with and through India, there is increasing evidence that they are meddling in frontier affairs, and it would be only prudent to assume that, as with the Germans and Italians in 1941-42, they are not averse to stirring up trouble for us wherever and whenever they may find a suitable opportunity to do so. The Afghan Government are undoubtedly alive to this possibility and keep a close but not altogether efficient watch on Japanese activities; but the Japanese are a clever people, and it is certain that their legation in Kabul is up to no good. The Italian Legation is in process of being closed. Signor Anzilotti, the secretary, has recently left for Italy, and the Minister is due to leave this week for Moscow. The Afghans made no secret of their satisfaction at his departure. There are in fact rumours that they would like similarly to reduce the strength of the Japanese Legation or even close it altogether.



10. In general the attitude of the Afghan Government has been increasingly friendly. The approaching Allied victory makes them less cautious about showing on which side their sympathies lie; they are grateful for the assistance which, in spite of their own difficulties, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have so consistently afforded in supplying the country's most primary needs; and they look forward to a continuance of that assistance which in the period immediately following the end of the war will be more than ever vital to them in the political as well as in the economic sphere.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, to the North-West Frontier Province Government, to the Baluchistan Administration and to His Majesty's Consuls at Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 2113/37/93]

No. 2.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th April.)*

(No. 124.)

*Bagdad, 23rd March, 1944.*

Sir,

THE following are the chief events that have occurred in this country since the issue of my despatch No. 20 of the 13th January:—

2. The inauspicious signs which attended the birth of the new Cabinet, formed on the 26th December, were not belied and its members soon became involved in difficulties with the Regent. The Ministers wished Parliament to be prorogued for two months to give them time to prepare the Budget and the Regent was asked to sign the necessary Iradah. Hearing of this development, some of the Deputies went to His Royal Highness and represented to him that the Cabinet's request was only a manoeuvre to escape from the criticism of Parliament and that an adjournment would be inconvenient as the Deputies would thereby be obliged to come back to Bagdad at a time when it was important for many of them to be looking after the harvest. The Regent, who, from the beginning, has disliked the Cabinet, was persuaded by their arguments and refused to prorogue Parliament. He did not, however, discuss his reasons with the Acting Prime Minister, Taufiq Suwaidi, but merely sent a telephone message through the Chief of the Royal Diwan. This action upset Taufiq Suwaidi and some of his colleagues and they began to talk of being unable to remain in office unless they had the Regent's support. They said that it was not fair of the Regent to appoint them Ministers and then to encourage their critics by openly showing his disfavour. On the 15th January, before leaving Bagdad for Basra, I had an audience with the Amir and discussed the situation with him. His Royal Highness told me that he was not satisfied with the Cabinet, though he did not want an immediate crisis. I warned him that the Ministers were not likely to continue to remain in office on sufferance and that unless he stepped carefully he would provoke a crisis whether he wanted it or not. I also emphasised how greatly the country needed a stable administration so that the Ministers might have time to give continuity to the work of their departments. I advised him that he should explain to Taufiq Suwaidi his reasons for not wishing to adjourn Parliament and to let it be known that he had not been influenced by lack of confidence in his Ministers.

3. His Royal Highness professed agreement with, but did not act upon, my advice. Contrary to the Cabinet's wishes, the President of the Chamber called a meeting for the 22nd January and included on the agenda a new and amended Iradah appointing Taufiq Suwaidi Deputy Prime Minister. The latter (who had been left in charge when the Prime Minister went off for yet another cure in Palestine on the 10th January) was indignant and talked rather heatedly of immediate resignation. Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, persuaded him, however, that the proper course for the Government was to face their critics regardless of the attitude of the Palace and he and his colleagues thereupon took courage and prepared for battle in the Chamber. When the time came Taufiq Suwaidi made an excellent fighting speech, but his plan for the closure to be moved immediately afterwards was upset by the President, who abruptly adjourned the debate to the next meeting. In the meanwhile, the Government's opponents in the Senate had made plans to move a resolution for the question of the constitutional legality of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister to be referred to the High Court under Article 83 of the Organic Law. When news of this development reached the Cabinet, they decided to anticipate it and to put an end to further discussion by themselves referring the problem to the High Court. This was done at the sitting held on the 24th January. A month later the members of the court were, in accordance with the Organic Law, elected by the Senate. Of the four Senators chosen, three are generally believed to hold the view that the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister is unconstitutional; the opinions of the four judges are not known. At this stage Taufiq Suwaidi tendered his resignation in order that the High Court might be free to take a decision without regard to the personal feelings of the incumbent of the challenged appointment.

[29046]

B 3



4. Meanwhile, Nuri Said had returned on the 7th February from Palestine. A few days later he discussed the Cabinet's position with the Regent, and enquired whether His Royal Highness wished him to reform the Cabinet or whether he would prefer a new Prime Minister. On this point, the Regent has not yet really made up his mind. He has objections to every name that is put forward, but can suggest no suitable alternatives himself. Although the Cabinet contains some men of ability and is therefore, by Iraqi standards, fairly efficient, the Regent, not without reason, suspects the honesty and loyalty of three of its principal remaining members, Umar Nadhmi, Ali Mumtaz and Sadiq al Bassam. Moreover, the immediate and widespread unpopularity of the Cabinet, which has been noticeable since it first came into office, is in the main a reaction against the inclusion of these three "guilty men" who, as members of the last Cabinet of Taha-al-Hashimi, are held to be partly responsible for the events which led up to Rashid Ali's treason in 1941. The Regent's difficulty is to find an alternative team. Ibrahim Kamal, the obvious candidate for the premiership, would want at least two of the politicians named above to whom the Regent has such strong objection, while the Lord Mayor of Bagdad, the only other aspirant who has been seriously considered, is too temperamental and hot-headed to be successful. His Royal Highness's policy for the present is to give them a further period of trial and to judge their loyalty and capacity by the manner in which they carry out the business which he himself considers should be urgently undertaken. How long the Ministers will be willing to continue in office on such terms is not yet clear, but several of them have shown signs of wishing to resign rather than continue to work under threat of dismissal.

5. On his return from Palestine the Prime Minister spoke to me appreciatively of the kindness shown to him by a number of non-political Jews and told me also that he had had a not unfriendly talk with Mr. Shertok. His Excellency was fêted at both Beirut and Damascus. With the Syrian Government he claimed to have reached agreement in principle for the establishment of a close understanding between Syria and Iraq to include a common policy for defence and foreign affairs, whatever the other Arab States might agree to do. It was, he stated, also agreed that Nahas Pasha should be asked to form in March a small committee consisting of one or two representatives from each of the Arab States with which he had been in contact to draw up an agenda for the main conference which it was proposed should be held in Cairo in April or May. The conference would be attended only by official representatives and would decide on the form of federation to be adopted and the extent to which each country would conform. Reports received from independent sources indicate that Nuri's understanding with Shukri Quwatli may be neither so firm nor so positive as he represented and it appears that the Syrian Government are in fact unlikely to take any step of this kind without first being assured that it has the approval of the other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Early in February the Iraqi Government promoted their Chargé d'Affaires in Syria and the Lebanon to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. A small official Syrian delegation headed by Jamil Bey Mardam arrived in Bagdad on the 19th March on their return journey from Riyadh, where they visited King Abdul Aziz al Sa'ud to discuss Arab unity. Jamil Bey told me that he was pleased and satisfied with the results of the visit but gave me no details of the results achieved. He and his party were cordially entertained by the Iraqi Government during their short stay in the Iraqi capital and were honoured with appropriate decorations by the Regent. They left for Syria on the 20th March, travelling by railway via Mosul.

6. About the middle of February the Prime Minister received news from the Iraqi Legation in Washington of a resolution presented to Congress by Senator Wagner demanding that the United States Government should use their good offices to create a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine and abrogate the White Paper. Nuri Pasha at first kept all mention of this development out of the Iraqi newspapers, but he sent for the American Minister and told him that the Iraqi Government would protest. Mr. Henderson advised against official action by the Government and suggested that, if the Prime Minister was determined that Iraqi disapproval of the resolution should be voiced, the Senate and the Chamber should pass votes of protest in the same way that they had done at the time of the crisis in the Lebanon. A few days later the President of the Senate sent a cable to Senator Wagner in Washington protesting in dignified terms against the resolution, and the President of the Chamber sent a shorter, but similar, message to the same addressee. Both telegrams were repeated to Senator Taft, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate and to the Egyptian and Syrian Governments. These telegrams were followed by another to the

Speaker of the House of Representatives at Washington, which was signed by the Presidents of both Houses of the Iraqi Parliament. This later message was couched in more emphatic terms, contained exaggerated statements about the implications of the Wagner resolution and declared that its adoption would be tantamount to a request by Congress for an American declaration of war on the Arabs of Palestine. The Prime Minister explained to me that this further protest had been prepared after the receipt from the United States Minister of the full text of the Wagner resolution, the terms of which had caused the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber to feel that their earlier representations had not been phrased with sufficient emphasis. All these cables were shown to the Saudi Arabian Minister, who no doubt kept his King informed of their despatch. The texts were not, however, given to the Iraqi press, but on the 1st March, after the Egyptian Government had made public the fact that they had protested to the United States Government, the Iraqi Press Directorate put out a communiqué informing the public of the action taken by the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber. Afterwards the Arabic press took up the theme and each newspaper contributed to the chorus of pain and indignation that ensued. On the whole, these articles were restrained in their language, and their key-note was a call to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States speedily to make official pronouncements on their policy towards Palestine which would put an end finally to the present state of nervous tension and uncertainty which had for so long been a menace to the tranquillity of the Middle East. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me on the 6th March to speak about Field-Marshal Smuts's message to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland. This message, he told me, had been kept out of the Iraqi press, but it had been published in Egypt and a protest had been made by the Arab Union Club in Cairo. It was therefore bound to become known in Iraq. He explained that such a message from an honoured figure like Field-Marshal Smuts was bound to be very disturbing to the Arabs, and especially to the Iraqis, who were at all times sensitive to news concerning Palestine.

7. Mulla Mustafa, the insurgent Barzani chieftain, came in to Mergasur on the 8th January to meet Majid Mustafa, the Minister without Portfolio charged with the improvement of the administration in the northern liwas. On the 14th January Majid Mustafa arrived in Bagdad to report to the Cabinet. He made the following proposals:—

- (a) That Mulla Mustafa should be allowed to live in a village to be determined by the Government, outside the Barzan tribal area.
- (b) That his brother, Sheikh Ahmad, and the other Barzani chieftains and their families and followers, who had been sent to live in Hilla, should be permitted to return to their homes.
- (c) That chosen Kurdish officers of the Iraqi army should be appointed to carry out special duties as "liaison officers" under Majid Mustafa and to continue the work of pacification in the disturbed area.
- (d) That grain should be sent up to the Barzan and neighbouring areas and that relief works should be organised on the roads.
- (e) That the Iraqi army detachments should be withdrawn from Mergasur, but that certain police posts should be re-established.

Before the end of the month the Government had accepted all these proposals, and early in February Majid Mustafa went off again northwards to give effect to them. In the meanwhile, Sheikh Ahmad and his party (eighty-six persons in all) returned to their homes. A fortnight later Mulla Mustafa arrived in Bagdad to make formal submission to the Regent. With him came a dozen or more chieftains of tribes who are neighbours of the Barzanis. They were sent down by Majid Mustafa apparently with the idea of giving Mulla Mustafa confidence. This object was no doubt achieved, but the effect of their coming was, in other ways, not altogether happy. Their presence in Bagdad naturally attracted a good deal of attention and comment and provided ammunition for criticism of the Government, which, as I have related above, was used with effect in the Senate. Majid Mustafa has been doing good work in all the northern liwas. He has established the former Acting Chief of the General Staff as Mutassarif in Sulaimani and has found another man with a good reputation for Arbil. He has himself set about settling several complex tribal quarrels which threatened the peace in several different districts, and he has pushed ahead with energy the distribution of grain to the hungry villagers in all of the three liwas of Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani. He has, moreover, succeeded in recovering a



considerable number of the rifles which the Government distributed to certain of the tribes in the hope of encouraging them to resist the Barzanis. The cessation of fighting and the progress of Majid Mustafa's work of pacification has made it possible to withdraw the British Indian troops and armoured cars from Diyana, and the Iraqi army have also been able to recall most of the additional troops which they sent to Barzan and its neighbourhood last autumn.

8. Colonel Bayliss's rationing system for tea and coffee introduced on the 1st January has made fairly good progress in the large towns, where the ration for January and February, and in the case of Bagdad and Mosul for March also, has been distributed to nearly all coupon-holders. In the smaller towns and country districts, however, distribution of tea and coffee, as well as sugar, is much behind schedule and there are numerous small districts where no distribution has yet been made. It was not to be expected that the scheme could operate from the outset except in the larger towns, and even in some of these, such as Basra, serious teething troubles were encountered. The provincial administration, inexperienced in detailed supply work and undermined by corruption arising mainly from the inability of officials to make their salaries cover the mounting cost of living, has inevitably been overwhelmed by the spate of instructions associated with the rationing scheme. Nevertheless mutessarifs seem to be interpreting their instructions as best they can and, while uniformity is lacking, most of them are at least endeavouring to apply the rationing policy in the light of local conditions. The political advisory staff are giving the local administration all possible advice and assistance in this important matter and continue to help to clear up the many difficulties which arise.

9. Rationing of textiles began in Bagdad on the 1st March. In view of the greater complexity of the textile scheme, which is based on a form of points, it was decided to restrict it to the capital in the first place and extend it as the supply organisation permitted. Although stocks of textiles will as a result still remain frozen outside the capital and there is much grumbling concerning the delay in getting textiles in the provinces, it was prudent to make sure that the system would work before applying it throughout the country. About 200 retail shops have been selected for retail distribution in Bagdad and they are said to be working satisfactorily on the whole. The public seem to have discovered surprisingly quickly how to use the coupons and have no doubt been greatly assisted in this respect by the propaganda both in the press and on the radio which has been undertaken by the Government on a scale hitherto unknown in Iraq.

10. Price control continues to embrace an increasing number of imported commodities, the principles of fixed maximum selling prices or fixed profits being used according to the class of the commodity. In Bagdad at least the price control restrictions appear to be fairly widely observed, some prosecutions having had a salutary effect. A more cogent factor is probably a growing knowledge that the reorganised supply administration under Colonel Bayliss and his British staff really mean business. It is not surprising therefore that the prices of uncontrolled commodities have also shown a slightly downward trend.

11. In my despatch No. 20 of the 13th January I reported that there was a tendency for Colonel Bayliss to rush his fences as Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council and Director-General of Imports. He also gave the impression that he was trying to set himself up as "economic dictator of Iraq," an attitude which at one time caused considerable friction with the other British Advisers and eventually with the Minister of Finance. The issue became acute at the end of January as a result of a discourteous letter addressed to the latter by Colonel Bayliss. I was therefore obliged to intervene and spoke to Colonel Bayliss in no uncertain terms, pointing out to him that he must not adopt dictatorial tactics and that he would need all the co-operation he could get from other British officials. On my recommendation he withdrew the offending letter and apologised to the Minister of Finance. He has since been more amenable and more willing to seek and accept advice, more particularly from the political advisory staff. He continues to show commendable energy and resource and, despite staff difficulties, is pressing ahead with control measures with the promising results indicated above.

12. Colonel Bayliss is, of course, being bitterly attacked by the merchants, who are making every effort to undermine his position. He has, on the other hand, enjoyed a good local Arab press which reflects the ordinary man's sympathy with the steps he is taking to reduce the cost of living. The Public Relations Section of the Embassy is co-operating with him in arranging publicity, but the generally good tone of the press seems to be quite spontaneous.

13. One of the most interesting economic features during the past two months has been the downward trend in the prices of local produce, except meat, poultry, vegetables and fruit. The decline has ranged from 10 to 20 per cent., being most marked in wheat and dates. This healthy development has not been due to control measures, but mainly to the waiting policy which has been deliberately pursued in acquiring for His Majesty's Government barley and dates for export. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation or their agents have purchased 230,000 tons of barley or 30,000 tons more than the amount contracted for with the Iraqi Government last year, when, owing to emergency demands for India and elsewhere, there was no option but to fork out what local vested interests thought suitable. This year the boot, for the time being at any rate, is on the other foot—the Iraqis want to sell their remaining surplus, and so far there has been no panic demand from Cairo or anywhere else. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation have recently offered to buy at ID.16 per ton (the ruling market price), but the Government insisted on ID.18/500, with the result that the negotiations broke down and the Government freed the market, subject to the maintenance of the maximum price of ID.20/500, and also export, though the latter facility is merely a nominal gesture to holders of barley since practically all transport out of the country is controlled by His Majesty's Government. Meanwhile, the U.K.C.C. are now endeavouring to buy on the open market at a price equivalent to about ID.17 per ton at collecting centres. It is regrettable and inconsistent that the Prime Minister, while giving every support to measures aimed at reducing the prices of imported goods, should have assured Parliament on the 19th March that he hoped to secure a substantially higher price for the surplus Iraqi barley than the market price of ID.16.

14. The Euphrates date-growers have at last realised the folly of hanging on to their 1943 season dates in the hope of securing excessive prices and have reached an agreement to sell the remaining surplus of the 1943 crop to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Company for account of the Ministry of Food at a price of ID.20 per ton, which is more than 30 per cent. lower than their demand six months ago.

15. With the substantial decrease in British military expenditure in Iraq and a considerable fall in the price of major local produce, there is some prospect of slowing down, if not checking, the inflationary trend, provided that heavy and urgent demands are not suddenly made, as they have been in the past, for the export of cereals irrespective of price. Even if the prices of local produce did not fall further, but remained at the present slightly lower levels, the reduction should prove in practice a more important deflationary factor than the issue of internal loans up to a total of ID.2 million now under consideration by the Council of Ministers.

16. Iraqi pilgrims returning from the Hejaz in January brought with them stories of the summary execution of a Persian (Shi'ah) pilgrim for the alleged pollution of the precincts of the Haram at Mecca. The Shi'ahs maintained that the unfortunate man had involuntarily vomited into his "ihram" and had thereafter been judicially murdered by Ibn Saud's orders on a fabricated charge of having defiled the holy precincts. The Sunnis made no complaint about the man's treatment and accepted the official version that he had been punished for a disgusting sacrilege. In the Holy Cities there was a great stir and the Chief Mujtahid at Najaf, Saiyid Albu Hassan al Isfahani, telegraphed to the Shah of Persia begging him not to be silent but to have the matter fully investigated. The more fanatical elements also brought pressure to bear on the former to make some form of pronouncement condemning the action of the Saudi Government. On the occasion of the Arbain pilgrimage to Kerbala on the 15th February many of the processions chanted slogans against Ibn Saud and against the Wahabis, but there were no disorders and interest in the affair is now waning.

17. Towards the end of January measures adopted by the Iraqi Government to prevent the smuggling of sheep from Iraq to Syria and Transjordan via Saudi Arabia caused some tension in Saudi-Iraqi relations. The trouble began when the Iraqi Government gave notice to the Saudi Legation that all Saudi tribesmen entering Iraq to graze their flocks should register the number of their sheep with the Iraqi frontier authorities. The purpose of this measure was not only to put a check on the acquisition by these tribesmen of more sheep in Iraq which they could take away with them when they returned to Saudi Arabia, but also to safeguard *bona fide* Saudi grazers from coming under suspicion by enabling them at any time to show that the sheep with them had been brought into Iraq from their own country. Ibn Saud unfortunately did not understand



the scheme and quite wrongly regarded it as a new and ingenious plan for persecuting his tribesmen. His Majesty protested violently and threatened to take reciprocal "offensive" action against Iraqi tribesmen grazing their flocks in Saudi Arabia. So soon as the trouble was brought to my notice, I explained the Iraqi Government's purpose to the Saudi Minister and I also discussed the matter with the Iraqi Minister of Finance, whose department was responsible for the initiation of the plan to register sheep crossing the Saudi frontier. A few days later the Saudi Minister and the Minister of Finance talked the whole matter over together and the latter offered to work out jointly with the Saudi Government an alternative scheme to stop smuggling. Meanwhile, the original proposals do not seem to have been put into effect, and as, for purely economic reasons, it seems probable that the ban on the export of sheep will soon be lifted, I think it is reasonable to consider the incident as now closed.

18. A Chinese Goodwill Mission arrived in Bagdad on the 29th February, having travelled from London by way of Egypt, Turkey and Persia. The three members, Messrs. Wang, Han and Wen, were entertained to dinner by the Iraqi Government and lunched at the Embassy. They left Bagdad for Basra by air on the 2nd March. During their short stay they were treated as official guests and shown every courtesy and attention, creating themselves a very happy impression.

19. The Polish Minister of State in the Middle East also visited Iraq in February. The Iraqi Government gave a dinner party in his honour, and I also had the pleasure of entertaining his Excellency.

20. During the period covered by this despatch several events outside Iraq have attracted a good deal of local attention. I have already mentioned the Wagner resolution on Palestine. Another event in the United States that has quite naturally been much discussed was the statement made by Mr. Ickes and elaborated in the American press about American plans for the further development of the oil-fields in Saudi Arabia, Koweit and Bahrein. Some doubts have been expressed here whether a big increase in American interests in the Arab countries would be beneficial to Arab nationalism and the suggestion was put about that Ibn Saud was making the mistake of trying to free himself from financial dependence on Great Britain and turn for help to the United States instead. Among the Jews, however, the prospect of the growth of American enterprise in Iraq and the neighbouring Arab countries seems to have been welcomed. Many Jews are greedily absorbing United States propaganda and are beginning to think that if America's Middle Eastern capital interests develop she will play a bigger part in Middle East politics and that the minorities will thereby have a new safeguard against the danger of Arab oppression. Increasing United States interest in this part of the world is very noticeable, but is not in my view to be regretted, since the growth of overseas responsibilities must surely tend to undermine steadily the ingrained isolationism of the American people. I cannot but feel that the withdrawal of the Wagner resolution, following the representations of the State Department, General Marshall and others, is a significant pointer in this direction.

21. A keen eye is always turned from Iraq towards Turkey, and when in February it was seen that military consultations between Turkey and the Allies had been broken off the political gossips had an ideal topic to exploit. Generally, the sudden withdrawal of the British military experts seems to have been regarded as a set-back for Allied diplomacy, and on the whole sympathy was with Turkey in her reluctance to enter the war. The later news that Great Britain and America had stopped supplies of war materials, including aviation spirit, to Turkey stimulated still further interest in Turkey's relations with the Allies. It is generally considered here that Turkey's attitude has been influenced by the unfortunate set-back suffered by British arms in Samos, Cos and Leros, and the slow progress of the campaign in Italy.

22. The war review given by Mr. Churchill on the 22nd February provided many topics for talk from which people chose according to their fancy. The malicious tried to make much of his statement that he gave no guarantee that the war would end in 1944, the better-disposed retorted by pointing out that Mr. Churchill had been equally cautious about any guarantees the other way. The gloomy ones found reason for more gloom in the Prime Minister's warning that German retaliation for British air raids would increase, but the optimistic confidently seized on his assurance that the Allied air attacks on Germany would reach a degree of intensity far beyond anything yet achieved or imagined. Your own statement, Sir, replying to a question in the House of Commons on the 16th February, on the present situation of the Iraqi Government was a further source of animated discussion. Unfamiliar as they are with the astonishing

irrelevancy of many parliamentary questions, especially those dealing with foreign countries, the Iraqis sought to deduce the reason for the question put to you and ingeniously invented a variety of theories, all very far from the truth. Some decided that both the question and the answer were concerned with the competence of the present Cabinet, others thought that their purpose was to reveal dissatisfaction with Iraqi war collaboration, while among the minorities there were those who saw in your reply a sinister repudiation by His Majesty's Government of all interest in their fate. Talk on these lines did not last for long, though some of its effects may linger, nor was it active enough to influence to any considerable extent the ordinary course of local events. It was nevertheless significant because it showed how sensitive many people in Iraq are to any statements made in high British places touching themselves or their interests, and also how much the field of public opinion has been widened in recent years by the expansion of broadcasting and the development of other instruments of publicity and propaganda.

23. Rainfall this winter has been below the average throughout the country, but its effects are particularly noticeable in the southern areas, where in many cases flocks have had to be grazed on growing crops. It is estimated that the harvest will be some 25 per cent. less than last season, and that livestock will suffer severely. It is also feared that the coming hot weather will be punctuated by frequent dust storms.

24. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, Cairo, the Government of India, the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 3640/37/93]

No. 3.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st June.)*

(No. 225.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 8th June, 1944.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 124 of the 23rd March, I have the honour to submit the following summary of the principal events that have occurred in Iraq during the last two or more months:—

2. The Cabinet formed by Nuri Pasha on Christmas Day remained in an uneasy situation throughout March and most of April. The Regent continued to withhold his active support and to look around for a means to get rid of the three Ministers whom he particularly disliked, namely, Umar Nadhmi, Ali Mumtaz and Sadiq Bassam. I repeatedly warned His Royal Highness that the prolonged uncertainty about the position of the Cabinet was harmful and advised him that his proper policy was either to give it his full confidence or to replace it by another if he were certain that something more satisfactory could be found. At the end of April, after returning from his tour in the north, His Royal Highness told me that he had decided to keep the present Cabinet in office. At this stage it seemed that it might prove to be possible for Nuri Pasha's Cabinet to carry on at least until the end of the summer, but events soon dissipated this prospect. The debate in the Chamber on the budget for 1944-45 was exploited as usual for the discussion of every branch of the work of the Administration and attacks were made on the Cabinet at all angles. A climax was reached on the 21st May, when abusive language was freely exchanged between Deputies, and the sitting had to be suspended in an atmosphere of some disorder. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were satisfied that their critics would not have dared to become so violent if they had not felt that they enjoyed at least the sympathy of the Palace. The Ministers decided that they could no longer remain in office in such circumstances and resigned. The Regent accepted their resignation a few days later, and called upon Hamdi Pachachi to form a Cabinet. The invitation was accepted, but as the new Prime Minister, who is elderly and in indifferent health, was indisposed at the time, it fell to the Regent to choose most of his colleagues for him.



3. This task was completed within a fortnight and the following Cabinet took office on the 4th June:—

Prime Minister: Hamdi al Pachachi.  
 Minister of Interior: Mustafa al Umari.  
 Minister for Foreign Affairs and Acting Minister of Supply:  
 Arshad al Umari.  
 Minister of Finance: Salih Jabr.  
 Minister of Defence: Tahsin Ali.  
 Minister of Communications and Works: Abdul Amir al Uzri.  
 Minister of Justice: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.  
 Minister of Education: Ibrahim Akif al Alusi.  
 Minister of Economics: Towfiq Wahbi.  
 Minister of Social Affairs: Muhammad Hassan Kubba.

Like most Iraqi Cabinets it has both good points and bad. Abdul Amir al Uzri, Taufiq Wahbi and Ibrahim Akif al Alusi are newcomers who offer promise of good work. Arshad al Umari, for years a capable and progressive Lord Mayor of Baghdad, is a well-known thruster and should, if he is not too temperamental, be able to give the new Ministry of Supplies a fair start, and Salih Jabr, if he can resist temptation to sectarian favouritism, has it in him to be an adequate Minister of Finance. The black spot is Mustafa al Umari at Interior. He last held this post in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in the summer of 1941, and left it with reputation for corruption, bad even by Iraqi standards. It is a great pity that he should have been permitted to return, and I gather that it was only the essential need for support in the Senate that won him a place in the Cabinet at all.

4. The "Edmonds Committee" on political detainees was reassembled at the end of March by the late Minister of the Interior. They recommended the unconditional release of twenty-five men and the release on security of four others. These recommendations were accepted by the Council of Ministers and the twenty-nine men concerned were freed on the 12th April. The Military Security authorities were kept fully informed of the committee's work and no attempt was made by the Minister of the Interior, or any other Minister, to influence the committee's decisions.

5. The Iraqis interned in Southern Rhodesia returned to Iraq on the 2nd April and were at once taken into custody by the Iraqi authorities. This trial began in May last but does not seem to have made much progress. The change of Government may possibly cause new delays.

6. In the financial field the major developments during the past two months have been the submission of a record budget to Parliament, the participation of the Iraqi Government in the Middle East Financial Conference in Cairo beginning on the 23rd April, the approval of legislation for the flotation of two internal loans, and the payment of the debt of approximately £330,000 for the Hinaidi Cantonment, which had been outstanding for nearly six years.

7. The 1944-45 budget estimates contain several important innovations, including the amalgamation of the ordinary and capital works budgets, hitherto kept separate, and the creation of an emergency budget, covering the expenses of the supplies organisation and the cost-of-living allowances, on the one hand, and profits on Government trading on the other. The total combined revenue is estimated at ID. 17,712,740, which almost balances the total combined expenditure at ID. 17,696,500. The latter figure is ID. 1,555,843 higher than the corresponding figure for the preceding year and is more than twice the pre-war budget expenditure. The budget estimates have been approved by the Chamber of Deputies with comparatively little modification, but only after lively debate, during which full opportunity was taken by Nuri Pasha's opponents to attack the Government's policy, especially on supply matters. The estimates are now before the Senate Financial Committee.

8. The Iraqi Government sent a strong delegation, headed by the Minister of Finance, Saiyid Ali Mumtaz, to the Middle East Financial Conference, and I understand that they acquitted themselves well. They were able to point out that Iraq was well in the van of the Middle Eastern countries as regards anti-inflation measures, having, for example, already raised income tax to a high level, initiated action for the issue of local loans, as well as being one of the very few countries in the Middle East where prices of bulk cereals have been showing a downward trend.

9. Legislation was submitted to Parliament on the 18th April authorising the flotation of two local loans—one short-term for a total of ID. 1 million

bearing interest at 3 per cent., and the other a long-term lottery loan with interest at 4 per cent., of which 2 per cent. will be paid as interest and the remaining 2 per cent. in the form of prizes. The proceeds of the loans are to be reserved for railway and irrigation development. The Bill was finally approved by Parliament on the 28th May. Doubts continue to be held, however, in some quarters regarding the outcome of this venture into what is a novel form of investment in Iraq and at the beginning of May there were for a time heavy withdrawals of currency from the banks owing to malicious rumours to the effect that bank depositors would be forced to subscribe to the loans.

10. In the economic field the Government have decided to carry out crop assessments in respect of the 1944 wheat and barley harvests, but on different lines from last year. Instead of individual assessments, based on inspection of individual crops and the out-turn on the threshing floor, last year's assessments are to be adjusted in accordance with crop conditions in the various areas, a reduction of 20 to 30 per cent. being taken as a general guide. On balance, this new system should give fairly adequate, though by no means ideal, results. The Government will probably take over half the wheat crop again. Their policy regarding barley, on the other hand, will be largely governed by the volume and pace of purchases by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. By holding off the market until prices broke in April the Corporation, after completing their 1943 contract to buy 200,000 tons at ID. 20/500 a ton at collecting centres, were able to purchase substantial quantities of barley at a price equivalent to rather less than ID. 16/000 a ton. They were, however, obliged to suspend purchases at the end of April as there seemed to be no immediate prospect of moving the barley from Iraq owing to shipping difficulties while storage was proving difficult for the 50,000 odd tons already on hand in Basra and the 30,000 tons coming forward. The market has since weakened further in view of the offerings of new barley. The suspension of purchases by the Corporation, coupled with the substantial fall in price, is naturally causing unfavourable comment among agricultural interests and, if serious resentment is to be avoided, it is essential that an early decision should be reached regarding the quantity of barley to be purchased for account of His Majesty's Government within the next twelve months and the price to be paid. While it is clear that the opportunity should be taken to get the price of barley down to a reasonable level in the general interest of Iraq, as well as our own, especially as other local products tend to fall in sympathy with it, the reduction should not be so drastic as to create undesirable political reactions. A proposal by the United States Minister that American shipping should be employed to lift barley to the Red Sea/Suez area is at present under consideration in London and Cairo.

11. On the 1st May Parliament passed a law creating a Ministry of Supply and thus gave sanction to a scheme advocated by Colonel Bayliss ever since his arrival in Iraq. There is much to be said for the concentration in one Ministry of Supply organisations hitherto dispersed among five different State departments, who have often not seen eye to eye in dealing with supply matters. The problem will, however, be to find adequate and suitably qualified staff for the new Ministry, which may also experience some difficulty in securing full co-operation from other Ministries unless the Minister of Supply is a strong but tactful personality. Nuri Pasha did not fill the post, there being few aspirants to it in view of the inevitable unpopularity likely to be attached to the incumbent.

12. Colonel Bayliss, who holds ambitious views and whose policy is all-embracing, is anxious that all supply questions should come under the control of the new Ministry and even that the control of all local products should be transferred to it from the Ministry of Interior. I understand, however, that he has waived his insistence in this respect as regards wheat and barley. It is largely this anxiety to get his hands on everything having any connexion with supplies and to set himself up as "economic dictator" of Iraq that has inevitably aroused serious opposition to him in Ministerial and British Advisory circles and recently caused me to send you, Sir, a warning that the Iraqi Government might ask him to go unless he showed himself more ready to seek and accept advice and to proceed with greater caution generally. He has continued to display commendable energy and resource, but his pace has tended to be too fast for a country such as Iraq with a comparatively primitive economy and a weak Administration in which, moreover, corruption has, unfortunately, become rife in the past few years. Nevertheless, as a result of his efforts, the general level of prices of certain imported goods has shown an appreciable drop over the past six months.



13. The main supply problem remains the shortage of cotton piece-goods, which is causing widespread anxiety and growing discontent, particularly in rural areas. The latter have so far received no cloth under the rationing scheme which, owing to the reduced supplies, has hitherto been limited to urban areas. Releases are now beginning in the country districts, but only, for the time being, on half the meagre scale enjoyed by towns. Coupled with the delay in distribution and coming on top of the differentiation between town and country rations of sugar, tea and coffee, this discrimination is causing increasing resentment in tribal areas. I have impressed upon Colonel Bayliss the need for making distribution as equitable as possible and have in particular emphasised the importance of not giving any other part of the country, *e.g.*, Basra, earlier attention or more favourable treatment than the distressed Kurdish districts.

14. A development, which should promote ever closer co-ordination in supply matters between the Iraqi Government, the American Legation and this embassy, was the formation after protracted negotiations of a joint Anglo-American-Iraqi Committee for Co-ordination of Supplies under the chairmanship of the responsible Iraqi Minister. Both the embassy and the American Legation (also the Foreign Economic Administration) are represented on the committee, which held its first meeting on the 13th May. Meetings are to be held fortnightly and judging from the first two meetings they should provide opportunities for frank and profitable discussion of Iraq's supply problems.

15. The parliamentary abuse unhappily directed against the Government's settlement with Mulla Mustafa had the unfortunate effect of dissuading the Cabinet from going steadily ahead with the plans propounded by the Kurdish Minister without Portfolio, Majid Mustafa, for the pacification of the disturbed Kurdish areas. After the latter's return to Bagdad from the north in February, no fresh instructions were given to him and he remained in the capital discouraged, disgruntled and constantly threatening to throw up the sponge. Meanwhile, the liaison officers, whom he had left behind to help the regular qaimmaqams and mudirs to restore tranquillity and remedy administrative defects, were without guidance, lost heart and began to get into trouble with the officials whom they were intended to assist. The Barzani tribal people were quick to sense that something had gone wrong. They heard of the outburst of ill-feeling in Bagdad; they put the worst interpretation on Majid's failure to return to continue his work and they mistrusted the Government's intentions because they persisted in keeping garrisons at Mergasur and Bille.

16. The result was that unrest increased. The Barzanis and their neighbours refused to surrender the rifles demanded from them and they began to show the familiar symptoms of sickening for an outbreak of violence of some kind.

17. On the 13th April I received, by the hand of a special messenger, a letter from Mulla Mustafa complaining that the improvements in the Administration which had been promised were not being carried out, and that Iraqi troops in the areas adjacent to Barzan were being reinforced instead of withdrawn, and finally declaring that, provided that His Majesty's Government had no objection, he and his people were prepared to win their rights with their own hands.

18. In reply, I sent him an oral message through Majid Mustafa stating that I was displeased to see that he was again interfering in politics in spite of his recent promises to me to keep quiet and restore the agricultural life of his villages, and warning him of the serious consequences to himself of anything he might do to embarrass His Majesty's Government.

19. At this time the Minister of the Interior was away in the Mosul Liwa touring with the Regent, and, at my request, the Prime Minister spoke to him by telephone and invited him to make personal enquiries into the Barzani situation. Later on, the Prime Minister himself joined the Regent and accompanied His Royal Highness to Ruwanduz. It had been planned that the Regent should attend gatherings of the Kurdish clans, one near Amadiyah and the other near Ruwanduz. Unfortunately, the first had to be abandoned altogether, and the second curtailed owing to bad weather. The chief result of the Regent's tour was that, after His Royal Highness and Nuri Pasha had returned to Bagdad, the Prime Minister submitted a memorandum to the Emir in which he outlined the history of events in the Kurdish areas since the creation of the Iraqi Kingdom and summarised the measures which he considered should be taken to restore tranquillity and speed up the improvement of social services. The Regent approved this memorandum, and on the 12th May the Prime Minister took Majid Mustafa with him on another tour in the north. Together they visited Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani. In each place the Prime Minister had talks with the officials and notables and set out the policy of the Government. He obtained

from the mutasarrifs a report on the administrative reforms desirable in their respective liwas and accepted petitions from the local chiefs explaining their grievances. His tour was rather too hurried and many of those whom he saw said openly that they had heard fair words before but had waited in vain for years for their fulfilment. Nevertheless, I think that his talks did do something to improve the temper of the people. Unhappily, soon after his return to Bagdad the whole Cabinet fell and much of the good impression left by the tour was effaced.

20. On the 22nd May Majid Mustafa and Major Kinch (Acting Political Adviser, Northern Iraq) visited Mulla Mustafa at Barzan. Both of them admonished the Mulla for his political restlessness and urged him to settle down quietly, cultivate his lands and establish reasonable relations with the local authorities. Mulla Mustafa pressed for a general pardon for all his men, including police and army deserters, and for the withdrawal of the army detachments at Bille and Mergasur. The mutasarrif explained that it was not practicable to pardon all classes of offenders who had joined Mulla Mustafa, but undertook to see what could be done to arrange that, if these men surrendered, they should receive considerate treatment. The military force at Mergasur was withdrawn early in June; that at Bille may be withdrawn later. Since the meeting described above, Mulla Mustafa has handed in nine of the 172 rifles which it is estimated he captured during the fighting last winter.

21. Meanwhile, inter-tribal fighting broke out in the Bradost nahiyah north of Ruwanduz. On the 17th May Khalifa Samad of the Bradost tribe attacked a village belonging to Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq (son of Saiyid Taha). The men of both clans rallied to their leaders and a week later there was a skirmish, in which there were a few casualties on each side. Police reinforcements were thereafter sent to Ruwanduz, and the Qaimmaqam is endeavouring to arrange a peace. Mulla Mustafa seems to have offered his help to both sides.

22. In Sulaimani General Baha Ud-din-Nuri has been doing good work cleaning up the administration. Sheikh Latif, the son of Sheikh Mahmud, has been persuaded to come back from Sardasht and arrived in Sulaimani on the 10th April. The people of Sardasht have written to many different quarters expressing their fear that Sheikh Latif's departure will expose them to depredations by the Pizher. Their fears are not altogether unfounded.

23. In the Mosul Liwa several troublesome tribal questions have worried the local authorities. A dispute between Sheikh Sfuq and his brother Ahmad, of the Shammar, about the division of their late father's estate divided the tribe into two camps, and the Mutasarrif of Mosul at one time felt obliged to take guarantees for good behaviour from the two protagonists and a number of lesser chiefs. This firm action had good results and at the end of April Sfuq and Ahmad came to an understanding. The terms of the settlement are, however, extremely vague and more is likely to be heard of this affair before long. The quarrel between the Aulad Faisal and the Aulad Shallal is another disturbing element in the internal affairs of the tribe and further action has been necessary to make the Aulad Shallal observe the settlement imposed by the authorities after the fighting that occurred in the late summer of 1942. There have also been frontier difficulties arising from fighting that has occurred in Syria between the Agaidat and some sections of the Shammar, in which the Iraqi Shammar became involved. A tribal conference which was to have been held in April and which Sheikh Sfuq, the leading sheikh of the Iraqi Shammar, was to have attended was in the end postponed, but a second attempt to get tribal arbitrators together at Tel Kotchek in early May, when the Mutasarrif of Mosul played a useful part, was more successful and resulted in the signing of peace terms between the warring tribes. This is not, however, the final chapter of the story and more trouble is probable before the terms of the peace are implemented.

24. In addition to these difficulties with the Shammar, there are outstanding disputes among the Yazidies which need careful handling and a serious feud between the Kurdish, Brifkani and the Muzuri tribes started by the abduction of Nuri Brifkani's daughter by the son of Haji Malo of the Mazuri. Said Brifkani, the son of Nuri, has murdered Haji Malo and is now defying arrest with a large bodyguard of armed men. Efforts to persuade him to come in to submit to a tribal settlement have been unavailing and the police have not yet been able to capture him. It is difficult to dispose promptly of affairs of this kind, and while they drag on they are harmful and disturbing to the Administration.

25. The Amir Abdullah arrived in Bagdad on the 9th April and, after taking part in four days of elaborate official entertainment, he left with the Regent for a visit to the northern liwas. His Highness returned to the capital on the 21st April and left for Amman on the 27th April. When I called to see His



Highness at the Palace he expatiated at length on what he termed the American menace. He was intensely suspicious of the expanding influence of the United States in the Levant States and disliked what he regarded as their support of Zionist pretensions. He thought that their proposals for exploiting the oil resources of the Arabian peninsula were part of a plan to obtain a dominant politico-economic position in the Middle East. He said that he regarded these developments with alarm and did his best to make me share his apprehensions. My efforts to dissipate his fears had little success. Referring to Palestine, His Highness urged adherence to the White Paper of 1939, and he deplored the continued uncertainty of the future of Syria and the Lebanon under French influence. The Amir's visit provoked a good deal of comment and speculation. The view generally taken seems to have been that he came to canvass support for his candidature to the Syrian throne. Though he did his best everywhere to be amiable, I do not think that he succeeded in enhancing his popularity, and reports which I have received indicate that in many quarters he enjoys little esteem.

26. A Lebanese delegation headed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs passed through Bagdad early in April on their way to visit King Abdul Azziz al Saud at Riyadh. They were received as official guests and were most cordially entertained during their three days' stay in Bagdad. They returned to Bagdad on the 16th April and left the following evening by train for Syria. They professed themselves most favourably impressed by the wisdom of King Abdul Azziz al Saud and by the efficiency of his administration. It cannot be doubted that while in Bagdad they had many talks with official and non-official Iraqi personalities about Arab Unity, but it is not likely that these talks progressed beyond the stage of formal expressions of support for the ideal of closer co-operation between the Arab countries. No official communiqué was issued in Bagdad concerning the result of their visit either to Saudi Arabia or Iraq.

27. Two new diplomatic ministers have been accredited to the Iraqi Court. M. Li Tieh Tseng, representing the Chinese Republic, presented his credentials on the 8th April, and M. J. M. Kadlec, representing Czechoslovakia, was received in audience by the Regent for the same purpose three days later. Both reside in Tehran and are also accredited to the Shah. The Chinese Government have, however, taken a small house in Bagdad to serve as a legation, and the Minister intends to leave a secretary in charge.

28. Colonel Spillman, a member of the French Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at Algiers, arrived in Bagdad on the 10th May, to establish contact with the Iraqi Government with a view to securing official recognition for the National Committee of Liberation. He told me that the Committee wished to have full representation in Bagdad. If, however, the Iraqi Government were at all hesitant about according recognition, the Committee would not be greatly perturbed but would await a more favourable opportunity. The change of Government has naturally interrupted his talks with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but I gather that the new Minister is favourably disposed to Colonel Spillman's proposals.

29. The Regent has carried out several successful tours during the past two months. Between the 14th to 16th March he visited Hillah and the Holy Cities of Kerbela and Najaf and took with him the young King. The Royal Party was received with what appeared to be genuine enthusiasm by tribesmen and townspeople alike, and all accounts testify to the pleasure which His Royal Highness gave by his gracious talks with the leading Divines. On the 25th March His Royal Highness went off to Basra on a visit which lasted until the 3rd April, and included an extensive tour of the Southern Desert area. Between the 13th and 21st April he toured Mosul, Arbil, Ruwanduz and Kirkuk, and on the 26th April he was at Rumaittha to open a new irrigation regulator.

30. The Iraqi people continue to react satisfactorily and with unshaken confidence to the course of the war. The news of the invasion of France, coming so closely after the fall of Rome, spread like wild-fire through Bagdad, and telephone calls on the 8th June rose sharply by 40 per cent. over the normal. I have received numerous telegrams and other messages of congratulation.

31. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East, Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, and the Government of India.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 3772/3772/93]

No. 4.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th June.)

(No. 229.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 10th June, 1944.

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 9th June, 1938, and to my despatch No. 214 of the 17th June, 1943, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1944.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Report on Leading Personalities of Iraq for 1943.*

THE ROYAL FAMILY.

1. *King Feisal II.*—Born in Bagdad the 2nd May, 1935. Succeeded to the throne on the death of his father, Ghazi I, on the 3rd April, 1939. His mother is a sister of the Amir Abdul Illah. He has an English nurse and also an English governess.

He and his mother were confined in the Qasr Zahur during most of May 1941, but were removed to the summer palace at Pir Mum (Arbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a bright, intelligent child, though somewhat delicate with a tendency to asthma. His Majesty visited Egypt in April 1943, proceeding and returning via Palestine and Transjordan.

2. *Abdul Illah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*—Only son of Ali-bin-Hussein, ex-King of the Hejaz, who died in 1935. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Bagdad as a child with father in 1926, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly at home and partly at Victoria College, Alexandria.

He speaks good English.

In November 1936 he married in Bagdad the daughter of Salah-al-Din Fauzi Beg and grand-daughter of Amin Yahiyah Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and maintains a large stable.

Became Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April, 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

In November 1943 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Divorced his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941, which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he endeavoured to resist the Prime Minister's demands for the appointment of new Ministers, but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital.

During the night of the 1st April the four army commanders already mentioned occupied the city with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took refuge in the American Legation. Thence he was smuggled out to Habbaniya on the 2nd April and flown to Basra. On instructions from Bagdad the Officer Commanding, Iraq Army, at Basra attempted to arrest the Regent, who took refuge on board one of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of rallying support for his cause in the south had been lost. On the 16th April he was flown to Jerusalem, together with Ali Jaudat and Jamil Madfai, who had meanwhile joined him at Basra. During the hostilities in May the Regent remained in Palestine. He returned to Bagdad on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime and was welcomed by a large gathering of officials, notables and well-wishers.

[29046]

c



Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past two years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public. Nevertheless, even if he has not won the affection of the Iraqis he appears to be steadily gaining ground. He is genuinely friendly to Great Britain.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious interference in the choice of Government candidates for the General Election. He has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir*.—Born in Constantinople in 1900. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Feisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Accompanied by his wife, he came to Bagdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Illah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Feisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Balliol. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1933 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This *mésalliance* mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad it was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942.

#### OTHER PERSONALITIES.

1. *Abbas-i-Mahmud Agha*.—Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (Kurdish) see Babekr Agha). Generally on the side of disorder when trouble is brewing. Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi*.—Shiah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in Tehran 1931. Minister for Education, November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality.

3. *Abdul Amir al Uzri*.—Shia, born Kadhima in 1899. Educated Bagdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (C.E.). He returned to Iraq in 1929 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate-General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director-General in 1941. He acted as Director-General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944.

4. *Abdul Aziz-al-Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Rasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Rasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920, and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul-general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released, but remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Naji-al-Suwaiddi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

Early in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's régime, did his best to clear his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements.

5. *Abdul Aziz-al-Qassab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Kaïmakam of Kut under the Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutessarif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutessarif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiq in January 1923, and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade I, November 1933.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq-al-Suwaiddi.

6. *Abdul Illah Hafidh*.—Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhil, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained



a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Bagdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1938-39; Consul-General, Bombay, 1939-40; Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fat, genial personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

7. *Abdul Latif Nuri*.—Born in Bagdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *agid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *zaim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Bagdad on his pension.

8. *Abdul Mahdi (Saiyid)*.—Shiah of Shutia (Muntafiq). Born about 1894. Belongs to an influential family and owns a large estate (Abu Hawan Muqatah). Deputy for Kerbala in Turkish Parliament, and in Iraqi Chamber in 1927. Minister for Education under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani, March-October 1933. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1934.

He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (*Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani*).

After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was again elected to the Chamber in December 1937.

He was again returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al-Hashimi. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet when Rashid Ali seized power in April. Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Nuri as Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942. Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Tahsin Ali, the Minister of Education.

9. *Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani*.—Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Bagdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1938. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an Egyptian girl of good family and was popular in Egyptian society. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944.

10. *Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid*.—Sunni of Bagdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with

noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November 1932, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

11. *Abdul Razzaq al Uzri*.—Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A Bagdad lawyer. Deputy 1931-32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutessarif of Kerbela and Diyala. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943.

12. *Abdul Wahid Shaikh*.—Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sikkar, once the most powerful sheikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivates extensive properties on the left bank of the Mishkab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Feisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Jaudat's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin-al-Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwaniyah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Hassan Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942.

13. *Abdullah-al-Damluji*.—Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Bagdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Feisal-al-Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Bagdad, posting his resignation to Ibn Saud. Arrived Bagdad, September 1928. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General, Cairo, in 1930, recalled October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was resented by Ibn Saud, and for a short time Damluji's presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's second Cabinet in February 1934; resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.



For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1938. Soon after Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister in December 1938 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

14. *Abdullah Qassab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Shaikh, Abbas Amin-al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, *q.v.* Educated in Bagdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Qaimaqam of Samarra in 1936 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Kerbala in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwaniyah a month later. Did well as a Mutesarrif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul in March 1944.

15. *Ahmad, Shaikh of Barzan*.—A chieftain of the Kurdish Zibar tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Chia-i-Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Barosh and Mazuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowanduz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1919, but no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barosh and Mazuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the summer of 1931 he began a private war with a neighbouring chieftain of Baradost, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khalil Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hillah.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the autumn of 1943 Shaikh Ahmad was removed to Hilla and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs.

16. *Ahmad Mukhtar Baban*.—Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was re-formed in December 1943, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet of June 1944.

17. *Ahmad al Rawi*.—Born about 1894. Sunni of Bagdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Mada'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

18. *Ahmad-al-Shaikh Daud, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1875. He comes of a family of learned men, his father was a well-known teacher in Bagdad, under whom most of the men of Sheikh Ahmad's generation studied. In the early days of the occupation he was a prominent Nationalist. He was arrested and deported to Henjam in August 1920, but was allowed to return to Bagdad in February 1921. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in March 1924, he opposed the treaty of 1922 and voted against it. Failed to secure a seat in the subsequent general election, but was successful at a by-election. In October 1925 he became pro-treaty, but in January 1926 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928, but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934.

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937. Reappointed to Senate January 1943.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

19. *Ahmad-i-Taufiq*.—A Kurdish notable of Suleimani, born 1898, who has had the advantage of a better education than most of his contemporaries. He has held a number of administrative appointments since the first days of the occupation of the Suleimani Liwa. Was appointed mutessarif after the reoccupation of Suleimani in 1924. The Iraqi Government have several times endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but those chosen have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has now (1933) been mutessarif without interruption since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhder tribe, and owns property in the Surdash nahivah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

20. *Ahmad Zaki-al-Khaiyat*.—Shiah Baghdadi. Born 1896. Educated Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul-general at Muhammerah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutessarif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

21. *Akram Mushtaq*.—Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (*q.v.*). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940.

22. *Ali Jaudat*.—Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1886. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shuaibah; subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish officer prisoners to join the Sheriff. He was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After



the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha early in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Feisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutessarif of Hillah, which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands on supporters of his political views. In January 1923 he was appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *mujtahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Askari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutessarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani and Yasin-al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King, March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in April 1939. Resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the Regent and accompanied His Highness to Jerusalem. He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

23. *Ali Mahmud Shaikh Ali*.—Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the Ubaid tribe. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1923 and practised as a lawyer for about thirteen years. He also learnt to speak English and French. He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the newspaper the *Istiqal* attacking British policy in Iraq. He was arrested in 1924 on account of his agitation against the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, but was acquitted on trial. He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return he was appointed (through the personal influence of Yasin-al-Hashimi, the Prime Minister) to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he has shown more talent and good sense than was to be expected from his past career. Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1938, but was permitted to return when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutessarif of Basra, where he soon began to make trouble for the Sheikh of Koweit. After holding this appointment for about a year he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutessarif he allowed his political prejudices to colour too deeply his administrative activities.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fleed to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. Handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned in Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

24. *Ali Mumtaz*.—Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created Rafidain Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

25. *Amin-al-Umari*.—Born Mosul 1889 of the notable family of the Umaris. Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople, where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in Samawa, Abu Sukhair and Rumaitha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912. Fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chitaljah lines. After the war of 1914-17 he took part (with Jamil-al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Deir-ez-Zor and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas. Was relieved of his command and placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

26. *Amin Zaki Sulaiman*.—A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the Euphrates Division, Diwanayah. Promoted brigadier in June 1936.

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937, when he was appointed G.O.C., the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

He is now 53 years old and is the senior officer now serving in the Iraq army. Is a staunch supporter of Taha-al-Hashimi, and is considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but is generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men. (Written in 1940.)

Under pressure from Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, he threw in his lot with Rashid Ali in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the State. He fled to Persia when British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Ahwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.



27. *Arshad-al-Umari*.—Of the well-known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands some English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Muhsin Beg. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamdi-al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies.

28. *Asim-al-Naqib, Saiyid*.—The fourth son of Saiyid Abdul Rahman and younger brother of Saiyid Mahmud. Born Bagdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Saiyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character, but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

29. *Ata Amin*.—Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angora.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1939 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad, and was appointed Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1943.

30. *Babekr Agha*.—A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1938.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Sulaimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

31. *Duad-al-Haidari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1880. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Duad Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war, and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for

the treaty 1924. Hazb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Minister for Justice under Taufiq Suwaidi, April–November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Taufiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade I in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England.

32. *Duad-al-Sadi, Saiyid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Hillah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938, but returned as soon as Nuri-al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Bagdad for trial in March 1944.

33. *Fadhil Jamali Dr.*—Born Kadhimain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921–27. Columbia University, New York, 1927–29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the Embassy in developing the work of the British Council, he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to do his utmost to resist British influence and opposed the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in Washington in January 1943, but at the end of May he was still in Bagdad hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education. A year later he was still in Bagdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation.

34. *Fahmi-al-Mudarris*.—Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Feisal in Syria and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Feisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College, but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937. Was placed on pension a year later.

35. *Hamdi Pachachi*.—Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself



owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the liwa. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot-head and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Auqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhsin al Sadun, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942. Ceased to be President of the Senate when he became temporarily Minister of Economics in December 1943. Was not reappointed a Minister in Nuri's ninth Cabinet formed on the 25th December, 1943. Succeeded Nuri Said as Prime Minister in June 1944.

36. *Hanna Khaiyat*.—Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Bagdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy, October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

37. *Hikmat, Sulaiman*.—Sunni. Born 1886. Director of Education in Bagdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played an active part in organising intensive opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin-al-Hashimi's Government, and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His intentions were excellent, but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were exchanged between Hikmat and Sabah, Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimani, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Bagdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now (1944) a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether.

38. *Husain Fauzi-bin-Hassan*.—Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born in Bagdad in 1889. Entered the Military College in Istanbul and received a commission in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army (artillery) in May 1922. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Bagdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District. In August 1935 he became a brigadier, and in November 1936 he was made G.O.C., 1st Infantry Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

39. *Ibrahim Akif-al-Alousi*.—Sunni. Born Bagdad 1894. Educated Bagdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several places under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Bagdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944.

40. *Ibrahim Kamal*.—Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Shereefian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Maan. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime. Came to Iraq with Jamil-al-Madfai in 1919 making propaganda for the Shereefians. Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Bagdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haidar removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military *coup* made against them by Nuri-al-Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

Made a Senator in January 1943.

In the Senate he has worked industriously on committees, and has been an outspoken critic of Nuri Said's administration. His hopes of becoming Prime Minister have not, however, been realised, mainly because he is not able to attract colleagues to work with him.

41. *Jafar Abu Timman*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daud and Ali Bazirgan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Bagdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist



movements, especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Henjam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Baghdad he relapsed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shiah Hizb-al-Nahdhah. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Baghdad by-election June 1928. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary-general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin-al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al-Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwanayah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937, but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution. Since then he has withdrawn from political life.

Is chairman of the newly established Vegetable Oil Extraction Company in Baghdad.

42. *Jafar Hamandi*.—Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Baghdad. After the war he graduated at the Baghdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutessarif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafiq February 1939, to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Baghdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hillah liwa. Saleh Jabr as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this.

43. *Jalal Baban*.—Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Henjam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration, holding the posts of mutessarif in Nasiriyah, Karbala and Arbil until November 1932, when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shaukat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali-al-Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934, and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in December 1934. Transferred to be Director-General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason)

that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939; resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1943, but resigned in October of the same year.

44. *Jamal Baban*.—A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in Jamil Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Retained his portfolio when Jamil-al-Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

45. *Jamil-al-Rawi*.—A Bagdadi; born 1892, officer in the Turkish army. Served in the Shereefian forces during the Arab revolt. Chief aide-de-camp to King Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of the Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutessarif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December 1942.

46. *Jamil-al-Madfai*.—Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutessarif and saw service in a number of different *liwas*. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931, at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high-handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.



He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941, Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan-Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government.

47. *Jamil-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamid-al-Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdullah, and Shakir-al-Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the late King Feisal.

Appointed a judge in 1923 and became director of the Land Registry Department (Tapu) in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

48. *Kamil Chadirji*.—Sunni, born Bagdad, 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi-al-Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and political agitation. In 1930 he was editor of *Al Ikha-al-Watani*, and his paper was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha-al-Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt-al-Ahali*, of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months.

Returned in the autumn of 1937 and soon began to encourage communistic propaganda. He supports the moderate group among the "Communists" in Iraq and is the controller of the left-wing daily *Al Ahali*.

49. *Khalid Sulaiman*.—Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (*q.v.*). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhsin Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

50. *Khalid Zahawi*.—Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Faisal I. Promoted to colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C., R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutessarif of Bagdad, but was relieved of his appointment in June.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

51. *Khalil Ismail*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutessarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

52. *Khushaba, Malik*.—Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 55. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American missionaries at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village.

53. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931, but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad-al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

54. *Mahrut-bin-Hadhdhal, Shaikh*.—Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1896. Intensely



proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Bagdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate at Razza, near Kerbala has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

55. *Mahmud, Shaikh*.—Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukumdar of Suleimani in 1922, after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 31st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Bagdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraq Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return in 1938 he was given employment in the railways. Latif is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

His properties in Sulaimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud escaped from Bagdad, and in company with Abbas-i-Salim, brother of Babekr Agha (*q.v.*) he raised a tribal force to attack Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, however, Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzian. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutesarrif of Sulaimania.

56. *Majid Mustafa*.—A Kurd of Sulaimani, born about 1894. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut liwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimaqam of Nasiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutesarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Bagdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali régime.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting

with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

57. *Mar Shimun*.—Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholicoi of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David and his aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £780 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring temporal power to spiritual leadership, he has been the means of inflicting much needless suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus. Since 1940 he has been living in the U.S.A.

58. *Maulud Mukhlis*.—Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Feisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to Bagdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Bagdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria, but returned soon after Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator since 1925.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected President of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

59. *Muaffaq al-Alousi*.—Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Bagdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Bagdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928



Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Azziz-al-Saud. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Bagdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

60. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*.—Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Bagdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

61. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*.—A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill-health. Made a Senator December 1943.

62. *Muhammad Hassan Kubba*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry. In December 1943 he joined the Cabinet as Minister for Social Affairs under Nuri Said. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944.

63. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)*.—Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make

a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shiah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation to foster anti-British feeling.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahamad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao.

64. *Muhammad Ridha-al-Shabibi*.—Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1880. Belongs to a well-known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with the chief permanent officials of his Ministry, and he resigned in September 1935. He became President of the Senate, February 1937, and was reappointed Minister for Education in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937. He is president of the Bagdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a man of letters. Resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai in December 1938.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943.

65. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*.—Bagdad Mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar troubles, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in organising the boycott of the Bagdad Electric Light Company in the autumn and winter of 1933.

During the premiership of Yasin-al-Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate, but when Hikmat Sulaiman came into office in October 1936 Muhammad Salih became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chadirji with a left-wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Ramadi, where he remained until December 1937, when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

66. *Muhammad-al-Sadr, Saiyid*.—Born about 1885. An influential Shiah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Feisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1937, when Ridha-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil al Madfai.

67. *Mulla Mustafa*.—Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was "pardoned" after



paying a formal visit to Bagdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he returned to Barzan, but he remains restless and untamed, and the Government have not yet been able to re-establish control over the Barzani tribal area.

68. *Musa Shabandar*.—Bagdadi Sunni, born 1899.

Elder son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy land and property owner of Bagdad.

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932, when he returned to Bagdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations.

Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1935.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Bagdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was ever any real evidence against him. Elected Deputy for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and sent as Chargé d'Affaires to Berlin. Returned to Bagdad October 1939, and was appointed Assistant Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner hid a close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Nazi intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944.

69. *Muzahim-al-Amin Pachakji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashimi Cabinet, August 1924. In 1927, while in London, he made a close study of British politics. Recalled to Bagdad in February 1928 and joined the active Nationalists. His ideas seemed to be tinged with communism. Was prominent in anti-Zionist manifestations in summer of 1929. Became Minister of Economics and Communications in January 1931, and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which post he unexpectedly gave satisfaction to his British advisers. Resigned in October 1931 on account of a difference with his colleagues regarding his dismissal of the Amin-al-Asimah. Towards the end of May 1932 he was charged with complicity in the circulation of scurrilous anonymous letters, making allegations against the personal honour of the King. Resigned his seat in the Chamber and was committed for trial with four others by Bagdad magistrate's court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October 1934 he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1935 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister at Paris in July 1939.

Remained in France as Minister to the Vichy Government after the collapse of France in 1940. Recalled in November 1941, when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1943 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

70. *Mustafa-al-Umari*.—Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1893. Graduated in Law School in Bagdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Bagdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the following: kaimakam in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and mutessarif in a number of liwas. In 1936 he was appointed Mutessarif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August 1937.

During the first half of 1938 he acquired a reputation for taking large bribes, and, though no allegations were proved, the Prime Minister thought it well to transfer him to another Ministry. He accordingly went to Justice in October 1938. In December 1938 he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's

Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. Since then he has been a prominent speaker in the debates of the Senate, and has been a constant critic of Nuri Said's administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

71. *Dr. Naji-al-Asil*.—Bagdadi, born 1895. First became prominent in 1922 as semi-official Hashimite representative in London. Continued to represent Hashimite interests in London until final conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr. Naji then became destitute in England, and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda in August 1931. Returned to Bagdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Feisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. Appointed consul, Mohammerah, October 1932. Acting Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1933. Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Bagdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace, and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937, and was not included in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai.

A pleasant man of considerable intelligence. He now (1944) lives in complete retirement and has little prospect of re-employment.

72. *Naji Shaukat*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and became a reserve officer. Joined the Sharif and was at Aqabah with Colonel Lawrence, for whom he has a great admiration. Returned to Bagdad in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given an appointment under the Mutessarif of Bagdad, and subsequently became mutessarif. He showed considerable administrative ability, and maintained cordial relations with his British advisers. He was appointed Mutessarif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923, and of Bagdad in 1924. Minister for Interior, June 1928, Minister for Justice, September 1929, and reverted to Interior in the changes which followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Bagdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1933. Minister for the Interior in November 1933, resigned February 1934. Again appointed Minister at Angora April 1934. He accompanied Taufiq Rustu Aras, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on his official visit to Bagdad in the summer of 1937, and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939.

Became Minister for Justice in Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940.

After the collapse of France, he became a strong advocate of reinsurance with the Axis. With Rashid Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador, Herr von Papen. It was perhaps more than a coincidence that just before his return to Iraq, towards the end of October 1940, the local Arabic press published the official Axis declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations, and that just after his return the resumption of direct telegraphic communication between Iraq and Germany and Italy was announced. He resigned in January 1941, but was appointed Minister of Defence in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.

In 1942 he found his way to Europe and moved between Berlin and Rome, receiving a Minister's salary from the Reich Government. In 1943 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine.

73. *Nadhif Shawi*.—Born Bagdad about 1890. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff College. Served in Turkish army until the end of the war 1914-1918. He joined King Feisal's army in Syria and



fought at Maisalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

74. *Najib-al-Rawi*.—Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad-al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mme. Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected President of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister. He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943.

75. *Nasrat-al-Farisi*.—Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943, but did not proceed.

In June 1943 he became Foreign Minister. Resigned in October 1943, as a protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

76. *Nishat-al-Sanawi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919; criminal magistrate, February 1922; judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin-al-Asimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930, and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director-General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

77. *Nuri-al-Said*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A modernist with an exceptionally alert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied Feisal in London, Paris and Syria in 1919 and 1920. He always wished for a reasonable rapprochement between the French and the Arabs, and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took

charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director-General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a 'Bon-Voisinage' Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October, 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al-Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a solution of the problem of the future of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri-al-Said spent the whole of the year 1938 outside Iraq, occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay, and a few days later a military demonstration in his favour organised by Taha-al-Hashimi and Husain Fauzi overthrew Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri-al-Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940, but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March, when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of Rashid Ali's increasing inclination towards the Axis. In April, shortly before Taha-al-Hashimi's Cabinet was overthrown by Rashid Ali and the army, Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest.

78. *Rashid Ali-al-Gilani*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of



Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation, he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931, in company with Yasin-al-Hashimi, Naji-al-Suwaïdi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al-Hashimi.

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al-Said succeeded Jamil-al-Madfai as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the embassy forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'Etat* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey, and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried *in absentia* by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq.

79. *Rashid-al-Khojah*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. He returned to Bagdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutessarif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi consul-general at Cairo October 1928, and Director-General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jeddah, August 1933, but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil-al-Madfai. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February

1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al-Madfai. Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri-al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

80. *Rauf-al-Bahrani*.—A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise, January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

Resigned with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

81. *Rauf-al-Chadirji*.—Sunni of Bagdad. He was Mayor of Bagdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Bagdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation; nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Bagdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Appointed Iraqi Minister in London in December 1936, and proceeded to his post early in 1937. Resigned March 1940 and remained in England, where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

82. *Rauf-al-Kubaisi*.—Sunni; of Kubaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Bagdad in February 1921. He was appointed Kaïmakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Bagdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence, April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Auqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Bagdad November 1938 and Director-General of Auqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Auqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

83. *Sabih Najib*.—Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Bagdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syrio-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor, Berlin, June 1935.



Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil-al-Madfa'i Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey.

84. *Sadiq-al-Bassam*.—Shiah of Bagdad. Born 1895. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School, and for several years practised as a lawyer. Deputy for Kut 1930-34. In the Chamber he gave steady support to Yasin Pasha, and was a member of the Ikha-al-Watani party. In June 1935, as a reward for his political services, he was appointed Director-General of Government Lands and Properties in the Ministry of Finance, and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Kut December 1937 and for Bagdad in June 1939. Became Minister of Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

85. *Said-bin-Ali*.—Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Baidra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maiyana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

86. *Salah-al-Din Ali-al-Sabbagh*.—Born about 1896. Educated at Istanbul and graduated as an officer from the Turkish Military College. Taken prisoner in the war 1914-18 and released to join the Amir Feisal's army. Gazetted second-lieutenant in the Iraqi army 1921. Has done courses at Belgam and Sheerness and also attached to British units. Instructor at Bagdad Military College 1924. Appointed Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence September 1937, and became O.C. 3rd Division March 1940. Is an efficient officer, but has the reputation of being a careerist with ambition.

Belongs to the group of senior officers who are particularly active in politics.

With Fahmi Said, Kamil Shabib and Mahmud Salman he formed the group of officers known as the Golden Square, which dominated Iraqi politics in 1940, and, in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the *coup d'Etat* of the 1st April, 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

Turned up again in Turkey in February 1942 and was placed under strict police supervision by the Turkish authorities. The Iraqi Government's request for his extradition was refused.

87. *Salman-al-Barrak*.—Shiah and a tribal notable of Hillah. Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President.

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

88. *Salman-al-Sheikh Daud*.—Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad-al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government.

89. *Salih Jabr*.—Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and ready speaker. Appointed Minister for Education under Jamil Madfa'i November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in April 1935, where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil-al-Madfa'i formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwaniyah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutassarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations, and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

He is married to a strong-minded tribal woman of Hilla, who causes her husband much trouble by interfering in the tribal politics of Hilla Liwa.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Finance in June 1944.

90. *Sami Shaukat*.—Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denies these allegations. However this may be, he has done little himself to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

91. *Shakir-al-Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al-Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi was the G.O.C. He was right-hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Bagdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al-Madfa'i's Government, but permitted to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had formed a Government. Appointed to the Iraqi diplomatic service in June 1939 as second secretary to the Iraqi Legation, Tehran.



At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941.

92. *Sufuq-al-Ajil*.—Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil-al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan-al-Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undesirably Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long.

93. *Tahsin al Askari*.—Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces under the Amir Faisal 1916-18 and later appointed Governor of Aleppo. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became Kaimakam of Samawa in 1927 and Mutessarif of Kirkuk in 1930; a year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar al Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'Etat* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed Counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became Minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943, and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943, and was appointed Minister at Cairo.

94. *Taha-al-Hashimi*.—Brother of the late Yasin-el-Hashimi. Born 1888. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920, but returned to Bagdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army, and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. The post of chief of the General Staff was abolished shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the (then) Crown Prince Ghazi. Appointed chief of the Census Department in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence, and was promoted *Jariq* (general). In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahiyah of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin-al-Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil-al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil-al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq, but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

95. *Tahsin Ali*.—A Sunni Moslem born in Bagdad in 1890. Educated in Bagdad and Istanbul. Participated in the Balkan War, fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Bagdad joined King Hussain of the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was awarded the M.C. Returned to Bagdad with Faisal and became Secretary to the Defence Ministry. Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sabunchi faction and transferred to the Dulaim area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutessarif of Mosul and Basra. Director-General of the P.W.D. in 1938. Was largely connected with the activities of the local Palestine Defence Committee while in Basra. Became Mutessarif of Mosul again in April 1939, but was removed by Rashid Ali after his *coup d'Etat* in May. Was restored when the Madfai Cabinet was formed in June.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig-headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement." Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as Rais of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi in June 1944.

96. *Tahsin Qadri*.—Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Feisal in Damascus and accompanied him to Europe in July 1920. Came with him to Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the palace March 1932. Accompanied King Feisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his post in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut.

97. *Talib Mushtaq*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until



November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Angora. Appointed Director of the Consular Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

98. *Taufiq al-Suwaidi*.—Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1913. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929. Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1931. Joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in July 1934 as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but resigned with the whole Cabinet in August. Held Cabinet office for twelve days as Minister for Justice in Jamil-al-Madfai's short-lived Cabinet in March 1935 and in October was appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts. He became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937, and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December, 1938, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the London conversations on Palestine in 1939 after Nuri-al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs and did what he could to break up the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister.

99. *Taufiq Wahbi Maroof*.—Kurd, born Sulaimania 1887. Educated Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18, he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 13th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha.

After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Adviser and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923, but left him when his attitude became pro-Turkish and his conduct impossible. He returned to Bagdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of Colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Bagdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutessarif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director-General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Taufiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet.

Taufiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Public Relations Department in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

100. *Thabit Abdul Nur*.—Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur, a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikole. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda. There he put forward a number of fantastic proposals to the Saudi Arabian Government for which he had been given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he helps in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

101. *Umar Nazmi*.—Born Kifri 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khaniqin 1913; Baqubah 1914; on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Bagdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921; Arbil 1923; Kirkuk 1924; Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924; Hillah 1925; President, Civil Courts, Diala; Mutessarif of Kirkuk Liwa 1927, Mutessarif of Kut and Basra Liwas; Administrative Inspector 1931; Mutessarif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri-al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

102. *Yunis Bahri*.—Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme



nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and in 1936 he sold himself to the German Legation. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

103. *Yusuf Ghanimah*.—An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad; born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber. Has sat in Parliament for Bagdad since the first election. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the activities of the two Opposition parties, the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) and the Hizb-al-Ikha-al-Watani (the Party of National Brotherhood). Appointed Director-General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director-General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural-Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941.

104. *Yusuf Iz-al-Din*.—Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sulaimani. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Bakr Sidqi's influence over the Prime Minister.

#### Obituary since last Report.

Abdul Ghafur Badri.

Faris Agha.

### CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

[E 663/95/31]

No. 5.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 30th January.)

(No. 478.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 30th January, 1944.

ON 27th January there were put before the House of Representatives two resolutions proposing that the good offices of the United States should be used, and that appropriate measures should be taken, with the object of ensuring for the Jews unlimited entry into Palestine to the end that a "free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth" might be established there.

2. It is stated by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that his committee will probably report favourably on the resolution on the 1st February. Then it is likely that the resolution will be debated on the floor of the House and that it will be adopted without much opposition.

3. On 28th January, Sir R. Campbell's attention was called to this resolution by Mr. Berle, who informed him that any expression of views which we might like to make about the manner in which this development might be handled would be welcomed by the State Department. On Monday I propose to tell him that if the State Department wish to say anything, they might point out that the White Paper provides for the continuation of Jewish immigration if the Arabs agree, but that it is not for us to express any opinion on any action which the United States Congress may decide to take. Would Congress be prepared to recommend the use of force if they consider that the position should be changed and that immigration should continue against the wishes of the majority of the population?

4. If, as is possible, these ideas are put into the minds of some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee by the State Department, the result may be to arouse doubts in the minds of the committee. This, however, is election year, and it must be remembered that there is no Arab vote in America.

[E 1433/95/31]

No. 6.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 5th March.)

(No. 1117.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 5th March, 1944.

MY telegram No. 1030.

I hear that the Zionists themselves are now in favour of shelving of the Wagner resolution. McCloy said on the 2nd March that War Department are continuing to do their best to ensure that it does not emerge from the committee. The impression on Capitol Hill is that most members of Congress and particularly of Sol Bloom's committee are getting tired of the whole business. But it remains to be seen whether some irresponsible congressmen will not introduce another resolution of a similar nature.

2. It is too early to say whether reactions from Arab countries will prove helpful or will revive otherwise flagging interest. I have lately been putting into the heads of a few key people the idea that Arab hostility to Zionism is hardly compatible with United States oil interest in the Middle East. The fact that a message has been received from Ibn Saud (though this has not been published so far as I know) reinforces this argument. The press has begun to use this argument, and it may prove to be one of the most helpful.



[E 1590/95/31]

No. 7.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th March.)*

(No. 1208.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 9th March, 1944.*

UNITED Press report of 2 p.m. to-day states that Wise and Silver, Co-chairmen of American Zionist Emergency Council made following statement after conference with the President:—

"President has authorised us to say that American Government has never given its approval to White Paper of 1939. President is happy that doors of Palestine are to-day open to Jewish refugees, and that when future decisions are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home, for which our Government and American people have always had deepest sympathy, and to-day more than ever in view of tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

[E 1781/95/31]

No. 8.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th March.)*

(No. 1381.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 19th March, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1315.

Foreign Affairs Committee of the House voted on 17th March to defer action on Palestine Resolutions 418 and 419. This action followed testimony by McCloy and receipt of letter from the Secretary for War, which concluded "without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on this at this time would prejudice the successful prosecution of the war."

2. Representative Compton (Republican, Connecticut) and Wright (Democrat, Pennsylvania) spoke expressing extreme disappointment and disapproval of the Committee's decision. Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York) said he had voted against tabling the resolutions. There was a suggestion of introducing a watered-down resolution omitting reference to a Jewish Commonwealth, and concentrating on the immigration question, but the War Department believes that he has averted even that.

[E 2670/95/31]

No. 9.

*Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd May.)*

(No. 344.)

Sir,

*Washington, 8th April, 1944.*

IN my telegram No. 1381 of the 18th March I had the honour to report that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives had on the previous day voted to defer action on House Resolutions 418 and 419<sup>(1)</sup> (texts enclosed). Although these two specific resolutions may therefore be dead, the issue which inspired them, namely, the Zionist agitation over the future status of Palestine, is still very much alive in this country, and it may therefore be useful if I trace briefly the recent course of events in Congress.

2. House Resolutions 418 and 419 are defined as "urging the use of American good offices to the end that the doors of Palestine should be opened and that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth." The resolutions were originally introduced in the Senate by Senators Taft (Republican, of Ohio) and Wagner (Democrat, of New York), and in the House by Representatives Compton (Republican, of Connecticut) and Wright (Democrat, of Pennsylvania). Hearings took place in the House on the 9th and the 15th February; accounts of these hearings are contained in the second and third appendices to this despatch<sup>(1)</sup>, which show that the opposition case was presented in a way which, all things considered, was surprisingly satisfactory. Already at the first hearing the danger of the resolutions provoking Arab disturbances was raised. The opposition case was finally beaten down by the energetic testimony of Rabbis Heller, Silver, Goldstein and Wolf Gold. The hearing on the 15th February (see Appendix 3<sup>(1)</sup>) followed

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

more or less the course of the previous hearing; the ablest exponent of the opposition case was Professor Hitti, of Princeton University; but again the Zionist witness, Emanuel Neumann, had the last word and demolished fairly completely the structure raised by the opposition. The main outcome of the hearings was the immense embarrassment of the chairman, Mr. Sol Bloom, who throughout has been torn between the desire on the one hand to placate his many Jewish constituents and on the other to keep in with the President and Mr. Hull. Mr. Bloom finds himself in the awkward position of a man trying to sit on the fence with both ears to the ground.

3. At this stage in the proceedings the Arab world began to raise its voice in protest (stimulated to some extent, I am informed, by the Military Attaché at the Iraqi Legation here). The President of the Iraqi Senate cabled to Senator Wagner, protesting against the resolution; he was joined in a second protest by his colleague, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, this joint effort being considerably more violent in tone than the first one. The Syrian Foreign Office then joined issue and presented on the 24th February to the United States Consul at Damascus a note enclosing copies of telegrams despatched the day before by the Speaker and Chairman of the Syrian Foreign Affairs Committee to their counterparts in the Congress of the United States, protesting against the resolutions. The Egyptian Government was not slow to enter the fray and their example was rapidly followed by the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan and by the Arab National bloc in Palestine. Finally, King Ibn Saud is believed to have made a contribution, though the form and contents of his intervention have not been divulged.

4. This series of Arab outbursts provoked mixed emotions in the United States. On the one hand the Zionist element in Congress indignantly protested against what Representative Compton chose to describe as "presumptuous dictation from foreign legislators": in this he was supported by Senator Wagner's Olympian, but in this context faintly humorous, dictum that "Congress for over a century has decided questions on its own without interference from foreign countries." On the other hand the more serious elements were given seriously to think by the prospect of disturbances in the Near East, for which responsibility might rest with the United States Congress. At the same time it became obvious that the Administration viewed without enthusiasm the prospect of the passage of the resolutions; on the 29th February the columnist Constantine Brown, usually looked upon as a State Department mouthpiece, wrote an article in the *Washington Star* deploring the resolutions in particular and the irresponsible, unrestrained Zionist pressure in general. In the meantime, the unhappy Mr. Bloom was stalling desperately in the hope that the Administration would come to his aid; rumours were gaining currency of the opposition of the War Department; most members of the committee were tired of the whole performance and, although too frightened to say so publicly in an election year, were secretly hoping that the War Department would kill the whole issue. Several members were also afraid that action on their part under pressure from the Zionists, favouring a particular settlement of the Palestine problem, might easily open the way for the various minority national groups to begin putting pressure on Congress in favour of their own specific solution of problems affecting their mother-countries. (This pressure from minority groups has increased in the last few weeks, and many Congressmen are distinctly worried over the possibility that it may considerably complicate matters for them in the coming elections.) Supporters of the resolutions, such as Representatives Wright (Democrat, of Pennsylvania), Rogers (Democrat, of California) and Celler (Democrat, of New York), felt that Mr. Bloom's dilatory and unenthusiastic performance was the main cause for the failure of the resolutions to pass.

5. Protests continued to come in from the Arab world, acts of violence took place in Palestine, and the more serious elements even amongst the Zionists themselves began to feel that this was no time for resolutions of this nature. As I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 1117 of the 4th March, Mr. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary for War, told me at that time that the War Department were doing their best to ensure that the resolutions should not emerge from committee. At the same time the impression was gaining ground in circles connected with petroleum interests that the unrest which the resolutions might well produce in the Arab world would not be conducive to the successful outcome of the Near Eastern oil projects then on foot. King Ibn Saud's reported protest was particularly significant in this respect.

6. On the 4th March the *New York Times* published a despatch headed, "Marshall Opposes Vote on Palestine," reporting that the Chief of Staff had



urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to postpone action on the resolutions for reasons of military expediency. The general's testimony was given at a closed meeting of the committee and further details were not available. The tone of the press on the next day was one of general expectation of indefinite postponement. Protests against this "administration interference" naturally followed, but the forces opposing the resolutions were gaining ground. The President at his conference on the 3rd March had declined to comment; Mr. Stettinius on the same day had confirmed the receipt by the State Department of protests from four Arab Governments, although he had not committed himself on them. Meanwhile, the German Ministry of Propaganda was enjoying itself over this "clash between Islamism and Americanism," and numerous rumours were set on foot to the effect that Great Britain had inspired the Arab protests. Although the hearings appeared to be suspended, the resolutions still provoked frequent comment in both Houses; on the 7th March Representative Compton (Republican, of Connecticut) made a brief statement protesting against "dictation to Congress by a few wealthy Arabs under British domination." This was the general tone of the protests, which included one of considerable length lodged on the 14th March by Representative Dickstein (Democrat, of New York).

7. Zionist protests had already lost a considerable amount of their appeal when on the 8th March the widely-detested, but no less widely-read, columnist, Drew Pearson, asserted that the deferment of the Palestine resolutions was a result of Major-General Patrick J. Hurley's talk with President Roosevelt on problems of the Near East. The allegation of British pressure on the protesting Arabs was strongly rebutted by various organs of the Arab press and, as indicated above, the Zionists themselves were already getting cold feet. On the 14th March Representative Hamilton Fish (Republican, of New York) put forward a compromise suggestion, supported by Representative Celler, proposing that the word "Commonwealth" should be omitted from the resolution. On the 17th March, as reported in my telegram No. 1381, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House voted to defer action on the resolutions. Representatives Compton and Wright expressed strong disapproval and recorded their disappointment at the decision of the committee. Mr. Bloom, however, admitted to the press that he had voted against reporting the resolutions out of his committee. Even the modified form suggested on the 14th March had also apparently been indefinitely put on the shelf.

8. So far as Congressional action is concerned the resolutions may well be dead. The Zionists, however, do not intend to accept this state of affairs and are going to do everything within their power to revive the corpse; on the 22nd March the Interim Committee of the American Jewish Conference met in New York and adopted a resolution expressing the hope that the military authorities "will soon find it possible, consistent with the reality of the situation, to withdraw their objection so that Congress may proceed to express itself."

9. The President himself gave the Zionists a new lease of life when (as reported in my telegram No. 1208) he received Drs. Wise and Silver on the 9th March and authorised them to quote him as saying that "the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939"; not only the Zionists but practically all American Jewry welcomed this unexpected windfall, which they interpreted as meaning that the President was on their side and had not inspired the War Department pressure which had led to the shelving of the resolutions. This manoeuvre by the President, possibly not unconnected with the imminence of the New York State Primaries, has undone much of the good achieved by General Marshall's testimony and, by exposing so obvious a rift in the ranks of the Administration, has effectively revived an issue which we had begun to hope was dead. The enclosed copy of an article<sup>(1)</sup> written by I. F. Stone in *The Nation* of the 18th March will show you the sort of comment which this remarkable demonstration of Presidential subtlety has produced.

10. The State Department has been considerably embarrassed by the President's statement. At his conference with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Commission on the 22nd March Mr. Hull, I am reliably informed, was asked by Senator Vandenberg how Congress could comply with his request for collaboration with the Administration if the latter was divided within itself, as shown by the contrast between, on the one hand, General Marshall's testimony on the military inadvisability of discussing at this juncture the question of immigration into Palestine and, on the other hand, the direct encouragement to

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

do just that thing given by the President on the 9th March to Drs. Wise and Silver. It is reported that Mr. Hull, after a long and troubled silence, replied to the following effect: "In all the twenty years that I have known you, this is the first time you have asked me a deliberately painful personal question." A senior member of the State Department said recently to a member of my staff that the Palestine question would be all right "if only we can keep Wise and Silver out of the White House."

11. Since the foregoing paragraphs were drafted I have seen in this morning's *New York Times* a report (a copy of which I enclose<sup>(1)</sup>) of the President's not very convincing explanation of his statement and of the speeches made on the subject in Congress yesterday by Senators Clark (Democrat, of Missouri) and Johnson (Democrat, of Colorado). I also enclose a copy of an interesting article<sup>(2)</sup> on this point, written by Arthur Krock, normally a supporter of the State Department, in the same paper.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

R. I. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 9.

78TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, H. RES. 418.

*In the House of Representatives, 27th January, 1944*

Mr. Wright submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs:—

*Resolution.*

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on the 30th June, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



## CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA.

[E 2118/2118/34]

No. 10.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th April.)*

(No. 118.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 14th March, 1944.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 213 of the 2nd July, 1940, I have the honour to transmit herewith a revised List of Personalities in Persia.

2. The list has been compiled by Mr. Trott, oriental secretary, from the material accumulated since his return to Persia at the end of 1940. Since the departure of Reza Shah, in September 1941, the available material has greatly increased, both owing to the greater number of consular and other officials in the country who have been able to render reports, and owing to the lifting of the restrictions on intercourse with foreigners which was one of the most tiresome features of the régime of Reza Shah. I regret that the compilation of this record has been so greatly delayed: the delay has been due not only to the great increase in the available material but to the continual demands on the oriental secretary's time which have made it difficult for him to devote much time to compiling records of officials who occupy most of his office hours in long interviews.

3. Mr. Trott has endeavoured to keep track of all persons who have come to see him, and to record all available details about them in a series of files which will remain on record for his successor. To include them all would have swollen the Personalities List to unwieldy dimensions. He has, therefore, only included the most important in this list. It comprises 236 persons in all; three of the old names have been omitted as the persons concerned seemed of little or no importance; and twenty-seven of those on previous lists have died. Forty-six new names, including a fair number of promising members of the younger generation, have been added.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Government of India and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10.

*Report on Personalities in Persia, December 1943.*

- Aalam, *see* A'lam.  
A'azam-Zanganeh, *see* A'zam-Zanganeh.
1. Adl (Adle), Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh).
  2. Afkhami (or Afkham-Ibrahimi), Abdul-Reza.
  3. Afshar, Reza.
  4. Aghevli, *see* Aqevli.
  4. Ahi (Ahy), Majid.
  - Ahmedi, *see* Amirahmedi.
  5. Airon (Ayron), General Muhammad Hussein.
  6. Akbar, Hassan.
  7. Ala, Hussein, C.M.G. (Moin-ul-Vizareth).
  8. A'lam (Aalam), Dr. Amir (Amir-i-A'lam).
  9. A'lam (Aalam), Muzaffar.
  10. 'Alam (Alam), Muhammad Ibrahim (Shaukat-ul-Mulk).
  11. Alamir, Abbas (A'zam-es-Saltaneh).
  12. Aliabadi, Ahmad.
  - Amori, *see* Ahmad.
  13. Amin, Habibullah (Amin-et-Tujjar).
  14. Amin, Hussein (often called Amin Muhandis).
  15. Amini, Dr. Ali.
  16. Amirahmedi (or Ahmedi), Ahmed Agha.
  17. Amir Khosrovi, Reza Quli, General.
  18. Amiri (Ameri), Javad.
  19. Amiri (Amery), Sultan Muhammad.
  20. Amir-Taimur Kalali, Muhammad Ibrahim.
  21. Ansari (Ansarie), Abdul Hussein Mas'ud (Massoud).
  22. Ansari, Ghulam Ali.
  23. Aqevli (Aghevli), Farajullah.
  24. Arasteh, Nadir.
  25. Ardalan, Abbas Quli.
  26. Ardalan, Dr. Ali Gholi.
  27. Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik).
  28. Ardalan, Ghulam Ali.
  29. Ardalan, Nasir Quli.
  30. Arfa, Hassan.
  31. Asa, Mustafa (previously known as Hushmand).
  32. Asad (Assad, really As'ad), Muhammad Quli (Sardar Bahadur).
  33. Asadi, Salman.
  34. Atabeki, Muhsin.
  35. Aurang (Owring), Abdul Hussein.
  36. A'zam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid.
  37. A'zam-Zanganeh, Ali (Amir-i-Kull).
  38. Azudi, Yadullah (Amir A'zam).
  39. Bader, Abdul Wahhab.
  40. Bader, Mahmud.
  41. Bahar, Malik-ush-Shuara.
  42. Bahman, Aliakbar.
  43. Bahrami, Abdullah.
  44. Bahrami, Farsjullah (Dabir-i-A'zam).

45. Bahrami, Fazlullah.
46. Bakhtiari, Murteza Quli Samsam.
47. Bayat, Murteza Quli (Saham-us-Sultan).
48. Bayendor, Ghulam Hussein.
49. Bushihri-Dehdashti, Agha Jawad (Amir Humayun).
50. Bushihri-Dehdashti, Agha Riza.
51. Buzurjmehri, General Kerim Agha.
52. Dadgar, Hussein (Adl-ul-Mulk).
53. Dadvar, Mehdi (Vussuq-es-Saltaneh).
54. Dargahi, Muhammad.
55. Dashti, Ali.
56. Daulatshahi, Abul-Fath.
57. Diba, Abul Hassan (Siqat-ed-Dowleh).
58. Divanbegi, Agha.
- Djam, *see* Jam.
- Ebtehaj, *see* Ibtihaj.
- Entezam, *see* Intizam.
- Esfandiari, *see* Isfandiari.
59. Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk).
60. Farhudi, Dr. Hussein.
61. Farrukh, Mehdi (Mu'tasim-us-Saltaneh).
62. Farrukhi, Muhammad.
63. Farzaneh, Hassan.
64. Fateh, Muhmud.
65. Fateh, Mustafa.
66. Fatimi, Mehdi (Imad-us-Saltaneh).
- Fatimi, Mishah, *see* Mishag-Fatimi.
67. Fatimi (Fatemy), Seiffur.
68. Feroughi, Abul-Hassan.
69. Ferouhar, Abbas.
70. Ferouhar, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem).
71. Fidakar (Fedakar), Taqi (Taghi).
72. Firuz, Muhammad Hussein.
73. Firuz, Muhammad Vali.
74. Furughi (Foroughi), Muhsin.
- Ghadimi, *see* Qadimi.
75. Ghaffari, Emir Sebaheddine (Zuka-ed-Dowleh).
76. Ghaffari, Hassan Ali (Mu'avin-ud-Dowleh).
77. Ghaffari, Jalal-ud-Din (Muhandis-us-Mamalik).
78. Ghani, Qasim.
- Gharagozlu, *see* Qaraguzlu.
- Gharib, *see* Qarib.
- Ghawam, *see* Qawam.
- Ghodso, *see* Quds.
79. Hajhir, Abdul Hussein.
80. Hakimi, Ali Akbar.
81. Hidayat, Abdullah.
82. Hidayat, Izzatallah.
83. Hidayat, Mehdi Quli (Mukhbir-us-Saltaneh).
84. Hidayat, Rezaquli (Nayyer-ul-Mulk).
85. Hikmat, Aliaschar.
86. Hikmat, Reza (Sadar Fakhir).
87. Homayunjah, Muhammad Ali.
88. Ibtihaj (Ebtehaj), Abdul-Hassan.
89. Ibtihaj (Ebtehaj), Ghulam Hussein.
90. Ikhan, Amir Hussein.
91. Intizam (Entezam), Abdullah.
92. Intizam (Entezam), Nasrullah.
93. Iqbal, Ali.
94. Iqbal, Dr. Manuchihr.
95. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Colonel Abbas Quli.
96. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Abdul Hussein (Sadiq-ul-Mulk).
97. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Assadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik).
98. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Fathullah Nuri.
99. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Hassan (Haji Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh).
100. Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Musa Nuri (Muvaftaq-us-Saltaneh).
101. I'timadi (Ettemadi), Nasir Quli (Nasser-ud-Dowleh).
102. Jahan (Djehan), Ja'far (Djafar).
103. Jahanbani, Amir Lashkar Amanullah.
104. Jahanbani, Muhammad Hussein.
105. Jam (Djam), Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk).
106. Jehangir (Djehangir), Nasrullah.
- Kalali, *see* Amir Taimur.
107. Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk).
108. Kamal Hidayat, Mustafa Quli (Fahim-ud-Dowleh).
109. Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad.
110. Kazimi (Kazemi), Baqir (Bagher) (Muhazzib-ud-Dowleh).
111. Kazimi (Kazemi), Mustafa (Dabir-ul-Mulk).
- 111A. Kashani (or Kaahi), Seyyid Abul-Qasim.
112. Keyhan, Jalal-ud-Din.
113. Keyhan, Masud (Massoud).
114. Khajeh-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Sultan).
115. Khajeh-Noury, Hussein.
116. Khosrovani, Shahab.
117. Khudayari, Khudayar.
118. Khosrovani, Sartip Ahmad.
119. Kooros, Issa.
120. Kupal (Koupal), Sadiq (Sadegh).
121. Kurdistan, Asadullah.
122. Lahouti (known usually as Major Lahouti Khan).
123. Mahdavi, Reza (Rais-ut-Tujjar).
124. Malekzader, Mehdi.
125. Malik, Haji Hussein Agha.
126. Mansur (Rajab), Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk).
127. Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Hussein (Saeed-ul-Mulk).
128. Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Ismail (Amin-ul-Mulk).
129. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Dowleh).
130. Mas'udi (Massoudi), Abbas.
131. Matin-Daftary, Dr. Ahmad.
- Merat, *see* Mirat.
132. Miftah, Abdul Hussein.
133. Mir'at, Ismail.
134. Misbah-Fatemy, Ali Naghi.
- Moadel, *see* Mu'addil.
- Moazed, *see* Muazid.
- Moghaddam, *see* Muqaddam.
- Moiny, *see* Muini.
- Motamedy, *see* Mutamidi.
135. Mu'addil (Moadel), Lutf Ali.
136. Muazid (Moazed), Mas'ud (Massoud).
137. Mubassir (Mobasser), Amrullah.
138. Mudabbir-Noury, Kazim (Mudabbir-us-Saltaneh).
139. Muhsini, Dr. Ahmad (Imad-ul-Mulk).
140. Muini (Moiny), Sarlashkar Ahmad.
141. Mukhtar, Rukn-ud-Din.
142. Mukri, Murtiza.
143. Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Muhammad Ali.
144. Muqaddam, Sarlashkar Hassan.
145. Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh).
146. Mushar, Hassan (Mushar-ul-Mulk).
147. Mutamidi (Motamedy), Ali.
148. Muwaqqar (Movagher), Jalal.
149. Muzaffari, Hussein Quli (Prince Nusrat-us-Saltaneh), G.C.V.O.
150. Nabavi, Taqi.
151. Nafisi (Naficy), Abol-Ghassem.
152. Nafisi (Naficy), Dr. Ali Asghar (Muadab-ed-Dowleh).
153. Nafisi (Naficy), Fathullah.
154. Nafisi (Naficy), Hassan (Musharaf-ud-Dowleh).
155. Nafisi (Naficy), Said.
156. Najm, Abul-Qasim (Abol-Ghassem).
157. Nakhai, Muhammad.
158. Nakhchevan, Muhammad (Amir Muwassag).
159. Nakhchevan, Ahmad.
160. Nasr (Nassre), Seyyid Ali.
- 160A. Naubakht, Habibullah.



161. Nikpey, Ahmad (Mufakham-ul-Mulk).  
Nikpey, Azizullah, *see* No. 158.  
Nikpey, Manuchehr, *see* No. 158.  
Nizam Qaraguzlu, *see* Qaraguzlu.
162. Niqabat, Zia-ud-Din.
163. Nurzad, Chulam Reza.
164. Oveisi (Ovaisy), Ali Muhammad.
165. Pahlevi, Reza, Ex-Shah.
166. Pahlevi, Shah Muhammad Reza.
167. Pahlevi, Royal Family.
168. Paknazar, Jaafar (Ihtisham-ul-Visareh).
169. Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa).
170. Pirnazar, Hassan.
171. Pirnia, Hussein (Mutamin-ul-Mulk).
172. Purvali (Pourevali), Abul Qasim (Abolghassem).
173. Qadimi (Chadimi), Dr. Hussein.
174. Qajar, Abul Fath (Salar-ud-Dowleh).
175. Qaraguzlu, Ali Reza (Baha-ul-Mulk).
176. Qaraguzlu, Hussein Ali.
177. Nizam-Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam).
178. Qaraguzlu, Muhsin.
179. Qaraguzlu, Taqi.
180. Qashqai, Ali (Salar Hishmat).
181. Qashqai, Muhammad Nasir.  
Qashqai, Khosro, *see* No. 181.
182. Qawam, Ibrahim (Qawam-ul-Mulk).
183. Qawam (Ghawam) Ahmad (Qawam-us-Saltaneh).
184. Quds (Ghodse), Hussein.
185. Raf'ati (Raffety), Hussein.
186. Rahnama, Aein-ul-Abedin.
187. Rais, Muhsin.
188. Razavi, Seyyid Muhammad.
189. Razmara, Hajali.
190. Riaz, Ali.
191. Rukni, Muhammad Ali.
192. Sadiq, Dr. Issa (Sadiq-i-A'lam).
193. Sadiqi, Sadiq (Mustashar-ed-Dowleh).
194. Sadr, Seyyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf).
195. Sadri, Abdul Ali (Sadiq-us-Saltaneh).
196. Sa'id (Sa'id, Saed), Muhammad (Said-ul-Vizareh).
197. Sajjadi, Muhammad.
198. Saleh, Allahyar.

199. Sam'i (Samiyi), Hussein (Adib-us-Saltaneh).
200. Sa Mi'i (Samiyi), Kazim.
201. Sanjabi, Kerim.
202. Sayyah, Hamid.
203. Sayyah, Humayun.
204. Sayyah, Kazim.
205. Sepahbudi, Anushirwan.
206. Shafa'i, Ismail.
207. Shahbakhti, Sipabbud Muhammad.
208. Shaibani, General Habibullah.
209. Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Assadullah (Shahab-ud-Dowleh).
210. Shaaqi, Hadi (Hishn-ed-Dowleh).
211. Shaaqi, Hassan.
212. Shariat-Zadeh, Ahmad.  
Shaukat, *see* 'Alam, Muhammad Ibrahim.
213. Shayesteh, Muhammad.
214. Shirvani, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk).
215. Shukuh, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk).
216. Siasi (Siassi), Ali Akbar.
217. Suhaili (Soheily), Ali.
218. Sur, Qasim (formerly Sur-i-Israfil).
219. Sururi, Muhammad.
220. Taba, Dr. Abdul Hussein.
221. Tabatabai, Muhammad Sadiq.
222. Tabatabai, Seyyid Zia-ud-Din.
223. Tadayun, Seyyid Muhammad.
224. Taheri, Dr. Hadi.
225. Tajbakhsh, Mehdi Quli.
226. Taqizadeh, Hassan.
227. Vakili, Ali.
228. Valatabar, Abol Fath (Hishmat-ud-Dowleh, previously named Diba).
229. Vasiqi (Vassighi), Sadiq (Sadegh).  
Vossuq, Ahmad, *see* Qawam, Ahmad.
230. Vossuq, Hassan, G.C.B. (Vossuq-ed-Dowleh).
231. Yezdan Panah, General Murteza.
232. Zahidi, Fazlullah (Basir-i-Diwan).
233. Zand, Ibrahim (Ebrahim).  
Zanganeh, *see* A'zam-Zanganeh.
234. Zanjani, Hussein.
235. Zarghami, Azizullah.
236. Zarrinkafsh, Ali Asghar.

### Obituary.

Afsar, Muhammad Hashim.  
Ansari, Ali Quli.  
Ansari, Mahmud Agha.  
Asaf, Ali Naqi.  
Assad-Bahadur, Assadullah.  
Atabeki, Ahmad.  
Azimi, Baqir.  
Badi', Hassan.  
Bahrami, Dr. Hussein.  
Bayendor, Ghulam Ali.  
Diba, Seyyid Abdul Ali.  
Farzin, Muhammad Ali.  
Feroughi, Muhammad Ali.

Isfandiari, Muhammad Taqi.  
Jalal, Ghaffar.  
Keyostovan, Hussein.  
Mifta, Daoud.  
Mudarris, Seyyid Hassan.  
Muhsin, Suleiman.  
Pusht-i-Kuh, Ghulam Reza.  
Qarib, Abbas Ali.  
Rakhshani, Hassan Ali.  
Shahrugh, Arbab Keikhusraw.  
Shaibani, Ali Muhammad.  
Sineki, Jawad.

Omitted as being of no further interest.

Amini, Muhsin (15 in 1940 list).  
Diba, Abul-Fath (61 in 1940 list).  
Rakhshani, Hussein (174 in 1940 list).

1. *Adl (Adle), Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born in Tabriz about 1885. Went to Egypt when quite young. There he finished his primary education and afterwards went to Paris. In Paris he studied law, and graduated from the Faculty of Law in that city. Secretary at the consulate at Tiflis in 1903. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short period, and then transferred to the Ministry of Justice. Appointed a member of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission in 1913. Since then employed principally as Under-Secretary

at the Ministry of Justice until 1927. He became in that year legal adviser to the Ministry and drafted a number of new judicial codes. A member of the Supervisory Board of the National Bank from 1929-32; in 1933 Director of the Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, and professor in the Law Academy at Tehran.

Appointed Persian Minister at Berne in 1934. Recalled to Tehran, December 1936. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 1937. Under-Secretary, July 1937. Acting Minister, March 1938. Minister at Rome, July 1938, and also accredited to Budapest, September 1938.

Returned from Rome late in 1941. Director of the Faculty of Law 1941. Minister of Education in Soheily's Cabinet, March to August 1942. He was not conspicuous for help to the Allied cause in 1942 and if it is true that he has now retired from public service it will not be much loss. He was, however, appointed Minister without Portfolio in the reshuffled Soheily Cabinet of December 1943.

A quiet little man without much personality. A good bridge player. Speaks French.

2. *Afkhami (or Afkham-Ibrahimi), Abdul Reza*.—Born in Tehran 1885, a son of the late Sultan Ali Khan Vazir-i-Afkham, chamberlain of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah.

Educated in Persia and in a military college in Austria. Joined the gendarmerie in 1911, and by 1921 had risen to the rank of colonel. Has been a staff officer for many years. Served on Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission 1931. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934.

Military Governor of Tehran, April to June 1942. Very active in famine-relief among the poor of Tehran during the winter of 1942-43. General officer commanding of the Kerman Division, September 1943.

A rubicund face indicates a certain fondness for the bottle, but he has always been well-disposed to us. A pleasant fellow, always ready for a joke. He gives the impression of being a competent soldier not interested in politics. Speaks English.

3. *Afshar, Reza*.—Born at Urumieh (now Reza'iyeh) about 1888. Joined the Ministry of Finance as a young man, and during Mirza Kuchik Khan's rebellion in Gilan acted as financial agent to him; and soon after the war he got away with certain funds from the Finance Office in Resht. With these he bought carpets and took them to America for sale. Served also under Sir P. Cox, who paid him well. Returned to Persia in 1921, full of American ideas and education. Joined the staff of Dr. Millsbaugh, the American financial adviser. A staunch supporter of the Pahlevi régime; elected to the 5th, 6th and 7th Majlis. Opposed Firuz Mirza when the latter was Minister of Finance. Governor of Gilan in 1929. While at that post he organised the Gilan Import and Export Company, which was founded in opposition to Russian trade monopoly methods. As a result he incurred the hostility of the Russian interests there. Governor-General of Kerman in 1931. Minister of Roads in February 1932. Resigned in the following July, being unable to build the Chalus road fast enough for the Shah. Governor of Isfahan September 1932 to December 1933. Since then unemployed. Was put under surveillance in Tehran in 1935 owing to supposed inefficiency (perhaps complicity) in connexion with the Bakhtiari plots in 1934. Sentenced to six months' imprisonment and permanent exclusion from Government service, in June 1936, for accepting a bribe when Minister of Roads.

Not yet re-employed. Candidate for the Majlis 1943. Speaks English fluently. Full of ideas and energy. Very nationalistic, and rather anti-British and anti-religious.

4. *Ahi (Ahy), Majid*.—Born in Tehran 1886. Educated in Persia and Moscow. Holds a degree in law from the University of Moscow. Returned to Persia in 1914 from Russia. Appointed Commissioner for the Lianosoff Fisheries 1915-18. Director-General of the Ministry of Education 1922-24. A judge of the Court of Cassation 1928-33. Governor-General of Fars, August 1933, where he did good and energetic work. Minister of Roads and Communications, January 1936. Received the 1st Class Order of Humayun on the completion of the Transiranian Railway, September 1938. Suddenly relieved of his duties and placed more or less under house arrest at the end of November 1938. He had failed to satisfy the Shah over arrangements for the Tehran-Tabriz Railway.

Minister of Justice, July 1940, and again in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941 and Soheily's of May 1942. Ambassador to U.S.S.R., August 1942.

As Minister of Justice he was largely responsible for the details of the law concerning the restitution of the ex-Shah's properties to their former owners. In



those discussions he showed more attention to detail than to principle and the resulting cumbrous and complicated enactment pleased few except the lawyers who tried to understand it and interpreted it in various ways.

Speaks Russian, French and a little German. Married a Russian or Polish Jewess. Able, hard-working, and friendly to foreigners in general.

5. *Airom (Ayrom), General Muhammad Hussein*.—Born about 1882. Son of an emigrant from Erivan. Educated in Tehran and in Russia. Commissioned into the infantry of the Cossack Division about 1901. In 1912 colonel and staff officer at the Cossack Division headquarters. Fell into disgrace in 1918 as the result of intrigues with women. A favourite of Reza, he was re-employed in 1922 and appointed to command the Northern Independent Brigade at Resht. While in that command he showed enterprise, energy and some power of organisation, and kept Bolshevik intrigues under severe control. He also did a great deal for the improvement of the city of Resht. Appointed commander of the troops at Tabriz in 1925. Fell again into disgrace a year later, probably through his inability to abstain from intrigue. Chief Inspector of the army in 1927, and in the police of Tehran during 1928. Went to Europe; then returned to be chief of inspection missions in 1930 and 1931. Appointed chief of police in April 1931.

At one time, Ayrom was looked upon as having greater power than any member of the Cabinet and to be the Shah's right-hand man. His son even married a sister of the Queen; he subsequently died of a mysterious disease.

Ayrom left suddenly for Germany, ostensibly for medical treatment, in the summer of 1935. Serious charges of taking bribes and of all kinds of trickery have since been made against him, and Reza Shah, furious with "the only one of my trusted servants who has hitherto deceived me," tried to secure his extradition. But he got large sums of money out of the country, and was heard of in 1942 living on the Riviera as a Count of Lichtenstein.

Has an Italian wife, whom no one saw while he was at Tehran.

Speaks Russian and a little German. A strong disciplinarian; he had no use for bolshevism and organised a kind of OGPU in Tehran to counteract Soviet spying.

6. *Akbar, Hassan*.—Born about 1904; second son of the late Sardar Mu'tamid of Resht. Inherited large estates in Gilan from his father. Educated at Tehran. Married in 1937 Victoria, daughter of Sarem-ud-Douleh. Deputy for Resht in the 13th Majlis, and again for Fumen in the 14th.

A fat and cheerful little man who, like all the members of his family, has always been on good terms with us. Not of great intelligence, but clever and active when it comes to disposing of his rice crop and circumventing the Russians.

7. *Ala, Hussein, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Vizareh)*.—Born about 1884. Son of the late Prince Ala-es-Saltaneh, for many years Persian Minister in London. Educated at Westminster School, where he seems to have received rough treatment, which resulted in a strong anti-British bias, at any rate for the next few years. Created C.M.G. in 1905, when he accompanied his father on a special mission to London for the coronation of the late King Edward VII. Appointed "chef de cabinet" in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1906, his late father being then Minister for Foreign Affairs. He remained as "chef de cabinet" to various Ministers until 1915. Appointed Minister of Public Works in January 1918, and continued to direct that Ministry during the Cabinet presided over by Samsam-us-Saltaneh, which was in power from May to August 1918. This Cabinet abrogated the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

Ala was hostile to Sir Charles Marling, His Majesty's Minister from 1915 to 1918, and caused repeated complaints to be made to the Foreign Office through his brother, who was then Persian Minister in London. He accompanied the abortive Persian mission to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Appointed Persian Minister at Madrid in 1919, and at Washington in 1920. Conducted negotiations in Washington in 1921-22 for the American Financial Mission to Persia, after he had failed to obtain the North Persia Oil Concession first for the Standard Oil Company and then for the Sinclair Corporation. Returned from Washington in 1925 and took his seat in the fifth Majlis as a Deputy for Tehran. Minister of Public Works for a short time in May 1927. Second delegate to the League of Nations for some time. Attended Locarno in that capacity in December 1928.

Appointed Minister at Paris in 1929. One of the Persian delegates selected to represent Persia before the League of Nations in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Returned to Tehran early in 1933 to take over a

high post in the National Bank of Persia, though he had no particular knowledge of banking. Was also very active in the organisation of the "Red Lion and Sun," and in the Ferdousi Memorial Committee.

In 1931 his transfer to the post of Minister in London was mooted, though it did not materialise. On that occasion His Majesty's Government were unwilling to receive him, on the ground that his attitude in reporting a libel on His Majesty King George V rendered it difficult to suppose that he was then animated by friendly sentiments.

Appointed Minister in London, July 1934. Recalled in the summer of 1936; returned to Tehran in October. Appointed Supervisor of Monopoly Companies, December 1936. Director-General of Commerce in 1937, and given the new appointment of Minister of Commerce in September 1937. Removed from this appointment, April 1938. Chief Persian attached to Major-General the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during their visit to Tehran for the Crown Prince's wedding, April 1939.

Married Fatimeh Khanum, the only daughter of the late Abu'l Qasim Khan Qaragozlou (Nasir-ul-Mulk), Regent of Persia, in July 1927. Mme. Ala was one of the first of her generation to leave off the veil. President of the National Bank, October 1941. Minister of Court, October 1942, but appears to have done nothing to curb the young Shah's evident intention to rule the country in much the same way as his father did.

A hard worker and a staunch patriot; intelligent and well-read; interested in the literature of many countries and quite a good pianist. Has a perfect command of English and speaks good French. In the past he has had a reputation for anti-British sentiments. In 1943 and 1944, however, his relations with the British Legation were good; he seems a good deal more anti-Russian than anti-British, and is doubtless more pro-Persian than either.

8. *A'lam (Aalam), Dr. Amir (Amir-i-A'lam)*.—Born about 1880. Son of the late Mirza Ali Akbar Khan, who was Persian consul at Damascus for a number of years. Educated at Damascus, Beirut and Lyons, where he obtained a medical degree. In private practice in Tehran since 1911. An army doctor for some years.

Married the eldest daughter of Vossugh-ed-Douleh, and took part in politics through the influence of his father-in-law. Reorganised the shrine hospital at Meshed.

Minister of Public Works 1920; a member of the fourth Majlis. Minister of Education 1921. Court physician in 1925 and subsequent years.

Helped to found the "Red Lion and Sun" Society, and has devoted a good deal of time and energy to its affairs. Vice-president of the Inter-Parliamentary Union 1934, and vice-president of the "Red Lion and Sun" organisation in Persia. Speaks French.

9. *A'lam (Aalam), Muzaffar*.—Born about 1885. Son of the late Mirza Ali Akbar Khan, Persian consul at Damascus for a number of years, and brother of Dr. Amir Aalam. Brought up at Damascus, and destined for a military career in his youth. Sent to St. Cyr and served for some time in the army. Served on several occasions on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission. In 1928 appointed Governor of the Gulf Ports, and in February 1931 Governor-General of Fars, with jurisdiction over the Gulf Ports as well. Relinquished that appointment in July 1931 to serve on the Frontier Commission once more. In April 1933 appointed Governor of Western Azerbaijan, residing at Rezaieh (Urumieh).

Director-General of Commerce 1935. Minister to Iraq, April 1936. Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 1938. Represented Iran at the League of Nations Assembly, September 1938.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again in 1941, but summarily dismissed by Reza Shah early in that year, at which he retired to Isfahan and has hardly been heard of again.

Speaks French, Arabic and Turkish fluently. A corpulent and agreeable person, showing little signs of intelligence on any subject. Is said to owe his advancement to the fact that he saved the life of Reza Shah on one occasion.

10. *'Alam (Alam), Muhammad Ibrahim (Shaukat-ul-Mulk), C.I.E.*.—Born about 1882. Descended from a family the members of which have exercised more or less independent rule in the Qainat and the neighbourhood for several generations. Has been Governor of Sistan and the Qainat on many occasions. Has a long record of friendship with the British and has often been a great help to us. Previous to the present extension of the authority of the Central Government Shaukat enjoyed a considerable measure of



British support; for example, Sir W. Townley obtained for him the governorship of Sistan and Qain in 1913. Visited Tehran for some months in 1925, when he kept in close touch with this Legation. He presented Reza Shah with an expensive gift on the occasion of the latter's coronation in 1926. Since then his power and local influence have been on the decline in proportion as the power of the Central Government has increased. In 1930 he entertained His Majesty the Shah and his suite in a very lavish manner, thereby drawing the Royal attention to his position in East Persia; the consequences of which imprudence nearly ruined him. In 1932, however, he received the second class of the "Humayun" order for his services in connexion with the Helmand boundary commission, the whole of the expense of which he bore himself. Visited Tehran in May 1932, to thank the Shah for his order. He was detained at the capital for several months and selected to accompany the Shah in visits to Mazanderan and Shiraz; and was only permitted to return to Birjand in October 1932, when arrangements had been initiated to distribute the lands of the Sistan Sardars (including the Shaukat and several of his relatives) among the peasantry, the theory being that all the land in question was Crown land, which the Sardars had usurped or occupied by force. Appointed Governor-General of Fars, September 1937 until October 1938. Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, February 1939.

Again Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Furughi's Cabinet of 1941, when he was very helpful. Returned to his lands at Birjand in the summer of 1942, and has since been extremely useful to us in many ways and to the Persian Government in collecting and controlling wheat.

A very generous, open-handed, agreeable man. Certain of his relatives were educated in England. His nephews, Hisum-ud-Dowleh and Samsam-ul-Mulk, and his brother-in-law, Malik Muhammad Khan, are persons of local importance.

11. *Alamir, Abbas (A'zam-es-Saltaneh)*.—Son of the late Mahmoud Alamir, Fhtisham-es-Saltaneh. Born in Tehran 1893. Educated in Persia, Turkey, Austria and Germany. Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Berlin. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and appointed an attaché of the Persian Embassy at Constantinople in 1912. Secretary at Vienna in 1913. Secretary at Berlin 1914.

Married a Persian woman, but divorced her, and married a German woman. Held various posts in the Ministry of Public Works from 1927 to 1930; then in the Ministry of National Economy, and from 1931 served in the Department of Industry. Sent to Europe in 1933 in connexion with the purchase of machinery for coal mines and sugar factories. Under-Secretary and Director-General of the reorganised Department of Industry in 1935. Unemployed in 1937 and thought to be in Berlin.

An able and intelligent man.

12. *Aliabadi, Ahmad*.—Born about 1902, the son of an official in the Ministry of Justice. Educated in Tehran and in America, where he obtained a Ph.D. On return to Persia served in the Ministry of Education, and in the Press and Propaganda Department, under Dr. Sadiq, before the fall of Reza Shah. Then practised as a lawyer in Tehran, and in 1943 was employed as a legal adviser by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at Abadan. Slow and dull in conversation and no great brain, but well-meaning; has a somewhat exaggerated idea of his own worth.

13. *Amin, Habibullah (Amin-et-Tujjar)*.—Born in Isfahan about 1878, of a family of Isfahani merchants. Amin, on his father's death, was in charge of the family business, and besides general import and export business, became interested in the export of opium. He expanded the scope of the business and started banking as well.

Became interested in politics also, shortly before the war, as a Nationalist. Joined the pro-German party, and fled from Isfahan in 1915. His property was consequently confiscated by the Russians and administered by them for a few years.

Returned to Persia in 1918 and took up residence in the capital. In 1920 elected to the fourth Majlis. Interested in the "Sharq" Company, a Russian organisation, 1923-27. In 1931 obtained a monopoly of export of opium, for which he formed a private company. Elected several times to the Majlis, he combines business with politics.

Married a Russian as his second wife in 1930. In June 1933 was deprived of his parliamentary immunity, and tried on charges of offering a bribe to

Teymourache in order to obtain the monopoly of opium. Found guilty and sentenced to six months' imprisonment, but was soon after pardoned and released by the Shah.

14. *Amin, Hussein* (often called *Amin Muhandis*).—Born about 1890 from a Tabriz family. Educated in Europe, principally in Switzerland. Graduated as an electrical engineer, and had some practical experience in that subject at Lausanne. Chief engineer of wireless stations for some years in Tehran. Director of Factories in 1932. Chief of the Department of Industry, January 1935. Superseded by General Djehanbani in March 1936, Amin remaining as assistant director and technical expert. Technical Director-General, Ministry of Industry and Mines, July 1938. Engaged in contracting business 1942.

Speaks French. Married an Italian. His daughter married Djamshid Kitabji.

15. *Amini, Dr. Ali*.—Fourth son of Mohsen Amini (Amin-ed-Douleh). Born at Tehran in 1903. Educated in Persia and in France. Studied law at Paris. Married one of the daughters of Hassan Vussugh (Vussugh-ed-Douleh). Served for some years in the Customs Administration; appointed acting head of Customs about May 1936, and (1939) head thereof until the autumn, when General Amir Khosrovi had him transferred to the Ministry of Finance as one of the Minister's assistants.

Secretary to Qawam-es-Saltaneh when Prime Minister in 1942. Appointed as head of a commercial mission to Washington by the latter, but did not proceed.

Speaks French and is evidently very intelligent. Accused by his enemies of various kinds of speculation and sharp practice. An agreeable, and usually very helpful, representative of the younger school.

16. *Amirahmedi* (or *Ahmedi*), *Ahmed Agha*.—Born in Tehran about 1880. Comes from an Ardebil family, his forbears having emigrated from the Caucasus. Enlisted in the Cossack Brigade in 1899 and received speedy promotion; he was soon commissioned, and was a general in 1920. Took a prominent part in operations against the Jangalis in 1919. When the army was reorganised in 1922 he was given the rank of Amir Lashkar (chief of a division) and placed in command of the Western Division with headquarters at Hamadan. Was recalled on account of his shameless robbery and for his treacherous oppression of the Lurs; but, being a favourite of Reza Shah's, he was appointed to command the amnieh or road guards. Appointed in 1926 to command the North-West Division, while retaining command of the amnieh. Recalled the next year, and appointed to command in Luristan in the spring of 1928. He succeeded in pacifying Luristan by the summer, and in disarming the Lurs; he also assisted in the construction of the Khorramabad road. Promoted Sepahbod (field-marshal) in April 1929 as a reward for his services. Returned to Tehran for medical treatment, and left for Europe in 1930. Sent to Kurdistan to disarm the Kurds in December 1931. Commanded operations against Jaafar Sultan in 1932, and against Lurs in 1933. Director of Remounts, 1935.

Minister of War in Furughi's Cabinet which negotiated the Tripartite Treaty in 1942. Military Governor of Tehran with wide powers to suppress the rioting in December, 1942; and then Minister of War under Qawam-es-Saltaneh and Soheily. Resigned December 1943 when Soheily reformed his Cabinet and at the Shah's instance appointed Zand, a civilian, as Minister of War. Refused command of the Southern division as he considered he would not be properly supported in Tehran in that appointment. Suspected by the Russians and disliked by the Shah and Yazdan-Panah for his attempt to insist on the authority of the Ministry of War and to limit the Shah's intervention in matters of command and administration. Ambitious and always hopeful of becoming Prime Minister. Though his record of bribe-taking and his sketchy education do not make him a satisfactory candidate for a head of Government, he has shown himself a man of action and determination in times of crisis, and has been very friendly to us since Reza Shah's departure.

Speaks Russian. His accumulated wealth and large properties appear to have satisfied his desires, so that he seems to have got over his youthful inclination towards robbery.

17. *Amir Khosrovi, Reza Quli, General*.—Born in Tehran, of obscure origin, in 1896. Educated in the cadet school attached to the Cossack Brigade; joined that brigade in 1915. Was Reza Khan's trumpeter and owes his promotion to his master. Army cashier 1922-28. Manager of the Pahlevi Bank in 1931. Sent to Paris to study banking in 1931. Returned to Tehran in 1933, and in 1934



appointed managing director of the National Bank. Promoted major-general, March 1939. Minister of Finance, October 1939.

Married a much-divorced Caucasian lady, usually known as Kitty Khanum. Speaks French and Russian. Sociable and friendly; a bridge player; but will never be an eminent financier. Carried on a long rivalry with Mahmoud Bader, when he was head of the bank and the latter was Minister of Finance.

Dismissed from the post of Minister of Finance, May 1941. Since then in retirement and seldom seen; went to India on business 1942. Got rid of Kitty Khanum and married the wife of one of his staff. Left Tehran October 1943.

A man of little intelligence and no scruples—his main idea in banking was to spend as much money as possible.

18. *Amiri (Amery) Javad*.—Born in Tehran 1895, from a Semnan family. Educated in Persia and France. Speaks French, and has studied law in Paris. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1914, and was for many years assistant to the French judicial adviser attached to the Ministry of Justice. Was a professor in the law school. In 1928 appointed president of the Tribunal of Commerce. President of the court of first instance in Tehran 1931-34. Director of the Department of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice in 1934. Went to Bagdad with Fathullah Noury Esfandiary in December 1935 as legal and technical adviser in the abortive negotiations about the frontier, &c., with Iraq. Juridical Counsellor in charge of the Advisory Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1938. Administrative Director-General, August 1938, and Under-Secretary, January 1939, in that Ministry.

In charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the invasion 1941. Minister of the Interior in Soheily's Cabinet 1942, and later Minister of Justice; in the former post he was a disappointment, in the latter he was more at home but was soon replaced. Elected to the 14th Majlis from Semnan, December 1943.

A man of considerable influence and importance in his capacity as technical adviser on legislation. Having been trained by the French legal advisers here, his ideas of law are somewhat different from those held by British lawyers.

Conscientious and hard-working, with a lawyer's capacity for rapid assimilation of detail. Amiable but weak.

19. *Amiri (Amery), Sultan Muhammad*. Born at Nain about 1885. Educated at the American School at Tehran. A teacher at that school in 1913. Helped Seyyid Zia-ed-Din by translating English articles for his paper *Ra'ad*, and so became closely connected with the Seyyid. Appointed assistant in the Department of Indirect Taxation by the Seyyid's influence. After the latter's *coup d'Etat* in 1921, was appointed "chef de cabinet" and Acting Minister of Finance, and elected a Deputy to the fourth Majlis. After the Seyyid's fall he made a speech in the Majlis, revealing the fact that he had been reporting all the activities of the Seyyid to the Minister of Court. Re-entered the Ministry of Finance in 1922, and served under Dr. Millspaugh. Under-Secretary of Finance in 1926. Visited Europe in 1928. In 1931 chief accountant of the northern railway construction. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1933. Governor of Western Azerbaijan in March 1935.

Arrested and tried in Tehran for embezzlement in 1936, and sentenced to imprisonment, though after the departure of Reza Shah he managed to obtain a new trial and was exonerated.

Speaks English. A clever and intelligent official.

20. *Amir-Taimur Kalali, Muhammad Ibrahim*.—Born about 1895. Member of a well-known Khorassan tribe. Educated in Tehran. Elected to the Majlis in the time of Reza Shah, and again for Kashed in the 14th Majlis elections, 1943, where he headed the poll.

A talkative demagogue, fond of working himself into passionate indignation about subjects which he does not understand. For instance, he opposed the tripartite treaty and caused the Feroughi cabinet a great deal of trouble. But he is amenable to argument, and, though pig-headed and vain, is not entirely without good ideas.

21. *Ansari (Ansarie), Abdul Hussein Mas'ud (Massoud)*.—The eldest son of the late Ali Quli Ansari Mushavir-ul-Mamlik. Born 1899. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. Served for a number of years in the Persian Embassy at Moscow as secretary, and his rapid promotion is largely due to his father's influence. Counsellor at Moscow in 1927, and held that post till he was transferred to Tehran in 1931. Head of the Economics Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in September 1933. Went

to Germany as a member of the Persian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Head of the Third Political Section (dealing with British affairs) 1936. Head of the Protocol Department, November 1937. Consul-General, Delhi, May 1938. Minister to Sweden 1941.

Married a Russian at Moscow; the lady was suspected of being a spy; she died in Berlin in 1936 leaving one child, a boy. Married an Iranian in 1937.

Civil and fairly energetic, but formal, and lacking in geniality and sense of humour. When he was in charge of the Economics Section it proved impossible to get much useful information out of him, and as the head of the Third Political Department he was not particularly helpful. Speaks Russian, French and German; his outlook is almost as much Russian as Persian, and many of his colleagues distrust him accordingly.

22. *Ansari, Ghulam Ali, Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Born about 1900, of a military family. Joined the army and earned a reputation for honesty and energy. Director of Artillery, November 1941. Commandant of the Officers' School, June 1942. Assistant to General Greely, United States army, when adviser to the Ministry of War, August 1942. Under-Secretary for War, September 1943, but was not allowed to do much good owing to the opposition of rivals. Unpopular in the army because of a rough tongue, a strong temper and an uncompromising mind.

Married to a daughter of Abdul Hussein Shaibani (Wahid-ul-Mulk).

23. *Aqeeli (Aqherli), Farajullah*.—Born in Isfahan 1888, the son of the late Dr. Amanullah Khan, a well-known physician. Educated in Tehran; speaks French and some English. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911. His brother, Colonel Fazlullah Khan, committed suicide when a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission, which sat in 1919-20.

Appointed general in 1922, and Chief of Staff to the Western Army in Hamadan. Military Governor of Gilan for a time in 1925. Governor-General of Khuzistan 1928 to 1930, during which time he showed administrative ability in establishing the authority of the new régime.

Accused of partiality towards the tribes, he was placed on the retired list in 1930.

Appointed Director-General of the Registration and Civil Census Department in 1932. Relieved of this appointment in 1934.

Re-employed in the Army after the departure of Reza Shah, was suspected of pro-German bias at the time of the arrest of Zahidi in 1942. Head of the Gendarmerie in 1942 and did his best to re-organise that force; but was not in close agreement with the American Gendarmerie advisers. Arrested and removed with other suspects to Sultanabad in June 1943.

Has the reputation of being efficient, energetic and conscientious, and a devout Moslem.

24. *Arasteh, Nadir*.—A Qajar prince. Born about 1893. Governor of Pahlavi in 1928. Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan in 1930-32. Governor of Khuzistan, May 1932-August 1933. Has also served in the Persian Legation in London. Appointed Minister to Poland, December 1933. Appointed first Persian Minister to the Argentine Republic, August 1935; presented his letters in October 1935. Recalled to Tehran, October 1936; the post being abolished. In charge of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short while in 1937. Minister at Berlin, August 1937. Accredited also to The Hague in 1939. Recalled from Berlin May 1940. Governor-General of Mazanderan, January 1942, and of Qilan, January 1943.

A little man, speaking English and French. Agreeable, but no great character.

25. *Ardelan, Abbas Quli*.—Born about 1897, of the well-known Kurdish family. Educated at the American College, Tehran; then joined the Ministry of Finance. Spent three years in London, where he studied the work of the Bank of England and the British Treasury. Has written a book on accountancy and is considered an authority on that subject. A man of good reputation and capable. Has been for some years Treasurer-General; resigned from that appointment summer 1943.

26. *Ardelan, Dr. Ali Gholi*.—Born about 1900; brother of Amanullah Ardelan. Served mostly under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various posts from 1922. Secretary at Washington, 1932, where he had a dispute with Ghaffar Jalal, the Minister. Counsellor at Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Returned to Tehran 1942 and was in charge of the English section of



the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for more than a year, fulfilling his duties with efficiency. Counsellor at Ankara at the end of 1943.

Speaks English. Very helpful to us while he was at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

27. *Ardelan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik)*.—Born about 1888. Son of Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk of Kurdistan. Educated at Tehran. Elected a Deputy to the second Majlis through the influence of his father, when the latter was Governor of Arabistan. Served first in the Ministry of Finance. An active member of the Democratic party and elected to the third Majlis from Kermanshah. A pro-German during the war, he left Persia for Turkey at that time. After the war he became financial agent for Kerman through bribing Akbar Mirza, the Minister of Finance, and made a good thing of that post. Financial agent for Fars 1922-23. A member of the fifth Majlis. A close friend of Suleiman Mirza and the Socialists. Minister of Public Works in Sardar Sepah's Cabinet of October 1923. Resigned, April 1924. Again employed under the Ministry of Finance in Kerman and Fars. Governor of Astarabad 1928; of Luristan, &c., in 1932, of Gilan in 1933, and again of Luristan in 1934, of Bushire and the Gulf Ports 1935; and Governor-General of Kerman in May 1936. Recalled in August 1937.

Governor-General of Azerbaijan (West) at the time of the invasion 1941; fled precipitately to Tehran when the Russians advanced, fearing that revenge would be taken on him for various anti-Russian measures which he had been ordered to take. Then Director-General of Ministry of Finance, and Governor of Isfahan in 1942. Minister of Public Health in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Minister of Finance in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Has been very helpful to us since 1941. Speaks some English.

An intelligent and progressive person, though not over-scrupulous when it comes to making money.

28. *Ardelan, Ghulam Ali*.—Born in Kurdistan about 1893. A Kurd from Senneh. Served as an interpreter to some British officers during the war of 1914-18. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1918, and has since been employed in various posts. Served as a secretary to the Legation in London twice. Sent back to Tehran from London in May 1933, the Minister, Hussein Ala, having arranged his removal. Member of the Department of Information, Publications and Translation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1938.

Speaks English. Married an Armenian, and has one son and one daughter. Was the subject of a complaint by the London police for leaving a car at night with no lights. Amiable, but rather stupid.

29. *Ardelan, Nasir Quli*.—Born in Tehran 1896. Third son of the late Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk, who was a Court official; his mother is the daughter of Izz-ed-Douleh and grand-daughter of Mohammed Shah. Educated at Tehran and in Belgium. Spent a year in London learning English. Returned to Persia 1915 and entered the service of the Ministry of the Interior, where he served for fifteen years. Served as Governor of Do-Dangeh in Mazanderan, of Firuzkuh, and in Khuzistan as Acting Governor. Then was Governor of Sari, Acting Governor of Mazanderan, and Governor of Semnan. Governor of Mohammerah (Khorramshahr) in 1925, and Governor of Abadan in 1930. Employed in the National Bank since 1931.

Intelligent and capable. Elected deputy for Senneh in the Majlis elections of December 1943.

30. *Arfa, Hassan*.—Born about 1890, the eldest son of the late Prince Reza Arfa (Arfa-ed-Douleh). Educated in Russia and France; his mother, now mentally deranged, being a Caucasian. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 as secretary to the Persian Consulate at Tiflis. Secretary at the Persian Legation at St. Petersburg in 1908. Joined the gendarmerie in 1911; and has been in the army since then. Commanded the crack cavalry "Pahlevi" Regiment in 1931. Has served as military attaché in London for a short time, and has been a prominent officer in the new army. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in 1934. In 1935 on the General Staff, in charge of a training school. Persian delegate to the Zahidan Conference in 1935, where, no doubt under strict orders, he took an extremely nationalistic and anti-British standpoint.

Officially attended Atatürk's funeral in 1938. Promoted Brigadier-General April 1939. Inspector of Cavalry 1942. Commanding the 1st Division 1943.

Speaks French, English, Turkish, and Russian. His anti-British utterances were no doubt a measure of prudence, as he is married to an Englishwoman, *née* Bewicke. Intelligent and efficient.

31. *Asa, Mustafa* (previously known as *Kushmand*).—Born about 1899. Served in the South Persian Rifles 1918-1920 as a young, capable and courageous cavalry officer. On its disbandment joined the Gendarmerie and later the army. Was in the operations against the Kurdish leader Simko in about 1926, and served for some eight years in Luristan and also for some time in southern Kurdistan. Commanded the 12th Division, and then the 5th Kurdistan Division, 1941. Then transferred for duty at the Ministry of War and had various duties, including Military Governor of Tehran; again appointed to command the 4th Kurdistan Division in 1942. Our officers reported in 1943 that he commanded the trust and respect of the Kurds and had done much to persuade the Kurdish tribes that their future peace and prosperity lay in their establishing good relations with the Persian Government.

Does not seek the limelight and had the reputation of avoiding foreign society.

32. *Asad (Assad, really As'ad) Muhammed Quli (Sardar Buhadur)*.—A brother of the late Sardar As'ad Bakhtiari. Born about 1887. Sent to Europe to be educated; speaks English. Joined the army in 1917. Commanding the "Fateh" Cavalry Regiment in 1932. Placed under arrest in November 1933, together with other Bakhtiari Khans; tried by a military court on charges of high treason, but acquitted in November 1934. Thought by some to be one of the best of the Bakhtiari; though according to others no reliance can be placed upon him. Employed as inspector of the Caspian ports 1942, but soon left that employment and went to live at Isfahan.

33. *Asadi, Salman*.—The eldest son of the late Mohammad Vali Asadi, mutawalli of the shrine at Meshed, who was shot for treason in 1935. Born about 1896. Educated at the American College, Tehran; spent a few years also at Cambridge and in London; speaks English. Owing to his father's influence elected to the Majlis as member for Seistan for the seventh and eighth sessions.

Served for a short time in the News Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as a translator. In charge of the Department of Propaganda 1941 to March 1942. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Food 1942 and worked hard to ensure the food supply of Tehran with Mr. Sheridan in the famine winter of 1942-43.

A pleasant young man, well read and intelligent; but a bit of an intriguer and rather lazy.

34. *Atabeki, Muhsin*.—Born about 1889. Son of the late Ali Ashgar Atabeg-i-Azam, the former Prime Minister. Educated in Persia. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1918. Secretary to the Persian Embassy in Turkey 1927. Secretary at Brussels 1928. Has served also at Rome, and as "chef de cabinet" of the Ministry of Public Works. Secretary in London, 1930-32. Second secretary at Washington, 1933. Returned to Tehran the following year after a dispute with the Minister, Ghaffar Jalal. Vice-consul at Damascus 1936.

Brother-in-law of Prince Akbar Massoud. Divorced his first wife, who later married Ali Akbar Devar, and was again divorced. Then married a Persian girl, *née* Chourabchi, from Istanbul.

Speaks French and English, and has good manners. Not a forceful personality, but remembers with gratitude the help which his father received from the British Legation long ago.

Returned from Damascus 1942 and divorced his wife. Appears depressed and indolent.

35. *Aurang (Owraq), Abdul Hussein (Sheikh-ul-Mulk)*. Born in Khorassan about 1889. Educated as a mulla. Early developed a talent for declamation and oratory, and also studied law at Tehran. Did various services to the Bakhtiari before and during the 1914-18 war. Has also acted for the Charagozlou family, with whom he is very intimate, especially with Baha-ul-Mulk. Deputy for Hamadan in the 13th Majlis, but not elected for the 14th. One of the few Tehranis who maintain two wives, each in her separate house.

A typical demagogue and windbag, with a talent for declamation.

36. *A'Azam-Zanganeh, Dr. Abdul Hamid*.—Born at Kermanshah about 1899, of a well-known family; his half-brother being Amir-i-Kull. Educated at Tehran in the Law School and the Political School. Went to Paris 1929 and obtained a doctorate in law and economics, his thesis being on oil; has also been in England. 1935 returned to Persia and was employed in the Ministry of Education; professor in the Law School. Also a pleader in the Court, mostly



in mortgage-bank business and agricultural cases. Co-editor with Dr. Suratgar of the newspaper *Iran Javan*.

A small and quiet-spoken man; makes a good impression and seems intelligent.

Deputy for the 14th Majlis for Kermanshah; he seems to regard himself as elected by the personal order of the Shah.

37. *A'zam-Zanganeh, Ali (Amir-i-Kull)*.—Born about 1878. Son of the late A'zam-ud-Douleh, and grandson of the well-known Zahid-ul-Mulk. A wealthy landowner of the Kermanshah district, and chief of the Zanganeh tribe of that district. The Governorship of Kermanshah has been held by members of his family from time to time in the past. Has also been Governor of Sultanabad. His daughter is the wife of Abbas Qubadian Amir-Muazzam, a chief of the Kalhur tribe. One of the chief personalities of Kermanshah. Deputy for Kermanshah in the ninth Majlis.

Governor-General of Kermanshah province from early in 1942 to 1943. Was a mere cypher in the hands of General Shahbakhti, and did little or nothing to stop hoarding or organise the wheat supply of Kermanshah during the famine winter of 1942-43.

An unpleasant intriguer, though agreeable to talk to. The British Political Officers in the 1914-18 war considered him greedy and prodigal; and he had large debts to the former Russian Bank (Banque d'Escompte).

38. *Azudi, Yadullah (Amir A'zam)*.—Born in Tehran about 1890. The son of the late Nusratullah Mirza, and a grandson of Vajihullah Mirza Sepahsalar who was the grandson of Fath Ali Shah. Inherited large estates from his father, all of which were situated in the neighbourhood of Damghan and Shahrud. Educated in Persia; has spent some years in Europe. Married first a daughter of Hasan Pirnia (Mushir-ed-Douleh), who died a few years later; he then married a daughter of Vossugh-ed-Douleh (Hasan Vossugh).

Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary of the Persian Legation at Berlin in 1928, and for some time was Chargé d'Affaires there. Chief de Personnel at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1929-30. Counsellor at Washington 1931, and acted as Chargé d'Affaires there. Minister at Warsaw in March 1933; but recalled to Tehran as the result of some scandal dating from his Washington days the following December. Chief of the Passport Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, August 1935 (now known as the Consular Department). Administrative Director-General of the Ministry, March 1937, until November 1937. Minister of Roads under Qawam-es-Saltaneh 1942, and did well in that post. Resigned early in 1945 partly owing to accusations of nepotism; appointed Minister to Brazil, and proceeded thither July 1943.

Speaks French and German, and usually very helpful and forthcoming.

39. *Bader, Abdul Wahhab*.—The eldest son of Mirza Ahmed Khan Bader Nasir-ed-Douleh. Born in 1889, and for three years studied at King's College, London. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as an interpreter in 1916, and remained on the staff for a number of years. Transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1921, and for a time was "chef de cabinet" of that Ministry. Married, as his second wife, a French lady doctor named de Romps. Consul at Karachi 1928-29. Secretary at the Legation at Washington 1930. Consul at Prague 1933. Recalled to Tehran at the end of 1936. A small man (like all his relations), with a perfect command of English. Quite friendly and agreeable.

Counsellor at Berlin in 1940, and Chargé d'Affaires from May 1940. Living in Switzerland 1943.

40. *Bader, Mahmud*.—Younger brother of Abdul Wahhab Bader. Born in 1893. Educated in England. Has been in the service of the Ministry of Finance since 1910. Assistant to the Accountant-General at the Ministry of Finance for a number of years. Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Public Works October 1928. In the same capacity in the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1930. Director-General of the Ministry of Finance 1933. President of the Iranian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Succeeded Abolghassem Ferouhar as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Finance in April 1936. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance on the death of Davar in February 1937. Minister of Finance, September 1937 until October 1939, when superseded by General Amir Khosrovi, head of the National Bank, with whom he had carried on a long contest for control of the Government's financial operations. M. Bader was said to favour dealings with Germany.

Minister of Finance in Soheily's Cabinet 1942, and in that capacity showed himself helpful in smoothing over financial difficulties and in negotiating currency agreements. Minister of Industry in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943, but was not very successful in settling various wages disputes, and on Soheily's forming a new Cabinet in December 1943 he was not included in it.

A small man, with a great sense of his own importance. Helpful and intelligent.

41. *Bahar (Malik-usb-Shuarā)*.—Born in Meshed, 1882. Son of a well-known poet named Sabouri. A member of the old Democratic party, and edited a paper in Meshed called the *No-Bahār*. A member of the third, fourth and fifth Majlises from Meshed, and of the sixth from Tehran. Edited his paper *No-Bahār* in Tehran during the war, and was pronouncedly pro-German. Nevertheless, he supported Vossugh-ed-Douleh's Cabinet of 1918-20 during which time he edited the *Iran* newspaper. Opposed the Government during the term of the fifth Majlis and was an opponent of the change of régime. An attempt was made on his life when the debate on the change of régime took place in the Majlis; but another unfortunate man who resembled him was the victim. Seyyid Hasan Mudarris helped him to get elected to the sixth Majlis.

Nothing much was heard of him during Reza Shah's reign, except that he composed some odes in celebration of the Firdausi centenary in October 1934, and translated into Persian verse a poem by John Drinkwater on that occasion. He has been exiled from Tehran on more than one occasion.

In spite of a fondness for opium has been fairly active at Tehran since the change of régime in 1941. Up to August 1942 he and Massoud Sabeti actively supported Qawam-es-Saltaneh's candidature for the post of Prime Minister. After the latter's fall early in 1943, Bahar seems to have swung over to the Soviets. He obtained newsprint from the Russians with which he kept his paper *No-Bahār* going, and published a series of articles apparently critical of but really supporting Qawam. In fact a shifty and over-subtle politician.

Acknowledged to be a leading poet, and a practical newspaper writer. He himself maintains that he is above all anti-Russian, and that that fact is the only source of the false accusation of pro-German feelings often made against him.

42. *Bahman, Ali Akbar*.—Born in Tehran about 1880. Educated in Tehran, as well as in Paris and Russia. On his mother's side is a descendant of Bahman Mirza, a Qajar prince who emigrated to Russia and declared allegiance to the Tsar. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs through Russian influence; was chief accounts officer of that Ministry in 1916. Minister Resident in the Balkan States in 1920. Returned to Tehran 1923; Minister to Egypt in 1924. Recalled by Mushar-ul-Mulk in the following year. Minister to Brussels in 1926. Returned to Tehran in March 1933 and appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Court May 1933. Director-General of Commerce in Ferouhi's Cabinet of September 1933; and appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan March 1935.

Recalled in July 1936 and appointed first Persian Ambassador to Egypt, February 1939. Retired early in 1942 and settled in Tehran. Has aspirations to a soft job at Court.

A talkative and fussy little man, on whom no reliance can be placed. His wife left him when he was employed in the Balkans. He has unpleasant personal habits.

43. *Bahrami, Abdullah*.—Born in Tehran about 1883. A cousin of Farajullah Bahrami. Educated in Tehran. Speaks French. Joined the Police Administration in 1911 and served under Swedish officers. Chief of the Azerbaijan police for two years, from 1915. Returned to employment with the Tehran police in 1918. Director of the Welfare Department of the Tehran Municipality 1921-22. Under-Secretary of Education November 1923 till 1925. In the following year Persian delegate to the police conference held in New York. Director-General of the Ministry of Education 1927-30; Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Justice in 1930. Acted as Minister for a short time. Went to Europe on four months' leave in 1931, and then unemployed till November 1936, when he was appointed Minister at Berne and Permanent Representative of the Persian Government at Geneva. Attended coronation of King George VI in 1937 as Persian Government representative; Minister at Brussels, August 1938. Returned to Tehran 1941 and talks of settling down in England whenever possible.

The author of a work on the principles of prison administration. An honest and capable official, though his nickname "The Cow" is not an inapt description of his person, and perhaps of his intelligence.



44. *Bahrami, Farajullah (Dabir-i-A'zam)*.—Born about 1890. A member of a well-known and numerous Tehran family. Munshi or secretary to Reza Shah before and after his accession to the throne in 1925. Was appointed member of a commission of examination in connexion with the Lionosoff Caspian Fishery claim, but resigned from that position.

Lost the Shah's full confidence in about 1927, and was sent abroad to take charge of the Persian students in Europe, at Paris, Berlin, &c. Returned to Persia about two years later. In July 1930 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and a year later Governor-General of Fars. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in March 1932. Resigned on the fall of the Hedayat Cabinet in September 1933, and was sent to Meshed as Governor-General in the following January. Superseded as Governor-General of Khorasan in October 1934, for reporting that adequate facilities did not exist at Meshed for the accommodation of the orientologists attending the Ferdousi millenary. Since that time under a cloud. In the summer of 1935 he was suspected of complicity in some plot and was exiled to Malayir. Allowed to return to Tehran under surveillance, October 1936.

After the change of régime in 1941 he has been a prominent member of the Adalat party. Minister of the Interior in January 1943, but he very soon became involved in a quarrel with his chief, Qawam es Saltaneh, which led to the collapse of the latter's cabinet. His criticisms of his chief in that episode did not create a good impression on this Legation; he is evidently self-opinionated and stubborn. Is very alarmed at the Soviet menace to the independence of Persia. Governor-General of Isfahan, April 1943.

A very friendly person, who always appears to do what he can to help British consular officers. Has great aspirations to literary eminence; a great admirer of Hafiz. As Minister he incurred some criticism from his fellow-countrymen for inaccessibility and lack of hospitality. Speaks very little French. Business-like and hard-working.

45. *Bahrami, Fazlullah*.—Born about 1897. For some time a colonel in the police, and in charge of the detective force. Acting chief of the Tehran Municipality in 1937. Director of Census and Civil Status, January 1938.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Soheily's Cabinet of 1942 and filled that post adequately. Head of the municipality again July 1943; suspended from his functions during the Tehran elections at the end of 1943 owing to accusations of illegal intervention in the elections, but resumed his functions January 1944.

A large individual with some energy; but he seems to have made a good deal of money by dubious land transactions when head of the municipality. Obstinate like all the Bahramy family.

46. *Bakhtiari, Murteza Quli Samsam*.—The son of the famous Samsam-us-Saltaneh. Born probably about 1875. Took part in operations against Salar-ud-Douleh in 1911. Represented the Bakhtiari tribe in the Majlis in the same year, and appointed Ilbeggi of the tribe in 1912. Governor of Yezd in 1914. Helped the Germans during the war. Made his peace with the British Legation after the war. Has held the appointment of Ilbeggi or Ilkhani of the tribe on several occasions. Was with the tribe when most of the Bakhtiari Khans were arrested in December 1933; he then had the appointment of Ilkhani. He escaped the fate of his fellow Khans, and has assisted the Government in their policy of inducing the Bakhtiari tribe to abandon their traditional nomadic habits. Appointed Governor of Bakhtiari early in 1943 and did well, suppressing various upstarts like Abol Ghassem, and establishing order in that tribal area. A clever man, not above intrigue. Served Reza Shah well. Very pleasant to meet, but not the sort of man one can trust very far, as he is very much in the hands of his strong-minded wife and also places implicit trust in a worthless agent, Misbah Fatemy.

47. *Bayat, Murteza Quli (Saham-es-Sultan)*. A landowner from Sultanabad, born about 1882. Owns considerable property. Member of the Majlis on several occasions, and Minister of Finance 1926 to 1927. Deputy Speaker of the Tenth Majlis. Member of the Adalat party 1942. Accused of hoarding wheat during the winter of 1942-43. Minister of Finance in Soheily's Cabinet 1943 and performed the useful function of effacing himself completely in favour of Dr. Millsbaugh. Not included in Soheily's revised cabinet of December 1943.

Speaks a little French. A highly respectable and polite man, who will never set the world ablaze.

48. *Bayendor, Ghulam Hussein*.—Elder brother of Ghulam Ali Bayendor. Was a captain in the army until 1930, when he went to Italy on a course of naval

engineering. Returned in 1934, and was appointed engineer officer of the southern naval force. Promoted major in 1935. Port officer of Abadan and Khorramshahr in 1936. Lieutenant-Colonel, 1938.

Keenly interested in mercantile affairs, and helped to float the monopoly company for the landing of cargo in the port of Khorramshahr in 1937. Unpopular with his subordinates. Quick and hot tempered, but less so than formerly. Uses his position for his financial advantage. Not very intelligent, but very hard-working. Speaks French and Italian. Does not appear to like the British.

49. *Bushihri-Dehdashti, Agha Javad (Amir Humayun)*.—Born in Tehran 1898. Second son of the late Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Speaks French and English. Married a daughter of the late Haji Amin-uz-Zarb. Elected a member of the seventh Majlis. More interested in politics than his elder brother Agha Riza. Fond of pomp, and very extravagant in his manner of living. Nicknamed by some of his friends "Prince Merchant."

Was in Hamburg at the outbreak of the war in 1939, and spent some time in Germany thereafter. Finally got away to Stamboul in 1942 with the help of Count Schulenburg and returned to Tehran March 1943. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad as a suspect in June 1943.

A clever man who in the past has always maintained friendly relations with British officials.

50. *Bushihri-Dehdashti, Agha Riza*.—Born in Tehran, 1896; the eldest surviving son of the late Haji Moin-et-Tujjar. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Married Mme. Lianozoff in 1922. Never employed in a Government post; interested in developing his father's business. Resided in Europe, mostly in Italy, from 1924-29, in connexion with his father's silk export trade. A member of the eighth Majlis. Started a company for the manufacture of soap in Tehran. Treasurer of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce in 1934. Left Persia for Europe in 1935 after several disputes with the Government, as well as with Russian trading organisations. Heard of again at Hamburg and Berlin at the end of 1936, making speeches on the advantages of German trade for Persia. Was at Hamburg at the outbreak of the war in 1939, and spent most of the war in Germany or Austria, unable to leave, his wife being in Paris in 1942, unable to join him.

Speaks French, English and Russian. A go-ahead merchant, always ready for new schemes for making money. Quite pleasant to get on with.

51. *Buzurjmehri, General Kerim Agha*.—Born about 1878. Formerly a non-commissioned officer in the Cossack Brigade. Rose from the ranks and served for years as a brother officer of Reza Shah Pahlavi. He followed the fortunes of the latter, who, when he became Minister of War, used his influence to make Kerim Agha Director of the Tehran Municipality.

In September 1929 Kerim Agha was made Minister of Public Works in addition to his directorship of the municipality, but in March 1930 the Ministry of Public Works was divided into the Ministries of Public Economy and of Roads and Communications, and after that Kerim Agha retained only the municipality.

He has given considerable personal attention to the modernising of Tehran, widening the streets by forcing the owners of houses and shops to pull down their antiquated buildings and reconstruct them on more modern lines, after ceding to the municipality for a mere song the amount of frontage necessary for enlarging the streets. His methods were not strictly legal, and at first caused a considerable amount of discontent amongst property owners, but he without doubt improved the aspect of the capital, and as the newly-constructed properties are bringing in to their owners considerably enhanced rents, the former discontent has gradually died down. High-handed methods were perhaps necessary to force the Tehranis to co-operate in the improvement of the city, and Kerim Agha's driving power proved invaluable. He is a man of no education and his standard of intelligence is below that necessary for a ministerial post. He caused the Railway Syndicate so much trouble, even going so far as to refuse to pay the monetary instalments as they fell due, that the latter were compelled to give him an ultimatum, threatening to close down if he persisted in being obstructive. This caused the Shah to invoke the help of Teymourache, who was able to smoothe matters over and satisfy the syndicate. As Minister of Public Works he was certainly not the success that he was as Director of the Municipality. Before he attained ministerial rank he had been in charge of the private estates of the Shah, and



is said to have enlarged them considerably at the expense of the owners of neighbouring estates, and by methods which will not bear too close scrutiny. Commanded a division of the Tehran Garrison in 1937. Visited the Legation once in 1942, but takes no part in politics, and spends most of his time in his village. He speaks no foreign language but understands a little Russian.

Kerim Agha is a typical product of the Cossack Brigade and a man of similar character to Reza Shah. He can be very suave and agreeable when he likes, but he is a robber at heart.

52. *Dadgar, Hussein (Adl-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1882. First came into prominence as a member of the Democratic party in the third Majlis (1914-15). In 1916 he turned against the party. Was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1916 and remained there until 1918. Was anti-British. Later became Acting Minister of the Interior. Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister in 1920. Was involved in the *coup d'Etat* of 1921 and fled to the mosque at Kum when Seyyid Zia fled to Europe. Remained some months in refuge at Kum. Elected a Deputy to the fourth Majlis 1921, and to the fifth Majlis in 1924. Assistant to Prime Minister 1923. Minister of the Interior 1925. Elected Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly, December 1925, which elected Reza Pahlavi to the Throne of Persia. Elected as a Deputy to the sixth Majlis 1926 and to the seventh Majlis 1928. President of the seventh Majlis. Elected a member of the eighth Majlis 1930.

Left Persia suddenly in the summer of 1935 under circumstances which have never been officially explained. It is said that the Shah suspected him of allowing subversive activities among certain Deputies of the Majlis; or else that he took bribes. Understood to be living in straitened circumstances in Paris 1943. A rumour that he was founding a "Free Persia" movement there appears to be unfounded.

Outwardly very friendly, but liable to be touchy about protocol questions of precedence; rather vain and stupid. Speaks a little French.

53. *Dadgar, Mehdi (Vussuq-es-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1874. Entered the service of the Ministry of War when quite young. Chief of Accounts of the Mazanderan Regiments 1905. Joined the Nationalists and came to Tehran with the Nationalist forces. Chief of Accounts at the War Office 1909. Held this post for six years. Assistant Minister for War 1916 to 1918. Governor of Zinjan and Khamseh 1918. Minister for War during 1920. Governor of Gilan for a few months in 1922. Governor-General of Fars in 1924; and of Kerman 1925. Governor-General of Khorasan 1926-27. Elected a member of the eighth Majlis. Deputy Speaker of the ninth and tenth Majlis. In the eleventh he was (1939) only a member for Tehran.

Attached to one of ephemeral parties in the Majlis in 1942-43, but having failed in his ambition to become once more Minister of War he is devoting some of his time to promoting trade with India.

A voluble politician, well disposed towards us, but carrying little weight in the Majlis.

54. *Dargahi, Muhammad*.—Born about 1886 in Zinjan. His ancestors lived in the Caucasus, and he has been heard to say that he looks forward to the time when the Caucasus will return to its rightful owners, the Persians. Employed at Court in his young days in some menial capacity. Educated at the Dar-ul-Funun school at Tehran. Joined the gendarmerie under Swedish officers in 1911. At Kerman and Shiraz in 1915; was with the rebel gendarmerie at Shiraz in 1915, being finally arrested and imprisoned for six months. Commanded the gendarmerie at Qum in 1921. Chief of military police at Tehran in 1922. He made himself very useful to Reza Khan, and was made chief of police on the dismissal of the Swedes in 1923. Promoted to the rank of general (Sartip) in 1928. Chief of the Department of Conscription in 1931. Director of the Census Department in 1935; and dismissed in May 1936. Rendered valuable service to the Shah during the intrigues which led up to the deposition of the Qajars; skilful in handling the bazaars, and well acquainted with the baser psychology of his own countrymen. Active and energetic, and extremely vigilant in detecting conspirators against the Shah; vindictive and cruel, and quite unscrupulous in fabricating evidence. A dapper little man in appearance.

Living in retirement at Tehran 1943. He has not returned to the limelight since the fall of Reza.

55. *Dashti, Ali*.—Born about 1887. Educated in the schools of the Holy Places of Iraq. Returned to Persia about 1922 and edited a paper called

the *Shafag Surkh*. As an editor he became notorious for slanderous abuse and the extortion of money by blackmail, and his abuse of Great Britain and British statesmen was frequently the subject of complaint from His Majesty's Legation to the Persian Government. He was elected a Deputy to the fifth Majlis in 1924, but he was refused a seat by the Parliamentary Commission, whose duty it was to scrutinise his election proceedings. He was prominent in the abortive Republican movement in 1924, and is said to have received and pocketed large sums from Reza Pahlavi, on whose behalf he worked. After acquiring a share of this world's goods he appeared to become more human and ceased the abuse and vituperation for which he had become famous. He espoused the cause of Reza Pahlavi against Ahmed Shah, and was elected a Deputy to the sixth Majlis in 1926. He was invited to Moscow in October 1927 to attend the tenth anniversary of the Soviet régime. From Moscow he went to Berlin and Paris and returned to Persia early in 1928. He was elected a Deputy to the seventh Majlis in 1928 and to the eighth Majlis in 1930.

Edited or controlled his paper till about July 1935, receiving subsidies now from the Shah and now from the Soviet Embassy. He is a hot-headed firebrand with no scruples and no principles, and is capable of the basest villainy if it will help him to attain his ends. He speaks no European language, except a little French.

In July 1935 he fell into disgrace and was said to have uttered disparaging remarks about the present régime. His paper was suppressed and he himself was allowed to plead sickness and to retire to a Government hospital, where he was made to pay well for his maintenance.

At liberty again at the end of 1936. In charge of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Interior in 1937.

Since the fall of Reza has returned to the forefront of Tehran politics. A severe critic of Furughi and Soheily in 1942, he worked hard for the return of Qawam-es-Saltaneh as Prime Minister. When the latter came back to power and did not make Dashti a Minister, he turned against him and criticised him in many speeches. Dashti is certainly a persuasive orator, who holds the attention of the Majlis as few other persons can do. A prime mover in the Adalat party, he now utters the most enthusiastic praise of democracy on the British model, and evidently hopes that his past will be forgotten by us. As he appears to have much more audacity and forensic ability than most of his rivals, he may well go a good deal further than his present position as a Majlis Deputy. Backed by the Shah as candidate for the fourteenth Majlis, 1943.

56. *Daulatshahi, Abul-Fath*.—Born about 1879. A son of the late Mishkát-ud-Douleh. His mother was a daughter of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk Zanganeh of Kermanshah. Is married to a daughter of Mirza Hashim Ashtiani. A Qajar prince. Appointed Governor of Tehran in 1929 through the influence of his brother the late Ghulam Ali Mirza Daulatshahi, a relative of the second Pahlavi Queen. Appointed Governor of Luristan in 1925, but did not proceed; Governor-General of Fars 1936, from which appointment he was dismissed in September 1937, and was arrested for numerous corrupt practices. An easy-going spendthrift, up to his ears in debt, but not without intelligence.

Since 1941 has come out of his shell and is evidently hoping for employment, but was disappointed at failing to get elected to the fourteenth Majlis from Kermanshah.

57. *Diba, Abul Hassan (Siqat-ed-Douleh)*.—Born in Tehran 1898. Son of the late Vakil-ul-Mulk; a half-brother of Hishmat-ud-Douleh and of Dr. Musaddiq. His mother is a sister of Farman Farma. Educated in Europe. Employed for some time in the Ministry of Finance. Owns considerable property in Tabriz and Tehran. Employed in the Railway Office in 1928. In the Department of Commerce in 1931. Assistant Director of that Department July 1932. Resigned May 1933, and has since then devoted himself to private trade. Formed a private company, which is interested in various projects. Married; one of his daughters was educated in England. Owned the Park Hotel 1943.

Not devoid of brains.

58. *Divanbegi, Agha*.—Born in Kurdistan about 1891. Educated in Persia. In the employ of the Ministry of the Interior for some years. Went to Turkey with the Nationalists during the war. "Chef de cabinet" to the Governor-General of Kerman when Teymourtache was in charge there. A member of the sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises. Governor of Gilan in 1931. Resigned in 1933, and appointed Governor of Mazanderan in October 1934; relieved early in 1936.



Governor-General of Khuzistan, July 1942, and showed some energy, but is reported to have lined his pockets pretty thoroughly in connexion with certain contracts. Recalled early 1943.

Speaks French. Agreeable to talk to, but unreliable. Related to the Qaragozlou family.

59. *Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1885. Related to the Mukhbir-ud-Douleh (Hedayat) family.

Employed in various posts in the Foreign Office early in his career. Minister of Finance in June 1922. Appointed Governor-General of Kerman in October 1925, but did not proceed. Member of the Majlis for Quchan on several occasions. *Rapporteur* of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. Supported, by a speech in the Majlis, the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concession. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in February 1934. Ambassador to Turkey, May 1936. Recalled, November 1939.

Prominent member of the Society of Supporters of the League of Nations, founded in December 1933. Governor-General at Tabriz, 1941, after the fall of Reza. Did not display much energy in dealing with a difficult and delicate situation. Recalled to Tehran at the end of 1942. Minister without portfolio in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Speaks French. Very agreeable and reasonable in conversation. Not a great personality.

60. *Farhudi, Dr. Hussein*.—Born about 1899. Son-in-law of Wahid-ul-Mulk Shaibani. Educated in Tehran. Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Education, at Tehran and in the provinces. Has also done newspaper work. One of the directors-general of the Ministry, 1943. Successful candidate for Dasht-i-Mishun and Susangird in the fourteenth Majlis, 1943, though he had little connexion previously with that district beyond having been representative of the Ministry of Education in Ahwaz about 1933.

A rather greasy individual, well-disposed to us as he regards his success in the elections as our doing; and in fact a warm recommendation from the Minister of the Interior, Tadayyun, was passed on by this Legation to the Consul-General at Ahwaz.

61. *Farrukh, Mehdi (Mu'tasim-us-Saltaneh)*.—A Seyyid. Born about 1887. Was for some years in the employ of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and head of the 2nd Political Department, dealing with eastern countries. Minister at Kabul in 1927-28. Subsequently Director-General of Industry, Governor of Western Azerbaijan, February 1936. Again Director-General of Industry and Mines, September 1937, and shortly afterwards raised to the newly-created appointment of Minister of Industry and Mines. Removed from this post without explanation, March 1938.

Governor-General of Fars 1940, and of Kerman in 1941. Minister of the Interior of Soheily's Cabinet, July 1942, and in spite of Majlis opposition maintained his place in the Cabinet. Qawam-es-Saltaneh, in August, made him Minister of Food, in which post he displayed a sort of crazy activity which irritated many and did not achieve much. Having fallen out with the American adviser Sheridan, he left the Ministry of Food on the fall of the Qawam Cabinet in February 1943. Elected a deputy for Zabul in the fourteenth Majlis, November 1943.

62. *Farrukhi, Muhammad*.—Born at Yazd about 1885. Self-educated, coming from a poor family. A professed Communist since the Russian revolution of 1917. Started a paper in Tehran called *Tufan (Storm)* in 1922, which lasted in all eight years, being temporarily suspended eleven times during that period. Repeatedly exiled from Tehran, and once took refuge in the Soviet Embassy (which subsidised his paper) for three months. Elected a Deputy to the seventh Majlis, when he repeatedly criticised the Government. Succeeded in leaving Persia for Russia in 1930 without a passport. After a short stay in Russia went on to Germany where he edited, for a short time, a Persian Communist paper called *Nehzat (Progress)*. This paper was suppressed in 1932 by the German Government. Since then is believed to be living in Germany. Composes poetry.

63. *Farzaneh, Hassan*.—Born about 1892. Educated at Tehran and in France. Was in the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for about twelve years, during which he acted as *Chargé d'Affaires* for Moscow and Rome in 1924 and 1929. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior in 1935, and appointed Governor of Khorramshahr in February 1936. Assumed charge of the Governorates of Khorramshahr and Abadan in October 1936. Employed in

Ministry of Interior 1942. Head of Political Department 1943. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, December 1943.

Speaks French, a fair amount of English and a little Russian. Well educated and polished, keenly interested in westernisation. Friendly to the British.

64. *Fateh, Mahmoud*.—Brother of Mustafa Fateh. Born about 1900 at Isfahan and educated at Tehran and at Montpellier. Trained in agriculture and husbandry. In charge of the Karaj agricultural school for some years. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture 1943. Has planned a model village at Veramine, of which he is very proud.

Helpful and business-like, though inclined to be too optimistic and to imagine that all Persia's agricultural difficulties can be solved by tractors.

65. *Fateh, Mustafa*.—Born in Isfahan about 1897. Son of Fateh-ul-Mulk, a servant of the Prince-Governor of Isfahan, Zill-us-Sultan. Educated at Tehran and at Columbia University, United States, where he graduated in economics. Entered the Anglo-Persian Oil Company about 1922 and is the senior Persian official in that company at Tehran, drawing a large salary. Author of a book on the economic condition of Persia, published in 1926. Has a perfect command of English and is keenly interested in Persian politics. He also has an international outlook and a considerable knowledge of world politics, particularly those of the left. In 1943 founded the *Hamrahan* party, with the express object of combating communism, though the party's programme contained elaborate socialistic ideals far beyond anything which will be practicable in Persia for some time. Always very approachable and desirous of enlisting British help for his schemes; and a mine of information about the foibles of his countrymen, whom he divides into two sharply distinct categories: (1) The old gang who are hopelessly corrupt, and (2) his party members who are sublimely honest. Few other people believe in this dichotomy, and he has many enemies who accuse him of devoting the oil company's funds to the purposes of his party and its newspaper, *Imrooz va Farda*.

Has a son in England and a daughter married to Asghar Mirga, the son of Sarem-ud-Douleh, who surely would come in category (1). His wife was a daughter of the Zill-us-Sultan's head secretary, Siraj-ul-Mulk.

66. *Fatimi, Mehdi (Imad-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1886. Has had an official career in the Ministry of Finance, and in 1918 was financial representative in his native city of Isfahan, where he is influential both through his own family and through that of his wife, who is a daughter of the late Prince Zill-es-Sultan. Appointed Deputy-Governor of Fars in 1922-23. Elected a Deputy from Isfahan in the fifth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Appointed Minister of Education in August 1925, Minister of Justice in December 1925, and Minister of Interior February to May 1927.

Formerly somewhat addicted to opium and fond of gambling, but when he attained ministerial rank he put aside these bad habits to a certain extent, with beneficial results to his health. As a Minister and a Deputy he was uniformly popular and successful. In 1928 he fell out with the Minister of Court and was not allowed to be elected to the seventh term of the Majlis. Elected a Deputy to the eighth Majlis 1930. Is socially agreeable and friendly to His Majesty's Legation. Governor of Gilan from December 1933 until October 1937.

Survived a good many attacks from the Court in connexion with his conduct as Governor of Gilan; one of the charges being that he allowed the level of the Caspian Sea to fall.

Head of the Municipality of Tehran under Soheily's Cabinet, February 1943. Resigned 1943 and elected Deputy for Nain 1943. He speaks no European language except a little French.

67. *Fatimi (Fatemy) Seiffur*.—Born about 1905; one of three brothers, a Naini family which claims relationship with Mehdi Fatemy (Imad-us-Saltaneh), though the latter denies it. Educated at the Stuart Memorial College, Isfahan, where he became a baptised Christian; but he made away with some of the mission funds and the mission do not forgive him. He and another, named Hussein Saadat, wrote a book against Islam. In order to marry his present wife, who is well-off, became a Bahai.

Farmandar (Governor) of Shiraz 1941-43; then resigned, apparently because he had amassed too much money there. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, considered him energetic, helpful and capable. Then returned to Isfahan as candidate for the Majlis for Najafabad, and though he had little real following in that area success was engineered for him by Morteza Quli Bakhtiari and Sarem ud Douleh.



Intelligent, entirely unscrupulous, and very ambitious; speaks good English and has studied English and English literature, and can remember many extracts. At present (1944) it suits him to appear pro-British; he is certainly anti-Russian. Has many enemies, both Persian and British, but is a man who can, when he wishes, make himself very useful.

68. *Feroughi, Abul-Hassan*.—Born about 1878. A younger brother of Muhammad Ali Feroughi. Employed in the Ministry of Education for many years as a professor of philosophy; in his teaching he has always shown leaning towards an extreme Sufi-ism. A member of the High Council of Education for many years. President of the Ecole normale for some time. Appointed Minister in Switzerland 1933, probably in order to keep an eye on the Crown Prince's education in that country. The professor did not shine as a diplomat and was recalled in 1934: he apparently failed to pay proper reverence to the Pahlavi Queen when she visited her son early in 1934. Since then living quietly at Tehran; a highly respected, timid, and ineffective professor of philosophy.

69. *Ferouhar, Abbas*.—Born about 1895. Though his junior in age, is an uncle of Abul-Qasim Ferouhar. Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1934, and acted as head of that department in 1935 and part of 1936. Head of the Personnel Department, July 1936 to April 1937. Counsellor, Angora, until September 1938. Head of the Protocol Department, September 1938.

Speaks French. Married in 1939 a daughter of Muhammad Ali Muqaddam. Polite, friendly and well-meaning, but the head of the Protocol Department under Reza Shah had a thankless task. Nevertheless, M. Ferouhar, unlike his colleagues at the Court, survived the ordeal of the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations.

Sent to Beirut with the vague title of "Délégué" at the end of 1942. Recalled temporarily in 1943 to give explanations about the conduct of Muzaffar Firuz. He survived the ordeal and attributed the unfounded accusations against him to the enmity of Nasrullah Entezam.

A talkative but somewhat too oily little man.

70. *Ferouhar, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem)*.—Born in Tehran about 1883. A grandson of Mirza Abbas Khan Qavam-ed-Douleh, who was Minister of Finance for some years. Educated in Tehran and Switzerland; studied law. A judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1915-21. Chief of Construction at the Tehran Municipality 1921-24. President of the Tribunal 1926-27. Assistant Director of the Registration Department in the Ministry of the Interior 1927-28. Judge in the Appeal Court in 1929. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance under his great friend Davar October 1933. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934. Minister to France June 1936; but recalled in January owing to an anti-Persian press campaign in some French newspapers. Acting Minister of Interior, July, and Minister, September 1937. Minister of Industry and Mines, March 1938. Minister of Interior, August 1938 to February 1939, when superseded for no stated reason. A Deputy for Tehran in the twelfth Majlis, October 1939, and in the 13th Majlis, 1941. Appears to have lost some of his energy, being unwilling to become Minister of the Interior to run the elections in 1943. Married to a Bulgarian lady, he has a child in Germany, but he has always been friendly to us, and is a man of considerable intelligence.

71. *Fidakar (Fedakar), Taqi (Taghi)*.—Born about 1905, in Isfahan, of humble origin. Educated at the Saremieh school at Isfahan. As a boy he got into trouble for socialistic beliefs. Trained as a lawyer. Worked for a time in the Soviet Consulate-General at Isfahan in connexion with the sale of Soviet textiles in Isfahan. From 1940 onwards has devoted most of his energies to bettering the lot of the Isfahan factory workers and has done much to help them, as he has become the chief workers' representative in disputes about conditions of work. Founded a primitive sort of trade union for the protection of workers' interests, including insurance. Elected to the fourteenth Majlis for Isfahan 1943, being supported by the Tudeh party, of which he is a member, though he disclaims being a Communist and is not looked upon favourably by the Tudeh party in Tehran owing to his moderate views. He is thought not to have had any direct relations with the Soviet authorities concerning the elections. He is, of course, disliked by most of the capitalists of Isfahan, though some of them accept him as a fairly single-minded man. His main political following is among the factory workers and guilds and small bazaar men, who are naturally opposed to domination by the few rich families of Isfahan.

72. *Firuz, Muhammad Hussein*.—Born about 1895. The fourth son of the late Farman Farma. Educated at the military college at Petrograd. Entered the Persian army during the 1914-18 war, and was regarded as one of the promising young officers of the army. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Southern Division in 1925, and did very good work in organising the troops in Fars and enforcing discipline and efficiency. Sent to Delhi as representative of the Persian army at the Indian army manoeuvres early in 1925. Fell under suspicion for some reason about 1929 and resigned his commission. His Qajar origin was no doubt the cause of his collapse. Very attached to his brother Firuz (Nusrat-ed-Douleh) but not on good terms with his father. Married a Miss Namazi, who was educated in Hong Kong and speaks English perfectly.

Returned to Persia late in 1941, and was sent to Fars as G.O.C. and Governor-General in March 1942. Superseded in both appointments by Marshal Shahbakhti a year later. He had succeeded in keeping a rather precarious order in Fars, but never succeeded in repressing Nasir Qashqai's rebellious movement. Head of the Air Force, 1943.

Speaks very good French and some English; intelligent and enlightened. A brilliant talker, he seems capable of proving with most convincing reasons that he is always right—but one feels sometimes that he is too convincing.

73. *Firuz, Muhammad Vali*.—Third son of the late Farman Farma. Born about 1893. Educated at Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as head of the Finance Department, 1915. Said to have taken many bribes while in that appointment. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected a Deputy to the fourth, fifth and sixth Majlises for Tabriz. On the fall of his brother, Nusrat-ed-Douleh, in 1931, he retired from public life and was seldom seen. Has been in Europe a good deal.

Elected to the thirteenth Majlis for Sarab in September 1941, and again to the fourteenth in November 1943. His appearance, being that of an underfed bird of prey, seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence.

74. *Furughi (Foroughi), Muhsin*.—Born about 1907; son of the late Muhammad Ali Furughi. Educated at Tehran and in Paris, where he took a degree. On return to Tehran began practising as an architect. Does not take part in politics. A good type of young Persian. Married to a Frenchwoman of good middle-class family.

75. *Ghaffari, Emir Sehameddine (Zuka-ed-Douleh)*.—Born in Tehran about 1880. The second son of the late Muhandis-ul-Mamalik. Educated in Persia and Germany. On the staff of the Ministry of Education 1914-18. Appointed Persian Minister in Berne 1919-22. Did not venture to return to Persia till the Pahlavi régime was well established in 1931. A chamberlain to Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah and Ahmed Shah. Employed in the Ministry of Education 1934, as a professor of economics. Imprisoned 1939 by order of Reza Shah, on an accusation of having expressed doubts whether the trans-Iranian railway would pay. Sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but kept in prison when his term had been served. Finally obtained release on the fall of Reza Shah in 1941. Director of the Propaganda Section in 1942 and 1943 though he was not very effective in that post and was relieved of his duties early in 1943. Advocated propaganda in favour of religion in order to keep men's minds away from communism.

Speaks French, German, and some English. A very voluble, persistent little man, with a great idea of his own importance and infallibility. Has a large family of daughters.

76. *Ghaffari, Hassan Ali (Mu'dvin-ud-Dowleh)*.—Born about 1890, son of the late Moavin-ed-Dowleh, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Europe. Once an attaché to the Persian Legation in Brussels. Has made his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he became Director of the Protocol Department. After the coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1926, Ghaffari was appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court, which post he held until March 1929, when he was appointed Political Director-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. He was dismissed in November 1929 for permitting publication in the press of the judicial safeguards accorded to foreign subjects in 1928, after the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges, but was reinstated in December 1929. He owed his appointment and reinstatement to Teymourache, the Minister of Court, with whom he was on terms of intimate friendship.

Ghaffari is an agreeable and well-educated man, and speaks French and German fluently. Appointed Minister at Brussels in the spring of 1933. Recalled to Tehran December 1936.



77. *Ghaffari, Jalal-ud-Din (Muhandis-ul-Mamalik)*.—Born in Tehran about 1878. Son of the late Muhandis-ul-Mamalik, one of the Ministers of Nasir-ud-Din and Muzaffer-ud-Din. Educated in Persia and Germany. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1913; has held various posts as revenue officer in that Ministry. Discharged suddenly owing to intrigues against him in 1929. Since then acted as agent for the Sheikh of Mohammerah in negotiations with Government Departments. Unemployed since the sheikh's death in May 1936.

Voluble and energetic; very well disposed towards us.

78. *Ghani, Qasim*.—Born about 1894 at Sabzevar. Sent to Tehran for education by his uncle, Agha Khazra'i, and studied in the Bahai "Tarbiat" school for four years. Then went to Beirut where he qualified as a doctor after a course lasting about seven years. On return to Tehran stayed a short time and then went back to his native town and practised medicine, founding a hospital and doing many good works. Then went to Meshed, where he married a rich wife. A great student of Persian literature. Elected as a Deputy for Meshed in the 13th Majlis. Minister of Health in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Member of the Persian Farhangistan or Academy.

A cultured and widely-read man, reputed to be a Bahai, but that is doubtful. Author of a history of Sufism.

79. *Hajir, Abdul Hussein*.—Born about 1895. The son of one of the "Fida'is" of the early days of the Constitution, who served under Taqi-zadeh.

In 1930 served under Taqi-zadeh in the Ministry of Roads and Communications; and in the following year followed that Minister to the Ministry of Finance. Government inspector of the National Bank. A favourite of Davar's, he was given various lucrative posts by him, including the management of the Cloth Monopoly ("Shirkat-i-Qumash") and, most important of all, the direction of the Exchange Control Commission. Relinquished his post at the Exchange Control Commission in the summer of 1937 to proceed to Europe as part of a commission to purchase stocks for the Cloth Monopoly. Head of the Industrial and Agricultural Bank, August 1938. Minister of Commerce and Industry, March 1942, and Minister of Roads and Communications in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Showed commendable energy in inspecting communications in person.

Went to England to study transport conditions in June 1943 and was still away at the end of the year; meanwhile, in December 1943, on the Cabinet being reshuffled, he became Minister of the Interior.

An energetic and resourceful man; in his early days he was an interpreter and munshi at the Russian Consulate-General. Speaks French, Russian and English; very talkative but has many sound ideas and a shrewd knowledge of his countrymen. Is unmarried.

80. *Hakimi, Ali Akbar*.—Born in Tehran about 1894, the son of the late Mirza Mahmoud Khan Hakim-ul-Mulk, a personal servant of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah. Married to a French lady. Owns property near Tehran, on which he managed to grow a variety of cotton which was considered of very good quality. In virtue of this, appointed Director of Agriculture in 1931, though he had had no previous experience in Government service. Resigned in 1932. Acted as a member of the Directing Board of the Agricultural Bank during 1933. Since then has retired to his estates.

Minister of Agriculture in Feroughi's Cabinet, October 1941, but resigned through ill-health, or more probably incompetence, February 1942. It was not much loss.

81. *Hidayat, Abdullah, Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Born about 1902, the son of Mukhbir-ud-Douleh (Ghulam Reza Kemal-Hidayat), and so member of a family that has usually been pro-British. Brigadier Hidayat is outwardly friendly; and is intelligent and ambitious but something of an intriguer. Trained at the French Ecole de Guerre, and also at Fontainebleau. Head of the Third Bureau, General Staff, February 1941; at the Staff College November 1941; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, May 1942; Commandant of the Officers' School, November 1942.

A well-qualified serious officer, more staff officer than a commander. Has a good reputation for honesty. When with the General Staff supported Yazdan-Panah in his opposition to a foreign military mission. Belongs to the military clique headed by his friend Razmara. Speaks good French and some English.

82. *Hidayat, Izzatullah*.—Son of the late Sani-ed-Douleh, who was murdered in Tehran during the Constitutional troubles about 1908. Born about

1895. Educated as a civil engineer in Germany. Member of the staff of the Legation at Berlin 1920-23. On the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 1925. Appointed Chief of Railway Construction about that time. Interested in various engineering projects in Tehran, and in a spinning factory. Director of the port of Pahlavi 1930. Arrested and tried for complicity in the irregularities in the Ministry of Roads and Communications February 1936; sentenced in the autumn to six months' imprisonment and a fine.

Intelligent, and of charming manners. Speaks French and German. His mother was a daughter of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah. Exonerated after the fall of Reza Shah, but not re-employed in Government service. In 1943 engaged in contracting work.

83. *Hidayat, Mehdi Quli (Mukhbir-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1865. Spent several years in Germany as a young man. Was appointed Chamberlain at Court in 1896. Accompanied the Atabeg on his tour round the world in 1903, and afterwards performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned to Tehran in 1904, and was appointed Director of the Military College. Appointed Minister of Public Instruction in March 1907, and Minister of Justice in October 1907. Governor-General of Azerbaijan in 1908, but left for Europe in June 1908. Returned in August 1909 and resumed the Governorship-General of Azerbaijan, where he remained until 1911, when he again visited Europe. At this time, Hidayat was on very bad terms with the Russian Legation in Tehran. Returned to Persia in December 1911. Governor-General of Fars from 1913 to 1915. During the war his sympathies were with the Germans, and in Fars he secretly helped German agents. Appointed Minister of Justice in November 1917, and again in January 1918. Became Minister of Interior in April 1918, when he abetted the Jangalis in their rebellion against the Central Government, and he also used his official position to carry on propaganda amongst the men of the South Persia Rifles, which led to some disaffection. Appointed Minister of Finance from July to November 1920, and Minister of Public Works from March to June 1923. Elected a Deputy to the fifth term of the Majlis 1924-26. Minister of Public Works June 1926. Appointed chief judge of the Court of Appeal in April 1927, and Prime Minister in June 1927. During his tenure of office as Prime Minister he acted at times as Minister of Finance as well.

Speaks German, French and some English, and is intelligent and well read. His hatred of Russia caused him to favour the German cause during the European War, and as a result he was often very unfriendly towards Great Britain. Of later years he has become more friendly, and endeavours to eschew political intrigue. As Prime Minister he was but a figure-head, and carried out the policy which Teymourache dictated. He is addicted to opium smoking, and is rapidly becoming more enfeebled in both mind and body.

Hidayat's Cabinet lasted till September 1933, when the Shah instructed it to resign. Hidayat was then appointed Governor-General of Khorasan, but succeeded in begging himself off, on grounds of old age and private affairs; he therefore did not proceed to Meshed, and another Governor-General was appointed in December 1933.

84. *Hidayat, Reza Quli (Nayyer-ul-Mulk)*.—Eldest son of the late Jaafar Quli Khan Nayyer-ul-Mulk, and a brother of the late Mukhbir-ul-Douleh. K.C.I.E. Born in Tehran about 1870. Educated at the Darulfunun College at Tehran. Served in the Ministry of Education 1895-1920. Director-General of that Ministry from 1919 to 1921. Minister of Education in Seyyid Zia's Cabinet of 1921. Again in the same post in 1922. Member of the High Court of Appeal 1927. Acting president of the High Court of Appeal 1928 to 1934, and president from 1934 to 1936, when he had to resign owing to the Shah's displeasure at the conduct of the trials for corruption of members of the Ministry of Roads and Communications. A member of the supervisory Board of the National Bank of Iran 1929-32.

A highly respectable and respected old gentleman, who was no doubt glad to relinquish the delicate task of supplying exactly judgments which the Shah required from him.

85. *Hikmat, Ali Asghar*.—Born about 1894. A member of a Shiraz family and cousin to Mushar-ud-Douleh (Mirza Nizam-ud-Din Khan Hikmat) and Sardar Fakhr (Mirza Reza Khan Hikmat). Educated in the Church Missionary Society School at Shiraz 1908-09. Well read in Arabic. Went to Tehran in 1914, where he entered the American College, graduating in 1917. Joined the Ministry of Public Instruction as an inspector. Appointed Director of Education for Fars about 1920, but kept out of the position owing to



intrigues. Candidate for Parliament (the fifth Majlis) in 1923, for Shiraz and also for Jahrum, but was not successful. Employed in the Ministry of Education until about 1930, when he went abroad to Paris to study law. Said to have done well in his examinations. Returned to Tehran in September 1933, to take charge of the Ministry of Education as acting Minister. Raised to the rank of Minister in February 1936. Dismissed, July 1938, owing to the Shah's displeasure about a telegram connected with the Paris Exhibition, but restored to favour as Minister of the Interior, February 1939. Resigned March 1940. Was proposed for Minister, Berlin, but the German Government hesitated about his agreement. When it did come the Shah decided to re-employ him as Minister of the Interior instead, but dismissed him in June 1940.

Minister of Industry and Commerce in Feroughi's Cabinet in 1941, and had a good deal to do with the negotiations about the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Health, March 1942. Minister of Justice in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943, but resigned in July owing to differences of opinion with his chief.

The author of some literary works, he spends some time instructing students in Persian literature at the university. Often accused of intriguing against Qawam-ul-Mulk, but such accusations have not been proved. He remains one of the most promising candidates for the post of Prime Minister.

Speaks English and French well; always very helpful to us.

86. *Hikmat Reza (Sadat Fakhr)*.—Born Shiraz about 1888. Cousin of Ali Asghar Hikmat. During the 1914-18 war was a determined enemy of Qawam-ul-Mulk and friendly with the Qashqais. Since that war settled down in Tehran and was employed in various Government appointments. Governor-General of Kerman 1940-41. Head of the Statistics and Civil Status Office 1942. Candidate for the 14th Majlis 1944 for Shiraz, and seemed still to enjoy the support and friendship of the Qashqais.

A corpulent and polite man, very hospitable, but a man of curious friends.

87. *Homayundjah, Muhammad Ali*.—Born about 1888. A graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Judge of the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-25. Has held various clerical posts in the Ministry, culminating in that of head of the personnel section of the Ministry 1932-34. Sent as counsellor to Paris in 1935; a post to which he was singularly ill-fitted owing to his scanty knowledge of French.

For some obscure reason, said to be connected with seniority, was made Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1942; in which post he maintains his reputation of benevolent and useless stupidity.

A corpulent individual showing few indications of intelligence; his appointment to a foreign post was looked upon as a very good joke in Tehran.

88. *Ibtihaj (Ebtahaj), Abul-Hassan*.—Second son of Ebtahaj-ul-Mulk, and brother of Ghulam Hussein Ebtahaj. Born at Resht about 1900. Interpreter to the British forces in Gilan towards the end of the war. Entered the service of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Resht about 1920. Did well there, and was transferred to Tehran 1925. Assistant to the chief inspector from then till he resigned in 1936.

Head of the Mortgage Bank 1939. Realised one of his ambitions when he became president of the National Bank of Iran (Banque Mellié) in September 1942. In that post he has worked hard and been of great service to us in many ways. He seems to be one of the few Persian financiers with intelligence, ability and energy. On the other hand he is hasty, hot-tempered and easily upset, and his persistence in an unwise legal attack on the Imperial Bank of Iran (a suit which he eventually lost) seems to show that he bears that institution a grudge. Pro-British and anti-Russian to such an extent that he is almost regarded as a British agent by his numerous political rivals.

Married in 1926 Maryam, daughter of Taghi Nabari (Muazziz-ud-Douleh). Both he and his wife speak English, French and Russian well. No children.

89. *Ibtihaj (Ebtahaj), Ghulam Hussein*.—Born at Resht 1898. Eldest son of the late Ebtahaj-ul-Mulk, who was for years in charge of the Gilan estates of Fathullah Akbar. Educated at Resht and completed his studies at Beirut, and for a short time in France. Interpreter to the British Expeditionary Force 1918-20.

His father was assassinated by the Jungalis, and he, together with his family, fled to Tehran when the Bolsheviks occupied Gilan in 1920. Clerk in the Prime Minister's office 1920-21. Secretary to the Governor of Gilan 1921-22. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and assistant to the American

adviser, Colonel Morris 1923-28. Dismissed from that post, apparently for dishonesty. Joined the Ulen Company in 1929, when the latter had a contract to construct the railways in the south. Transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1931; first secretary in London April 1932. First secretary in Cairo March 1933. Suspended by the Ministry shortly after, apparently for conduct in London when the d'Arcy Concession was cancelled. In 1934 Chief of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior; and then director of the Tourist Department and chief of the Touring Club of Iran. Went to Moscow in September 1936 to arrange the transfer of the Russian tourist organisation "Intourist" to his organisation, newly named "Iran-tour." Assistant to the Chief of the Tehran Municipality October 1937, but returned to the Ministry of Interior in 1938. Director of Administrative Services in the Ministry August 1938. Acting Chief of Tehran Municipality July 1939.

Incurred Reza Shah's displeasure and was relieved of his charge of the Municipality in September 1940. Since then has been controlling "Iran-tour," an hotel syndicate, and also serving on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Mixed Administration. In 1942 divorced his Persian wife and married a Polish refugee.

Author of a widely used guide book to Iran. Speaks English, French and Russian. A clever young man, with vast ideas; not to be trusted very far.

90. *Ilkhan, Amir Hussein*.—Son of the late Sardar Zafar, Bakhtiari. Born about 1896. Educated partly in England. Married to a sister of the later Sardar Asad. Governor of Yazd 1918-19. A Deputy to the sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and placed under arrest in December 1933. Tried by a military court on charge of treason to the State; sentenced to three years' imprisonment with hard labour November 1934. Released 1936.

A popular and pleasant young man, who speaks English and French.

Candidate for the fourteenth Majlis 1943. One of the best of the younger Bakhtiari.

91. *Intizam (Entezam), Abdullah*.—Born about 1897. Brother of Seyyid Nasrullah. Served the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various capacities since about 1921. While secretary at Washington married an American lady. At the Ministry in Tehran 1925-27. In the Press Department of the Ministry 1933-35. Transferred to Prague 1936 as consul. Chargé d'Affaires, Berne, May 1938.

Head of the 3rd Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1941, and was responsible for most of the routine work connected with as a member of the staff of the Legation at Berne at the end of that year. He had previously divorced his American wife and one explanation of his journey to Berne was that he was pursuing another lady.

A pleasant and go-ahead young man; speaks English and French.

92. *Intizam (Entezam), Nasrullah*.—Born about 1899. Son of the late Entezam-us-Saltaneh, and nephew of Hassan Ali Ghaffari. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Secretary at Paris 1926. Secretary at Warsaw 1927-32. Secretary to the Persian delegates to the League of Nations during the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Member of the Persian delegation to the World Economic Conference 1933. Secretary at London May 1933. Transferred to Washington 1934. Has also served in the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. First secretary at Berne 1936. "Délégué suppléant" at the League of Nations May 1938. Head of the 3rd Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing *inter alia* with Great Britain), July 1938. Attended the Duke of Spoleto's wedding in Italy June 1939.

Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the reconstruction of Qawam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet in February 1943, a post which he retained in the following Cabinet of Soheily.

A quiet and attractive young man. Helpful and honest. Speaks French and English.

93. *Iqbal (Eghbal), Ali*.—Born in Meshed about 1895. Son of a well-known landowner of Khorasan, with property at Kashmar and elsewhere in the province. Deputy in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth Majlises. Never in Government service, but well acquainted with Khorasan politics. Aspired to becoming the mutawalli-bashi of the Meshed shrine 1943, but did not succeed owing to the opposition of the Governor-General. An enemy of Soheily, and a professing supporter of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din. In the Majlis does not cultivate the limelight but exercises a good deal of influence on various committees and political groups.



94. *Iqbal (Eghbal), Manuchihr*.—Younger brother of Ali Iqbal. Born at Meshed about 1898. Educated at Tehran at the medical school, and then in France, where he qualified as a doctor and received a medal for research. Returned to Persia in 1939 and was employed for some time in the Ministry of Public Health. Under-Secretary of the Ministry 1943, he ran the technical side of the Ministry's work with success, and is evidently hard-working and efficient. Does not mix in politics. Married to a Frenchwoman.

95. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Colonel Abbas Quli*.—Born about 1897. Third son of Hassan Esfandiari. Graduated at Saint-Cyr in France and joined the French army during the war; was wounded and captured by the Germans. Was a captain in the French army and received the Légion d'Honneur and the Croix de Guerre. Returned to Persia in 1919 and joined the gendarmerie with the rank of major. Married a daughter of Farman Farma in 1931. On special duty with the Haardt Citroen Trans-Asiatic expedition in 1931. Acting head of the 4th Bureau at army headquarters in 1932.

Chief of the 1st Bureau of the General Staff, Tehran in 1940.

96. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Abdul Hussein Sadiq (Sadiq-ul-Mulk)*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1917. First secretary at Brussels 1926. Recalled in 1931. Counsellor at Kabul 1933. Consul at Karachi 1934-36. Head of the Economics Section of the Consular Department, later made a separate department, 1937.

Consul-General at Jerusalem 1939. Married a daughter of Yamin-Esfandiari.

A relation of Haji Muhtashim-es-Saltaneh (Hassan Esfandiari). Rather a stupid individual, the inefficiency of whose methods caused travellers from Karachi to Iran a good deal of trouble in 1936.

97. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Asadullah Yamin (Yamin-ul-Mamalik)*.—Son of the late Yamin-ul-Mamalik and a nephew of Hassan Esfandiari. Born in Tehran 1885. Educated in Tehran and Tiflis. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1901; in 1908 had reached the rank of deputy chief of the Foreign Office Tribunal. Karguzar in Isfahan 1917. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1921-23. Consul-general at Baku 1924-29. Governor of Mazanderan 1930-32. Recalled from that post and under a cloud for some time. Director of the Tehran Telephone Company.

Deputy in the thirteenth Majlis 1941 to 1943. Is a director of most of the important companies of the capital, and finds time to look after the affairs of the Aero-Club as well. Has a typical capitalist and conservative outlook, but nevertheless spoke in the Majlis in favour of the factory workers at Isfahan.

98. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Fathullah Nuri*. Second son of Hassan Esfandiari (Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh). Born about 1895. Educated in Switzerland and France. Second secretary of the Persian Legation in London 1914-24. Assistant chief of the English Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1925. First secretary at Washington 1926-29. Counsellor at Paris 1929-30. Counsellor in London and Chargé d'Affaires 1930-31, and was in charge at the time of the Persian Exhibition. Chief of the Economics Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1932. Chargé d'Affaires again in London March to December 1933. Head of the Treaty Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1934; served also in the Passport section. For three months from the end of 1935 he was in Bagdad on a mission charged with negotiations over the frontier dispute, but achieved little. "Chef du protocole" May 1936 to December 1937. In charge of the Government-controlled "Iran" Insurance Company 1938. Appointed Persian Government representative with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1942 in London.

Married to a Frenchwoman; speaks French and English. Conscientious and helpful; an excellent type of permanent official, though he has not inherited the eloquence of his father, much to the latter's disappointment.

99. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Hassan (Haji Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1862. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and after a short time was appointed secretary to the Persian Legation in Berlin. In 1895 he was appointed Persian consul in Bombay; returned in 1897 to Tehran and became Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah to Europe in 1905. Later he became Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior. Appointed Persian Minister in London in 1906, but did not proceed. Minister of Justice in 1910 and Minister for Foreign Affairs from January to July 1911. Minister of Finance in 1912-13 and again

from August 1914 to March 1915. Minister for Foreign Affairs from April 1915 to December 1915. Minister of Finance from June to September 1917, when he was appointed Governor-General in Azerbaijan. In 1919 he was exiled to Kashan by Mirza Hassan Khan Vossuq for intriguing against the Government of the day. He was allowed to return to Tehran in July 1920. Minister for Foreign Affairs, February to March 1921 and from June 1921 to January 1922. Minister of Education June 1922 to June 1923 and Minister of Finance from September 1926 to January 1927.

Hostile to the Allies in the war of 1914-18, he was bought by the Germans in 1915, but that did not prevent him from taking money from the Russians as well. Reputed to be dishonest and an intriguer. When Minister of Finance in 1917 he caused the grain in the Government stores to be sold in order to pay up arrears of salaries due to Government employees, and by this act was partly responsible for the mortality caused in Tehran by the famine which followed the crop failure of 1917. Elected as a Deputy to the eighth Majlis 1930. Was a prominent speaker in the Majlis when the latter body unanimously denounced the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession at the end of 1932.

A pleasant man to talk to; has great ideas of his own importance and seniority. He is interested in the silk industry of Gilan, holding a Government concession for the export of cocoons. The father of Fathullah Hourri Isfandiari (q.v.), &c. Speaks a little French. Prominent in support of the Persian Society of Supporters of the League of Nations. Appointed president of the Majlis when Dadgar fell in July 1935, and re-elected president of the eleventh Majlis September 1937, and of the twelfth October 1939. Headed the Iranian Mission to the Coronation of King George VI, and the mission to Egypt on the marriage of the Crown Prince to Princess Fowzieh, February-April 1939. Continued as president of the Majlis in its thirteenth legislative period 1941, in spite of being well over the age-limit. It seems difficult to imagine the Majlis without him, and, in spite of occasional newspaper attacks, he is widely respected as an Elder Statesman. One of the last acts of the thirteenth Majlis, in December 1943, was to vote him a life pension of 10,000 rials per month.

100. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Musa Nuri (Muvaffaq-es-Sultaneh)*.—Brother of Asadullah Yamin-Esfandiari. Born in Tehran 1894. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. Secretary at Rome for some time. Chief of the Economic Section of the Ministry 1929. Chief of the League of Nations' section 1932. Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires at Paris 1933. Counsellor at Moscow in December 1933, and very soon afterwards transferred to Angora, where he was Chargé d'Affaires for some time. Head of the Consular Department, March 1937. Director-General of Industry and Mines, July 1937. Summarily relieved of that appointment in September owing to a muddle over the Chalus silk factory that was in reality due to his predecessor, Jehanbani. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 1937. Minister, Bagdad, August 1938. Sent on a special mission to Berlin 1939. Left Berlin on rupture of relations in 1941, and returned to Bagdad as Minister; recalled to Tehran, on conclusion of five years' foreign service, in 1943. Though at first suspected of pro-German feelings, owing to his visit to Berlin, he behaved correctly on his second period of office in Bagdad. Minister of Agriculture in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943.

Speaks French and Italian. A pleasant young man. Married very early, and has a son who is a champion at lawn-tennis.

101. *Itimadi (Ettehad), Nasir Quli (Nasr-ul-Douleh)*.—Born about 1886. A Qajar prince, descended from the famous vazir, Mirza Taghi Khan. Occupied various posts in Government service, including Governor of the Gulf Ports in 1923. Sent on an economic mission to Germany in connexion with the settlement of various accounts about 1939. Returned to Persia 1942, and soon after appointed assistant to the Prime Minister by Soheily, with the rank of Under-Secretary of State.

Ambitious and clever; a good bridge player; but without much stability. Speaks French and German.

Having previously served in the Ministry of War he hoped at one time to become Minister of War. Resigned January 1944, having hopes of governing Fars.

102. *Jahan (Djehan), Ja'far (Djafar)*.—Born at Kerbela 1905, of a Mazanderani family. Educated at Tehran in the Law School. In 1931 went to France and studied law at Toulouse but did not complete the course. 1933 judge



in the Tehran Court of First Instance. 1934 in the Ministry of the Interior. 1938 to 1940 employed on inspection duties. Editor of a Tehran newspaper. Has done translations for this embassy.

A talkative man, very self-opinionated; speaks of a revival of religion in Persia, and advocates a return to religious control of the "Waqf" endowments.

103. *Jahanbani, Amir Lashkar Amanullah*.—Born about 1890, son of the late Amanullah Mirza, Zia-ed-Dowleh (a descendant of Fath Ali Shah), who committed suicide in the British consulate in Tabriz, where he had taken refuge from the Russians in 1917.

Amanullah joined the Persian Cossack Artillery School in 1907. In 1910 he was sent to the military school in Moscow, where he graduated in 1913. For the following two years he was attached to the Imperial Guard. In 1916 he entered the Persian Cossack Division with the rank of captain, and was made aide-de-camp to the Russian General Starosselsky, then commanding officer of the Cossack Division. He sided with Reza Khan in the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and later distinguished himself in the operations against Simitko, being greatly helped therein by former Tsarist officers attached to his staff. Was made a general, and became chief of the General Staff in 1922. He visited France and England in 1923. Although a Qajar prince, he favoured the change of dynasty in 1925. Removed from his post as Chief of Staff for taking matters too easily, but regained the Royal favour, and was appointed to command the Eastern Division in August 1926. He organised and commanded the expedition for the pacification of Persian Baluchistan in the autumn of 1928, and in November 1928 he was created General of Division (Amir Lashkar) as a reward for his services; in December 1930 went to France to follow a course of two years' training at the Staff College.

Inspector-General of the Army in 1932. Inspector of military schools in 1933. Employed in Baluchistan in 1934 and 1935. In October 1935 fell from favour as the result of remarks made by him criticising certain arrangements for the Senior Officers' Staff College. His eclipse was, however, brief, and he was appointed Director-General of Industry in March 1936. Dismissed in July 1937. The reasons are variously rumoured as friendliness with foreigners, espionage by his Russian wife, or an explosion which occurred in a powder magazine.

He is pleasant and agreeable, though inclined to suffer from swelled head. Intelligent and fairly well educated, he is enthusiastic about sport, which he has done much to encourage in the Persian army; plays polo and tennis moderately well. Fond of European society, easy-going, and somewhat lacking in determination. He does not fleece the populace as do many of his colleagues. He is inclined to imitate westerners, and is ready to accept new ideas and machines without considering their suitability.

Is friendly to Englishmen, but finds Frenchmen and Russians of the former régime more congenial. Reported in prison in Tehran in July 1939, and in poor health. Liberated 1941 and made Minister of the Interior in September. Minister of Roads and Communications, December 1941. Minister of War, March 1942, and employed in the autumn at Court as a kind of aide-de-camp in general to the Shah. Useful in doing little jobs with the Soviet Embassy, but gives the impression of being overmuch inclined to subject the present Shah to the same sort of fulsome flattery which turned his father's head.

General officer commanding, Fars, September 1943.

Speaks Russian and French fluently; has a Russian, as well as at least one Persian, wife.

104. *Jahanbani (Djehanbani), Muhammed Hussein*.—Born about 1892, brother of Amanullah Jahanbani. Educated at Tehran and in Russia, and joined the Persian Cossack Division about 1916. Chief of Staff to General Amir Ahmedi in the Luristan operations about 1928. Military Governor of the Boir Ahmedi country shortly afterwards, where he governed with some success. Fell from favour with Reza Shah at the same time as his brother, in 1935. Then served in various capacities at the Ministry of Industry, especially in some purchasing commissions. Director-General at the Ministry of the Interior 1943, being in charge of the arrangements for the elections to the fourteenth Majlis, an occupation which nearly drove him crazy. Chief of Police, February 1944.

Speaks French, Russian, and some English. The author of an anthology of Persian poetry. Said to be very corrupt financially, but is easy to get on with.

105. *Jam (Djam), Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1880. Has had a long career in the Customs and other Government departments, and was, for more than ten years, Persian secretary to the French Legation in Tehran.

Director of the Alimentation Service, Tehran, from 1916 to 1920, where he did good work. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived Cabinet of Sayyid Zia-ed-Din 1921. Acting Minister of Finance, January 1922, and Minister of Finance October 1923 to August 1924. Appointed as assistant to Prime Minister, Serdar Sipeh, until the latter became provisional head of the State on the 31st October, 1925, and then assistant to the two following Prime Ministers. Appointed Persian Minister to Brussels in 1926, but did not proceed. Appointed Governor of Kerman Province in September 1927, and Governor-General of Khorassan in April 1928. Recalled from Khorassan in December 1928 and appointed Minister of Public Works. Returned to Khorassan as Governor-General in August 1929. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Feroughi's Cabinet of 1933, and succeeded him as Prime Minister in December 1935. Headed the mission to Egypt on the Crown Prince's betrothal to Princess Fowzieh, June-July 1938, and received the Order of Muhammad Ali from King Farouk. Minister of Court, October 1939. Ambassador to Egypt 1941.

An amiable and pleasant man who speaks French fluently. The Legation, in their dealings with him, have always found him trustworthy and sincere.

106. *Jehangir (Djehanguir), Nasrullah*.—Born about 1896. Served for many years in the Finance Ministry. Director of the Concessions and Petroleum Department of that Ministry, and rose to the rank of Director-General. In 1941 transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the National Bank, as Deputy Director.

Not brilliant, but sound and conscientious; said to be a convinced democrat; very well disposed to us.

107. *Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1880, son of the late Mukhbir-ul-Dowleh, K.C.I.E.

He was prominent in the political events associated with the constitutional troubles of 1909-11, and became a member of the second Majlis in 1913. In March 1915 he was appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, Commerce and Public Works, and in that capacity was suspected (in common with his uncle) of pro-German leanings. He held various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1923.

In 1921 he accompanied the then Crown Prince of Persia on a voyage to India and to various European countries.

In 1925 he was appointed Governor-General of Isfahan.

In June 1927 he was appointed Governor-General of Fars, and in December 1927 went to Bagdad as acting consul-general. His tenure of office at Bagdad was not a success; he fell foul of the Residency owing to certain discourteous omissions in his conduct towards the Residency officials. Whether or not these transgressions were performed on his own responsibility or under instructions from his Government, the latter soon recalled him in some disfavour.

Thereafter he was unemployed until December 1931, when he was appointed Persian Minister at Tokyo. Recalled to Tehran, July 1934. Appointed Governor of Tehran, November 1935 until December 1938. President of the "Cour des Comptes" or Audit Department 1940, and was Minister of Justice for one day in the short-lived Feroughi Cabinet of March 1942.

He is a pleasant and intelligent little man. His relations with British consular officers at Isfahan and Shiraz were always cordial and friendly, but he is not a great personality.

108. *Kamal Hidayat, Mustafa Quli (Fahim-ud-Dowleh)*.—Son of the late Mukhbir-ud-Dowleh, K.C.I.E. Born about 1878. Served in the Persian Foreign Office for many years. Master of Ceremonies in that Ministry in 1915 and 1916. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice in 1916. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from July 1920 to November 1920, and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs from November 1920 to January 1921. Persian Minister in Switzerland 1926.

Rather extravagant. While at Berne, according to his enemies, he negotiated a worthless cheque and was recalled in disgrace. Owes money to the former Russian Bank, and is permanently hard up.

Official host (mehmandar) to the Crown Prince of Sweden during his visit to Persia in October 1934. Governor-General of Isfahan, May 1942, where he endeavoured to cope with the machinations of General Zahidi and others without very signal success. It was he who first told this Legation of the Zahidi plot. Recalled to Tehran, March 1943 and appointed Governor-General of Kermanshah.



A delightful and amusing conversationalist, speaking French well. On very bad terms with his uncle, Mehdi Quli Hedayat.

A man of the world but too old to exert himself greatly, in fact, he is now too inclined to depend on his subordinates.

109. *Kambakhsh, Abdus-Samad*.—Born 1905, at Kazvin; his father, still alive in 1943, was Ain-ul-Mamalik, a Qajar prince and wealthy landowner at Kazvin. Entered Persian army about 1923; sent to Leningrad for training and became a pilot there; also imbibed the doctrines of communism with enthusiasm. On return was active Communist and was known as the Persian representative on the Comintern. Sentenced to death by Reza Shah, but was pardoned and then imprisoned with fifty-three other Communists. Exiled in 1940 to Bandar Abbas; released on the fall of Reza in 1941. Married to a Persian related to the Kia family who acts as an accoucheuse in Tehran.

Candidate for the 14th Majlis for Kazvin, and helped in that contest by the Soviet representative.

110. *Kazimi (Kazemi), Bagir (Bagher) (Muazzib-ud-Dowleh)*.—Born about 1887. Educated in the School of Political Science in Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, being first attached to the Russian section, and later employed in the Cabinet of the Ministry. Appointed Chief of Cabinet in 1921. Appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Washington in 1925. Sent to Iraq to inspect Persian consulates in 1928. Later in the same year appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Kabul, but could only proceed as far as Herat, where he remained as Persian consul-general. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Roads and Communications in 1930, and Acting Minister in 1931. Appointed substantive Minister of Roads and Communications in May 1931, but had to resign in February 1932, owing, it is said, to being unable to build roads fast enough for His Majesty, the ex-Shah. He was subsequently appointed Persian Minister in Baghdad, towards the end of 1932.

To almost everyone's surprise, Kazemi was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Feroughi's Cabinet of September 1933.

Went on official visits to Afghanistan and India November-December 1935, and was the guest of the Viceroy (Lord Willingdon) at Delhi. Resigned March 1936, and unemployed until appointed Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan, April 1937. Ambassador, Kabul, July 1938. Ambassador, Angora, October 1939.

Kazemi is socially agreeable and friendly, and speaks English and some French. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he was not a success. He was untruthful and unreliable, and relations between him and His Majesty's Ministers in 1934-36 became very strained. His departure was greeted by all foreign missions with relief.

Minister of Public Health, December 1941 to March 1942. Then Minister of Finance in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, but resigned before its fall in circumstances which did him little credit. Appointed to Angora as ambassador in May 1943, but did not proceed; the Turks appear to like him as little as the Iraqis, who have not forgotten how he opposed them in the dispute concerning the Shatt-el-Arab waters. Nevertheless he is a man of intelligence and energy.

111. *Kazimi (Kazemi), Mustafa (Dabir-ul-Mulk)*.—Born in Tehran 1891. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran. Entered the Ministry of Education 1914, and appointed Director of Education at Kerman in 1915. A staunch member of the Democratic party and intensely anti-British. Caused a great deal of trouble to the British forces and the Imperial Bank of Persia during the war. Financial agent at Isfahan 1920-22. In the Ministry of Finance 1923-25. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1927-28. Chairman of the Caspian Fisheries Committee 1928-32. Governor-General of Kerman 1932-33.

Engaged in politics after the fall of Reza Shah; tried to found a new party, without success, June 1942. Elected member of the Majlis for Kerman 1943, after vehement protestations of repentance for his anti-British past.

An unreliable person.

111A. *Kashani (or Kashi), Seyyid Abul-Qasim*.—Born about 1888. Educated at Kerbela and lived there for many years as a mujtahid. Expelled by the Iraq Government in 1922 for non-co-operation with our policy in that country, and came back to Persia, where he has been ever since. Kept in the background

during Reza Shah's reign, but on the latter's abdication in 1941 came back into prominence and achieved a certain popularity partly owing to his reputation as an opponent of Reza Shah. His anti-British bias, a legacy from 1922, led him into intrigues with German agents and in August 1943 he fled from Tehran to avoid arrest as a suspect. An intriguing and unscrupulous reactionary.

112. *Keyhan, Jalal-ud-Din*.—Born in Tehran 1884. Educated in the Tehran School of Political Science. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1905. Deputy chief of the English section in 1909. Vice-consul at Tiflis in 1910. In the Russian section of the Ministry 1914. Consul in Kerbela 1919. Consul at Damascus 1926. Consul at Bombay 1927-32. Deputy Governor of Azerbaijan, June 1932. Head of the First Political Section of the Ministry 1935-36. Consul-general at Tiflis 1936 to 1938, when the post was suspended.

Head of the Russian Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1941. Consul-General, Stamboul, July 1943.

A rather dried-up individual, who hardly seems to have recovered from the shock of being imprisoned, while Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan, for the offence of allowing a serious flood to take place. Speaks French and English, and is reasonable and agreeable to deal with.

113. *Keyhan, Mas'ud (Massoud)*.—Born in Jehran 1886. Brother of Jalal-ud-Din Keyhan. Educated in Persia and France, having been through the military course at Saint-Cyr. Joined the gendarmerie in 1913 and served as a staff officer in different parts of Persia. Appointed Minister of War in Seyyid Zia's short-lived Cabinet in 1921. Left the army after this, and since 1924 has been a professor in the secondary schools and the Ecole Normale at Tehran.

Speaks French. The author of a *Geography of Persia* in three volumes.

114. *Khajeh-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-us-Saltan)*.—Son of Amir Noury (Nizam-ud-Dowleh). Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for several years, with an interval as secretary at the Legation in Rome in 1935. Visited London in September 1937 on business connected with the printing of bank-notes for the Iranian Government and commissions for the Royal palace.

Educated partly in Russia, where he learnt ballet-dancing. Speaks French and Russian. Though of decadent appearance, he is helpful and friendly. Aided by his cultivated and charming wife, who is a daughter of Dr. Ali Aeghar Nafey, he is hospitable and popular with the Diplomatic Corps.

Has done various services for the court after the fall of Reza Shah, the latest one being French instructor to the Queen-Mother, whom he admires with an enthusiasm which is no credit to his intelligence.

He prefers to be known as Nizam Khajeh-Noury.

115. *Khajeh-Noury, Hussein*.—Born about 1892. Of Qajar descent. A cousin of Vossough-ed-Dowleh, and related to the Noury-Esfandiari.

Entered the service of the Ministry of Finance about 1909. With Dr. Millspaugh's mission as assistant director of supplies, and later of accounts. Joined the National Bank in 1927 and assisted to found it. Sent for six months' training to a private bank in Berlin, and was assistant to Dr. Lindenblatt. Dismissed in July 1932 on the departure of Dr. Lindenblatt, owing to accusations concerning a loan taken during his period of office. In the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Roads August 1932.

Held various posts in the Ministry of Finance in recent years, including that of interpreter and assistant to Dr. Millspaugh's financial experts in 1943. A keen and well-disposed little man. Speaks English.

116. *Khosrovan, Shahab*.—Born about 1900. Native of Mahallat. Educated in Tehran. Related by marriage to Abdul Hussein Naimy, previous head munshi to the legation. Made a considerable fortune out of contracting for various constructional works 1940-43. Candidate for the 14th Majlis 1943-44.

An astute business man, but little more.

117. *Khudayari, Khudayar*.—Born 1873. Educated in Persian schools. Enlisted as a private in the cavalry of the Cossack Division in 1892. Promoted colonel in 1906. Resigned owing to the bombardment of the Majlis. Reinstated after the abdication of Mohammad Ali Shah. A great friend of Reza Khan's in the Cossack brigade. Retired by Colonel Starosselsky in 1917 for taking bribes. Joined Reza Khan for the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and when Reza came into power as Minister of War he was made Governor of Kazvin. Director of Public Domains when this department was taken over by the Ministry of War during



1922. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923; resigned after a few months, and was appointed to the High Military Council. Director of the Army Conscription Bureau 1929-30. Director of Alimentation 1931. In 1935 a director of the Pahlavi Bank.

Attracted notoriety to himself in the autumn of 1942 by being accused, probably with justice, of hoarding large quantities of grain in his villages near Tehran. The Minister of Food, Farrukh, had a public quarrel with him, as a result of which Khudayar threatened to shoot him.

An influential man of the old school, and one of Reza Shah's creatures. Has never had any scruples about robbing, thereby accumulating a large fortune.

118. *Khusrovan, Sartip Ahmad*.—Was in temporary command of the air force in 1931 during the occasions when General Ahmad Nakhchevan was suspended, and again in 1937 when General Nakhchevan was appointed assistant to the Minister of War. Promoted brigadier (Sartip) and placed in command of the air force 1939.

Showed some initiative during the attack on Persia in 1941; but not over-intelligent.

119. *Kooros, Issa (Esau)*.—Born about 1896. A commissioned officer in the South Persian Rifles during the 1914-18 war. For many years a leading merchant of Tehran, representative of Imperial Chemical Industries, Metropolitan Vickers, &c. Has a branch in London, and his wife and children are in England (1943). Speaks excellent English and is well disposed towards us. Patriotic and of strict integrity. Fell into disgrace under Reza Shah through no fault of his own. Seems inclined to enter politics and stood for the Majlis for Tehran 1943 without success. Vice-President of Tehran Chamber of Commerce since October 1942. Member of Tehran Municipal Council 1943.

120. *Kupal (Koupal), Sadiq (Sadegh)*.—Born in Tabriz about 1889. Educated in Persia and Constantinople. Originally an artillery officer; but joined the gendarmerie in 1911. Was with the Turks when they approached Hamadan in 1916. Went to Angora on a congratulatory mission in 1922 and remained there as military attaché, till 1924. On the staff of the G.O.C. North-West Division in 1924. Chief of police in 1929. In temporary command of the air force in 1931. Liaison officer with the Iraq forces in the operations against Jaafar Sultan 1931-32. Head of the Conscription Department 1934. Accompanied His Imperial Majesty the Shah on his journey to Turkey in 1934. Has the Gallipoli star.

Governor of Rezaieh in 1941, but retired thence in a great hurry when the town was threatened with insurrection by Kurds and Assyrians in March 1942. Suspected of complicity in the Zahedy plots. Very intimate with the Turkish Ambassador, 1943. Arrested at the instance of the Allied security authorities September 1943.

Energetic and loquacious; a brigadier-general in rank. Has a Turkish wife. Neither studious nor professionally ambitious. Shows some interest in horse-racing.

A bovine and brutish appearance gives the clue to his personality.

121. *Kurdistan, Asadullah*.—Born in Kurdistan about 1882. Self-educated; he speaks French fluently. Employed in the Customs Administration for many years, serving in Kurdistan, Kermanshah and Tabriz. Joined the Nationalist movement in 1908 and elected a Deputy for Kurdistan. Under-Secretary of Posts and Telegraphs in 1912. Then returned to the Ministry of Finance and appointed Chief of Indirect Taxation for the Province of Kerman 1917 to 1919. After his return, speculated in postage stamps, obtaining some contracts from the Post Office for printing stamps in Europe; later, when Dr. Millspaugh and his advisers arrived, these contracts were annulled and Kurdistan obtained some compensation.

A sick man in 1943; unlikely to play much of a part in Persian politics in future. Estimates of his character vary greatly—by some considered very honest, by others an adventurer and an intriguer; but in his old age lives respected in retirement.

122. *Lahouti* (known usually as *Major Lahouti Khan*).—Born in Kermanshah about 1882. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1909, under Yeprim. Became captain under the Swedes in 1911, and was in command at Qum. Earned the special praise of General Hjalmarsen for disarming 150 Bakhtiari at Qum; Lahouti was then decorated with an Order of Valour. In 1913 in the gendarmerie at Sultanabad with the rank of major. Accused of taking a bribe from a tribal

chieftain, he was recalled to Tehran, but absconded and lived incognito in Tehran for some time. Left Persia during the 1914-18 war, and has been living the life of an adventurer ever since. Joined the Turkish army and served in it for three years. In 1923 obtained a pardon from the Persian Government and given a commission in the Tabriz division with the rank of major. Engineered a *coup d'Etat* in 1923 at Tabriz, in which certain Swedish officers were implicated. The plot fell flat and Lahouti fled to Russia, where he became a teacher of oriental languages in Moscow. Nothing was heard of him for some time, until after the troubles of 1941. He was then heard of as the author of several Communist leaflets and an expert on cultural propaganda in Turkistan.

123. *Mahdavi, Reza (Rais-ut-Tujjar)*.—Born about 1880. Son of the late Malik-ut-Tujjar of Meshed. A cousin of the late Haji Amin-uz-Zarb. Has large estates in Shirwan, Sabzewar, Bujnurd, Meshed, Quchan, &c. Was very much under Russian influence before the war of 1914-18, when he had the concession of the Meshed-Bajgiran cart road. A Deputy to the Majlis for Kherasson on several occasions. Always short of ready money, and on bad terms with the Imperial Bank of Persia, who considers that he once cheated them.

124. *Malek-Zadeh, Mehdi*.—Born in Isfahan, 1881. Eldest son of the late Malek-ul-Mutakallimin, who was a famous nationalist orator, killed in 1908 by order of Mohammed Ali Shah. Educated in Persia and Beirut. Obtained a medical degree at Beirut. Returned to Persia about 1910 and was a teacher in the medical school. Director of the Vaziri hospital in 1923. A Deputy in the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises.

By the thirteenth Majlis had become one of the elder members of that institution, being then member for Bam, with which place he had little or no connexion. Head of the rather nebulous group known as the Party of National Union, but his speeches bored the Majlis and he carried little weight. Always professes the greatest friendship for us, but consorts with doubtful persons, such as the Armenian journalist Eghikian. Ultra-Nationalist by reputation.

125. *Malik, Haji Hussein Agha*.—Born about 1873. A large landowner of Khorassan, with properties in the Tehran summer resort of Shimran, and a noted collection of books and MSS. Most of the Dehzangi Barbaris are his tenants. In 1917 took an active part in tribal disturbances, and received some support from the Russian consulate in Meshed. In 1921, though imprisoned for a time by Colonel Muhammad Taqi, he afterwards gave the latter a certain amount of unwilling support. A strong opponent of Reza Mahdawi (Rais-ut-Tujjar of Meshed), and since 1920 has been well disposed towards the British. Has made several visits to Europe. A Deputy in the 7th Majlis (1928-30). His daughter married the late Sardar Asad Bakhtiari, and at the time of the latter's death he came under suspicion. From October 1935 he was more or less detained in Tehran and in June 1937 it was common report that he had been placed in confinement, possibly because the Royal eye has fallen upon a nice property adjacent to the summer palace of Saadabad, or properties in Khorassan.

A Persian and Arabic scholar, with a slight knowledge of French, Russian and English. An amiable and pleasant old man, very generous; he is now nearly deaf, and leads a retired life.

With the fall of Reza Shah he found himself free from oppression and devoted himself to his library, his stamp collection and good works; has become a national symbol of scholarship and benevolence.

126. *Mansur, (Rajab) Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1888. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was employed in the English section. He subsequently transferred to the Tribunal section, where he rose to be Director of the Civil Court. Appointed Director of the English section in 1917. Appointed Under-Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1920. Created C.B.E., 1920. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in April 1927, and held that post until January 1931, when he was made Minister of the Interior. Transferred to the post of Minister of Roads and Communications in January 1933. Arrested in January 1936 on charges of misappropriation and incompetence. Acquitted August 1936. Rehabilitated as Minister of Industry and Mines, August 1938.

Mansur is believed to have made money out of the sale of promotions while at the Ministry of the Interior. During the time he was employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs he was brought into contact very frequently with this legation, and was always found to be friendly and agreeable. Selected by



Reza Shah for the post of Prime Minister June 1940, it was to him that the joint Russo-British ultimatum was delivered on the 25th August, 1941. As the result of the subsequent events he resigned in September 1941. Governor-General of Khorassan February 1942, in which post he showed some energy in collecting wheat, though his administration of the funds of the shrine laid him open to various accusations of embezzlement. A clever man, often in the running for the post of Prime Minister. Speaks French.

127. *Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Hussein (Saeed-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1888. Nephew of Dr. Ismail Marzban. Studied as a doctor and was employed in that capacity on the Turco-Persian frontier commission in 1913. Then entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary and counsellor at Constantinople about 1920, and thereafter for some years, acquiring a very good knowledge of Turkish and a Greek wife. Consul-General at Baku in 1929. Governor of Luristan 1936. Governor of Western Azerbaijan at Reza'ieh in 1942 and again in 1943. On Soheily's proposing him for the post of Governor-General at Tabriz the Russians objected to him as pro-Turkish. It is unlikely, however, that he is either pro-Turkish or pro-Soviet; he has seen both countries at very close quarters and knows their peculiarities intimately.

A queer-looking little man with a large bald head and a withered hand; equally at home in French, Turkish, Russian and Persian. Clever and very well-disposed towards us; on the other hand, his open opposition to the Russians at Reza'ieh in 1942 went a little too far.

128. *Marzban (Marzuban), Dr. Ismail (Amin-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1875, at Resht. Studied medicine in France, and has practised as an oculist at Tehran for about the last forty years. Visited London in connexion with the Constitutional movement in 1906. Has had several excursions into politics, having been Minister of Posts and Telegraphs whenever his fellow-citizen, the late Sipahdar, was in power. President of the Iran Club after Jam, a post which he still holds.

Universally liked and respected as an honest old gentleman. Owns a little property in Resht, but is not rich, and still practised up to his appointment as Minister of Public Health under Qawam-es-Saltaneh in 1942. He resigned from that post in December 1942. One son, Nan'chihr Marzban, is now in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has been a member of the "Taraqqi" party for some years, but has never done much active political work. Unlikely to do much, either right or wrong. Benevolent and agreeable manner. Speaks French. Took a prominent part in supervising the Tehran elections, December 1943.

129. *Mas'ud, Akbar (Sarim-ud-Douleh)*.—Born 1885. Eighth, and second surviving, son of Mas'ud Mirza Zill-us-Sultan, son of Nasir-ed-Din Shah. Was early recognised as one of the most intelligent of the Zill's fourteen sons, and now has succeeded to the major part of his father's inheritance. Minister of Public Works and Commerce 1915. Minister for Foreign Affairs 1916. Governor of Isfahan in 1917. Minister of Finance in Vusug-ud-Douleh's Cabinet of 1919; one of the triumvirate who arranged the abortive Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1920; Governor of Kermanshah and Hamadan in November 1920. Governor-General of Fars 1922-23, and again in 1929. Arrested shortly after the fall of Firuz Mirza in 1929, and kept under surveillance near Tehran for several months. Thereafter lived quietly in Tehran till 1932, when he was allowed to return to his vast properties in and around Isfahan.

Killed his own mother at his father's instigation on a point of honour in 1906. He seems to have lived down the odium of this deed. Has been several times to Europe and has visited England. Speaks English and French fluently and is pleasant mannered, clever and intelligent. The two-fold stigma of being pro-British and a Qajar prevented him coming back to power during the régime of Reza Shah. Since the fall of Reza Shah he has continued aloof from public affairs, though he has kept in touch with what is going on, and has now become the unofficial controller of almost everything in Isfahan. He takes a great pride in his model village at Asgharabad, near Isfahan, and may very easily have a part to play in shaping Persia's future in the next few years. Has one surviving son, and a daughter. A famous hunter.

130. *Mas'udi (Massoudi), Abbas*.—Born in 1895 in Tehran. Educated in Tehran, and for a year in France. A journalist by profession and by nature. Proprietor with his brother, Jamal Massoudi, of one of the two principal vernacular daily papers in Tehran (the *Ittila'at*) and of the French daily paper *Journal de Tehran*. He accompanied the present Shah, when Crown Prince, to Iraq, Syria and Egypt on his wedding tour as press representative, and kept the

Tehran press supplied with a stream of accounts of the Prince's doings, in that quasi-religious style that alone is permitted to Iranians when speaking of their monarchy. A Deputy in the eleventh and twelfth Majlis.

A career in Persian journalism is a poor recommendation.

In the thirteenth Majlis came out strongly in opposition to Qawam-es-Saltaneh, being severely beaten by some of his opponents in the riots of the 8th December, 1942. Visited Palestine and Egypt in May-June 1943.

131. *Matin-Daftary, Dr. Ahmad*.—Born in Tehran, 1898. A nephew of Dr. Musaddiq, whose daughter he has married. Educated in Tehran, partly at the American College. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1918. Persian secretary to the German Legation in Tehran 1920-23. Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1923-27. Joined the Ministry of Justice in 1927 and appointed Attorney-General of the Court of Appeal. Sent to Europe by the Ministry of Justice in 1929 to take up an advanced course of law, during which he studied in Germany, and for a time was sworn in as a judge in a German court. Obtained a degree as doctor of law. Returned to Persia 1931. Director-General of the Ministry of Justice 1932. Acting Minister of Justice when Davar was away at Geneva in 1933. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1934. Represented Persia at the International Law Conference held in Berlin in 1935. Minister of Justice 1936. Member of the mission to Egypt for the Crown Prince's marriage, February-April 1939. Prime Minister, October 1939.

The Shah made him resign in June 1940, and his conduct of the various negotiations which had taken place while he was Prime Minister gave rise to a strong suspicion that he was favouring the Germans. In fact, in the speech which he made to journalists and Majlis Deputies shortly after Matin-Daftary's dismissal, Reza Shah accused him of not reporting fully to the Shah. However, it is difficult to believe this, and the reports that he connived at and failed to report certain German propaganda and fifth-column activities are difficult to believe; the Shah being an absolute autocrat, receiving detailed reports from numerous sources, it seems unlikely that any Prime Minister would risk the royal wrath by suppressing anything. He himself says it was the Shah who ordered him to favour the Germans. Retired into seclusion in June 1940 until two years later. In 1943 was evidently hoping to re-enter the political arena. Arrested as a suspect June 1943.

Speaks French and German, and a little English; he has travelled in England. A very hard-working and conscientious official, always very helpful when approached. A good speaker, with a thorough knowledge of local legal administration. Has taken a leading part in the Persian League of Nations Union, being secretary of that organisation.

132. *Miftah, Abdul Hussein*.—Son of the late Sir Daoud Miftah, K.C.M.G. Was attaché to his father when Minister in London in 1925. Passport Officer, Quetta, 1931-35, during which time he officiated as Consul-General, Delhi, in the absence of the incumbent. Then employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A member of the suite attending on the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations April 1939.

Married an Englishwoman, who was killed in the Quetta earthquake of 1935; he then married his deceased wife's sister, who is a bit of a social climber.

Consul at Stamboul 1940.

Slightly loud and self-confident, and does not appear to have inherited his father's well-bred manner. Speaks English and French.

133. *Mir'at (Merat), Ismail*.—Born in 1892 in Tehran. Son of a prominent politician, Mir'at-ul-Mamalik. Began his career in the Ministry of Interior. Governor-General, Kerman, November 1937. Acting Minister of Education, August 1938. Confirmed as Minister 1939.

Minister of Public Health, September 1941, and resigned two months later, having incurred displeasure by converting an old shrine into a football field and encouraging mixed bathing.

Spent several years in France, and speaks French. Not a very forceful personality.

134. *Misbah-Fatemy, Ali Naghi*.—Born about 1898. Related to Imad-es-Saltaneh (Mehdi Fatemy) of the well-known Isfahan family, though not related (he says) to Seifpur Fatemy and his brothers. Has had a career under the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties. Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925, where he fell out with the Governor, Nasar-ul-Mulk, who accused



him of taking bribes. Governor-General of Khuzistan in 1940 and again in 1943, where he did well in asserting Government authority over hoarders and speculators. He also intervened to great effect in the elections, being successful in getting the Government candidate elected for Dasht-i-Mishun, but putting in a great friend of his, Niqabat, for Abadan, in defiance of the Government's wishes.

Speaks English and French, and seems to get on well with the authorities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; but a man who should not be trusted too far. Very voluble and plausible.

135. *Mu'addil (Moadel), Luft Ali*.—Born at Shiraz, 1902. Educated at Tehran. A landowner in Fars and considered a specialist in agriculture. 1929-33 head of the municipality at Shiraz. 1934-43 Deputy of the Majlis for Jahrum, and candidate for Shiraz in the elections for the 14th Majlis, 1944.

An active and intriguing little man, who was of great use to Soheily in many ways; he did well as *rappporteur* of the Finance Commission in piloting the income-tax bill through the Chamber at the end of the 13th Majlis. Qawam-ul-Mulk, however, considers him a venal and untrustworthy politician.

136. *Muazid (Moazed), Mas'ud (Massoud)*.—Born about 1890. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and served in certain Russian posts, also Trebizond. A personal friend of Bagher Kazemy, who, when Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1934, appointed Moazed head of the second political section of the Ministry which deals with Russia. Consul-General at Herat in 1937. Head of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1937. Counsellor, Angora, November 1938.

Speaks Russian and French.

Returned to Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1940 and in 1941 became the head of the Consular and Passport Department.

Persian Government representative at Beirut, January 1944, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

A somewhat dried-up individual; not a striking personality.

137. *Mubassir (Mobasser), Amrullah*.—Born about 1904. Younger brother of Mehdi Mubassir, who was for years an interpreter in the Imperial Bank of Persia. Studied law in England, was called to the Bar and at one time proposed to practise from chambers in Chancery Lane. Returned to Persia about 1938, and served in the Ministry of Justice. 1942 was President of the Court of First Instance in Tehran. Lent by the Ministry to assist in the interrogation of the suspects sent to Sultanabad under suspicion of pro-German activities. He was thus placed in a difficult position and did not please us.

138. *Mudabbir-Noury, Kazim (Mudabbir-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born 1894 in Shiraz. In 1912 entered Government service and till 1927 was employed in Government offices in Fars, reaching the rank of Assistant Governor. In 1935 Governor of Yezd; in 1937 of Ardebil; in 1938 of Luristan; and in 1941 of Mazandaran, where he had to cope with the invading Russians in August and September of that year. In May 1943 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and was useful and co-operative in collecting grain, &c.

A talkative man, full of bright ideas and a great sense of his own importance.

139. *Muhsini, Dr. Ahmad ('Imad-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1885. Native of Khorassan. Came to Tehran in his youth and studied medicine.

Went to England before the 1914 war, where he made the acquaintance of Professor Browne, who helped him in many ways. Studied medicine in England, but failed to qualify as a doctor. Lost interest in medicine and then studied pedagogy.

Returned to Persia about 1918.

Employed under the Ministry of Education and made head of the department of the Ministry of Education in Azerbaijan, where he was at the time of the ex-Shah's visit in 1932. On the resignation or dismissal of Mirza Yahya Khan Gharagozlou from the post of Minister of Education in June 1933, Dr. Muhsini became acting Minister of Education.

In this post he was not a success, being old-fashioned and conservative in his methods. The Cabinet resigned in September 1933; and Dr. Muhsini was relegated to the comparatively unimportant post of Governor of Kermanshah in the following November. Relieved of his duties at Kermanshah July 1935, since when he has been in retirement at Tehran.

Dr. Muhsini is rather a wind-bag with a great sense of his own importance.

Married to a daughter of Mirza Suleiman Khan Meykadeh, and therefore has many connexions with the Germans; nevertheless always makes a parade of his pro-British feelings. He made a good deal of money when in England by teaching and translating, and he evidently looks back with pleasure on his stay there. Speaks English.

140. *Muini (Moiny), Sarlashkar Ahmed*.—Born about 1899. A Seyyid, whose family originally came from Resht, his father being a Tehran merchant. First came to Ahwaz in charge of a detachment in 1925. Helped to arrest the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and after the latter's downfall went with troops to Shush and covered the sheikh's removal to Tehran. Then served under the Sipahbud in Luristan; and then in Kuhgilu. Returned to Ahwaz in December 1930 as General Officer Commanding the Khuzistan Brigade; promoted to Brigadier-General (Sartip) in 1933, and Major-General (Sarlashkar) in 1938. An energetic and forceful personality, who since 1930 has taken a very prominent part in the affairs of Khuzistan, and has been the leading and most influential personality of Ahwaz.

He is extremely hardworking in training his troops and in the administration of his charge. He has seen a good deal of actual fighting in Persia and is proud of a bullet-wound through his ear. Very popular with officers and men who serve under him. At Ahwaz has a finger in every pie, civilian or military. Said to be a favourite of Reza Shah. An inspecting commission endeavoured to bring forth some scandals concerning his command in 1938, but he managed to get most of its findings quashed. Transferred to Rezaieh as general officer commanding, January 1939.

Has visited Germany, and returned to Persia shortly before the 1939 war. Retired with his troops when the Russians attacked in August 1941; eventually captured by the Russians but escaped from them at Baneh. General Officer Commanding, Isfahan, October 1941, but relieved of his command in the following month; since then unemployed.

White-haired, he looks much more than his age.

141. *Mukhtar, Rukn-ul-Din*.—Born about 1893. Son of the late Mukhtar-us-Saltaneh, a former Governor of Tehran. A police officer. Chief of Police at Kermanshah in 1927, and for a time acting Governor and in charge of the municipality of that town. Deputy chief of the central police, Tehran, under Airom, and succeeded him as chief of police in 1935, with the police rank of "sarpas" (general).

On the fall of Reza Shah in September 1941 he retired to Kerman, and then to Kermanshah, but was summoned to Tehran and tried on charges of compassing the death of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, Mudarris, Nusrat-ed-Douleh and others. The trial attracted a great deal of attention and Mukhtar was eventually sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, though he very naturally argued in his own defence that whatever he had done had been under the direct orders of Reza Shah. He was, no doubt, an efficient and very obedient Chief of Police, and the popular indignation which was vented upon him was almost entirely an expression of the pent-up feelings of resentment against the oppression of Reza Shah.

142. *Mukri, Murteza*.—Born about 1882. A military officer. During the 1914-18 war was engaged on intelligence duties on the Russian frontier. Acting Governor-General, Khorassan 1924-27. Subsequently Frontier Commissar on the eastern frontier. Acting Governor, Zabul, from the 1st July, 1934, and military commandant. Governor, Zabul, but no longer military commandant, 1935-37. Acting Governor-General of Mukran July 1937, and confirmed as Governor-General December 1937. Rank: Colonel (1938).

Governor of Ilam (Fuaht-i-Kuh) 1942-3, in which post he distinguished himself among a crowd of corrupt and inefficient Governors, by his sound and just administration of a turbulent tribal area.

Intelligent, and a keen patriot. Well disposed, and has a reputation for honesty.

143. *Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Muhammad Ali*.—Born about 1889. Educated in Tehran. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for the most part in Russia. Director of Archives in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a time, 1930-31 "chef de cabinet" to the Minister. Sent to the Hejaz and Saudi Arabia as Minister at the end of 1933. Left Jedda for Beirut May 1935, and appointed Minister to the Balkan States just after, residing at Bucharest. Accredited also to Czechoslovakia, January 1938.



Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, January 1939. Accompanied the Crown Prince to Egypt, February to April 1939. "Chef du Protocole" of the Court, August 1939. Minister in London, 1940.

Relieved of his functions by Taghi-Zadeh, October 1941, but stayed in Scotland for some time before venturing home. Back in Tehran, unemployed and disappointed, early in 1943. Appointed to Cairo to deal with Saudi-Arabian affairs, residing at Cairo, December 1943.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English. His wife is of Russian birth. Has developed into a long-winded and foolish man.

144. *Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Hassan, General (Sarlashkar)*.—Born about 1890. Commanded at Sauj Bulagh in 1929. General Officer Commanding North-West Division, December 1929. General Officer Commanding Kurdistan Division at Senneh 1936. When in Kurdistan had a reputation for efficiency and energy. Was the undisputed ruler of the province of Kurdistan from 1938 to 1941. General Officer in command of the troops in the West when the Russo-British invasion took place in 1941, and after handing over to the invading forces retired to Tehran.

Being an old friend of Reza Shah he was retained in the army and in June 1942 was made Governor-General of Azerbaijan, on account of his local knowledge and alleged ability to get on with the Russians. However, being himself a land-owner in the district he became involved in all sorts of chicanery concerning his wheat, and failed to produce the much-needed grain for Tehran. He was also accused of giving in to the Russians about the election candidates and other matters, and was summoned to Tehran in May and finally dismissed in August 1943; he appears to have resisted for some time the order to report to Tehran: instead of obeying he retired to his estates near Karagheh.

Muqaddam gives the impression of being a clever though cautious old soldier, unable to resist the temptation to make money whenever possible. His daughter is married to Reza Qawam, son of Qawam-ul-Mulk.

145. *Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1885; a nephew of Farman Farma. Has studied law in Paris to a certain extent and poses as a jurist. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authority from Parliament to purge and reform that Ministry. However, during his six months' tenure of that portfolio he destroyed indiscriminately the good with the bad, and at the end the organisation was worse than before, as he proved himself entirely incapable of making reforms. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in 1922, and in 1923 became Minister for Foreign Affairs for a period of four months. Elected as a Deputy to the fourth, fifth, and sixth terms of the Majlis from Tehran. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the sixth term, steps were taken to prevent him from being elected to later terms of the Majlis. He is a demagogue and a windbag.

Imprisoned and otherwise ill-treated by Reza Shah, he spent the last few years of Reza's reign in a village near Tehran. Headed the poll in the Tehran elections in 1944. Tried unsuccessfully to unseat Sayid Zia. Speaks French fluently.

146. *Mushar, Hassan (Mushar-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1874. Started his career in the Ministry of Finance and rose to be an accountant. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1916, and again in 1918 in the Cabinet of Mirza Hassan Khan Vossug, subsequently exchanging that post for that of Minister without portfolio until June 1920. Appointed Minister of Court by Seyyid Zia-ed-Din in 1921. Elected a Deputy to the fourth term of the Majlis in 1921, but, being suspected of plotting against Reza Khan Pahlavi, then Minister of War, he was obliged to resign and go to Europe. He returned to Persia in 1924, his innocence having meanwhile been established. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1924 and resigned in December 1925. Appointed Minister of Finance in November 1929, but resigned in April 1930, having found that the interference of the Minister of Court in financial administration rendered his position untenable.

He is a man of common sense and intelligence. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, he showed himself very friendly to His Majesty's Legation, and used his best endeavours for the settlement of outstanding questions. He is not popular with many of his compatriots in high places owing to his straightforward character and outspokenness.

In 1931 he was appointed steward of the Royal estates in Mazanderan, a post which appears to have occupied all his energies till 1935. Being unwilling

to hand over the whole of his properties to the Shah he then fell from power and at the end of the year he was said to be under close surveillance in his house.

Went to France 1940 and in 1943 was said to be in Switzerland. Speaks no foreign language.

147. *Mutamidi (Motamedy), Ali*.—Born about 1897. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1919. Served abroad as secretary at various posts; Chargé d'Affaires at Rome in 1933. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry (which dealt with British affairs) in 1934 and 1935. Transferred to direct the First Political Department, June 1936. Hard-working and intelligent; a good type of the younger school, who showed himself reasonable and conscientious in dealing with our affairs in the Ministry. Head of the Department of Registration of Land and Documents under the Ministry of Justice, March 1938. When the Minister of Justice (Matin-Daftary) was made Prime Minister in October 1939, he took Mutamidi with him as Private Secretary.

Married the sister of Ghulam Ali Khajeh-Noury. Private Secretary to the Prime Minister in Soheily's Cabinet of 1942, and became Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for a few days at the end of Qawam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet, February 1943. Has also been in charge of the road transport board in 1942 and 1943. Appointed Consul-General at Delhi July 1943.

Speaks French, Italian and a little English.

148. *Muwaqqar (Movagher), Jalal*.—Started life as a priest's servant in Bushire. During the war became associated with the late Hussein Muwaqqar, and was in partnership with him in Basra. Having made a lot of money, he came to Khorramshahr, married Muwaqqar's daughter and adopted his father-in-law's family name. Since then he has made himself the foremost merchant of Khorramshahr, being greatly helped through having obtained a hold over Ghulam Ali Bayendor, naval commandant from 1932, Ghulam Hussein Bayendor, port officer from 1936, and other naval officers. He is the principal partner in several local trading companies, including the Electric Light, Water and Ice Company; in return for various subsidies, he obtained in 1937 the monopoly of the cargo landing company; and he then pressed for a monopoly of the river transport on the Karun between Khorramshahr and Ahwaz. His brother-in-law, Majid Muwaqqar, who was a Deputy of the 13th Majlis and owns the newspaper *Mehr-i-Iran*, was blacklisted by us in 1943 for anti-British articles.

Capable of generosity, for he has built a hospital in Khorramshahr. An astute business man and a great intriguer.

149. *Muzaffari, Hussein Quli (Prince Nurrat-ul-Saltaneh), G.C.V.O.*.—Born 1894. Fifth and a favourite son of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah Qajar, by whom he was taken to Europe on that Shah's last tour in 1905. His mother was not of the Imperial family. Educated for a time in Vienna. On return to Persia he was a classmate of his nephew, the late Ahmad Shah, whose companion he was, and who had a greater affection for him than for his other relations.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1915, but only got as far as Abadan whence he was recalled. Governor-General of Kerman in the same year, until February 1918. Accompanied Ahmad Shah to London in 1920, and was the guest of His Majesty King George V at Buckingham Palace. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in March 1921. Resigned in the troublous times following on the disbandment of the South Persia Rifles in October 1922. Since then he has been in retirement, living for the most part at Tehran, and taking an active interest in the development of his estates in the Veramin district. Married to the daughter of the late Nizam-us-Saltaneh, and has two sons (Mehdi Quli Mirza and Muin-ud-Din Mirza) and one daughter.

When in Fars he kept great state; and he evidently attached great importance to the dignity of his Imperial rank. He is personally very charming and cultivated, speaking French and well read in French literature. Has always been on good terms with members of His Majesty's Legation, to whom he has consistently shown hospitality, even when it would appear against his interests to do so.

In November 1933, as a result of an article in the *Daily Mirror* alluding to the Qajar family, a press campaign against that family began in the Tehran press, and Nusrat-us-Saltaneh, as the principal Qajar in Tehran, wrote a letter to the press stating that the numerous members of that family, who resided in Persia, were completely satisfied with the Pahlavi régime.

After the fall of Reza Shah Nusrat-us-Saltaneh has come back to the lime-light and hopes, hitherto in vain, for a suitable job which would enable him to re-establish the family fortunes.



150. *Nabavi, Taqi (Muazziz-ed-Douleh)*.—Born in Tehran 1882. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1899. Consul at Batoum 1908. Consul at Ashkabad 1910. Karguzar at Meshed in 1912. Consul-general at Tiflis 1919-21. Has served as consul-general in India. Minister for Foreign Affairs for two months in Seyyid Zia's Cabinet of 1921. Consul-general in Syria 1930. Minister in Iraq 1931-32. Appointed president of the Iran-Soviet Caspian Sea Fisheries Company, 1935. Minister at Brussels, August 1937. Recalled August 1938.

A corpulent little man, speaking French, Russian and English. Was well in with Teymourache, but survived the latter's fall. Suspected of making irregular use of customs privilege while employed abroad. Quite a well-disposed person, though not exceedingly intelligent.

Head of the Caspian Fisheries Board again 1940. A difficult post which he seems to occupy with some success, as he knows Russian well and is often able to frustrate, by a little diplomacy, the Russian plans to gain complete control of that undertaking.

151. *Nafisy (Naficy), Abol-Ghassem*.—Born about 1907; son of Dr. Moaddeb Naficy. Educated in Paris and London; spent some months at the Great Ormond Street Hospital and became a specialist in children's diseases. Has been practising in Tehran since about 1935, doing good work in organising maternity clinics and welfare work among the poor of Tehran. A good type of young Persian. Married to Iran, daughter of Qawam-ul-Mulk.

152. *Nafisy (Naficy), Dr. Ali Asghar (Muadeb-ed-Douleh)* (he now calls himself *Dr. Moaddeb Naficy*).—Eldest son of the late Dr. Nazim-ul-Atibba, who was a Court physician. Born in Tehran about 1875. Educated in Tehran and later went to Belgium and France to study medicine. Has a medical degree from the Lyons Military Medical School. Returned to Persia in 1897 and set up private practice. Went to the Paris School of Medicine in 1902 and studied there for another two years. Practised again in Tehran 1904 and obtained an extensive clientèle. Elected a municipal councillor in 1907. Head of the Health Department in 1921. Special physician and instructor to the Crown Prince in 1927. Accompanied the Prince to Europe for study in 1931; returned with him in 1936 from Switzerland. Accompanied the Crown Prince to Egypt for his marriage February-April 1939, and took part in the mission to Egypt in June 1938 on his betrothal, when he received the Order of Ismail from King Farouk. Resigned from his official position in the Court 1941, and now seems to have retired, though he is often seen at Court functions. A highly respectable old gentleman.

153. *Nafisi (Naficy), Fathullah*.—Born about 1903; related to Dr. Moaddeb Naficy. Educated in Birmingham, where he graduated in Petroleum Technology at the University. Served for some years with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and then joined the Ministry of Finance. Was at one time assistant director of the Mines Department but left it dissatisfied with its inefficiency; retains his interest in the subject. In 1942 Director of the Concessions, Petroleum and Mines Revenue Department. Placed on unemployed list by Baqir Kazimi August 1942.

Has a good reputation and is intelligent and hard-working.

154. *Nafisi (Naficy), Hussan (Musharaf-ul-Douleh)* (sometimes known as *Dr. Mocharaf Naficy*).—Third son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1896. Educated in Persia and went to France in 1909, where he graduated from the Lycée Henri IV. Returned to Persia in 1914 and joined the Ministry of Finance. On the staff of that Ministry till 1921, when he was appointed Director of the Inspection Department of the Tehran Municipality. Left for France in 1922, where he studied law for two years. Obtained the degree of doctor of law from the University of Paris, and the diploma of the School of Political Science. Returned to the Ministry of Finance for two years in 1925. Assistant to the procureur général of the Court of Appeal in 1927, and in 1928 president of the Tribunal of Commerce. Joined the staff of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company as legal adviser in 1928. Visited London 1929. Left the company's service in 1930, and set up private practice as an advocate in 1930; but remained the company's lawyer. Has one of the best legal practices in Tehran. Visited London again in 1933 and 1935.

Minister of Finance in Feroughi's Cabinet 1941, and did good work in the difficult task of reconstructing the country's finances in a new basis. Resigned with that Cabinet early in 1942 and has not since been employed. He now contributes articles on financial subjects to newspapers, and was the author of

a brochure on inflation and how to combat it. Not popular with the ordinary run of Persians because he despises flattery and circumlocutions.

Married the daughter of Amin-ed-Douleh in 1931. Speaks English and French. A very sensible man, with a sound knowledge of local and French law; has been very helpful on many occasions to this Legation on legal points.

155. *Nafisi (Naficy), Said*.—Second son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atibba. Born in Tehran 1893. Educated in Persia and later in France. Returned to Persia in 1911, and was employed in the Ministry of the Interior. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works in 1916, where he held different posts till 1927. Since then has been professor of the Persian language and literature in various schools. Has also done a good deal of journalism for the *Ittila'at*, the *Journal de Téhéran* and other newspapers. Has also been active in promoting the first Persian cinema film. Has a great reputation as a prose writer. Author of a life of the poet Rudaki, and of a French-Persian dictionary. Published some violently anti-British articles in the local press when the D'Arcy Concession was cancelled. Has a certain knowledge of the Pahlavi language. A member of the Iranian Academy (Farhangistan).

Regarded as a profound scholar; but of unpleasant appearance; not a lovable personality.

156. *Najm, Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem)*.—Born in Tehran 1893. Son of the late Najm-ul-Mulk, a noted astronomer.

Educated at the School for Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1911. Chief accountant at the Ministry 1920-24, and again from 1926-28. Transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and appointed Director-General there in 1930. Under-Secretary to that Ministry in 1933. In November of that year appointed Minister to Germany. Transferred Minister in Tokyo early 1940; recalled on rupture of relations 1942. Said to have expressed admiration for Japanese methods. Ambassador at Kabul July 1943.

A polite and hard-working official, whose appointment to a foreign post caused general surprise, as he does not shine at foreign languages and had had no experience of life abroad. When he was serving in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this Legation regarded him as a blockhead.

157. *Nakhai, Muhammad*.—Born about 1902. Educated in Persia; speaks French.

Secretary of the Persian Legation in Brussels from 1928 for some years, and then remained in Belgium teaching Persian. Also studied law, and eventually returned to Persia to join the National Bank as head of its legal department. Later transferred to the Ministry of Finance as private secretary to the Minister (General Amirkhosrovi). 1941 became president of the Exchange Commission. At the end of 1943 private secretary to the Prime Minister (Soheily). Has visited England, and his thesis for his doctorate was a dissertation on *Le Pétrole en Iran*, largely culled from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Intelligent and well-disposed towards us. Brother of Dr. Hussein Quds (Ghodse) (No. 184). Brother-in-law of Najm (No. 156).

Has rank of Director-General. In autumn 1943 helped to organise Government Employees' and Tenants' Association. 18th in the 14th Majlis elections for Tehran's twelve seats.

158. *Nakhchevan, Muhammad (Amir Muwassaq)*.—Born at Tehran about 1882. His father was an officer in the Cossack Brigade. Educated partly in the Russian Military School at Tiflis. On his return to Persia he joined the Cossack Brigade. Director of the Military Academy at Tehran in 1922, as a reward for loyalty to Reza Shah; he had previously been engaged in the fighting in Gilan with the Bolsheviks and Kuchik Khan. In 1928 appointed Acting Chief of the General Staff. Acting Minister of War in August 1934; attained the rank of Amir Lashkar in 1935. Relieved of his functions as Acting Minister in April 1936.

An exceedingly stupid, fat man, who appears to owe his high appointments to a habit of carrying out orders with no comment; never holding any opinion of his own, he never went far wrong, and finally fell simply from the fact that his stupidity got on his royal master's nerves. Head of the Persian Staff College, 1942.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English.

159. *Nakhchevan, Ahmad*.—Born at Tehran about 1893. The son of an emigrant from Nakhchevan, in the Caucasus. Educated in Persia and France.



Entered the Cossack Division School in 1910. Commissioned in the cavalry in 1913. From 1913 to 1920 served in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Gilan. At Kazvin in 1920 he became a supporter of Reza Shah and joined him for the *coup d'Etat*. In 1922 sent to France for a three years' course in flying. In returning to Persia in 1926 he flew all the way from Paris to Tehran. Director of the Air Force in 1927. Suspended from duty and reinstated three times during 1930-32. Commanded the air force again from 1933 to the end of 1936. Was considered the best Persian pilot. Employed in the Ministry of War early in 1937. Under-Secretary for War in 1938, and virtually Minister, owing to prolonged vacancy in that appointment. Acting Minister of War throughout the latter part of 1938 and the whole of 1939 and 1940. Imprisoned and nearly executed by Reza Shah in a fit of rage during the attack on Persia in September 1941. Minister for War in Ferughi's cabinet 1941-42. Not employed in official posts since then; he has had trouble with one eye. Proposed as Military Attaché in London but had not proceeded by the end of 1943.

Speaks French and Russian. A gambler, not very interested in politics. A patriotic and fairly dependable person, well-disposed to us, and honest.

160. *Nasr (Nassre), Seyyid Ali*.—Born Tehran about 1890, of a well-known family of Seyyids, one of whom was assassinated while serving in the Finance Ministry in 1924. A Government servant whose career has been mostly in the Finance Department, under which he has served in Khuzistan and on various inspection duties. Ministry of the Interior as Assistant, 1943, and was in charge of the Ministry on the departure of Tadayyun in December 1943. Appointed Minister to China, January 1944.

One of the moving spirits in the Persian repertory theatre at Tehran; in his youth he was an actor, and has translated and adapted for the Persian stage a number of foreign plays, including those of Molière. Speaks French.

160a. *Naubakht, Habibullah*.—Born Shiraz about 1895. Taught in a school at Shiraz and ran a scurrilous paper there 1920. Then went to Tehran and was employed in various posts under the Ministry of Education. Published an eloquent and extravagant panegyric of Reza Shah and was elected for Fasa in the thirteenth Majlis. Opposed the Tripartite Treaty in the Majlis debates in 1941 and 1942, with a great parade of ultra-Nationalist and anti-foreign sentiments; having been struck slightly by another Deputy in a brawl, he came into the Majlis the next day with a very large white bandage round his head to make a still more vituperative speech. Friendly with Abul-Qasim Kashani and in contact with German agents in 1943, and fled to his friends the Qashgai tribe to avoid arrest as a suspect, August 1943. A worthless little demagogue and time-server.

161. *Nikpey, Ahmad (Mufakham-ul-Mulk)*.—Born in Isfahan 1880, and educated at the Church Missionary Society School at Isfahan. Joined the army in 1903 and served at Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire. Deputy-Governor of Isfahan 1915, and again from 1916 to 1917. Head of the Finance Department at Isfahan 1919-20, when he is said to have embezzled large sums of money. Arrested by Seyyid Zia's Government; and fled to Europe. Returned to Persia in 1924 and repaid to the Government part of the sum embezzled by him at Isfahan. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1926. Governor of Kurdistan 1929. Governor of Mazanderan 1932-34.

Speaks English and French. A very pleasant man to meet. Colonel Haig, when consul-general at Isfahan, thought highly of him.

Has two sons: (1) *Azizullah (E'zaz-ed-Douleh) Nikpey*, born 1896; Governor of Kermanshah 1940-41; member of the directing board of one of the Isfahan factories; married a sister of Sarem-ud-Douleh; speaks English and French; clever and charming; did well at Kermanshah. (2) *Manuchihr Nikpey*, born about 1898; served in the Customs and various posts in the Ministry of Finance; 1943 head of the Tobacco Monopoly. Speaks English and French.

162. *Niqabat, Zia-ud-Din*.—Born about 1901. Educated in the south of Persia, where he learnt English. A lawyer practising in the Tehran courts. At one time represented the heirs of the late Sheikh Khaz'al. Deputy in the Majlis on various occasions, and succeeded in 1943 in being elected from Abadan, in spite of the opposition of Dr. Raji. In that he was helped by the Governor-General, Ali Naghi Mibah-Fatimy, an old friend of his. Helped to found the "Ta'avun" organisation, a political party disguised as a benevolent society.

A quiet-spoken and clever man, capable of good work, but too much of an intriguer ever to do real service to his country.

163. *Nurzad, Ghulam Reza*.—Born in Tehran about 1880. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1905 and held different posts in various consulates in Russia. First secretary of the Embassy at Moscow in 1922. Counsellor there in 1924, and later *Chargé d'Affaires*. Chief of a section at the Ministry 1929. Consul-general at Delhi 1933. Head of the Consular Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1938.

Speaks French and Russian, as well as a certain amount of English. A rather long-winded person, but quite harmless.

Consul-General at Stamboul, May 1941. Recalled July 1943 and appointed head of the International Relations Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1943. Transferred to the Court 1944.

164. *Oveisi (Ovaisy), Ali Muhammad*.—Born in Tehran 1884. Educated at the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1903. Vice-consul at Baku 1904. Karguzar at Darejiz 1905. Deputy Karguzar at Tabriz 1906. Governor of Enzeli (now Pahlevi) 1908. Passport Officer at Constantinople 1909-14. In the Ministry of Public Works 1918. Served in this Ministry in various posts until 1931, when he was appointed Governor of Yezd. Governor of Khuzistan 1933-35. Appointed as commercial representative in the East (India, China and Japan), with headquarters at Bombay, March 1936. Still employed in Tehran 1943, in Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as Under-Secretary of State.

Speaks French fluently, and is a pleasant conversationalist. Married to a European lady. Has great ideas on commerce and development schemes. Not popular with his colleagues.

165. *Pahlavi, Reza, ex-Shah*.—Abdicated September 1941, and was taken first to Mauritius and then to South Africa. As there appears little likelihood that he could ever return to Persia after his record of oppression and misrule, and at the age of over 70, all that is necessary to record is that he remains hale and hearty in his exile in Johannesburg. His son, the present ruler, retains a warm filial regard for his father and pays him the compliment of imitating him as much as possible; he also initiates propaganda in favour of Reza, but it is not taken seriously.

166. *Pahlavi, Shah Muhammad Reza*.—The eldest son of Reza Shah by the daughter of Teymour Khan; this lady was the ex-Shah's chief consort and was known as the "Malikeh."

Born on the 26th October, 1919, and proclaimed Vali-ahd, or heir-apparent, on the 1st January, 1926. Educated in Tehran under tutors at first, and then in Switzerland at La Rosey, under the direction of Dr. Moadeb Naficy. Returned to Persia in the spring of 1936. Extremely keen on football and other sports. Speaks excellent French and good English.

Betrothed in June 1938, and married Princess Fowzieh, sister of King Farouk of Egypt, at Cairo on the 15th March, 1939. The marriage was preceded by a very pompous journey through Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The principal wedding festivities took place in Tehran in April, on the couple's arrival, and were attended by delegations from many countries, including the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, the Duke of Spoleto and General Weygand. The only offspring so far is one daughter, Shahnaz, born in 1940.

The Shah succeeded to the throne, on the abdication of his father, in September 1941. He has fulfilled the duties of his office with distinction and charm, though it is as yet too early to say whether he will be able to establish the Pahlavi dynasty on a permanent basis in the face of the reaction against Reza Shah which was such a remarkable feature of what are now called the "events of 1941." He speaks well and makes a good impression on visitors. On the other hand he is determined to interpret literally the provision of the Constitution which says that the Shah is the commander of the armed forces, and has hitherto delegated little if any responsibility in army matters to the Minister for War. As yet he has no male heir and he has not yet declared any of his brothers to be the "Vali-ahd" or next in succession to the throne.

His attitude in the riots of the 8th December, 1942, and in the re-shuffle of Soheily's Cabinet in December 1943, showed him to be on the one hand prone to listen to the advice of worthless subordinates, and on the other hand determined to emulate his father and (in the reported words of Stalin to him at the Tehran Conference of November-December 1943) "be a King in fact as well as



in name." His admiration for his father, and the influence of his bitterly anti-British mother, must both tend to make him believe the theory which his mother instils into him, that the British expelled Reza Shah, whereas in actual fact the latter abdicated at the advance of Russian troops on Tehran.

167. *Pahlavi Royal Family*.—The following are recognised members of the Pahlavi Royal Family:—

Sons—

- (i) Shahpour Ali Reza, born the 1st March, 1922.
- (ii) Shahpour Ghulam Reza, born the 13th April, 1923.
- (iii) Shahpour Abdur Reza, born the 19th August, 1924.
- (iv) Shahpour Ahmad Reza, born the 17th September, 1925.
- (v) Shahpour Mahmoud Reza, born the 3rd October, 1926.
- (vi) Shahpour Hamid Reza, born the 4th July, 1932.

Daughters—

- (i) Shahdukht (Princess) Shams-ul-Muluk, born the 18th October, 1917. Married Feridun, son of Mahmoud Jam, 1937. Has a daughter.
- (ii) Shahdukht Ashraf-ul-Muluk, born the 26th October, 1919. Married Ali Qawam, son of Qawam-ul-Mulk, 1937, but a divorce took place early in 1942, with the Shah's approval. Princess Ashraf has a son, Shah-Ram, who is at present the only male grandchild of the ex-Shah, Reza. Married 1944 the son of an Egyptian Pasha.
- (iii) Fatima Khanum, born the 30th October, 1920. Does not appear to be recognised as a princess.

Of these (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of the sons, and (iii) of the daughters, are the offspring of the ex-Shah's second consort, Ismat (Esmat) Pahlavi; the rest are offspring of the present Shah's mother, except (ii), whose mother, long ago divorced, is Turan, daughter of the late Raji Majd-ud-Dowleh, K.C.M.G.

168. *Pak-Nazar, Jaafar (Ihtisham-ul-Vizareh)*.—Born about 1888. An employee of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In charge of the section dealing with cyphers for many years. Has also been in charge of the passport section. Consul-General at Tiflis 1934. Returned to Tehran 1936. Head of the Minister's Office at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937 until 1938. Counsellor in Kabul 1941.

Speaks a little French. Always very friendly, but many years of coping with the cyphers of the Ministry have blunted the edge of his intelligence.

169. *Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa)*.—Born about 1885. First became known as a member of the second Majlis, where it appears that he was the laughing-stock of his colleagues. In 1910 he obtained the appointment of Persian consul-general in Constantinople, although he had had no previous career in any Government Department. From Constantinople he went to Egypt as consul-general, and later became Persian Minister there until he returned to Tehran early in 1925. In 1925 he was appointed Director of the Russian and Turkish section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Embassy objected to this appointment at first, on the score that Pakravan, having been many years in Egypt, was probably a British agent. Finally, the Soviet Embassy withdrew its objection, and Pakravan became *persona grata* with the Russians, so much that when Ansari became Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 1926 the Soviet Embassy asked that Pakravan be appointed Under-Secretary. He duly received this appointment, and was in charge of the Ministry during Ansari's absence in Moscow until he was appointed Persian Minister in Rome in December 1928.

When he assumed charge of the Foreign Ministry, the first impression he conveyed was that of an agreeable and conscientious young man, but closer contact proved him to be a garrulous nonentity. Teymourache exercised a close supervision over matters relating to the Foreign Ministry, and it was evident that Pakravan carried no weight, and was but a figurehead. Teymourache was at no pains to hide the fact that he considered Pakravan merely an amiable fool. Interviews with him were mere waste of time, and during the twenty months that he was in charge of the Ministry affairs remained at a standstill. Appointed Persian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in February 1931. Was accredited also to Finland and Estonia as Minister in 1932. Has a Russian wife. Recalled from Moscow in February 1934. Appointed Governor-General of Khorassan November

1934. Order of the Humayun, 1st class, May 1937. On Khorassan he showed that, if backed by the Shah, he is prepared to ride roughshod over all opposition.

After the fall of Reza Shah, was relieved by Ali Mansour in February 1942 and was brought to Tehran under arrest on various charges of peculation and irregular conduct while Governor-General of Khorassan; but managed to get out of prison on bail after a few months. At present living at Tehran unemployed; it is unlikely that the popular indignation against the many arbitrary acts which he had to commit by order of the ex-Shah will soon permit his re-employment. Nevertheless he was one of the very few Persian officials who stood his ground when the Russians invaded the Meshed district in August 1941, and he deserves credit for preventing a good deal of destruction by his firmness on that occasion.

Speaks French fluently.

170. *Pirnazar, Hassan*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary in Cairo 1925. Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo 1930. Returned to Persia in 1931. Consul at Bombay 1932; Consul-General at Baku April 1935. Head of the Economic Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1941.

Speaks French and some English. Seems a conscientious official.

171. *Pirnia, Hussein (Mutamin-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1875, the second son of the late Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Educated in France. After finishing his studies he returned to Persia in 1902, and became secretary to his father, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs. Received his first Cabinet appointment in 1918 as Minister of Education. Was appointed a Minister without Portfolio in 1920. He has generally preferred a parliamentary to a ministerial career, and was elected to every term of the Majlis since its inception until the seventh term. To that term also he was elected, but refused to take his seat, as he did not consider the elections to have been held freely. He was chosen as president for the whole terms of the third and fourth Parliaments and for the greater part of the fifth term and for half of the sixth term, and he showed himself to be firm and impartial.

Has not come back to politics since the fall of Reza Shah, though he is often mentioned in terms of extravagant praise as the most honest man, if not the only honest man, in Persia. He refused to form a Government on the fall of the Qawam-es-Saltaneh Government in February 1943, in spite of the insistent request of the Deputies; and similarly refused to be head of the Committee of Supervision for the Tehran elections to the Majlis in 1943. Elected for Tehran 1944 but refused to take his seat.

172. *Purcali (Pourevali), Abul-Qasim (Abolghassem)*.—Born in Tehran about 1896. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1921. A judge in the Foreign Office Tribunal from 1922 to 1924. Second secretary at Brussels 1925-27. First secretary at Rome 1927-30. Transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1931, and employed there as chief of the Import Permits section. In 1933 chief of the Passport and Nationality section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1934 appointed counsellor at Berlin. Consul-general, Hamburg, 1938. Head of Personnel Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1939.

Head of the second section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which deals with Iraq and Turkey, 1942.

Married to a German lady.

Speaks French. A voluble little man, who has a great idea of his own importance, and has never gone out of his way to give us any help.

173. *Qadimi (Ghadimi), Dr. Hussein*.—Born in Tehran 1895. The second son of the late Asadullah Ghadimi, Mushar-es-Saltaneh. Educated in France, and holds a doctor's degree. Attaché at Paris 1918-21. Married to a French lady. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-23. Secretary at Berne and for the League of Nations 1924-28. Chief of the League of Nations and Treaty Section of the Ministry 1929-32. Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm 1932. Counsellor at Berne 1936. Director of the League of Nations Section of the Advisory Department of the Ministry, 1937, and of the League of Nations Department, when that section was raised to a department in September 1938. Minister at Berne November 1941.

Speaks perfect French. A very efficient man at his job.

174. *Qajar, Abul Fath (Salar-ud-Dowleh)*.—Born the 1st November, 1881, the third son of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. Governor of Kermanshah in 1897;



of Zinjan in 1899 and 1900, and of Arabistan from 1901 to 1904, where he married the daughter of a local chief. Fled from Tehran to Luristan in April 1904, but was brought back and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in 1905.

Collected tribesmen from Luristan and rebelled against Muhammad Ali Shah in June 1907. A fight occurred in that month between his followers and the Shah's troops outside Nihavend. He was defeated and took refuge at the British consulate at Kermanshah, but was handed over to the Persian authorities under a promise of personal safety. Thereafter he was placed under surveillance and was considered mentally deranged. Expelled to Europe after *coup d'Etat* of 1908.

Entered Persia again in May 1911 from the direction of Bagdad. In the following July he seized the capital of Kurdistan and advanced on Kermanshah. Having arrived there he collected a large force of Lurs, including the Kalhur tribe, and marched on Tehran via Sultanabad. Bakhtiari and Armenian irregulars were sent against him and inflicted a severe defeat on him near Nubaran in September 1911. He then retreated to Luristan and was again defeated in November 1911.

Having been at large in Kermanshah and Kurdistan for some time, he suddenly appeared near Tehran and threatened, but did not actually attack, the capital. He then betook himself to Asterabad whence, with the assistance of Russian influence, he carried on negotiations with the Persian Government to be appointed Governor of Gilan. After some further adventures he was persuaded to leave Persia with a pension from the Persian Government and resided in Switzerland till 1918.

In that year he formed a project to enter Persia through Transcaspia and raise a revolt in the Asterabad district. He was caught by a British detachment in about December 1918 before crossing the Persian frontier, and was sent via Kazvin to Bagdad where he was interned till the following autumn, when he was again allowed to return to Switzerland.

He slipped over the Iraq-Persian frontier in June 1926 somehow avoiding the Iraq police authorities. His presence caused considerable embarrassment to the new Pahlavi Government who realised that Salar, however mad, was a possible rallying point for the forces of reaction. However, after fruitless negotiations with various Kurdish chiefs, during which he contracted marriage with the daughters of some of them, he left Persia in the autumn of 1926. The Persian Government from that date paid him a subsidy of 1,500 rials per month from secret funds up to September 1933. Salar was persuaded to settle down at Haifa after having given an ambiguous promise to behave himself. On the cessation of his subsidy in 1933 he was informed by British authorities that he was free to do what he liked. In 1935 living at Alexandria, where he has employed lawyers to press his claims against His Majesty's Government.

Speaks French. Scatter-brained and under-sized.

Still reported to be at Alexandria 1943; has not attempted to return to Persia after Reza Shah's fall; but his two sons, who have been living in penury at Tehran for many years, are now trying to get back some of the family properties.

175. *Qaraguzlu, Ali Reza (Baha-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1880. Owns property at Hamadan, and is a cousin of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk. Has lived in Europe for a number of years and is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences of Paris. Elected to the fourth Majlis as member for Hamadan. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1923, though he had held no Government office before. Resigned in April 1923, as he found that he was controlled by Dr. Millsпах. President of the Government Supervisory Board of the National Bank of Persia 1929-32.

Minister of Justice in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942; resigned in the following January without having accomplished anything valuable. An honest politician, but much too old to learn anything new or useful. Lives in Tehran; used frequently to visit Paris. A queer and eccentric man, with a reputation for honesty.

176. *Qaraguzlu, Hussein Ali*.—Second and younger son of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk, Regent of Persia. Born in 1900. Educated at Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Married the daughter of Teymourache in 1931; and divorced her in 1935. An attaché at the Legation in London 1931. In the same capacity at Paris 1932. Returned to Tehran at the end of that year, and since employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at first in the Treaty Department, and from the end of 1936 in the Protocol Department. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 1937.

Resigned from Government service in 1938 and took to chicken farming. After the fall of Reza Shah was not employed in Government service until he became secretary to Dr. Millsпах at the end of 1942; and in May 1943 was employed at Court, his brother-in-law, Ala, being Minister of Court.

Charming but ineffective; his failure to fulfil his early promise has been a disappointment.

Speaks perfect English and French.

177. *Nizam-Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam)*.—Born in 1883, the eldest son of the late Amir Nizam. A member of the Qaraguzlu family of Hamadan and a nephew of the late Regent, Nasir-ul-Mulk. Educated in England and Austria. Passed through the Military Academy at Vienna, and served with a commission in an Austrian infantry regiment for three years. Inherited large estates from his father in the district of Hamadan, but owing to his absence in Europe from 1921 to 1929 these estates have been allowed to deteriorate. Was appointed Governor of Kermanshah by Vossuq in 1919, where he was very popular on account of his honesty and integrity. Being a rich man he was imprisoned at the time of the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and made to pay 20,000 tomans as the price of his release. He was so disgusted at this unmerited treatment that he left Persia and vowed never to return. During his stay in Europe he lost heavily at Monte Carlo and Deauville. Teymourache met him in Europe in 1928, and persuaded him to return to Persia, which he did in 1929. Appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1929. Sent to Europe on private business for the Shah in March 1930 and returned at the end of December.

A reputation for honesty saved him from sharing his friend Teymourache's fall. Grand Master of Court Ceremonies (Foreign) 1938. Dismissed owing to royal irritability during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations in April 1939, and retired to his estate at Kabud-Rahang, near Hamadan.

An extremely agreeable and likeable man, with more than a veneer of European culture. Is the best type of educated Persian, and is noted for his honesty and integrity. Speaks fluently French, German and English.

178. *Qaraguzlu, Muhsin*.—Eldest son of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk, Regent of Persia. Born about 1895. Spent about fourteen years in Europe with his late father, and received most of his education there. Elected a member of the seventh and eighth Majlis for Hamadan. Appointed Court Chamberlain when his brother-in-law, Ala, was Minister of Court at the end of 1942; accompanied the Pahlavi Princesses on various visits to Cairo.

Well-disposed but lazy. Charming manners, but neither energetic nor useful. Speaks English and French. Unmarried.

179. *Qaraguzlu, Taqi*.—Born in Hamadan about 1891. The youngest brother of Ali Reza Qaraguzlu. Educated in France. Owns large properties round Hamadan. Employed in the A.P.O.C. office at Paris 1923-29. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1929 and sent to Rome as secretary. Returned two years later. Deputy Master of Ceremonies at the Court in 1934.

Speaks French and English. A handsome man with charming manners; pleasant, but ineffective.

180. *Qashqai, Ali (Salar Hishmat)*.—Born 1889. Son of a former Ilbegi of the Qashqai tribe. Half-brother to the late Ismail Khan Soulat-ud-Douleh and full brother to the late Ahmad Khan Sardar Ihtisham. Appointed Ilbegi by the Farman Farma in 1918, he thereafter sided with the British troops against their inveterate enemy Soulat-ud-Douleh. Gave up the Ilbegiship in September 1920. In 1922 resided in Eastern Fars, where his followers committed certain depredations. In the following year he lived in Shiraz, claiming the restoration of certain villages seized by his half-brother, but got no redress. In 1929 he took an active part in the Qashqai rebellion, leading the Qashqai tribesmen in their revolt against their Military Governor. With a small band of followers he remained for the most part at Siyakh, south of Shiraz, while other khans were treating with the Government forces. Through the influence of Soulat-ud-Douleh the anti-Government movement fizzled out, but Ali Khan remained more or less actively in opposition to the Government, acting as a centre of the many recalcitrants. A force of 500 troops was sent from Shiraz to round him up in 1932; it does not appear, however, that he was defeated in battle. In 1933 he came to Tehran, having come to terms with the Government; he is believed to have been given a safe-conduct in return for a promise of good behaviour.



Allowed to come to Tehran from Kerman at end of 1942; and sent to Shiraz to help the Government troops in their campaign against the Qashqais in June 1943, in return for which he hoped to recover his family estates in Fars.

He has the reputation of being the most courageous of his family in the field. However, he has no talent for organisation and administration; in fact, according to most observers, he is scatter-brained and foolish.

181. *Qashqai, Muhammad Nasir*.—Born about 1895. The eldest son of the late Ismail Qashqai (Soulat-ed-Douleh). Elected to the eighth Majlis as a member for the Qashqai tribes. Ilkhani of those tribes for a short time during 1930. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested for conspiracy September 1932.

Fled from Tehran during the general disorder in September 1941, and since then has been at large in the south of Persia, carrying on a wordy warfare with his own Government about the return of his lands and restitution for his wrongs. At the same time he has seized all the lands he can lay hands on with the help of his tribesmen and endeavours, through the agency of friends in the Majlis and elsewhere (such as the notorious Nawbakht), to make himself out to be a very patriotic and well-intentioned person. Having expressed fears lest we might be against him by way of revenge for the deeds of his father, our great enemy in the last war, Soulat-ed-Douleh, His Majesty's Minister sent to him a document assuring him that we had nothing against him provided he submitted to his own Government. It seems certain that he had two Germans with him in 1943 and that he made a landing-ground intended for German aeroplanes near Farrashband. Attacked by troops under Marshal Shahbakhti in May 1943, but the operations were very half-hearted and soon fizzled out.

His youngest brother, Khosro, is actively assisting him in his intransigent attitude. Two other brothers, Malik Mansour and Ahmed, were in Germany at the outbreak of war but were in Stamboul at the end of 1943.

Observers before his escape in 1941 considered him reasonable and intelligent, but he now seems as cunning and unreliable as his anti-British father.

Speaks English.

182. *Qawam, Ibrahim (Qawam-ul-Mulk)*.—Born 1888. The son of Murza Habibullah Khan Qawam-ul-Mulk, who was killed accidentally in May 1916. During the war of 1914-18 was very friendly to us, and carried on his father's traditional policy of opposition to the powerful Qashqai group of tribes headed by the late Ismail Khan Soulat-ed-Douleh. Having inherited vast properties in Fars from his father, as well as the titular headship of the "Arab" tribes of that province, he wielded immense authority in the south of Persia at the time of the *coup d'Etat* of 1921. Reza Khan (late Reza Shah) when Minister for War met the Qawam at Isfahan in August 1923 and expressed a wish that he should reside at Tehran; he therefore became elected to the Majlis as member for the Khamseh (Arab) tribes and thereafter has resided a good deal in Tehran. Always on terms of close friendship with His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, the Qawam engaged in 1926 a British agricultural expert to develop his vast estates; the experiment proved a failure through local opposition and the Qawam's stinginess; the British expert left in 1928. In 1929 fled to Europe, doubtless having foreseen the Qashqai revolts of that year. Visited London 1929. Returned to Tehran the following year, having put his two boys to school at Beirut. His vast properties were left in the hands of his servants, who remitted him a monthly subvention. In 1929 various questions of validity of title to property were raised by the Ministry of Finance; and in 1931 the whole question was settled by the exchange of lands. The Qawam was given crown lands in Nishapur, in the neighbourhood of Tehran, and elsewhere in the centre of Persia, in exchange for his Fars properties. It is believed that he did well out of these transactions, and that he is one of the wealthiest landowners of Persia at present.

In the ninth Majlis of 1933 he was a Deputy for Baluchistan. He had also accompanied Reza Shah on several of his journeys, and was generally supposed to enjoy His Majesty's full confidence. In November 1933, however, on the arrest of the Minister of War, Sardar Asad, while in attendance on the Shah at the Turcoman races, the Qawam seems to have become the object of suspicion, and he was placed under arrest with Asad.

He is an attractive personality to meet. Very pro-British in sentiment, he sent his two sons (Ali Muhammad Qawam and Muhammad Reza Qawam) to England to be educated. Until his arrest he appeared to have settled down permanently as a peaceful courtier at Tehran. He plays polo, but does not mix much in society. Quiet in voice and retiring in manner, he is

yet capable of driving a very hard bargain with his own countrymen. He does not appear to have much ambition. Though his name is still a household word at Shiraz, he cannot be considered a tribal leader in the sense that the Qashqai chiefs are; he is best considered as a Persian noble whose family had for some time held suzerainty over a group of tribes and who attained great wealth and influence in Fars, partly through backing the right side in the 1914 war.

His son, Ali Muhammad, married Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1937, but the marriage was dissolved. He had previously been an undergraduate at Bristol University, where he did very badly. A daughter married Assadullah 'Alam, son of Muhammad Ibrahim 'Alam (Shaukat) in 1939.

Played his part in the "events of 1941"; he and his family at one time "took bast" in the British Legation at Gulhek; and when Reza Shah abdicated and went to Isfahan it was Qawam who was sent by the Government to obtain Reza's signature to documents handing over his properties and private fortune to the State and to his son respectively.

Visited India 1941-42 and bought a house at Bangalore.

Sent back to Shiraz to help Marshal Shahbakhti with his attack on the Qashqais in June 1943.

His elder son, Ali Muhammad, went to Washington as Assistant Military Attaché at the end of 1941.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars September 1943, but could not agree with any of the military chiefs about tribal policy, and returned to Tehran November 1943, still holding the office of Governor-General.

183. *Qavam (Ghavam), Ahmed (Qavam-us-Saltaneh)*.—A brother of Hassan Vossuq, than whom he is younger by a few years. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Became Minister of War, July to October 1910, and Minister of Interior, July to November 1911, and again in December 1911. Minister of Finance, July to August 1914, and Minister of Interior, November 1917 to January 1918. Appointed Governor-General of Khorassan April 1918 and remained there for three years, during which he administered the province with uniform success during troublous times. Became Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, June 1921 to January 1922, and again Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1922 to February 1923. Banished to Europe in October 1923, being accused of having plotted against the life of Reza Khan (Reza Shah). Was allowed to return to Tehran at the end of 1928 and arrived in March 1929, when he went to reside quietly on his property at Lahijan near Resht.

Came back to live in Tehran after the fall of Reza Shah. Prime Minister, August 1942, after the fall of Soheily. Worked hard, but gradually surrounded himself with his own relations and friends. Tried hard to gain control of the Ministry of War, but failed to counteract the young Shah's enthusiasm for the control of the army. The Shah's opposition to him was shown in the disturbances of the 8th December, 1942, in which Qavam did extremely well and undoubtedly performed a great public service in re-establishing governmental authority. Thereafter, however, he became more and more involved in petty intrigues and favouritism, and had to resign in February 1943; since when he has been more or less openly accused of being the real instigator of the riots of December 1942. Seems really to be too old-fashioned and unbending to adapt himself to the changed political life of to-day.

Believed to have been in touch with the Japanese Legation early in 1942, and to have received, when Prime Minister in 1942, messages from persons whom he knew to be German agents, without informing us. This was brought to the notice of the Shah in January 1944.

A clever man, but sly, intriguing and unreliable. Has generally been friendly to His Majesty's Embassy.

Speaks a little French.

184. *Quds (Ghodse), Hussein*.—Born about 1892. Graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary in London for five years. Edited, for a short time, a small literary review. Private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 1934. Secretary and, for a time, Chargé d'Affaires at Washington 1935, until relations were broken off. Accused of having abused customs franchise while in charge at Washington. Secretary in London March 1937. Consul, Izmir, 1939. Counsellor in London early 1943.

Speaks English and French. A quiet and level-headed official.



185. *Raf'ati (Raffety), Hussein*.—Born about 1906. Educated mostly in England; studied at London University and acquired an Oxford accent. An instructor at the Officers' College. Very thrilled with his English education and anxious to return to England whenever possible. A solid and capable man. Interested principally in literature.

186. *Rahnema, Zein-ul-Abedin*.—Born about 1888, one of the sons of the late Sheikh-ul-Iraqain, a Persian subject and small mujtehid of Kerbela.

Rahnema was educated in Iraq and came to Persia about 1910. He was a member of the Democratic party and edited first the newspaper *Rahnema* and subsequently the semi-official paper *Iran*. He was elected a Deputy to the fifth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Was sent to Europe in 1923 on a mission to "boom" Persia, and stayed most of the time in Paris. Was appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Public Works at the end of 1926 and Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior in April 1927. In June 1927 he fell from favour and confined himself to journalism, and accompanied the Shah on his journey to Khuzistan in October 1928 as press representative.

Rahnema is an ambitious man, with plenty of "push." His great ambition has always been to obtain a Government post, which he hoped would culminate in a ministerial appointment. With that object in view, he discarded his turban and gave up his title of "sheikh." This brought him three different under-secretaryships in succession. He is intelligent and clever in a certain sense.

Went to Europe in 1933 to purchase printing machinery. In the summer of 1935 was exiled to Iraq and took up his residence in Beirut; the Shah was said to have suspected him of plotting against the régime.

Returned to Persia after the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, and resumed his editorship of the newspaper *Iran*. On a mission to the ulema of Iraq in 1942, and brought back certain messages addressed to the young Shah. Plunged into political intrigue in 1942 and after being disappointed at not being accepted by the Iraq Government as Minister, became a sort of secretary and spy in Soheily's administration in 1943, but soon resigned. A smug, soft-spoken hypocrite. Speaks a little French and English.

187. *Rais, Muhsin*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Persia and France. The eldest son of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919. Sent to Switzerland as secretary of the Persian delegation to the League of Nations. Returned to Persia in 1924, and served in the Ministry till he was sent to Paris as counsellor in 1930. Head of the Treaty Section of the Ministry in 1933. Minister at Berlin and The Hague 1935. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 1937. Minister at Bucharest for Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, December 1938.

Transferred to Vichy in 1941, and returned in July 1942 to Tehran. Minister in Bagdad July 1943.

A very agreeable man, not afraid of hard work. Speaks good French. Married one of the many daughters of Farman Farma in 1935.

188. *Razavi, Seyyid Muhammad*.—Born about 1888. Educated at Tehran. For many years on the staff of the Ministry of Finance. Revenue officer at Isfahan in 1928-30. Transferred to the Ministry of Justice in 1931. Director of the Registration Department at Isfahan 1930-32. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Education 1933. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs later in the same year. Got into trouble in 1935, and after being under arrest for some time on a charge of embezzlement while serving at Meshed many years before, retired for a time to Isfahan. Employed in the Finance Department at Meshed 1941; and again at Tehran 1942-43.

Speaks French. A rather dull, saturnine man, whose wife, a much more lively person, was among the first Persian women to unveil in the provinces.

189. *Razmara, Haji Ali: Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Trained in France, at Saint-Cyr. Born about 1900. Related to the Kemal-Hedayat family. Joined the army and commanded a regiment in 1931. Military Governor of the Khamseh tribes 1931. Commanded operations against the Kurdish insurrection of Jaafar Sultan 1932. General Officer Commanding 1st Tehran Division October 1941. Chief of the General Staff July 1943; relieved by Riazi September 1943. Director of the Shah's Military Secretariat October 1943.

An able, energetic but corrupt officer with a reputation as a disciplinarian: in fact, he is said to have killed a man on parade for insubordination. Very ambitious and a great intriguer, and trims his sails to any wind. Speaks some English.

190. *Riazi, Ali: Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Born about 1891. Entered the army and was trained in France, where he graduated as an engineer officer at the French Staff College, and became Military Attaché in Paris. Was a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission of 1920, where he earned the respect of the British members for his honesty and frankness. Was one of the supporters of Seyyid Zia in his *coup d'Etat* of 1920. Retired from the army in Reza Shah's reign and joined the Ministry of Education: became Director of Education in Fars, where he did good work in preserving and restoring old monuments. Rejoined the army on the departure of Reza Shah and was appointed (1941) Deputy Chief of the Technical College and then of the General Staff. Strongly urged the appointment of foreign advisers for the army and thus came into conflict with the Chief of the General Staff. Then (1942) appointed Under-Secretary of State for War, in which capacity he did good work in piloting various Bills through the Majlis. Chief of the General Staff after Razmara September 1943, but was hampered in his efforts to work by the intrigues of his colleagues and the suspicion of the Shah. A serious man, of culture, intelligence and charm, of the studious rather than the commanding type. Universally respected for his honesty and simplicity. One of his daughters works in the Tehran Museum under M. Godard.

191. *Rukni, Muhammad Ali*.—Son of Prince Rukn-ed-Douleh, who was a nephew of Nasir-ud-Din Shah. Has served at various posts under the Ministry of the Interior. Governor of Qum, Qazvin, Hamadan, and the Gulf Ports in succession. Governor of Kermanshah July 1935 till May 1936. A dignified and quiet little man.

Governor of Meshed since autumn 1940.

192. *Sadiq, Dr. Issa (Sadiq-i-A'lam)*.—Born about 1892. Educated partly in England (where he was for a time munshi to Professor Browne) and partly in America, where he took a doctor's degree. Began his career in a very lowly station in the Ministry of Education. Rose to be Director of Education in Gilan. Attended an international congress on education in England about 1929, where he lectured on modern educational methods in Persia. Principal of the Teacher's College (Ecole normale) since about 1932.

Minister of Public Instruction in Feroughi's Cabinet September 1941. On the resignation of that Cabinet in 1942 became Dean of the University of Tehran. Again Minister of Education in Soheily's reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943.

An intelligent and go-ahead man, speaking English and French. Well disposed towards Anglo-Saxon methods of education. The author of several works on education.

193. *Sádiqi, Sádiq (Mustashar-ed-Dowleh)*.—Born about 1865. Educated at Constantinople. Was a secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey for many years. Elected a Deputy for Tabriz, his native town, to the first Majlis in 1906. Elected President of the second Majlis in 1909. An ardent Constitutionalist he was arrested by Muhammad Ali Shah in 1908 and imprisoned until January 1909. Elected a member of the committee which was convened to draw up the Electoral Law. Appointed Minister of Interior in 1911, Minister of Posts in 1914 and 1915, and again Minister of Interior in 1915 and in June 1917. In the following Cabinet he was a Minister without portfolio.

Before the war he was pro-Russian, but when war broke out he espoused the cause of Germany and Turkey, and was one of the most extreme of "enemy partisans." After the war His Majesty's Legation demanded that he be exiled to some outlying province of Persia. From that time, with the exception of a short period in 1921 when he was a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, he lived a retired life and had little or no influence.

Appointed Persian Ambassador to Turkey in January 1931. Returned to Tehran on retirement at the end of 1935.

Minister without portfolio in Qawam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet of August 1942, and continued in that capacity, with vague duties, in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Highly respected and considered a wit, but almost useless and senile. Dropped from Soheily's Cabinet December 1943.

Speaks French and Turkish.



194. *Sadr, Seyyid Muhsin (Sadr-ul-Ashraf)*.—Born about 1873. An almost unknown person in Tehran politics until appointed Minister of Justice in Feroughi's Cabinet of the 7th September, 1933. Spent the whole of his previous service in various judicial posts under the Ministry of Justice. Has been president of the Court of Cassation. One of the old school, who looks much better in the turban, which he wore for most of his life, than in a Pahlavi hat. Was responsible for some of the new sections of the Civil Code. Resigned September 1936.

Bitterly attacked in connexion with a water dispute at Qum 1942. Looked upon as an elder statesman and one of the senior members of the Majlis 1943.

Minister of Justice in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Said to have been one of the pro-German "Kabud" party in 1942.

195. *Sadri, Abdul Ali (Saliq-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born in Tabriz about 1886. Son of the late Sadr-ed-Douleh. Entered the court of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah when quite young and was appointed a chamberlain. Attached to the court for many years. Imperial Commissioner of the Persian Government to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 1905-18. Persian Minister in Washington 1919-21. Minister in Berlin 1924-25. Minister in London 1926-27. Lived in Europe for five years after that, returned to Persia in 1932.

Speaks French and English. An intriguer, whose reputation is not of the best. His recall from London was said to be due to the Shah's suspicions that he had friendly relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah. A relation of the late Qavam-ed-Douleh. His brother, Farid Sadri (Farid-es-Saltaneh) is a well-known adventurer, who makes his living by his wits, making himself out to be a fabulously wealthy Persian prince; in this way he married an Englishwoman and deserted her after getting her money; he lives in Europe.

In Germany 1942 and 1943, but returned to Tehran December 1943.

196. *Sa'id (Sa'id, Saed), Muhammad (Said-ul-Vizareh)*. Also known as *Muhammad Said Maraghehi*.—Born about 1885. Educated in the Caucasus. Served in various capacities in the Persian consular posts in the Caucasus: viz., at Baku, Tiflis and Batum. Acting consul-general at Baku in 1927. Head of the Russian Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1933. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow in February 1934. Minister at Rome June 1936. Accredited also to Hungary, 1938. Ambassador at Moscow, April 1938.

A very agreeable official, whose Russian is better than his Persian. He must have an intimate knowledge of the Caucasus and of Soviet methods of administration. He has a handsome Latvian wife. Always willing to help. Appears to have no delusions about Russia. On the other hand, some members of the Persian Government look askance at Said, as he was brought up in Russia.

Recalled from Moscow to be Minister for Foreign Affairs in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet August 1942. Held the post in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. In the running for Prime Minister, being favoured for that post by the Shah 1943, but the Majlis would not agree and, indeed, Said seems to have neither the personality, the energy, nor the intelligence for the post. His running of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs resulted in a sort of benevolent anarchy in that department.

197. *Sajjadi, Muhammad*.—Born in 1899 in Tehran. Son of a Mulla. Employed in the Ministry of Justice by the late Davar and later transferred to the Customs as Acting Director-General 1934. Then employed in the Tobacco Monopoly until 1937, when he became Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Communications. Acting Minister of Communications on Ahi's dismissal in November 1938.

Minister of Roads in Feroughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and then head of the Tehran Municipality in 1942. Since then has been interested in the "Adalat" party. A talkative and clever man, with a rather attractive air of buffoonery, but superficial. Married his brother's wife.

Arrested and sent to Sultanabad by the Allied security authorities September 1943.

Spent several years in France, and speaks French.

198. *Saleh, Allayar*.—Graduate of the American College at Tehran. Born about 1900. For some years employed as a secretary in the American Legation at Tehran. He then entered the Ministry of Justice, where he held various appointments as judge, public prosecutor, &c. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance through the influence of Davar, and appointed director of the opium monopoly, and afterwards director of the tobacco monopoly.

Head of the customs for a short time. Then accountant-general.

An intelligent and able young man. Speaks French and English.

Sent to Washington on an economic mission 1941. Returned in the autumn of 1942 to be Minister of Finance in the hope that he would work well with Dr. Millspaugh, but he proved a disappointment, quarrelled with Dr. Millspaugh, and was allowed to resign by Soheily in March 1943.

Sent on a Commercial Mission to India September 1943.

199. *Sam'i (Samiyi), Hussein (Adib-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1878, a native of Resht. Spent his early career in the Ministry of Interior and was once Governor of Resht. Appointed Minister of Public Works 1921 to June 1922. In March 1923 he became Minister of Interior for three months. When the present Shah became Prime Minister in October 1923, Samiyi was chosen as his assistant, until, in August 1924, he was appointed Minister of Justice. Early in 1926 he was appointed Governor of Tehran and held that post until he was appointed Minister of Interior in June 1927. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in May 1931. Grand Master of Ceremonies (Internal), 1938. Dismissed during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations, April 1939. Ustandar (Governor-General) of the IVth Ustan (Western Azerbaijan), July 1939.

Ambassador to Kabul 1939. Returned to Tehran July 1942 and became Minister of State, without portfolio, in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942. Appointed Minister of the Interior by Soheily in July 1943, ostensibly in order to supervise the elections to the 14th Majlis, but he soon resigned. President of the Farhangistan (Academy) at Tehran 1943.

Sam'i is a pleasant man, but of little influence. He is not very energetic nor highly intelligent. He speaks no foreign language.

200. *Sam'i (Samiyi), Kazim*.—Born about 1887. Educated in Tehran. Married to the daughter of the Imam Jum'eh of Tehran. On the staff of the Ministry of Justice for some years. Director-General of that Ministry 1921-27. Director of the Civil Registration Department 1928-34. Director of Exploitation of State Agricultural Establishments, January 1939.

Speaks French. A conscientious official of the old school. Living retired at Isfahan 1943.

201. *Sanjabi, Kerim*.—Born 1904, near Kermanshah; a member of one of the principal families of the well-known Sanjabi tribe. In 1920 came to Tehran for study and completed the courses at the Political and Law Schools at Tehran. 1928 went to France and spent three years in Paris and three in the provinces. Doctor of Law of Paris. In 1934 returned to Persia, and served in the Religious Endowment Department of the Ministry of Education, and also taught law. 1940 head of the statistical department of the Ministry of Finance. In 1943 professor of law at the Tehran University.

A well-spoken young man with progressive ideas; wished to stand for the Majlis 1943, but decided not to do so owing to our discouraging attitude.

202. *Sayyah, Hamid*.—Born in Isfahan 1886. Brother of Humayun Sayyah. Educated at Moscow. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. For some time a judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry. Commercial secretary at Moscow 1922-26. A director of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Board 1927-31. Chief of the Russian section at the Ministry in 1932. In charge of the Eastern Department 1933. Consul-general at Beirut, March 1934. Minister at Warsaw, June 1936.

Minister of Post and Telegraphs in Feroughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and was most helpful to us. Again Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 until January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs again December 1943.

Speaks French and Russian. Married his cousin, Fatimeh Khanum Sayyah, but afterwards divorced her. A charming man, knowing too much about Russian methods ever to incline towards bolshevism. A good bridge player.

203. *Sayyah, Humayun*.—Born about 1883. Eldest son of a famous traveller and "character" named Haji Sayyah. Educated in Persia. Served in the Ministry of Finance for some years. Was financial agent for various provinces under the American Millspaugh mission. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Finance 1929-32. Director of the Department of Commerce, May 1933. In the following September transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where he has been Under-Secretary and Acting Minister since then.



Retired from public service in 1938 and went to live in the provinces; in 1940 went to Isfahan to preside over one of the factories at Isfahan.

Speaks French. A worthy fellow, with little claim to brilliance.

204. *Sayyah, Kazim*.—Born about 1892. A family of Turkish descent, sometimes calling themselves Sayyah-Sipanlou, and not related to Hamid Sayyah. Served in the Turkish army in the 1914-18 war, and taken prisoner by the British troops 1917. Then employed in the Caucasus where he had various adventures in 1920 and 1921. A strong supporter of Seyyid Zia in the latter's *coup d'Etat* of 1921, and when the Seyyid fell he fled with him to Switzerland. Returned to Persia about 1923 and was imprisoned by Reza Shah for some time. Then employed under the Ministry of Industry in supervising the factories at Isfahan. Was also in charge of the Fine Arts Department at that place 1940 to 1942. Fell under suspicion as pro-German owing to his relations with the factory engineers, most of whom were Germans. Transferred to Tehran 1942 and put in charge of the glycerine factory. In 1943 employed by the Americans in the price stabilisation section of the Ministry of Finance.

A man of the world, capable of good work, and claims to be well-disposed towards us. Married to a Greek.

205. *Sepahbady, Anushirwan*.—Born in Tehran about 1890. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1907 and worked there till 1910. Vice-consul at Vladikavkaz in 1910, and thereafter served at different posts in the Caucasus till 1918. Then chief of a section at the Ministry; in charge of the Protocol Department in 1926. Minister in Switzerland 1929-33. Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, July 1933. At the beginning of 1934 made Minister at Rome, being accredited also to Vienna, Prague and Budapest. Ambassador at Moscow, June 1936, until April 1938. Minister, Paris, July 1938, and also accredited to Spain in June 1939.

Ambassador to Turkey 1940; due to return to Tehran 1943 but on Bagher Kazemy being appointed there was a hitch and Kazemy did not proceed.

A man of no particular family, he has made his way to the top while still young. Speaks French and Russian. Is quite well supplied with brains, but is often too lazy to use them.

206. *Shafai, Ismail*.—Born in Tehran about 1885. Educated in Persia and Russia. Joined the Cossack Brigade in 1910. Appointed chief of the arsenal in 1922. Visited Europe in 1923, and again in 1926, in connexion with the purchase of machinery for a new arsenal. Promoted brigadier-general March 1932. Went to Europe that year to purchase military stores. Ceased to control the arsenal in 1934 on going to Europe, where he remained, usually at Berne, as chief of the Arms Purchasing Commission until 1937, when he returned to Persia.

Speaks Russian and German.

Employed at Court 1943, and supervised the Arms and Powder factories; his services appear to have pleased the Russians.

Minister of Industry December 1943, but in coping with a strike had the misfortune accidentally to kill one of the strikers. Resigned March 1944.

An amiable and jolly old soldier. Is a Bahai.

207. *Shahbakhti, General Muhammad*.—Born about 1882, the son of a peasant inhabiting the village of Ishtihar, near Tehran, but has now been heard to describe himself as a native of Azerbaijan, possibly to cover up his humble origin.

He enlisted in the Cossack Brigade about 1901, distinguished himself by bravery in the field, and received a commission. In 1914 he was a captain. He attached himself to Reza Khan, whose influence with General Starosselsky secured him promotion to the rank of colonel in 1919. After the *coup d'Etat* of 1921 he was appointed to command the Ahan regiment of infantry. In 1925 he was promoted general and given command of an infantry brigade in Tehran. In 1926 he was sent to command the Western Division, but was recalled in the spring of 1928 for corruption; he, however, managed to ingratiate himself with the Shah, and was appointed shortly afterwards to command the Persian troops in Kurdistan. In December 1928 he was sent to command the troops in Fars, but was superseded by General Shaibani.

Appointed to command the troops in Azerbaijan in 1932. Promoted to the rank of Amir Lashkar in March of that year. Transferred to Ahwaz as general officer commanding, January 1939.

Appointed commander of the Western Forces October 1941, with the rank of Marshal (Sipahbud). Controlled the Kermanshah area pretty thoroughly,

ignoring completely the civil governor, till he was transferred to Fars to quell the Qashqai under Naser Qashqai in February 1943. He was not very successful in that campaign and after the defeat of the garrison at Semirum in July 1943 came to Tehran to report. In his old age he seems to have become more arrogant and unapproachable. Suspected of taking large bribes when at Kermanshah.

An almost entirely uneducated survival from the Cossack Brigade, resembling in appearance and manners the more famous product of that corps, Reza Shah.

Placed on retired list October 1943.

208. *Shaibani, General Habibullah*.—Born about 1885, the son of Nazm-ed-Dowleh, who came of a middle-class family of Kashan.

In 1906 Shaibani went to Saint-Cyr, where he graduated in 1910 and joined a French regiment. Returned to Persia in 1913, and was commissioned into the Swedish officered gendarmerie as a captain. He was highly regarded by the Swedish officers, and was promoted major in 1914. He was strongly anti-Russian, and consequently anti-Ally, during the war, and he joined the Muhajerin (the pro-German party), and remained in Turkey until 1918, when he returned to Tehran and re-entered the gendarmerie. He appears to have made contact with Reza Khan about 1920, and was working in his interests before the *coup d'Etat*. Promoted colonel in 1921, he served in the operations against the Jangalis and against Simitko. Promoted General of Brigade in 1922, and in 1923 went to France in charge of Persian military students. He entered the French Staff College and graduated with distinction in 1925. He attended the Arms Traffic Conference at the League as Persian representative in the autumn of 1925, and was very sore at the success of the British representative in getting the Persian Gulf included in the Maritime Zone. In 1926 he was appointed acting Chief of the General Staff. He resigned that appointment in March 1928 owing to his disagreement with certain orders issued by the Shah. Appointed Minister of Public Works in May 1928 until December, when he lost that appointment and was placed *en disponibilité*. Appointed a member of the High Military Council in January 1929. Promoted General of Division in June 1929, he was sent to command the army in Fars to deal with the rebellion in that province. He was successful in restoring order, as the Qashgai, although in a fighting mood, were short of munitions. In 1930 he commanded the operations in the Mamasenni district and against the Kuhgelus, and by October he had succeeded in reducing the Kuhgelus, only one of the khans still refusing to make his submission to the Government.

Shaibani is a man of independent views, and is somewhat rigid and narrow-minded. He is a strict disciplinarian, and does not play to the gallery. His military ideas are conservative and sound, and he is perhaps the only French-trained officer who has not been led away from the realisation of realities. He regards Russia as the enemy of Persia; of the motives underlying British policy he has a fair understanding, and he thinks that Britain can and should help Persia in her own interests, but he believes that Britain will always sacrifice Persia if it should be in her interest to do so. He is intensely patriotic, and will stoutly oppose whatever he considers to be derogatory to Persian sovereignty or detrimental to Persian independence. At the same time he views with disfavour Persia's hasty efforts to play the rôle of a civilised nation. He is remarkably honest, direct in speech, and prompt in action. He has little sympathy with Persian officialdom. His nickname in the army is "Feranghi," not by reason of any imitation of Europeans, but rather because of the un-Persian nature of his character.

He speaks French fluently.

Tried by a military court-martial in the autumn of 1931, on a charge of military inefficiency in his 1930 operations against the Mamasenni and the Boir Ahmedi tribes, resulting in some 500 Persian casualties. Sentenced to two years' imprisonment and deprivation of all his ranks and dignities. He was released after a few months in prison, and is said to have gone abroad during 1935. Said to be either in Berlin or in Switzerland 1942.

209. *Shams-ul-Mulk Ara'i, Asadullah (Shahab-ud-Dowleh), K.C.V.O.*.—A Qajar prince. Born about 1880. Educated in Persia. For many years employed in the Telegraph Department. Governor of Yezd in 1911. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1914-15. Minister of Public Works 1915. Master of Ceremonies at the Court 1922-25. Governor of Kermanshah 1929. Recalled 1933, and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in October 1934. Recalled April 1936, owing, it is said, to having incurred the displeasure of the Shah through not accelerating reforms in his province.



Holds the dignity of K.C.V.O., received when in attendance on Ahmed Shah during his visit to London in 1919.

Governor-General of Fars early 1942, but was superseded in the following summer, without having accomplished much.

A rather pompous man, said to be a great intriguer; but he is not averse to the society of foreigners, and probably regrets the good old days.

Speaks English and French fluently.

210. *Shaqqi, Hadi (Hisn-ed-Douleh)*.—Born at Tehran 1890. Educated in Persia, Russia, and France. Did his military training in France. A cavalry officer, he has held various posts in the army, and in 1932 was general inspector of cavalry, with the rank of brigadier-general.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942. Considered a competent officer without any frills. Inspector of Artillery 1943, and later in the year head of the Military Tribunal.

Speaks French and Russian.

211. *Shaqqi, Hassan*.—Born in Tehran about 1893. Educated in Persia and in Switzerland, where he studied civil engineering. Returned to Persia 1914. Employed on surveys by Prince Sarim-ud-Douleh 1916-19. Joined the Ministry of Roads 1920, and employed in road construction since then. Inspector-General of the Department of Roads 1930-32. Director of Railways 1932. Is considered an able engineer, with a good deal of experience of roads in Persia. Director-General of the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1933.

Arrested on charges of embezzlement with other members of the Ministry of Roads in 1935 and sentenced to imprisonment. Later released, but not heard of since.

212. *Shariat-Zadeh, Ahmad*.—Born in Mazanderan about 1880. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1909, and rose to the post of Procureur-General in 1916. Resigned from the Ministry soon after and began practice as a lawyer. His practice rapidly grew, and he soon gained the reputation of being one of the cleverest lawyers in Tehran. Retained with a large fee by the Imperial Bank of Persia 1921-24. Deputy for Mazanderan in the fifth Majlis. Owns considerable property in Mazanderan.

Speaks French. Is much feared, owing to his reputation as a dangerous opponent in the courts. Is a rogue.

213. *Shayesteh, Muhammad*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Son of a merchant. Educated at Tehran in the law and political schools, and entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Served for some time as a member of the Tribunal of the Ministry before the abolition of Capitulations. Then became head of a department and about 1940 was transferred as counsellor to Washington, where he was chargé d'affaires for a long time. Has also served as counsellor in London, where he astonished everyone by his powers of talking volubly on any subject without saying anything useful.

An unreliable and false little bureaucrat.

214. *Shirvani, Abu Tâlib (Banan-es-Sultan)*.—Born in Isfahan about 1899. Educated in the local schools, and also for two years at the Church Missionary School. Studied English, but cannot speak it well. Led a disreputable life in his youth, joining the famous brigand Riza Khan Jauzani; served also under another brigand Mashallah Khan. Started the newspaper *Mihan* at Isfahan in 1919. On writing an article criticising Major Fazlullah Khan, the head of the gendarmerie, he was arrested and whipped by order of the major. In 1921 started the paper *Mihan* at Tehran. His paper was Nationalist and scurrilous. Published articles against the Sinclair Company in 1922, doubtless for a consideration. Deputy for Isfahan in the fifth and sixth Majlises. Interested in the Khourian Oil Company. Visited Moscow by invitation in 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Visited London December 1927. Became an advocate in the Tehran courts in 1927.

Came again into prominence on the fall of Reza Shah. Head of the Department of Propaganda 1942, but had to resign owing to hostile criticism in certain newspapers accusing him (with truth) of being a Christian. Has claims to land in Fars.

An unprincipled intriguer, quite without scruple and quite untrustworthy.

215. *Shukuh, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1880. Educated in Tehran. A relation of Hassan Vussugh (Vussugh-ud-Douleh). Has been in Government service for about thirty-three years, having held various posts in different Ministries. "Chef de cabinet" to the Prime Minister in 1919 and

again in 1921-23. Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs 1924-28. "Chef de cabinet" to the ex-Shah, and in charge of the ex-Shah's special office since 1928. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934.

Kept his post at the Court on the fall of Reza Shah; still remaining the soul of discretion and eschewing the society of foreigners.

Speaks French. A capable and polite official.

216. *Siasi (or Siassi), Ali Akbar*.—Born 1893. Educated in France 1911 and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in pedagogy. Employed as dragoman and Persian secretary at the French Legation from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was instructor in psychology and law at the University of Tehran; later professor. Went to Europe 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Persian Club" in 1921.

An intelligent man with a perfect command of French; his outlook is more French than Persian in some respects. Always polite and agreeable to talk to. Is also able to make a very good speech in English.

Minister of Education, August 1942. Resigned from Soheily's Cabinet in August 1943. Dean of the University of Tehran.

217. *Suhaili (Soheily), Ali*.—Born about 1890. Educated partly in Russia and talks Russian well, also French and a little English. His career has been in various Government administrations. In January 1931 was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Kazimi. In September 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary, when Kazimi was appointed Minister. Soheily had also served as chief Persian representative on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Directorate. Several times Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of his chief. Minister in London March 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs May 1938, but dismissed in July, owing to the late Shah's displeasure over a telegram concerning the Paris Exhibition. Ustandar (Governor-General) of the VIIIth Ustan (Kerman) February 1939. Ambassador, Kabul, October 1939.

Became Prime Minister, rather unexpectedly, in March 1942, after having been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Feroughi's Cabinet from September 1941 (during which time he was the Persian signatory of the Tripartite Treaty of February 1942). His Cabinet fell in July 1942, partly owing to lack of support from the Court and the army. Again Prime Minister on the fall of Qawam-es-Saltaneh in February 1943, once more unexpectedly; this time it was largely because Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk could not stand and the Majlis did not want the Shah's candidate, Saed. Proved himself once more a hard worker, but carried little weight in the country and had to maintain himself by various "combinations" and political deals with Majlis Deputies.

A very reasonable, matter-of-fact person, with a businesslike manner. Hard working, and a good deal more approachable than some of his colleagues. In his contacts with this Legation he has always given the impression of his willingness to help and to arrive at reasonable settlements.

Has a Caucasian wife with a "past," and is universally suspected of having taken a great many bribes.

218. *Sur, Qasim (formerly Sur-i-Israfil)*.—Born in Tehran about 1880. The son of Haji Mirza Hassan Khan Mustaufi. Editor of the paper *Sur-i-Israfil* during the period of the first Majlis. This paper, of pronouncedly Liberal, if not Socialist, views, was suspended by Mohammad Ali Shah several times, and one of its editors was hanged. Sur was elected a Deputy to the second and third Majlises. Left the country with other Democrats during the war and went to Turkey. Joined the Socialist party when it was formed in Tehran in 1922. "Chef de cabinet" to Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik when the latter was Prime Minister 1922-23. Acting Minister of the Interior till 1924. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1928-32. Member of the board of the Agricultural Bank 1933, and later in the year appointed Governor of Isfahan. Governor of Gilan, October 1937. Acting chief of Tehran Municipality, December 1938 to July 1939.

An amusing little man, usually very helpful when he was Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and not devoid of intelligence.

Living in retirement in Tehran 1943.

219. *Sururi, Muhammad*.—Born about 1900. Served in various Government Departments, being one of the favoured young men selected by Davar, then



Minister of Justice, when he revised the organisation of the Ministry in 1929. Has been judge in the Tehran courts, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. Director of the Agricultural Bank 1942, but removed from that post June 1943. Posted to the Ministry of the Interior to look after it till Hajhir's return, January 1944.

Businesslike and said to be honest.

220. *Taba, Dr. Abdul Hussein*.—Born in Tehran about 1911. Educated in medicine in England and qualified in medicine and surgery after eight years in Birmingham and at Guy's Hospital. Real name is Tabatabai, of the Yezdi family of that name. Employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a doctor 1940-42, and since practising in Tehran.

A bright young man who seems keen on his profession. Married the youngest daughter of Vosugh-ed-Douleh.

221. *Tabatabai, Muhammad Sâdiq*.—Second son of the late Seyyid Mohammad Tabatabai, who was a prominent figure in the Nationalist movement of 1906 to 1910. Born in Tehran about 1880. Elected to the third and fourth Majlises. In close touch with pro-Germans during the war of 1914-18. Emigrated to Turkey in 1916. Returned in 1918 and co-operated with Suleiman Mirza in forming the Socialist party. During this phase he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy. Ambassador to Turkey 1924-27. Recalled in 1927 and offered a post as a judge in the High Court of Appeal, but did not accept it.

Speaks French. Said to be intelligent and hard-working. Was more or less under arrest for about ten years in Tehran until the fall of Reza Shah 1941. Gradually entered political life after that and initiated and fostered the only Liberal party of Persia, called the "Millat" party ("The Nation"). In his old age has become very garrulous, but is shrewd, and is one of the few Persian politicians who tries to bridge the gap between the die-hard Conservatives and the young socialistic hot-heads.

Head of the Election Committee for Tehran 1943-44, and himself elected Deputy. Aspires to becoming Prime Minister, but, though intelligent, has ruined his health by excessive opium-smoking.

222. *Tabatabai, Seyyid Zia-ud-Din*.—Born about 1893. Son of the late Seyyid Ali Yazdi Tabatabai. Edited the newspaper *Rad* (Thunder) in Tehran in 1915-16. Played a considerable political rôle in 1917-18. Sent to Baku by Vosuq-ud-Dowleh in 1919 as Persian representative to Caucasian Azerbaijan; returned to Tehran in May 1920. Carried out *coup d'Etat* with the help of the Cossacks in February 1921, and seized the reins of office. Appointed Prime Minister with full powers by Ahmed Shah on the 1st March, 1921, and effected numerous arrests. His reforms were too radical for the country and the time, and he fell from power in June, fleeing the country. He has been in the tobacco business while exiled.

Took a prominent part in the Pan-Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in 1933.

Said to have assisted Kazemi in the negotiations with Iraq at Geneva during 1935.

In 1942, being by that time the owner of a very prosperous farm near Chazza in Palestine, which he had developed himself, he began to think of returning to his native country, and Muzaffar Firuz began with great energy and indiscretion to run a newspaper campaign in his favour in Tehran. He published a letter from the Seyyid in which the Russians were praised in fulsome language. His name came forward a good deal in the Tehran press during 1943, and quite a number of Deputies in the 13th Majlis seem to have favoured his return. The Russians and the Shah, however, were steadfastly opposed to his return, the former because they mistrusted Firuz's unfortunate letter, and the latter through fear that the Seyyid might become a dictator. However, he returned to Tehran in September 1943 and was elected to the 14th Majlis from Yezd, his native place. Caused annoyance by insisting on wearing a woollen hat of Caucasian style, and alienated some of his friends by an appearance of stubbornness and obstinacy. But he may yet have a part to play in controlling Persia's destinies.

Speaks French and English.

Has something of the mystic in him.

223. *Tadayun, Seyyid Muhammad*.—Born about 1884, a native of Birjand in East Persia; educated in Tehran, where he graduated and became a schoolmaster. After the split up of the original Democrat party in 1912, Tadayun became the leader of one of the more important Democrat factions. He was elected a Deputy

from Tehran to the fourth term of the Majlis, and from Birjand to the fifth and sixth terms. Was elected President of the Majlis in the second half of the fifth term, and again at the beginning of the sixth term. In February 1927 he was appointed Minister of Education, but in December he resigned that appointment owing to disagreement with his colleagues in the Cabinet, but he resumed office nine days later at the personal request of the Shah. On the 7th January, 1928, the Shah ordered him to resign, and his fall was said to be due to the personal animosity towards him of Teymourache, who even vetoed his candidature as a Deputy to the seventh term of the Majlis. In June 1930 he was appointed Governor of Kerman, and appears to have recovered the Royal favour to a certain extent.

Tadayun was one of the principal supporters of the Republican movement in 1924, and is said to have appropriated to himself a large part of the funds put at his disposal for the realisation of that object. As President of the Majlis he was a success, being impartial and strict in upholding the rules of the House. He is undoubtedly an intelligent man, and has a very pleasant manner.

He knows a little French.

He was recalled from Kerman in March 1931, and he appears to believe that one reason for his recall was the fact that he was too friendly with Lieutenant-Colonel Noel, then British consul. However, he appears to nourish no anti-British grievance on that score.

Returned to politics on the fall of Reza Shah; was Minister of Education in Feroughi's Cabinet of 1941-42, and spoke eloquently in favour of the tripartite treaty of 1942. Minister of Food after Farrukh in 1942; resigned in July 1943, becoming a Minister of State.

Minister of the Interior September 1943, and did well in running the elections. But was not included in the reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943. The Russians, who for some reason are against him, seem to have secured his exclusion.

224. *Taheri, Dr. Hadi*.—Born at Yezd about 1888. Son of a mulla. Land-owner and proprietor of various concerns at Yezd. A great rival of the Nawwab family of Yezd. Elected to the Majlis on various occasions, and has served as president of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. In the 13th Majlis was one of the vice-presidents and was considered one of the leading members of the Majlis. Served on the Committee of the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, 1943, and was helpful in providing local knowledge. Was largely responsible for the success of Seyyid Zia-ed-Din in the Yezd elections of 1943, thereby incurring the dislike and distrust of the Shah. Very friendly to us. Accused of various speculations at Yezd, but nothing has been proved, and he is considered one of the most solid and reliable Deputies.

225. *Tajbakhsh, Mehdi Quli*.—Born about 1885. A Tehrani, and a land-owner in the districts of Malayir and Sultanabad. A military officer. Was on service against the Bakhtiari in 1929. Commanding the Mixed Independent Brigade of Luristan 1931-32. Acting military governor of Luristan 1934. Governor-General of Mukran (Baluchistan, Zabul and Zahedan), January 1935 to December 1937, when summoned to Tehran. Rank: brigadier (1938). Acting Director-General of Agriculture October 1938 to December 1939. Again commanding Luristan 1942, but did not succeed in apprehending the murderers of Harris and Griffiths.

Sensible, able, energetic and sociable.

Relieved of his command December 1942 and retired from the army September 1943.

226. *Taqizadeh, Hassan*.—Born in Tabriz about 1880, the son of a small preacher. He was educated in his native town, and used to haunt the booksellers' shops, where he showed great eagerness to acquire knowledge. In his early youth he was an ardent Nationalist, and was connected with the Nationalist movement in Persia from the beginning. He was elected to the first term of the Majlis and was one of its most prominent members. Mohammad Ali Shah hated and feared him, and, when the Shah made a *coup d'Etat* in 1908 against the Majlis, Taqizadeh took refuge in His Majesty's Legation. The demand made by the Shah that he should be given up was refused, and Taqizadeh was eventually amnestied, on the condition that he went to Europe. He visited London and Cambridge, but returned to Tabriz at the end of 1908. He was elected to the second term of the Majlis in 1909, and, after the capture of Tehran by the Nationalist forces and the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah in July 1909, Taqizadeh became a prominent member of the Nationalist Committee,



which was set up to decide on the Government of the country. Went to Europe in 1910. He was elected in his absence to the third and fourth terms of the Majlis, but did not take his seat. He stayed in Europe and America during the whole period from 1914 to 1923, and was for years in Berlin, where he edited a paper called *Kaveh*. For publishing certain articles of an anti-Islamic nature he was excommunicated by the Mujtehids. He negotiated the Perso-Soviet Commercial Treaty in Moscow in February 1921, and finally returned to Persia in 1924. He was elected to the fifth term of the Majlis 1924-26, and to the sixth term in 1926. He visited America again in 1926 as Persian delegate to the Philadelphia Exhibition. Appointed Governor-General of Khorasan in January 1929; he was recalled in May and appointed Persian Minister in London, where he remained until April 1930, when he returned to Persia and became Minister of Roads and Communications. In August 1930 he was appointed Minister of Finance, in addition.

Taqizadeh is a well-bred man, and has travelled extensively. He is no longer so notably popular as he was in the early days of the Constitution, and the years have tempered his excessive energy and zeal. His speeches in the Majlis marked him as a man of common sense and moderation, and were in sharp contrast to the utterances of the former fiery young Nationalist.

Taqizadeh fell from grace in September 1933, for reasons which are obscure. The Shah is said to have suspected him of intrigue with Majlis members in connexion with the purchase of gold. He was, however, soon re-employed, as he proceeded to Paris as Minister in December 1933.

Recalled from Paris in August 1934, but obtained prolonged leave of absence and did not return to Persia. Appointed Iranian representative at the Congress of Orientalists at Rome in September 1935. But an article which he wrote for the official *Journal* of the Ministry of Public Instruction, in which he said the revision of the Persian language must proceed gradually and without the use of force, annoyed the Shah and caused the suppression of the paper.

He is married to a German, and talks German fluently. He speaks English and French less well.

Appointed Minister in London by Feroughi 1941, and has been suggested as Prime Minister on more than one occasion since then, but he has always preferred to stay in London. Became ambassador in 1944.

227. *Vakili, Ali*.—Born about 1897 at Tabriz. Started as a carpet-merchant and general exporter of produce. Was sole agent for Dr. Ross's life pills, from which he derived considerable profit. Has also managed the Cinema Sepah at Tehran. He still has the agency for certain American products.

A Deputy for Tehran in the tenth Majlis. Member of the municipal council for Tehran. Director of the Central Company, which imports cars, &c.

An energetic person; a protégé of Davar, the late Minister of Finance.

228. *Valatabar, Abol Fath, K.B.E. (Hishmat-ud-Dowleh, previously named Diba)*.—A member of the Tabatabai family of Tabriz. Born about 1885. A chamberlain of Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah when the latter was Crown Prince residing in Tabriz. Private secretary to Mohammad Ali Shah before he came to the throne, and continued in that post till 1909. An open enemy of the Nationalists. Governor of Resht in 1915. Minister of War 1916-17. Governor of Kerman 1918-19. Minister of the Interior 1920. Imprisoned by Seyyid Zia. Governor-General of Khorassan May 1924; resigned the next year owing to differences with the military authorities.

Has owned large properties near Tabriz, but has spent most of his substance. Speaks French.

Living quietly in Tehran 1943. Made a pilgrimage to Kerbela early in the year. Aspired to employment in a suitable post at Court, and attained an appointment as a kind of chamberlain at the Court in 1943.

A respectable old-timer who helped us during the 1914-18 war and received a K.B.E. He took no part in politics during Reza Shah's reign and is too old to do much now.

229. *Vasighi (Vassighi), Sadig (Sadegh)*.—Born in 1898 at Tabriz, but of a Mazanderan family. Employed for many years in the Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Public Works, and in the Ministry of Commerce since the former ministry was divided up. Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce until April 1938, when he became Acting Minister on the dismissal of M. Ala.

He has paid several visits to Europe, notably to Germany when the Clearing Agreement with that country was negotiated in 1935, and to Moscow in 1939, when the question of renewing the Russo-Iranian Trade Agreement arose. Head

of Agricultural Bank in 1942, but was removed to make room for one of Qawam-as-Saltaneh's political nominees. Member of the board of the Iran Insurance Company February 1943. Head of Mortgage Bank December 1943. Secretary of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.

Educated in Tehran at the Ecole Polytechnique (Dar-ul-Funun), and speaks French and English.

230. *Vossuq, Hassan, G.C.B. (Vossuq-ed-Dowleh)*.—Born about 1868. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Elected a Deputy to the first and second terms of the Majlis, and in 1909 chosen to be a member of the Nationalist Committee, which directed the affairs of State after the abdication of Muhammad Ali Shah. His first Cabinet appointment was as Minister of Justice in October 1909. In the following month he became Minister of Finance, but resigned in July 1910. In July 1911 he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Again Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1913, he left for Europe in June of the same year. Minister for Foreign Affairs, July-August 1914, and Minister of Finance, August-December 1915. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1916 to May 1917. Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from August 1918 to June 1920. Negotiated the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1919. Visited Europe in June 1920, and only returned to Persia at the beginning of 1926. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1926, but resigned in November to take his seat in Parliament. Elected as a Deputy from Tehran to the seventh term of the Majlis 1928-30. Appointed President of the new "Academy" for the revision of the Persian language, December 1935.

A man of great ability and character. He became unpopular over the Anglo-Persian Convention, but, after a most able and convincing defence of his acts as Prime Minister during the period 1918-20 before the Majlis, he regained a large measure of popularity. Still has some bitter enemies, who seem to have prevented him from acquiring the favour of Reza Shah.

Went to Europe for a serious operation 1940; survived it, and is now reported to be living in Switzerland (1943), unable to return to Persia; he was appointed ambassador to Turkey by his brother Qawam-es-Saltaneh in 1942, but could not proceed.

Speaks French fluently, also a little English.

231. *Yezdan Penah, General Murteza*.—Born about 1891; son of Mirza Ali Akbar, a small shopkeeper in the village of Serdasht. In 1907 Murteza Khan entered the Cossack Cadet School. Received his commission in 1912, showed strong pro-Russian sympathies, and consequently gained rapid promotion. Made lieutenant-colonel in 1919 and colonel in 1920. During the whole of his service he was intimate with Reza Khan, and accompanied him on the march to Tehran in February 1921 which culminated in the *coup d'Etat*. Was promoted general and given command of the Central Division. In July 1927 he fell from favour, and was put under arrest for a short time for an unknown reason. Whatever the suspicions against him were, they appear to have been unsubstantiated, for he was released very soon. In the autumn of 1928 he was appointed inspector of the gendarmerie, but was superseded in 1930 and left without any active command.

Murteza Khan was always regarded until 1927 as a very loyal supporter of Reza Shah, but after his arrest in 1927 he appeared to have lost confidence in Reza Shah. He is active, intelligent, ambitious, and a strict disciplinarian. His military ideas and his general education are very limited, but he has shown anxiety to learn. He is not popular amongst the troops, but is feared and respected. Holds aloof from foreigners, and is a strong opponent of foreign interference in Persia.

Inspector of Infantry in 1932. Commandant of Tehran Cadet College, 1933.

On the fall of Reza Shah, Murteza Khan came again to the fore. He soon became Chief of the General Staff, and gradually worked as a loyal supporter of the young Shah. On the appointment of Amir Ahmedi as Minister of War in 1943 it became apparent that the two could not work together, and Murteza's department became quite separate from that of the Minister of War; in fact, the Shah took to giving orders to the Chief of the Staff without the knowledge of the responsible Minister. Murteza took two months' leave in June 1943, but was soon appointed commander of the Tehran garrison. On the whole, was a disappointment, and was suspected of having sold himself to the Germans.

Speaks Russian and has a Russian wife.

Appointed Adjutant-General to the Shah autumn 1943. Member of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.



232. *Zahidi, Fazlullah (Basir-i-Divan)*.—Born in Hamadan about 1883. His father was for many years in charge of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk's property at Hamadan. Joined the Constitutional movement and was wounded. Joined the Cossacks and thus came into contact with Reza Khan, under whom he served. Rose to the rank of general in 1921. Commanded the troops at Shiraz in 1922. In 1924 commanded the troops sent to Khuzistan, and helped to arrest the Sheikh of Mohammerah in 1925. Transferred to Resht in 1926, where he commanded the Northern Independent Brigade. Recalled to Tehran December 1928. Commanded the Road Guards 1929. Arrested and degraded for neglect of duty in 1929. Soon after he was pardoned and reinstated. Chief of police 1931. Relieved of this post after a few months owing to the escape of some prisoners from prison. Dismissed from the army in 1931. Turned his attention to business and became a partner in the "Kazadema" Ford agency. Reinstated in the rank of general 1932 and made A.D.C. to the Shah. Member of the Iranian commercial delegation to Russia in April 1935, and subsequently visited Central Europe.

More of a politician than a soldier. Made a good deal of money in Khuzistan. Being capable of generosity he was not unpopular with the troops under his command.

Married the daughter of Hussein Pirnia (Mo'tamen-ul-Mulk) in 1927.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942, and gradually took charge of all departments of Government; proof was found that he was working with the Germans, and he was arrested by British troops and taken out of Persia in the autumn of 1942.

233. *Zand, Ibrahim (Ebrahim)*.—Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France, where he was a contemporary and friend of Jawad Amery. Towards the end of the last war became an active member of the Musawat party in Azerbaijan, and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia, where Davar employed him in the Ministry of Justice as an adviser. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Ebtehaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed at Court as Comptroller of the Royal accounts. Minister of War in Soheily's third Cabinet, December 1943.

Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahramy. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian. A harmless but weak man, who has not succeeded in making his mark in either politics, law or banking, and has obtained the post of Minister of War in order that he should enable others to run that Ministry.

234. *Zanjani, Hussein*.—A native of Zinjan, whose former family name was Qizilbash. Second Secretary at Constantinople 1924-28. In the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1928-31. Secretary at Warsaw, 1931-34, and in London, 1934-37. Retrained to Warsaw, May 1937, and recalled to Tehran to be Acting Chief of the Third Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing, *inter alia*, with Great Britain), November 1937. At Geneva, August 1938 to October 1939, studying League of Nations organisation, employed in the Inspection Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939.

Consul at Basra at the end of 1942.

Speaks French and some English. Has an Armenian wife. Agreeable, though slightly clammy.

235. *Zarghami, Azizullah*.—Born in Tehran about 1882. Educated in Persia. Joined the gendarmerie under Swedish officers in 1911 and has been serving in that force or the army ever since. Commanding officer of the Road Guards since April 1930. Officiating Chief of the General Staff in August 1934, with the rank of major-general. Chief of General Staff 1938. Retired in November 1941.

A deeply religious, well-educated and capable officer.

236. *Zarin-Kafsh, Ali Asghar*.—Born about 1885, of a Tehran family of Kurdish descent. Educated at the Political School in Tehran, and employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in subsidiary posts for several years. In 1923 and 1924 was head of a section of the Ministry and was always very courteous and helpful whenever referred to by members of this Embassy. Served as "chef de cabinet" to Mirza Muhammad Ali Khan Feroughi while the latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was

subsequently posted to Washington, where he spent more than a year as secretary to the Persian Legation. He was recalled to Tehran in about 1927, and served in the Ministry of Justice for a time under Davar, at the time when the Ministry was being fundamentally reformed. He was for a time a judge of the Cour de Cassation. He then was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, where he was serving as Under-Secretary when the Minister of the Interior, Mirza Ali Khan Mansur, was transferred to the Ministry of Roads on the 26th January, 1933. From thenceforward he served as Acting Minister of the Interior until Feroughi's Cabinet was formed in September 1933.

A charming man to meet. Speaks English and French. At the Ministry of Justice earned a reputation for severity, which was no doubt needed.

Proceeded to England as commissioner of the Persian Government with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in December 1933, with his wife and two children. Honorary counsellor to the legation in London 1937.

Returned to Persia December 1940. Under-secretary at the Ministry of Justice from 1941. Has always been helpful in settling cases and giving advice on points of Persian law. On Hikmat's resignation from Soheily's Cabinet in June 1943, became Acting Minister of Justice, but on the appointment of Sadr as Minister returned to the post of Under-Secretary.

[E 2135/189/34]

No. 11.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 6th April.)

(No. 127.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 20th March, 1944.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 121 of the 26th March, 1943, I have the honour to transmit herewith a review of the principal events affecting our interests in Persia during 1943.

2. I am indebted to Mr. Holman for the political sections, to Colonel Macann, Mr. Iliff, Major-General Fraser, Air Commodore Runciman, Mr. Trott, Mr. Cumberbatch, Major Savidge, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Bingley and Colonel Ross for contributions regarding their respective spheres, and to Mr. Somers Cocks for co-ordinating the report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Viceroy of India and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

(for the Ambassador),

J. S. SOMERS COCKS.

Enclosure in No. 11.

*Report on Political Events of 1943.*

*Anglo-Persian Relations.*

1. During 1943 Persian cabinets came and went in gloomy procession with little to distinguish them from each other in composition and quality. Each bore the traces to a remarkable degree of those three well-known Persian characteristics: dishonesty, inefficiency and inertia. The more the political pack was shuffled and reshuffled, the more drab the hands became without even the appearance of a joker to break the monotony and enliven the scene. For practically the whole year the destinies of the country were in the hands of M. Soheily, that prince of indecision and champion political tight-rope walker, and it was, therefore with him as Prime Minister and his companions that all our official business had to be transacted. For Anglo-Persian relations it was not an entirely happy year, though far easier than its predecessor. The Persian ship of State weathered many storms in an inexplicable manner and at the close of the voyage had reached comparatively calm water. This may bode well for the future, but in a country like Persia it is better to refrain from reckless prophecy.

2. In times of peace Persia has a special interest and importance for us, but war has multiplied the importance of those interests out of all recognition in view of the widespread responsibilities, both direct and indirect, now placed on the shoulders of ourselves and our Allies. At present Persia constitutes first and foremost the vital supply line for carrying aid to Russia and, although the operation of the Trans-Iranian railway was transferred on the 1st April



to the American military authorities, responsibility for the security of the railway as well as for that of the other lines of communications required for military supplies from the south remained vested in the British military forces. In addition, the protection of the oilfields from tribal and other disturbances provided our troops with a further heavy responsibility. Persia, too, is perhaps the only country in which Anglo-Soviet-American interests meet in an acute form and, if not carefully handled, are liable to clash. A spanner thrown into the Allied machinery by an artful Persian may do untold harm. It is in the light of these considerations and of the inherent weakness of the structure of the Persian State that our policy in this country during the last year should be judged. As is well known, the Persian economy has, under war conditions, failed to carry unaided the burden which it has been called to shoulder in the economic, financial, military and other spheres, and in order to carry out efficiently our vital war responsibilities here, we and our Allies were forced into a considerable measure of interference in many branches of the Persian Administration, which we should naturally have preferred to avoid. Further, as the success of our war effort depends to such an extent on calm and stability throughout the country, that measure of interference which had taken shape in 1942 was necessarily developed and extended in the year under review. For instance, the complete inability of the Persian Government to maintain order in large areas of the south, which will be dealt with more fully in another section of this despatch, compelled us at one time to provide military protection for convoys on the Bushire-Shiraz-Isfahan road, whilst later the presence of Germans with the Qashgai tribes, which constituted a potential danger of sabotage to the Trans-Iranian railway and the oilfields, called for similar intervention, for lawlessness and insecurity could not fail to affect our vital interests. At the end of the year a measure of peace has been restored and that was our principal immediate consideration. Again, under war conditions the outcome of the general elections could not be without interest to us. Consular officers were accordingly instructed to encourage and support those elements that appeared to be honest and animated by public spirit.

3. Generally speaking, our policy in the economic field was to concentrate on increasing our contribution to the welfare of the Persian people to the greatest extent consistent with the carriage of the necessary supplies to Russia. The principal element in the promotion of their welfare could only be internal reform, which we encouraged to the best of our ability, and the reorganisation of the provision and the distribution of essential goods. Consequently, when Dr. Millspaugh arrived in Persia in February as Administrator-General of Finances, in order to cope with the chaotic financial situation, and pressed for wide powers to control prices, reorganise the system of taxation and balance the budget, &c., he had our fullest backing in all his measures. Similarly, every occasion was taken by us to support the American advisers in other branches of the Administration in the hope that their labours might bring some benefit to the departments concerned. Throughout the year cereals, transport and civil supplies presented serious problems. There again, all our efforts were directed towards alleviating distress as far as the general war situation would permit. The full quota of wheat was imported under our Food Agreement of 1942; British Consuls and Consular Liaison Officers continued to work at high pressure in the provinces to ensure the collection of the Government share of the grain crop; and at the close of the year the British army averted a shortage of wheat in Tehran by transporting some 10,000 tons of wheat from Kermanshah and Hamadan to railhead. An Allied Road Transport Board was set up and Lease-Lend lorries were supplied, and in this way a semblance of organisation was introduced into the civil transport system. In addition, steps were taken to increase the supply of consumer goods, particularly from India, and to allocate additional tonnage for civil supplies on the Trans-Iranian railway. On the financial side the acute shortage of currency notes was eased by the arrival of considerable consignments from the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, too, assisted Dr. Millspaugh by making advances to the Persian Government on the oil royalties payable in 1943/44.

4. All the measures which we and our American Allies took to alleviate the lot of the poorer classes and to establish some order in the corrupt and antiquated machine of Government aroused the most bitter opposition from Persian vested interests both in the Majlis and elsewhere. Unfortunately, gratitude is a quality which is lacking in the Persian make-up. Economic distress was almost invariably ascribed to British inefficiency and machiavellian intentions. This campaign undoubtedly had a deplorable effect on our

popularity and it unfortunately acquired some show of justification when, at the beginning of the year, owing to the unforeseen interruption of the rail traffic and other causes for which the British were not responsible, Tehran was threatened with a serious shortage of oil. The public had naturally been greatly influenced by the fulminations of the press at our expense, which for long periods were allowed to continue their campaigns unchecked by the Government. These attacks might have become even more violent if it had not been for our victories in the various theatres of war. Fortunately, towards the end of the year, with Persia's declaration of war on Germany and her adherence to the United Nations, and the issue of the Tehran Declaration, the position returned to normal and there was little to complain of in the attitude of the press. It was at times rather galling that Soviet Russia, having done little or nothing to help the Persian economy and at times having even acted in a manner detrimental to vital Persian interests, should remain immune from attack. The Persian attitude, however, towards Russia remains one of deep respect based on fear. As a Persian journalist once said: "We do not attack the Russians because they kidnap people!" It is a case of the Persian cat purring at full blast if the Russian bear will only refrain from growling!

5. Early in July the Persian Government notified the Soviet, American and British Representatives of their decision to adhere to the Declaration of the United Nations, and asked to be informed as to what additional obligations Persia would thereby incur and what advantages she would secure. An agreed reply by the three Governments was in due course returned to the general effect that (a) Persia would on entering into a state of war with one or more of the Axis Powers become eligible for adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations, (b) such adherence would not entail for Persia additional economic or military obligations, and (c) Persia would enjoy the benefits of full partnership with the thirty-two United Nations, and would have equal rights with them to participate in the appropriate conferences connected with the peace settlement.

6. On the 9th September war was officially declared on Germany, and Persia finally adhered to the Declaration of the United Nations on the 14th September. Up to that time Persia had really been an unwilling and purely nominal ally. However, the actual declaration of war, while not altering the situation fundamentally, produced a psychological change in the Persian people, considerably strengthened the position and prestige of the Government, and provided it with a ready-made justification for taking strong action against Axis sympathisers. In fact Persia felt that she had at last become a full-blown ally. The news was well received by the Majlis and the press, and gave intense satisfaction to the Shah, who had always been keen on closer participation in the war, though for reasons of his own connected with the morale and equipment of the army. It was only the relatives of those serving in the army who bewailed the event, fearing that their menfolk would be called upon forthwith to proceed on active service.

7. It was not long before Persia figured in the limelight again, although to a minor degree. The Secretary of State passed through Tehran in October on his way to the Moscow Conference. Considerable interest and even apprehension was aroused in official circles, as it was feared that independent decisions might be taken at the expense of Persia. As it turned out, the British and American Representatives were unable owing to Soviet opposition to secure agreement on the issue of a declaration which would have reassured Persia as to the intentions of the Allies. On their return journey to Tehran the American delegation informed the Persian Government that during the Conference the Russians had repeatedly declared their intention to execute the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. This gave general satisfaction and relief. According to the British records of the meetings, however, it would have been more accurate to say that the Soviet delegation considered reaffirmations of the treaty as unnecessary, as the Persian Government had complete confidence in the intentions of the Allies. This no doubt could be taken to imply that the Soviet Government intended to honour their treaty obligations.

#### *Tehran Conference.*

8. For Persia all other events of the year were overshadowed by the historic Tehran Conference, which was attended by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill and their staffs, and lasted from the 27th November to the 2nd December. The meeting, which passed off without a hitch, excited the interest and flattered the vanity of the Shah, the Government and the whole nation, in that Tehran had been chosen as the seat of such an important conference. For reasons of security the strictest measures in regard to secrecy



had to be observed, and the news of the impending arrival of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill was only communicated to the Persian Government a very short time in advance. In the case of Marshal Stalin, longer notice was given by the Soviet Embassy without our knowledge. This veil of secrecy, which virtually prevented official visits and entertainment, caused some slight resentment and disappointment to the Shah and the Persian Government. It was quickly dissipated, however, by the issue of the Anglo-Soviet-American Declaration.

9. When the Secretary of State called on the Persian Prime Minister on the 29th November, the latter stated that Tehran was expecting that some communiqué relating to Persia would appear as a result of the conference, and suggested the lines on which such a communiqué should be based. A similar appeal was made to Mr. Churchill by the Shah. The Persian Government clearly knew that the British and the Americans were both sympathetic, and that all that was required was to secure the assent of the Russians. In the cordial atmosphere prevailing their assent was secured without difficulty, and a Declaration was eventually issued (a) recognising the assistance given by Persia in the war effort, (b) agreeing to continue economic assistance to Persia, (c) expressing readiness to give full consideration to any economic problems confronting Persia at the end of the war, and (d) confirming the independence and territorial integrity of Persia. This Declaration which naturally added to the prestige of the Shah and the Prime Minister, gave Persia all that she had asked for and was hailed by the nation as the first occasion on which a country had been given such a guarantee by the three Great Powers.

10. It was in the course of the Conference that took place, both the handing over by Mr. Churchill of the Stalingrad sword to Marshal Stalin at the Soviet Embassy, and the celebration on the 30th November of Mr. Churchill's 69th birthday by a dinner party in the dining room of the British Legation in the presence of President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. These historic events served to reflect the close spirit of friendship and cordiality pervading the whole atmosphere of the Tehran meeting.

#### *Indian-Persian Relations.*

11. In the spring of 1943 the Persian Government expressed a desire to send a Trade Representative to India in order to develop commercial relations between the two countries. The Government of India concurred, and His Excellency, M. Allahyar Saleh, a former Persian Minister of Finance, left Persia in November for Bombay, where he has set up his headquarters as Persian Trade Commissioner in India.

12. A project which had been under consideration by the Government of India for some time, for the appointment of an Indian Trade Commissioner to Persia with headquarters at Tehran, has now been approved.

13. Early in 1943 the Government of India sent Major Naqvi, formerly of the Indian C.I.D., to study the Indian community in this country with special reference to anti-British and pro-Axis activities. As a result of Major Naqvi's report on his return to India the Government of India requested that the Persian Government be asked to withdraw the *permis de séjour* of eight Indians. The Persian Government agreed to do so and the Indians were arrested under the Defence of India Act as they crossed the Indo-Persian frontier. As a sequel to this, the Government of India are sending Major Naqvi back to Tehran, where he will be attached to the consulate as a temporary measure in order to continue, under the supervision of the Additional Counsellor, his study of the Indian community in Persia. His first duty will be to cultivate the better types of Indian, and consider in what ways they can best be helped—whether in trade matters, army contracts or in any legitimate grievances they may have against Persian officials or others. At the same time he will keep a watch for pro-Axis or anti-British activities on the part of Indians.

14. Towards the end of the year the Government of India extended an invitation to the Persian Government, through His Majesty's Legation, to send a small Cultural Mission to visit a number of Indian Universities. It was contemplated that the tour should begin and end with a few days in Delhi and take approximately a month in all. The Government of India have offered to be responsible for all accommodation and travelling arrangements and expenses from the moment the Mission reached Delhi till it left Delhi at the end of the tour.

15. The Government of India, on being asked for a contribution of cloth to the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, made a generous gift of Rs. 50,000 worth of thick and thin cloth suitable for winter and summer clothing for men and women. At the end of the year the cloth was on its way to Zahidan from India.

#### *Soviet Interests.*

16. Soviet policy in Persia remained during 1943 somewhat of an enigma. Officially it was based on strict non-interference in Persian internal affairs; that was invariably the attitude adopted by the Soviet Embassy whenever they were approached for their views or concerted action on any issues which happened to arise during the year. Their real intentions were difficult to fathom, and it may be that they had not clearly made up their minds about long-term policy in this country. From the short-term point of view it was clear, however, that they were studiously preparing the ground by all forms of propaganda, pressure and quiet interference to serve their interests as circumstances might later require. In spite of these difficulties and the natural language barrier this legation made every effort to work in the closest harmony with the Soviet authorities and to give them no cause for complaint, but unfortunately the Soviet Embassy seemed quite incapable of acting without clear-cut instructions from Moscow, and in any case the views of the embassy often carried little weight, when the interests of the Soviet army or other authorities were directly concerned. At times there was a surprising lack of frankness and candour in questions which concerned the Allied war effort in Persia, and any move on our part was invariably viewed with deep suspicion. It was only in cases where "Aid to Russia" and Soviet war interests demanded some measure of Allied collaboration that the Soviet Embassy displayed more willingness to co-operate. (For instance, the Soviet Embassy collaborated with us over the arrest of the Persian suspects in August, and over the variety of air matters which arise out of the fact that Tehran is the junction point of the British and Russian air spheres). The absence of a Soviet Ambassador for many months of the year did not render our task any more easy, but fortunately the victories in the Mediterranean, and later the more cordial atmosphere generated by the Moscow and Tehran conferences, were necessarily reflected in varying degree in the attitude of the Soviet authorities in Persia.

17. The Soviet authorities have continued to show particular interest in Central and Southern Persia and increasing suspicion of British and American policy. For instance, a Soviet scientific expedition toured Southern Persia at the beginning of the year, whilst Soviet consular officers have increased their activities, particularly at Kermanshah, in connexion with political, economic and tribal conditions in various parts of Persia. The Soviet authorities have constantly asked for information about road and aerodrome construction by the British army and our troop movements in Eastern Persia and have gradually extended their military posts southwards. On the other hand they, for their part, have refused to issue passes to British military personnel to visit places where Russian troops are stationed, unless they are satisfied that their journey is directly concerned with the furtherance of aid to Russia, or to agree to a British liaison officer residing at Tabriz. This attitude of suspicion, which is characteristic and hardly surprising in view of past history, has been much increased by the support which we have consistently given to the American advisers in this country. No doubt a deep-seated fear exists that the influence of the Americans in the administration of the Government will in some way or other react adversely on Russia, e.g., by producing some semblance of order out of the existing chaos. There is little doubt that the Soviet Embassy are working against the American advisers. Other grounds for suspicion are our alleged support of Seyyid Zia, who returned to Persia in October. The reason for this attitude is not entirely clear, as he has never been associated with anti-Soviet policy; in fact, it was during his premiership that the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was rejected. The strong campaign launched against him was presumably based on the fact that he had lived so long in Palestine and was therefore regarded as an instrument of British Imperialism.

18. As was to be expected, the Soviet Embassy took an exceptionally keen interest and part in the general elections. The ground was well prepared, as closer contact by the Persians with the Russians, their discipline and morale and their sympathy for the lower classes had greatly affected preconceived ideas of the Soviet system. They began to be looked upon as the champions of the oppressed and as possible supporters of revolution against the present ruling classes. The Tudeh or Left party was undoubtedly inspired and supported financially and otherwise by the Soviet authorities, however much they may deny this. Although the election results must have been rather disappointing to the Russians, they managed to secure the return of a few Tudeh candidates in the north, who will be more or less subservient to their views. The Tabriz elections, when completed, will probably include more Soviet protégés. The bogey of a large Soviet party in the Majlis has not materialised.



19. Soviet propaganda has been extremely active. Large increases in cultural activities, films and exhibitions have been noticeable. As a counterblast perhaps to the military hospital which we opened in Tehran for Persian typhus patients, the Russians offered to place their military services at the disposal of the Persian health services for preventing the spread of epidemics. In addition, a well-equipped Russian hospital was opened in Tehran, though it does not cater exclusively, or even mainly, for the poor. Their main weapon of propaganda, however, has been the press, and certain organs are known to be the mouthpiece of the Soviet Embassy, especially in their campaigns against Seyyid Zia.

20. It is in economic issues that co-operation with the Soviet Embassy has proved particularly difficult. The cereal shortage at the beginning of the year was due largely to the failure of the northern zone to make that contribution in grain which, as the most fertile part of Persia, it might have been expected to do, and had in fact always done hitherto. It is difficult to decide to what extent this was due to a definite Russian prohibition and to what extent to Russian acquiescence—unlike the active co-operation with the Persian authorities which we showed in the south—in the slackness of the landowners and the officials. Both factors were present, and the Russians made a virtue out of their anti-social attitude, for they fostered the absurd opinion that if there was more food in the north than in the south, this was because the Russians were more generous than the British to the Persian population. Owing to shortage of wheat, the bread issued in Tehran at the controlled price remained poor in quality for the first two or three months of the year, but the quality was just beginning to improve with the arrival of the first consignments of the 25,000 tons of wheat promised to Persia by the British and American Governments in the previous year, when the Soviet Government, without consulting the British or Americans (who, of course, had kept them fully informed of the progress of their negotiations of the previous year and had even suggested that Russia should sign the wheat agreement even if only as a gesture) suddenly announced that they would supply 25,000 tons of wheat for Persia. The Supply Department suggested that the Soviet Government should not take from Azerbaijan the 5,000 tons of wheat they had induced the Persian Government to sell them and should reduce by that amount the wheat to be supplied from Russia, but this would have reduced the publicity value of the Soviet offer and the sanctimonious reply was given that this was impossible as the whole of the 25,000 tons from Russia was meant for the poor of Tehran. In spite of this the British and American representatives made further attempts after the 1943 harvest to secure Russian co-operation in the matter of grain supplies for Tehran and other large towns. The Soviet Ambassador declared that the Soviet authorities would not need any wheat (they continued, however, to collect the arrears of the 5,000 tons for which they had contracted, as well as the rest of the 15,000 tons of barley). Later they even admitted that the north ought to contribute 40,000 tons for the feeding of the rest of Persia, and promised to assist in the carriage of this grain, both by rail and, where necessary, by the back-loading of motor lorries working under Transovtrans. By the end of the year one-fifth of this programme had been fulfilled and the prospects for its complete execution were poor.

21. The Soviet policy of aloofness applied in the same way to transport and civil supplies. Wishing no doubt to escape responsibility, as well as to remain free from its regulations, the Soviet authorities did not keep their promise to participate in the activities of the Allied Road Transport Board. Similarly they took no part in the Allied effort to organise civil supplies, but simply sold goods (often direct to merchants) in an attempt to obtain rials and to develop their trade regardless of Middle East Supply Centre and Persian control. In some cases Soviet action entailed a serious burden for the Persian economy, as, for instance, the Soviet-Persian Financial Agreement, which was in much less generous terms than our own, and the Munition Factories Agreement for the supply of rifles, &c., to the Soviet Government under such conditions that only loss could accrue to Persia. At the end of the year no price had even been fixed by the Russians for the payment of munitions supplied.

22. Russian influence with the Shah has increased to a noticeable degree since the appointment of General Razmara in October as Chief of the Shah's Military Cabinet. This officer is known to be well disposed towards Russia and hostile to the American advisers, and he will no doubt be used by the Russians to counteract Anglo-American influence. Further, at the time of the Tehran Conference, the Shah was deeply flattered by the visit paid to him by Marshal Stalin at the Palace, particularly in view of the sympathy which His Majesty felt that he had found in the Marshal for his personal ambitions and

the security of his position as Shah. The Russian offer of aircraft and tanks made on that occasion flattered the weakness which the Shah shares with his father and predecessor for an army which looks impressive rather than for one adapted to the needs of the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that very soon afterwards the Shah removed from office the Ministers of War and Interior, the only two strong men in the Cabinet, in view of their supposed anti-Russian views. Stalin's advice in favour of strong personal rule and a large army was strange, coming as it did from a person whose embassy was openly backing the Tudeh party, whose members had hitherto been violently opposed to both.

#### *American Interests.*

23. American advisers in the different branches of the Persian Administration played a prominent part during the year and in spite of the constant obstruction with which they were faced from vested interests and other circles succeeded in making considerable progress. Dr. Millspaugh arrived in February to take over the post of Administrator-General of Finances and gradually built up around him an American staff and organisation to enable him to cope with the chaotic state of the country in the financial and economic fields. Transport, finance, cereals and other civil supplies all presented serious problems and as the result of the co-operation eventually established between this legation and the American authorities many obstacles were overcome and adequate organisations set up to deal with important issues. On all occasions the American advisers could rely on our warm support and sympathetic understanding of their difficulties.

24. Close contact was maintained by this legation with Mr. Sheridan, the American Food Adviser, in his efforts to feed the country, provide for the maximum possible collections for the next harvest, and secure funds and transport to put his plans into effect. He had the benefit of our constant advice, and of our assistance in the provinces through the labours of our consular liaison officers, but he proved unequal to the task and in August he resigned. He was replaced by Mr. Crawford as Chief of the Cereals and Bread Section. The Allied Road Transport Board, with Anglo-American-Persian representation, which had been set up to remedy the defects in the Persian civil transport system and to supply lorries, &c., under a system of control to the Persian Road Transport Department, worked harmoniously and in spite of disappointments, did much to improve conditions. Mr. Birkle, head of the department, left in the summer, and pending a permanent successor, was replaced by Mr. Vivian and the staff was strengthened by the addition of several Anglo-Saxon assistants. The Anglo-American control of civil supplies has also operated smoothly.

25. Dr. Millspaugh has proved an honest and conscientious public servant. He has, unfortunately, suffered from bad health, and his inelasticity of vision, his tendency towards centralisation and his failure, due in part to ignorance of any language but English, to establish direct contact with and to consult more freely competent Persian authorities before reaching decisions, have at times exposed him to strong criticism. In addition he has had to face the inevitable opposition on the part of the Russians, who are suspicious of any development of American influence here. Similar difficulties have been experienced by the American military advisers. In spite of this Dr. Millspaugh has much to show to his credit, as a result of his uphill struggle. He obtained special powers and secured the passage of the budget and Bills for the reform of the income tax law, the provision of sixty American advisers, the issue of Treasury bonds, &c.

26. The transfer of the control of the operation of the Trans-Iranian railway from the British to the American authorities was completed on the 1st April. Responsibility for the security of the line and allocation of tonnage were still vested, however, in the British authorities. Although at first some dislocation of traffic necessarily occurred, the handling of the railway has proved efficient, whilst the co-operation which we obtained from the American army authorities in rounding up Persian suspects on the railway in August could not have been more effective. By the end of the year no agreement similar to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 had been signed by the American and Persian Governments to regularise the position of American troops in Persia. The terms of an American-Persian Financial Agreement have been drawn up and in operation for some time. According to the agreement, which has not yet been signed, the United States authorities provide the Persian Government with dollars against all rials required by the United States and are ready to exchange all these dollars for gold. It has been made clear to us that it is not the intention of the American



Government to vary the rate of exchange without prior consultation with His Majesty's Government.

27. An American-Persian Commercial Agreement was signed in Washington on the 8th April.

28. In spite of the rather shifty and weak attitude of the United States Minister our relations with the United States Legation have, on the whole, been very satisfactory, in fact, far more so than those existing between the United States Legation and their own military. These have been marked by a distinct coldness and have frequently been the subject of complaint to me by my United States colleague and of hints by the American General Officer Commanding. In a country like Persia, where whole-hearted collaboration is all important in Allied interests, it is unfortunate that we have been unable to secure more sincere co-operation from Mr. Dreyfus. He left for America on leave after the Tehran Conference, and in his absence Mr. Ford, the chargé d'affaires, has proved an ideal colleague.

#### *Polish Interests.*

29. A dual authority administered the Polish refugees from the Soviet Union. On the Polish side was the Polish Civil Delegation directly dependent on the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in London. On the British side was a small organisation set up by the Middle East Relief Refugee Association, Cairo, at the instance of the Minister of State.

30. The opening of the year found an acute situation among the refugees. In Persia there remained a total of about 24,000 (not 22,000, as stated in last year's review) of whom 15,500, including 500 sick, were in camps near Tehran, 2,500 were in Isfahan (including 1,700 children), 3,300 were in Ahwaz, 860 were in hospital and 2,000 were living in Tehran itself. These figures did, however, represent a small reduction on the maximum number of 25,700 which had existed in October 1942. The number of sick also showed a reduction from a maximum of over 2,000 in September 1942.

31. There were three main problems connected with the Polish refugees. The first was economic; the acute shortage of wheat and certain other staple commodities in Persia was used by many malevolent and irresponsible persons to blame the presence of the Poles in Persia for this state of affairs. Arrangements had been made to import all the flour, tea and sugar which the Poles had been using and which they would in future require and there was little or no truth in these asseverations; such other items as were required were available in the country without affecting the ordinary consumption of the Persian population. With the diminution of the number of Poles to 9,500 by the end of the year, this situation improved considerably. The next problem was political; here again ill-meaning agents used the presence of Poles as an excuse for attacking their British sponsors. These attacks have ceased, though there is no guarantee that they will not be renewed. The third problem was that of transport; in spite of various considered programmes involving the apportionment of shipping for Polish needs, the problem of transporting the Poles overseas was always acute. The number of ships available was nearly always much less than had been expected; at the same time the necessity for keeping the Polish transit camp at Ahwaz filled to capacity was due to the fact that ships were liable to arrive at any time without due warning and had, owing to general exigencies of shipping space, to carry away a full complement of passengers.

32. The total number of Polish men, women and children evacuated during the year was about 14,500. A large majority went overseas to East Africa or to India; a small proportion were sent to Palestine and some who had relations in the Polish armed forces in the United Kingdom joined them there; a few, whose number did not exceed 2,000, left via Karachi bound for Mexico. Recruiting among the refugees continued throughout the year; 800 young men joined the Polish army and 2,600 young women joined the Polish A.T.S., Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. 760 boys and 250 girls also joined the youth organisations. (These figures refer to 1942 and 1943.) All these were sent to Palestine to join the Polish armed forces there.

33. The morale of the Poles as a whole remained at a fairly low ebb; uncertainty as to their future fate, the relations of their Government with Moscow, failure to provide shipping and lack of employment were all responsible for this. Employment was, nevertheless, found for more than 3,000 Poles throughout most of the year, mainly in various Polish official institutions; about 850 found work with the British and American armed forces and a few with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and similar organisations.

#### *British Military Interests.*

34. The special Military Governor of Abadan Island, Police-Colonel Hatemi, took up his duties early in the year. This appointment, however, did not lead to an improvement in the measures for the security of the refinery precincts for which the Persian Government were responsible, as Colonel Hatemi shirked responsibility and was incapable of taking any action without referring to Tehran. Continuous pressure had, therefore, to be applied on the Persian Prime Minister to obtain the execution of the measures required. In July His Majesty's Legation asked for the removal of Colonel Hatemi; at the same time it was decided to entrust the military and the police duties of his post to two separate persons, and in September Colonel Doulatshahi and Colonel Wakar were appointed military governor and chief of police. In April Lieutenant-Colonel W. Y. Gow had been appointed as political adviser in Abadan to the Persia and Iraq Command, in the hope that the military governor would be guided and invigorated by his advice, and in October he was succeeded by Colonel H. J. Underwood (a former military attaché at this legation) with the title of Political Adviser for the Province of Khuzistan. By the end of the year Colonel Underwood was able to report that security measures in the Abadan area had improved and that at present conditions gave no cause for alarm. Furthermore, a number of measures had been taken, or were impending, to improve the efficiency and terms of service of the Persian police in the area.

35. At the beginning of the year His Majesty's Government considered the question of civil defence duties for British nationals in Persia, in the light of the changed military situation in Russia. They concluded that whereas the risk of air attack was now remote it remained essential to protect Abadan against the risks of sabotage or accidents due to special war conditions. They decided, therefore, to apply to the Province of Khuzistan Regulation 29 B.B. of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, and on the 7th May His Majesty's Minister signed an order under paragraph 7 of Regulation 29 B.B. requiring British nationals (including Indians) in Khuzistan to undertake civil defence duties.

36. Relations between the British and the Persian authorities and people were on the whole good. The Persian Government made a number of complaints against the British troops in Persia. Most of these, however, were petty. Many also were sweeping, unsubstantiated and out-of-date, so His Majesty's Legation had frequently to point out to the Persian Government that no action could be taken to satisfy them unless they gave chapter and verse promptly. The only serious incidents occurred as a result of the persistent pilfering of British army property, notably telegraph wire, since nothing short of forcible measures sufficed to reduce the pilfering. In April His Majesty's Legation had to inform the Persian Government that telephone poles erected by the British forces would be surrounded by a barbed wire fence inside which explosive charges would be placed, while explosive charges would also be attached to the lines themselves. Later in the month an Indian officer shot dead five Persians whom he declared he had caught *in flagrante* stealing telegraph cable. The Persian Government made a violent protest regarding this incident, to which His Majesty's Legation replied with vigour, defending the officer's action. Unfortunately the same officer four days later shot an orange seller on very flimsy grounds; his action was found to be unjustified, and the British military authorities therefore agreed to pay compensation in this case. In December His Majesty's Legation had to request the Persian Government to remove the Governor of Qum, on the grounds that he was not co-operating with the British forces in suppressing the pilfering of telegraph wire. Towards the end of the year, however, better co-operation had been secured from the Persian authorities in the prevention of thefts of wire, and there had been a decrease in the number of thefts.

37. Owing to the prevailing insecurity, the inefficiency of the Persian forces and the demand of the American Persian Gulf Command for a high degree of security, British troops have had to undertake increasing responsibility for the protection of supply routes to Russia and of installations important to the war effort. In the latter half of the year the practice of shooting at troops, particularly small patrols engaged in the protection of the railway, became a favourite sport with the Lur tribesmen. It is improbable that this had any political significance. The chance that an ambush might be successful and result in the capture of a rifle or some ammunition would be sufficient inducement. Hold-ups of isolated vehicles on the roads also took place. The number of casualties to Indian troops was about six.

38. During the typhus epidemic which visited Tehran in the spring the Persia and Iraq Command placed at the disposal of the Persian Government



1,000-bed Indian hospital in tents, complete with doctors and orderlies. The hospital remained open from the 11th April to the 10th July and treated 2,036 patients. This gesture on the part of the Persia and Iraq Command created an excellent effect among the Persians and served as good propaganda.

39. During the autumn the Persian Government pointed out to His Majesty's Legation that no procedure had yet been established for dealing with civil and criminal matters affecting Persians on the one hand and the British forces on the other, although article 4 (1) of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th January, 1942, provided for the settlement, "in co-operation with the Iranian authorities," of all questions concerning relations between the latter and the Allied forces. As the Persian Government's contention appeared reasonable, His Majesty's Legation communicated it to the Persia and Iraq Command, who expressed the view that the same arrangements for the judicial immunities for British troops should be made in Persia as in Iraq, so as to secure uniformity throughout the command as far as possible. The command then submitted a draft agreement on this basis, the text of which His Majesty's Legation forwarded to the Foreign Office for instructions and to the United States Legation in Tehran for comment (since co-ordination with the United States authorities on this matter seemed desirable). That was the position at the end of the year.

40. In January the Soviet Ambassador in London complained that His Majesty's Government had made important changes in the disposition of British troops in Persia without notifying the Soviet authorities. This, the ambassador asserted, was a breach of an undertaking, given by Mr. Eden in letters dated the 21st October and the 21st November, 1941, that the Soviet authorities should be consulted on such occasions. His Majesty's Legation, commenting on M. Maisky's complaint, pointed out that they had always informed the Soviet Military Attaché in advance of all important moves of British forces in West Persia. They had not informed him of military movements in South or East Persia, but these had been confined to a few reconnaissances. The Soviet Embassy, however, had never reciprocated with information about movements of Soviet troops. Every facility had been given to Soviet authorities to visit the British zone, but here, too, the Soviet authorities did not grant reciprocal facilities. In April Mr. Eden wrote a letter to M. Maisky suggesting the following procedure:—

The military attaché to this legation should communicate to the Soviet Military Attaché in Tehran, on condition that the latter reciprocated, advance information regarding minor changes in the disposition of British troops in Persia which did not involve a substantial change in their total number; on the other hand, major movements, involving a substantial change in the total number should be communicated in advance through the diplomatic channel.

The Soviet Government accepted these proposals. The Soviet Embassy in Tehran, however, have never given any information to His Majesty's Legation regarding changes in the numbers or dispositions of their troops although there is reason to believe that such changes have taken place.

41. In the autumn the Persian Minister of Communications, while in London, complained that His Majesty's Government were not consulting the Persian Government regarding the disposition of British troops in Persia, notwithstanding His Majesty's Government's undertaking to do so in the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th January, 1942. His Majesty's Government decided that, in view of the changed strategical situation within the Persian and Iraq Command and of the representations made by the Persian Minister of Communications, information regarding the location of British troops in Persia should be forwarded to the Persian Government provided that the actual designation of formations and units was not divulged.

#### *Security Questions.*

42. As in 1942 the rounding up of Germans and of Persian fifth columnists continued to exercise the closet attention of the legation in view of their danger to Allied security and interests in Persia, particularly on the vital lines of communications carrying aid to Russia. During the summer, owing to the serious deterioration in the general political situation and the dropping of German parachutists in various parts of Persia, it was decided to make use of certain information connected with the Axis plot of the previous year and to demand the arrest by the Persian Government of a few dangerous Persians. The Soviet and American Governments were kept fully informed of our intentions. It happened

that at that time the Deputy Naubakht had tabled an interpellation in the Majlis attacking the Persian Government and the Allies. Therefore, as a first step, I provided the Prime Minister with full evidence about Naubakht's treasonable activities to enable the Government to reply. I also asked for his parliamentary immunity to be withdrawn to facilitate his arrest by the Persian authorities. After interminable delays the Government failed to take any action and Naubakht fled to the Qashgai country without proceeding with his interpellation. Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, the anti-British mullah, went into hiding simultaneously. It then soon became clear that, if the Axis-controlled organisations were to be effectively dislocated, a much larger number of arrests than originally foreseen would have to be effected. Accordingly, having obtained the collaboration of the American authorities in the arrest of some railway employees and relying on the acquiescence of my American colleague, I handed to the Prime Minister on the 29th August a joint Anglo-Soviet list of 162 suspects with a request for their immediate arrest and detention and interrogation at Sultanabad. As well as the railway employees the list included Naubakht, Kashani and a number of senior army officers. On this occasion I was able to secure the support of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, and the Prime Minister agreed, and by the end of the year about 138 had been arrested and handed over to us at Sultanabad. In October an additional list of ten suspects was handed to the Prime Minister for similar action, and the majority of these were arrested. This constitutes an example of the good effect of joint Anglo-Soviet representations to the Persian Government. As a matter of fact on the Anglo-Soviet list figured a certain number of suspects proposed by the Russians against whom we had no evidence. In view of the embarrassing position in which we were placed the matter was taken up by the legation with the Soviet Embassy with the request that they should either take over their suspects or take part themselves in the interrogation at Sultanabad. Finally, after considerable delay and notwithstanding the apprehensions of the Persian Government, it was agreed that the suspects in question should be transferred to Resht for examination, although the move had not taken place by the end of the year.

43. On the whole the position as regards Axis activities in Persia has been vastly improved during 1943 owing to the prompt manner in which the Persian Government reacted to the joint Anglo-Soviet representations referred to above. In addition, in dealing with suspects the Persian Government have had their hands strengthened by their declaration of war on Germany and adherence to the United Nations. In fact they have at last come down completely on the Allied side of the fence. The course of the war, too, has had a sobering effect on potential Axis agents. Even so we shall always be up against the venality and cowardice of the Persian authorities, and evidence of this is that well-known suspects such as Naubakht, Vaziri and Kashani are still at large, whilst a few German agents are known to be in hiding in the south. Active measures are, however, being taken by us to round up those concerned in spite of the very considerable difficulties involved.

#### *Anglo-Persian Public Relations.*

44. The entry of Allied troops into Persia in 1941, while it resulted in the elimination of many nationals in the country, had done little to win over the Government and people from their deep-rooted admiration and friendship for everything German which had been so zealously and thoroughly fostered by the Nazi party during the latter years of Reza Shah's reign. It became apparent, therefore, that a publicity organisation of greater magnitude than the press attaché's office was essential to carry out British propaganda and to counteract the general feeling prevailing in the country that the Allies would be defeated. Accordingly in the early months of 1942 an office of the Ministry of Information was established at Tehran as the Public Relations Bureau of His Majesty's Legation. The new organisation was suitably located in the old centre of German propaganda, the "Brown House" at Tehran, and the activities of the bureau expanded rapidly. By the beginning of 1943 the first English newspaper in Persia, the *Tehran Daily News*, had made its appearance. A film unit had been set up to promote the showing of British news-reels and propaganda films, both through Persian commercial channels and by means of mobile cinema vans in the provinces. Steps had been taken to disseminate large quantities of reading material throughout the country, and a start had been made with the establishment of information centres in the provinces in conjunction with the various consulates. The field of broadcasting had also been entered and a daily half-hour broadcast in Persian organised from Radio Tehran. Visual publicity



had been catered for by a special production unit in the bureau, which prepared pictorial material for display at the British Information Centre in Tehran and in the various consular reading rooms throughout the country. The office of the press attaché had been incorporated in the new organisation and had set itself the uphill task of securing the co-operation of an unfriendly local press.

45. During the year under review these activities were further expanded and systematised. The *Tehran Daily News*, which had first appeared as a cyclostyled bulletin, was converted into a printed newspaper with a special supplement once a week. By the end of the year approximately 4,000 copies were being sold daily in Tehran and the provinces, and a substantial circle of permanent subscribers, totalling over 1,400, had been built up. This paper, in addition to providing reliable information about the course of the war, was also used considerably as a medium for publicising British activities such as those of the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund and the Middle East Supply Centre. During the latter half of 1943 the attitude of the Persian press, which previously had on occasions been hostile in the extreme, underwent a welcome change for the better and many articles favourable to ourselves and our Allies were accepted by local editors for reproduction both in the Tehran and in the provincial papers.

46. In the course of the year considerable expansion took place in the publicity work centred on our consulates, and separate public relations units were brought into being at each consulate under the local supervision of His Britannic Majesty's Consuls. In addition to arranging for the distribution of reading material of all kinds, several of these provincial posts undertook the publication of local news bulletins and the establishment of numerous reading rooms for the public in outlying areas where, besides facilities for reading, daily broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation and other British radio services were made.

47. In the field of local publications a weekly news commentary in Persian, *Tafsir*, published by the press attaché's office, attained much popularity and 11,000 copies of each issue were regularly distributed to all classes of the people. With a view to influencing the younger generation of Persians a special fortnightly newspaper for schoolchildren was introduced in October and its popularity proved so great that the original circulation of 5,000 copies had to be raised to 17,000, all of which were disposed of by sales in schools.

48. Exhibitions and window displays depicting the Allied war effort and portraying the ordinary life and institutions of the British Commonwealth were arranged from time to time and a regular circuit of such displays was established for our consulates.

49. During the year the seven mobile cinema units of the bureau covered many thousands of miles and gave performances to audiences in outlying areas which had hitherto, in many cases, never seen a cinema. In Tehran a special newsreel cinema was built in a central part of the city and after a mediocre start succeeded in attracting considerable attention locally.

50. In order to meet the demands of the representatives of our many Allies in Tehran, a special section of the bureau was formed in October to carry out propaganda towards foreign nationals in the capital. As part of its duties it undertook the teaching of English to the various foreign communities, and by the end of the year over 500 Czechs and Poles were receiving regular instruction.

51. During the course of the year the favourable change in the fortunes of war altered fundamentally the basis of our propaganda in Persia and the need for special emphasis on the war largely diminished. Propaganda policy towards the end of the year was, therefore, directed more to supplying the people of the country with information of a general nature concerning all sides of British life. There is no doubt that a knowledge of how the average Briton lives and of how his civilisation has been established will go far towards laying the foundations of a better understanding between Britain and Persia, which is so essential to the two countries in the post-war period.

#### *British Council Activities.*

52. The first member of the British Council teaching staff arrived in Tehran in January 1943 and an institute building was leased in February, but owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary staff and equipment the formal opening was delayed till June. The institute now has 650 members taking English lessons and 400 members who have joined for other activities. These include a lecture, film exhibition, concert and debate every week, a library and restaurant. The present building having proved too small, negotiations are now in progress for a much larger building to which all cultural and social activities will be

transferred leaving the present building for teaching only. The permanent teaching staff of five is also teaching in the university, teachers' training college, schools, technical college, national bank, railway school and elsewhere, the number of students in this category being over 2,000. The Agricultural College and Department of Mines have also asked for lessons. In a separate building lent by the Ministry of Education 700 adults are taught in evenings by British personnel who are employed during the day in the embassy, army, R.A.F. and other British organisations. This is obviously not altogether satisfactory, but no other teachers are available. The number now being taught English could be immediately trebled.

53. An Anglo-Persian medical association, a dramatic society and an art club were formed and promise to develop successfully.

54. During the summer months of 1943 a separate institute was opened in the hills some miles above Tehran for younger people on vacation from the university and schools. A summer course was held in Tehran for those unable to leave the city. This will be repeated in 1944.

55. Books and periodicals have been presented to the libraries of the university, certain schools, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Parliament, to professional people of importance and also to the Shah. Books for sale to shops have been imported, but the demand far exceeds the supply. Educational films with Persian commentary are being shown every day to different schools and faculties of the universities. A photographic exhibition of Britain open to the public was attended by 6,000 people. The council's relationship with the Ministry of Education is excellent. The Minister has asked for British teachers in all secondary schools and professors for the university and has formally requested directors of institutes to inspect and submit to him reports on schools. The Minister of Commerce has asked for technical instructors for the technical colleges.

56. An institute was formally opened in Isfahan in December 1943 with a permanent British staff of three. There are 500 members taking English lessons and 200 have joined for other activities. As in Tehran the staff is teaching at the technical college and schools. Teaching could be extended to the staff of twelve factories which employ 25,000 operatives, to the large Armenian community in Julfa (a suburb of Isfahan), and to the 2,500 Polish children and adults who will remain there for the duration of the war, if sufficient staff were provided.

57. There is an urgent demand for institutes in other large towns of Persia. If permanent staff and sufficient funds to cover the considerable overhead expenses for institutes are not forthcoming, temporary staff for teaching should at least be provided.

58. At the end of the year the Russians were planning to open an institute in Tehran on the same basis as the Anglo-Persian institute.

#### *Internal Affairs.*

##### *(a) Majlis.*

59. The 13th Majlis came to an end on the 23rd November. For many reasons less was heard than in the previous year about proposals for the limitation of its powers or its complete abolition. There seems to have been a general feeling that the powers of the Shah were tending to increase and ought to be held in check by the Majlis. Further, the Prime Minister had shown signs of using the Majlis as a smoke-screen to cover up his failure to pass distasteful legislation, whilst the Shah no doubt felt that the Majlis had its uses in curbing the power of the Prime Minister. At any rate, the provisions of the Constitution as far as they affected the Majlis continued to be observed and a firman announcing the arrangements for elections for the 14th Legislature was duly published on the 23rd June. Up to the end of the year more than half the Deputies had been elected, although elections in Tehran and Tabriz had not been completed. In spite of Russian pressure, which resulted in the election of a few Communists, voting was less of a farce than in the time of Reza Shah and, on the whole, the successful candidates did represent their constituencies. Governmental interference, irregularities and corrupt practices, being endemic in this country, could not be eliminated.

60. Legislation passed by the Majlis during 1943 included Bills for compulsory education, the establishment of a police training college, transfer of military personnel to the jurisdiction of civil courts, except in case of purely



military offences, insurance for workers and various important measures sponsored by the Millsaugh Mission, which are referred to in other parts of this report.

(b) *Cabinets.*

61. At the beginning of the year Qawam-es-Saltaneh was in power, but soon began to lose ground. His relations with the Shah had never been good. Both were determined to control the Ministry of War and the Shah was openly advocating social reform and the limitation of the power of the moneyed class, to which Qawam-es-Saltaneh belonged. Internal troubles in the Cabinet also embarrassed the Prime Minister. Seyyid Mehdi Farrukh, the Minister of Food, resigned and, after carrying on practically single-handed for some days, the Prime Minister presented a new Cabinet to the Majlis in the third week in January. It was composed as follows:—

Minister without Portfolio: Ibrahim Hakimi.  
War: Marshal Amir Ahmedi.  
Education: Ali Akbar Siassi.  
Industry and Commerce: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
Agriculture: Ahmed Adle.  
Food: Mehdi Farrukh.  
Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Saed.  
Justice: Jawad Amery.  
Finance: Allahyar Saleh.  
Interior: Farajullah Bahramy.  
Posts and Telegraphs: Muhsin Rais.  
Roads: Ili Motamedy.  
Health: Nasrullah Intizam.

The last three were the Shah's nominees and were relatively young men, without previous Cabinet experience. Early in February the Cabinet showed signs of disintegrating owing to internal dissension and the Prime Minister's treatment of the press; but he managed to obtain a vote of confidence by a small majority. His position *vis-à-vis* the Majlis was becoming hopeless. In a desperate attempt to appease the Deputies he tabled Bills (a) to abrogate the fundamental law that no Deputy might become a Cabinet Minister, and (b) to give to the Majlis powers over the appointment of the head of the National Bank. These measures merely gave rise to acrimonious comment, and when the Shah's sympathies were alienated by the Prime Minister's declaration that, in order to establish the authority of the people, the Constitution should be revised, and by his legitimate attempt to curb the Shah's control of the army and the General Staff, it became evident that the game was up and Qawam-es-Saltaneh resigned.

62. Soheily was the next Prime Minister, and on the 21st February the following Cabinet received a unanimous vote of confidence from the Majlis:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior: Ali Soheily.  
Commerce and Industry: Mahmoud Bader.  
War: Marshal Amir Ahmedi.  
Communications: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
Justice: Ali Asghar Hikmat.  
Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Saed.  
Finance: Allahyar Saleh.  
Education: Ali Akbar Siassi.  
Posts and Telegraphs: Nasrullah Intizam.  
Health: Amanullah Ardelan.  
Ministers without Portfolio: Mohammed Tadayyun and Hussein Sami'i.

63. Such a team seemed the best available in the circumstances, with the possible exception of the Prime Minister. The programme of the Cabinet included the supply of food, the stabilisation of prices, the improvement of the welfare of the peasants, the workers and Government employees, and co-operation with the Allies. Tadayyun, an experienced Majlis debater, was appointed Minister of Food in March, and Ettebar, a Majlis Deputy, became Minister of Agriculture a fortnight later. The Prime Minister managed to curb the excesses of the press, largely as a result of representations from this legation. The offences for which newspapers might be suppressed were also re-defined and eleven organs of the press were actually suppressed. The Bill defining Dr. Millsaugh's powers was proceeded with in spite of agitation against it, as expressed by the closing of the bazaars. However, the whole effect of this show of firmness was

ruined by the Prime Minister declaring in secret session that such action had been forced on him by the British.

64. As a result of a dispute between the Minister of Finance and the American advisers, the former resigned and was replaced at the end of April by an elderly Majlis Deputy, Murteza Quli Bayat. The Government survived with a large majority an interpellation in the Majlis in May challenging the legality of the appointment of the Majlis Deputies, Ettebar and Bayat as Ministers, as well as the right of the Government to transfer their authority under the Military Governor Law to the Minister of War and to interpret in their own way a section of that law. The Government victory was alleged to be due to the fact that there was no obvious successor to Soheily. Strikes of engineers and professors, the rise of the Tudeh party and the refusal of Marshal Ahmedi to continue acting as Military Governor of Tehran still further complicated Soheily's problems in May. Dr. Millsaugh's regulations for the stabilisation of prices, his Income Tax Bill and his retrenchment in Government expenditure were of course unpalatable. The introduction of a Bill for the limitation of the number of newspapers in Tehran and the establishment of a press censorship proved unpopular and resulted in the resignation in June of the Minister of Justice and the Director of the Department of Press and Propaganda.

65. At the beginning of July Hussein Sami'i took over the Ministry of the Interior, and Khalil Fahimy filled the vacated post of Minister without Portfolio. Disorder and insecurity consequent upon the disaster at Semirum in July seemed likely to create an ugly situation throughout the country, particularly in the tribal areas. How the Government dealt with that problem is told in the section on the Tribal Situation. The vacant post of Minister of Justice was given to the elderly reactionary, Muhsin Sadr, early in August. At the end of August Siassi resigned owing to a difference of opinion with Soheily. Hussein Sami'i found the Ministry of the Interior too exacting for him and resigned early in September, and was replaced by Tadayyun. The latter had the invidious and unpleasant duty of administering the elections throughout the country, and carried out his duties with firmness and courage, though the inevitable accusations of bribe-taking and corruption were made against him, usually from disappointed candidates.

66. The complicated disputes between the General Staff and the Ministry of War concerning their spheres and relative positions proved a great embarrassment to Soheily. Dr. Millsaugh also became restive at the procrastination of the Majlis in connexion with the passing of the Income Tax Bill, and threatened to resign. To make matters worse for Soheily about thirty of the Deputies, who had found that they had no chance of re-election to the 14th Majlis, began to intrigue against the Prime Minister in every possible way. An interpellation concerning the nation's bread supplies was taken on the 31st October, and resulted in a vote of confidence for Soheily. Eventually, in November, the Income Tax and other essential measures became law.

67. Throughout the last three months of the year Soheily had to deal with the threat to his position caused by the return to Persia, at the beginning of October, of Seyyid Zia-ud-Din Tabatabai after 22 years' absence in exile, latterly in Palestine. The Prime Minister profited from, and probably abetted, the campaign against the Seyyid, which was instigated by the Russians and by the Shah, and it was not owing to Seyyid Zia but to the Shah that Soheily had to resign in the middle of December. It soon became apparent that the Shah's chief interest was to eliminate from the Cabinet the only two strong men therein: Tadayyun at the Ministry of the Interior and Marshal Amir Ahmedi at the Ministry of War. Soheily was called upon to form a new Cabinet without them, and on the 16th December the following Cabinet was appointed:—

Prime Minister: Ali Soheily.  
Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Saed.  
Justice: Muhsin Sadr.  
Finance: Amanullah Ardelan.  
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
Roads: Nasrullah Intizam.  
Agriculture: Moosa Noury Esfandiary.  
Education: Issa Sadiq.  
Posts and Telegraphs: Hamid Sayyah.  
War: Ibrahim Zand.  
Public Health: Qasim Ghani.  
Commerce and Industry: General Shafai.  
Without Portfolio: Mustafa Adle.



Of these Zand, Shafai, Intizam and Noury Esfandiary were nominees of the Shah, and it was generally thought that this was the Shah's first step in the experiment of governing the country through a subservient Cabinet, as his father had done. Zand was the first civilian to be Minister of War for a long time, and the general opinion was that the Shah was determined to become commander-in-chief of the army in fact as well as in name, and to circumvent the weak civilian Minister by issuing orders through his Chief of Staff, in spite of the decree he had signed in the spring making the General Staff subordinate to the Ministry of War.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

68. The weakness of the Government, its lack of any consistent policy and the ineffectiveness of its forces have been responsible for its failure to re-establish control in large areas of tribal country. An uneasy peace has been secured by a policy of giving way to tribal leaders and by avoiding undue interference in tribal affairs. But this policy, by strengthening the influence of the tribal leaders, must inevitably increase the difficulties of the eventual establishment of Government authority, which must be preceded by disarmament. For the time being the stronger tribes have little to complain of from the oppression of Government officials; they have benefited by the high prices prevailing for grain, mutton and wool; they escape conscription to a large extent; and if they do not always pillage the peaceful villager they usually levy tribute in some form or another. On the other hand they can justly complain of almost total neglect by the Government in the matter of provision of medical and educational facilities and of tea, sugar and cloth.

69. In Fars the situation is particularly unsatisfactory. After the demoralising defeat inflicted on the Persian army at Semirum (see section on Persian Land Forces), the Persian Government realised that they could rely neither on their commanders nor on their troops to compel the submission of Nasir and the Qashgai tribes. Frightened at the prospect, they called on Qavam-ul-Mulk to raise the Khamseh tribes, who had formerly been under his and his family's leadership, in support of the Government. But, hardly had they made this decision, when they wavered in the face of the criticisms of Nasir's supporters in Tehran and of the champions of peace at any price, and, taking the immediately easier way, they approved a policy of conciliation of Nasir and his brother Khosrow and the tacit recognition of their leadership of the Qashgai tribes. They made certain conditions, which have, of course, not been fulfilled. Nasir was to surrender the arms which had been taken at various times from Government forces and to hand over certain Germans who were known to be in Qashgai territory. At the end of the year the situation was that Nasir and Khosrow had greatly increased their influence in Fars; the Government being unable to give any protection to property situated in areas dominated by the Qashgai tribes, landowners were forced to accept Nasir's terms; Nasir has been steadily acquiring wealth by the sale of grain on the black market and by levying tribute on villages and landowners; German agents are still at large, if not always in Qashgai territory yet still under Qashgai protection; and the Persian army appears to be no nearer the day when it can deal with Nasir by force. But there is no serious disturbance, and provided that Nasir is allowed to continue to have his own way it will be to his interest to show that he can restrain the lawlessness of his tribes within moderate bounds.

70. He seeks to extend his influence to Kuh-i-Galu, and especially to the Boir Ahmadi, of whom certain sections played the principal part in the attack on the Persian troops at Semirum. But the rebel Boir Ahmadi leader, Abdullah Zarghampur, has little reason to trust the Qashgai and is well occupied with dissensions in his own tribe and rivals in Kuh-i-Galu. These dissensions led to some unrest on the borders of the oil-fields from Masjid-i-Suleiman to Gach Saran, but, except for an occasional hold-up of road traffic and a raid on the pumping station at Do Gumbadan, where the raiders contented themselves with looting the houses of some employees, there has been no direct interference with the oil company's interests. Any deliberate attack by a responsible chief is unlikely, but while Germans are present with the tribes the possibilities of sabotage must be guarded against.

71. In Bakhtiari also the old ruling family has got back to power. Again because of the weakness of their forces and the inefficiency and corruption of their officials, the Persian Government were obliged to depart from their avowed policy of preventing the return to positions of authority in their own country of

important tribal chiefs and to call on Morteza Quli, son of the late Samsam-es-Sultaneh, to accept the governorship of Bakhtiari. He is the most respectable and influential of the Bakhtiari Khans and the least likely to indulge in adventures harmful to the Government. In the short view his appointment has been an undoubted success. Bakhtiari is more settled and peaceful than for many months past. The rebel Khan Abul Qasim, seeing that Morteza Quli's influence was ousting his own, decided to submit, and he is now living in Tehran. There are inevitably the usual family feuds and jealousies inseparable from any Bakhtiari rule, but it is to be hoped that Morteza Quli's sense and influence will prevent their leading to disturbance. Bakhtiari is relatively peaceful, but it is to a large extent an autonomous tribal entity.

72. Some of the Arab tribes of Khuzestan were persuaded by a show of force in the summer to surrender about 1,000 rifles. This represents only a small proportion of what they have, but they were relieved of further persuasion by an outbreak of the Janeki tribe which required the whole attention of the available Persian forces. Since then they have been left in relative peace. They still possess a large number of arms and they have been guilty of much robbery with violence. Large numbers of them are employed at good wages by the Allied military forces and they should benefit by schemes of agricultural development now being planned by Colonel Noel.

73. The Lurs have shown little unity; inter-faction jealousies are much alive. It is doubtful even whether they would combine effectively against an attempt by the Government to disarm them, as there are no chiefs of outstanding influence. Meanwhile, if reports are true, they are purchasing considerable numbers of rifles from Iraq to be used against each other or in certain eventualities against the Government.

74. The Kurds of Northern Kurdistan have been disappointed to find the Soviet authorities less sympathetic—indeed, supporting the Persian authorities against the Kurds and showing clear disapproval of Kurdish raids across the Turkish frontier. They have consequently been behaving with discretion in the neighbourhood of Russian troops and have restricted their pillaging of villages to the more distant areas. In Southern Kurdistan the tribes are to a large extent being left alone to run their own affairs. There are the usual inter-faction squabbles and disputes over land, but the influence of local British officials has prevented these from developing into serious disturbances. The Kurdish tribes of Persia continue to demonstrate their inability to co-operate or to show a united front.

#### *Persian Land Forces.*

##### *(a) Army.*

75. Regrettably little progress has been made in the reform of the Persian army. The causes are many, but they can all be traced to the absence of an accepted policy or of any clear direction. The Shah continues to hanker after absolute personal command unhampered by parliamentary criticism or financial considerations and to insist that Persia must have an army at least equal to Turkey's. On the one hand, fear of public and parliamentary criticism, added to his own defects of character, do not allow him to exercise effective command; and, on the other, his jealousy and suspicion lead him to oppose the exercise of authority by the Minister for War or Chief of Staff. Stalin's offer of aircraft and large tanks and his alleged advice that Persia needed a strong army for the defence of the dynasty and of the country's independence have made him more than ever unwilling to accept schemes of reorganisation drawn up to suit the limited financial provision which Dr. Millspaugh is prepared to make, still less inclined to authorise and support their execution. The situation is further complicated by widespread corruption and by dissensions in the army which, it is feared, are encouraged by the Russians in their opposition to the increase of the influence of the American advisers.

76. General Ridley's mission now consists of eleven officers with nine more on demand from America. The full number requested by the Persian Government is thirty. Regulations have been issued governing the responsibilities and functions of the American advisory mission. They are confined to administration, and insufficient authority has been given to the American officers to make their control really effective. The difficulties before them, which are formidable in any case, are increased by their lack of experience of any similar problem and by their ignorance of the country and the language. Since their plans are



designed to improve administration, and since that entails a check on long-standing habits of embezzlement, they are meeting with much opposition and progress is very slow. The arrival of 600 lorries from America has enabled them to begin the organisation of much-needed transport services, and they are working hard to bring some order into the medical, supply and finance services of the army. The American advisers appear to be leaving the development of the Persian air force to the Royal Air Force.

77. Some attempt has been made by the present Chief of Staff to discourage corruption. A number of senior officers have been placed on the retired list, but while military tribunals continue to acquit with monotonous regularity, even in flagrant cases, and the Shah to intervene to protect his favourites and their favourites, no great change of heart can be expected. The application of conscription continues to be one of the most scandalous abuses in the country, the sale of exemptions being a steady source of profit to the police, the gendarmerie and the medical and military officials connected with the calling up of recruits. The result is that the army gets only the poorest men.

78. The only serious operation ventured on during the year was that carried out by General Shahbakhti in May and June in an attempt to secure the submission of Nasir Qashgai. After weeks of procrastination, an initial success was scored by the driving of Nasir Qashgai from his stronghold at Firuzabad. This, however, was not followed up, and the tribes retaliated by inflicting on the Persian garrison of Semirum, in the Qashgai summer quarters, a serious defeat which resulted in the capture of all the arms and equipment of the force of some 800 men. Some minor operations were carried out in different parts of the country, nominally for the collection of arms, but there is no reason to believe that any of them was more than partially effective.

79. At the end of the year the nominal strength of the Persian army was 80,000, but it is doubtful whether its real numbers exceeded 70,000. It remains widely dispersed over the country organised nominally into ten so-called divisions, two of which are at Tehran. The spirit of the officers remains very poor: the better ones are disheartened and discontented; the others make as much profit as they can.

#### (b) Gendarmerie.

80. Although American advisers have been at work in the gendarmerie for over a year no considerable improvement is yet visible, nor is any real improvement possible until the gendarme is paid a living wage. His present wage is far below that standard. Colonel Schwarzkopf has recently been given fairly extensive executive powers, and, as he has energy, determination and much optimism, it is hoped that he will soon be able to show results. His schemes are perhaps too ambitious. He aims at creating a force which will be entirely independent of the army in all respects, with its own services and equipped to carry out minor operations. As the rôle of the army in present circumstances is nothing more than the restoration of internal security, it seems that a close co-operation between the two forces and a pooling of certain resources would lead to economy and efficiency.

81. The official strength of the gendarmerie at the end of the year was 937 officers and 22,303 men. Its actual strength was probably considerably less.

#### Persian Air Force.

82. The strength of the Imperial Air Force on the 31st December, 1943, after deduction of 53 officers and 196 non-commissioned officers awaiting transfer or discharge, was 225 officers, 433 non-commissioned officers and 596 conscripted men, the flying personnel being 52 officers and 60 sergeant pilots and 64 officer observers. This is a reduction of more than one-third from the strength of a year before and reflects a wholesome attempt at reorganisation on realistic lines. The strength in aircraft was 189, of which 101 were Hart Variants and 78 Tiger Moths. No new aircraft were brought into service during the year. The morale, discipline and training of the force remain poor, but there are signs of improvement in all of them. This is due partly to the efforts of the present head of the air force, General Mohammed Hussein Firouz, and largely to the encouragement given by His Majesty's Government in the promised supply of fifteen new Anson aircraft and the assistance and advice of technical officers of the Royal Air Force. The return to the Imperial Air Force of certain buildings at Doshan Tappeh and the completion of the hangars at Isfahan should help to improve the standard of maintenance of aircraft. In this respect better organisation and a proper stores

procedure should also in time show good results. A drastic reform of the headquarters organisation is in progress. It will, nevertheless, be some time before the force can hope to have any serious operational value.

83. Relations between the Persian Air Force and the Royal Air Force are good.

#### Finance.

##### (a) General.

84. Our financial relations with Persia in 1943 were more amicable than they had been during the previous year, principally because the vexed question of the supply of currency for the Allied war effort in Persia seemed at last to have been settled. But, although relations had improved, the financial situation had not. Several crises arose during the year which threatened to wreck the whole financial and economic structure of the country, and in turn the entire machinery of government. Only by a very narrow margin was this avoided, but the elements which were responsible for the crises still exist, and Persia's financial future remains at best unsatisfactory and at worst precarious.

85. When, in 1942, the Persian Government saw their country sliding into financial and economic chaos, chiefly because of their own reluctance or inability to adopt and enforce the measures which have been universally accepted as essential to combat war-time inflation, they decided to invite Dr. A. C. Millspaugh—an American who had headed a financial mission to Persia in the years immediately following the last war—to undertake the guidance of their country's finances in the difficult time that lay ahead. He arrived in February 1943, with a small staff of assistants, to take up this thankless task in the face of a covertly hostile Majlis which, in the months which were to follow, obstructed by all the means in its power every item of legislation which he proposed in order to combat inflation and restore the country's economic equilibrium. The reason for this was not far to seek. The Deputies of the Majlis were themselves the very people who would profit by a continuation of the existing state of affairs, i.e., landowners, merchants, contractors, &c. They wasted days in futile debates, and used every artifice of oriental politics to delay and emasculate essential legislation, either for their own selfish ends or for those vested interests of which they were the willing tools. Eventually, at the beginning of November, Dr. Millspaugh's patience ran out, and he delivered an ultimatum that he and the members of his mission would resign if the Majlis failed to pass within a week the Income Tax Bill and a Bill authorising the engagement of a total of sixty Americans, inclusive of his then staff of ten or twelve. The Deputies, realising that the game was up, capitulated and passed the two Bills. At the same time, they hastened to proclaim that it was their devotion to their country's interests that had compelled them to subject these Bills to such close scrutiny.

And that's the wavering Majlis; for their love  
Lies in their purses; and whoso empties them,  
By so much fills their hearts with deadly hate.

##### (b) Price Control.

86. Dr. Millspaugh asked the Majlis for special powers to control prices, regulate imports and exports, fix rents, and control wages on all public works and in public services. This authority was eventually granted on the 4th May, 1943, under a law entitled the "Millspaugh Special Powers Law," which enabled him to issue regulations from time to time designed to carry these measures into effect. Chief among these regulations was one establishing a new Department of the Ministry of Finance, called the Price Stabilisation Section, with a subsidiary organisation in the provinces.

87. Armed with these wide powers, Dr. Millspaugh proceeded to issue regulations aimed at checking hoarding, stabilising rents and regulating prices of essential commodities. As often as not active campaigns of protest followed upon their publication, and in some cases he had to bow before the storm and issue amendments to conciliate the opposition elements. Not only had Dr. Millspaugh these obstructions to contend with, but he found himself obliged to work through a bureaucracy lacking any serious experience of administration of measures of this kind and, as well, unbelievably corrupt and demoralised. It is therefore remarkable that, in spite of all these handicaps, Dr. Millspaugh has been able at least to keep in check to some extent the soaring prices which have given Persia the unenviable reputation of being probably the only country in the world, with the exception of China, where war-time inflation has been allowed, with the connivance of the ruling oligarchy, to run rampant.



(c) *Financial Crisis.*

88. By April it seemed that the financial volcano was at last about to erupt. The main cause of the new crisis was the Government's unhealthy budgetary situation. Dr. Millspaugh estimated that, in excess of ordinary taxation revenue, at least another 1,500 million rials would be needed to balance the country's budget. He could rely upon internal borrowing only to the extent of 500 million rials, to be obtained from the National Bank, and he suggested that the Allies should grant an emergency loan to cover the remainder of his apprehended deficit. In the event, he has been able to carry on up to December 1943 without recourse to foreign loans, though he had, in fact, applied to the State Department for a loan of \$30 million (subsequently increased to \$50 million). He did, however, obtain an advance of £4 million from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company against future payments of oil royalties, and this has been used to finance the ordinary expenses of Government.

89. As the year progressed, and anti-inflationary legislation was slowly forced through a reluctant Majlis, Dr. Millspaugh began to take a more optimistic view of the Government's financial position. Revenue returns exceeded his expectations, and it was this, combined with his reluctance to put before the Majlis another major controversial measure, that induced him to postpone his request for a foreign loan. It is interesting to note the Persian Prime Minister's reaction (and presumably that of the Majlis) to the loan project. It can be summarised as follows:—

Purely American loan: acceptable.

British participation: unwelcome, but acceptable if unavoidable.

Russian participation: entirely unacceptable.

And that, perhaps, sums up the degrees of confidence which the Allies enjoy among well-informed Persians.

(d) *Inflation.*

90. The trend of inflation throughout the year can best be gauged by a study of the cost-of-living and wholesale price indices. While in January 1943 the cost-of-living index was 614 and wholesale price index 554, by December 1943 they had risen to 1076 and 665 respectively. (The heavy comparative rise in the cost-of-living index figure is an indication of the extent to which retailers are amassing profits.) The internal price level in this country at the end of the year was therefore probably higher than in any other territory in the Middle East. In the closing months of 1943, however, wholesale prices eased, although the relief had not begun to be felt in the retail market. To some extent this tendency could be attributed to the growing belief that the end of the war was not far off, which caused hoarders of consumer goods to begin to unload; at the same time an improvement in the transport situation facilitated the arrival in the interior of stocks of goods that had lain for months in the Gulf ports; this also added to the anxiety of hoarders and contributed to the weakening of black market prices.

91. The scarcely concealed activities of hoarders and speculators also greatly hampered Dr. Millspaugh's efforts at price stabilisation, and it was not until late in the year that there was some tightening up in the enforcement of these regulations, more particularly against hoarders, some of whom were sent to prison. The primary cause of inflation in Persia, of course, was still the uncontrolled pressure of a constantly increasing amount of internal purchasing power upon a static or diminishing supply of consumer goods.

(e) *The Income Tax Bill.*

92. Of all Dr. Millspaugh's anti-inflationary measures placed before the Majlis, the Income Tax Bill was the most unpalatable, as it directly affected all the Deputies, and created the crisis which almost led to his departure. The Bill hung in the Financial Commission for many weeks, and went through a process of emasculation which destroyed much of its original purpose. Finally, during the first week of November, it came before the Deputies in full session for enactment. Amendment after amendment was proposed—all directed towards relieving the pockets of the rich from the incidence of income tax. It was obviously the intention of the Deputies to pigeon-hole this unpopular measure for at least the remainder of their term of office, which had almost expired. Dr. Millspaugh thereupon decided to let it be known that unless the Bill was passed in its entirety, except for reasonable amendments, he was not going to remain. On hearing of this the Shah promptly intervened, indicating that it was his wish that the Bill, and the Bill to engage more Americans, should be

enacted without delay. So, on the 11th November, the Majlis capitulated, and the Bill was passed. In its final form, the Bill represented a substantial compromise on Dr. Millspaugh's original proposals, but no amendment was incorporated which seriously jeopardised its principles though the postponement of its application for a year deprived the country of much-needed revenue.

(f) *The Budget Law.*

93. Another major item of legislation which the Majlis passed in November was the Budget Law for the financial year from March 1943 to March 1944. As presented, the Bill was divided into two parts—the Ordinary Budget, which showed a deficit of about 1,400 million rials, and the Extraordinary Budget (covering the industrial and trading operations of the Government), which was self-balancing. Although Dr. Millspaugh had indicated that the only way he could see of balancing the Ordinary Budget was by borrowing from the Allies, the Deputies, in their patriotic zeal, preferred to produce a balanced budget by including as an item of revenue the value of stocks of commodities held by the various Government trading organisations at the beginning of the financial year, rather than consent to a foreign loan.

(g) *Sale of Gold.*

94. By no means the least important weapon employed in the fight against inflation in Persia was the sale by His Majesty's Government of gold in the open market, in order to withdraw the excess purchasing power from the people to some extent. In the initial stages of the scheme, which was begun in June 1943, the proceeds of the sales of gold were allocated to the British military authorities in Persia, to defray in part their local expenditure, but later, when the United States authorities also began to interest themselves in what seemed a profitable plan for financing the cost of the war, an arrangement was concluded between London and Washington whereby the whole of the local currency proceeds derived from sales in Persia were placed at the disposal of the American authorities with effect from 25th September, 1943.

(h) *Note Circulation.*

95. In January 1943, the value of notes in circulation was Rials 3,193.24 millions compared with 935.93 millions on the outbreak of war. By December 1943, notes in circulation had risen to 6,150.75 millions, an increase during the year of 2,957.51, or almost 100 per cent.

96. The supply of currency notes during the year occasionally gave cause for anxiety, but there were no acute shortages such as were experienced in 1942. At one stage early in the year, however, the currency authorities threatened to issue no more notes against sterling until we delivered the gold due to Persia under the Financial Agreement. The position we had adopted was that we would hand over the gold when the Majlis ratified the agreement. As it happened, the threat was never carried into effect, and the agreement was ratified in June.

(i) *Sale of Silver to India.*

97. When the National Bank of Iran decided, as a matter of policy, to replace the silver in the Currency Reserve by gold which the Government was purchasing from the United States authorities, the Government of India were asked if they wished to buy a quantity of 500 tons which was available for sale in the open market. Of this amount the bank offered to sell 120 tons at Rupees 80 per 100 tolas 916 fine—the approximate price at which the Government of India had sold a similar amount to the Persian Government in 1942—and the remainder at the current Tehran price. The offer was accepted, and at the end of the year arrangements were being made to pack and ship the silver to India. Altogether the quantity of silver in the Currency Reserve amounted to 1,600 tons and the National Bank hope to be able to sell the whole amount to the Government of India. If this can be done, the Persian Government will not only stand to make a substantial profit (the silver stands in the Currency Reserve at the international market price), but under the Financial Agreement the rupees paid by the Government of India will qualify for convertibility as to 60 per cent. into gold. On the other hand, the Government of India are buying the silver at a price well below that ruling in Bombay.

*Civil Supplies and Transport.*

98. The new import licensing system introduced in the latter part of 1942 at the request of the Middle East Supply Centre to restrict imports to essential



commodities was functioning by the beginning of the year. Of the total import quota for the period January-June of 71,000 tons, licences were issued for 59,000 tons, the difference being due to a reduction in the originally planned imports of sugar owing to the discovery of adequate stocks in the country. Persia's need for imported goods was considered with sympathy at the Imports Conference held in May by the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo, when more motor vehicles, heavy chemicals and cotton piece-goods than originally planned were allocated. In May also agreement was reached between the British, Americans and Persians as to the method of satisfying Persian requirements of drugs, a subject that had given rise to misunderstanding between the British and the Americans on account of our respective post-war interests in the Persian market for these products.

99. The Middle East Supply Centre, Tehran, moved out of the British Legation in May and set up in separate offices as an Anglo-American body. The staff nevertheless continued to be entirely British, for repeated efforts on our part to find Americans to share the work (and the odium) and to facilitate co-operation with the American advisers and the Lease-Lend organisation met with no success, and American participation was limited to attendance at committees and to the provision of an American room, which is usually empty, in the Middle East Supply Centre building. In the middle of the year Dr. Millspaugh's Price Stabilisation Section, as part of its attack on high prices, issued a number of regulations concerning imports which tended temporarily to discourage merchants and caused a diminution of activity; but many of these restrictions were later withdrawn and merchants' imports of the goods that had not remained Government monopolies (*e.g.*, cereals, sugar, tea and cotton piece-goods) filled the available quotas. Co-operation between the Middle East Supply Centre and the Millspaugh Mission, though tenuous at first, grew steadily, thanks mainly to the initiative of the former, into a very close and constant collaboration.

100. In the autumn clear signs of potential crisis during the winter appeared, but energetic action all round has removed our worst fears. Owing to low rates and poor control Government transport had become seriously disorganised and the ability of the Road Transport Department to meet many vital demands arising concurrently was seriously reduced, although at that time the Government owned 900 recently arrived Lend-Lease trucks and had under contract (on paper) about 1,000 other vehicles. Cereals collection and the distribution of other essential goods were very seriously threatened by this prevailing lack of transport. Furthermore, the Government monopolies of sugar, tea, cotton piece-goods and drugs were not operating, and in fact had resulted merely in substantial stocks of these goods not reaching the public. On top of all this came the threat by Dr. Millspaugh and his entire mission to resign. Happily this was withdrawn in time for the mission to co-operate with the Anglo-American supply authorities in removing the worst features of the threatened civil-supply crisis. The Persia and Iraq Command and the Middle East Supply Centre came to the rescue. The British army undertook to carry cereals for Tehran from the west and oil from Kermanshah to Tabriz and from Shahrood to Meshed; and arrangements were made for the seconding of Middle East Supply Centre officers to Persia to supervise cereals collection and civil road transport.

101. The year closed with the economic situation much steadier and with prices showing a tendency to fall. The new Government formed in December indicated a desire to work closely in economic matters with the British and American Legations and the Middle East Supply Centre; the new Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines, General Shafai, even paid public tribute to the help given in the past to Persian industry and trade by His Majesty's Legation and certain Middle East Supply Centre officers.

102. With the end of the war in sight many Tehran merchants began thinking of re-establishing connexions with United Kingdom firms; and the number of enquiries received by the Commercial Secretariat on this point increased.

#### *Industry.*

103. Early in the year an Industrial Development Committee was set up under the aegis of the Middle East Supply Centre, with Persian, British and American participation. Its object was to promote local industry in order to economise imports. This body was able to give substantial help to Persian factories, and it was mainly thanks to its efforts that the sugar-beet crop was

harvested and local sugar production maintained. Lack of transport hampered industry throughout the year. Latterly, signs of labour unrest increased, but direct Russian encouragement, though widely suspected, could not be proved.

#### *Agriculture.*

104. In the early spring the Persian Government asked the Allies for help to provide seed for spring sowing. As a result, arrangements were made to import 2,000 tons of sorghum (a variety of millet) from Iraq and an Anglo-American-Persian committee was set up to supervise distribution. Thanks to the work of this committee a large part of the imported seed was sown, but the results, unfortunately, were not good owing (it is alleged) to the quality of the seed having been poor. The Khuzistan Agricultural Society, under the management of Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. C. Noel, D.S.O., C.I.E., continued its activity, but will not be extended because the soil in that area has proved to be unsuitable. Irrigation schemes in the vicinity are, however, being proceeded with under Lieutenant-Colonel Noel's direction and with the support of the Persian Department of Irrigation.

#### *Grain Collection.*

105. Our efforts to assist the country as a whole to feed itself, so as to be independent as far as possible of supplies from abroad, continued throughout the year. Thanks to this, to arrivals of wheat from North America and adulterants from Iraq, and of wheat from Russia, the country reached the 1943 harvest without widespread famine, though there were undoubtedly many deaths from starvation in various places, including Tehran, and the free market price rose in some places to £80 a ton. The small band of British Consular Liaison Officers worked untiringly; without their help the situation would have been much worse. The central control of grain collection was transferred from Mr. Sheridan, who resigned in August, to Mr. Crawford, another American. Mr. Crawford was without experience of such work, but he is less spasmodic than Mr. Sheridan and he welcomed from the start the assistance of British officials of whose value it took Mr. Sheridan some time to be convinced. Towards the end of the year the control of the Consular Liaison Officers, which had hitherto been vested in His Majesty's Legation, was transferred to the Middle East Supply Centre, who also interested themselves in the question of additional help of Dr. Millspaugh. As Americans to fill the Millspaugh cadre of sixty were coming in very slowly it was agreed between the Americans and the British concerned that the British authorities should lend for work in Persia a considerable number of officers and men who had had experience in grain collection and road transport control in Syria, and that in March 1944 the situation should be reviewed to decide whether this help was still needed or not.

106. The difference between the British attitude and the Russian has been touched upon in the section on "Soviet Interests." The north, though the main granary of Persia, contributed little towards the feeding of the deficit areas during the 1942-43 harvest, and against the histrionic gift of 25,000 tons of wheat from Russia must be set the large quantities of grain, especially rice but including several thousand tons of wheat and more of barley, which the Soviet authorities consumed in the country or exported from it. The bumper harvest which was secured all over the country in 1943 raised the hope that this time the north would contribute its quota for the common good. Every reference to this subject in conversation with the Russians was met with the enquiry what Hamadan and Kermanshah were doing. In fact, not only did these two districts, which always export wheat, do well, but even in Shiraz, which is normally a deficit area, the British Consular Liaison Officer made contracts for a quantity of grain exceeding local consumption. The large quantities of wheat which, thanks to the energy of British Consular Liaison Officers, were collected in Hamadan and Kermanshah might, however, have been useless to the capital at its time of greatest need if the British military authorities had not carried grain from these two places to railhead at Sultanabad with military transport. By the end of the year the quantity carried had exceeded 10,000 tons and the lift was continuing. The Prime Minister, stimulated by Dr. Millspaugh and the British Legation, approached the Soviet Embassy about grain supplies from the north, whence Dr. Millspaugh had hoped to obtain 50,000 tons towards feeding the deficit areas and building up a reserve. The Russians admitted 40,000 tons as a fair quota from the north, and offered to help with the carriage from the main centres—provided that adequate road transport was provided for local hauls. Considerable numbers of lorries were sent up to Meshed and Tabriz,



but by the end of the year the quantity of grain received by Tehran from Khorassan was small, and from Azerbaijan, nil.

107. On the other hand, the position in the central and southern regions of Persia is vastly different. Out of a target of 170,000 tons up to the harvest of 1944, 149,360 tons had actually been collected by the end of the year and grain was still coming in satisfactorily. Provided that 20,000 tons only out of the 40,000 tons hoped for from the northern areas are actually received in Tehran, it seems likely that grain supplies will be sufficient to last till next harvest without the necessity to import from abroad. If this result is achieved, it will be because, whereas the north has served the State very ill, the south has made an unprecedentedly high contribution—thanks to the assistance afforded by British consular officers and British Consular Liaison Officers whose local knowledge, energy and powers of persuasion have been invaluable.

#### *Locust Control.*

108. Since 1943 was the third year of the current migratory cycle of the Desert Locust and a serious influx of swarms into Persia was expected, the British, Soviet and Indian Governments lent every possible assistance to the Persian Government, with a view to obviating emergency shipments of food to this country and also to hindering the mass reproduction of the insect which threatened India and the U.S.S.R.

109. A mission of Soviet entomologists (who had been in Persia since 1941 under the provisions of the Persian-Soviet Anti-Locust Agreement) and a British Locust Control Officer (Mr. O. B. Lean) co-operated with the Persian Ministry of Agriculture in perfecting as far as possible the Persian control organisation, and successive releases of lorries for this organisation were made by the Anglo-American-Persian Road Transport Board. In addition, the support of the Inter-departmental Committee on Locust Control and of the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East enabled Mr. Lean to secure very generous assistance from the British military authorities. An Indian cavalry regiment was placed at his disposal for scouting and eventual control operations in Khuzistan, and when it transpired that the unusual weather conditions of the winter of 1942-43 had confined the invading swarms to East Persia the Indian army despatched several companies into Kerman Province, where they did excellent work with Mr. Lean. Meanwhile, the Government of India had despatched a representative to the Tehran International Locust Control Committee (Dr. K. D. Baweja), whose first-hand information about the westward movement of swarms from India and whose assistance in the forward planning of the Persian campaign were of great value. The Soviet mission, for their part, called forward an aeroplane fitted with apparatus for the destruction of locusts from the air by poison dust and after having installed similar apparatus into five Persian aircraft they supervised effective operations by this method in Khorassan, towards the end of the summer. In spite of the considerable effort employed against them the locusts penetrated as far north as Meshed and as far west as Hamadan district, but the damage to crops was insignificant.

110. In July the Persian Government called an international anti-locust conference in Tehran (at the suggestion of the Anti-Locust Research Centre in London) at which it was generally agreed that preparations must be made in the autumn of 1943 for a much more serious campaign in Persia in 1944. Consequently, a Soviet aerial control unit was established at Jiwani, a Royal Air Force anti-locust flight at Bandar Abbas, and British military units at both these centres. Large orders for a new lethal dust (with di-nitro-orthocresol base) were placed in the United Kingdom and the United States. And by November every preparation had been made for a devastating campaign against the swarms which were expected to enter from India and Oman.

111. The non-arrival of Desert Locusts in Persia (owing mainly to a successful campaign in India during the summer of 1943) has been a source of justifiable disappointment to those who worked so hard to prepare for them, because the success of such a mechanised campaign (an attack on and not a defence against the pest) would have been epoch-making. However, the preservation of the crops from locusts now is the most important thing, and the experience gained from training the units concerned will undoubtedly be of value in future migratory cycles.

[E 2156/422/34]

No. 12.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th April.)*

(No. 137.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period of the 20th to the 26th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 27th March, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 12.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period 20th to 26th March, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. THE new Prime Minister is having difficulties with the Majlis over the composition of his Cabinet, in spite of the fact that the Deputies had assured him that they would give him a free hand, expressing, however, the hope that he would select his ministers from the young, progressive and honest. Sa'ed intended to retain the Cabinet as it was, with the exception of Seyyid Mushin Sadr, the Minister of Justice, and making a new appointment to the vacant Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The Majlis, however, indicated that this did not fall within their interpretation of a free hand, and the representatives of so-called Majlis parties demand that more of the young and progressive should be represented, but they have refrained from specifying the individuals who would meet with their approval. The five days of the Noruz holidays postponed the issue.

##### *Economic.*

2. The absence of spring rains in large areas of the country is arousing anxiety regarding the next harvest, with the inevitable result of a rise in prices in the wholesale and free retail markets and an increase of hoarding and speculation. The immediate grain situation is satisfactory, some 300,000 tons of the 310,000 required to feed the towns until the next harvest having been collected. But the latter figure includes no reserve, and the Government should have a reserve of at least 50,000 tons. The prospects of collecting this amount are not good, although there are still stocks of grain in the country. Of 18,000 tons expected from Azerbaijan only 700 tons have as yet reached the capital.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

3. Eight more American officers have arrived to join General Ridley's mission, making nineteen in all. A twentieth is expected. Five of them will be posted to the Headquarters of Provincial Divisions, so that there will be one American officer at each Divisional Headquarters.

##### *Appointments—military.—*

4. Sarhang Himmat to command the 6th (Fars) Division *vice* Sarhang Bahrami.

5. The following promotions have been announced:—

Army Sartips to be Sarlashkars—

Abdul-Reza Afkhami (F.O. 2; M.A. 2), Commanding 7th (Kerman and Mekran) Division.

Ismail Shafai, lately Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Rahullah Kaikausi—Military Governor of Tehran.

Muhammad Hussein Firuz—Commanding Persian Air Force.

Ali Riazi—Chief of Staff.

Hassan Arfa—Commanding 1st Division.

Haji Ali Razmara—Commanding Officers' Cadet School and Chief of Shah's Military Secretariat.



## Sarhangs to be Sartips—

Reza Javadi—Commanding 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division.  
 Assadullah Gulshayan—Commanding 5th (Luristan) Division.  
 Hushmand Afshar—Commanding 4th (Kurdistan) Division.  
 Mansour Muzayini—Commanding 2nd (Tehran) Division.  
 Fazlullah Humayuni—Commanding 10th (Khuzistan) Division.  
 Nasrullah Motazedi—Commanding Independent Cavalry Brigade.  
 Abbas Wahdati—Commanding 19th Brigade, Khwash, 7th (Kerman and Mekran) Division.  
 Ali Akbar She'ri—Inspector of Infantry.  
 Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami—Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff.  
 Abdullah Qalabegi—Military Prosecutor-General.  
 Seyid Wahullah Ray—Medical Services.  
 Ali Firuzi—Veterinary Services.

## Gendarmerie.

## Sarhangs to be Sartips—

Farzaneh—Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie.  
 Feraidun—Commanding Gendarmerie of 2nd (Azerbaijan) District.  
 Muqaddam—Chief of Gendarmerie Medical Services.

## Internal Security.

## Fars.

6. Four of the five Germans who were being harboured by the Qashgai have been handed over to the British Security authorities. This should greatly reduce the possibility of attacks deliberately aimed against British war interests. The usual disturbances are, however, to be expected during the migration, which is likely to begin earlier than usual this year for tribes in southern and south-east Fars, owing to lack of rain and grazing.

## Khorassan.

7. Dissensions between Kurdish chiefs of the Bujnurd-Quchan area, notably Farajullah Khan Zaafaranlu and Ali Khan Bisharanlu, have for long disturbed the peace of that district. The Persian Government have been able to do little to maintain order owing to the Russian prohibition on the entry of Persian troops to that area. The Russians have, however, recently agreed to the stationing there of a small detachment.

## American Affairs.

8. There are now American advisers in the following departments of Persian administration:—

Army	...	...	...	...	...	19
Gendarmerie	...	...	...	...	...	3
Police	...	...	...	...	...	1
Irrigation	...	...	...	...	...	1

Finance; Audit; Internal Revenue; Customs; Price Stabilisation; Road Transport; Cereals and Bread; Monopoly Goods; Ceded Properties and Public Domains—all under the supreme control of Dr. Millspaugh—31.

## Russian Affairs.

9. In Summary No. 2/44, paragraph 15, it was stated that M. Koslov, the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed, had been appointed to the Inter-Allied European Commission. This has now been cancelled and he has been appointed Soviet Minister in Abyssinia.

10. Over 3,000 tons of stores were delivered to the Soviet authorities by the U.K.C.C. by the Zahidan-Meshed route during the month, the 6th February to the 4th March. In addition, the U.K.C.C. carried 2,121 tons of stores for the Soviet authorities from Shahrud to the Russian frontier at Bajgiran during the same period.

## British Affairs.

11. The total amount of grain lifted by British military transport for the Persian Government is 18,240 tons—see Summary No. 9/44, paragraph 16.

## French Affairs.

12. M. Pierre Lafond, delegate to Persia of the French National Committee, has now arrived in Tehran.

## Persian Affairs.

## Political.

13. The Prime Minister presented the following Cabinet to the Shah on the evening of the 26th March:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed.  
 Ministers without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl, Morteza Quli Bayat (F.O. 50; M.A. 65).  
 Industry and Mines: Amanullah Ardalan.  
 Roads and Communications: Hamid Sayyah.  
 Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
 War: Ibrahim Zand.  
 Public Health: Dr. Ghani.  
 Minister of Posts and Telegraphs: Abul Qasim Ferouhar (F.O. 74; M.A. 89).  
 Education: General Ali Riazi.  
 Justice: Assadullah Mamaghani.  
 Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh.  
 Finance: Mahmud Nariman.

The last five are new appointments. They can hardly be said to represent progressive youth. Ferouhar has been a Minister in Reza Shah's Cabinet and was Deputy for Tehran in the last Majlis. General Ali Riazi was Chief of Staff. He is not ill-suited to his present post, but his appointment to the Cabinet is probably due mainly to the Shah's desire to get rid of him politely from the General Staff with a view to the appointment of General Yazdan Panah. Assadullah Mamaghani was a Judge of the High Court of Appeal, with a none too good reputation as regards his sentiments towards the Allies. Mahmud Fateh was Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture. Nariman is a former Director-General of the Department of Indirect Taxation. Bayat, who has been included in the Cabinet mainly for the purpose of relieving the Prime Minister of parliamentary work and to deal with Deputies, for which he is better qualified than the honest and not too eloquent Prime Minister, was Minister of Finance in Soheily's second Cabinet in the spring of 1943. The reactions of the Majlis are not yet known, but it will be surprising if this Cabinet has a long life.

Tehran, 26th March, 1944.

[E 2385/422/34]

No. 13.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th April.)

(No. 147.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period the 27th March to the 2nd April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this embassy.

Tehran, 3rd April, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the Period  
 27th March–2nd April, 1944.

## Persian Affairs.

## Political.

THE Majlis did not take long to signify their disapproval of the new Cabinet, whose composition was given in Summary No. 12, paragraph 13. The Prime Minister then invited the Deputies to furnish him with a list of thirty persons acceptable to them from which he would select his Ministers. By

[29046]



allowing that the Deputies might dictate to him the composition of his Cabinet the Prime Minister has weakened his position, and even among the Deputies one of the five parties which have been formed and the independents, who have joined no party, profess to be averse to any such intervention by the Majlis. It is understood that a good deal of the opposition of the Deputies to the present Cabinet is concentrated against Ibrahim Zand, the Minister for War, Dr. Ghani, the Minister for Public Health, and General Riazi, the Minister for Education, because it is believed that they were nominated by the Shah. Two of his selections in the previous Cabinet, Nuri Isfandiari and Nasrullah Intizam, have already been dropped. The opposition of the Deputies to these Ministers arises not so much from objection to them personally as from resentment at the Shah's interference. There is a very strong feeling in the Majlis that the Shah's activities must be confined within strictly constitutional bounds. Dr. Millsbaugh, too, is likely to come in for vigorous criticism.

2. Five parties, or rather groups, since, with the exception of the Tudeh, they are not political parties in the ordinary sense, have been formed in the Majlis. They are the Democrats with 19 members, the *Ittifaq-i-Milli* with 13 members, the *Tudeh* with 8 members, the *Mihan* with 19 members, and the *Iran* with 11 members. The last-named is composed entirely of Deputies from Khorassan. These groups include 69 of the 108 Deputies elected up to the 2nd April. Some Deputies who are likely to be influential in the Majlis, notably Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai, Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, Dr. Musaddiq and Ali Dashti, have not joined groups. There are still twenty-eight Deputies to be elected, mostly from Azerbaijan and Fars. Of the 108 Deputies already elected, the certificates of election of eighty-three have been accepted by the Majlis.

3. The Prime Minister announced the programme of his Government as collaboration with Persia's allies on the basis of mutual respect for each other's rights and interests; strengthening of friendly relations with friendly and neighbouring countries; re-establishment of public security and faithful execution of the laws; measures to assure the provision of food and essential needs of the population; measures to assure to peasants and the working classes the essential minimum in food, housing, hygiene and education; administrative reorganisation to associate the people more closely with the administration of local affairs; long-term plans for agriculture, industry, commerce, public health and education; improvement of the situation of Government employees; encouragement for the deserving and punishment for the delinquent.

4. A Tradesmen's and Guilds' Union has been formed in Tehran whose alleged objects are to improve the economic position of the country; to fight against speculation and profiteering; to promote charitable works; to protect workers and employees of trades and guilds; and to strengthen the system of parliamentary government.

5. The arrest and trial of Soheily, the previous Prime Minister, has been demanded by certain Deputies on charges of accepting bribes, unconstitutional interference in the elections, illegal suspension of newspapers and smuggling jewels out of Persia in the baggage of agents whom he had provided with diplomatic passports.

#### *Economic.*

6. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that, owing to the ban imposed by the Soviet authorities on the export of dried fruits from Azerbaijan, great hardship is being imposed on growers and merchants. Estimated stocks are now 2,100 tons of almonds, 16,000 tons of raisins and 9,000 tons of peaches.

7. The municipal tax of 3 per cent. levied on all goods and food-stuffs brought to towns for sale has been abolished from the 21st March.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

8. Muhammad Nakhai to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Appointments—Military.*

9.—(i) Sarhang Kamran Pursaif to command the Behbahan Brigade (10th Khuzistan Division).

(ii) Sarhang II Habibullah Deihimi, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, to be Sarhang.

(iii) Sartip Ali Akbar Sha'ri to be Military Governor of Tehran.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Fars.*

10. Nasir Qashgai has been sending threatening telegrams to the Majlis and the Government. The people of Fars, he says, are so enraged at the interference of the Government in the elections (to which he likes to attribute his failure to be elected for Shiraz) and are so likely to be driven to despair by famine that he dissociates himself from any responsibility for the good behaviour of the tribes. This mood, if it lasts, may result in some robbery. A village has already been looted—on the night of the 27th–28th March—in the near vicinity of Shiraz, but Qashgai's complicity has not been proved. Nasir's demands grow more ambitious. He is now hinting that he should be made Governor-General of Fars. General Jahanbani has tentatively resigned, possibly because he fears that the situation may get out of hand.

#### *Kerman.*

11. In October last operations were carried out by Persian troops against an old tribal brigand of the Serjan district, Hussein Buchakchi, which resulted in his submission. His son, Akbar Khan Shujapur, however, remained an outlaw and has only recently surrendered himself, bringing in with him the rifles taken last year from the gendarmerie at Baft. The remaining prominent outlaw of this tribe, Murad Ali Murad, is still at large.

#### *British Affairs.*

12. Since it has now been decided that an invasion of locusts into South-East Persia is improbable, the Transjordan Frontier Force Regiment and the R.A.F. anti-locust flight are to be withdrawn from the Bandar Abbas–Jask area (see Summary No. 5/44, paragraph 8).

#### *Russian Affairs.*

13. Further information shows that the movements of Russian troops along the Turkish frontier, referred to in Summary No. 11/44, paragraph 10, were almost certainly merely normal reliefs. The increase in numbers is inconsiderable. From Sabzawar, 100 miles west of Meshed, comes reliable information that the Russians have secured accommodation there for fresh troops, sufficient, according to local reports, for 6,000. This is certainly an exaggeration, but the arrival of Russian troops in Sabzawar is confirmed, and coincident with their arrival the Soviet commander in Meshed ordered the closing down of all public traffic over the Khorassan telephone lines.

14. The Tabriz elections are now finished, but the counting of votes will take about another month. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that Russian interference on behalf of their candidates has been open and aggressive and so effective that it is likely that they will be elected in spite of the fact that they command no respect locally.

#### *American Affairs.*

15. The appointment has been announced of Mr. Leland Morris as American Ambassador to Persia.

[E 2386/189/34]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th April.)*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 3rd April, 1944.*

AS the elections are not yet over in some parts of the country I am not in a position to report fully on the composition of the 14th Majlis; the following notes on the present position may, however, be of interest.

2. By the 2nd April the election of 108 Deputies had been announced, leaving 28 results to come, mostly from Azarbaijan (including Tabriz) and Fars. Of the 108 Deputies so far elected the certificates of election of 83 have been passed by the Majlis; the certificate of election of one Deputy, Habibullah Durri from Darajaz, has been rejected.

3. Of the 108 Deputies 40 were members of the 13th Majlis, 32 having been re-elected for their old constituencies and 8 elected for different ones.

[29046]

L 2



Among the old members re-elected are Dr. Taheri, Amir Taimur, Naraqi, Behbehani, Ali Dashti and Tehrani. The notorious trouble-maker, Majid Muwaqqar, has not so far secured re-election, nor has the reactionary businessman, Nikpur. Among the new Deputies are several well-known personalities such as Sayyid Zia-ud-Din, Tabatabai, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai and Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, and, apart from the Tudeh, a number of comparatively young men of the professional classes.

4. The usual groups have been formed among the Deputies who have reached Tehran and account for about two-thirds of them, the rest considering themselves "independents." With the exception of the Tudeh none of these groups possess principles, discipline or cohesion, and I need not trouble you with a detailed account of them. The Tudeh group at present numbers eight: Iskandari (Sari), Fidakar (Isfahan), Gunabadi (Sabzawar), Kambakhsh (Qazvin), Khalatbari (Babul), Kishawarz (Pahlavi), Radmanish (Lahijan) and Shahab Firdowsi (Firdows).

5. The Majlis has so far done nothing but discuss the certificates of election of its members and offer confused and unhelpful advice to M. Sa'id on the composition of his Government. Since there are so many new Deputies anxious to attract attention it may be expected that the 14th Majlis will be notable for the volume of its oratory.

6. I shall report in detail on the composition of the Majlis when the elections are completed.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Government of India, and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2389/189/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th April.)*

(No. 156. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 6th April, 1944.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 1st January, I have the honour to convey to you herewith a report on events in Persia during the first three months of 1944.

*Raising of His Majesty's Legation to Status of Embassy.*

2. At the end of 1943 the State Department informed His Majesty's Embassy at Washington that the President of the United States had decided to raise the American Legation at Tehran to an embassy; as a result of the Tehran Conference declaration regarding Persia, the latter was now regarded as having assumed the status of co-belligerent and it was the general policy of the United States Government to have embassies in co-belligerent countries.

3. In view of this decision His Majesty's Government decided to elevate the status of His Majesty's Legation. On the 10th February His Majesty's Mission issued an announcement to the effect that it had been decided to raise the status of the British and United States Legations to that of embassies; His Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion that in view of their special relations with the Persian Government, recently strengthened by the Persian declaration of war on Germany and the adherence of Persia to the United Nations, this change of status of their mission constituted a natural development and would serve to perpetuate the feelings of cordiality and friendship which had so long existed between Great Britain and Persia. (The United States Legation issued a similar announcement the same day.)

4. I presented my new credentials to His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah on the 9th March.

5. The Persian Legation in London has likewise been raised to an embassy.

*Relations with India.*

6. As part of a move to improve Indo-Persian relations, the Government of India in December 1943 issued an invitation to the Persian Government to send a small cultural mission to tour India this cold weather as guests of the Government of India. The mission, chosen with the concurrence of His Majesty's Embassy, consisted of Ali Asghar Hikmat, an ex-Minister of Education and of

Justice, Foor-Davoud, a professor of literature and a specialist in Avestic studies and ancient Persian law, and Rashid-i-Yasemi, a professor of history.

7. The mission reached New Delhi on the 8th March, 1944, and are still in India. They stayed a few days at the Viceroy's house, visited Delhi University, the Delhi Polytechnic, where they saw war technicians under training, All-India Radio and the ancient monuments of Delhi. From here the mission proceeded on a tour of Lahore, Aligarh, Benares, Allahabad, Bombay and Hyderabad (Deccan), visiting museums, universities, industries and colleges of all kinds. After visiting Bangalore and Madras the official tour will terminate, but it is understood that one or two members of the mission propose to spend further time in India pursuing their investigations. The mission was entertained at various places by Governors of provinces and other distinguished persons, by city corporations, Islamic and other societies and the staffs of universities and colleges. From reports received the mission appears to have been a success. Much will now depend on the extent to which the members disseminate the facts they have acquired in India on their return to Persia. The majority even of educated Persians are entirely ignorant of the culture and the progress in scientific and industrial matters to be found in India.

8. Meanwhile the Public Relations Bureau, Tehran, has organised an exhibition of photographs of life, industry and the ancient monuments of India, which is arousing some interest. It is hoped, before the exhibition closes, to give a reception to local notables at which at least some of the members of the mission will be present to give their personal experiences.

*Security.*

9. As a result of further strong pressure by this mission the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy eventually agreed that the Persian suspects at the internment camp at Sultanabad on the Russian list should be transferred to the Russian zone. They were removed from Sultanabad on the 3rd February, and after a stay in Tehran were transferred to Resht. The joint investigation by the Anglo-Persian Commission of the suspects on the British list was completed by the 23rd February, and it was decided to release twenty-three; only one of them, however, was found to be completely innocent. The remainder were made to sign an undertaking:—

- (a) To refrain from anti-Allied activities;
- (b) To notify any change of address;
- (c) To report to the police when required; and
- (d) To communicate to the Persian and British authorities any information regarding anti-Allied activities which might come to their notice.

The Soviet Embassy was kept informed of the release of these suspects.

10. In the middle of March the Persian Government pressed His Majesty's Mission to allow the internees still remaining at Sultanabad to be transferred to Tehran. This has been agreed to in principle, and the internees will be transferred as soon as the new camp has been made secure.

11. After prolonged negotiations with the British Security authorities the Qashgai handed over to them four Germans whom they had been harbouring for a number of months. A fifth German, who was born in Russia but had lived many years in Persia, had escaped or had been allowed to escape two or three weeks before. So far as is known there are no other Germans loose in Persia.

12. Our Security authorities had intercepted in Syria two of Nasir Qashgai's brothers, who were returning to Persia from Germany, and this was not without influence on the outcome of the negotiations. The two gentlemen are now being restored to the bosom of their tribe.

*Anglo-Persian Public Relations.*

13. The Public Relations Bureau continued to disseminate propaganda material in considerable quantities throughout the country. This reading matter is eagerly sought after and the principal periodicals are now firmly established. A new venture in the form of a fortnightly children's newspaper, designed primarily to project Britain and the Commonwealth to the impressionable youth of Persia, has been particularly successful, and over 17,500 copies are regularly bought by school-children all over the country.

14. The half-hour daily broadcasts from Tehran Radio by the Public Relations Bureau were favourably received, and particular interest was shown in a new series of talks given by Persian "guest speakers." The mobile cinema



vans of the bureau continued to give performances throughout the country, and in several areas reached audiences which had hitherto never seen a cinema.

15. Window displays and exhibitions on a variety of subjects were arranged in Tehran and at our consulates. An exhibition of pictures depicting "Women of Great Britain" attracted special attention and was seen by many thousands of people.

16. Publicity was given to the activities of the Middle East Supply Centre and other British institutions giving material help to the country through the medium of special articles written for the English daily newspaper published by the bureau and for the local Persian press.

17. Special attention continued to be paid to propaganda directed towards the many Allied nationals in Tehran and the classes in English instituted by the Bureau by agreement with the British Council attracted over 400 pupils from the Czech and Polish communities.

#### *British Council Activities.*

18. *Tehran.*—The Anglo-Persian Institute in Tehran now has 800 adult students and 750 club members. The staff also teaches in the University, Teachers' Training College, schools, Technical College and Survey Department of the Ministry of Mines, and the National Bank. By using the voluntary services of British persons employed in the embassy, Army and Royal Air Force, evening classes for 500 more adult students have been opened in a school (previously the American College) belonging to the Ministry of Education. Classes in the Agricultural College, near Tehran, have been started, and selected students will be sent to agricultural universities in India. A large building belonging to the Tehran Municipality has been leased and all council activities, other than teaching, will be moved to it. The Anglo-Persian Medical Association, Dramatic Society, Art Club and Music Society have increased their activities. A Shakespeare play will be staged out-of-doors in June. It is intended to publish the British medical bulletin in Persian, and broadcast English lessons from the Tehran Broadcasting Station will commence in April.

19. *Isfahan.*—The Anglo-Persian Institute in Isfahan now has 350 adult students and 150 club members. To accommodate the increasing number of members the removal of all club activities to another building is under consideration. The demand for further teaching, particularly in the twelve large Isfahan factories, is insistent but cannot be undertaken owing to shortage of staff.

20. *General.*—Special courses in the Tehran and Isfahan institutes for those wishing to take entrance examinations in Persia for British universities will be started in April. Many applications have been received for the six research scholarships in the United Kingdom, already offered by the council, for October 1944. The opening of institutes elsewhere in Persia (which has been strongly urged by all consulates) cannot be considered until more staff is available.

#### *American Interests.*

21. As stated in paragraph 3 the American Legation has been raised to an embassy. Mr. Dreyfus, the Minister, has been on leave since the Tehran Conference and is not returning. It is announced that the first American Ambassador to Tehran will be Mr. Leland B. Morris, at present Minister in Iceland, where he will be succeeded by Mr. Dreyfus.

22. On the 3rd March the Foreign Office informed His Majesty's Mission that there might be some discussions regarding Middle East policy with Mr. Stettinius, who was to visit the United Kingdom in the second half of March; if there were any special questions affecting Anglo-American relations, His Majesty's Mission was to telegraph brief notes. In reply, His Majesty's Mission pointed out that—

(a) The lack of co-ordination between the American advisers in Persia was somewhat disturbing; the United States Government and His Majesty's Mission were equally desirous that the advisers should succeed, being convinced that if they failed Persia had a poor chance of keeping her feet, unless some dictator, so resolute as Reza Shah, and much more intelligent, came to the front. Russia hardly concealed her animosity towards the advisers in general and openly hampered their work. The advisers, however, had no cohesion among themselves and His Majesty's Mission wished to suggest that there should

be some co-ordinating authority. This should be the American Embassy and His Majesty's Mission considered that instructions to that end should be given to the new American Ambassador; His Majesty's Mission added that the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Ford, was in general agreement with their views.

(b) The Standard-Vacuum Company and the Shell Group, backed by American and British Governments respectively, were competing for oil concessions in Persia. The Persians, and probably the Russians, were likely to regard this as a conflict of national interests and to rejoice accordingly. Apart from the desirability of avoiding, if possible, Anglo-American rivalry, His Majesty's Mission suggested that the Persian Government were not likely to grant a new concession to British interests when the grant of a concession to American applicants would at once give the powerful United States Government an economic interest in the fate of Persia. (To this the Foreign Office replied that the desirability of reaching an understanding with the Americans over oil concessions was fully realised by His Majesty's Government, but that meanwhile His Majesty's Mission should continue to support the Shell group.)

#### *Soviet Interests.*

23. During February there was a scare regarding the alleged arrival of fresh Soviet troops in North Persia; after making enquiries, His Majesty's Mission reported to the Foreign Office that the rumours were not confirmed, although there had been some reliefs of Russian troops and an additional labour battalion had been brought into Persia. In March, however, confirmation was received from several sources of movements and increases of Soviet troops along the Turkish frontier; previous troops had been relieved by fresh troops and garrisons at Khoi, Shahpur and Hazirgan, had been reinforced, though not on a large scale. The Soviet military attaché denied that there had been any increases.

24. The Soviet section of the Tripartite Censorship in Tehran has recently begun to examine, with the greatest care, all books sent out from the United Kingdom to booksellers in Persia, and they have now listed about twenty as prohibited. The list includes a number of books which are admittedly highly critical of the Soviet régime, but also *Modern Iran*, by Mr. Elwell-Sutton, a member of the staff of the Public Relations Bureau, and Robert Byron's *First Russia, Then Tibet*. They have also refused to allow to be distributed many items of news in which the British section saw no harm. In some cases, the items have subsequently been published in *The Daily News* which, being regarded by the Soviet authorities as the official organ of His Majesty's Embassy, is immune from censorship. The Russians claim that all the news which they send in is immune from censorship, being sent under the auspices of *Tass* and therefore official. In this way they distribute the most ferocious slanders on the Poles, while they object to the mildest defence of the Polish case. One telegram, which we printed in the *Daily News* after the Soviet section had prohibited its general distribution, merely pointed out the obvious fact that the splendid Russian victories had been facilitated to some extent by the Anglo-American air attacks on German industrial targets.

25. The cultural activities of the Russians in Persia are increasing. On the 6th February the inauguration ceremony was held of a newly-formed committee for Soviet-Persian Cultural Relations. (Please compare penultimate paragraph of my despatch under reference.) The Persian Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador are honorary presidents. The committee has not yet taken any building for cultural activities in spite of many rumours to the contrary. The teaching of the Russian language by Russians in the university, schools, and in technical and agricultural colleges is now being strongly urged upon the Persian authorities.

#### *Polish Interests.*

26. The main event affecting the Polish refugees in Persia during the period under reference was the visit of M. Henryk Strasburger, the Polish Minister of State. This was the second time that a member of the Polish Government had visited Persia, the previous occasion being the visit of M. Stanczyk, the Minister of Social Welfare, in the spring of 1943.



M. Strasburger arrived on the 24th February, spent fourteen days in Tehran, where he made a thorough tour of inspection and then spent four days visiting the Polish children's colony in Isfahan. He left Persia on the 12th March.

27. The total number of Polish civilians in Persia on the 1st January was 9,622. By the end of March this had been reduced to 8,366. In the interval one ship left with 849 Poles with Rhodesia as their ultimate destination. The remaining odd 400 left for various destinations such as Palestine or (in the case of a few) the United Kingdom either as military personnel recruited in Tehran or as civilians. Negotiations were started for the settlement of 500 Poles in Syria and for about 200 Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association and Red Cross personnel to be transferred to Palestine. Neither of these plans had matured by the end of the period under discussion.

28. As the bulk of Polish refugees come from the eastern provinces of Poland, the declaration by Mr. Churchill concerning the future eastern frontier of Poland had a disturbing and demoralising effect on the refugees in Persia and rendered more difficult the task of the British authorities who deal with them. A fresh difficulty was created towards the end of March when some Poles representing the Union of Polish Patriots in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set up an office in Tehran and began to angle for support among the refugees, using as bait the offer to allow the refugees to communicate with their relations in Russia and to send them parcels.

#### *Internal Politics and Majlis.*

29. The position at the end of 1943 was that the Majlis was not in session, the 13th legislative period having come to an end and the 14th not having commenced. About one half of the Deputies had been elected, but the results of the Tehran elections were not known, though voting had finished. Provincial results were, however, coming in steadily, and early in January a sufficient number of Deputies to enable the Majlis to open were elected. The formal opening was fixed for the 22nd January and all arrangements were made, when, as the result of a series of intrigues, the ceremony was postponed. The Shah was certainly against the opening, and went so far as to suggest to His Majesty's Minister that as the elections had been so badly conducted it would be a good plan to annul them and to have fresh elections under a Prime Minister in whom everyone would have confidence, viz., Dr. Musaddiq. His Majesty spoke of large sums spent on votes and interference by officials and by the Russians. The truth seems to have been that what the Shah really wanted was to have a more subservient Majlis: he was also apprehensive of what would happen when Seyyid Zia Tabatabai took his seat, and hoped that in fresh elections the Seyyid might be defeated. His Majesty's Minister deprecated the Shah's plan and pointed out that it did not seem to be founded on good constitutional grounds as the Majlis was in any case bound to examine the Deputies' credentials and hear any complaints of irregularity: new elections, especially if governed by a new electoral law promulgated by decree, would therefore be likely to arouse feeling against the Shah himself. The Shah finally abandoned his plan, alleging as his reason that Dr. Musaddiq wanted first to hold a referendum to amend the electoral law.

30. The date of formal opening was finally fixed for the 26th February, and the Majlis was in due course opened on that day by the Shah, who made a speech setting forth the tasks which lay before the Majlis during the 14th legislative period.

31. Then ensued the usual examination of the credentials of Deputies. A number of objections were tabled, the most interesting being those against the election of Seyyid Zia Tabatabai. The attack was led by Dr. Musaddiq, who based his objection not on the election proceedings at Yezd but on the Seyyid's unfitness to be a Deputy owing to his share in the *coup d'Etat* of February 1921 and the subsequent events. A full-dress debate ensued, during which a good deal of past history was brought up by both sides, and Seyyid Zia took the opportunity to give his version of what exactly did happen then. He argued that he, and he only, was responsible for what he did at that time, i.e., that he was not in any way subject to British influence, and he took advantage of the opportunity to state how friendly he had been to the Soviet Government at that time. His oratory made a good impression on the Deputies and his credentials were passed by secret ballot with a good majority. The only Deputy whose credentials were definitely rejected was Durri, the Deputy for Darajez, whose election was said to have been secured by all kinds of irregular intervention and military pressure, which must have meant pressure from the Russians.

32. Muhammad Taghi Assad (Amir Jang) was elected temporary president of the Majlis for the examination of credentials, and afterwards Seyyid Muhammad Sadigh Tabatabai, who had been in charge of the Tehran electoral committee, was elected president.

33. The Tehran elections passed off without any great surprises: no Tudeh candidates got in for Tehran, nor did Qawam-es-Saltaneh nor Seyyid Zia, and some rich contractors who bought votes on a grand scale were also disappointed. The notorious mujtahid Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, was among the first twelve, but after pressure from His Majesty's Ambassador his name was omitted from the list by the Government. The highly-respectable but aloof Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk Pirnia was high in the list of successful candidates, but as usual refused to serve. Another successful candidate was the aged Firuzabadi, but objections to his candidature on the ground that he was older than the age-limit of 70 were made and appeared likely to unseat him. The elections of Tabriz were at last finished by about the 21st March, but the votes had not been counted by the end of the period under review.

34. Apart from the resignation of General Shafai in February in circumstances mentioned below, the Soheily Cabinet, which had been formed on the 16th December, remained in power till the business of passing credentials had been got out of the way. Soheily then resigned, having guessed that the feeling of the Majlis was against him. After a good deal of talk about Ahy, Ambassador in Moscow, and Mansour, Governor-General of Khorasan, the Shah asked Sa'ed to form a Cabinet, and after deliberation during the No Ruz holidays from the 21st March onwards Sa'ed announced his team as follows:—

Prime Minister: Muhammad Sa'id Maraghe'i.  
Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh.  
Commerce and Industry: Amanullah Ardalan.  
Communications: Hamid Sayyah.  
Education: Sarlashkar Ali Ri'azi.  
Finance: Mahmud Nariman.  
Foreign: Muhammad Sa'id Maraghe'i.  
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
Justice: Asadullah Hamaqani.  
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Abul Qasim Furuhar.  
Health: Dr. Qasim Ghani.  
War: Ibrahim Zand.  
Without portfolio: Murteza Quli Bayat, Mustafa Adl.

35. Two Ministers who were thought to be the nominees of the Shah, viz., Intizam and Moussa Moury-Esfandiary were thus dropped, though a third, Zand, Minister for War, remained. Two new names appear: Mahmud Fateh and Mahmoud Nariman; the former's appointment was interpreted in some quarters as a mark of the Shah's appreciation of the opposition of Mustafa Fateh, Mahmoud's brother, to Seyyid Zia. The latter was known as a young man of intelligence possessing a sound knowledge of finance and able to speak English, a great advantage in dealing with Dr. Millspaugh. At the end of March Sa'ed had only announced his programme: he did not venture to present his Cabinet for the Majlis's approval, as the Chamber showed itself divided and capricious: in fact, at the end of the quarter it looked as if the Majlis would accept Sa'ed but not his colleagues.

36. Three general remarks are worthy of notice in the political events of this quarter. The first is the fact that the Russians displayed great interest in the internal affairs of the country. Evidence was forthcoming of their intervention in the personnel of Soheily's Cabinet of December 1943; they had objected to the inclusion of Tadayyun and Amir Ahmedi. They also supported the Tudeh party with hardly a pretence of concealment, and in the intrigues connected with the postponement of the opening of the Majlis on the 22nd January the Tudeh Deputies, after having strongly supported the opening, suddenly veered round to the opposite side on instructions from the Soviet Embassy. Their opposition to Seyyid Zia Tabatabai also continued, in spite of the latter's efforts to convince them that he was not anti-Russian. In the Tabriz elections it was also evident that the Soviet authorities were insisting on the inclusion of certain Communist candidates.

37. The second general remark concerns the Shah. There has been a definite increase in the anti-Shah feeling which was noticed in previous reports. The Shah's intervention in the army continued; he went on issuing orders on



military matters without informing the Chief of the General Staff. His Majesty made use of Dr. Musaddiq to oppose Seyyid Zia. The Majlis showed that they objected to the Shah's nominees in the Cabinet, his support of the candidature of a certain Muhi for Saqqiz, his interference in judicial proceedings, his frequent changes of opinion, and his support of General Shafai, the Minister of Commerce, when the latter accidentally killed a workman in the course of a strike, were all the subject of adverse criticism.

38. The third remark is the growth of the power of parties and unions. The so-called "fractions" in the Majlis had little programme and no cohesion; but the Tudeh party spread its influence in various parts of the country, notably at Isfahan and perhaps in Abadan: various workers' organisations, usually called "Ittihadieh i Karagan," appeared in some towns: Seyyid Zia also began serious preparations towards founding a brand-new party of his own, by a process of forming "circles" of progressive elements throughout the country.

39. Further evidence of popular determination to show detestation of Reza Shah was afforded by the trial of various police officials in connexion with the deaths of the Communist Dr. Arani and the Zoroastrian Deputy Arbab Kei-Khosraw; one police doctor being sentenced to death and other officials to terms of imprisonment.

40. During the quarter the well-known leader of the Tudeh party, Suleiman Mirza Muhsin Iskandari, died and was given an impressive funeral, some members of the Soviet Embassy being present.

41. Princess Ashraf, the Shah's twin sister and previously the wife of Ali Qawam, married an Egyptian named Ahmad Shafiq, the son of a pasha.

42. A good deal of popular indignation was worked up about the execution of a Persian pilgrim at Mecca on a charge of polluting the holy shrine; the Persian Government went so far as to threaten to break off relations with Saudi Arabia unless they were given satisfaction.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

43. The tribal situation has remained comparatively peaceful since the beginning of the year, the tribes having been allowed in large part to manage their own affairs. On the other hand, no steps have been taken by the Government towards a permanent settlement of the tribal problem, an essential condition of which is the establishment among the tribes of some confidence in the Government. It is true that, thanks largely to the initiative and co-operation of British officials, rationed issues of tea, sugar and cloth at controlled prices were made to certain Lur and Bakhtiari tribes living adjacent to the railway and to some of the Kuhgalu tribes adjacent to the oilfields area, but this will be interpreted as a recognition of the capacity and opportunities for mischief of those tribes rather than as a reward for virtue or an indication of a change of heart in the Government. The tribes generally get no share of the Government stocks of these commodities.

44. In Fars the growing conviction that the Government is powerless against Nasir Qashgai is inducing tribes such as the Khamseh and the Mamassanni to make outward signs of co-operation with Nasir. But it is doubtful whether they really relish the prospect of having to recognise his overlordship, entailing, as it would, the payment of tribute in money or in kind; and there are indications that Nasir is none too confident of the support he would receive if Government should ever pluck up the courage to assert its authority. A peaceful demonstration by Persian troops towards the Bahmai and Janeki tribes, north-east of the oilfields, with the object of inducing them to surrender some arms, though they lie far from his sphere, is reported to have provoked in Nasir an outburst of nervous anger at such improper conduct of the Persian army and threats of raising all the tribes from Khuzestan to Persian Baluchistan in the defence of tribal interests or alternatively of divesting himself of all responsibility for the order of the tribes of Fars. It is possible that he may instigate some brigandage in order to squeeze more concessions out of the Government and to frighten the people of Shiraz into supporting him. This would not necessarily affect any British war interest; most of the tribes in close contact with the oilfields and the railway—the Darashuri and Qashquli sections of the Qashgai, some of the Kuhgalu tribes, the Bakhtiari and the Lurs—although none of them will miss a chance of thieving, are not, as far as my present information goes, likely to be a serious threat to British interests. There is more doubt as to the possible action of those sections of the Boir Ahmedi who follow Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, but even they do not as yet give any real cause for anxiety.

45. In Bakhtiari some discontent is becoming evident with the rather arbitrary government of Morteza Quli Khan, who, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, appears to be reverting to the customs of the days of Ilkhani rule, the return of which would be hardly more welcome to the tribesmen than the return of the military régime of Reza Shah's days. Morteza Quli Khan is reported to be levying on the tribe the old taxes levied by the Ilkhanis and abolished by Reza Shah. And he is departing from a well-established custom of the old days when the lucrative posts in tribal administration were evenly distributed between the two rival branches of the ruling family. Now only his own relatives get these opportunities, and the disgruntled Khans of the other branch heartily encourage all the discontent they can find.

#### *Persian Forces.*

46. (a) *Army.*—Indecision, conflicting views, internal intrigues and personal interests continue to obstruct attempts to reform the army. Persian supporters of the American advisers universally expressed disappointment at their apparently disinterested attitude towards the execution of the plans which they have themselves prepared. It is not true that the advisers are disinterested, but it would not be far from the truth to say that they are too inclined to adopt the attitude that it is for them to give advice and for the Persian authorities to act on it. Having regard to the strength of the opposition that is determined to discredit them, it may safely be said that they cannot hope to achieve success unless they take an intimate and aggressive interest in the execution of their schemes. Such of these as have been initiated are not functioning in a manner that carries conviction of their value, but this is due more to a lack of determination in operation than to unsoundness in the schemes. It should, however, be remembered that the advisers are very few for the difficult task before them. With the arrival of more officers it is to be hoped that the situation will improve. Of the nine additional officers demanded from America to make a total of twenty, two have arrived and seven are on the way. They will, however, continue to be handicapped in relation to the opposition until they are vested with such powers and influence as will establish them as the deciding factor in the advancement of officers. What is needed is that they should have the full support and confidence of the Shah. It is to be regretted that this they have so far failed to get. The Shah is disappointed because they have been unsympathetic to his desires for a large army with quantities of the most modern arms and because they have hitherto failed to obtain more than a few items of the stores and equipment he would like to have. Moreover, he has allowed himself to be persuaded by the hostile criticism of his two irresponsible military advisers, Generals Yazdan Panah and Razmara, and the implied criticism of the Russians, that the proposals of the American advisers, even those to which he has already given his approval, are unsuited to the conditions of Persia.

47. The American mission has begun the organisation of transport units equipped principally with the 600 trucks recently received from American sources. Here they claim to be making progress in spite of the many difficulties that arise from indiscipline, corruption, lack of workshop equipment for maintenance and of trained personnel. Their plans are ready for the organisation of field medical, signal and engineer units as soon as equipment is obtained. The new systems of supply and pay have not yet convinced the private soldier that there is anything of the fairy godmother about the American advisers. Lack of reliable personnel, lack of funds and lack of stores—such reserves as there were having been consumed during the last two years without replenishment—have effectively prevented the successful operation of the new system.

48. For a time the Shah's head seemed to be completed turned by his conversation with Marshal Stalin during the Tehran Conference and by the latter's offer to him of a gift of tanks and aircraft. He appeared to have convinced himself that he would have Stalin's support in his ambition to have a large army under his personal command and Stalin's assistance in equipping it. He sought for means to please his Russian friends. He dismissed the pro-British Minister of War, General Ahmadi; and later General Ansari, the Under-Secretary of State for War, who was also displeasing to the Russians. He was also clearly anxious to replace General Riazi, the Chief of Staff, who has co-operated frankly with us and with the American advisers, by General Yazdan Panah, who would be more acceptable to himself and the Russians. Fearing, perhaps, that to do so immediately would appear too obviously as an anti-British gesture, he postponed action until the formation of a new Cabinet gave him opportunity of getting rid



of General Riazi from the General Staff by appointing him as Minister of Education. His successor has not yet been named.

49. Reflection and the views of his Ministers have to some extent modified his elation and roused doubts of the disinterestedness of the Russian gift, to which it has been found certain unwelcome conditions were attached. For the Russian offer extends to the organisation of tank and aircraft regiments with a strong framework of Russian personnel, and obvious Persian unwillingness to walk into this trap may result in the withdrawal of the bait.

50. There has been much discussion as to the strength of the army that should be budgeted for in the financial year just beginning. The Shah held out for 120,000; Dr. Millspaugh maintained that he could not find more money than the 100 million tomans allotted for the past year. The final decision of the Government was that the Ministry for War should budget for a strength of 90,000 Dr. Millspaugh being left to find the money as best he could. The Shah has, however, demanded that a further credit should be allotted for an additional 10,000 men, to be drawn against only if circumstances should demand this increase to the army. The organisation on which the figure of 90,000 is based—that is ten divisions, each with a strength of 5,000–6,000, and, in addition, independent cavalry and mechanised brigades in the capital—has been considered by the Commander-in-chief of Persia and Iraq Force and it is understood that he considers it reasonable having regard to the task before the army.

51. (b) *Gendarmerie*.—In the gendarmerie Colonel Schwarzkopf has been given extensive authority and has, in practice, complete control of the force, under the Minister of the Interior. That no improvement is yet visible is due not to any lack of enthusiasm or energy on his part but largely to lack of sufficient funds to pay the officers and men of the force a living wage, to shortage of clothing and equipment and, in some degree, to his own too great confidence in the co-operation of his Persian colleagues. He is planning for the current year for a force of eighteen regiments, with a total strength of 28,000 officers and men, divided into eight districts corresponding approximately with the provinces; each of six districts to have two regiments and the Tehran and Fars districts to have three each. The cost of this force, at the rates of pay he considers necessary to attract a suitable type of man, will probably amount to 50–60 million tomans for the year, an increase of 100 per cent. on the provision made last year. An additional three American officers are now on their way to join Colonel Schwarzkopf's staff which, on their arrival, will total six.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

52. The reorganisation of the Persian Air Force drags slowly on. They are resuming under Royal Air Force guidance various branches of training which have been neglected over recent years and a certain amount of their equipment is being shown to be more serviceable than they thought. It is hoped that the delivery of their eagerly-awaited Ansons may be the beginning of a serious attempt to reach a degree of operational efficiency.

53. Colonel Stedakh, who was attending the Middle East Staff College, has had a nervous breakdown and has had to be recalled to Tehran. Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East, have offered to accept another officer, if a suitable one can be found, for the summer course at the college.

#### *Finance.*

54. The inflationary situation remains serious, though the prospects of keeping it under control are better since the staff of the Millspaugh Mission has been increased. It is hoped to achieve more success in the enforcement of the Price Stabilisation Regulations and in the curtailment of black market activities; while Dr. Millspaugh also feels reasonably optimistic about the budgetary situation, as revenue is coming in better than he had expected. There are also indications that the Persian Government, no doubt under pressure from the Millspaugh Mission, are taking steps to put their house in order. They have begun a series of investigations into large-scale embezzlements and frauds which have occurred in various Government administration departments, and as a result there have been some dismissals and arrests in the Road Transport Department, the army and in the Ministry of Finance. The cost of living indices still show up upward tendency, though of late the rate of increase has slackened. In December the figure was 1,050, in January 1,076, and in February 1,082. The wholesale price index over the same period was 665, 668 and 662 respectively. The incidence of note circulation also increased during the past three months.

On the 14th December currency notes in circulation amounted to 5,195.07 million rials, while on the 12th February they had risen to 5,701.06 million rials.

55. The currency situation gave rise to some anxiety in February. It was found that, unless a substantial portion of the note forms which are being printed in London were flown to Tehran immediately upon delivery from the printers, there would be a serious currency shortage in April, and air transport did not seem to be available. If such a shortage occurred, not only would it seriously embarrass the Persian Government in its financial obligations, but it would also affect the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union. A peculiarity of the situation was that, although the National Bank of Iran was short of notes, the Imperial Bank of Iran had a surplus of about 300 million rials in excess of its normal reserve. It was suggested that these rials might be utilised to finance British military expenditure in Persia over the crucial two or three months when the currency shortage would be most acute, thus easing the position of the National Bank, which would otherwise be called upon to produce rials against sterling to meet this expenditure. Several technical difficulties arose in trying to find the manner in which this could best be accomplished to everyone's satisfaction, but in the event it was found possible to transport to Persia by air notes to the value of 450 million rials, which relieved the situation.

56. The conclusion of a financial agreement to cover the use of the Iranian State railways by the Allied Powers has hung fire for over two years, but at the beginning of the year negotiations were speeded up, and a draft agreement was prepared by us in consultation with the American authorities, and submitted to the Russians for their approval. The draft as finally agreed between the Russians, the Americans and ourselves will then form a basis for subsequent negotiation with the Persian Government.

57. The new silver coinage which the Majlis had authorised to be minted was put into circulation for the first time on the 29th February. The denominations of the coins are 1 rial, 2 rials, 5 rials and 10 rials, and are legal tender to the extent of 500 rials. So far, only the 1- and 5-rial pieces have appeared. The coins are of 600 fineness, composed of an alloy of silver and copper, and their total value will be 100 million rials. Although silver is being sold in the open market in the Tehran bazaar at 760 rials per 1,000 grammes (916 fine), and the value of the new 1-rial piece at that price is therefore .795 rials, there was an immediate run on the banks for these coins, and later the 5-rial pieces were being sold on the street for 6 or 7 rials each. These are presumably being hoarded.

58. The silver deal with the Government of India, under which the National Bank of Iran sold to them 500 tons of cut rupees, rial and kran coins, has now been completed, the final shipment being made on the 19th March. The bank sold 120 tons at 80 rupees per 100 tolas (916 fine) and 380 tons at 93 rupees 12 annas per 100 tolas (916 fine). The former price was approximately that at which the Persian Government had previously bought 120 tons of silver from India, while the latter is the price ruling on the open market in Persia.

#### *Economic Situation.*

59. In spite of the good harvest last year and the provision of nearly a thousand lend-lease trucks, the country was faced at the beginning of 1944 with another bread and transport crisis. This was happily averted by the combined efforts of the Millspaugh Mission, Paiforce and the Middle East Supply Centre. Dr. Millspaugh recognised the need to concentrate on cereals collection and the organisation of transport; and the Persian Government were fortunately able to have the help of these Allied organisations. The Middle East Supply Centre provided fifteen British officers and n.c.os. to help in supervising the collection and movement of grain and another twenty-five to assist with the control of civil road transport. Paiforce provided transport companies, which moved 17,000 tons of cereals from the Kermanshah-Hamadan area to the railway. Thanks to this measure, bread supplies for the population of Tehran and other centres were assured. The transport of civil goods by rail from the south to Tehran also improved following the appointment of a British officer to the Millspaugh Mission to supervise loadings.

60. The distribution of tea, sugar, piece-goods, drugs and other essential goods was another story. This was a failure, in spite of the Government's large stocks of these commodities and of considerable efforts made by Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. Most of the civil population did without these "necessities" and bazaar prices remained at very high levels. Unfortunately, some of the measures aimed at reducing prices which were passed by Dr. Millspaugh have tended to aggravate the situation by holding up distribution by merchants. Some



of the harmful measures were later rescinded; but the monopolisation of the commodities mentioned above is still a hindrance rather than a help to distribution.

61. The Persian Government agreed in January to supply the Russians with 36,000 tons of low-grade rice at considerably below cost price in exchange for Russian goods to the value of about £320,000. Like the arms contract now in force between the Persians and the Russians, this agreement is financially disadvantageous to the Persians. A new Rice Monopoly Company was set up to collect and deliver rice to the Russians (and also to the civil population of Persia), but its success up to date has not been remarkable.

#### Transport.

62. Mr. Floyd F. Shields arrived from the United States during the quarter and assumed the direction of the Road Transport Administration. He has three American assistants and the twenty-five British officers and n.c.os. provided by the Middle East Supply Centre to work temporarily with the Persian Government to help organise civil road transport on a proper basis. The Government Departments concerned with transport have been reorganised and the usual hopes are held that the future will be brighter. Supplies of tyres and spare parts for motor vehicles are being received satisfactorily; but lack of maintenance facilities is still one of the chief handicaps to the proper use of the Government's fleet of motor vehicles.

63. With the extra staff at its disposal the Road Transport Administration began to exert its authority in the provinces. In some places, particularly Khorassan, it encountered opposition from local officials. In Meshed the Governor-General and the local road transport officials have developed a very profitable private racket, which ensures that almost anything profitable will be transported and very little that is really essential. But as the influence of the Road Transport Administration increases a diminution in these practices and an increase in the transport of essential goods may be expected.

64. The movement of civil goods by railway from the south to Tehran improved considerably, and no anxiety is felt on this score either in connexion with supplies of oil or of other commodities.

#### Cereals.

65. It may now be stated with reasonable certainty that there will be no need to import grain from abroad between now and the forthcoming harvest. Out of a target of 310,000 tons required to feed the towns approximately 305,000 tons have been collected. There are at present about six weeks' stocks in the Tehran silo and over 12,000 tons surplus (almost two months' stocks) available in the southern region of the country for transport to the capital.

66. The target of 310,000 tons, however, does not include the substantial reserve necessary to maintain confidence to tide over the period of harvesting and to provide against the possibility of an indifferent harvest this year. The failure so far to accumulate this reserve is entirely due to poor deliveries from the northern region. Deliveries to Tehran from the southern region have, by totalling 50,000 tons, exceeded expectations. Similar deliveries from the northern and most fertile region of the country have only just exceeded 17,000 tons instead of reaching the 40,000 tons which might most reasonably have been expected. The difference of 23,000 tons, when added to further possible deliveries from the south, would have constituted a reserve, albeit a small one, with which to start the next agricultural year. Unless deliveries from the north increase materially during the next few weeks the Persian Government grain reserve at harvest time is likely to be insignificant.

67. Lateness of rain, and lack of rain in some areas, have caused anxiety regarding the forthcoming crop. The profiteers have taken full advantage of this by raising the free-market price of grain and by spreading exaggerated rumours of the failure of crops. Well-informed circles have estimated, so far as it is possible to form an estimate at this stage, that the present crop is unlikely to exceed 70 per cent. of the last crop.

#### Locust control.

68. From the beginning of the year until the 23rd March there were no desert locust swarms in Persia, and the reports received from British Baluchistan and from Oman had been consistently reassuring. Preparations had therefore been made for the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight to East Africa, the return of the mechanised regiment of the Transjordan Frontier

Force to Middle East Command, and the early withdrawal of the British Locust Officer from Persia.

69. Between the 23rd and 31st March, however, half a dozen reports have been received which indicate that three or more swarms of indefinite size are moving in the Kerman and Eastern Fars provinces. Unfortunately their appearance was so unexpected that the British anti-locust unit was not able to attack any of them with D.N.O.C. poison dust as they crossed the coastal area. The situation is still very obscure, as exact information has not been received about the size of the swarms or the maturity of the locusts.

70. Mr. Lean at once asked for the retention of the Royal Air Force and military units, and A.H.Q., Persia and Iraq, have agreed. General Headquarters, Middle East, however, could only agree to the retention of the mechanised regiment of the Transjordan Frontier Force until the 10th April, as they are required for duty in the Middle East Command thereafter.

71. It is therefore to be hoped that in the next ten days the swarms will be proved to be small (and therefore controllable by the Persian authorities) or else will be largely destroyed. Otherwise the withdrawal of the British anti-locust unit immediately after the arrival of swarms in this country will not only impress the Persian Government unfavourably but may also do harm to the Allied war effort if Persian crops are exposed to serious damage.

72. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 2589/422/34]

No. 16.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th April.)*

(No. 160.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the period of the 3rd April to the 9th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 10th April, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 16.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the Period  
3rd-9th April, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

AFTER some days' discussion, the different Majlis groups and the independent members decided against giving to the Prime Minister a list of persons whom they considered suitable to be Ministers. On the 6th April the Prime Minister presented to the Shah his reconstituted Cabinet. Three of the five new Ministers he had presented the previous week—Mahmud Fateh, General Riazi and Mahmud Nariman—were dropped and in their places he introduced Nasir Etamadi as Minister of Agriculture and Dr. Sa'ed Malik as Minister of Hygiene; Dr. Ghani moved from the Ministry of Hygiene to the Ministry of Education in place of General Riazi and Ferouhar from the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs to the Ministry of Finance in place of Nariman. The former Ministry remains vacant. Etamadi was Under-Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office of Soheily's Cabinet in 1943. Dr. Malik has not previously been in the Government. The Cabinet does not appear to be any stronger than its predecessor, and it cannot be said to contain anyone truly representative of the young and progressive, except possibly Hajhir, probably for the good reason that any such appointment would raise a storm of jealousy and hostility from all the



disappointed young and self-styled progressives. It will not be greeted with any enthusiasm in the country nor raise hopes of better days; nor is it likely to be able to deal effectively with a Majlis which shows signs of being critical, troublesome and too disunited to be constructive. It may last longer than its merits would seem to warrant, since, of possible successors to Sa'ed, the only two who appear to have any real Majlis support are Qavam-es-Sultaneh and Seyyid Zia, who, besides being opposed to each other, have both powerful enemies.

2. The Cabinet is now composed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed.  
Ministers without portfolio: Mustafa Adl, Morteza Quli Bayat.  
Industry and Mines: Amanullah Ardelan.  
Roads and Communications: Hamid Sayyah.  
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir.  
War: Ibrahim Zand.  
Public Health: Dr. Sa'ed Malik.  
Education: Dr. Ghani.  
Justice: Assadullah Mamaghani.  
Agriculture: Nasir Etamadi.  
Finance: Abul Qasim Ferouhar.  
Posts and Telegraphs: Vacant.

3. The programme of the Government is the same as that reported in Summary No. 13/44, paragraph 3. Twenty-seven Deputies have announced their intention of speaking against the Government when the programme comes up for Majlis approval, but the forecast is that it will be approved by a small majority.

4. The Shah is reported to be much concerned at the growth of Seyyid Zia's influence in the Majlis. The Seyyid makes little secret of his intention to raise at an early date the question of the constitutional position of the Shah and to have it defined by the Majlis. In opposition to Seyyid Zia, the Shah finds himself allied to the Tudeh party, whose press continues its violent attacks.

5. Organisers of labour unions (*Ittihadieh-i-Kargaran*) are becoming more active throughout Persia. Such unions have existed for some time in the Russian-occupied zone, where they are closely affiliated with the Tudeh party, in Tehran, Isfahan, among railway workers, and recently among the workers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In Isfahan, where they succeeded some time ago in forcing better conditions out of the factory owners, they have recently come under the influence of the Tudeh party, and the workers are now showing signs of an intransigence that is frightening the owners and the capitalists of the town to such an extent that even the Governor-General has come to the conclusion that the situation can be dealt with only by the establishment of a military governorship. There is a reluctance on the part of Persian officials to take action against movements which are suspected of being inspired from Russian sources. It is probable that the Tudeh party will endeavour to establish influence over all labour unions in all parts of the country.

#### *Economic.*

6. The press has been making critical attacks on Dr. Millspaugh and his mission on the general grounds that the achievements of the American advisers do not justify their cost to the country. The discontent with the American Mission is widespread. They were never popular with the rich and the poor are disappointed that conditions have shown so little improvement from their point of view since their arrival. There is no noticeable decrease in the cost of living and monopoly goods—tea, sugar and cloth—which should be distributed at controlled prices on rationed scales, rarely reach the peasant or the tribesman. A weighty attack on Dr. Millspaugh has already been made in the Majlis by Dr. Musaddiq.

7. A beginning has, in fact, been made on a small scale with the distribution of tea, sugar and cloth. Rationed quantities of these goods have been issued to some Lur and Bakhtiari tribes on the railway and to some of the Kuhgalu tribes. Arrangements are also being made for issues to the tribes and, it is hoped, to some of the villagers of Fars. The nature of the communities selected for these first issues should be convincing proof of the value of a nuisance potential in attracting consideration.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

8. Ismail Bahaduri to be Farmandar of Ardebil.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

9. Malik Mansur and Muhammad Hussein, brothers of Nasir Qashgai, have recently returned to Persia from Germany and have gone to the tribe. They were both educated in England, and after their experiences in Germany there is reason to hope that their influence on their brother will be good. Nasir, while still rebellious towards his own Government, is showing signs of desiring to get into the good books of British authorities. It is possible that he may find a champion in Seyyid Zia, who is playing for tribal support. This has increased the Shah's uneasiness about the situation in Fars and his suspicions of General Jahanbani's policy towards Nasir, with which he has for some time been very displeased.

##### *Kuhgalu.*

10. The peaceful operations for the collection of arms from the Bahmai and Janeki tribes are now ended. The Janeki surrendered some 170 rifles, but the Bahmai did not carry out their promises of co-operation and, as far as is known, they surrendered few, if any, rifles. Their change of mind was probably due to the influence of Abdullah Zarghampur, Boir Ahmadi, who rightly appreciated that General Jahanbani would not risk a fight. The Bahmai consequently retain their arms and Government prestige has been still further lowered by the failure to carry through an operation which had been launched with no little advertisement.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

11. It is reported, but has not yet been fully confirmed, that the Russians intend to operate a bi-weekly commercial air passenger service between Tehran and Meshed, beginning on the 23rd April. A trial trip was made on the 5th April.

*Tehran, 9th April, 1944.*

[E 2589/422/34]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th April.)*

(No. 171.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for the period of the 10th to the 16th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 17th April, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 17.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the period 10th April to 16th April, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

AFTER more than a week's futile debating by the Majlis of its programme the Government was given a vote of confidence by 69 of the 90 members present, 9 voting against the Government and 12 abstaining. There is a larger majority than was at first expected, since 27 members had announced their intention of speaking and voting against the Government. That was perhaps due more to the desire of budding parliamentarians to secure an opportunity of airing their theories and gaining some publicity than to any conviction that in present circumstances the defeat of the Government would lead to anything better.

[29046]

M



During the debate Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues came in for much criticism and it is clear that the dissatisfaction with them is deep and widespread. Such defence of them as was attempted was half-hearted and did not go much further than to claim that Dr. Millspaugh himself meant well and that in principle an American advisory mission was desirable for the finance and economy of the country, if only for the purpose of keeping alive American interests in and sympathy with Persia.

2. Seyyid Zia's relatively vigorous personality is creating some impression and causing some concern. The Court fears that he is imbued with hostility to the Shah and that he is determined to endeavour to bring about a limitation of the Shah's part in the affairs of Government to that of a strictly constitutional monarch. The Shah has perhaps an uneasy conscience, for he knows that it is believed by Seyyid Zia and many others that he encouraged Dr. Musaddiq to oppose the acceptance of Seyyid Zia's election to the Majlis and that he arranged for the hostile demonstration of factory workers outside the Majlis on that occasion. Suspicious as he always has been that Seyyid Zia could not entertain friendly sentiments for the son of Reza Shah he now finds added reason to fear some act of revenge. There are others, too, who fear the effects on the country of a struggle between Seyyid Zia and his supposedly increasing band of followers on the one hand and the Shah and his paid intriguers on the other; others, the rich, who fear the advent to power of Seyyid Zia; and others who expect that if Seyyid Zia looked like being successful the Russians would attempt a *coup d'Etat* to prevent this victory of British policy. Several requests have recently been made by influential Persians to His Majesty's Ambassador that he should mediate to effect a reconciliation between Seyyid Zia and the Shah. The Shah is perturbed. For some time he has had no indications of any particular concern on the part of the Russians for his welfare. He suspects, possibly with good cause, that the Russians have taken offence at the Persian refusal to accept the conditions that were attached to the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft—see paragraph 9 below—and are annoyed by his failure to unseat Seyyid Zia. (The Tudeh party were persuaded to leave the attack entirely to Dr. Musaddiq, the Shah's man for this purpose.) Now, doubtful of Russian support and almost convinced that Seyyid Zia was accepted by the Majlis as a result of British support and that his policy is laid down by the British Embassy, he hardly knows where to turn. For the time being he is making a show of giving his Government a free hand and of abstaining from attempting to influence the course of affairs, but he continues to have relations with dangerous and unprincipled intriguers.

3. The Hamrahan party, composed mainly of intellectuals with Socialist views under the leadership of Mustafa Fateh of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which has never made much impression on the public, has recently suffered the secession of some of its members who have formed a party called the Socialist Party of Iran. The reason for their secession is said to be their discontent with the lack of vigour shown by the Majlis representatives of the party—there are only two—in their opposition to the acceptance of Seyyid Zia's election to the Majlis. The new party retains the party newspaper *Imruz va Farda*, and the old party has started a new paper *Shamâ*.

4. The proposal to make a new Shahrstan (Governor's district) out of the Bakshes of Saqqiz, Baneh and Sardasht in Kurdistan—see Summary No. 48, 1943, paragraph 6—has been abandoned. Saqqiz will remain in the Shahrstan of Sanandaj, and Baneh and Sardasht in that of Mahabad. The Shahrstan of Sanandaj, under the Governorship of Shihab ed Douleh—see Summary No. 11, 1944, paragraph 6—is now to be independent of the Governor-General of Kermanshah.

#### Economic.

5. It is now estimated that the Government may have, when the new harvest begins to come in, a surplus of 25,000 tons of grain as a reserve. This, however, is not considered sufficient to put any effective check on hoarders or on the black market, especially in view of the unjustifiably gloomy reports that are being circulated about the coming harvest. Although crops have failed almost completely in some parts of South Persia, it is estimated that, taken as a whole, the harvest will not be below average. The prevention of famine in areas where crops have failed will depend on the extent to which the surplus crop can be collected in other areas and on distribution.

6. An earthquake occurred at Gorgan on the 5th April which, according to the Persian press, has destroyed or rendered uninhabitable all the houses in the town. The Shah and the Queen are now visiting the town.

#### Persian Forces.

##### Army

7. The Russians have refused to allow American officers of General Ridley's staff to be stationed at Tabriz and Meshed, the headquarters of the 3rd and 8th Divisions respectively. It is part of General Ridley's scheme that an American officer should be attached to the headquarters of each division to reorganise the administration. The Russians have suggested to the Persian Government that if the Persian army requires advice or assistance they, the Russians, will be glad to give it.

8. The press reports that a number of officials of the Conscription Department in the provinces have been recalled to Tehran on charges of corruption. The application of the Conscription Law is one of the greatest scandals in Persia. Exemptions are secured not by virtue of the law but by bribery, and the result is that only the poorest classes reach the army. The present Minister for War has the desire to clean up these abuses, but it has yet to be seen whether he has the strength to do so.

9. The general terms of the Persian reply to the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft—see Summary No. 9, 1944, paragraph 9—are that the Persian Government accepted the offer with gratitude, but that, since they were to be a gift, they did not see the necessity for a formal signed agreement, as requested by the Russians, for the formation of new tank and aircraft units with a Russian instructional staff. The Persian Government proposed that they should send the necessary officers and men to take over, after they had been instructed in their use, the tanks and aircraft at places convenient to the Russians. This reply was given to the Russians some six weeks ago and fairly reliable information is that since then the Russians have not reverted to the subject.

10. One of the papers of the Tudeh party, presumably at Russian inspiration, has published an article advocating a strong army. But the army must belong to the nation, must find its support in the nation and be ready to fight against reaction and despotism. The article refers to the "mysterious influences" that are trying to reduce the strength of the army.

#### Internal Security.

##### Fars.

11. The northward migration of the Qashgai tribes has begun. It is reported that the return of Nasir Qashgai's two brothers to the tribe—see Summary No. 14, 1944, paragraph 9—with British permission and assistance has had a good effect on the tribe.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire reports that following on the withdrawal of Persian troops—see Summary No. 6, 1944, paragraph 11—disorder has again broken out in Dashti and Tangistan. The Dashti outlaw, Ali Ismail, who had taken refuge with Nasir Qashgai, has returned to Dashti, and the Tangistanis have recently been guilty of many robberies.

#### Russian Affairs.

13. The impression is now gaining strength in certain circles that the Soviet Embassy is dissatisfied with affairs in Persia. The causes for this are alleged to be the ill-success of Tudeh candidates in the elections, the failure of the attempt to unseat Seyyid Zia and the refusal of the Persian Government to accept the conditions attached to the offer of tanks and aircraft. The omission of the Soviet Government to send to the Shah the usual telegram of felicitations at the Persian New Year and to acknowledge the Shah's telegram of congratulations on recent successes of the Red Army is regarded as convincing proof of Soviet displeasure.

14. The strength of the force of Russian troops whose arrival at Sabzawar was reported in Summary No. 13, 1944, paragraph 13, is reliably reported to be 600. No information of the impending arrival of these troops was given to the Persian Government or local authorities.

15. It is confirmed that the Russians propose to run an air service, probably fortnightly, between Tehran and Meshed and perhaps between Tabriz and Tehran. It will carry Russian and Persian passengers only. See Summary No. 14, 1944, paragraph 11.



*Polish Affairs.*

16. An office of the Union of Polish Patriots has been established in Tehran under Russian auspices to the serious perturbation of the authorities in charge of the Polish refugees in Persia. In its endeavours to get into touch with these refugees the Polish Patriots have a strong card: they are offering to put refugees in touch with their relatives in Russia.

*Tehran, 16th April, 1944.*

[E 2647/155/34]

No. 18.

*Report by Captain H. Garrod, R.A.M.C., on Tour by 12th Indian Division Mobile Dispensary in Fars.—(Communicated by British Embassy, Tehran; Received in Foreign Office, 1st May.)*

*General.*

SINCE its arrival at Shiraz the unit has been working under the guidance of His Majesty's Consul. It was decided to tackle first the area bounded by Khisht and Ardekan to the east and by the A.I.O.C. workings at Gach Saran to the west. No one was more appreciative of this than the A.I.O.C. manager at Gach Saran to whom the officer commanding owes a great debt of gratitude for the unstinting assistance which he gave over transport, introductions and local information, for the hospitality which he extended and for the interest which he took in our work.

The tribes in this area from south-west to north-east are (i) Kashkuli, Qashgai (winter only), (ii) Darrashuri, Qashgai (winter only), and (iii) Bavi Mamassani and Doshman Ziari. The Mamassani are further sub-divided into Rustami, Javidi, Fehliani and Bakesh. At the extreme south-east are the settled villages of the Khisht plain and to the west the settled lands of Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri. Camped over winter in the valleys of Rustami and Bavi are what remains to Mohd. Hussein Taheri of the Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi (Upper). Scattered in Kashkuli, by whose Khans they are owned, are a few permanent villages, some of Qashgai, others of mixed origin. The first week was spent with Kashkuli working north-west through Mahur from roadhead at Khisht. Fehlian was the next roadhead, treatment being given at Bakesh *en route*. From Fehlian to Basht sick were treated at a number of Rustami villages and a rare opportunity was seized to treat and study the Qaid Qivi Boir Ahmedi, whose black tents command the route, whilst working in the comparative safety of Rustami protection. Bavis and the nomadic Tir Taji Boir Ahmedi were treated at Basht.

Ahwaz was visited to replace certain drugs which had become exhausted owing to the high incidence of malaria and the accidental immersion of a loaded mule. After returning to Gach Saran short trips were made into Darrashuri and sections of Kashkuli hitherto unvisited by us.

Arrangements had been made to stay a night at Aru, the centre of Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri, where a mysterious epidemic was decimating the population, in appreciation of the help which their Kalantar, Muzaffar Khan Ariani, had extended to the Persian Government and the A.I.O.C. But at the last moment other counsels based on the growing insecurity of the area prevailed and the visit was cancelled. To appease Muzaffar's disappointment a present of quinine was forwarded by runner.

On the difficult route to Mamassani through Darrashuri endless transport troubles were experienced, and frequent changes of animals were necessary. Rain added to the delays. It was the intention, had not the officer commanding been taken ill, to continue through Javidi and Doshman Ziari to Ardekan and thereby complete the picture. It is hoped to visit these tribes on some future occasion.

*Conditions encountered.*

(a) These lands harbour but a part of the intricate tribal mosaic which overlies the rugged framework of Fars and Kuh Galu. Of divers origins, brave traditions and mixed tongues, the inhabitants live in an unstable equilibrium whose balance once more is determined one way or the other by force of arms. Old blood-feuds and half-buried quarrels are apt to erupt with destructive fury; whilst the strength of the weaker tribes is ever provoked and

their patience sorely tried by the raids, incursions or exactions of their more powerful neighbours. Those who are settled in rich lands have little to gain and everything to lose from lawlessness; and from having been rich feeding ground for Government officials they are now the tempting prey of irresponsible nomadic tribes. Whether villager or nomad, man must bear arms and be brave to survive.

(b) With the fall of Reza Shah his much-prided infantry and armies lost morale and were overthrown by the tribes or quick to escape from the narrow valleys where they were quartered, fearful of the awakening wrath of those they had been obliged to oppress. The nomads rejoiced in a reaccession of freedom, and buried arms saw light again and were carefully cleaned. New rifles were bought or acquired, some sold by the army (Colonel Qavimi, Military Governor of Behbahan in 1940, is said to have sold many rifles to Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi) or arms traffickers, others seized in daring raids on outposts of the army and Amnieh. Added to these were the many rifles of the deserters, some of whom had been conscripted from the tribes and were quick to return to their tents. The rearmament race had begun.

Those of the former Khans who had survived long exile or imprisonment slunk back to their tribes and set to to re-establish their lost hold and recoup their confiscated lands. The latter awaits full accomplishment and has occasioned more than one bloody battle with the Government; whilst the former was not always easy because, although they were welcomed by the majority of their old subjects and their weaker relatives who had been allowed to remain with the tribes, as fellow-sufferers from Reza Shah, there were not a few among the latter who, thanks to the difficult accessibility of their pastures, or to lending themselves as tools to the Government, had escaped the worst oppression and had profited from the sufferings of their neighbours and now found irksome a return to the absolute rule against which there is no appeal but mutiny or secession from the tribe. Others who had been settled in squalor and misery had been cowed into taking a craven and half-hearted pride in being law-abiding citizens, had had their strength sapped by disease or famine and were reluctant at first to return to their former spartanism. Moreover, in the absence of the chief Khans, the tribes had been weakened internally by poisonous intrigues of which the Government are masters and had been infused with insidious propaganda against the Khans. Much ill-blood had been neutralised or removed. However, they mostly succeeded and tribal pride and morale were slowly reborn, whilst the myth of the invincible Persian army, of which many had come to be possessed and which only the Boir Ahmedi had disposed of at Tang-i-Tamuradi, receded from their minds. Of all these tribes only the Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi had not been fully subdued by the Shah who, by placing a cordon round their forbidding mountains, succeeded only in restricting their activities, whilst such robber kings as the late Luras and Ali and Vali Izad Paneh, continued to sally forth although on a lesser and more cautious scale. Although their principal two chiefs were lured into captivity and ultimate assassination, the pride of the rank and file was never shattered by defeat.

The Qashgai horde resumed its biannual migrations without having to pay immense bribes for this ancient privilege, which had landed them in penury or debt. And the settled communities in their path endured once more the depredations and trappings down that accompany these undisciplined moves. Meanwhile, the "Iliat" were building up their flocks of sheep and goats and camels and the Kadkhudas and Khans their stables of horses and mules, which had become thinned out from having been stolen by Government employees or given in bribes, and in the case of those that could not move had perished for want of grass.

So the position to-day is that outposts of gendarmes and garrisons of troops are to be found only along the main road from Shiraz to Bushire, where traffic must run in escorted convoys, whilst there are two ineffective Gendarme posts at Shahpur and Fehlian on the Mamassani road. These are unable to prevent armed Mamassanis and Kashkulis from levying a toll on all civilian passengers and caravans at four points along the road, which they do by order of their Khans on the pretext of receiving payment for their safe custody. At Gach Saran there is a company from a crack Persian regiment of the north, supported by British troops, who give security to this area from Boir Ahmedi and other would-be marauders.

Elsewhere local government rests with the tribal Kalantars who in Kashkuli, Darrashuri and other Qashgai "tirehs" are chosen by Nasir Khan from their own ruling families. In other tribes they are accepted by their subjects on a



by no means rigid hereditary basis in which, in Kuhgalu, assassinations, blood feuds and forcible usurpations play an appointed part. The Government either acknowledges or is unable to oppose their appointment and sometimes face-savily grants them a mandate to keep the peace in their territory, a responsibility it cannot itself undertake. Taxes are no longer paid to the Government except on what is exported to the towns. Tribute is rendered to the Khans, and in Qashgai the Kalantars signify their support of Nasir Khan by the offering of "presents" which are really in the nature of a voluntary tax. Nor are the tribesmen conscripted, a practice which having experienced they consider degrading in that their men would be slaving for despised and corrupt officers and n.c.o.s without payment or food and under appalling conditions, whilst their families would have to support them and would suffer hardship in their absence. There are, of course, other factors too, on both sides.

An intense hatred of the Government is found in most nomadic tribes, but in the light of past experience its power is feared more than might be expected, whilst the day of reckoning is being prepared for and is awaited by many. The camps of the Khans and Kadkhudas of Boir Ahmedi and Qashgai are littered with the booty of Semirum and Kamfiruz. Rifles, ammunition, bell tents, revolvers, uniforms, greatcoats, boots, telephones, ammunition boxes, saddlery and horses, are all shown with naughty childlike pride by their owners, who say, mockingly, that they were given by the Government. In Qaid Qivi Boir Ahmedi pride of place is given to a pair of machine guns generously bestowed by Abdullah Zarghampur from among many on his lesser rival Mohammad Hussein Taheri for his part in the Semirum battle. At Semirum the Boir Ahmedi bore the brunt of the fighting and took the lion's share of the booty (many fought with clubs and axes), leaving little to Darrashuri or Kashkuli and even seizing a number of rifles off the latter, so it is asserted and even half admitted. The bulk of Kashkuli booty is from Kamfiruz. Nowhere has the officer commanding seen such profusion and display of good modern arms and well-stocked bandoliers, except, perhaps, in Kurdistan, as he met in these tents. Any youth with a rifle is able to lord it in little ways over his unarmed neighbours, and his head becomes swollen with pride. A horse and saddle complete his outfit by which time his feeling of importance may preclude him from work and he takes to robbing or joins the paid retinue of the Khans.

But there is another side to the picture. Evidence in Darrashuri and Kashkuli suggests that the rank and file, for some time to come at any rate, have had their picnic and are more concerned in reaping good harvests and swelling their flocks than they are in joining battle or in robbery. They suffered much last summer from the unrest in which they participated and many were hindered from reaping or giving full mind to their crops in the north by the calls of battle and a premature withdrawal to the garmsir, dictated by fear that the Government might try and block the narrow way south. The majority of Darrashuri and Kashkuli are good peaceful folk, the best type of shepherd, proud fathers, intensely hospitable, and whose first concern is the protection and prosperity of their flocks and families. It is only in obedience to their more ambitious Khans that they will take up arms in aggressive conflict, and even then some sections will decline whilst others soon tire and can seldom stay long without hardship to their families. Of Kashkuli (of the three divisions of Kashkuli, only Kashkuli Buzurg was visited) only a few, such as the Abulvardi, are habitual robbers and these are despised by most of the others, who themselves will only rob in bad times or perhaps when on the move. The Darrashuri, who own less land in the garmsir and are poorer and wilder than Kashkuli, are for these reasons more given to depredation. If indulged in for long the habit breeds laziness, and this in turn poverty and a vicious circle is set up. It is the conviction of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company manager, Gach Saran, that last winter much of the robbing in that neighbourhood was determined by want of clothes. For this the Government is partly to blame for failing to effect a more equitable distribution of cloth (which is, however, in very short supply). And although this sounds like putting the cart before the horse, the provision of sugar and tea at Government rates (which are about an eighth of those of the bazaar) is of equal importance, the reason being that tea, sugar and tobacco are the only luxuries indulged in by 95 per cent. of the population of Persia, whether settled or nomadic. And of such staple importance are the former two rated that they will be bought at any price, even before food and clothes. A hungry pauper would rather a drink of tea than a meal. This fact has to be accepted and no purpose is served in trying to wean them from their prejudices. Means must be found for the tribes to get their fair share of these monopoly goods without having to buy at exorbitant black-market rates if much

misery, poverty and increase in robbery are to be avoided. Large stocks are available in Shiraz and the means of distribution is at hand in the numerous empty lorries which go out to collect wheat and rice for the Kharbar. None has been given to Qashgai this year, but some has been promised for the "Nauruz."

It is safe for an accredited Englishman to go anywhere in Kashkuli or Darrashuri provided warning is given, as the Boir Ahmedi do not raid here in winter, when the Qashgai are present. An armed escort is hardly necessary. But it would be out of the question for a Persian officer, soldier, gendarme or official to do so, and a keen watch is kept against strangers who may enter their land.

(c) *Settled Tribes.*—The Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri, Bavi, Mamassani and Doshman Ziari constitute in that order a continuous block of tribes settled within the last few generations and extending from South-East Kuhgalu to the western borders of Shiraz. Their lands include the fertile north-east fringe of the garmsir and pass into the Sarhad in their northern and eastern confines. A few families only of Bavi, Rustami and Bakesh and the greater part of Javidi move up in summer with their flocks and this is at the most only a few days' journey. To the north are the valleys and amphitheatres hemmed in by formidable crags which keep the Boir Ahmedi flocks alive in summer; and to the north-east the summer hills of Kashkuli. To the south are the deeply-cut "gach" hills of Mahur, which are the winter quarters of Kashkuli and Darrashuri, the latter being contiguous; whilst for the last few winters the Rustami have anxiously harboured the Qaid Qivi Boir Ahmedi, and the Bavi the more peaceful Tir Taji Boir Ahmedi.

Twice yearly in their migrations to and from Semirum the Darrashuri must pass eastwards through Bakesh and Doshman Ziari or Javidi before they turn north; whilst the Kashkuli, after Dastarjan, follow a northerly route which passes through the south-east corner of Doshman Ziari to their hills north of Ardekan.

The Bavi and Mamassani view with comprehensible alarm the growing power of Qashgai and Boir Ahmedi and the loose but formidable alliance between the two. Although not so long ago the Mamassani themselves were wild, lawless and renowned above others for their bravery, they are now settled peasants, who have, however, retained their tribal organisation, jealous and proud of their richly watered lands, and prepared to die, to the last warrior if needs be, in their defence. The immovable nature of their wealth inclines them naturally to the side of law and of order and of government. But they point out cynically how little is to be gained from supporting it, having in mind the unfavourable settlement of their vexed land question (reference Appendix "E") and viewing the success of those who, employing force, are able to rearm and build up their strength and will soon achieve their ends from the inability of the Government to oppose them. However, they have recently been given rifles by the Government (probably safer in their hands) and can muster about 1,500 tofangchis; and at the first sound of an alarm they run forth, all sections united, bravely to the scene of battle. This was enacted three autumns ago, when Boir Ahmedi, then lightly armed, pillaged and burnt the Rustami villages and were beaten back by Mamassani near Fehlian, and again a few days before the officer commanding's return to Shiraz, when they joined with Mohammad Hussein Taheri in battle against the notorious Ali and Vali Izad Paneh (Qaid Qivi) who, among other wrongs, had ransacked Tal-i-Surneh, a Rustami village. Although the burning of the grasses as autumn draws near is a recognised practice to enrich the soil, yet this summer the Khans of Bavi and Rustam, alarmed by the impending arrival of Boir Ahmedi and Darrashuri, flushed with the spoils of Semirum, contrived to burn a somewhat larger area and more thoroughly than hitherto. This had the planned effect of speeding Darrashuri through their lands and of keeping them out of the long Deh Nau valley of Rustami, and has driven their camps into the barren and uncultivated southern wastes of Bavi. But it seems to have had little effect on Qaid Qivi who, being robbers, depend less on their own flocks. Some bad blood has arisen from this measure, the Darrashuri alleging that they had done nothing to provoke it, and that their flocks have been put to some hardship, as dried grasses are their sole food until the green grass carpets the land in January.

Young Malek Mansur, of Bavi, is doing his utmost to get arms to defend his lands and will go to any length in telling lies and discrediting his neighbours (other than his allies, the Mamassani) to this end. His efforts have been unsuccessful. Many of his peasants, though of brave Kuhgalu stock, are clearly degenerating from the insidious and cumulative poisons of malaria, bred in the rice fields which line their valleys and supply their food and wealth. On the other hand, the tougher Mamassani, although equally riddled with the disease, seem to have lost little of their ancient courage.



The Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri, settled east of Behbahan under Muzaffer Khan, are still holding out against the octopoid encroachments of Abdullah Zarghampur, victor of Semirum, Kalantar of Boir Ahmedi Sarhad (Lower) and self-styled Ilkhani of Kuhgalu, who already controls the fertile district and tribe of Cheram and much of Taibi Garmsiri to the north and has virtually annexed Dil, one of Muzaffer's villages. These settled Boir Ahmedi, aided by Government rifles, are tough people and may yet fight against odds before losing their lands. They have been joined by Khosrow and Kalb Ali, two of Abdullah's brothers, who have quarrelled with him, and live in the full blast of a "war of nerves" conducted by Abdullah. Added to the effects of this year's malaria, the worst on record, the Garmsir was smitten this summer by a terrible plague termed "Ranj," which, attacking the horses and mules, spared few of their lives. The donkeys, however, were but lightly afflicted. This has seriously weakened them as against the nomads who passed through at the end, their animals escaping infection. The stables of the nomadic Javidi, however, were also free from the disease.

Although Mohammad Hussein Taheri has given an assurance to his friend Hussein Quli Rustam that he will not rob the latter's villages—the condition under which he winters in Rustami—yet it is quite unsafe to travel in northern Mamassani without an adequate escort, which should not be let out of one's sight, nor that of one's baggage, and quite out of the question to proceed after dark; nor would any armed guard consent to accompany one after nightfall. The reason is that Qaid Qivi Boir Ahmedi are a bold, undisciplined crowd and, although their chiefs and Kadkhudas can prevent major raiding sorties, for the planning of which they are themselves responsible, they are unable to curb completely the propensities of their lusty youths for minor robbery and would become highly unpopular and impoverish the tribe if they succeeded in doing so. The state of insecurity is reflected in Rustami villages, each of which nestles round a mound capped by a mud tower on which a tofangchi look-out is ever posted; whilst at night armed guards patrol the perimeter and give vent to frequent false alarms, shots ringing out at intervals until the dawn. In Bavi the Tir Taji Boir Ahmedi are more concerned with their vast flocks and camels and little inclined to rob. However, a guard is still advisable, on account of loose outlaw elements within the Bavi tribe itself, who are in opposition to the Kalantar and given to preying on solitary travellers, small caravans, and on the villages of the more peaceful sections of the tribe. In Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri security is probably worse in winter than in the preceding areas, from the northern proximity of the Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi (lower).

There remains, lastly, the settled "buluk" of Khisht, occupying a roughly triangular plain (altitude 2,000 feet) bounded by the Bushire road to the east, the Kuh Takan range to the south-west and by low rugged hills to the north, it is richly watered by the considerable stream of the Shahpur River, which flows from east to west near the northern foothills. A network of untidy canals traverses the plain and waters date plantations and paddy fields. Wheat, barley, tobacco and cotton are also grown. The many villages would be richer were it not for the insecurity of the area, occasioned largely by its own inhabitants, partly by Abulvardi Kashkuli, and for the ghastly tolls of malaria, trachoma and other diseases. Nor is the hot climate of summer conducive to work. The Abulvardi Kashkuli camp under the northern hills up to the road, but do not extend south of the river. Jehangir Khan Kashkuli, who, however, owns none of the land or villages, has taken upon himself the security of the area, which doubtless he covets, and has posted his tofangchis at the motorable village of Khisht, for which he is said to be levying taxes. Much of the property is owned by Hikmat, Hishmat al Mamalik of Shiraz.

The inhabitants of mixed Persian and Lur stock are brave, fierce and well armed and speak Farsi mingled with some Luri. They live in miserable palm huts and mud hovels where they are tormented by flies and mosquitoes. The Kashkuli tribute them with being good shots at long range, but state that they are inferior to themselves in close fighting. Although security is said to have improved, robbery and the clashes of small armed bands still give rise to shots in the plantations at night. These and the incessant howling of jackals are sufficient to deter most travellers after dark, and the Kadkhudas will not sanction their movement or risk escorts in their favour.

#### *Public Relations and Propaganda Value.*

From reports received by A.L.O., Ahwaz, and Gach Saran it would appear that the goodwill value of the tour was considerable. Some of the Khans, besides being gratified by the treatment, remarked that they were even more pleased

that an Englishman should be willing to live as they do and take an interest in their families, their history and their way of living. The officer commanding was forcibly struck by the genuine and friendly attitude of Kashkuli and Darrashuri Khans, by the extent of the gratitude shown by the tribes and by the welcome he received on his return to Mamassani. Living in close proximity to the A.I.O.C. workings at Gach Saran for which they supply part and full-time employees, Kashkuli and Darrashuri have had ample opportunities to get to know the British, and have found the association profitable. Even now the company are negotiating with them for the purchase of many head of sheep in exchange for the much-needed tea, sugar and cloth. Moreover, there are traditions of co-operation with the British against the Saulat-ud-Dauleh in the Great War; and the South Persia Rifles, in which a number of tribesmen (mostly Qashgai) enlisted, is still spoken of with respect and held up as an example of British justice and good rule.

It is likely that these powerful and semi-independent sections of Qashgai exercise a moderating influence on any elements within the tribe that might desire to oppose the British. However, they themselves were not unsubjected to, nor unaffected by, insidious anti-British propaganda, and the following summary of the Qashgai attitude towards us during the past few years would apply equally well to many other tribes of Persia that the officer commanding has visited.

Tribal policy is largely determined by fear, hatred and suspicion of the Central Government, based on past persecutions, and by a desire to strengthen themselves against a future reassertion of its power. With the fall of Reza Shah they shared in the short-lived hopes that a new dynasty and a more capable and sympathetic Government would arise, whilst punishment would overtake their late oppressors. At this time the majority would probably have flocked to serve us as being their liberators from a cruel and selfish tyrant. But when they found that we had not come to reorganise the country or interfere in its internal affairs, and that we were supporting the son of Pahlevi and the Central Government, and when they saw the same corrupt clique continue in office and the cloth and food situation deteriorate, hope turned to disappointment, and anti-British propaganda, aided by British reverses at arms, found a fertile medium in which to take root. The old stories that we had been behind the policy of Reza Shah (*vide* Report No. 4) were resurrected and found favour among them. It is only with the changing fortunes of war, the confounding of enemy prophecies and an ultimate realisation that we have done them no harm that their feelings have recently begun to swing back in our favour. Nevertheless, friendly though they may be, they are unlikely to repose their full confidence in us so long as we are associated with a Government they despise. They know now that the Allies are the masters of the war, and that the ultimate fate of their country and themselves rests partly in our hands, and hope that our influence may be used to prevent their future oppression or to give them the benefits of a semi-independence. They assure one that they are now satisfied that the accusations made against us were quite unjust. However, one is still asked why we didn't exterminate the Pahlevi dynasty and supplant it by another as though in token of our goodwill towards the people of Persia. The same remark was addressed by a Boir Ahmedi Kadkhoda with the prefix: "The Boir Ahmedi want to know why . . ." It was replied that it isn't the custom of the British to indulge in unnecessary bloodshed, and that in England the sins of the father are not visited on the sons.

They express admiration for the way we have turned the war in our favour, and sum up their feelings in a remark heard several times that "the British know well how to manage these things." The Kashkuli are keen to explain that the recent Qashgai activities were directed against the Government and not against ourselves, as also to point out that the Germans are now with Boir Ahmedi and no longer with the Qashgai tribe. In excuse for the past they explain Nasir Khan's anxiety for his two brothers who were in Germany and his fear of inciting reprisals against them. However, no bitterness is expressed against Germany other than an occasional "Give us arms and we will fight with you against them."

On the other hand, hatred of the Russians is intense, and, though much of this is likely to have been inspired by propaganda, a knowledge of the ruthless cruelty attending the settlement of the Turkoman tribes is probably another causal factor. With regard to the rank and file, it must be remembered that they are 99 per cent. illiterate and in extreme ignorance of outside affairs. Their opinions are largely moulded by elders or "Rish-Safids" (literally "white-beards"), who, if they have a smattering of letters, are given the additional title of Mullah. They are rich in local experience and tribal lore, and often exercise



a moderating influence, although there are trouble-makers among them. They should be treated with the respect due to their age and which is given them by the Khans and Kadkhudas, and are a mine of information which is not, however, always accurate unless it pertains to family trees.

The Mamassani and Bavi look to the British for protection against their enemies, and, like the Armenians, are apt to resent our helping anyone else.

The Boir Ahmedi were very appreciative of treatment, hospitable and behaved reasonably well. Soon after arriving in their camps one is invited to a rifle contest in the presence of a large and critical audience. If successful in hitting the mark their respect is soon won and one is taken without further question into their circle.

Cordial relations are being maintained with Dr. Hikmat, Director of Public Health for Fars, and information is exchanged about conditions in the areas visited about which he seems to know little.

#### Medical.

(a) *Prevailing Diseases.*—The health of Fars last summer and autumn was undermined by an unusually severe epidemic of malaria, accompanied by an almost complete lack of quinine and atabrin to cope with the cases. As was to be expected, mortality was high. Among the factors probably responsible were (i) the unusually heavy rainfall during the winter 1942-43 (17½ inches in Shiraz), which kept nourished water courses normally dry in summer, extended the swamp areas and allowed of a more extensive cultivation of rice, (ii) the mild autumn weather and late rainfall (mosquitoes were active and attacking furiously in Mamassani and Bavi in the third week of December, and fresh cases were still occurring), and (iii) the tendency towards increased rice cultivation which has shown itself since the fall of Reza Shah, who, for selfish motives, tried unsuccessfully to limit it to his Crown lands in Gilan and Mazandaran in order that he might gain a monopoly. Although the paddy field areas (where *An. elutus* appears to be the principal vector) suffered most, a high incidence was also met with in villages such as Naugak, which are situated near a pebbly watercourse, and where an almost 100 per cent. infection was encountered. The only vector identified, and that in large numbers, was *An. superpictus*, the commonest vector in the mountain and submontane areas of Iraq and Western Persia.

Although their Sarhad is said to be largely free from malaria and the aridity of Mahur in the south, apart from a few brackish swamps, precludes any large-scale anopheline breeding, yet the Kashguli became heavily infected (about 70 per cent.) in the course of their downward migration. They say this took place at Shahpur, a highly malarious riverine and rice-growing area where they camp before dispersing to their winter quarters whilst tarrying in commerce with the merchants of Kazerun. By coming down earlier than is their normal habit, they arrived in what was probably the height of the season instead of near the end as in normal years.

The Darrashuri were only lightly infected as they passed swiftly through the fever-ridden belt of Mamassani, whilst the Boir Ahmedi, who arrived much later and remained in the area, caught the tail end of the epidemic and were about 30 per cent. infected. Mortality from malaria was high in Mamassani, Bavi and Boir Ahmedi, Garmsiri and at Khisht, and the after-effects and complications of the disease will continue to levy their toll during the cold winter months. Hardly a day passes in Fehlian without the tremulous wails of the women which proclaim the passing of a body through the village.

Some of the children are a pitiful sight, barefoot, clad in tattered rags, their teeth chattering and spleen-filled bellies protruding, yellow and emaciated at a time when their resistance needs to be strongest to withstand the winter epidemics to which they are exposed. The chief complaints of the adults are intractable fever, intense headaches and lack of energy, with which nephritis with dropsy and pneumonia or broncho-pneumonia are commonly associated. It is not surprising that a doctor with a box of quinine and aspirin is regarded as something in the nature of a saviour by the afflicted inhabitants, who start quarrelling among themselves for his attentions, and view with alarm the diminishing quinine, which has to be more or less rationed for each village. It is the policy to give thorough treatment to a limited number of persons rather than attempt to appease all with insufficient tablets to effect a cure.

Other epidemics encountered were (i) smallpox among children throughout Kashkuli, with a high percentage of eye complications and much permanent damage to the sight, (ii) typhoid and infective jaundice in a section of Darrashuri,

and (iii) whooping cough in Basht. No typhus was seen, but a few odd cases were suspected. Tuberculosis is not uncommon among nomad and villager alike, and routine examination with X-ray would probably reveal a percentage approaching 5 per cent. This is not surprising in the light of the high incidence of chronic bronchitis and the habit of spitting indiscriminately on the walls and floors of confined spaces which is indulged in by every villager. Scabies is exceptionally widespread throughout the area and results from the indiscriminate use of other people's bedding which is never cleaned and the rarity of washing. Lice are almost equally prevalent. Venereal disease is almost unknown in Qashgai, Darrashuri and Boir Ahmedi, but is just starting in Mamassani. Some cases were also seen in Khisht. Among injuries hideous ulcers reaching to the bone and initiated by thorns and dog bites are common among the nomadic tribes, and three cases were seen of the right eye destroyed by the bursting breach of an ancient rifle. Many Qashgai are still nursing the battle wounds of last summer, while ancient gunshot scars and sinuses are common in Mamassani and at Khisht.

(b) *Local Medical Facilities.*—It might almost be said that these amount to nil. There are Government and private doctors at Kazerun and an ill-supplied Government doctor at Behbahan. Cases requiring hospital treatment must find their way to Shiraz. At Maliki, in Mamassani, there has been for several years a very poorly qualified Government doctor. But the complete lack of quinine, atabrin and other essential drugs from which he has been suffering for many months makes him an unfortunate object of ridicule. The A.I.O.C. doctor at Gach Saran is willing to treat neighbouring tribesmen, but is only allowed to give medicine to those who are employed by the company. In exceptional and deserving cases the company arranges accommodation in its hospitals at Abadan or Masjid-i-Suleiman for tribal chiefs or members of their families.

(c) *Supply of Drugs.*—Additional quinine and atabrin over and above normal rates of consumption should have been supplied to Government medical services in Shiraz from Tehran to cope with this year's epidemic, but this does not appear to have been done. An attempt is about to be made to bring down the prices of the chemists in Shiraz by the establishment of a Government pharmacy which will sell at Government rates.

A. GARROD, Captain, R.A.M.C.,  
O.C., 12th Ind. Div. Mob. Dispensary.

February 1944.

#### Appendix.

##### Notes on Boir Ahmedi.

(i) *Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi.* Strength about 7,000 families.

##### 1. Distribution.

Sarhad and Garmsir more or less adjacent, being partly separated in the south-west by the narrow strip of Cheram and Doshman Ziari Kuchek and in the south by the Sarhad of Bavi and Rustam.

(a) *Sarhad.*—Roughly trapezoid in shape, with the following boundaries apt to vary with the fortunes of the tribe and incapable of accurate definition.

*North-East.*—From north-west to south-east Kuh-i-Dinar range, Kuh-i-Kakun and Kumehr, forming boundary with Qashgai Sarhad.

*North.*—From north-west extremity of Kuh-i-Dinar range running convexly westwards well north of Pataweh, Maregun and Burj-i-Chin to upper reaches of Marun River near Qaleh Gulab.

An obscure and exceedingly mountainous boundary merging into unexplored lands which used to be occupied by the Noui tribe and beyond which lie the Bakhtiari Kiamerai tribes to the north and the Taibi Sarhad to the north-west. Bakhtiari has spread southwards into Noui territory and now adjoins Boir Ahmedi.

*South-West.*—Kuh-i-Siah extending south-east into the Chaslekh range and the upper reaches of the Khairabad River. Contiguous with Doshman Ziari Kuchek in north-west, Cheram in centre and Bavi in south-east.



*South.*—An irregular line which follows upper reaches of Khairabad River from Shah Bahram to a point north of Kuh-i-Elburz, whence it turns east, running through Kuh-i-Zardward north of Tang-i-Tamuradi (B/06) and Sargah Chinen to edge of Kuhmehr district of Kashkuli. Contiguous first with Bavi then with Rustami Sarhads. There has been a tendency during the last three years for Boir Ahmedi to push the boundary south at the expense of Rustami, so that the whole Tang-i-Tamuradi, Kuwaishk and the Sargah Chinen villages are now in the hands of Qaid Qivi. The northern Bavi lands are also threatened. Abdullah Zarghampur has his summer headquarters at Chenar, Mohammed Hussein at or near Tal-i-Khosrovi, and Qaid Nasir Tamuradi at Pataweh.

The above territory includes some of the most difficult, mountainous and least explored parts of Persia, especially towards its north-west confines. Its nature is briefly described by A. V. Harrison, who has traversed parts of it, in an article entitled "Some Routes in Southern Iran" (*Journal of R.G.S.*, April or May, 1942), and in Route 63 (Bell), *Routes in Persia*, Vol. III, 1910 (G.S., India). It is well-wooded and contains a large number of cultivated and well-watered villages around Tal-i-Khosrovi and Sisakht in the east, in Tamuradi country to the north and round Safariab in the west. As a general rule it may be said that the "upper" section occupies the south and south-east, and the "lower" the north and north-west of the area.

(b) *Garmsir.*—Boundaries more variable than those of Sarhad. Falls into two areas: (i) North-east of Behbahan, bounded by Marun River to north and east bordering Taibi Garmsiri, by Kuh-i-Kaviz to south-west bordering settled Behbahan district, and by Khairabad River to south bordering Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri. To north-east more or less contiguous with south-west border of Sarhad, the intervening settled strip of Cheram and Doshman Ziari Kuchek being overrun by the tribe as also sometimes the Taibi Garmsiri to the north-west. This area is occupied by the "lower" section, whose Kalantar Abdullah Zarghampur has his winter headquarters at Qaleh Pilli. Those lands not in possession of the above-mentioned tribe are owned by Boir Ahmedi. (ii) Basht Valley, Bardangan area and Rustami from Talispid to Kupun. These lands do not belong to the tribe, but are now occupied by the "upper" section, Mohammed Hussein Taheri establishing his winter quarters near Kupun. Until a few years ago they wintered near Gach Saran and Behbahan. A section of Qaid Qivi remains in Tang-i-Tamuradi or its slopes during winter and summer, the Kadkhuda living in an almost inaccessible eyrie.

## 2. Migration.

The Boir Ahmedi Sarhad is the last of the tribes to move down and the first to move up, remaining from late November until about mid-March in the Garmsir. The Qaid Qivi have the shortest route, the Tamuradi and Aghai the longest. Qaid Qivi and Tir Taji follow the Nauguk Valley and Tang-i-Tamuradi, the Tamuradi the route Qaleh Gul or Qalah Kalat, Marun River, Qaleh Chin to Sagaweh and Pataweh. Other sections either follow these or other more difficult trails through the Khairabad basin, or via Safariab and Sa'adat.

## 3. Sub-divisions.

A list of sub-sections with their present habitats and allegiance (December 1943) is given in section (c) of this appendix. There has been a strong tendency during the past year for sections of the "upper" to transfer to Abdullah Zarghampur, who has also seized some of the "upper" villages. Thus Mohammed Hussein Taheri is now left with only Tir Taji, the greater half of Qaid Qivi, the small Sa'adat Murderazi (which follows Tir Taji) and an insignificant section of Aghai and of the Aulad Mirzali section of Dasht-i-Mauri. These together with his villages in the Sarhad amount to little over 1,000 families, as against the 6,000 which Zarghampur can command.

The Qaid Qivi are universally acknowledged to be the bravest, most warlike, most intelligent and least disciplined, but are much split by quarrels and blood feuds between the rival Kadkhudas. The Tir Taji are relatively peaceful and concerned more with the protection of their vast flocks against other sections of the tribe than with robbery. They are the only Boir Ahmedi who keep camels.

The Tamuradi is the largest, most inaccessible and most powerful section and is in a position of semi-independence. Jalil and Babakani are savage and lawless but not so brave as Qaid Qivi. The Aghai and Farsi sections took part in recent raids on Kashkuli and on Bandar Dilam respectively. The Zangawari are closely associated with the Dasht-i-Mauri and are noted within the tribe for the beauty of their women. The Sa'adat sections claim Arab descent, are mostly settled and

are sayids. There are a few Ali-Ullahis and Bahars among the Sa'adat-i-Bahmahmid. The activities of the settled Sisakhtis who under Mullah Qubad were once the scourge of the Qumshah, Abadeh and Abarquh-Yezd areas, are well-known and have been recorded in Christian's *Tribes of Fars*. Under the many sons of the late Mullah they have resumed their former habits and are reputed to have raided near Nain and Yezd this summer.

## 4. Character and Habits.

The Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi are still living in the "heroic age" and are becoming an interesting though highly-dangerous anachronism. Unless their growing power can be ruthlessly curbed the security and peaceful development of a large part of South-West Persia will be jeopardised as it has been intermittently throughout the present century.

Their resurgence is directly attributable to the weakness of Government rule and the longer they are allowed to expand their power and increase their arms the more difficult will be their ultimate defeat. Pressure can most easily be brought to bear on them from Tal-i-Khosrovi and in the more accessible Garmsir country, where their downward migration could be forestalled by a powerful force. They are universally acknowledged by their enemies and by Qashgai to be the bravest, toughest and most ruthless fighters in Southern Persia, and on their own summer ground can outmanoeuvre any attacking force. These qualities, added to their general untrustworthiness and inaccessibility, have made them the terror of their neighbours and the scourge of settled areas up to 150 miles from their strongholds. Their mobility, though on foot, rivals that of the mounted Turkomans, whose depredations during the last century extended from the shores of the Caspian and Atrak valleys to the confines of Isfahan. However, like all tribes in whom the predatory instinct is highly developed, their energies are frequently dissipated in internal feuds; but these are soon submerged when the tribe as a whole is threatened from without and it is possible in normal times for a powerful leader to unite most sections so long as the prospect of sufficient loot can be held before them. Travelling fast over little-used tracks in well-armed bands of about 300 strong, of whom most are on foot, he covers immense distances and is often away with his booty before a general alarm can be raised. When near the scene of his quarry he may lie up in some unfrequented spot during the day protected by sentries whilst others survey the lie of the land. He is usually able to fight his way through should opposition be met and is successful in disarming outposts of gendarmes. His raids are carefully planned and usually avoid Qashgai country when the latter are there. Thus the settled villages of Mahur, Liravi, Zaidan and Behbahan are raided after the harvest in summer, whilst the Abadeh, Qumisheh and Abarquh-Yezd areas are disturbed most often in spring and autumn before and after the interposition of Qashgai between them and their quarry. Whilst in frequent conflict with Mamassani he holds these ancient enemies, when armed, in respect and will only tackle them in great strength. In the absence of a rifle he will fight with club or axe (as at Semirum) and has little compunction in seizing the arms of his allies in the general confusion of battle. Such is his vanity that he will sometimes claim that his raiding casualties were killed by his own people rather than grant the honour to his opponents. He shows scant consideration to his own wounded, even if it be a brother, and would rather return with spoil than be encumbered by a disabled friend. The womenfolk instil the love of raiding and war into their sons at an early age and are said in Qaid Qivi to whisper into the ear of the new-born child that he is born to die in battle. Their greed is a frequent motivating force behind the raids, it being said that they may refuse to cohabit with their husbands should the latter return empty-handed. It is interesting that in recent raids on Neza and Baba Munir (Kashkuli Garmsir) the women were all stripped of their outer clothing. Nevertheless he is reputed to be a respecter of women and to curb his ferocity in their presence. A raided village is a pitiful scene for several years to come. Everything is seized from the new-born lamb to the lamest ass, from the last grain of stored wheat to the innermost male garment. If resistance is offered the village is likely to be burned, and the Deh-Nau Valley of Rustami is a tragic and bitter testimony to repeated Boir Ahmedi depredations, the villages having ceased to build houses, dwelling in reed huts which can be easily replaced. What booty cannot be fairly divided between the robbers is given as a peace-offering to the Sayids. Kadkhudas are made or broken by their skill and resourcefulness in leading raiding bands and thereby enriching the tents of their followers.

In appearance, judging from Qaid Qivi and Tir Taji, the Boir Ahmedi is superior to the average Lur, and shows a great variety of types in all of which



great muscular development predominates. Medium-tall men, fine features and fairish hair, eyes and skin are very common in Qaid Qivi, but a broad, stocky and swarthier type is said to be more typical of the tribe as a whole. He speaks a Luri dialect which is little removed from Bakhtiari. In dress he differs only slightly from his neighbours of Fars, wearing the long and often colourful robe of Qashgai, a brown felt "Kolah" and socks or puttees under short loose trousers, with strong givehs or sandals on his feet. Over all is a massive and heavily-stocked bandolier and a large kummerbund in which an assortment of knives or a pistol are stuck. He never lets his rifle out of his hand for fear his brother or a friend will seize it, and quarrelling over arms with frequent bloodshed is a common source of strife and the beginning of many a blood-feud. In the absence of a rifle, a long stick with a club end weighted with metal is carried. The women are boisterous and a picture of rustic health, and dress in all the finery of stolen jewellery and brocades. Polygamy both among the Khans and in the rank and file is more common than in any other tribe I have met and results in enormous families. Death being common, men often marry the wives of their deceased brothers and complicated relationships are set up. A man's success depends largely on the number of his sons and some families can put no mean force in the field. Thus a tribesman of Aulad-i-Mahmun is reported to have seventeen sons each armed with a rifle. The big families may account for the uniformly large size of Boir Ahmedi tents which would be considered those of Khans in other tribes, and also for the frequent quarrels between half-brothers which reflect the bitter struggle for existence; and this should be kept in mind when assessing the number of souls or fighting strength from the number of tents, the usual computation of five per family or tent being too low.

They suffer little from sickness and are callous towards their weaklings, desiring the death of an emaciated infant rather than it should be assisted to survive. They attribute their health and strength to the eating of acorn bread and on being asked whether they suffer much from trachoma a Kadkhuda replied, "No, we should perish if we had trachoma." However, malaria is said to be rampant in the settled villages around Tal-i-Khosrow where well-watered maize fields abound.

I was lucky to be present shortly after the marriage of Mohammed Hussein's sister to his cousin Nasir. The festivities were marked by animated dancing and music, in which both the tribal "raqs" and the "Tarkeh Bazi" or stick dance were performed. Though very similar to the dances of Luristan and Bakhtiari, yet both are worthy of being recorded for the small differences they may display. The former took place round a cairn of stones which supports a bonfire at night. The musicians (trumpets and drum) stood at one side of the circle of dancers who faced towards the centre, the women occupying one arc, the men the other, in all about fifty at a time. The women, adorned in their finest silks, held a coloured handkerchief in either hand which they waved alternately above the head in time with the music and the movements of their feet which were two small hops on each foot in turn with a gentle swaying of the waist and a slow progression to the right. The movements of the men were no different except that instead of handkerchiefs they carried a rifle at the "port-arms" with the butt resting on the kummerbund. All looked intently and proudly to the front whilst a united "Kel" or high-pitched tremulous wail of the women or the discharge of a rifle burst through the music at intervals. The dance continued for over an hour during which they entered or left the circle at will, seldom dancing for more than a few minutes at a time. The stick dance was performed to a special tune and grew wilder as successive champions entered the ring. One carries a defensive pole about six feet long, the other a shorter cane with which to attack. The prelude is a double hopping forward stride in which one precedes the other in a circle to the rhythm of the music, each holding his weapon in gondolier style. As the tempo and drumming increases they take up a facing position, the aim of the holder of the cane being to confuse his opponent by feints and the ferocity of his stare and finally to strike him as savagely as he can anywhere below the waist whilst he wards off the blow with the pole. The game is decided on from one to three rounds, after which the competitors change places. The women form a vocal background.

Funeral ceremonies in which all take part are reserved for "lion-men" and those who die in battle, and their principal feature is the parading of a finely caparisoned horse on which the dead man's accoutrements are placed. Death from assassination or other causes is not usually deemed worthy of a fine funeral, human life being held of little worth and a fighting death the greatest glory. Economically their life is similar to that of other nomads except that

nature has favoured them with less than their neighbours to the East. Their mountainous Sarhad is little suited to agricultural activities and as much of their garmsir is in other hands they are therefore unable to cultivate it, which probably accounts for the shorter time they spend there. They are largely dependent on acorn-bread supplemented by what grain or maize they grow in the Sarhad and what they can plunder. Wild berries, nuts, fruits and rice complete the vegetable part of their diet, the latter being bought from the garmsir tribes in exchange for roghan, sheep, hides, wool and rugs. Gums are collected and charcoal extracted in the forests and these with other produce are traded at Ardekan or Behbahan, their principal market centres, and to a lesser extent Iqlid. Their rugs are coarse, of simple and gay design, and bright vegetable colours. They also weave tent-cloth of goat's hair and "Khurba" or rough woollen bags for carrying grain. Horses are few and ill-adapted to the terrain, donkeys and mules being used for the transport of their produce and household goods. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, robbery if over-indulged in breeds laziness, and this in its turn leads to a neglect of agriculture and eventual poverty. This factor, combined with that of the general lack of security of sections among themselves, which have been in operation during the present century, have probably led to a decrease in the area under cultivation. Bell, about forty years ago, mentioned the rich cultivation and well-watered valleys of the Sarhad, and the Rais-ut-Tujjar of Behbahan speaks of the greater prosperity and increased acreage under cultivation throughout Kuhgali early in the century. It is probable therefore that much of the acorn-eating is due to neglected opportunities, and that with good and strong Government the tribe could be made self-supporting and eventually settled in the Sarhad. The visit of an irrigation or agricultural expert to the Sarhad would be necessary to determine this point. The settled villages are self-supporting and produce maize, corn, dried fruits and nuts which are bartered with the nomads or marketed at Ardekan, a share being taken by the Khans in taxes.

#### (ii) Boir Ahmedi Garmsiri. Strength 700 families.

##### 1. Distribution.

A triangular area, East of Behbahan, bounded as follows:—

*North-West.*—Khairabad River from Khairabad to Nazkun.

*East.*—From Nazkun, passing east of Aspar and Dil to Kuh-i-Dil, thence to main Du Gunbardan-Behbahan road at about Chaha.

*South-West.*—Main Du Gunbardan-Behbahan road from Chaha to Khairabad, inclusive of Lishtar.

2. They are harassed by malaria and threatened by the Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi. All are permanently settled and grow rice, wheat, barley, linseed and tobacco. Muzaffer, their Kalantar, lives at Ard fort and is at enmity with Zargham, son of Nasrullah, who lives at Dil and is in league with Abdullah Zarghampur. Nasrullah is mentally afflicted and has ceased to play an active rôle.

#### Notes on Qashgai.

These notes cover only the Kashkuli and Darrashuri "tirehs" and deal principally with facts that have not been recorded or fully recorded in the official publications. Therefore they lack continuity in the historical section on Kashkuli. As I have not visited the Sarhad areas my information about them is necessarily scanty.

##### 1. Kashkuli.

*History.*—Known history dates from the late 18th century. Hussein Agha Zend, with his sons Hassan Agha and Mohammed Agha, accompanied the great Kerim Khan Zand to Shiraz from the Kermanshah area. A daughter of Hussein Agha married Jani Khan Qashgai, the first Ilkhani, and the latter gave the Kalantarship of Kashkuli to the sons of Hassan and Mohammed, dividing it into three parts: (i) Kashkuli Buzurg, under Ghassem Khan, son of Hassan Agha; (ii) Kashkuli Kirmani (or Kuchek) under Haji Abbas Ali Khan, son of Mohammed Agha; and (iii) Kashkuli Gharrachi, under Haji Fazali Beg, second son of Mohammed Agha. These divisions under the descendants of the above-mentioned Khans remain to-day, and the "Lak" section of Kashguli Buzurg are the descendants of the Zend followers who accompanied the Aghas. The Kashkuli claim that Ghassem Khan was appointed Ilkhani for eight months by Manuchehr Khan, Vizier of Fars, prior to Jani Khan.



Previous to Ghassem Khan the garmsir of Kashkuli Buzurg and Gharrachi was well east of the present Shiraz-Bushire road near where that of Kashkuli Kirmani still is. He found them new winter quarters in Mahur-i-Mehlatun, in the course of which Mamassani and Khisht were dispossessed of a barren part of their lands, the former inhabited by the now almost extinct Mohammed Saleh section of Mamassani. Thus Baba Munir (A/9715) and Noghan are still peopled by Mohammed Saleh remnants, whilst the population of Mal-i-Shaikh (G/0679) are Khishtis. In 1922 the unscrupulous Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar (Bushiri) produced ancient evidence to show that the Bikarz hills, where the A.P.O.C. was working, were once inhabited by Mohammed Saleh tribesmen and therefore belonged to Mamassani, and claimed shares in the company undertaking.

The numbers of Kashkuli have shrunk considerably. Thus the Gharrachi are said to have been 5,000 families as against the 500 of to-day. The Kashkuli Buzurg have seldom quarrelled with Mamassani or their neighbours to the north, although Mohammed Ali Khan was sent by the Saulat-ud-Dauleh to inflict punishment on the Mamassani in 1910 for their depredations on the Shiraz-Bushire road. But there was a tendency before the Great War for territorial aggrandisement to the south-east, at the expense of the Kumarij, Khisht and Mazara'eh "buluks," and to gain control of Kazerun and the adjacent sections of the Shiraz-Bushire road.

In 1921 certain Kashkuli Khans (including Ilyas and Fathullah), encouraged by Hadi Khan, signed an agreement with the A.P.O.C. over the Bikarz workings, by which they were paid for provision of guards and the use of the land. But the jealous Saulat-ud-Dauleh, out for revenge against the tribe for their participation in his defeat in 1918, and with the support of his newly-won friend the Minister of War, stirred up the Central Government to upset the agreement and signed another himself with the company. This was broken in 1923 by Ghulam Husain and Isfandiar Khans Kashkuli, the Saulat-ud-Dauleh's unpopular puppet Kalantars with little support in the tribe, who, acting on his orders, incited an attack on A.P.O.C. officials by the guards. The Saulat-ud-Dauleh continued his oppression, detaining Ilyas, Jehangir and other Anglophil Khans, and the tribe became impoverished and its power broken.

*Strength.*—A little over 3,500 families made up as follows:—

1. Kashkuli Buzurg	...	...	2,000	} not visited by me.
2. Kashkuli Kirmani (or Kuchek)	...	...	1,000	
3. Kashkuli Gharrachi	...	...	500	

*Tribesmen.*—Industrious, on the whole peaceful, and enjoy a higher standard of living than other tribes. The large Abulvardi section under Mullah Fathullah and the Bagdeli are wilder and more predatory, "guarding" and robbing the Khisht Kamarij frontier and that section of the Bushire road. Monogamy is universal and venereal disease and opium smoking apparently unknown. Physically tallish, wiry, dark-skinned and hawk-nosed. Dress same as other Qashgai. Complete return to tribal dress.

*Arms, &c.*—Appear to be fairly well armed, but including a large proportion of ancient weapons. The money of the Khans is largely spent in buying arms. The Kashkuli is essentially an infantryman, but they can muster about 400 sowars. His fighting qualities are reputed to be good but nothing outstanding. The warlike spirit appears stronger among Jehangir's than among Ilyas's following. Owing to their wide dispersion, difficult communications, limited pastures and scattered supplies, it would be extremely difficult for the tribe to concentrate a force in their garmsir, and one could only be maintained at the expense of more fertile neighbouring areas (e.g., Khisht, Mamassani).

*Agriculture.*—Wheat and barley are grown in the few open areas of the garmsir, notably at Mal-i-Shaikh, Mehlatun, Burj-i-Safar Beg, Bikarz, Mashun, Neza, Baba Kelu and around Baba Munir. They are sown in December or early January, are rain-fed and harvested from end of April until early June, by the settled sections or by those who delay their move to the Sarhad. Dates are grown at Mal-i-Shaikh, oranges and limes at Baba Kelu, and sundry fruits at Baba Munir. Small-scale irrigation is resorted to in these villages. The Sarhad is said to be well-watered and more fertile, and supplies the greater part of their crops, as well as nuts and dried fruits.

*System of Internal Tribal Administration and Taxation.*—There are about thirty sections, each under Ilyas or Jehangir for administrative purposes, and under these or other Khans for taxation purposes. Many are divided between Ilyas and Jehangir, e.g., Abulvardi, Bagdeli. Their subservience to the respective

Kalantars is determined by geographical situation and traditional family allegiance. But they appear to be free to transfer from one to the other should the attractions tempt them. The Kalantars supply funds for the upkeep of tofangchis and sowars, distribute arms when available and have a right to call on their sections for tofangchis or sowars in time of battle or when migrating, and claim a variable share of any booty and a proportion of the annual taxes.

Besides these loyalties, which vary with changes of Kalantars, sections or their sub-sections are directly controlled by the different land-owning Khans. Any family which chooses to cultivate must render a fifth of the crop to the land-owner. In addition one sheep per flock (flock 100) per year is given to the respective Khans, and a share of this is passed on to the Kalantars. The settled villages give half their corn and varying amounts of other produce to the owner, in return for protection against robbers and provision of arms.

The only Government taxes paid are those on produce which enters controlled market centres (e.g., Kazerun, Ardekan).

*Appointment of Kalantars and their Extra-Tribal Power.*—Nominally the Kalantars are still appointed by the Government, Nasir Khan having no direct warrant from the latter to exercise the powers of Ilkhani. But in practice they are now appointed by Nasir with due and careful deference to the wishes of the tribe, and more or less acknowledged by the Government. At present their outside powers are considerable, in keeping with Nasir Khan's unofficial assumption of responsibility for law and order in Fars. Thus Jehangir Khan controls the security of Khisht and Kuhmarreh with his tofangchis, and Ilyas the lower part of the Shahpur-Mamassani road, for which they both take taxes and traffic tolls; and security, though far from good, is probably better and oppression less than if the areas were under Government control. Hikmat, Hishmat-ul-Mamalik, whose claims in the first place to Khisht are very dubious, and who in the past has bled the area white, now finds difficulty in securing his share of the taxes and produce. Meanwhile Jehangir and his brother Abdullah are doing all in their power to gain the respect and goodwill of the Khishtis and appear to be succeeding. The taxes collected by the Kalantars are split with Nasir Khan, the promoter of the scheme, whose share is referred to as presents and is grudgingly afforded.

Nadir and Feridun Khan guard the A.I.O.C. roads in their area without payment other than rations.

*Effects of Reza Shah's Oppression.*—This, coming as it did on top of Saulat-ud-Dauleh's revenge on the tribe, led to much suffering and impoverishment. They had a choice between (i) settling in the Sarhad where in the absence of fuel, proper houses and winter pastures they could not withstand the cold or maintain their flocks, or (ii) settling in the arid unhealthy garmsir which can support only a few lives in summer, or (iii) paying immense bribes in money or kind for the privilege of migrating. Each of these factors led to impoverishment. The power of the Khans was broken and many fell into debt from having to pay exorbitant taxes or large fines for real or trumped-up offences (e.g., Jehangir is said to owe 30,000 tomans, which he was forced to borrow long ago from Shiraz merchants). The miserable settled villagers of Mashun testify to the speed with which degeneration can set in.

However, with rearmament and a resumption of migration and robbery in 1942 they started on the road to recovery and their rehabilitation has been remarkable. But it is doubtful if they will ever see their former wealth and prosperity.

In conclusion, the Kashkuli represent nomadic life at perhaps its highest and most dignified level, and it is a pleasure to work with these people or enter their tents. However, in the general excitement and new-won freedom of last summer the tribe undoubtedly contributed its share to the looting and misery of settled villages, and will as a whole have to share the reputation of its wilder and more predatory sections.

## 2. Darrashuri.

*Tribesmen.*—Like the Khans, they are remarkable for their fair hair and features and hazel or blue eyes. Thus they cannot be of the same stock as Kashkuli, although both speak the same Turki.

*Arms, &c.*—Except in the camps of the Khans, there is very little display of arms, which gives an impression that they are scarce. The fighting qualities and predatory instincts are said to be more highly developed than in Kashkuli. The Darrashuri is essentially a horseman.

*Agriculture.*—Very little in the garmsir, mostly in Sarhad.

*Livestock.*—Few camels, numerous horses (small and badly kept, but tough).



### 3. *Relations of Darrashuri and Kashkuli Buzurg with Nasir Khan and Boir Ahmedi.*

The khans of Darrashuri and Kashkuli are keen to point out that they have been supporting Nasir Khan because "they love him and he is trying to help them regain their former greatness," but not because he has any hold over them. Nor do they feel any duty in this respect. My impressions were that so long as it is profitable (*e.g.*, their increased prestige with their neighbours by being in a formidable *bloc*) they will continue to support him and will render him very limited aid (*e.g.*, presents). But when it suits them they will swing over to independent action. Whilst in the garmsir their past relations with Bavi and the formidable (if armed) Mamassani, on whom Darrashuri are so dependent for their migration route and both their trade (rice), have tended to be good, as also with the A.I.O.C. at Gach Saran. Economically and geographically they are far removed from the main body of Qashgai, with whom they are only linked by racial ties and common hatred of the Government and fear of its oppression. And recent Kashkuli history is marked with bitter memories of the Saulat-ud-Dauleh which are sure to be revived should any differences arise with his son, Nasir Khan. Jaffar Quli is unpopular with the other Darrashuri Khans, because of his refusal to co-operate actively with Nasir Khan, and his grandfather Ali Panah Kikha opposed the Saulat-ud-Dauleh.

Kashkuli and Darrashuri have a respect for the fighting qualities of Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi which amounts almost to reverence, and perhaps reflects the consciousness of their own limitations in this respect.

#### *Notes on Mamassani.*

The Mamassani (excluding Doshman Ziari) number about 5,000 families, made up as follows:—

- Rustami: 1,500—about fifty villages.
- Javidi: 1,400—about thirty-five part-occupied villages, mostly nomadic.
- Bakesh: 1,750—about sixty villages.
- Fehlani: 500—twelve villages.

#### *Nature of Country.*

(a) For fertility, beauty of scene and strategic importance Mamassani is probably unsurpassed in Fars. Lying at the junction of "garmsir" and "sarhad," where sandstone and conglomerate give way to limestone crags and wooded ranges, it enjoys the advantages of both. The bulk of the tribe is spread out in green valleys which open and contract in an unbroken chain from Burabad to Chal-i-Mureh. Smaller side valleys and canyons cut north-east through the grain of the hills into the sarhad and south-west to Bardangan, whilst the axis of Javidi runs eastwards along an important cross-fracture to Ardekan. In the north-east the mountains rise steeply one over the other through Boir Ahmedi to the more open valleys of Qashgai and provide summer pastures for Javidi and a few families of Rustami and Bakesh.

(b) *Water Supply.*—Massive rice cultivation is fed by ample springs and streams. Nurabad drains the Dashman Ziari hills to the east. Fehlani and East Rustami depend on the Fehlani River, which gives off a network of channels before collecting itself and cutting through the hills to Bardangan. West Rustami is well watered by the Ab-i-Siah, which, rising from springs at Deb Nau and Mansurabad, passes through lake and swamp to the Naugak stream at Kupun.

(c) *Strategic Importance.*—The uncompleted motor road from Kazerun to Behbahan through Mamassani and Bavi follows the only natural alignment short of the coastal plain and would offer a great saving over the present road. An unmotorable branch track leads east along the Javidi cross-fracture to Ardekan. These are the routes followed by armies and caravans in the past, and the ruins of Sassanian and Safavieh bridges at Pul-i-Birin and Pul-i-Murd testify to their ancient importance, as also the remains of a defensive wall at the Tang-i-Sangar (B/2280). The Qaleh Safid (B/3625), which commands the road to Ardekan, is a remarkable natural stronghold or "diz." Rising with precipitous limestone walls 2,000 feet above the valley, its summit is fed by a spring and is approachable only by a steep and guarded path. Its 3-mile circumference is circled with the remains of massive boulders poised to descend on those who tried to scale its walls.

The armies of Alexander and the Mongol hordes were embarrassed by its impregnability.

(a) *Historical.*—The origin of the Mamassani and whence they came is obscure. Lurs with a Luri tongue, their appearance and peculiar characteristics are sufficient to place them in a separate branch of this racial group. Their proud bearing, handsome features and large physique have been described as of the ancient Iranian type and have been preserved with scanty admixture of Arab and other invading elements. Their arrival in Shulistan with Doshman Ziari, who are usually classed as a separate tribe, dates from about two centuries ago. Previously Fehlani and the adjacent Shah Hassani villages, then the only cultivated areas, had been ransacked by Afghans returning from an unsuccessful assault on Behbahan, and the bulk of the inhabitants had fled to Shiraz, Bushire and Kazerun. The present Fehlani are rather different from the others and are probably a mixture of Mamassani grafted on to the original Fehlani stock. They have neither memories nor legends of a past nomadic life and their present ruling family, the Mansuris, are of distant Behbehani origin.

Nomadic at first, Rustami, Bakesh and a part of Javidi began to settle, living in winter in villages and extending the belt of cultivation. They paid taxes to the Governor-General of Fars when they had to, but made no claims to ownership of their land, which was Crown property. The Rustami, through the marriage of the khans into the ruling family of the neighbouring Boir Ahmedi, tended to drift apart from the others participating in frequent feuds against them. (In this connexion it is only during the exile of the leading khans of Rustami and Boir Ahmedi that they have been in conflict.)

The Bakesh, under Vali Khan, great-grandfather of Vali Khan Kiani, engaged in war against the Government but were eventually defeated near Behbahan by the forces of Mutamid-ud-Dauleh Gorgi, the Governor-General of Fars, and Vali with all his sons except Sherif were captured and exiled to Ardebil, where they died. It was on this occasion that a party of their women-folk, who had taken refuge in the Qaleh Gulab (A/2134), rather than fall captives to the soldiery, bound their hair together and threw themselves, infants in arms, from the high parapets on to the rocks below. Sherif Khan, the successor of Vali, was powerful and greatly respected and waged a successful war against Khoda Karam Boir Ahmedi, wounding and defeating him at Karbal, near Gach Saran, and killing over a hundred of his followers.

The Javidi have shrunk in numbers, many families having migrated to Kelestan, Fasa and other parts.

(b) *Mamassani Land Question.*—As the rest of the history is more or less bound up with their land it is best told under this heading. In 1898 Sayid Ismail Shahbankareh was the owner of many rifles in a gun-running ship, whose cargo was captured and confiscated by the Persian Navy. In collaboration with his more influential friend, Haji Mohd. Dashti, Muin-ut-Tujjar (Bushiri) they sought the ear of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah through the medium of the Atabeg whom they had bribed, and claimed compensation on the grounds that they were Sayids deprived unjustly of their trading wealth. Their case was granted and Mamassani (less Fehlani), which was stated to be a village, was ceded to Sayid Ismail by Royal farman with full rights of ownership. He gave a third to Haji Muin in recognition of his cunning assistance. The Mamassani were incensed at this intrusion into their time-honoured independence, Imam Quli Rustami especially, and put every difficulty in the way of the agents of the new landlord. However, their chances of a successful appeal against the Government decision were lost through their inability to unite, a circumstance of which Haji Muin was quick to take advantage. Sayid Ismail grew discouraged and sold him the rest.

From now on until 1930 the story is one of unscrupulous intrigue by Haji Muin and his agents. In their endeavours to involve alternatively the Saulat-ud-Dauleh and Qavim-ul-Mulk by offering them shares in the land they heaped coals upon the fires of their already bitter rivalry, and by splitting the rival elements of Mamassani in attempts to drive a firm wedge into the property, they were able to gain only a meagre and uncertain portion of their revenue and virtually none from Rustami. Thus Abdullah Khan Bakesh was bribed to murder his elder brother Husein Quli, the Kalantar and an inveterate enemy of Haji Muin. Abdullah was similarly dealt with when he ceased to serve the Haji's interests a few years later. By bribing the Chief of Army, Shiraz, in 1922 he obtained the services of troops supported by a cannon and a detachment of S.P.R. under the direction of his son Jawad Agha, Amir Humayun, with the intention of forcibly occupying the Rustami area and securing his revenue. But Imam Quli Rustam withheld them for many months, although in the next year he proffered his obedience to the



Government and consented to destroy his fortifications. Amir Humayun visited Mamassani at subsequent intervals through the Bakshdar of Fehlian, but failed to get any benefit from the lands.

In 1930 Reza Shah, bent on destroying the independent Rustami, occupied Mamassani with his troops, induced Imam Quli to visit Tehran through a promise by the Sardar Asad of his safe-custody (and ultimately killed him), and confiscated Mamassani as "war compensation," the descendants of Haji Muin losing their claim to the lands.

Until 1942 it was ruled by gendarmes and Government officials and was subjected to increasing extortions, whilst the now broken khans led a life of misery and oppression. However, Amir Humayun succeeded in retaining Fehlian, which he had bought from the Qavam-ul-Mulk.

Soon after the Anglo-Russian entry in 1941 the khans seized their chance and retained all the wheat and rice, the Government being too weak to enforce its rule. With the escape of Hussein Quli, son of Imam Quli, from exile in the spring of 1942 and his successful assumption of the Kalantarship of Rustami, he set to to bury the hatchet between his and the other sections by marrying his sisters to Bakesh and Javidi Khans. Now all are united and linked with their Bavi allies to the west. Whilst anxious to work with the Government, whom they could serve if necessary in the warrior tradition for which they have been famous in the past, not for love but because they have mutual fears of the growing might of Boir Ahmedi and Qashgai, yet a complication has crept in. Amir Humayun and the relatives with whom his affairs now rest succeeded in regaining their entitlement to the lands. But in a recent Government decision less than a third of the property has been made over to the khans, who, however, are adamant in their insistence upon complete ownership. Meanwhile Nasir Khan Qashgai fearing Mamassani independence and anxious to include them in a southern tribal bloc subservient to him, has threatened to buy the lands from Amir Humayun, an undertaking which, if successful, might place him in a position to oust the khans and extort the revenue by force and with a legal backing. There is, therefore, a growing embitterment against the Government by the tribe, which may yet, in the continuance of official indecision, join the ranks of the rebels and further tip the scales against the declining forces of law and order in Fars.

*The People and their Khans.*—(a) A typical Mamassani is a striking figure and has features which class him apart from the other tribes of Persia. Proud and well-built, often tall, usually dark-skinned with prominent nose and ancient-type features, he is comparable with some of the sculptured figures of Persepolis. His intelligence and sense of humour is above the average for Lurs, yet there is a streak of the old wildness and barbarity in him that reminds one of his traditional love of combat. He dresses in the pale long-sleeved robe of Fars with a stout kummerbund and a predilection for black in his "kulah." The women are even more striking than the men from their habit of emphasising their eyebrows with broadly and skilfully tattooed curves, a habit which I have seen in no other Persian tribe. They wear principally black offset by bright colours and a display of jewellery and gold coins suspended from their turbans. Their dignity and grace contrasts strongly with their ferocity when roused, which I saw in a land dispute in Rustami in which they hurled stones with their menfolk and no less than three, including the kadkhuda's wife, were laid low with broken and bleeding heads.

Their health is undermined by the wide prevalence of malaria, and one wonders how long their brave spirit can resist so insidious and continuous an assault. Opium-smoking is indulged in by nearly 15 per cent. of the men of Fehlian, but is rare and severely discouraged in the other sections. In Maliki and Fehlian, which are the centres of contact with the Government, venereal diseases are beginning; but so long as they retain their tribal organisation and pride, with its strict rules, its spread will be slow.

(b) The Kalantarships are hereditary. The khans keep contact with the tribes by marrying into the families of the leading kadkhudas, each maintaining from three to four wives. They are popular with their people. There is a gaiety and nonchalance about their manner in contrast with their determination to defend their rights. Banishment or their contacts with officialdom during the present century have veneered them with much of the suavity and corruptness of the towns.

Hussein Quli Rustam is now the acknowledged leader of the Mamassani-Bavi bloc and is rigorous in his exclusion of Government officials from his area. He keeps close contact with Mohammed Hussein Taheri, his companion in exile, who, with his dwindling following of Boir Ahmedi Sarhadi (upper), is being

drawn to seek support against his rival Abdullah Zarghampur, with whom, however, neither he nor Mohammed Hussein are anxious to come into conflict.

Vali Khan Kiani and his cousin Mohammed Khan are the joint Kalantars of Bakesh. Vali, the more powerful and unscrupulous of the two, exercises considerable weight in tribal councils.

*Villages.*—Numerous and small, and would support a larger population without the malaria. Those of Bakesh and Fehlian are fairly well-built and planted with trees, but in Rustami they consist principally of reed huts walled to a varying height and clustered to the slopes of mounds on which rest the more solid and fortified qalehs and towers of the khans and kadkhudas. This is retrograde so far as the Deh-Nau Valley of Rustami is concerned and is traceable to the depredations of the Boir Ahmedi from 1930-41.

*Agriculture and Live-stock.*—Rice is the predominant crop wherever water abounds. It is sown in the month of "Mordad," transplanted two months later and cut at the beginning of "Aban." Wheat, barley, lentils, vetch and opium are also grown and are mostly rainfed, the latter being confined to the villages of Fehlian and Bakesh. Maize is only found in the higher lands of Doshman Ziari to the east. Bitter oranges, limes, a few date-palms and other fruits mingle in the gardens of Nurabad and in the Naugak valley of Rustami, but are not enough to export.

The considerable flocks of Javidi support their nomadic way of life, and the village shepherds of Bakesh and Rustami dwell in tents on the outskirts of the plains and move with their flocks to the neighbouring hills in the summer. Almost all the horses and mules were killed this summer by a plague termed "Ranji." Wild boar abound in the rice-fields but withdraw to the acorned hills with the cutting of the crop.

*Markets.*—Much trade is carried on with the surrounding nomadic tribes, who are extensive buyers of rice in exchange for animal products which are locally consumed or eventually marketed elsewhere. Maliki and Fehlian are the principal centres for the collection of corn, rice and opium, some of which is collected by kharbar lorries and brought to Kazerun and Shiraz.

The A.I.O.C. bought 65,000 kilog. of rice from Hussein Quli Rustam last year in addition to their purchases from Basht.

*Taxation.*—The villagers give a quarter of their corn and a half of their rice to the khans, and a tenth of each to their kadkhudas. But in Rustami Hussein Quli has remitted them a sixth of the rice, so that they only have to render a third. This is in compensation for their recent hardships and to secure their goodwill. Nothing is now paid to the Government nor to the legal owners of the land.

*Internal Administration.*—Each village has one or more kadkhudas, who are chosen by the Kalantars from the leading families (often hereditary, and each of whom controls a sub-section of the tribe). They are directly responsible to the Kalantars.

#### *Hygiene and Sanitation.*

(a) "Hamman."—As there are none in Mamassani, Bavi or Khisht a good opportunity exists for the Government to start them on hygienic lines, with showers. The reason for their absence is probably because the winter climate is mild, a "hamman" serving in higher places as a refuge from the cold.

(b) *Clothing.*—The paucity of cloth and raggedness of clothing is one of the most serious evils in Persia to-day, and is the direct or indirect cause of much disease and mortality, more so in areas where the health is already undermined by malaria. It is surprising that the nomad has not learnt to weave or knit woollen cloth to protect him from the cold, but has always relied on the towns for the production of his articles of clothing.

(c) *Venereal Disease.*—An example of the evils which social reformers are up against in the towns and larger villages is a superstition which prevails among men that gonorrhoea can be cured by intercourse with a small girl. The tragic effects are not infrequently seen in the mission hospitals, and it would seem that the crime passes unpunished.

(d) *Marriage.*—Child marriage, which was forbidden by Reza Shah, is coming into practice again in the towns, and cases similar to that in paragraph (c), and arising from this cause, are sometimes seen in the hospitals.

(e) *Inter-Breeding.*—First-cousin marriages and close inter-breeding are the rule in the families of the tribal khans, and no ill-effects whatsoever are apparent after perhaps several centuries of this practice (e.g., Kashkuli).



*Reactions of Tribesmen to Medical Treatment.*

The average tribesman is more sensible about the taking of medicine and more appreciative of treatment than the average villager. He is less wrapt up in ideas of "hot and cold," perhaps from the more restricted nature of his diet. However, it is possible for enemy agents to cast doubts upon the medicine and arouse suspicions which can only be neutralised by follow-up visits. Thus, they told the Kashkuli six months ago that a British army doctor would be visiting them and distributing drugs which exerted a very slow poisoning effect (this from Khosrow Khan), and a recent source of information has reported much talk on these lines in the tribe based on a few cases which failed to recover or got worse after treatment.

Another factor is that free distribution is not understood in this country, a snag being suspected. By having to pay, even a small sum, their faith in the treatment would at once be trebled.

[E 2661/422/34]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd May.)*

(No. 182.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period the 17th to 23rd April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 24th April, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 19.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the Period  
17th to 23rd April, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

THE Majlis has passed a law authorising the adoption of three-twelfths of the budget to regularise immediate expenditure pending the passing of the entire budget.

2. Sa'ed's Cabinet has been the subject of much windy oratory and destructive criticism. Sa'ed himself is agreed by the majority of the Deputies to be an honest and gentlemanly fellow, competent in his own sphere of diplomacy, but quite incapable of holding his Cabinet team together or of putting into effect the items in his programme. Deep distrust of his possible rivals, and especially of Seyyid Zia-ud-din, is the sole reason for the limited support which the Deputies are prepared to afford him.

3. Both in the press and in the Majlis opposition to the American Mission has increased, and most papers have now passed the bounds of legitimate criticism and have descended to scurrilous abuse. The Persian passion for hyperbole; their inability to consider the basis for the truth of any statement before making it, and the absence of any law of libel has resulted in the wildest utterances. Two American advisers are openly accused by name of having accepted large bribes. The attacks against Dr. Millspaugh and his associates are made from every angle, but the chief accusations are as follows:—

- (i) That they do not possess the necessary qualifications for their job.
- (ii) That they are too numerous.
- (iii) That they have accomplished nothing.
- (iv) That they are costing the country too much and are paid too highly.
- (v) That they create new jobs for still more Americans instead of training young Persians to do those jobs.
- (vi) That they employ unsuitable Persians and others (e.g., Armenians) in posts as confidential secretaries.
- (vii) That they behave in an autocratic manner and are subject to no control.

Dr. Millspaugh, in a communiqué to the press, has replied to these accusations. On the whole his is a dignified and reasoned protest, and he points out that his chief opponents and most bitter critics are the racketeering, profiteering class who stand to lose most by the carrying out of his measures. He warns the nation that abuses are so widespread and the breakdown of governmental machinery so complete that it is useless to expect a speedy cure of those ills, and that some of his reforms may take years to come to fruition.

*Economic.*

4. Conditions approaching to famine in the Tangistan coastal area are causing a migration of the hungry to the Khorramshahr and Ahwaz areas in search of work and food.

5. Casualties in the Gorgan earthquake (see Summary No. 15/44, paragraph 5) were at first reported to be slight (two killed and four wounded), though the destruction to buildings has been heavy. Subsequently, exposure to wet weather has caused much sickness, chiefly pneumonia.

*Elections.*

6. Sheikh Abdullah Galledarian has been elected as a Deputy for Bandar Abbas.

*Persian Forces.*

7. Sarlashgar Razmara (M.A. 243) has been appointed Chief of the General Staff. The post had been vacant since the appointment of Sarlashgar Riazi as Minister for Education on the 26th March in Sa'ed's short-lived first Cabinet. The appointments of Commandant of the Officers' Training College and Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat remain vacant.

*Internal Security.*

*Isfahan.*

8. There has been much unrest among mill workers in Isfahan for a long period. This unrest is partly economic in origin, but is much more largely due to the political rivalries of the Tudeh and anti-Tudeh parties, who squabble for the support of the workers and the right to represent them. A fight between these two parties occurred on the 18th April. Troops were used to restore order. The mills have remained closed since that date. The absence of a Governor-General (Bahrami resigned in early April) and of any clear-cut policy on the part of Government are delaying the settlement of the dispute. General Qadr, the General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division, who has for some time past been advocating the establishment of a military governorship, is in Tehran. The Under-Secretary for War stated on the 23rd April that Government did not intend to appoint a military governor.

*Mekran.*

9. After a period of some weeks free from insecurity, a hold-up is reported of a U.K.C.C. truck on the 13th April, 18 kilom. north of Zahidan, and of three U.K.C.C. trucks on the 16th April, some 60 kilom. north of Zahidan. One child was killed and one child and a driver were wounded. Tyres and personal effects were stolen. The robbers are thought to be Baluchis, but there is strong evidence of connivance on the part of the gendarmerie.

*Fars.*

10. The Qashgai's northward migration continues, and has not, so far, produced any widespread pillaging, highway robbery or clashes with troops. Owing to the return of Nasir Khan's two brothers to the tribe and the sobering influence of their recent and first-hand knowledge of war-time Europe, Nasir Khan may be reshaping his policy with regard to the elections, co-operation with Government and restraining his tribesmen from acts of brigandage.

*Russian Affairs.*

11. The second aeroplane on the recently started Tehran-Meshed air service arrived in Meshed on the 12th April (see Summary No. 15/44, paragraph 15). As on the first run, it carried only Russian and Persian passengers. The Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs state that permission to start this service has never been asked for by the Russians, though it is possible that the scheme



may have been mentioned to Soheily or, more likely, Qavam-es-Sultaneh during his premiership.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that there are signs of a concerted plan to increase Russian influence in Tabriz. A Russian hospital is to be opened for the local population, and schools are to be provided in which the chief languages will be Russian and Turki. The Turki newspaper *Vatan Yolinda* has reappeared under the editorship of a Russian Armenian from Baku with a large staff of Caucasians. Some semi-Communist propaganda is being carried on in factories and some talk of a greater Azerbaijan or a new Caucasia is heard.

*Tehran, 23rd April, 1944.*

[E 2850/422/34]

No. 20.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th May.)*

(No. 195.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the period the 24th April to the 30th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 1st May, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the Period the 24th April to the 30th April, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THERE is little in the situation to justify hope that Sa'ed's Government will be able to make much effective progress. The Deputies continue to give daily proof of their irresponsibility and the press to publish defamatory reports about Dr. Millspaugh's assistants and others without the slightest regard for truth. The attacks against the American mission are slightly less virulent, and a few papers have even ventured to speak guardedly in their defence, but the harm done to their reputation throughout the country must be great. Seyyid Zia is causing increasing anxiety to his opponents by the attention he is attracting not only in Parliament but among the general public. He has lately proclaimed himself as an admirer and champion of the tribes, obviously with a view to gaining their support, but his contention that the tribes must be allowed to retain their arms to protect themselves against military oppression until they are assured of just treatment may have dangerous results. The Tudeh papers are loud in their condemnation of this reactionary suggestion.

2. The Prime Minister has announced the formation of a Tribal Commission to consist of the two Ministers without portfolio and two tribal Deputies, Amir Jang Bakhtiari and Abbas Qobadian Kalhur. In a statement the Prime Minister said that it was not the intention of the Government to act towards the tribes as in the past, but to endeavour to right the wrongs from which the tribes had suffered.

3. A Bill was tabled by Seyyid Zia and thirty-one other Deputies whose purpose was to oblige Ministers to take an oath on appointment pledging themselves to perform their duties uprightly and honestly according to the Constitution and to the laws passed by the Majlis; to be loyal to the Shah; to do no treason to the principle of sovereignty or to the rights of the nation; and to be guided solely by considerations of the interests of the Persian State and nation. There was little discussion on the matter, and after some days a motion to remove the Bill from the agenda of the Majlis was approved.

4. Dr. Millspaugh has asked the Public Prosecutor to take action, under article 269 of the Penal Code (which deals with defamatory statements and publications), against the authors of the slanderous statements made about him and his assistants.

5. The Minister of Education, Dr. Ghani, has resigned from the Cabinet.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 6.—(i) Reza Afshar (F.O. 4, M.A. 4) to be Governor-General (Ustandar) of Isfahan Province.
- (ii) Hassan Sadr to be Farmandar of Malayer.
- (iii) Hussein A'zam Rukni to be Farmandar of Qum.
- (iv) Ali Asghar Musavvar Rahmani to be Farmandar of Saveh.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

7. The last stage has now been reached in a plot which has been patiently worked out for months for the elimination from positions of influence in the army of a number of officers who were characterised by their determination to support the American military advisers and their belief in the value of co-operation with the British. For these reasons they were regarded unfavourably by the Russians, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that their elimination is at least in part due to Russian influence. The first to be removed was General Ahmadi from the Ministry for War, and there is little doubt that his removal was a condition made by Stalin when he made his offer of tanks and aircraft to the Shah. The next to go was General Ansari from his post as Under-Secretary for War, and he has recently been relegated to unemployment. The next was General Riazi (see paragraph 13 of Summary No. 12/44), who was a strong opponent of the acceptance of the conditions attached to the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft, a fact of which the Russians were probably made aware by General Razmara. And now General Arfa has been relieved of the command of the 1st Division. General Razmara, who has recently been reappointed Chief of the General Staff, has been, since he resigned from that post in September 1943, in close and intimate contact with the Russians (see Summary No. 42/43, paragraph 14). The Shah is well aware of his restless ambition, his infinite capacity for intrigue and mischief and his lack of principle, and it is unlikely that he would have taken the risk of appointing him to be Chief of the General Staff unless influenced by some extraneous consideration. It has been suggested that the appointment was dictated by the Shah's desire to regain Russian favour, which, as was reported in Summary No. 15/44, paragraph 2, he feared he had lost.

8. The budget for the army, including the air force, which has been made out for a total of 90,000 men, comes to between 140 and 150 million tomans. In their present temper the Deputies will only with great difficulty be persuaded to grant more than 100 million tomans. There is, consequently, no fear of the army this year exceeding 90,000; it is more likely to be reduced to a lower figure.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

- 9.—(i) Sarhang Abdullah Amidi from command of the 8th (Khorassan) Division to command the 1st (Tehran) Division vice Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa.
- (ii) Sarhang Ghulam Hussein Naqdi to be Judge Advocate General *vice* Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari.
- (iii) Sarhang Qolpira to be Head of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff.

#### *Internal Security.*

10. All the tribes of South Persia are now on migration. Whether the villages are suffering from the usual tribal depredations is not known, but there has as yet been little or no disturbance on the roads.

##### *Fars.*

11. Labour unrest has now shown itself in Shiraz. The employees of the power station went on strike and there was trouble in one of the spinning factories. The arrest of three leading agitators, all of the Tudeh party, has temporarily, at least, restored order. This trouble followed shortly on the greatly increased activity of the hitherto inactive Tudeh party of Shiraz. There was a sudden drive to enrol new members and collect funds, presumably on the orders of the headquarters of the party in Tehran.

##### *Isfahan.*

12. The mill workers of Isfahan returned to work on the 25th April. The terms of the settlement are not yet known. There is some evidence that some of the workers are growing resentful of the control of the Tudeh party and of the latter's desire to exploit them for political purposes.



*Russian Affairs.*

13. The Russians have now inaugurated a weekly air service between Tehran and Tabriz. The passenger fare is 1,200 rials for the single journey. The service between Tehran and Meshed is running regularly and five trips have now been made. It is very popular. In an official communication the Soviet Embassy has stated that these services are mainly for the convenience of Soviet organisations in Persia, but that other passengers will be carried when accommodation is available.

14. The press has indulged in fulsome adulation of the Soviet Embassy for their gift of 1 million rials for the sufferers from the Gurgan earthquake.

15. The Russians have offered to hand over to the administration of the Iranian State Railways the operational control of the sector from Tabriz to Julfa, and have offered to pay 6 million rials a year for their traffic, estimated at 450,000 tons a year. As the annual upkeep of the railway is variously estimated at 30 million and 60 million rials, the proposition is not viewed with favour by the Persian authorities.

Tehran, 30th April, 1944.

[E 2979/422/34]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th May.)*

(No. 204.)

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period the 1st May to the 7th May, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 8th May, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 21.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18, for the Period 1st May to 7th May, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The Prime Minister is struggling with honesty and courage to carry out his task in the welter of intrigue by which he is surrounded, and with which his simple and straightforward nature is ill-qualified to deal. He gave a sensible and salutary lecture to journalists which had some slight effect on their irresponsible virulence. He dropped a bombshell into the Majlis by introducing a Bill, actually sponsored by the Minister of the Interior, proposing that the officials of all Ministries should for the period of the war be considered to have the same liability as officers and soldiers called to the colours; that factories, whether the property of Government or of private owners, and their workmen should similarly be considered to have been mobilised for national service; and that restrictions should be imposed on the place of residence of persons who have acted against the war-time interests of Persia or her Allies, or who have instigated others to act against public order or who are engaging in activities likely to disturb the peace. This Bill is likely to arouse considerable opposition.

2. The situation that has arisen among the factory workers in Isfahan has figured prominently in the Majlis and in the press, and it has given cause for much violent abuse of each other by the Tudeh party and the supporters of Seyyid Zia, each accusing the other of attempting to stir up strife. There seems to be little doubt that the trouble originated in the aggressive action of the Tudeh members of the Workers' Union in attempting to prevent the employment of certain workers who had refused to accept the control of the Tudeh party. In the resulting riot 500-700 workers were injured, most of whom were not members of the party. Troops had to be called in and the local authorities seem to have acted with reasonable firmness. The Tudeh party which includes 4,000 of the 10,000 members of the Workers' Union in Isfahan then insisted on a strike. As

reported in Summary No. 17, paragraph 12, the workers returned to the factories on the 25th April, but were unable to work as the owners would issue no materials. The present position is obscure. It is reported that opposition on the part of the workers to the control of the Tudeh party is spreading, largely because the party demands a monthly subscription from the workers from which they receive no benefit in return. Much capital is being made by the opponents of the party out of the fact that no accounts have been published of the disposal of the estimated income of the party from these sources of 10-20,000 tomans a month. Much prominence has been given in the press and in the Majlis to the necessity for legislation to regulate the relations between employers and workers. Representatives of the Tehran Workers' Unions congregated before the Majlis building and demanded the passing of a labour law, the prosecution of those who had instigated the Isfahan disturbances and the official recognition of the Labour Unions.

3. In Meshed on May day more than 2,000 persons took part in processions and a mass meeting organised by the Tudeh party. The processions shouted "Long live Stalin, Lenin and the Red Flag."

4. Seyyid Zia has given proof, disturbing to his enemies, of the esteem in which he is held in some quarters by collecting two million rials for the relief of sufferers from the Gurgan earthquake. He continues to impress people by the forcefulness of his personality if not by his wisdom.

5. In Summary No. 13/44, paragraph 5, it was reported that certain deputies were demanding the trial of Soheily, the ex-Prime Minister, on charges of having attempted to influence the elections. These charges have been investigated by a Majlis Commission which has decided that they are without justification. Charges have now been made by a Deputy, who is also President of the Majlis, against Tadayyun of corruption during his tenure of office of Minister of Supply during the period March 1943 to July 1943.

6. The Shah, accompanied by the Queen and important officials of the Court, left Tehran on the 6th May for Shiraz. He is to spend a night at Isfahan and another at Persepolis. In view of the unsettled conditions of the working classes in Isfahan and of the importance of his Government in Fars, it is difficult to appreciate the considerations that prompted the selection of this time for this visit or to foresee what effect it will have on the situation at either place. It is unlikely that Nasir Qashgai will come to Shiraz to offer allegiance, and, since the Shah's visit is not likely to be followed by any more vigorous assertion of the Government's authority, it may be interpreted as tacit recognition of the status existing—that is the supremacy in Fars of the authority of Nasir Qashgai.

7. The elections in Tabriz are now finished. Of the nine successful candidates only two are from those supported by the Russians.

*Persian Forces.**Appointments—Military.*

8.—(i) *Army.*—Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be Commandant of the Officer Cadet School in addition to his duties as Under-Secretary of State for War.

(ii) *Police.*—Colonel Saif to be Acting Director-General of Police *vice* General Jehanbani, resigned.

*Internal Security.*

9. The Prime Minister has appointed a Commission consisting of the Ministers of the Interior and for War and representatives of the General Staff, to consider measures for the improvement of security, first in the capital and then in provincial towns.

*Fars.*

10. Nasir Qashgai has visited Shiraz for the first time for about two years, and has called on the Acting Governor-General and on His Majesty's Consul, promising to use his influence to maintain law and order in the province. He returned to the tribe after a stay of a few days.

*Khorassan Mekran.*

11. In Summary No. 16/44, paragraph 9, attacks on, and robbery of, U.K.C.C. trucks were reported to have occurred North of Zahidan. Since then, on the 1st May, in the same area a British military engineers' truck was fired on and a Persian officer and his wife travelling by it were wounded. On the 2nd May a large party of armed Baluch raiders from Afghanistan carried off 150 camels



from a district South of Birjand. In this case the Persian gendarmerie and armed locals reacted with some vigour, recovered all the camels and killed three and wounded two of the raiders. In view of the insecurity prevailing on the Zahidan-Meshed road the Government of India has sent some mechanised troops for the protection of Aid to Russia convoys.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. The Soviet Ambassador, M. Mikailov, has returned to Moscow, nominally on leave but probably on permanent recall, and has been replaced by his Counsellor, M. Maximoff, as chargé d'affaires. Since his arrival in January very little has been seen of M. Mikailov. For some weeks past he has pleaded illness and has seen no one. Rumour has it that his illness was diplomatic rather than real, and that both his indisposition and recall were due to the failure of the attempt to unseat Seyyid Zia, and to the rejection by the Persian Government of the conditions attached to Stalin's offer of tanks and aircraft.

#### *Brazilian Affairs.*

13. M. Eulalio, Brazilian Minister in Persia, has left on transfer to Chungking. He is to be succeeded by M. Lakva, now Brazilian Minister in Portugal.

*Tehran, 7th May, 1944.*

[E 3180/422/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th May.)*  
(No. 210.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period of the 7th to 14th May, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 15th May, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 22.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the Period*  
*7th-14th May, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE Bill to apply military law to Government employees and factory workers referred to in Summary No. 18/44, paragraph 1, has provoked attacks on the Prime Minister by the Tudeh press, where he is labelled as weak and reactionary and the tool of vested interests and of the enemies of Persian independence. Notice has been given by one of the Tudeh Deputies of intention to interpellate the Government on the recent appointment of Reza Afshar as Governor-General of Isfahan, it being alleged that he is ineligible for a Government appointment owing to his having been convicted in a civil court. It is expected that the Government will survive the interpellation.

2. The Shah is reported to have had a good reception in Shiraz and has decided to prolong his stay. He is now due to leave on the 15th May. He was entertained by Nasir Qashgai's brothers, Muhammad Hussein and Khosrow, but Nasir himself did not come in.

3. The mill-workers' dispute in Isfahan has been settled for the time being. It has been agreed that membership of the Workers' Union shall be unrestricted; that strikers shall return to work and the workers recently expelled (at the instance of the Tudeh party) shall be re-employed; that there shall be no propaganda inside the factories; and that the disputes between employers and workers shall be dealt with by a special committee comprising the Governor of Isfahan and representatives of the Ministries of Justice and of Commerce and Industry.

##### *Economic.*

4. In reply to questions in the Majlis, the Minister of Finance stated that the Government had under consideration certain applications for the grant of new concessions to foreigners for the development of new oil-fields in Persia. The discussions were still in the preliminary stage (see also Summary No. 11/44, paragraph 5).

5. Dr. Millspaugh has issued new regulations to govern the collection of the coming harvest. The intention is to enable the Government to get hold of the whole of the surplus crop, whether belonging to landowners or peasants. The sale of wheat, barley and flour has been made a Government monopoly and any quantities offered for sale or purchased on the free market are liable to confiscation. The price to be paid for wheat by the Government will be fixed separately in each area. Rules have been made for the methods to be employed in estimating the crop and for the assessment of the amounts that may legitimately be retained by the landlord and peasant. The whole of the difference must be sold to the Government. Government undertakes to distribute tea, sugar and cloth to peasants at controlled prices or, if it should fail to do so, to make a suitable increase in the price to be paid to the peasant for his grain. The landowner is made responsible for delivery to Government of the whole of the surplus production of his property, whether it be his share or the peasants'.

##### *Army.*

##### *Persian Forces.*

6. It has been decided to abolish the Directorates of Cavalry and Infantry in the Ministry for War. These directorates, which were entirely independent of the General Staff, in theory performed the duties of Inspectorates, but in practice served no useful purpose except to provide appointments without work or responsibility for a number of officers. These officers are now being transferred to the General Staff. The Directorates of Artillery and Engineers remain, but are deprived of their functions of inspection.

7. For purposes of conscription Persia is divided into eleven zones, eight of which correspond to the areas of the eight provincial Divisions and three are located in the area of the two Tehran Divisions. Hitherto the Conscription Offices in each zone have been under the direct control of the Director of Conscription in the Ministry for War and have been independent of the Commanders of the Divisions in whose area they are located. It has now been decided that they will be placed under their control with the exception of the offices in the three zones in the area of the Tehran Divisions. These will be under the control of the Central Recruit Training Depot in Tehran. The purpose of this change is to check the abuses and corruption that have long been prevalent in the Conscription Department. It is doubtful whether this object will be achieved.

##### *Gendarmerie.*

8. Three more American officers have joined the staff of Colonel Schwarzkopf, making a total of six. No more are expected.

##### *Appointments—Military.*

9. Sartip Karim Ghovanlu to be Military Governor of Tehran, *vice* Sartip Sheri, resigned.

##### *Internal Security.*

10. Only from Khuzestan are there reports of insecurity. For some time past the Arabs have been becoming increasingly lawless and the area of the Shushtar Mianab, in particular, has been suffering from the depredations of brigands. The local Persian authorities have for long wished to carry out operations for the disarmament of the Arabs, but doubts of the ability of the Persian forces to carry these through without provoking a disturbance that would adversely affect Allied war interests in Khuzestan have induced the British authorities to discourage such suggestions. Famine conditions resulting from the failure of the crops are likely to be an added incentive to lawlessness, and it may become necessary to agree to a limited operation for the establishment of Persian Government authority.

##### *Russian Affairs.*

11. It is reliably reported that since the middle of April numerous Soviet military survey parties have been operating in Khorassan. Nine parties have recently been seen in the vicinity of the Tehran-Meshed road and other parties have been seen in the vicinity of Jajarm, Bujnurd, Kashmar, Turbat-i-Haidari, Turbat-i-Jam and Khaf.



12. The strength of the Soviet garrison at Sabzawar (see Summary No. 15/44, paragraph 14) has been increased to 1,000; a platoon of infantry has been stationed at Nishapur, and a small garrison at Turbat-i-Haidari. Several new road maintenance camps have been established between Shahrud and Bajgiran on the Russian frontier. Increases in the garrisons of Meshed and Quchan are also reported and an influx of Russian women and children to Meshed. The Soviet Consul-General in Khorassan, when questioned about these activities, attributed them to the development of the Shahrud-Bajgiran supply route.

13. One of the papers of the Tudeh party has published an article refuting charges made against the party of being Communist in sentiment and an instrument of Russian policy. The party, it claims, is a supporter of constitutional democratic government; it has no desire to seize power; its mission is to organise and educate the masses so that they will form a force ready and able to defend the Constitution if necessity should arise. If the party press seemed partial to Russia, that was only an expression of the gratitude felt by all Persians for the genuine services Russia had rendered to Persia. The party believed in equal friendship with both Persia's big neighbours. The Tudeh press has, however, never published any appreciation of Great Britain, nor given any indication of friendly sentiments; it has, indeed, made veiled accusations against British policy in Persia. The party, too, has since its inception included among its members professing Communists, and the slogans shouted by the May Day processions of the party in Meshed (see Summary No. 18/44, paragraph 3) do not show evidence of impartial sentiments towards Russia and Great Britain.

*Tehran, 14th May, 1944.*

[E 3200/33/34]

No. 23.

*Shiraz Diary No. 9, 1st to 14th May, 1944 (received 26th May).*

*Tribal.*

NASIR KHAN'S projected visit to Shiraz duly took place on the 1st May. Still sore over being refused permission to stand for Parliament, Nasir Khan had from the beginning refused to call on the Acting Governor-General, whom he held (wrongly) responsible for Government opposition. Accordingly, when he came to Shiraz it was agreed that he should first call on the general officer commanding and "accidentally" find there the Governor. Taking this as a call on him Nasir agreed to "return" the call and did so by going to tea at the Governorate that day.

2. After his call on the general officer commanding, Nasir called on His Majesty's consul. During a call which lasted two hours he stressed his readiness to comply with our wishes and made no demands (even connected with elections) on us. Notably he stated that he was determined to prove his friendship for us by preserving good order in Fars. In addition, he asked that British officers should frequent the tribe. Throughout the interview he expressed complete distrust of the Persian Government.

3. Nasir Khan was entertained to lunch by the general officer commanding, senior Persians and British officials being present. The same people were also invited to the tea party given by the Acting Governor-General. On the morning of the 2nd May Nasir Khan returned to his tribal quarters, having spent the night with the general officer commanding.

4. The local authorities having received on the 3rd May news that the Shah would arrive in Fars on the 7th May, the general officer commanding wished to return Nasir's call at once. Accordingly the general officer commanding, Acting Governor-General and His Majesty's consul set out on the 4th May for Nasir's camp near Baiza. The general officer commanding naturally greatly desired Nasir to call on the Shah at Persepolis, and Nasir, though not admitting it, betrayed his desire to go, but only provided that His Majesty's Government would guarantee his immunity from arrest. The general officer commanding tried to induce His Majesty's consul to give the necessary guarantee, offering to give a written guarantee to His Majesty's consul that no action would be taken against Nasir. But His Majesty's consul felt unable to accede to this request without prior reference to the embassy—a course which time rendered impossible.

5. Nasir and his fellow khans still entertain the utmost distrust of the Government, and they feared that the Shah's visit to Fars immediately after Nasir's own visit to Shiraz indicated some danger for him. At the request of

His Majesty's consul, however, Nasir's two brothers, Mohammed Hussein and Khosrow, went to Persepolis to greet the Shah there and subsequently entertained him to dinner in Shiraz.

6. It is possible that the Shah, the general officer commanding and others are indignant that Nasir Khan did not come to greet him, and resent the fact that he would have come on a British guarantee which was not forthcoming.

7. During the visit to the Qashqai the general officer commanding discussed with Nasir Khan the question of the elections at the remaining three Shiraz seats, namely, Abadeh, Jahrum and Firuzabad. Nasir took the line with him (and with His Majesty's consul, who was subsequently dragged in) that he should have three Qashqai candidates—himself, Malik Mansur and Purreza—(to whom he had given his word) as all the other Deputies of Fars (except Reza Hikmat) were Qawam's men. In conversation with His Majesty's consul Nasir said that he must have all three seats or none at all, adding that he did not mind being unrepresented. His Majesty's consul deprecated the proposal that there should be no Qashqai representatives in the Majlis, whereupon Nasir said tentatively that he would agree to two candidates, himself for Abadeh and Purreza for Firuzabad. If he were elected, Nasir said he would go to Tehran from time to time, but would spend most of his time with the tribe. It was obviously not His Majesty's consul's business to refuse or accept this offer.

8. The general political atmosphere in Fars has been greatly improved by Nasir's visit to Shiraz and by the voluntary surrender (on the 4th May) of the Deputy, Naubakht, who has been harboured by the Qashqai for many months. Some progress has been made towards re-establishing confidence between the tribe and the Government. Further confidence has been established by the fact that Qashqai tribesmen, for the first time for several years, have lately visited the town in numbers to buy and sell, and also by the fact that the spring migration has been remarkably free from incident. Although Nasir's promise to comply with our wishes must be heavily discounted, it is certain that he has a certain respect for our wishes. It therefore seems probable that British interests are less in danger of damage at the hands of the Qashqai than at any time recently.

*Shah's Visit.*

9. On the 3rd May the senior Persian officials here received telegrams announcing the intention of the Shah to leave Tehran for Fars on the 6th May, spending only one night *en route*. At this news officialdom in Shiraz panicked. Meetings were held to discuss what was to be done to entertain the Shah and to furbish up the city to provide a fitting spectacle for his august eyes. Then it was discovered that the municipality had no funds to repair the pot-holes in the main streets and to sprinkle water on them. The water-men were on strike because they had had no wages for two months and there was no prospect of getting a loan from the bank as the municipality had already borrowed heavily from it. However, all was eventually arranged after a style (Persian) after lengthy and heated discussions.

10. On the evening of the 7th May the Shah, accompanied by the Minister of Court, M. Ala, and the Minister of the Interior, M. Hajhir, duly arrived at Persepolis and spent the night there. In the moonlight, His Majesty walked in the ruins of Persepolis for two hours, doubtless drawing inspiration from the illustrious dead. The next morning His Majesty's consul, at the request of the general officer commanding, went to Persepolis to be presented to the Shah. While waiting, His Majesty's consul was questioned by M. Hajhir and Shoku ul Mulk as to the remedies for the present tribal situation. His Majesty's consul replied that he understood that His Majesty's embassy had already made certain proposals in that regard to the Persian Government. Basically the situation was that the tribes entertained a deep-seated distrust of the Government, which was partly justified by the events of the past. The essential problem was to wean the tribes from their present nomadic life and settle them down as agriculturists, and to do this a new administrative machinery should be devised which would be honest and efficient and which would inspire confidence.

11. That evening the Shah came into Shiraz and appeared to receive an enthusiastic welcome from the population. From observations made during the course of the last week there appears to be no doubt that the enthusiasm was genuine, though it is hard to say whether it is due to the person of the present Shah or to the general idea of monarchy—but it is probably the latter.

12. In the interview given to His Majesty's consul the next morning the Shah made several platitudinous speeches in which he emphasised the need of



Anglo-Persian friendship, and stated that he hoped that our contacts—both commercial and cultural—would be multiplied after the war. He also spoke of the need—if Persia is to be a democratic country—of the law being applied strictly to rich and poor alike. Accordingly, the possession of arms should be restricted to Government forces, who alone are the instrument of the nation (emphasis on this word) to secure internal security and to defend the integrity and honour of the country against aggression. Thus the possession of arms by the tribes was an offence against democracy, as the khans could not be tried by the courts as could a statesman who had abused the nation's confidence in him. On the other hand, speaking of the tribes, he admitted that they had been treated harshly and unjustly in the past, and said that their lot should be improved. In this connexion both the Shah and members of his suite in conversation with the young Qashgai khans, Mohammed Hussein and Khosrow, expressed sympathy with the tribes and tried to gain their friendship. In particular, he said that as King he had many enemies and therefore needed friends and hoped to find those friends among the tribes.

13. Sightseeing, parties, shooting, &c., occupied most of the Shah's time in Shiraz, for which he has evidently formed a liking, for he has prolonged his stay here. In one visit he saw one of the Shiraz slums. Entering people's houses without ceremony he spoke to the people. On a subsequent occasion he revealed his emotion on discovering the wretched living conditions of his subjects.

14. There have been two or three hints that the Shah and his entourage are considering the present system of appointing officials as Governors of important centres and of appointing instead persons of family and estate, endowing them with wider powers. Such a step might, of course, lead to increasing the power of the Shah, but if the persons were suitable it should result in the elimination of much of the officialdom which at present clogs the wheels of administration.

15. Until the evening of the 12th May no British officials or officers were invited to any of the functions which took place in honour of the Shah nor were any contacts established between the suite and this consulate. This was strangely at variance with the normal state of affairs here and occasioned some comment in British circles. On the 12th May, however, Messrs. Johnson and Quilliam of the Imperial Bank played tennis against the Shah, partnered by Qawami, a Persian employee of the A.I.O.C. That evening the two military officers were asked to the manoeuvres to take place the next morning, and M. Ala sought an interview with His Majesty's consul. It is possible, therefore, that this seeming neglect was due partly to preoccupation of the Persians with their own affairs and partly to the idea of the local officials that the presence of foreigners would not be welcome to the Shah.

16. When His Majesty's consul called on M. Ala the latter was full of the press attacks (especially those in Ra'ad) on the Shah. He was clearly hostile to Seyed Zia and described him as an aspiring dictator with reactionary tendencies. The Seyed's policy, he considered, ran counter to the benevolent intentions of the Shah to lead his country towards democracy. M. Ala also betrayed anxiety over reports he had heard from Cairo and other places to the effect that the Shah had fallen into the power of the Russians over the offer of military material. He assured me that this was not the case and that His Majesty had rejected the Russian offer on account of the conditions attached thereto (i.e., the formation of mixed units).

17. At the end of the interview His Majesty's consul pointed out to M. Ala that since the Shah's arrival something approaching ostracism of British officials here had been observed. The Minister replied that such an idea was far from His Majesty's intention and apologised. Invitations for the remaining functions were sent on the morning of the 15th and the Minister returned His Majesty's consul's call.

18. On the evening of the 13th May His Majesty's consul called on M. Hajhir, Minister of the Interior, at his request. He seemed to have decided that a tribal settlement scheme, as advocated by His Majesty's embassy, was necessary and feasible. He also said that he thought Nasir should be elected for Abadeh and Malik Mansur for Firuzabad on condition that the latter immediately resigned in favour of, perhaps, Rezavi.

Shiraz, 14th May, 1944.

A. J. GARDENER, Consul.

[E 3257/422/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st May.)

(No. 221.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 20, for the period of the 15th to the 21st May, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 22nd May, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 24.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20, for the period 15th May to 21st May, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

AS was expected, the Government survived the interpellation made by the Tudeh Deputy, Farivar, on the appointment of Reza Afshar to be Governor-General of Isfahan. The Tudeh Deputies and the press, with a few exceptions, expressed great indignation that an official who had been convicted of corruption should be reappointed to a Government post. As far as the Tudeh party is concerned the indignation had its origin not so much in righteousness as in the knowledge that Reza Afshar is a strong man who may deal firmly with disturbers of the peace and attempts to compel the workers to join the Tudeh party. The basis of the interpellation was that the appointment was illegal because of Afshar's conviction. The Prime Minister said that he had taken legal opinion before making the appointment and claimed that it was justified by expediency and by the results already achieved. He promised, however, to refer the question of legality to the High Court of Appeal and he was then given a vote of confidence by 73 of the 92 Deputies present.

2. The Shah returned to Tehran from his visit to Isfahan and Shiraz on the 17th May. His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz says that his visit seems to have been welcomed by the people of Shiraz and that the enthusiasm with which he was greeted had every appearance of being genuine. The people of Shiraz are notoriously volatile, but there is among them a long-standing tradition of loyalty to the Crown and opposition to the Government and its officials. It is surmised that one of the reasons for the Shah's journey was to demonstrate that it was not only Seyyid Zia and the Tudeh party who took an interest in the tribes. He remarked to the brothers of Nasir Qashgai that as a King he needed friends and that he hoped to find those friends in the tribes.

3. The *détenus* arrested at the request of the Allies in August last year have been transferred from British custody at Sultanabad to Persian custody in Tehran.

Economic.

4. Recent reports from Kermanshah and Khorassan do not confirm the earlier optimistic estimates of the coming harvest. Both these provinces were relied upon to have surpluses sufficient to supply Tehran and to contribute to the deficit areas. Reports from Kermanshah in particular, which are from a reliable source, speak of disturbingly extensive failure of crops. On the other hand the Russians have now allowed it to be discovered that Azerbaijan has a surplus from the current harvest of 15,000 tons of grain.

5. The town of Semnan was seriously damaged by floods resulting from the heavy rains of the past week. According to the press the extent of the damage amounted to 20 million rials. Floods also washed out a section of the railway between Tehran and Bandar Shahi at a point about 160 kilometres from Tehran. The line was out of action for about 40 hours, but was repaired by the night of the 17th/18th May.

Appointments—Civil.

6. Fazlullah Hatemi to be Farmandar of Semnan.

[29046]



*Persian Forces.**Army.*

7. The Minister for War has tabled three Bills. The first deals with offences of officials engaged on recruiting. It proposes that any official who refrains from recruiting those liable to conscription or recruits those not liable shall be condemned to from two to five years' solitary confinement. If he accepts bribes in any form he shall be fined five times the value of the bribe and be classed as an armed bandit and suffer the punishment to which such criminals are liable. The second Bill forbids officers and other ranks of the army to form political parties or to take part in any political activities. The third Bill aims at speeding up the work of military courts. It proposes that in future ordinary military courts shall consist of a president and two members only and military courts of appeal of a president and five members.

8. In reply to a question in the Majlis the Minister for War stated that a sum of 51 million tomans of last year's allotments to divisions had not yet been accounted for. In a subsequent letter to the press he modified this statement by saying that the greater part of the amount had already been accounted for.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 9.—(i) Sarhang Najaf Quli Abbasi to be assistant to the Military Governor of Tehran.  
(ii) Sartip Mehdevi to be Director of the Supply Department of the Army, *vice* Sartip Diba, resigned.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

10. His Majesty's Consul in Fars reports that the atmosphere in Fars has been greatly improved by Nasir Qashgai's visit to Shiraz to call on the Acting Governor-General and on the consul and by the surrender to the British security authorities of the absconding Deputy, Naubakht. To the consul Nasir was lavish with assurances that his only desire was to act in accordance with British wishes. It may be assumed that he qualified that statement in his own mind with the proviso that British wishes should not conflict with his own interests. For the moment those are to show what a power for order he can be in Fars, and it must be said that the migration of the Qashgai is proceeding with less than the usual lawlessness. In spite of the fact that Nasir did not come in to Shiraz during the Shah's visit, his two brothers, Muhammad Hussein and Khosrow, were treated with marked friendliness and sympathy by the Shah and accompanied him to Tehran.

11. The Khamseh tribes, bullied, neglected, hungry, ragged and leaderless, are not so orderly as the Qashgai and have been guilty of some petty robbery and brigandage. These tribes have, in fact, suffered much more in recent years than the Qashgai and have, on the whole, behaved with restraint.

12. There has been some fighting on a small scale between the khans of Hiatt Daud and those of Liravi. Fathullah Khan of Hiatt Daud had been deputed by the Government to collect from Liravi grain which the khans had failed to deliver to Government, and this presumably led to the hostilities.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. At a ceremony at the Soviet Embassy the chargé d'affaires presented fifty medals to Persian motor drivers working for the Russian transport services in token of Soviet gratitude for their services. In his address the chargé d'affaires spoke with appreciation of the services rendered by Persia to the Allies in the prosecution of the war and of the devotion to duty of most of the motor drivers employed by the Soviet authorities engaged in transporting supplies to Russia.

14. In addition to the air services between Tehran and Meshed and Tehran and Tabriz, the Russians have now inaugurated a weekly service between Tehran and Pahlavi.

15. A Soviet Consulate has been opened at Kazvin, where there is already the headquarters of the Commander-in-chief of the Russian Forces in Persia.

16. It is reported, but requires confirmation, that the Russians intend to asphalt the road from Astara via Resht to Kazvin and that they have commenced

work on the sector between Astara and Resht. Much propaganda is being circulated, whether by the Russians or other interested persons, about the number of Persian labourers who are to be employed at high rates of pay and the happy conditions they will enjoy.

17. A number of civilian Russians have recently arrived in Resht with their families. They are said to be men who have worked especially well in factories and to have been sent to Persia to rest as a reward. Wives and families of military personnel have also arrived in Resht. Their arrival in Meshed and Tabriz has already been reported.

*Tehran, 21st May, 1944.*

[E 3391/422/34]

No. 25.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th June.)*

(No. 231).

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary, No. 21, for the period of the 22nd to 28th May, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 29th May, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 25.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 21, for the period 22nd May to 28th May, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. The future of Dr. Millspaugh and his mission has been the main topic of interest during the past week. There has been much lobbying, and the matter was discussed in one secret session of the Majlis. There is a strong feeling, even among his sympathisers, that Dr. Millspaugh has taken upon himself a heavier burden than he can discharge and that he should be relieved of some of his responsibilities and with them of some of the extensive authority given to him. Others think that he has proved himself to be unsuitable and that he should be replaced by another American. Others, again, wish to see the whole American mission depart. Whatever solution is found it is unlikely that the position and authority of Dr. Millspaugh will remain unaffected.

2. The case of Dr. Millspaugh has been summed up by a Deputy in a question to the Minister of Finance in the following terms:—

(i) Far from Dr. Millspaugh having brought about a decrease in the cost of living, prices have continued to rise. When he assumed his duties with extensive powers fifteen months ago the cost of living index was 750 (as compared with 100 in 1936) whereas to-day it is 1,250.

(ii) In spite of the extensive powers given to him over transport and distribution he had failed to ensure a satisfactory distribution of essential commodities, and the poor were worse off than they had been before his arrival.

(iii) His only attempt to check inflation had been to encourage the purchase of foreign exchange, with the result that during the past year much capital had gone abroad.

(iv) He had failed to take full advantage of the quota of imports allotted to Iran by the Allies.

(v) In spite of the fact that the harvest of the last year had been almost unprecedented in quantity the responsible organisation under his control had failed to build up any appreciable reserves of grain.



- (vi) He had not improved the financial situation; although capital expenditure had ceased the budget was not balanced and expenditure greatly exceeded income.
- (vii) He had insisted on the passing of an Income Tax Law which was not suited to the country and would result in reducing the productive power of the country, particularly in agriculture, and in a decrease of national income.
- (viii) In the administration of the departments under his control there were extravagance, disorder, irresponsibility and lack of attention to public duty.

This is a moderate statement of the criticisms usually made of Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. A reply was given by the Minister of Finance in a secret session of the Majlis.

3. Criticism of the Prime Minister by the press is increasing. It is true that Sa'ed has few qualifications other than honesty and a fatherly manner. His ignorance of conditions in his own country, which has become a by-word, increases the indecision that naturally results from his dislike of being unpleasant to anyone. One of the Russian-inspired papers says: "The feeble Government of Sa'ed is completely dominated by the dangerous schemes of the Minister of the Interior." The Minister of the Interior, Hajher, is regarded by the Russians as being friendly to British interests.

#### *Economic.*

4. In his report for the month the 22nd January to the 20th February Dr. Millspaugh notes that the loss in ten months on the commercial transactions of the Government, which include the Government factories and monopolies and the operations of the Cereals and Bread Section, amounted to 1,033,987,000 rials. The greater part of this loss was due to the difference between the price paid for grain purchased and the price received for bread sold. During the first ten months of the financial year 1943-44 the total excess of expenditure over receipts amounted to 1,242,762,000 rials.

5. Among numerous questions tabled in the Majlis during the past week are questions relating to the budget of the State Railway, where it is stated that during the past twelve months the Allies have paid to the railway the sum of 686,040,510 rials for the transport of war material; the organisation of the State Railway after the war, with particular reference to the disposal of the large number of employees who will become surplus; the provision of compensation for employees injured while working for the railway or for their dependents in the case of their death; the distribution of rationed and monopoly goods; the unsatisfactory financial condition of Government factories.

6. A Judicial Commission of Enquiry was sent to Meshed to investigate scandals in the sugar factory and in connexion with certain transactions in wheat. Their investigations have resulted in the arrest of the local Director of Finance, two other finance officials, the manager of the sugar factory and the Chief of the City Police.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

7. It has been decided to abolish the Southern Army Headquarters, which were formed for the purpose of combining operations against the tribes of Fars of the Isfahan, Khuzestan and Fars Divisions. As there is no intention of carrying out such operations, there is no purpose in retaining the Southern Army Headquarters. General Jahanbani, who is now in Tehran, will not return to Shiraz. General Muhammad Hussein Firuz will probably go to Fars as Governor-General and Officer Commanding Troops, a position he held in 1942. He is popular with and respected by the people of Fars and is more likely to hold the balance more fairly between Qashgai and other tribes of Fars than General Jahanbani.

8. There have recently been outbreaks in Abadan against the local Bahais, the first of which resulted in the killing of two Bahais and the burning of one of their houses. A later outbreak is reported to have been effectively dealt with by Persian troops and the ringleaders have been arrested. It is considered that these outbreaks have been instigated for some political purpose connected with the elections.

##### *Khuzestan.*

9. Operations will probably shortly be begun by the Persian army in the Shushtar-Mianab area for the punishment and disarmament of brigand bands and the recovery of property looted by them.

10. It is reported that the sheikhs of the Beni Ka'ab, of the Muhaisin and of the Beni Turuf have entered into an agreement for mutual aid and co-operation in resisting demands by the Government in matters of conscription and of the collection of the coming harvest. His Majesty's Consul at Khorramshahr reports that this alleged agreement is arousing considerable interest among the sheikhs of other Arab tribes.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

11. Many complaints have recently reached Tehran against the administration of Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari. While there is probably some ground for these complaints, Morteza Quli being a Persian tribal chief, there is no doubt that they have been greatly exaggerated, and that the agitation is being encouraged by almost all the other Bakhtiari khans, who are annoyed with Morteza Quli Khan for various personal reasons, and may even attempt to instigate disturbances in Bakhtiari to discredit him. The probability of this is not regarded as serious at present. The agitation, however, shows how wise Reza Shah was to remove all important tribal khans from their tribes and even, sometimes, from this world.

##### *Russian Affairs.*

12. M. Maximoff, until recently counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, has been appointed ambassador. Previous to coming to Tehran as counsellor he had been Soviet Consul-General in Meshed.

13. In Summary No. 16/44, paragraph 12, it was reported that there were signs of an intention on the part of the Soviet authorities to increase their influence in Persian Azarbaijan. The staff of the Soviet Consulate have recently been provocatively interfering in internal affairs, big and small, even when they were no concern of theirs. This, however, may be more the personal policy of the acting consul-general, Marchenko, than a policy dictated from above. His annoyance at the difficulty he had experienced in securing the election for Tabriz of even two of the Russian favourites was increased by subsequent protests made to the Supervising Committee against their election, and by the committee's decision to refuse to issue their credentials but to refer the matter to Tehran. He threatened the Governor that, if the Supervising Committee did not cease its hostility to the Russians, Azarbaijan as a whole would pay. The kurds could pillage and the mob could riot for all the Russians would care. Much propaganda is being made in favour of Soviet culture and Soviet systems. The reappearance of the paper *Vatan Yolinda*, printed in Turki at the Russian military press in Tabriz, was mentioned in Summary No. 16/44. It has recently contained several articles extolling the benefits that have come to Russian Azarbaijan from the Communist régime. Examples are appended to this summary. The Russian hospital, which is to accept local civilians, is nearly ready for opening, and search is still being made for a suitable building for the Russian school, which, while its main purpose is officially said to be the education of Russian children in Tabriz, is also to accept local children.

##### *American Affairs.*

14. One of the Deputies has given notice of a question to the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing out that the presence of British and Russian troops in Persia is governed by a treaty approved by the Majlis and asking by virtue of what law are American troops stationed in Persia. This question has been raised several times in press and Parliament since the arrival of American troops.

15. Between the 5th and 13th May two contingents of American technical troops, each of about 200, passed through Tabriz on their way to Russia.

16. Mr. Timmerman, American adviser to the Persian police, died suddenly on the 20th May.

##### *British Affairs.*

17. Four Indian members of the Viceroy's Defence Committee visited Tehran during the past week.



*Polish Interests.*

18. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 22nd May, 1944, was :—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	461	1,455	511	2,427
In Isfahan ...	131	932	1,310	2,373
In Ahwaz ...	460	1,746	907	3,113
	1,052	4,133	2,728	7,913

The total number of Poles in Persia in January 1943 was 21,691.

*Tehran, 28th May, 1944.*

Appendix.

*Extracts from "Vatan Yolinda" (see paragraph No. 13).*

*"Vatan Yolinda," No. 6, dated 21st April, 1944.*

*The 24th Anniversary of Soviet Government in Azarbaijan.*

*The Azarbaijanis and of what they can boast.*

During the last twenty-four years of Soviet Government, under the brilliant policy of the Bolshevik party, there has been great progress in arts, education, distribution of land and food, and many people have been trained for Government posts and defence work.

Before the revolution there were few engineers, doctors and teachers in Azarbaijan but now there are thousands of them. To-day Azarbaijan may boast of its numerous doctors, engineers, generals, officers, artists, teachers, writers, painters, specialists and the brave young men who have been decorated for their valour. There are also many well-known Azerbaijanis outside Azarbaijan. Besides this many Azarbaijanis are working in commissaries and other organisations outside the republic, and in order to help the war effort many engineers, workers, mechanics, &c., are toiling in the oilfields.

*"Vatan Yolinda," No. 8, dated 26th April, 1944.*

*Azarbaijan during the last 24 years under Soviet Government.*

Azarbaijan is a country of civilisation and education. It has made great progress in these during the last twenty-four years under Soviet Government. The national policy of bolshevism has changed Azarbaijan from an illiterate country to an educated one.

The April revolution greatly benefitted the Azarbaijanis, who now possess schools and fine arts which they had not known in the past. With the first years of revolution schools were established in every part of the country and the children of workers and labourers who in the past had been deprived of education were now educated free of charge. In 1914 there were 73,000 students, by 1940 the number had risen to 717,000. During the Soviet régime the number of schools has increased year by year so that between 1920 and 1939, 837 schools have been established. One of the greatest benefits the revolution has brought is the high schools, which now produce doctors, engineers, specialists, &c. Before the revolution there were only five-six papers being published, now there are sixty. Before the revolution very little was known of opera, now we have many like Kor Oghli, Shah Ismael Markis and many others.

*"Vatan Yolinda," No. 9, dated 28th April, 1944.*

*The Result of the War for Freedom.*

Azarbaijan did not gain Soviet Government, national freedom and a progressive life without any trouble, for during the past thousand years, as history will show, they have fought against usurpers, cruel men, and lately against the Czarist Government. They have gained it through the devotion of great men.

Stalin, who is the founder of bolshevism in the Caucasus, came to Baku in 1904 and started to lead the people against the Czarist Government in order to create freedom. . . .

In 1918 the Baku Labour party organised Soviet Government at Baku and proclaimed communism, which did great things in Baku for some months. But it did not live very long because Soviet Government was abolished through the treachery of Musawat party, Dashnagsagan party and Mensheviks, and the leaders of communism such as Azizbegoff Shaumian, Chaparidz and some twenty-six others were killed. Kazi Mahamad, Binyad Sardaroff, Bala Amu Dadashoff, Amir Aslanoff, Mugtadi Aydinbegoff and Ali Beyramoff were shot for being Liberals. This kind of treatment, however, created such anger among the people that instead of discouraging them they were stimulated to fight for the Soviet Government. At last in 1920 on the 28th April, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, Azarbaijanis, with the help of the Red Army, overthrew Mosavatist capitalists and hoisted the flag of freedom.

[E 3463/422/93]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 12th June.)*

(No. 240.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period the 29th May to the 4th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this embassy.

*Tehran, 5th June, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 26.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the Period 29th May-4th June, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

NO solution has yet been found to the dispute between Dr. Millspaugh and the Deputies. A proposal that he should surrender some of his powers to a Ministry of Economy was rejected by Dr. Millspaugh on the grounds that economic work was too closely associated with finance to allow of their separation, and he flatly refused to accept any reduction of his powers. In a confidential letter to the Government he answers some of the criticisms of his work. He points out that the rate of increase in the cost of living has notably slowed down since his arrival. He claims that, in grain collection, bread distribution and the procurement and distribution of monopoly goods, organisation and a settled policy have replaced confusion. The plans for the distribution of monopoly goods were only completed three months ago and were now in operation. The customs warehouses, once clogged with goods, were now clear. Monopoly goods were being moved in increasing quantities and were being distributed to people—villagers and tribesmen—who had never previously received such goods. Energetic steps were being taken in conjunction with M.E.S.C. to ensure that supplies will be ample for distribution to all.

2. The news that a letter had been addressed by the American Government to the Persian Government on the subject of Dr. Millspaugh's mission leaked out to the press and the public. It was represented as being a warning that the American Government would regard further criticism or opposition to the American advisers as unfriendliness to the American Government. The press worked up some indignation over this imagined interference in the internal affairs of Persia and protested against what was purely an internal matter being brought into the field of international relations. The text of the letter has not been published. It is known that its sense was not as originally represented by the Persian press, but was rather an expression of regret that the Persian Government had not defended more convincingly the American officials in their service. That the question of Dr. Millspaugh's powers is a matter for Persia alone to decide and is not a matter in which any foreign Power can properly intervene has been insisted on in the press and the Majlis.

[29046]

o 4



3. The Cabinet is not happy. The Shah is reported to be discontented with the Prime Minister, presumably because he is unwilling or unable to bring about the results desired by the Shah. The latter is said to be looking about for a successor and to be considering Qavam-es-Sultaneh and Hajhir, the present Minister of the Interior. The latter has probably too pro-British a colour to be acceptable to the Russians. His relations with the Prime Minister are now rather strained, and this is attributed to the latter's suspicions that Hajhir aspires to his place.

4. For some time past tension has been evident between Moslems and Bahais, and this resulted in demonstrations hostile to the Bahais at Senandaj, Hamadan and Abadeh, as reported in Summary No. 21, paragraph 8. This tension may be used, as it was at Abadeh, to provoke disturbances for political reasons. There has, in fact, been some increased missionary activity on the part of Bahais of late to celebrate the opening of the second century of the Bahai faith, and, although no evidence is as yet available that there has been any notable increase in converts, the greater freedom enjoyed by the Bahais to speak of their faith has probably frightened the Mullahs, since Islam is a weakening if not dying faith, whose place might well be taken by Bahaism. Bahaism, with its vague but kindly philosophy, is agreeable to Persian mentality, and the community has a tradition, resulting perhaps from years of oppression, of solidarity and co-operation among themselves, which contrasts with usual Persian characteristics.

#### *Economic.*

5. Dr. Millspaugh has published a statement to the effect that the total amount of grain collected by the Government since September 1943 is 346,278 tons and that stocks in Tehran on the 19th May were 31,510 tons. This he considers to be adequate assurance of the needs of the country until next harvest.

6. The instruments of ratification of the commercial agreement between Persia and the United States, which was signed in April 1943, were exchanged at Washington on the 31st May. The agreement comes into force thirty days after that date. The text is not yet available, but it is understood that it does not give discriminatory treatment in favour of the United States. Among Persian exports to America will be handicraft products, gum and opium, and American imports to Persia will include motor vehicles, tyres, machinery, lubricants.

7. As has already been reported, when the Soviet authorities forced the Persian Government to make a contract for the manufacture and supply to Russia of rifles, automatic pistols and ammunition the question of payment was left unsettled. The Russians have as yet paid nothing and the cost of operating the factories has been a very heavy drain on the funds of the Persian Government. The Prime Minister has stated that he has now some hope that the Russians will pay at the rate of 1,000 rials per rifle and 3 rials per round of ammunition.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

8. Sarlashkar Muhammad Hussein Firuz to be Governor-General of Fars.

#### *Persian Forces.*

9. In an interview given to the editor of the *Ra'di Imruz*, a paper closely connected with Seyyid Zia, Dr. Millspaugh gave the following figures for the budgets of the Persian forces for the past year:—

	<i>Rials.</i>
Army ... ..	1,000,000,000
Gendarmerie ... ..	298,246,100
Police force ... ..	187,000,000
	<hr/>
	1,485,246,100

He would allot the same gross total for these forces this year, and no more. It was for the Government to decide how it should be distributed among them; which force should be decreased and which, if any, increased. He expressed the opinion that in their present form these forces were superfluous and not worth the money spent on them. Whatever truth there may be in this, it is not encouraging to the American advisers who have been working with these forces for more than a year. The cost of the army considered necessary by General Ridley is about 1,500 million rials, and of the gendarmerie recommended by Colonel Schwarzkopf 600 million rials.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

10. Sarlashkar Muhammad Hussein Firuz to command the 6th (Fars) Division.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

11. A party of Russians with a Russian military escort recently visited Bushire. They said they were accompanying a member of the Russian Trade Delegation in Tehran who was enquiring into the possibility of purchasing opium. They gave exhibitions in Bushire of posters and photographs, not concerned with opium, which they had brought with them. Another party, including two military officers, recently visited the Georgian villages of Feraidan district in the Isfahan Province. These Georgians were brought from the Caucasus by Shah Abbas. It has inevitably been said that the purpose of this visit, as it may well have been, was to make contact with Persian minorities of Caucasian origin. The Armenians of Julfa, near Isfahan, also come in for Russian attentions. Three hundred of their children under 16 are now learning Russian from teachers specially brought by the Russians for the purpose.

12. The Irano-Soviet Cultural Society (see Summaries Nos. 9/44, paragraph 18, and 6/44, paragraph 20), which now calls itself the Iranian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, has now published its statutes contained in twenty-five articles. The second article sets out the main objects of the society under eighteen headings, which are mainly concerned with methods of making known the literature, art, drama, music, science, educational methods of one country to the other. It is clear that in practice the society will be used to make Soviet culture known to Persia and to spread Soviet ideas rather than to make Persian culture known to Russia. Ordinary members, who pay 3,500 rials a year as subscription, must be Persians, but Soviet citizens may be admitted as honorary members. A member of V.O.K.S. (Society for Cultural Relationships between the Soviet Union and Foreign Countries) must be a member of the committee. Branches may be opened in the provinces.

13. Questions have been asked in the Majlis by one of the Azerbaijan Deputies whose election was opposed by the Russians why the "Allies" were preventing the export from Azerbaijan of the dried fruit crop and other products. They had put Azerbaijan into a state of siege and the Governor-General was without authority.

14. The Soviet authorities have given contracts for the asphaltting of the road from Astara via Resht to Kazvin and for some masonry bridges on the section between Astara and Resht. The rates they have accepted are higher than those normally paid by the British authorities. The specification they have laid down is for a more enduring type of surfacing than has been used by the British authorities, and it seems that they have some longer-term object in view than their war-time needs, for which, indeed, the construction of the road seems to come rather late in the day.

15. It has now been ascertained that among the conditions attaching to Stalin's offer of tanks and aircraft to the Shah (see Summary No. 48/43, paragraph 8), which included the formation of regiments of mixed Russian and Persian personnel, were the following:—

- The commander of the regiment was to be a Russian officer.
- The Persian personnel were to be selected with the approval of the Russian commander.
- The Soviet Government would pay the Russian personnel.
- The regiments were to be under the command of the Red Army.
- The regiments could not be moved from their appointed places of training—Meshed and Kazvin—nor could the material be diverted to any other purpose, without the approval of the Red Army.

#### *Corrigendum.*

In Summary No. 21/44, paragraph 8, for "Abadan" read "Abadeh."

Tehran, 4th June, 1944.



[E 3596/260/34]

No. 27.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th June.)*

(No. 247.)

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a Confidential Circular to all consuls, Persia, regarding His Majesty's Government's post-war policy towards Persia.

*Tehran, 10th June, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 27.

Sir,

*Tehran, 10th June, 1944.*

Since, when the war is over and our forces are withdrawn, the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of that security which is necessary to our interests in Persia will devolve entirely on Persian officials it is desirable that British officials should bear constantly in mind the necessity for establishing and increasing the authority and prestige of the Persian Government and its officials. Subject to the overriding consideration of the security of our war-time interests, the influence of consular officers should be directed towards inducing the senior responsible Persian official, who will in most cases be the Governor-General, Governor, or O.C., Troops, to fulfil his responsibilities. When action is taken by a Persian official as the result of persuasion or pressure by a consular officer, the British instigation should, as far as possible, be kept discreetly in the background and subordinate officials and the public should be allowed and even encouraged to believe that the Persian official concerned acted on his own responsibility and initiative. While consular officers should insist that they should be consulted in all matters where British interests may be affected and should explain clearly the conditions that our interests demand, they should discourage any tendency on the part of Persian officials to hide behind British officials or to allow the British official to do the work they should do themselves. It is particularly desirable that the prestige of the American Advisers, who are, in fact, officials of the Persian Government, should be upheld to the greatest possible degree. Consequently, when, for example, British officials assist in the distribution of tea, sugar and cloth, full credit for the distribution should be given to the Persian Government and its American Advisers. It should now be our endeavour to establish in the minds of the Persian people the impression that the Persian Government really is in authority.

It is probable that for some time to come consideration for the security of our war-time interests will demand prompt action which may necessitate the by-passing of the responsible Persian official and direct action by British Consular Officers. Such action should, however, be limited to occasions when our war-time interests are at stake and when there is reasonable ground for believing that the responsible Persian official will not take the measures which the occasion demands.

I am, &amp;c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 3597/155/34]

No. 28.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th June.)*

(No. 248.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 10th June, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of an interesting appreciation of the tribal situation in Fars, prepared by Mr. Gardener just before he left Shiraz to proceed on leave. I agree generally with Mr. Gardener's appreciation and feel that particular emphasis should be laid on the following two points, both of which were mentioned by him:—

- (1) That, although the Qashgai tribes may rally behind Nasir in the face of a common danger, the kalantars of the main tribes have no desire to be exploited again by the Soulat ed Douleh family and, given a reasonable hope of fair treatment, they will very easily be persuaded to deal direct with the Government. Our experience in Bakhtiari

with Morteza Quli Khan, a much more reliable man than Nasir, shows us what happens nowadays when a tribal chief is put into a position of paramount authority in a big tribal confederation. Similar dissensions could be expected in Qashgai between Nasir and his brothers and other rivals.

- (2) That no long-term reliance can be placed on Nasir's assurances of a desire to act according to our wishes. We should take advantage of it now, but when British troops are withdrawn Nasir will probably pose as the national hero who saved Fars from a British occupation.

2. For some time I have been endeavouring to induce the Persian Government to evolve and implement a definite policy towards the tribes. Such a policy should include at least the following points:—

- (a) Settlement of tribal land cases and the restoration of, or the grant of compensation for, lands unjustly confiscated by Reza Shah. Under continual pressure from this embassy some action has been taken, but several cases are still outstanding, notably the important case of the Mamassani lands referred to by Mr. Gardener under the heading "Methods of Application of British Policy."
- (b) The distribution among the tribes (and among other rural communities) of the essential consumer goods—tea, sugar and piece-goods—which have for a considerable time been available to town-dwellers on coupon at controlled prices. There have been many scandals in this connexion and the distribution is, even now, far from efficient; but until recently rural areas, including the tribes, have had to depend entirely on purchases on the open market at exorbitant prices. Lately, with the appointment of American advisers at a number of provincial headquarters with instructions from Dr. Millspaugh to expedite the distribution of consumer goods to rural areas, the situation may have improved to some extent. I propose to call for reports from consular officers on this point in order to ascertain whether, in fact, any improvement in distribution is now taking place.
- (c) Settlement of the tribes. This is a long-term policy, and if the settlement is to be voluntary and not, as in Reza Shah's time, forced, it must involve long-term plans and a budget of considerable proportions. Reza Shah's settlement was carried out by military force and resulted in unprecedented mortality among the flocks on which the tribes so largely depend for a livelihood, and a general lowering of the tribes' already low standard of living. To bring about the voluntary settlement of tribes in villages, the Government must plan and provide funds for assistance to the tribesmen in building villages, irrigation works, and the provision of seed, as well as medical aid and the erection and staffing of schools. It seems unlikely that the Persian Government will be able to afford to implement all these proposals for some time to come, but a beginning might well be made on irrigation works in some areas (financed, if necessary, and where possible, by private companies formed for the purpose), the provision of some seed and perhaps medical aid in the form of the travelling dispensaries which the American Director of Public Health, Dr. Avery, hopes, with an optimism which is probably fated to be disappointed, to put into commission before long to the number of forty-eight.
- (d) The creation of a body, whether a Ministry for Tribes, a section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or some form of tribal commission, whose business it would be to study the needs of the tribes, to plan for them and to represent their grievances effectively to the Central Government. Several abortive attempts have been made to set up such a body, but I have better hopes of the latest suggestion—the formation of tribal councils—and propose to press M. Hajhir to carry it out. The scheme is to form a central tribal council in Tehran, consisting of representatives of the Ministries who would be concerned with any long-term tribal policy, i.e., the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Justice, Public Health and Education, and about twelve genuine tribal representatives (not town-dwelling ex-chieftains). The recommendations of the council would be executed through provincial tribal councils, which would consist of similar departmental representatives and representatives of the tribes in the provinces concerned, presided over by the Governor-General.



3. As for British policy in respect of Persian tribes (apart from the matters discussed above), I agree with Mr. Gardener that this should be directed, firstly, towards securing our interests both during and after the war, and, secondly, towards the re-establishment of the power of the Central Government on a just and equitable basis. That the first is completely subordinate to the second, as Mr. Gardener suggests, I am not entirely convinced. Mr. Gardener rather implies that a strong Central Government would be friendly to us. Of the contrary state of affairs we have had bitter experience in the recent past, though it can be argued that in keeping the Russians at arm's length Reza Shah performed a service for us which did much to counterbalance the injustices which he inflicted upon our interests.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Ahwaz, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Hamadan, and to the Officer Commanding, Persia and Iraq Command; and without enclosure to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Bushire and Shiraz.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 28.

#### APPRECIATION OF THE TRIBAL SITUATION IN FARS.

##### Introduction.

IN recent weeks, the political atmosphere in Fars has been cleared up by certain acts of Nasir Khan, the head of the Qashgai. These are: The surrender to us of the Germans on the 23rd March, Nasir Khan's visit to Shiraz on the 1st May, when he called on the local Persian and British representatives, and finally his surrender to us on the 3rd May of the mischievous Deputy Naubakht. As Nasir Khan now states that he is ready to accept British guidance in all his actions, it is necessary to determine our policy towards him and all the tribes of Fars.

##### Present Situation.

##### 1. Attitude towards Persian Government.

All the tribes (for brief description see Appendix), but particularly the Qashgai who are politically the most important tribe of Fars and who, therefore, figure most prominently in this appreciation, are imbued with the deepest distrust—amounting practically to hatred—of the Government. This is partly due to the harsh, inefficient, and venal treatment meted out to them by the ex-Shah, and partly to the tribal nature which prizes power and independence. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Government after the events of 1941, certain tribal leaders fled from Tehran and resumed control of the tribes. Gradually the tribes were rearmed by seizing arms from Government sources, by smuggling from abroad, and by digging up weapons not surrendered in the past.

Having, through his strong personality and in virtue of the fact that he is the son of the last great Ilkhani, consolidated his own position as head of the tribe, Nasir Khan's next step was the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the Qashgai and the Boir Ahmedi—the two leading fighting tribes of South Persia—to resist disarmament by force.

There seems little doubt but that these two tribes would now act in concert if attacked by the Government, and that other tribes, such as the Mamassani and sections of the Khamseh (notably the Basiri), would refuse to aid the disarming Government forces, and might even take sides against Government.

On the Government side, the army has not yet given proof of its ability to tackle these tribes, and judging by past performance the disarmament of the present tribal *bloc* would be a severe and perhaps critical test of its fighting powers.

Thus, as between tribes and Government there is a deadlock. The Government hesitate to embark on a disarmament campaign, while the tribes have done nothing to provoke Government into action.

##### 2. Attitude towards British.

Owing particularly to the attitude of the khans of the Darrashuri and Kashguli sections of the Qashgai, the Germans who were harboured by the Qashgai were not able to bring about damage to British interests. On the contrary, when

they were in tribal—though admittedly not Qashgai—areas, Nasir initiated his policy of preserving security in Fars. For the last six months, including this spring migration, security in Qashgai areas and on adjoining roads has been relatively good. This state of affairs was not altered (although the wound still smarts), when a severe blow was given to Nasir's pride by the Persian Government who refused to allow him to become a Deputy for Shiraz. Nor is there any reason, on present showing, to think that British interests are likely to suffer at the hands of the Fars tribes, *i.e.*, not including the Boir Ahmed. Furthermore, Nasir's feelings towards us will undoubtedly have a useful repercussion on the Boir Ahmed, as the paramount chief of that tribe—Abdullah Khan Zarghampur—is a close friend of Nasir's.

This agreeable state of affairs is not due to Nasir's love and admiration for us, but more probably to the following considerations: (a) knowledge of Allied war successes and desire to be on the "right" side; (b) general desire of the khans (especially Darrashuri and Kashguli) to be on friendly terms with us so that we may act as mediators between them and the Persian Government; (c) gratitude for our return of the Qashgai Khans who were recently in Germany. This argument especially appeals to Nasir's mother, who exercises a salutary influence over him; and finally (d) desire of the Khans to further their own personal interests.

Nasir Khan and the other Qashgai Khans now stress their desire to follow our counsels. Of course, this naïve attitude must be heavily discounted, but it is probably true that, for the time being, our advice will carry considerable weight with them.

##### 3. Internal Situation.

There is, as yet, very little evidence of the attitude of the other Qashgai Khans towards Nasir save that, at the moment, they are united with him in opposing disarmament. In any case, the present state of affairs rather suits the personal interest of all the khans. They supervise security on the roads, exacting tribute money in return. They are independent, and pay no taxes. No Government official robs or worries them. In fact, they are leading the old tribal life. But some of them yearn to come and live in towns. Even Nasir and some of his family desire this. Some khans may resent Nasir's assumption of authority over them. Former inter-tribal feuds are not forgotten. Furthermore, some of the khans desire to return to their former pursuits of agriculture and stock-breeding, from which they derived wealth in the past. The situation may be roughly summarised by stating that the Qashgai in times of war or danger are united under Nasir, but that, being human, they desire peace, and peaceful conditions best serve to disintegrate the tribe.

##### 4. Economic Situation.

The standard of living in the tribes—always lower than that in the towns—has suffered markedly in the last two years. In the first place, the nomadic tribes, responding to their khans' call to arms, have largely abandoned their agricultural pursuits (corn growing and stock raising) from which some of them gained their livelihood. Secondly, tribal produce (carpets, gum tragacanth, mutton, and animal fats) has fetched lower prices because the tribesmen have had no direct access to open markets. They are obliged to sell their produce and buy their necessities through grasping intermediaries. Finally, unlike the townsmen, they have not benefited from the rationing of tea, sugar and piece-goods. It is true that the tribes have robbed farms and villages, and have exacted "protection money" from those unfortunate people who lie in their path, but this wealth has gone mainly to the khans.

As a result the tribesmen feel that they are different from and inferior to the inhabitants of towns, and, in the case of the Qashgai who are of Turkish origin, this feeling may eventually lead to separation. Unfortunately, the tendency is to blame the British for these shortages, since the British always were, and still are, the most prominent foreigners in Fars.

##### Suggested Principles of British Policy.

It is obvious that British policy in Fars must be directed towards:—

- Security of British interests (notably oil-fields) during and after the war.
- Re-establishment of the power of the Central Government.

The first objective is clearly subordinate to the second, for, if a strong Central Government existed which was friendly towards us and able to administer



the tribes justly and efficiently, there would be no need for our intervention in tribal matters. But, in the absence of such a Government, our intervention is probably necessary to protect our interests and to bring about a state of affairs favouring the re-assumption of control by the Central Government.

In intervening, however, we should avoid certain dangers. Firstly, care must be taken that we do not enter into any commitments towards one side or the other which cannot be honoured. Secondly, we should not take such action with the tribes as to cause the Persian Government to consider we have created a privileged position for them and so lead to the Government taking reprisals on them after the war when we shall be less able to protect them. Thirdly, we should take care in our dealings with the tribes not to increase their importance so that Government will eventually find it more difficult to subdue them; and finally, care should be exercised not to enhance the standing of any one tribe (like the Qashgai) or family (like Nasir Khan); otherwise our difficulties will increase.

#### *Methods of Application of British Policy.*

The first task is obviously to break the present deadlock between the tribes and the Government. The deadlock is brought about basically by disagreement between the two parties as to the abolition of the nomadic life. The Government says they should abandon the nomadic life and be sedentarised, while the tribes claim they would do this if they were confident that the Government would not molest them. As a way out of the present *impasse*, His Majesty's Embassy has now suggested to the Persian Government that a special tribal administration be now formed with the object of ensuring the efficient administration of the tribes. In order to gain the confidence of the tribes, it is suggested that (a) foreign advisers be engaged; and also, apparently (b) the tribes be given some voice in the matter by the formation of a tribal council composed of chiefs. It is presumed that one of the first tasks of this tribal administration will be the settlement of the Mamassani land claims.

This general plan, if faithfully carried out, should meet with a considerable measure of success. It is probable that a hard core of unsettled tribe may remain due to the ambitions or ignorance of their leaders, but the organised tribal *bloc* would by then have been so weakened that the minimum of forceful persuasion would be necessary. It may well be, in the case of the Qashgai, that Nasir Khan will prove a stumbling-block to tribal settlement.

But the policy of settling the tribes is a long-term one, and in the meantime there are other steps of a detailed nature which, if taken, would serve to build up the confidence necessary for the success of the general plan.

First of all it is suggested that tea, sugar and piece-goods be distributed among the tribes, but that in doing so care should be taken that the Qashgai are not privileged. Secondly, tribes might, as far as possible, be encouraged to revert to agriculture by supplying them, in suitable cases, with seed wheat and barley. Thirdly, through our intervention and interest in them, we could encourage tribesmen to visit towns for trading purposes. Fourthly, we could urge the Government to provide better medical facilities for the tribes. In the main, all the above-mentioned points are for the Persian Government to execute, but, as we are blamed for the present bad economic conditions, so presumably we should be credited for any improvement therein.

As far as we ourselves are concerned, it is suggested that the employment of suitable tribal liaison officers (and especially medical officers) should be continued. Besides collecting useful tribal information both of a basic and a day-to-day nature, suitable officers make valuable contacts in the tribes, cultivate good-will and spread useful propaganda among ignorant people. So far, British officers have not been able, for valid reasons, to extend their activities to the Boir Ahmed tribe. Yet, since this tribe is situated so close to the oil-fields, they are of considerable political importance. It is possible that the present friendliness of Nasir Khan, the Qashgai ally of the Boir Ahmed, may facilitate our penetration into their relatively unknown area. Similar opportunities may present themselves from the Khuzistan angle.

In the local interpretation of our policy it is suggested that special attention be paid to the following points, some of which have been mentioned above:—

- (a) The importance of the Qashgai, and of Nasir Khan in particular, should not be exaggerated—otherwise other tribes will tend to fall under his influence.

- (b) Nasir Khan's ambitions for increased power, on the ground that he can thereby the better protect his tribe, should be regarded with some suspicion until he has proved his good faith.
- (c) Every effort should be made to act in concert with the local Persian authorities and thus make them and the tribes believe it is the Persians, and not the British, who are directing policy. Otherwise there is a danger of a recrudescence of anti-British feeling in Persian official circles which might result in reprisals on our alleged tribal protégés.

Shiraz, 6th May, 1944.

#### Appendix.

##### *Brief Description of Tribes of Fars.*

##### *Qashgai.* (Rough population 100,000.)

Politically, the Qashgai are the most important tribe in Fars because of their tradition of fighting strength and cohesion. They are comparatively well-armed and are united under the leadership of Nasir Khan, son of the former great Ilkhani, Soulet-ed-Douleh, who died when imprisoned by the ex-Shah. Nasir is an ambitious individual possessing great force of character, and is imbued with old-time ideas of the part to be played by the Qashgai in Fars. He is bitterly opposed to the Persian Government both on account of the former harsh treatment meted out by them, and also because Government acts as a curb on his ambitions. Nasir, in his exile in Tehran, became friends with Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, paramount chief of the Boir Ahmed (*q.v.*), and with Husain Quli Rustami of the Mamassani (*q.v.*).

The Qashgai, who are now almost entirely nomadic, have their winter habitat in the region between the oilfields around Gach Seran in the north and Lar in the south-east.

##### *Mamassani.* (Rough population 26,000.)

This tribe is a sedentarised offshoot of the Boir Ahmed who border them on the north. Their neighbours to the south and east are the Kashguli section of the Qashgai. As their lands are well-watered and fertile, the Mamassani have houses, live stock and crops to lose if they become enemies either of the Government or of the surrounding tribes. They possess a certain quantity of arms and declare their readiness to defend their rights against all comers. Their natural policy is obviously to ally themselves with whichever party offers them better protection. Until the rise to power of the Qashgai, this policy has led them to side with the Government, but since the decay of the latter's power, the tendency has been for the Mamassani to reach agreement firstly with the Boir Ahmed (whom they fear most), and secondly with the Qashgai. The tribe is divided into four sections, each governed by a Kalentar, of whom the most powerful is Husain Quli, who was exiled with Nasir Qashgai and Abdullah of the Boir Ahmed. An important element in the Mamassani politics is the land claims. A certain Bushire merchant obtained rights over their lands some fifty years ago, and is now claiming ownership of nearly the whole. His claims have, in the past, been supported by the Persian Government, and the present Government appears to be following the same path. In consequence, the Mamassani have additional cause to be estranged from the Government.

##### *Khamseh.* (Rough population 85,000.)

This tribe of mixed Turkish and Arab origins is now partly nomadic and partly sedentarised. It is split up into a number of sections and has now no prominent local leader. Its traditional head, Qawam ul Mulk, has for many years lived in Tehran, and his present authority over the tribe is open to argument. Thus, although the tribe has some arms, it is of little political importance save that the Basiri section flirt with the Qashgai.

##### *Boir Ahmed.* (Rough population 30,000.)

Economically it is the most distressed tribe of Fars, partly due to its own fecklessness, and partly owing to the exactions of Government officials. By other tribes it is held up as an example of the evils of submission to Government.



The territory of this tribe is not situated in modern Fars, but on account of its alliance with the Qashgai it plays a prominent part in Fars politics. Although of purely Persian origin, it is the most feared tribe of South Persia. Raiders from this tribe range far into settled territory in pursuit of loot, and are good fighters, possessing a considerable stock of modern arms. They have never been properly subdued by the Persian Government, and British contacts with them have, unfortunately, been very limited.

The Boir Ahmedi are mainly nomadic, though the range of migration is short as their country comprises both the warm foothills and a portion of the rugged plateau itself. In its winter quarters the tribe is very close to the oil-fields at Gach Seran.

Traditionally, the tribe is divided into warring factions, but Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, since his return from exile in Tehran, has been able to extend his authority over most of the tribe. This fact, together with the agreement with Nasir Khan Qashgai to unite to resist disarmament, makes these two tribes the most important political factor in South Persia.

*N.B.*—The population figures given are the best obtainable, but they are only a guess, as no statistics are available.

[E 3598/422/34]

No. 29.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 20th June.)

(No. 250.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period of the 5th to the 11th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 12th June, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 29.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period the 5th June to the 11th June, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

THE Court of Cassation came to a decision with unusual promptness in the case of Reza Afshar, the Governor-General of Isfahan, whose appointment had been the cause of an interpellation of the Government—see Summary No. 20, 1944, paragraph 1. The decision was that his previous conviction debarred him from being appointed to a Government post. He will now be recalled from Isfahan.

2. Certain of the Deputies from Azerbaijan, not including any of those favoured by the Russians, have combined with the Democrat group of Deputies to form a new group called Liberty, which will now have a membership of about thirty.

##### *Economic.*

3. The sugar ration, in theory available at controlled prices, is to be increased from 400 to 500 grammes per head per month.

#### *Persian Forces.*

4. The statements made by Dr. Millspaugh in his interview to the press—see Summary No. 22, 1944, paragraph 9—called forth a reply from the Minister of War, which was also published in the press. The Minister pertinently asks what justification had Dr. Millspaugh, an employee of the Persian Government, for discussing in the press the affairs of the army and gendarmerie, and for creating public anxiety by his criticisms. The Government was well aware of the need for army reform, but would it not have been better if Dr. Millspaugh had consulted General Ridley before making his strictures. He had said that the

army was unnecessary and that the money spent on it could more usefully be used for agriculture, education and hygiene. That was a matter for the Persian Government to decide, but did Dr. Millspaugh think that anything could be done unless the army established and maintained security? Would not Millspaugh do better to look to his own departments? The Price Stabilisation section alone cost millions of rials and had done nothing to reduce prices. The high cost of the army was entirely due to the bad administration of the country's finances and economy.

5. A Cabinet meeting has been held to consider the budgets of the army, the gendarmerie and the police. In addition to the Ministers it was attended by the Chief of Staff, General Ridley, Colonel Schwarzkopf and Dr. Millspaugh. General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf justified the budgets they had prepared. Dr. Millspaugh said he had calculated the maximum revenue of the country for the current year at approximately 4,000 million rials, and that he could not consider allotting to the three security forces more than 40 per cent. of the total revenue—between 1,500 and 1,600 million rials. He left it to the Government to decide how the amount should be distributed between the three forces. The budget for the army amounts to over 1,500 million rials for 90,000 men, of the gendarmerie to 600 million rials for 28,000 men, and of the police for 10,000 men to 300 million rials. Dr. Millspaugh suggested that they should each have approximately the amount allotted last year, that is 1,000 million for the army, 300 million for the gendarmerie and 200 million for the police. This would entail the reduction of the army to 60,000 men and of the gendarmerie to 14,000 men.

6. The Persian Government has been informed that fifteen Anson aircraft, which are being provided by His Majesty's Government in replacement of Mohawk aircraft taken over by the Royal Air Force in 1941, will shortly be available in Mideast for delivery to the Persian Air Force. Three Dominie aircraft will also shortly be delivered for the Persian Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

##### *7. Army—*

- (i) Sarhang Khodadad to command the 8th (Khorassan) Division.
- (ii) Sarhang Mir Aslani to command the Mechanised Brigade.
- (iii) Sartip Muhsin Diba to be Director of Artillery.
- (iv) Sartip Alai to be an Inspector in the Ministry of War.
- (v) Sarhang Dadvar to be Chief of the Army Finance Department.
- (vi) Sarhang Taryan to be Assistant Chief of the Army Finance Department.

##### *Gendarmerie—*

- (vii) Sartip Mahmoud Khosrow Pahah to be Chief of the Gendarmerie, vice Sartip Setvavi, resigned.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Kerman.*

8. When in October last (see Summary No. 13, 1944, paragraph 11) operations against the Buchakchi tribe of the Sirjan district resulted in the surrender of old Hussein Khan and later of his son, Akbar Khan Shiyapur, the other Buchakchi brigand, Murad Ali Murad, remained at large with a band of followers. Operations are now being carried out by two battalions of the 7th (Kerman) Division to round these up.

##### *Fars.*

9. A small operation was successfully carried out against the Khans of Liravi (north of Bushire on the Gulf Coast) for the purpose of obliging these khans to surrender grain they had undertaken to supply—see Summary No. 20, 1944, paragraph 12. A column, 180 strong, from Shiraz occupied Hisar (half-way between Ganaveh and Bandar Dilam), whereupon the principal Liravi Khan, Muhammad Ali, fled. The grain is being transported to Bushire and the column is being withdrawn.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

10. A number of Bakhtiaris gathered in the village of Buldaji for the alleged purpose of making a concerted complaint against Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari. There is little doubt that they were instigated by the



other senior khans, who are working up opposition to Morteza Quli—see Summary No. 21, 1944, paragraph 11—and it was suspected that the real purpose of the gathering was to organise resistance. Consequently, a battalion of troops from Isfahan rounded up the village. The dissident khans, who included some of the minor khans who had supported Abul Qasim in his brief career as a rebel, surrendered without opposition and were taken to Isfahan. Some thirty rifles were recovered, of which fifteen were Brno rifles which had been captured from Government forces.

11. It is intended shortly to initiate operations for the disarmament of certain sections of the Chahar Lang Memivand Bakhtiari in the area north-west of Faridan, including the Fuladvand, the Zillaki, the Hividi, who are believed to have been responsible for the murder of Mr. Harris—see Summary No. 32, 1942, paragraph 11—and the retainers of Khajeh Mehdi Quli Moghul. A column of a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry will operate from Ali Gudar and two battalions of the Isfahan Division from Faridan.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. His Majesty's Consul-General in Tabriz reports that there is now apparently a clear policy of posting Moslems from Soviet Azerbaijan to both civil and military posts in Persian Azerbaijan. Most military officers in Tabriz are now of that category, and a Moslim Vice-Consul has been posted to the Soviet Consulate-General. The Soviet Azerbaijanis, like Soviet Armenians, are the most fervent propagators of the expansion of Russian influence.

13. The operations of the Russian survey parties, which were reported in Summary No. 19, 1944, paragraph 11, have now extended to the Kal i shur River (between Turbat i Haidari and Juimand) and to the hills south-west of Khaf (I.41.G (1941)-N.1379). It is reported that geological survey, with a view to the location of oil, forms part of the work of these survey parties.

14. A certain Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani is standing for election for the constituency of Ardebil in Eastern Azerbaijan. He is a notorious intriguer, agitator and mob orator frequently used by the Shah to work up disturbances and demonstrations, and recently particularly to fan the agitation against Seyyid Zia. It is noteworthy that his candidature is supported not only by the Shah, but strongly by the Russians.

15. An extra assistant military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Ivanov, has arrived to join the staff of the Soviet Military Attaché.

16. The Russians persist in their refusal to allow the Persian Government to locate a regiment of infantry in the Mahabad district of Azerbaijan, as they have long wished to do, although they are willing to agree to a maximum of a battalion of 300.

#### *Yugoslav Affairs.*

17. A certain Colonel Mistrovitch is now in Tehran recruiting for Marshal Tito among Yugoslavs resident in Persia. He works in the Soviet Consulate and has so far recruited some fifty-sixty men, whom he is to take to Russia. Colonel Lozitch, who was Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow until he declared for Tito, is also here, accompanied by a youth whom he introduced as Tito's son.

#### *American Affairs.*

18. A Deputy, Dr. Shafaq, spoke at some length in the Majlis in eulogy of America, Americans and American services to Persia. This had presumably the object of allaying the irritation that might reasonably be expected to have been caused to the American Embassy and the American Government by the scandalous attacks on the American advisers. Among the reasons for which Persia would be eternally grateful to America, he said, were the services of American educationalists and of Morgan Shuster and Dr. Millspaugh during his previous engagement with the Persian Government, and American support of Persia at the Peace Conference after the last war.

*Tehran, 11th June, 1944.*

[E 3766/422/34]

No. 30.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th June.)*

(No. 255.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period of the 12th to 18th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 19th June, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 30.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the Period  
12th-18th June, 1944.*

#### *Political.*

THE Prime Minister, asked in the Majlis whether he had yet come to a decision regarding the future of Dr. Millspaugh, replied that he hoped to bring about amicably a change in the methods and in the financial and economic policy of Dr. Millspaugh that would be more suitable to the needs of the country and the wishes of the people. The Government accepted full responsibility, and the Majlis could rest assured that they would maintain direct and full control over the finance and economy of the country without delegating any of their responsibility to foreign advisers. While appreciative of the services of the American advisers, the Government was also aware of their shortcomings. Employees of the Government, whether Persian or foreign, who failed to give satisfactory service would be dismissed.

2. Three months of the current financial year have passed without the budget having been presented to the Majlis. All administrations are short of funds for the payment of salaries and current expenses. The Deputies are beginning to show impatience at the delay in presenting the budget.

#### *Economic.*

3. The reopening of the Western front in Europe has brought about a fall in wholesale prices, merchants fearing that the end of the war may find them with heavy stocks on hand.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 4.—(i) Hashim Mukarram Nurzad to be Persian Consul-General at Istanbul.
- (ii) Ismail Bahadur to be Governor of Maragheh.
- (iii) Abbas Ferouhar to be Persian Chargé d'Affaires with the Greek Government in Cairo.
- (iv) Vahid Tunakabuni to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education.
- (v) Dr. Nakhai to be Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Appointments—Military.*

5. Sartip Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami to be an additional Deputy Chief of the Staff.

#### *British Affairs.*

6. Thefts of British military telephone and telegraph wire, which, on account of its high value and the difficulty of its protection, has always been an attraction to Persian thieves, recently reached alarming proportions. The police and the gendarmerie, even if they had had the goodwill, lacked the numbers and the mobility to give any effective protection, so responsibility for certain defined lengths of the line has now been assumed by the Persian army.

#### *American Affairs.*

7. A Bill has been passed by the Majlis with double urgency authorising the transfer to the American Embassy in Tehran of the ownership of 22,000 square metres of land in the vicinity of the American camp near Tehran, to be used as a cemetery.

*Tehran, 18th June, 1944.*



## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

[E 2211/23/89]

No. 31.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 103, Syria and the Lebanon, 22nd March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th April.)*

(Secret.)

## 1. General.

HIS Majesty's Minister and the G.O.C., Ninth Army, have discussed with the Syrian President and Prime Minister the revised paper regarding military security and the transfer of the native levies. On the security issue the Syrians were reluctant to commit themselves and it is now for the French to produce a draft based on our amended paper, and to negotiate with the Syrians on that basis. Considerable progress, however, was made regarding the transfer of the levies. The result of the discussions made it clear that this question should be dealt with first, and the President and Prime Minister, though on tour, have agreed to invite the French to Lattakia to discuss it. The Syrian Government are anxious to avoid further delay, as there is an increasing tendency to blame the Government for their failure to secure results.

## 3. Syria-Damascus.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Finance have not yet returned, the delay in their departure from Riyadh being caused, according to the Syrian Foreign Office, by the indisposition of Jamil Mardam. Lutfi Haffar, the Minister of the Interior, is still in Jerusalem.

The President of the Republic left Damascus on the 16th March for his tour. He was accompanied by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister, and by the Chief Secretary of Government (Dr. Najib Bey Armanazi), Dr. Shakib Jabri (Director of the Press Bureau) and various other officials.

The Prime Minister left the President's party at Homs and returned to Damascus on account of a riot which had started at a Syro-Iraqi football match on the 16th. The encroachment of the crowd on to the football ground had led to an attack on a policeman by three soldiers of the Bataillons de Levant, and a scuffle ensued, in which one BdL sergeant and one soldier lost their lives. There were upwards of twenty civilian casualties, one fatal.

On Friday, the 17th, the town remained calm, but a demonstration took place outside the Sérail and there was much shouting of "down with the French" and demands for the immediate transfer of the army. On the following day, demonstrations continued, and stones were thrown at a French soldiers' club. A French military ambulance was stoned, overturned by the crowd and burnt, and all French signs on shops have been removed or obliterated.

The Prime Minister has stated that General Beynet, when he paid his official call, assured him that he had come as General Catroux's choice and would do all he could to facilitate the handing over of the powers so ardently desired by the Syrians.

According to the Minister of Justice, as a result of an exchange of correspondence with the French, the courts hitherto known as Mixed Tribunals will in future be designated "Courts dealing with matters affecting foreigners." The judicial *conseillers'* powers have been limited to technical judicial questions only, while the Minister reserves the right of judicial supervision, transfers and appointments of officials, &c.

Dr. Kazem Daghestani has been appointed Director of *Défense Passive*, lately ceded by the French, for the Southern area, with Damascus as centre, while Sayed Zeki Baqi has been similarly appointed for the Northern area, with Aleppo as centre.

A successful three-day display has been given by the Royal Air Force under the patronage of the President of the Republic. On the second day there were some 70,000 spectators, and in the evening, at a performance of the film "Spitfire," the Mohafez of Damascus announced that donations equivalent to the cost of eight Spitfires had been received.

## 5. Homs and Hama.

The President of the Republic, with his party, has visited Homs, Hama and Selemie, and there were appropriate receptions, dinners and speeches. It appears that the President made many promises. He spoke of a new era, and said that the army would soon be in the hands of the people. Some disappointment was caused by the absence of any reference to the serious problem of the high cost of living.

The enthusiasm shown during the visit was moderate; Nationalists from the towns were sincere in their applause, but few country people took any interest.

On the day after the President left, some students in Homs staged an anti-French demonstration outside the Sérail in sympathy, they said, with "their comrades in Damascus." There have been no further developments.

## 11. The Lebanon.

The settlement of the fate of Emil Eddé has again been postponed to the next session of the Chamber, which is expected to take place early next week.

It was reported in the press on the 21st March that a Bill was to be tabled that day providing for substantial increases in the salaries of Government employees, but the question was not in the end debated. It is feared that such increases, especially if they should be extended to commercial and industrial employees, would materially contribute to inflation, and the Lebanese Government have been urged to reconsider their proposals.

Rashid Mokaddem (see Weekly Summary No. 72 of 1943), whose health has been growing steadily worse for some time, was brought back to the Lebanon from his place of confinement in Cyprus on the 21st March and died in hospital in Tripoli on the following day.

Signs of trouble have been reported in the Chekka cement works, where a lawyer, who has a grudge against the company, has been exhorting the workers to strike for a programme of improved conditions. The workers are not on strike, however, and have apparently not shown much enthusiasm for the programme.

[E 2396/23/89]

No. 32.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 104, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 19th April.)*

## 1. General.

Political interest in the Lebanon continues to centre on the question whether the Government will proceed with the motion for unseating Emil Eddé. By the 22nd March it seemed that they would, having secured the support of a sufficient number of Deputies. The French appear to have committed the error of intervening directly on Eddé's behalf with the Lebanese Government. General Beynet has also seen a number of Deputies in an attempt to persuade them to oppose the Government's motion. The first result of this was that Riad Sulh informed M. Chataigneau, who had been sent to him by General Beynet, that this French intervention in a purely internal matter was most unwelcome. He pointed out that as the French had shot Pucheu they had no grounds for objecting to the Lebanese dealing in a much milder way with a traitor. The French also intervened with the Maronite Patriarch, who wrote to the President urging that Eddé should not be expelled from the Chamber. Riad Sulh called on the Patriarch and persuaded him to withdraw his opposition. Count Ostrorog again intervened, in General Beynet's name, with members of the Government with the same result. The consequence of these interventions has been to crystallise opinion in favour of strong action against Eddé. Realising this, the French changed their tactics and on the morning of the day the motion was to be voted upon, offered to obtain Eddé's resignation, failing which, by next Friday, they will wash their hands of the whole business. This is the position at the moment. It seems quite possible that if the French fail to obtain Eddé's resignation and the Government do not move the motion on Friday, it will be moved by private members and may result in a vote of no confidence in the Government.

[29046]

p 3



The recent minor disturbances in Damascus have provided an indication of the urgent desire of the Syrians to realise their promised independence, which means to them not only the transfer of certain attributions but the visual removal of French control and the formation of an army. The Government have lost in popularity and their hold on the people has visibly diminished owing to the long-drawn-out negotiations on the transfer of powers. General Beynet and the Syrian Prime Minister deserve, however, great credit for the reasonable and understanding way in which they have dealt with a very difficult situation. They have both refused to adopt intransigent attitudes, although hard pressed by their own extremists.

#### 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period from the 20th March to 23rd March were 484 tons, a daily average of 121 tons.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The disturbances reported in last week's summary were followed by seven days of outward calm. The Director-General of Police, who had complained to the Prime Minister that his task in maintaining order was made more difficult by the provocative attitude of certain of the *Troupes Spéciales*, later, on the latter's instructions, told his commissaires that the result of the enquiry showed that the French were in no way to blame for the disturbance on the football field, and that everything possible should be done to restore good relations between the police and the *Troupes Spéciales*, who would soon become the Syrian National Army. It appears to have been successful in calming the police, who were naturally feeling very sore at the way they had been treated on the 16th March.

The Prime Minister, in his talks with General Beynet, went to the unusual length of refraining from laying the blame of the disturbances where it belonged for the sake of maintaining good relations. The French delegate also displayed a very conciliatory spirit and did not take up, as he well might have, two particularly unpleasant incidents involving the French flag: in one case the tricolour was hauled down by the mob, and in another was dragged along the streets with old shoes fastened to it and trampled upon.

It is true that French subordinate commanders in one and possibly two more distant posts, when they heard of the disturbances in Damascus, hauled down the Syrian flag and substituted the French, but these incidents were not mentioned by the Syrian Prime Minister either.

On the 25th students and townsmen tried to force a shopkeepers' strike, but the Government, anticipating some such movement, took measures to stop the demonstrations. The Prime Minister, who had left earlier in the week for Aleppo, returned to take charge.

It appears that the recent state of tension had been exploited by opponents of the Government and of the *bloc*, and that the intended strike was to have been exploited by tradesmen as a demonstration against the Government's attempt to enforce the Income Tax Law, and by the far more numerous sections of the public who are angered at the failure to check the rising cost of living.

The protocol for the transfer in principle of the Bedouin Control has been signed, but the detailed agreement is still under discussion. The Government have appointed Nouri Ibesh, a big-game hunter, as Director of Bedouin Control in the Ministry of the Interior—a nomination which led one Syrian to ask whether the Government thought they were dealing with wild animals.

#### 4. Aleppo.

When the President arrived on the 23rd March for his seven days' visit the assembled crowds were not so large as had been expected, some Aleppines holding the opinion that the Government have failed to produce the improvements which national independence requires.

In his speech at the official dinner given by the Mohafez the President made no definite statement on the question of the Syrian army.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

The recent demonstrations in Damascus were imitated on a reduced scale in Soueida. On the 20th March a crowd, composed mainly of schoolboys, demonstrated before the Sérail, shouting "We want the Army." Hussein Abd ed Din and Said Abou el Hussein, two Soueida lawyers, harangued them from the Sérail

steps, and in addition to demanding the army urged the abolition of the present régime of financial autonomy. The crowd then dispersed, without incident. On the following day there was some stone-throwing, and a few shop signs bearing inscriptions in French were defaced. On the 22nd March there was a similar demonstration at Salkhad. The Mohafez and the police have very wisely refrained from taking any measures which might have inflamed the state of public opinion, and the movement has died a natural death.

By decree of the Syrian Government, Yunis Jerbua has been elected to the post of *Juge du Statut Personnel* in succession to Hammoud Jerbua, who died recently. The Assali family are very disgruntled at this appointment, and have been canvassing for signatures for telegrams of protest, but have met with little success.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The President arrived in Lattakia on the 19th March and stayed for five days. He was well received by all communities, and on visiting each district of the Alaouites was met by the tribesmen and their leaders, with the exception only of Suleiman Murshid and Munir-el-Abbas. These two were absent also from the official banquets, but they met the President on his arrival at Lattakia and attended the reception in the Sérail. Local feeling in favour of a national army was much in evidence.

During his visit to Slénffe the President received many complaints against Suleiman Murshid, and promised that justice would be done.

When the Alaouite Administrative Council met on the 25th March (see last week's summary), all the councillors attended with the exception of Munir-el-Abbas.

#### 9. Tribal.

The long-standing dispute between the Jubbour and the Shammar of Zor (Feddagha) is not yet settled. The Contrôle Bédouin evidently had not effectively expelled the Feddagha to their pasturage in Iraq (see summaries Nos. 98 of the 16th February and 100 of the 1st March). Sheikh Jamil Muslat, leader of the southern section of the Jubbour, and his son Hawash, took the law into their own hands on the 9th March and attacked the Feddagha, inflicting casualties. The Feddagha counter-attacked on the following day, wounded Hawash and killed seven Jubbours. Casualties among the Feddagha were reported to be fifteen killed. Meizer Abdul Mohsen, chief of the Shammar of Zor, was absent in Derbas-siyeh, and appears to have taken no action either to support his tribesmen or to settle the dispute. The French authorities sent aircraft, a platoon of Meharistes and medical aid.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

In the Chamber on the 27th March an Opposition Deputy tabled a motion calling on the House to condemn Zionist efforts to make Palestine into a Jewish national home. The Prime Minister, in reply, welcomed the motion, recalled that the Government had recently strongly protested against Senator Wagner's motion in Congress, and declared that for twenty-five years he had opposed the idea of the Jewish national home in Palestine. It is believed that this statement was made primarily with the intention of strengthening his position before the climax of the Emil Eddé affair (see under "General" above), it was in any case received with considerable enthusiasm.

At the same sitting a number of Deputies moved that the President be empowered to declare war on Germany and Japan and to strengthen relations with Soviet Russia.

The Lebanese budget was at last presented to the House on the 21st March. It totals £Syr. 34,099,000, an increase of about £Syr. 12 million on last year's budget; and to it must, it is understood, be added £Syr. 13 million for the first year's working of the recently announced Five Years' Plan, and the sums required for the working of the Common Interest services now taken over by the Lebanon. National defence received a mere £Syr. 22,000, thus suggesting that no provision had been made for the acquisition of a national army beyond providing a salary for the Minister of Defence. The receipts included £Syr. 1,900,000 to be collected from the war profits tax, which has not yet been put into operation. There has been considerable press criticism at the size of the budget, and on the 27th March



a Deputy strongly condemned the inadequacy of the direct taxes and the Government's policy of increasing wages rather than reducing the cost of living.

Amongst other laws recently submitted to the Chamber are (i) the long-awaited law for judicial reform, which reinstitutes the Court of Cassation and increases the number of justices of the peace; and (ii) the law on the defence of the State, which gives the Government powers to repress treasonable activities. It should be pointed out that the unseating of Emil Eddé is not to be accomplished under this latter law, but under another law which prohibits Deputies from accepting public functions except in certain defined cases.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are expected to leave at the end of this week for Bagdad, at the invitation of the Iraq Government, and thence to proceed to Riyadh on an official visit to Ibn Saud.

Regulations were published on the 17th March governing the entry into the newly constituted Lebanese Foreign Service, and it has now been stated that candidates must present themselves before the 26th April. The first posts will be given to nominated persons; future candidates will, however, have to pass an examination, the syllabus of which has been laid down. So far, despite considerable lobbying, the Government has only settled one foreign diplomatic appointment, that of the present Minister of the Interior, Camille Shamoun, as Lebanese representative in London. They appear to have resisted a strong hint from Nahas Pasha that Taufiq Pasha Mufarrije, who is domiciled in Egypt, would be acceptable as Lebanese representative in Cairo, and to have held fast to their principle that all their representatives must be sent from the Lebanon.

The establishment of a "National Association of Lebanese Culture" has been announced. It is understood to owe its inception to the Apostolic Delegate and Cardinal Tappouni, and to number amongst its members several prominent Christian Opposition Deputies. Moslems are understood to regard it with some suspicion.

[E 2300/23/89]

No. 33.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 105, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th April.)*

#### 1. General.

GENERAL BEYNET made a last intervention with the Lebanese Government on the 29th March in favour of Emil Eddé. He suggested that the motion for unseating him should be postponed until the 31st March, and stated that in the meantime the French authorities would endeavour to secure his resignation from the Chamber, failing which they would take no further action. The Lebanese Government agreed, but the intervention seems on the whole to have stiffened their attitude, the Prime Minister, in particular, declaring categorically that Eddé would be out of the Chamber before he himself left for Riyadh on the 2nd April.

On the 31st March, the resignation not having been offered, the case was at last brought before the Chamber in the form of a private member's motion asking the Government to pass a law for his expulsion. The Prime Minister replied that his case was already covered by a clause in the Electoral Law of 1934, which provides for the unseating of any Deputy who accepts "remunerative office" in Church or State. Another Deputy thereupon moved that Emil Eddé should be expelled, and the motion was carried, 34 Deputies voting for it, 8 being absent and 8 abstaining.

Following a decision by the Lebanese Government to establish diplomatic missions in Damascus, Cairo, Bagdad, London, Algiers and Washington, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has handed His Majesty's Minister a note requesting the *agrément* of His Majesty's Government to the appointment of Camille Bey Shamoun as Minister in London.

On the 29th March General Beynet left Beirut for Damascus, where he exchanged visits with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, during which he reiterated his wish to facilitate the transfer of powers. The Franco-Syrian meeting to discuss the Troupes Spéciales took place on the 3rd April, the French being represented by General Beynet and Count Ostrorog. Agreement was not reached on the questions of command and technical services, and the discussions were adjourned until the 6th April.

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The President returned on the 30th March, having cut short his tour on account of bad weather. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Finance have returned from Saudi Arabia, and the Minister of the Interior from Palestine.

There have been attempts during the week by opponents of the Government to foment disturbances, but without success. Certain merchants of Damascus, while declaring their readiness to contribute to the national exchequer, are expressing dissatisfaction at the Finance Department's assessments for income tax, and at the alleged injustices of the Ministry of Supply in the matter of import and export licences.

A few days ago the Prime Minister lost his temper with an Aleppine journalist who had enquired whether it was true that he intended to resign, and ordered the man's arrest. After a good deal of argument the order was cancelled, but it is thought that the Prime Minister's political opponents will make the most of this ill-judged and "unconstitutional" lapse.

#### 4. Aleppo.

During an extensive tour of the Mohafezat the President was well received by the public, who were pleased to see in him an active leader of independent Syria. In appealing for national unity, the President was at pains to reassure the minorities, and is considered to have increased both his popularity and his authority.

Textile prices continued to rise during the week, and the absence of a satisfactory reply to complaints against the Government's failure to achieve a policy of price control caused disappointment.

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The soldier of the Troupes Spéciales killed in the recent riot in Damascus (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March: "Damascus") was an Alaouite of Massief. Although it is not customary to arrange for burial in their home town of those who die on service, the body of this soldier arrived in Massief an hour or so before the time of the Syrian President's visit. Whether or not this was intended by those responsible to be an act of provocation, public feeling is hardening in favour of the early creation of a national army.

Since the President's visit the Mohafez has adopted a friendlier attitude towards Ibrahim Kinj, who has now become a supporter of the Nationalist party rather than of the French. Kinj has been elected Vice-President of the Alaouite Administrative Council under the presidency of the Mohafez.

News of the arrival of British troops in the Slenfie area has had a salutary effect upon Suleiman Murshid, who immediately telegraphed to the Syrian President claiming to be a strong supporter of national independence and apologising for his absence when the President arrived in his district.

#### 9. Tribal.

A dispute between the Shammar Khrossa and the Agaidat threatens to involve the Iraqi Shammar, who are reported to be gathered along the frontier. The Agaidat and other semi-sedentary tribes—the Baggara, Wulda and Afadla—fear an attack by the nomads and are resolved to stand together. The British Political Officer at Deir-az-Zor has suggested to the Political Adviser at Mosul that the Iraqi Shammar should be induced to withdraw. Colonel des Essars states that he has sufficient forces available to deal with any emergency. The British military representative in East Syria, however, believes that the French would not be sorry to see the situation deteriorate, and that they may be expected to favour the nomads—a policy already indicated by the behaviour of the Contrôle Bédouin Officer in the dispute between the Wulda and the Fedaan reported in previous Summaries. There are unconfirmed but persistent reports that the French are issuing arms to the Bedouin.

Fighting has ceased between the Jubbour and the Feddagha (see last week's Summary), a corridor having been established between the two tribes.

#### 10. Frontier.

At the routine frontier meeting between Turkish officials and the Officier Frontalier held recently at Kamichlie the kaimakam was present for the first time. The question of the status of the Syrian representative was not raised.



There has been a considerable increase in the smuggling of gold from Syria into Turkey, with a consequent drop in the value of Turkish paper money in Kamichlie.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government took police precautions against any possible unrest resulting from the expulsion of Emil Eddé from the Chamber (see under "General" above), but in the event the case aroused little feeling except amongst politicians and no disturbances of any kind have occurred; indeed, the general feeling appears to be that the action taken, although much overdue, was justified and gave a welcome proof of the Government's determination to further Lebanese independence. The French authorities enquired next day whether the action of the Chamber would be followed by any repressive measures by the Government against Emil Eddé, and were told in reply that this depended entirely on Eddé's future attitude, and in particular on whether he continued his previous attempts to arouse feeling between Christians and Moslems. A letter from the Maronite Patriarch expressing approval of the Government's recent Anti-Treason Bill was published in the press two days after the expulsion of Eddé, and was generally taken to imply that he endorsed it.

On the 1st April the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Chief of Protocol left for Damascus on their way to Bagdad and Riyadh. The Prime Minister had previously explained to the Chamber that the object of their visit was to strengthen the ties of friendship between the Lebanon and two important Arab countries, and was given a vote of approval.

Discussions are still proceeding between the Government and the Beirut merchants regarding the War Profits Tax. The Government, despairing of succeeding in any attempt to collect arrears of this tax, are endeavouring to come to an agreement whereby the merchants would compound for all arrears by a jointly guaranteed payment of £Syr. 6 million; if they succeed, their intention is to make similar arrangements with Lebanese merchants not in Beirut, with foreign companies and with concessionary companies. The amount asked from the Beirut merchants seems extremely small by comparison with the large profits which many of them are generally believed to have made, and the agreement is likely to be subjected to considerable criticism on this score, but so large a sum from this tax has already been earmarked in advance to pay for certain items in the budget, such as the Five-Year Plan, that the Government are obliged to resort to every available means of collecting funds. Attempts are at last being made to compel merchants to keep proper books, in pursuance of the recently promulgated *Code de Commerce*, and the imposition of an income tax, based on the Palestine model, is envisaged as soon as the merchants have been brought into line.

A question was asked in the Chamber on the 28th March on the Government's intention as regards amending the Constitution to abolish its confessional basis. The Prime Minister replied that the Government were prepared to consider this when all Deputies were agreed on its desirability. The question is one on which the country could easily become divided into two sharply opposing factions, the better and more progressive elements realising that the amendment is an essential preliminary to the establishment of an efficient administration and a united Lebanon, whilst clerical and other reactionary circles see in it a fatal blow to the continuance of their prestige and influence. It is known that the Government are convinced that the issue cannot safely be raised so long as their own position and the independence of the country as a whole are (at least in their opinion) still threatened by French intrigue.

[E 2451/23/89]

No. 34

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd April.)  
(No. 30.)  
Sir,

Beirut, 12th April, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 31st March the Lebanese Government expelled M. Emil Eddé from the Chamber of Deputies for his action in accepting office from the French after the *putsch* of the 11th November last.

Eddé has been widely regarded as a traitor to the cause of Lebanese independence ever since the events of November, but the Government did not, until a few days ago, feel sufficiently secure to take action against him. Their hesitation seems to have been due mainly to the President of the Council, who is

always extremely sensitive to any current which might threaten his position, and who feared, not without good reason, that, in taking action against Eddé, he would have to reckon with the Grand Sérail.

The French, on their side, naturally made the most of this nervousness. As soon as it appeared that the Government had secured a positive promise of support from a safe majority of Deputies, they expressed their disapproval of any sanctions being taken against Eddé by every possible means, including a personal intervention on the part of the Délégué Général himself, and a letter which the Maronite Patriarch was persuaded to address to the President of the Republic.

At the last moment, however, and after the debate in the Chamber had been postponed more than once, the French appear to have wavered; and the Maronite Patriarch having been won over by the Government no further serious opposition was to be feared. On the 31st March, therefore, a motion was debated, and carried by a large majority, excluding Eddé from the Chamber on the grounds that he had, by taking office on the 11th November, violated article 26 of the Electoral Law of the 2nd January, 1934, prohibiting Deputies from accepting remunerative posts in Church or State.

After the debate the Government took certain police precautions, especially in Eddé's district of Mount Lebanon. So far, however, there have been no signs of trouble and, on the whole, the position of the Government seems to have been strengthened by their decisive, if tardy, action.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the United Kingdom representative to the F.N.C.L.

I have, &c.

(For the Minister),

D. W. LASCELLES.

[E 2450/23/89]

No. 35.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, Secret, No. 106—Syria and the Lebanon, 12th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 22nd April.)*

#### 1. General.

Further discussions between the Syrians and the French concerning the transfer of powers took place on the 3rd and the 6th April. The protocol for the transfer of the Bedouin control was finally signed, but the deadlock over the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* has not yet been broken. The atmosphere seems to have been vitiated to some extent by a tactless attempt on the part of the Syrian Minister of Defence to insist that the future National Army should be placed, in practice as well as in theory, under Syrian command. The French for their part refused to accept the quite reasonable Syrian proposal that the army should be placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, as the commander of the United Nations forces in this theatre of the war, leaving it to him to dispose of it as he thinks fit. (The Syrians are well aware that the Commander-in-chief would hand the army back to the French command, but for reasons of prestige and "face" they greatly prefer this roundabout method to the alternative of themselves handing it back direct.) At a subsequent meeting between the Syrian authorities and His Majesty's Minister, the hare raised by the Minister of Defence was duly dealt with; but as an *impasse* had already been reached with the French, a new formula was proposed in an endeavour to reconcile the two points of view. The essence of this is that the Syrian Government should, in fact, hand back their army direct to the French command; but should emphasise that they do so as a contribution to the war effort of the United Nations as a whole, and at the express wish of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East. The Syrians promised to consider this formula further, and it is hoped that by adopting it they will be able to bridge the gulf.

A revised version of the British minimum military requirements in regard to the transfer of certain powers (Serials I and III, "Operations" and "Security"), has now been handed to both Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

There is evidence of the continued arrival of numerous French officers from North Africa and other French possessions. Many of these newcomers are of an undesirable character, and their presence is bitterly resented by the better French elements.



3. *Syria-Damascus.*

There has been some speculation during the week as to the possible fall of the Government, and there are signs of increasing popular opposition to the Nationalist faction. Lutfi Haffar, the Minister of the Interior, has returned to Damascus, but not, apparently, to his office. This is due partly to ill-health, but also to unwillingness to co-operate with the Prime Minister.

There has been a difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. Before the departure of the Syrian delegation to Riyadh in February, the Minister of Finance had stipulated that he should be appointed chairman of the Syrian Commission of the Supreme Council of Common Interests, and a draft decree was prepared to that effect. When he found on his return that the appointment had been given to Sayed Ihsan el-Sherif he complained to the Prime Minister and spoke of resigning. The affair has been settled satisfactorily, but there remains a lack of harmony among members of the Government. The Prime Minister realises the importance to the Government of maintaining unity until the negotiations with the French for the transfer of powers are concluded.

The President of the Republic has been taken seriously ill with duodenal ulcer.

9. *Tribal.*

Following a request made by the political officer at Deir ez-Zor to the political adviser at Mosul, Sheikh Sfuq el Ajil of the Iraqi Shammar has come from Iraq to negotiate a peace with the Agaidat, thus avoiding what might have been a serious clash (see last week's Summary). A tribal conference has been arranged.

The Fedaan have hopes of arranging a tribal conference at Palmyra under the auspices of French Bedouin control officers to settle their disputes with the Wulda and Afadla. The intention of the Emir Mujhim is doubtless to undermine the prestige of the Mohafez of Euphrates, whose committee he refused to accept (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March). The Syrian Prime Minister is taking steps to ensure that any such conference will be held under the authority of the Mohafez.

11. *The Lebanon.*

There has been no further repercussions of the expulsion of Emil Eddé from the Chamber, apart from muttered threats from his remaining followers in the Mont Liban. The Easter holidays, as usual, caused an almost complete suspension of both Government business and political activity, and the country is quiet.

Nominations for the three bye-elections to be held on the 23rd April must be in by 13th April. So far, three names have been mentioned as candidates for the one vacant seat in North Lebanon, one of whom is strongly backed by the President and is therefore a strong favourite. As regards the two seats in Mount Lebanon, the Government have two candidates (both of them politically sound but of doubtful moral character), and the main interest centres on whether Taufiq Awad will stand against them. In any case, the Government's powers are likely to prove adequate to ensure the return of their own men.

Criticism of the Government is at present directed chiefly against their administrative extravagance and their failure to produce a plan of fiscal reform. To meet this latter charge, Camille Shamoun, the Acting Minister of Finance, has granted an interview to the press and has explained the Government's ideas as regards the imposition of increased direct taxation, including income tax. This appears to have been well received, although one opposition newspaper comments that such measures, however desirable, will be difficult to get past a Chamber composed for the greater part of property-holders and merchants.

[E 2495/706/65]

No. 36.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th April.)

(No. 29.)

Sir,

Beirut, 5th April, 1944.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 165 of the 30th March, I have the honour to submit the following report on the origin, constitution and powers of the Supreme Supply Council and its dependent Advisory Boards.

2. The following Advisory Boards have been set up and are already functioning:—

- Joint Medical Advisory Board.
- Joint Agricultural Advisory Board.
- Joint Transport Advisory Board.
- Joint Paper Advisory Board.
- Joint Textile Advisory Board.
- Joint Iron and Steel Advisory Board.

3. Appendix A contains lists of commodities upon which each board is competent to advise.

4. The formation of a Miscellaneous Commodities Advisory Board has been agreed upon, but the board has not yet held its first meeting. This board will deal with all the commodities not already covered by the other boards (Appendix A 5).

5. The work of all of the boards is co-ordinated by a Joint Supply Council.

6. Although the setting-up of the Joint Medical Advisory Board was originally opposed by the French, it was finally agreed upon, and the first meeting was held on the 4th October, 1943.

7. The delay in setting-up this board did not result in the holding back of medical supplies since the bulk indent had been passed to M.E.S.C. several months before agreement was finally reached. At that time the local Governments distrusted the Office Pharmaceutique, which had been set up by the French for the control of the import and distribution of medical supplies, and had little confidence in its integrity. Although we held the same view as the local Governments, it was considered inadvisable to retard the progress of pharmaceutical imports under the bulk indent.

8. It should be understood that the holding-up of essential supplies referred to in my letter related only to the freezing of items imported by the U.K.C.C. which actually arrived in the middle of our negotiations. In particular, tyres, which were held in the Customs on U.K.C.C. account, were not released, owing to the blatant corruption existing in the French organisation for tyre distribution. So grave were the irregularities of this service, that the French themselves had to initiate a serious investigation. In this connexion I would draw your attention to the Minister of State's telegram No. 371 of the 30th November to me, repeated Saving to you.

9. The machinery for screening and passing on import licences functioned in a completely normal manner at the time of M. Massigli's letter of the 17th January, 1944, and the Commission Supérieure du Ravitaillement was still meeting at that time.

10. The Joint Supply Council originated in the necessity for a senior board for the co-ordination of the work of the various Advisory Boards, and was set up after the dissolution of the C.S.R. on the 22nd January, 1944. This body derived its authority from decrees issued by the Délégué Général, and one of the consequences of General Catroux's agreement of 22nd December with the States is that the Délégué Général will no longer issue such decrees, all legislative powers being now vested in the local Governments.

11. The Joint Supply Council is composed of five members, one Syrian, one Lebanese, one French, one American and one British, the French, American and British members being advisers to the Syrian and Lebanese members. The decree which created the Joint Supply Council and defines its powers is attached at Appendix B.

12. The Office Economique de Guerre continues to function, though the monopolies which it enjoyed with regard to various imports have been removed by the Governments in joint agreement. We have not taken any part in the negotiations concerning the future administration of the Office Economique de Guerre, and have not been invited to do so.

I have, &amp;c.

E. L. SPEARS.



*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 107, Syria and the Lebanon, 19th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 1st May.)*

(Secret.)

### 1. General.

IN view of the Syrian President's illness, no further discussions have taken place between the Syrians and the French concerning the transfer of powers. It is evident from the general expression of sympathy towards the President, particularly in those parts of Syria which he visited recently, that the present Government, with which he has become so closely identified, owes much to his personality.

The help given by the Ninth Army, who immediately provided medical specialists with blood-transfusion apparatus, has been most gratefully acknowledged by the Syrian authorities, and has had an excellent propaganda effect. It is generally believed, and probably with reason, that without this help the President would have died.

The Lebanese President has received a telegram from Ibn Saud, despatched the day after the Lebanese delegation had reached Riyadh, announcing his decision to recognise the independence of the Lebanon.

### 2. Wheat.

Recent rains have improved the prospect of a good harvest.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Speculation continues as to how the Government will face the reopening of Parliament on the 22nd April. The public have expressed dissatisfaction with the Ministers of Interior, Public Instruction, Supply and National Economy, but it is thought possible that Deputies may be persuaded not to press their criticisms in view of the President's illness, which will prevent him from taking part in public affairs for some considerable time.

The Army question will be an important issue, and some Syrians are doubtful whether the Chamber will agree to a vote of some 30 million Syrian pounds for an army which is to continue for all practical purposes under French command. The suggestion is now being revived in certain circles in Damascus that Syria should be content to take over a few battalions, which could then be used as the foundation for a small national force, imbued with Syrian rather than French loyalties.

### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Euphrates.*—There is at present a lack of confidence both in the local administration and in the Central Government. The Mohafez feels that he may be removed in favour of a member of the Nationalist bloc. He has been criticised as being weak, but his task is made more difficult by the lack of public spirit among his critics.

The period of adjustment following the transfer of the Bedouin Control to Syrian authority presents many difficulties to a Mohafez, whose duty it must be to induce the tribal sheikhs to accept that authority at the outset, and it is natural that French officers, while executive power remains in their hands, should tend to ignore the local Government representative. For instance, the two Mohafezes were given full scope to preside at the Shammar-Agaidat conference, but when Capitaine Briaux, the French Bedouin Control Inspector, though acting under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, arranged the Fedaan-Wulda conference at Aleppo and appointed himself as President, he did so against the expressed wishes of the Mohafez of the Euphrates. It was subsequently decided that the Emir Shayesh of the Muwali should be President. Such problems will continue to exist until the respective responsibilities of the Syrian authorities, the Bedouin Control and the French Military Commander are more clearly defined.

Prospects for the harvest are good, and it is unlikely that there will be any serious disturbance in East Syria while Allied troops remain in the area.

There has been an outbreak of typhus on both banks of the Euphrates between Deir ez-Zor and Abu Kemal. The Syrian Health authorities, assisted by the British, are taking active measures.

*Jezireh.*—No detailed reports received.

### 10. Frontier.

In recent weeks there have been cases of Turkish guards taking men and flocks from the Syrian side of the frontier in areas near Aleppo. Clashes have been avoided and on two occasions restitution has been made on the demand of British units or of the French Frontier Officer.

### 11. The Lebanon.

Nominations for the three by-elections which are to take place on 23rd April were received up till 13th April. There appear to be three serious candidates for the North Lebanon vacancy and four for the two Mount Lebanon vacancies. The Government are strongly backing one candidate for each seat, and, with the means at their disposal, are expected to ensure their election. Little interest has so far been displayed by the population. None of the candidates is of high standing, and two in Mount Lebanon are of particularly low moral character, so that in any case the level of the Chamber will not be raised by the result. The usual complaints of French intervention, so far quite unsubstantiated, have been received from North Lebanon.

The Government's attempts to compound with the Beirut merchants in regard to the payment of arrears of War Profits Tax have come to a standstill, as was generally expected. The Budget is still being slowly examined, but is not expected to be ready before next month at the earliest. The other taxation measures are still being studied, but there appears to be no intention of putting them into force before next year.

The Lebanese Government have formed a large committee, composed of representatives of all communities and of the principal commercial associations, to collect funds for the purchase of Spitfire aircraft for the R.A.F.

The Lebanese Minister of the Interior has protested unofficially to the French against their action in establishing, or proposing to establish, a number of new Sûreté posts in the Bekaa and South Lebanon, on the grounds that these posts are not needed for purposes of military security and that their establishment is provocative. It is understandable that the Government should be worried at any possible extension of French political activities in the Bekaa, in view of their own weakness in that troublesome area.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 108, Syria and the Lebanon, 26th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th May.)*

### 1. General.

THE Lebanese Mission has returned from Saudi Arabia. The question of Arab unity was discussed, and it appears that Ibn Saud's discouragement of any political Pan-Arab conference before the end of the war has fortified the Lebanese Christians, including the President, in their aversion to the idea of federation. It is considered unlikely, therefore, that the Lebanese Prime Minister will press for a conference at present. The attitude of the Syrian Government towards an early conference, though Pan-Arab feeling is stronger in Syria, will no doubt be influenced by the Syrian President, who is strongly attached to Ibn Saud.

Messages have been received by both Syrian and Lebanese Governments from the Imam Yahya of Yemen acknowledging the independence of their respective States.



## 3. Syria—Damascus.

At the reopening of Parliament on the 22nd April there was a good attendance of Deputies, and all the Ministers, with the exception of the Minister of Finance who is attending the Financial Conference in Cairo, were present. The President is still confined to bed, but has been able to study a number of draft laws which are soon to be submitted to the Chamber.

After the conclusion of the formal business, a proposal signed by fifty Deputies was read expressing their wish that the Chamber should present a Spitfire to the R.A.F. The proposal was adopted.

In reply to questions, the Prime Minister stated that he agreed that the educational system was faulty, but claimed that, since it had been in force for a quarter of a century, its modification would require both thought and time. With regard to the internees, he said that the efforts of the President in this respect had been successful, that many had been released, and that the Government were now endeavouring to arrange for the release of the remainder. The French, he said, had submitted two schemes regarding the cession of the Army. In each of them some points were not acceptable and some required study, but the most recent conversations had been encouraging. The illness of the President had, however, caused a temporary hold-up in negotiations. The Prime Minister repudiated the idea that the Government was taking over only the shadow and not the substance of the attributions of sovereignty as some of the Deputies had suggested, and added that Syrian sovereignty would be complete, more complete in fact than that in "certain neighbouring countries." He summed up by saying that all the other attributions, with the exception of the *Sûreté Générale*, had now been taken over.

It is probable that the Syrians will press their claim for control also of the *Séquestre des Biens Ennemis*. The French have been opposed to the transfer of this service on the grounds that the Syrians, who are not at war, can have no concern with the properties involved.

The Syrian Government have decided to send diplomatic Missions to Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algiers, Great Britain and the United States and to establish Consulates-General in Amman, Jerusalem, Bombay and Rio de Janeiro.

## 11. The Lebanon.

In the by-elections the two Government candidates for Mount Lebanon, Farid el-Khazen and Khalil Abu Jaoudeh, were returned with large majorities, but Nadra Issa Khoury, the candidate for North Lebanon, who had been supported previously by the Government, withdrew his candidature at the last minute on the advice of the Prime Minister, leaving Joseph Karam, who had strong local backing, to win a straight fight against Hassib Jahjah, who stood as a member of the Constitutional, that is, the pro-Government, party.

The Mount Lebanon result caused little comment. The President and four members of the Government, including the all-important Minister of the Interior, come from that region and the return of their candidates was a foregone conclusion.

In North Lebanon the result has been regarded as a blow to the prestige of the Government, although one of the principal factors which led to the success of Karam, whose family have long been influential in the neighbourhood, was his action in addressing a letter to the Prime Minister two days before the polling, in which he denied in the strongest terms any accusation of being a tool of the French and affirmed his intention of supporting the Government and the cause of Lebanese independence.

The French did not interfere in any way in these elections. There was, however, a certain amount of interference—destruction of ballot boxes, picketing of polling booths, etc.—by Karam's supporters.

[E 2966/23/89]

No. 39.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 109, Syria and the Lebanon, 3rd May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th May.)

## 1. General.

ON the 27th April the arrival of Joseph Karam, the new Deputy for North Lebanon, to take up his seat, was the occasion of a serious breach of the peace in Beirut. Karam himself, although previously known as a French protégé, had

renounced their support (see last week's summary), and had complied with the Government's request that he should enter Beirut with only a few cars. His party was, however, joined by a large crowd of Opposition elements at the entrance to the town. In accordance with the deplorable local custom, many carried fire-arms. The police cordons proved inadequate to restrain the crowd. The police barriers were broken and a large crowd formed outside the Parliament building. A strong police cordon holding Parliament Square was also broken through by the procession, which was accompanied, it is alleged, by some *Sûreté* men. There were certainly cars carrying French flags in the lead; on one of these was M. Chataigneau's personal bodyguard. There seems to be no doubt that this manifestation was deliberately organised by the supporters of Eddé and those elements who have been steadily worked up since last November against the Government's alleged anti-Christian policy.

After Karam had entered the building a section of the crowd attempted to follow him. At this point an n.c.o. in French uniform climbed up the ironwork over the main door and fixed a French flag over it. He was shot in the act of doing so. A general mêlée ensued, during which a hand grenade was thrown into the entrance hall, wounding the second-in-command of the police. One gendarme and four civilians were killed and some twenty persons, including a number of police and gendarmes, wounded before order was restored by the police.

Meanwhile the sitting of the Chamber was opened. The Prime Minister deplored the fact that there should be in the country a group of traitors who would violate Parliament and what it stood for. The Government's leniency, he said, had been mistaken for weakness, and force must now be used to suppress these traitors for the safety of the country. A declaration by Karam was read in which he dissociated himself from the incidents and reaffirmed his loyalty to independent Lebanon. A vote of confidence in the Government was then passed unanimously.

There seems to be no doubt that French troops in the telephone exchange opposite Parliament opened fire, whether because some shots fired by the gendarmerie hit the building or on their own initiative has not yet been established. Many eye-witnesses assert that there were French officers (or men wearing French officers' uniform) amongst the crowd. There were undoubtedly a number of French flags carried by persons in the procession (it is asserted that French lorries distributed French flags in the morning). It is widely believed that French agents working with Eddé and his supporters organised what was meant to be a movement to overthrow the régime. His Majesty's Minister at once conferred with General Beynet, who asserted that he was in no way concerned with the manifestations. General Beynet's attitude subsequently stiffened, and on the 29th April he handed the President of the Republic a strong note of protest against the Government's attitude. The Lebanese have replied, pointing out that, although the attitude of General Beynet himself has been perfectly correct, he does not appear to have been able to control French elements in the Lebanon who have not ceased carrying out subversive activities.

Meanwhile a joint Anglo-French enquiry has been set up, and the Lebanese are carrying on a parallel enquiry presided over by competent magistrates. The curfew, imposed by the Lebanese Government on the night of the incident, was raised on the 1st May and the town is now quiet.

The news of the incident caused great indignation throughout the country. There were some demonstrations but no breaches of the peace. Both in the Bekaa and South Lebanon the political officers successfully used their influence to discourage undue excitement.

## 2. Wheat.

Purchases during the period the 23rd to 27th April amounted to 450 tons of wheat, 867 tons of barley and 663 tons of other adulterants, a total of 1,980 tons and a daily average of 396 tons.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Government now faces opposition of two kinds. There is a group of intelligent and genuinely patriotic Deputies, such as Nazem Qudsi and Rushdi Kekhia of Aleppo, whose criticism of the Government is unrelenting but generally constructive, and several young Damascenes, including Sabri el-Assali and Ahmed Sharabati, both members of the Chamber, who call themselves "Progressives." There are others whose adherence to the group is due primarily to their desire for the early transfer of the army. On the whole this is a healthy opposition.

[29046]

q



There is a second group, however, composed of reactionary elements, certain Alaouite leaders, for instance, and pro-French Deputies, in particular the Emir Mujhim, who sees advantage in the fact that members of the more genuinely patriotic group have blamed the Prime Minister for the delay in the transfer of the army, and is rallying some of the more simple-minded provincial Deputies to what he claims to be the Prime Minister's support. The real object of these reactionaries is to maintain their feudal control at the expense of the Government's authority.

Following the disturbances in Beirut the Government took measures to prevent any attempt at anti-French demonstrations. The Prime Minister had already shown by his handling of recent Moslem-Christian disputes an appreciation of the fact that disturbances only weaken the authority of the Government and serve the purposes of elements who would welcome its discredit.

Colonel Oliva-Roget broadcast a message by wireless saying that he wished to assure the population that the French had no connexion with the Beirut disturbances, or with the incident at the Damascus football ground on the 16th March. He explained that the French position, as recently defined by General Beynet, was one of friendship and co-operation. This turned out not to be a very happy idea, on the principle of "qui s'excuse s'accuse."

#### 9. Tribal.

There are repeated indications that certain French elements are attempting to embarrass the Syrian Government by causing unrest among the tribes in the Jezireh, although the Délégué Adjoint has assured the political officer at Deir es-Zor that he has no knowledge of such activities, and there is no evidence that senior French officers are in any way implicated. The Mohafez of the Jezireh has sent a report on the matter to Damascus, and has asked that a committee of enquiry should be appointed under a Syrian Minister.

The holding of the abortive Fedaa-Wulda conference in Aleppo, which was arranged by the French Bedouin Control Inspector, has led to the postponement also of the final Shammar-Agaidat conference, at which the Emir Mujhim, now in Damascus, was to have been one of the arbiters. The consequent delays, which are to the detriment of Syrian prestige, have created the impression that less creditable French elements are interested in a postponement, and that similar manoeuvres may be expected so long as the French Bedouin Control officers retain their executive powers.

It has now been decided to hold the Shammar-Agaidat conference on the 6th May in the presence of the Mohafez of the Jezireh and the Moutassarif of Mosul.

#### 10. Frontier.

No progress has yet been made in the investigations concerning the reported abduction by the Turks of two Syrians of the Garde Légère. The Turkish authorities having refused either to produce the two men or to allow them to make a statement to the Frontier Commission, the matter remains under negotiation between the French délégué at Aleppo and the Vali's office at Antioch.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The prestige of the Lebanese Government, which had suffered on account of the result of the North Lebanon bye-election, has been strengthened as a result of the incidents reported in paragraph 1. The Phalange, Najjade and other organisations have published manifestoes calling on their members to support the Government in their struggle for Lebanese independence, and there is a general hope that the Government will not weaken in its determination to stamp out subversive elements. The failings of the internal administration have been temporarily forgotten. Popular demand for the transfer of the Sûreté and the armed forces has increased.

In Zahle on the 29th April French marines from Beirut and airmen from Rayak beat up a lieutenant of the Troupes Spéciales who, when asked "whether he favoured the French or the British," replied: "Neither; I am a Lebanese." Another Lebanese who came to his assistance was also beaten up. There were some slight incidents between French and Zahliots next day, but the French Prévôté Police and gendarmerie patrols sent out by the Mohafez restored order.

By what may have been an unfortunate coincidence M. Pruneaud, ex-Conseiller Administratif, visited Saïda on the 28th April. His visit appears

to have been a purely personal affair, but he was recognised on entering the town, and a strong protest, signed by relations of the victims of the November crisis, was telegraphed to the Government in Beirut.

On the 29th April Royal Air Force Spitfires gave a display to which the Lebanese President and Government and all Lebanese and Allied notables were invited. Many thousands of spectators attended, and the display was generally voted a success. The Lebanese Government's fund for the purchase of Spitfires, which is aiming at outdoing the combined results of Damascus and Aleppo, is mounting steadily.

[E 3128/23/89]

No. 40.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 110, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd May.)*

#### 1. General.

DURING the week following the incidents of the 27th April the Lebanese authorities showed signs of considerable nervousness regarding French intentions. As a result of strong rumours that the French would take some form of violent action against them, the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of the N.F.A., who had not been warned, spent the night on the 4th/5th May away from their homes. It is tolerably certain that these rumours were put about by disaffected Frenchmen; but as nothing came of them the atmosphere is now much calmer. There is good reason to believe that General Beynet, at about the same date, addressed the corps of French officers in Beirut and told them in no uncertain terms to refrain from meddling in politics.

The two committees of enquiry, Anglo-French and Lebanese, are still at work. The Lebanese committee have accepted an invitation from the Anglo-French committee to provide witnesses for interrogation by the latter. The Lebanese authorities are reported to have convoked in all some seventy persons for interrogation; but the Prime Minister has stated that only nineteen have been detained for trial. There has been general approval throughout the Lebanon, particularly in the Bekaa, of the Government's firm attitude. Indications so far available suggest that the Government intend to play down as far as possible any evidence of French complicity which may come to light.

The Syrian Prime Minister informed Colonel Oliva-Roget on the 2nd May that the Syrian Government did not propose to make any *démarche* in connexion with the incidents of the 27th April, but that they were watching the situation carefully.

There have been two discussions during the week between the Syrian Ministers and General Beynet concerning the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, but the results are not yet known.

#### 2. Wheat.

Purchases during the period 28th April to 3rd May amounted to 1,649 tons of wheat, 1,251 tons of barley and 348 tons of other adulterants, a total of 3,448 tons and a daily average of 575 tons.

The Cereals Commission have made a tour of Syria and the Lebanon in order to assess the prospects of the crop to consider the question of a reduction in prices. It is evident that the total quantity of barley and wheat available to be bought will be at least 300,000 tons, and, in view of the recent rains, may even be as much as 340,000 tons. The commission has therefore decided that the existing security stocks, amounting to four months' supply, can be reduced to a quantity sufficient for two months, and has approved also an allocation of 75,000 tons for export.

The Syrian Government are considering the possibility of financing the buying of this year's harvest. It is thought probable that, were they to do so, they would be in favour of a reduction in the buying price, as their first estimate of the funds required appears to be extremely low.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The week has been uneventful in Parliament. A motion was passed congratulating the Lebanese Government on their firmness in dealing with the recent incidents. Certain Deputies, in criticising the Municipal Law Bill as



designed merely to perpetuate a state of affairs inappropriate to the new régime, proposed that Municipal Councils should now be elected by the secondary electors, as are the Deputies, and that the heads of municipalities, who are at present nominated by the Government, should be elected by the Municipal Councils. A Deputy from Homs, the notorious demagogue Raif Milki, went further and condemned the whole system of two-degree elections as undemocratic. The discussion is to be resumed.

A Government proposal to sell Lebanese National Lottery tickets in Syria was criticised as being an unsound method of obtaining revenue. It was agreed to postpone a decision until after the return from Cairo of the Minister of Finance.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

*Jezireh.*—There is continued evidence of the French propaganda campaign in the Jezireh reported last week under "Tribal," and it now appears that the French are making a determined effort to win over the allegiance of the Assyrian colonists in the Khabour settlement.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The activities of the Committee of Enquiry have to a large extent held public attention during the week, and it is felt that the Government's strength to face opposition will depend on the action taken when the findings of the committee are made public. Though the prestige of the Government remains relatively high, it is now said that a number of Deputies who were formerly Government supporters are manœuvring for a Cabinet reshuffle which would involve such unpopular elements as the Ministry of Supply, whose administrative failings have caused much discontent.

Parliament met on the 2nd May and passed a Bill creating a Special Court of Justice to deal with crimes committed against the security of the State. A grant of £Syr. 25,000 for bye-election expenses was approved, also an increased grant to the gendarmerie. The salaries of Government employees have been raised. At a further session on the 4th May the reports of the Financial Committee on the 1942 and 1944 budgets were adopted.

The Prime Minister has visited the Maronite Patriarch, who has expressed his confidence in Riad Sulh's ability to safeguard the interests of the Lebanon and to achieve its complete independence.

[E 3208/23/89]

No. 41.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 111, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 26th May.)*

#### 1. *General.*

The Anglo-French enquiry into the disturbances of the 27th April is not yet concluded. The Government's independent judicial enquiry has, however, now been completed. It is understood that the evidence against Eddé himself is not conclusive and His Majesty's Minister took the opportunity in a conversation with the President to tell him that in his opinion it would be unwise to take proceedings against Eddé unless there was a cast-iron case. A long-drawn-out trial based on insufficient evidence would be most disturbing to public opinion. The President appeared to share this point of view.

The scare of further French repressive action against the Lebanese Government has now died down, largely because, after the Prime Minister's cordial references to General Beynet in the Chamber, relations between the French and the Government showed signs of improvement. The French, on the other hand, have intimated to the Government through their Délégué that they desire the removal of the Minister of the Interior, the Chief of Police and the Director

of Press, on the grounds of alleged anti-French conduct during and after the disturbances. They appear to have met with a blunt refusal from the Lebanese, and have consequently modified their attacks on Camille Shamoun but are maintaining their objection to the Director of the Press. They are nevertheless at pains to say, both publicly and through their organisations, that the Prime Minister is "irreplaceable." At the same time they have succeeded in annoying the President and Government considerably by holding a military review in Beirut on St. Joan of Arc's day without inviting or even notifying the Lebanese authorities. Fortunately, the advice the legation was able to give on this subject has smoothed over this incident.

The recent discussions between the Syrian Government and General Beynet concerning the Troupes Spéciales have resulted in provisional agreement, subject to the consent of the G.O.C. Ninth Army in the first place and subsequent reference to Algiers. The formula proposed by the Syrians is that the Armed Forces should be handed over when the Allied High Command no longer considers the Levant to be a likely field of action. The Syrians have proposed that a senior Syrian officer should be attached to the French Territorial Command, and that Syrian officers should be placed in the various bureaux of the Etat-Major, so that they may learn the duties of the command and staff so as to be ultimately in a position to take over.

As regards the Sûreté, further discussions are now to take place on the basis of the Ninth Army revised memorandum (see Summary No. 106 of the 12th April), which has been accepted by the Syrians.

#### 2. *Wheat.*

Purchases during the period the 4th–13th May amounted to 783 tons of wheat, 1,302 tons of barley and 436 tons of other adulterants, a total of 2,521 tons and a daily average of 252 tons.

The Cereals Commission have not yet decided on the buying prices for this year's harvest, but purchases have been suspended so as to prepare producers for possible reductions.

The Syrians have proposed a scheme for financing the buying of the harvest by loans to be issued by the O.C.P. and guaranteed by the Syrian Government, thus replacing the present system whereby purchases are financed by the French, and they are apparently confident of obtaining a sum of £Syr. 70 million at a rate of interest of 1 per cent. They ask in return that the Lebanese Government should undertake to buy 100,000 tons of the crop and that the M.E.S.C. should dispose of any surplus above the needs of the Levant States, which are estimated at 250,000 tons. They are prepared to agree to export of cereals as soon as it can be ascertained that the harvest will be more than sufficient to meet the needs of the two States.

#### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

There has been another quiet week in Parliament. Nazem Qudsi and Rushdi Kekhia, of Aleppo, and Naim Antaki, of Damascus, now form the nucleus of an opposition whose criticism, which is mainly constructive, has been directed against the Ministry of Supply and its failure to solve the problem of the high cost of living. Among other proposals it was suggested that, as an alternative to raising the pay of civil servants, facilities should be given to them to buy cheaply from Government co-operative stores. Fakhri Baroudi, a well-known firebrand, who was the most vehement in criticism, accused the Government of lack of energy in dealing with the problem, and pressed for an increase in imports as providing the solution.

The proposed enlargement of the Port of Lattakia, as promised recently by the President, was discussed at some length, also the question of an increase in the administrative staff in the Jezireh.

The draft of the important new Tribal Law has not yet been introduced, a fact which is causing some concern to the tribal Deputies.

#### 5. *Homs and Hama.*

There is nothing of political importance to report from Homs.

In Hama there have been occasional disputes, chiefly concerning land tenure, which inevitably involve both Christians and Moslems, and the Christian community have shown a nervousness which pro-French elements are eager to exploit. The Prime Minister has recently expressed the view that the disputes



in Hama have not been essentially of a sectarian nature, and has instructed local authority to deal firmly with those who seek to accentuate confessional differences.

Local notables are alarmed at the increasing activities of the Hama Communists, who are mostly Moslems, and have distributed pamphlets reporting the speeches of Khalid Baghdash, the secretary of the Syrian Communist Party. A society known as the "Youth of Mohammed" has issued a reply pointing out that communism is contrary to the Moslem way of life.

It is said that the Mohafez, who is still away from Hama, may resign, and there is already speculation on the choice of a successor.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

*Euphrates.*—It is evident that the future reputation, both of the Mohafez and of the Central Government, will be determined to a large extent by the degree of firmness with which the decisions taken at the recent Shammam-Agaidat Conference are enforced, and it is considered probable that, if the French are prepared to assist rather than embarrass the Syrian authority, a satisfactory issue in this case will greatly facilitate future settlements. French officials, including the Délégué Adjoint and the Chef du Bureau Politique, have, however, already made known their opinion that the conference was a failure.

*Jezireh.*—Recent disputes between semi-sedentary tribes in the Jezireh, which were largely due to the activities of certain French elements, have been dealt with by the Syrian authorities through the Gendarmerie and the Civil Courts. Some forty Baggara tribesmen are now in prison at Hassetché.

#### 9. *Tribal.*

Bedruddin Sabbagh, the Assistant Director of the new Tribal Affairs Office in Damascus (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March), has informed the Political Officer at Deir ez-Zor that it is proposed to create subsidiary offices in the various provincial centres in which a Syrian official would work together with the French Bedouin Control Officer. The success of this system, which is in theory excellent, will no doubt require a greater degree of co-operation from French officers than they have tended to show in the past (see under "Euphrates and Jezireh").

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

An apparent improvement in Franco-Lebanese relations having turned public attention once more to questions of internal policy, the Government has met with increasing criticism in the Chamber on economic and financial grounds, and the opinion is now being expressed in many quarters that a Cabinet reshuffle is overdue. It is natural that a Government which has remained in office for eight months should be the subject of attack, and it is difficult to determine the extent to which such criticism may be attributed either to a genuine conviction that the present Ministry could be improved, or to the ambition of other Deputies and officials who would benefit by a change. The Prime Minister has stated definitely that he will not change his Ministry on account of the present pressure, but a reshuffle will probably be made when the Minister of the Interior resigns his portfolio on appointment as Lebanese Minister in London (see below).

The O.C.P., the U.K.C.C., the Banque de Syrie and the Office Economique de Guerre have all been targets for criticism in the Chamber. The Government defended the first three, but stated that they had asked for the cession of the last-named as part of the Common Interests. The Government's five-year plan, its extravagance and over-staffing of the administration, and its failure to reduce the cost of living or collect the War Profits Tax, were other points on which Deputies expressed themselves strongly. Various chapters of the budget gave rise to heated debates, in which the Government obtained considerably less than its usual majority.

The Prime Minister has received a telegram from the Chinese Government announcing their decision to recognise the independence of the Lebanon.

The *agrément* has been received to the nomination of M. Camille Shamoun as Lebanese Minister in London (W.S. No. 105: Section 1).

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

The statement made by the Lebanese Prime Minister that the Government's enquiry into the events of the 27th April was being pursued with complete

impartiality, and his conciliatory reference to General Beynet's assurances of his determination to implement General Catroux's policy, are regarded by the press as an important contribution towards an improvement in Franco-Lebanese relations. It is emphasised at the same time that relations of friendship must depend on respect for Lebanese independence.

The Maronite Patriarch's declarations of confidence in the Prime Minister are frequently quoted, particularly his assertion that he would not object to being governed by Moslems alone provided that they were all like Riad Sulh.

[E 3377/23/89]

No. 42

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 112, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 7th June.)*

#### 1. *General.*

THE Lebanese Prime Minister announced in the Chamber on the 20th May the appointment of Camille Shamoun and Ahmed Daouk as Lebanese diplomatic representatives in London and Algiers respectively. It appears that the French Committee had decided, after the incidents of the 27th April, to withhold their *agrément* indefinitely, but that General Beynet forced their hand by acting on earlier instructions to synchronise his action with His Majesty's Government's announcement of the appointment of a Minister in London.

The Lebanese Government have not yet announced the results of their enquiry into the events of the 27th April, nor have they taken any action against Emil Eddé. Eddé's son has been vainly attempting to provoke a lawyers' strike in protest against the continued detention of two lawyers—followers of his father—who were arrested for complicity in the disturbances. The Government intend eventually to have all the cases tried by a special court, which has not yet been constituted. The results of the independent Anglo-French enquiry are not yet known, though their work has been completed.

The Syrian Prime Minister has informed the Political Officer at Damascus that the Délégué Général's final report on the discussions regarding the transfer of the army, incorporating the suggestions advanced by the Syrians (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May), has been transmitted to Algiers by the hand of M. Chataigneau, who left by air on the 18th May. The Syrian Government are meanwhile studying revised proposals produced by the French for the transfer of the Sûreté.

The French Délégué Général and Mme. Beynet gave a reception to celebrate Joan of Arc's Day. The President and members of the Government, being still very upset over the incident of the military review (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May), informed the French that they would not attend the reception unless they received an undertaking from the French never again to hold a review on Lebanese soil without first seeking the permission of the Lebanese Government. As the French could not afford not to have representatives of the Government at the reception, the undertaking was given and members of the Government, headed by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, were present. In Damascus the French Delegate approached the Government with a request for permission to hold the usual military review and torchlight procession on Joan of Arc's Day. The Syrian Government withheld permission but offered to attend a special religious service, provided it were not termed a "consular mass"; this compromise was accepted and members of the Government duly attended the service. In Aleppo the usual review of French troops took place, the Mohafez having granted permission without reference to the Government in Damascus.

#### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

In Parliament political activity has centred round opposition to the Government, particularly over the questions of the Ministry of Supply and the establishment of the civil service, and, though there is no sign of consolidation of opposition, there is criticism by individual Deputies of almost every proposal put forward by the Government. Rushdi Kekhia of Aleppo (see Summary No. 111)



attributes this criticism to the lack of confidence in the Government as a result of their failure to announce a definite programme.

In a debate on income tax the Government were criticised for leaving the distribution of the tax to the municipalities, who were merely called upon to provide lump sums to the Government. The Minister of Finance stated that this method was a heritage from a former Government, but promised that an attempt would be made to apply the system fairly and to assess each person on his real income.

On the 20th May the peace was broken in Damascus by demonstrators who sought to deliver a fatal blow to the feminist movement by preventing the attendance of Moslem ladies at a charity ball to be held that evening. An orderly demonstration had been held against the formation of a women's club in Aleppo earlier in the week. In Damascus the police were forced to intervene and there were some casualties. Calm was restored fairly rapidly, but the Government took the precaution of obtaining six armoured cars from the French to reinforce the authority of the police. After a speech by the Prime Minister, the Chamber adopted a resolution asking the Government to protect the freedom of the individual, and it appears that the demonstrators, who were led by a turbulent and obscurantist sheikh of the Ulema, have little genuine backing. On the other hand, they have been successful in so far as both the formation of the club in Aleppo and the charity ball in Damascus were cancelled.

The President is still in bed.

#### 6. *Jebel Druze.*

Agitation continues for the abolition of the régime of financial and administrative autonomy.

The day before General Beynet visited Soueida, Commandant Monclar, commanding the *Groupement Druze*, had the Druze flag put up alongside the tricolor and the Syrian flag outside the Officers' Club. In the belief that the display of this separatist flag was an indication of French intentions, demonstrators tore down both the French and the Druze flags, and the students of Soueida subsequently presented a written protest against French action to the Political Officer.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

*Euphrates*.—Nothing of political importance to report.

*Jezireh*.—The Political Officer at Hassetché was present at the tribal conference between the Agaidat and Shammar on the 6th May, when it was decided that, as tribal war had not been declared, there could be no cancellation of all losses. It was therefore resolved that both sides should, before the end of May, present to the Syrian and Iraqi authorities lists of casualties and losses suffered during the recent affray. This decision was unpopular with the Agaidat, who have a considerable credit balance of men killed and animals stolen. The final settlement of all claims is to be made, in the presence of arbitrators, on the 15th June in Deir ez-Zor.

#### 9. *Tribal.*

In view of recent tribal differences, the Political Officer at Deir ez-Zor states that, in his opinion, it is important that the new Syrian Department of Tribal Affairs, in concert with the French Bedouin Control Officers, should take further steps to avert disturbances. The visit of Bedruddin Sabbagh (see Summary No. 111 of the 17th May) has not improved matters to any appreciable extent.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The news of M. Shamoun's appointment (see "General") has given point to increasing rumours of changes within the Ministry. It is generally believed that Hamid Frangieh will take his place in the Cabinet and that the Government are considering the removal of Adel Osseyran from the Ministry of Supply (where he has not been a success) as well as the addition of a Maronite and a Sunni to the Ministry.

Following upon the by-elections in North Lebanon there have been clashes between groups of partisans from the rival Maronite villages of Ehden and Becharré. An attempt at mediation by the Minister of the Interior failed and fighting between the villagers became so intense that the Government, under the new agreement, called on the French to lend the civil authorities the necessary

troops. Two companies of Senegalese were despatched to the scene to restore order. The villagers have now been constrained to return to their homes and fighting has ceased. The Political Officer states, however, that only determined action by the Government against those responsible for the disturbances will prevent further outbreaks. In this connexion it is interesting that, according to the French O.C. Troops in Tripoli, the *Troupes Spéciales* (which would normally have been used in such an eventuality) were so unreliable that the Senegalese had to be sent in their place. The Lebanese and French authorities are examining the question.

The Government are still continuing their attempts to reach agreement with the Beirut merchants on the payment of arrears for War Profits Tax. A draft Income Tax Law has been submitted to the Chamber for examination.

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

General Beynet granted an interview to war correspondents who came here in connexion with the Greek Conference, and his remarks about France's friendly intentions towards the Levant States have been prominently reported and warmly acclaimed in the press. Newspapers also all express great confidence in the tact and power of Riad Sulh and praise the understanding shown by General Beynet, who is described as a true representative of the real feelings of France.

[E 3445/23/89]

No. 43.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 113, Syria and the Lebanon, 31st May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 10th June.)*

#### 1. *General.*

The troubles in North Lebanon (see paragraph 11 of W.S. No. 112 of the 24th May) are not yet over, and the Lebanese Government have been obliged to retain in that area one third of their total gendarmerie force, together with the Senegalese troops which had been supplied by the French. There is a danger of the ill-equipped Lebanese Gendarmerie being unable to deal with further outbreaks in other areas, and the Government have felt compelled to ask the French to place at their disposal a battalion of *Troupes Spéciales* and some arms and equipment, in order that they may have sufficient forces to maintain internal security pending the conclusion of a definite agreement for the handing over by the French of the Lebanese *Troupes Spéciales*. The French have apparently agreed in principle but have procrastinated. Reasons are always forthcoming for postponing a final decision.

The Syrian and French delegates met on the 27th May to continue discussions on the transfer of the *Sûreté*. The French are understood to be insisting on special privileges for their nationals, but neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese Governments are prepared to accept this contention. The Syrian Government have agreed to the attachment of a British officer to the future Syrian Security Service.

#### 3. *Syria-Damascus.*

The Syrian Government have gained considerably in prestige through their handling of the demonstrations of the 20th May. The Prime Minister by his confident and vigorous action has deftly turned the original issue, the emancipation of women, into a question merely of civil disturbance which has been dealt with satisfactorily by the Court of First Instance, thus defeating an attempt by the religious Society Al Gharra, who have always been politically ambitious, to impose their will on the Government.

In Parliament there has been little activity. A draft Bill for the Budget and the organisation of the Ravitaillement Department was refused by the Judicial Committee and passed to the Committee of National Economy with the recommendation that the proposed right of legislation should not be granted to the Ministry of Supply. A further draft Bill which would enable the Minister of Education to revise the establishment of his department by decree met with adverse criticism, but was defended by the Minister concerned, who explained that the scholastic year begins in October, before the re-assembly of Parliament, and that if he were not to receive immediate authority to make appointments, his scheme for the reform of his Ministry must be postponed until next year. The Bill passed into committee.



The Syrian Government have agreed to the use of the Damascus aerodrome by the British Overseas Airways Corporation as a port of call on the Cairo-Bagdad-Tehran line, and the service will start shortly. The French authorities at the airport are co-operating satisfactorily. The M.I.S.R. will also operate a service between Damascus and Cairo. A proposal for a programme of British Council activities in Syria has met with an enthusiastic response from the Syrian Government.

#### 7. *Alaouite Territory.*

The Court of Arbiters is now assembled to deal with the many complaints against Suleiman Murshid. A member of his harem has meanwhile hoisted the French tricolor in the village of Shatha, and his supporters have been celebrating with rifle fire the rumoured departure of the British from Syria. Numerous protests have been sent to Damascus by Alaouites accusing Murshid of working for the re-establishment of mandatory rule.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese Government are losing prestige through their failure to take decisive action to settle the trouble in North Lebanon (see "General"). Hamid Frangich, head of one of the Zghorta factions, handed over five of his partisans, but Joseph Karam, head of the other faction, failed to produce certain of his supporters whose arrest had been ordered by the Government, and this has further incensed his opponents, the people of Becharre. An attempt at intervention by the Maronite Bishops of North Lebanon was a failure, and unless the Government carry out a general round-up of those responsible, a prolonged feud may ensue.

The present session of the Lebanese Chamber ends on the 31st May, and the next full session does not start until October. The Government have, therefore, decided not to proceed immediately with a ministerial reshuffle, since it is not possible at the present time for Camille Shamoun to take up his new appointment in London. Adel Bey Osseyran has declared that if he is removed from the Ministry of Supply he will leave the Government, and in that case one of the Prime Minister's principal difficulties would be finding a competent successor for him out of the Shia community.

The Phalange newspaper *L'Action* has circulated an uncensored edition devoted to a bitter attack on the Government. While some of the allegations were exaggerated and unfair there were others which were more reasonable. It is generally admitted that it would be difficult to find a better team, having regard to the limitations imposed by the confessional system of representation, but the *Action's* criticisms have roused some misgivings even amongst the strongest supporters of the régime.

It is thought probable that the Budget will be passed before the Chamber rises, but several other important projects, including the judicial reform and the agreement with the merchants regarding arrears of War Profits Tax, will probably be held over until the next session.

An annual rally of the Najjade Party held in Beirut was attended by the Prime Minister and Vice-President, who both made speeches. The Party and its leader received Lebanese decorations.

The British Council, with the cordial support of the Lebanese Government, has decided to embark on a programme of educational and cultural activities in the Lebanon.

It has been announced that M. Shamoun, Lebanese Minister-Designate to His Majesty's Government, will also be Minister to the Belgian Government in London.

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

Local newspapers have expressed the view that the recent disturbances in Syria, though ostensibly of a religious nature, were similar in origin to the Beirut incidents of the 27th April, and that their motive was to undermine the foundations of national independence. It is generally considered that whatever may have been their origin, in both cases the results have served to strengthen, if only temporarily, the authority of the respective Governments.

[E 3604/23/89]

No. 44.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 114, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 7th June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 20th June.)*

#### 1. *General.*

NEGOTIATIONS between the French and the Syrians for the handing over of the armed forces reached a stage during the week when the divergence of their respective claims as to when the eventual transfer should take place threatened to cause serious difficulties.

The French contended that the transfer could only be effected either at "the end of hostilities" (a term which has not been defined), or upon a decision by the National Committee at Algiers.

The Syrians replied that the French had never claimed that they were entitled to limit, except in matters directly connected with the war, Syrian sovereignty; and that there had been no question in all the negotiations but that the armed forces would be handed over as soon as the military situation should permit. They said they had made many concessions and accepted far-reaching restrictions on the assumption that these were required by military necessity. They contended, further, that from the moment when the war definitely and finally receded from the Middle East, no valid military reason could be advanced for their not obtaining control of the army, and that the decision as to when that moment had arrived could only be made by the Supreme Military Commander in the Middle East. They further pointed out that it was clear from Serial No. II of the Ninth Army Memorandum, which had been accepted by both French and British, that the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, accepted the principle that further powers could be handed over to the local Governments progressively as the danger receded from their territory.

Général Beynet attempted to delay negotiations, but the Syrian Government, being determined to press their case, insisted that they should continue and stated they would have no choice but to recall Parliament should the French refuse to continue the negotiations. The Prime Minister warned Général Beynet plainly that in the present state of public opinion a revolution would almost certainly follow if the Syrians and the French failed to reach an agreement.

The French later produced a proposal that the army should be handed over when the two parties jointly agreed that the time for handing it over to the native Governments had come. The Syrians answered there were two objections to this, the first that it would permit the French to block the handing over indefinitely, the second that it would leave the decision of this purely military question in the hands of a political body, the F.F.N.C., a contingency hitherto never envisaged. They suggested, as an alternative, that the decision as to whether the Levant States were definitely no longer threatened should be left in the hands of the highest military authority in Europe, i.e., General Eisenhower. This point is now being considered by the French.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs were present at the Franco-Syrian negotiations concerning both the *Troupes Spéciales* and the *Sûreté*.

Negotiations have been concluded for the transfer of the Services of Common Interest, all of which are now under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

#### 2. *Wheat.*

Negotiations with the Syrians and the French for financing and fixing the price of the 1944 crop have now been successfully concluded, and only await acceptance by London and Cairo to be put into effect.

An agreement has been concluded between the French and the Syrians whereby the Caisse Centrale will finance the O.C.P. on the same terms as last year. At one stage the French put forward conditions which were totally unacceptable both to the British and to the Syrians, but they abandoned these in the course of the negotiations.

The following is a brief summary of the points on which agreement has been reached:—

M.E.S.C. will guarantee to purchase 100,000 tons of the 1944 crop at prices which are well within the limits assigned by London and Cairo.

The 15 per cent. Syrian Government levy (F.A.E.) will not be paid on these deliveries.



Prices paid to consumers for all adulterants will be substantially lower than in 1943, and although in the case of wheat the price per ton with 0 per cent. of impurities is maintained, the amount actually receivable by the producer will be decreased by raising the standard of deductions for impurity content and charging transport costs to the producer.

The Syrians have agreed to refund the 15 per cent. F.A.E. on all cereals from the 1943 crop delivered to the British army, and to adjust the charges on deliveries to Palestine, Cyprus and the U.K.C.C. to the prices paid by the local Ravitaillements. The total saving resulting to the British taxpayer from these refunds will be in the neighbourhood of 2 million Syrian pounds.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The Ministry of Supply has again been the centre of interest in Parliament. Demands for the appointment of a commission to enquire into alleged irregularities were resisted by the Government, who have decided to appoint their own committee of three civil servants of reputed integrity. The budget for the Ministry of Supply being still under consideration by the Committee of National Economy, it was decided to continue temporarily the system of *douzièmes provisoires*.

Parliament rose on the 31st May and will not meet again, unless summoned in Extraordinary Session, until the 17th October.

The President's health is improving, but his British medical advisers suggest that he should leave Damascus, where anxieties tend to delay his recovery.

### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Jezireh*.—Tension is again reported between the semi-sedentary tribes, Baggara and Kikieh, whose disputes had been dealt with recently by the Syrian authorities (see Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May). The Mohafez states that he has appealed several times in vain to the French for assistance in enforcing a settlement, and has now gone to Damascus with his Commandant of Gendarmerie to give his personal account of the recent tribal disturbances and of French activities in the Jezireh.

### 11. The Lebanon.

The trouble in North Lebanon seems to be nearly over. The Government, in spite of their failure to obtain a battalion of Troupes Spéciales from the French (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 113 of the 31st May), decided that strong measures must be employed, and gave full powers to the Minister of the Interior to effect the necessary arrests. Most of the supporters of Karam originally implicated (ten in all) are in custody, and a number of the gendarmerie have now been withdrawn.

Parliament has passed the budget, together with special allocations for the Ministries of Supply and Education. The Government have promised that an extraordinary session will be called towards the end of the month to consider the draft Income Tax Law and other outstanding matters.

The composition of a National Court of Justice to deal with offences against public order has at length been announced, and the cases of a number of persons accused of participation in recent disturbances have been submitted for trial.

Transjordan has recognised the independence of the Lebanon.

[E 3701/23/89]

No. 45.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 115, Syria and the Lebanon, 14th June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 24th June.)  
(Secret.)

#### 1. General.

Discussions between the French, Syrians and Lebanese regarding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the Sûreté have continued during the week but, although progress was made, particularly as regards the Sûreté, no final result has as yet been achieved.

In reply to a request by the Syrian Government for 1,000 rifles for the gendarmerie, the French have offered 400 1907 model rifles at a cost of £Syr. 400 each, which is equivalent to approximately five and a half times the cost, including all charges, of a new Lee Enfield, and have offered ammunition older than the rifles (1884 manufacture) at 147 piastres (3s. 4d.) a round. This offer being unacceptable, the Syrian Government may, it is understood, decide to send a written request to His Majesty's Minister through their Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the British authorities should provide the arms and equipment of which the gendarmerie are so urgently in need. The Lebanese Government may be expected to take similar action.

The Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers, having been informed by the French that the Soviet Government were considering the possibility of recognising the independence of their respective States and of appointing to them diplomatic representatives, have now decided to send a Syrian official to Cairo in order to establish contact there with the Soviet Legation. They apparently propose to reply to the French that they welcome the idea but would prefer to discuss it direct with the Soviets.

The news of the Allied landing in France induced a wave of somewhat exaggerated optimism throughout Syria and the Lebanon, causing a marked fall in commodity prices during the first few days.

#### 2. Wheat.

The agreement fixing the prices and the financing of the 1944 harvest, and granting refunds to the army and other British authorities on purchases from the 1943 crop have been signed by all the interested parties (see para. 2 of W.S. No. 114 of the 7th June).

[E 3677/217/89]

No. 46.

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd June.)

(No. 1191.)

(Telegraphic.)

Algiers, 22nd June, 1944.

I FOUND Massigli this evening in a state of violent agitation and extreme depression. He said that on 17th June the attitude of the Syrian Government, with regard to the handing over of special troops had suddenly hardened, and that the Syrian Prime Minister had referred to some "secret" that was in his possession on 21st June. His Majesty's Minister at Beirut informed General Beynet that the British military authorities had decided to provide the Syrian gendarmerie with arms and equipment. This he took to be the "secret" to which the Syrian Prime Minister had referred.

2. Massigli reminded me that on 5th February this year, a definite assurance had been given that the British would not give Syrians assistance either in finance, in equipment or in materials in order to enable them to maintain native troops, and that this assurance had been given by General Spears to M. Ostrorog at Beirut, by Sir M. Peterson to M. Viénot in London and by me to himself. He added that on 4th April this assurance had been reaffirmed by the Foreign Office. He suggested that giving of arms to the Syrian gendarmerie was in spirit if not in words a clear breach of this undertaking.

3. He added that it was also a breach of article 4 of Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, which laid down that the French should be the dominant Power in the Levant, and mentioned specifically control over gendarmerie.

4. There was nothing in the existing situation to justify such an act without consent or consultation. The French authorities were well able to look after the internal security, and it could hardly have been contended that Turkey was likely at the present time to make unprovoked attack upon territories under the control of the United Nations. In addition the French had on 26th January agreed to our demand that there should be set up at Beirut a Franco-British Committee with the express duty of examining all questions of military security. If there were really any need for rearming the gendarmerie the question should have been referred in the first instance to this committee.

5. He said that nothing more unfortunate could have occurred at the present time when negotiations which we all hoped would prove successful were proceeding in London. He implored me to present to you in the strongest language the dangers which he foresaw might arise.



[E 3792/217/89]

No. 47.

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Algiers).*

(No. 972.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 29th June, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1212 and my telegram No. 965, paragraph 2 [of 27th and 28th June: Syrian armed forces].

The case of the *Troupes Spéciales* is quite different from that of the gendarmerie. In the first place negotiations for transfer of the former to the States Governments are actively proceeding, and it would militate against securing the conditions which the French and we desire to attach to this transfer if arms were to be supplied by us before agreement is reached. In the second place, the creation of a Syrian national army would not in any way advance the war effort at present: and we have therefore adopted the line that we would not be willing to supply arms to it, though we shall have to see that *Troupes Spéciales* carrying out operational duties for us during the war are properly armed and equipped.

2. Gendarmerie, however, has important duties to fulfil in maintaining internal security, and it is a direct military concern of ours to see that it is capable of fulfilling those duties. We do not deny that (as between the French and ourselves) gendarmerie is primarily a French responsibility under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, but we cannot for reason given above disinterest ourselves from its efficiency. See in this connexion Lord Moyne's telegram No. 1537 with which I agree.

3. Moreover discussions of last February to which you refer related to the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States Governments. The Syrian gendarmerie are already a Syrian force (though the French had some say in its control).

4. No one could have had the gendarmerie in mind when we informed you (in paragraph 2 of my telegram 138 of 3rd February), that there had at no time been any question of His Majesty's Government accepting a financial commitment to enable native levies to be transferred to the Levant Governments. Incidentally the French seem to be reading into this alleged "undertaking" far more than we for our part had ever intended; but as we still have no intention of accepting such a financial commitment this does not greatly matter.

[E 3880/217/89]

No. 48.

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Algiers).*

(No. 259.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 29th June, 1944.*

M. VIENOT called upon me this afternoon and made representations, on instructions from M. Massigli, regarding the decision of the British authorities in the Levant States to furnish arms for the gendarmerie. The general lines on which he spoke were the same as the representations which M. Massigli has made to you (see your telegram No. 1191). M. Viénot complained that the question of the gendarmerie was a French responsibility under article 4 of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, and that Sir E. Spears should not have offered arms to the Syrian Government without previous agreement with the French authorities. He said that, while the question might have its technical aspects, our action must undoubtedly have political effects injurious to French interests; in particular, the effect would be to eliminate the French from all further influence in regard to the gendarmerie.

2. M. Viénot recalled the assurances given by you on the 5th February to the effect that we would not give financial assistance or arms to the Levant States to enable them to maintain an army, and urged that it was impossible to separate the gendarmerie from the army for this purpose.

3. At my request, Mr. Hankey, who was present at the interview, explained to M. Viénot the distinction between the gendarmerie and the *troupes spéciales* on the lines of my telegram No. 972. He recalled that the need for strengthening the gendarmerie in the Levant States had been apparent for some months, and that the French themselves had recognised this need. The Syrians had been unwilling to buy arms from the French, and Sir E. Spears himself, when he saw the Syrian President and Prime Minister in March with the Commander-in-Chief, 9th Army, had urged that this was an untenable attitude and had pressed

the Syrian Government to purchase the necessary arms without more ado. Subsequently, it had become apparent that the French could not supply the necessary arms at the present moment.

4. I told M. Viénot that we recognised that the French were entitled to be consulted regarding the provision of arms for the gendarmerie, but that, since our military authorities regarded the need as urgent, I must request that the matter should not be long delayed. I then told M. Viénot of the proposal contained in my telegram No. 972, paragraph 6, that an Anglo-French committee should consider the question in Beirut and that Sir E. Spears and General Beynet should agree on its composition, which should preferably be military, since the question was a military one.

5. M. Viénot appeared to be favourably impressed by this suggestion. He suggested that it might in any case be well if the arms were not in the end provided direct by the British military authorities, but were given to the French authorities for them to pass on. He did not, however, seem to press this suggestion.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and to the Resident Minister in the Middle East.

I am, &amp;c.

ANTHONY EDEN.



## CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 1580/16/65]

No. 49.

*Mr. Eden to Lord Moyne, Minister of State Resident in Cairo.*

(No. 36.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, 18th April, 1944.*

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the memorandum on British policy in the Middle East, which was handed to Mr. Wallace Murray, the Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the State Department, at the opening of his informal conversations with Sir M. Peterson at the Foreign Office on the 11th April.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Tehran and Algiers, and to His Majesty's Ministers at Beirut and Jedda.

I am, &amp;c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 49.

*British Policy in the Middle East.*

THIS paper is written without regard to the possibility of an United Nations organisation of one form or another being set up after the war to maintain peace and security, and to implement the terms of the Atlantic Charter.

2. There is nothing in British policy as defined below which need conflict with or impede such a desirable development. But it is relevant to remember that the region with which the paper deals does not contain either enemy States or in general colonial territories. And its peace and security are already partially, and not ineffectively, guaranteed by the treaty relations existing between its component States and Great Britain.

3. The Middle East as a whole is of particular importance to the British Commonwealth of nations, both individually and collectively. It lies on the direct line of communication by sea, land and air between the United Kingdom and India and the Dominions in the Pacific Ocean. In time of peace the importance of this route is obvious, but in war the necessity to maintain the link unimpaired can scarcely be over-emphasised, for political disturbances in the area marked by the triangle Suez, Aleppo and Basra would mean not only dislocation of the passage of troops and supplies between Australasia and the Mediterranean area but interference in the vital oil supplies from the Middle East oilfields to the Eastern Mediterranean and through the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is in fact a buffer between our principal enemies, Germany and Japan, and at the same time a vital link in the system of communications of the British Commonwealth. The importance of the Middle East to the British Commonwealth may perhaps be likened to that of the Caribbean Area and the Canal Zone to the United States.

4. In order to secure the safety of their interests in this area it has been for many years, and still remains, the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist in the development of prosperous, progressive and friendly States, possessed of a high degree of internal security and with stable Governments and a sound economic background. His Majesty's Government attach particular importance to the development of these conditions and have done their best to promote them.

5. When the countries of the Arab Peninsula were separated from the Ottoman Empire as a result of the last war it was already clear that most of them had passed beyond the colonial era but were not sufficiently developed politically, socially and economically to be quite fit to govern themselves. This state of affairs was recognised by the system of mandates inaugurated for Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, and the special Treaty of 1922 concluded with Iraq. His Majesty's Government are proud to have taken the lead in fostering and promoting self-government in these territories in accordance with their general policy of sympathy towards the Arab Nationalist movement. The approach of stability and self-government has been hastened by the guidance and encouragement given

by His Majesty's Government to Arab countries, particularly in matters connected with their economic, social and educational well-being. His Majesty's Government gladly recognise and welcome similar American efforts in some of these countries. The development of self-government in these States is a tender plant and it seems likely that they will continue to require assistance, especially in facing modern economic problems. Many British subjects have acquired special aptitude for this, apart from any contributions that may be made by the Middle East Supply Centre.

6. At the instance of His Majesty's Government the mandatory régime for Iraq was terminated in 1930 and Iraq became an independent member of the League of Nations as well as an ally of Great Britain, who, under the Treaty which was approved by the Council of the League, retain the responsibility for her defence against external aggression. When in the summer of 1941 Syria and the Lebanon were removed from the control of Vichy France and cleared of German influence, His Majesty's Government were able to arrange with General de Gaulle for the recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence. Palestine is complicated by the question of the Jewish Home, but until very recently His Majesty's Government still hoped that some measure of agreement might be obtained among its inhabitants on a satisfactory form of government.

7. Transjordan is ruled autonomously by the Emir Abdullah, with a certain amount of assistance from His Majesty's Government under the mandate.

8. With Saudi Arabia His Majesty's Government are in the closest relations of friendship, and they have given a substantial subsidy to Ibn Saud to enable him to overcome the critical situation resulting from the war and the falling off of the pilgrim traffic. His Majesty's Government have also the most intimate ties with the Arab sheikhdoms on the south coast of the Persian Gulf with whom they have special treaty relations, dating in most cases from the last century. Both Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms contain oilfields of great actual and potential value (in which American Companies are also largely interested), and on the full co-operation of the sheikhdoms depends a vital trunk line of air communication.

9. Notwithstanding the division of the Arab countries into separate States, which took place as a result of the last war, there is an increasing sense of unity among the Arabic-speaking peoples, particularly those who inhabit the Arab lands in Asia. This sense of unity has been growing rapidly during the last fifty years and the extension of education has resulted in a much larger proportion of Arabic-speaking people becoming aware of their common heritage of Arabic and Islamic culture and tradition. Modern communications, broadcasting and the press, are hastening this realisation and increasing the interest taken in the possibilities of co-operation with neighbouring Arab countries. Special interest has been shown recently in the possibility of some form of Arab federation (or at least active co-operation) by the Prime Ministers of Iraq and Egypt, and by certain personalities in Syria. While few Arab politicians or statesmen agree in any detail on what can or should be realised in this direction, His Majesty's Government have announced that they would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural and political unity. But clearly the initiative—in the political sphere at least—will have to come from the Arabs themselves, and so far no such scheme which would command approval has been worked out.

10. Persia and Afghanistan fall outside the framework of the Arab countries mentioned above, but they are of particular interest and importance to His Majesty's Government. The maintenance of a stable and friendly Government in Afghanistan is of vital concern for the defence of India, while Persia borders not only on India but also on Iraq, for the defence of which His Majesty's Government have treaty obligations. Both Persia and Iraq contain oilfields of the highest strategic value.

11. With this prelude further details may be given of British policy towards each individual country.

*Palestine.*

12. The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish Home in Palestine is based on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Various interpretations of these instruments have been elaborated from time to time, the last occasion being the White Paper of 1939 which it hardly seems necessary to summarise here. Meanwhile tranquillity in Palestine is essential for the duration of the war. This consideration must necessarily dominate all questions connected



with the Jewish Home and the attitude towards its realisation adopted by the local population, both Jewish and Arab, as well as by the Jews in other parts of the world and by the Arabs in other Arab countries. As has already been stated, His Majesty's Government have hoped that eventually it might be possible to obtain some measure of agreement between the inhabitants of Palestine on a satisfactory form of government. Owing to the need for tranquillity no fundamental decisions are desirable until the end of the war with Germany.

13. Under British guidance and largely as the result of Jewish activity and initiative Palestine has made astonishing material progress since the last war. Whatever the political outcome of the present situation may be Haifa is bound to remain a port of very great importance as it is one terminus of the pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. Palestine is also bound to retain strategic importance owing to its proximity to the Suez Canal and to sea and air communications essential to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

14. Under the Mandate, His Majesty's Government undertake the sole responsibility for the administration of Palestine, and have borne at the cost of British resources and British lives the burden of repressing the disturbances consequent on the policy, approved by the League of Nations and United States Government, of facilitating the immigration of European Jews. In the long run it has to be recognised that whatever settlement is made in Palestine must either meet with the acquiescence of the surrounding peoples or be maintained by force.

#### *Transjordan.*

15. Transjordan is a more primitive and desert country, but it is ruled autonomously by the Amir Abdullah with a certain amount of assistance from His Majesty's Government who are responsible, under the Mandate and by agreement with the Amir, for the conduct of his foreign relations. He has been loyal throughout the stresses of the war and his hereditary feud with Ibn Saud has never seriously affected the peace and prosperity of the Arabs. The future of Transjordan cannot be altogether separated from the future of Palestine, although it is under a separate Administration. The Emir Abdullah has several times suggested to His Majesty's Government the termination of the mandate, but it seemed better that a decision should await the outcome of the present state of transition in Palestine and Syria.

#### *Levant States.*

16. As previously stated, His Majesty's Government have been able to arrange for the recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the French authorities. In return they have assured the latter, notably in an exchange of letters between General de Gaulle and Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then Minister of State at Cairo, dated the 7th August, 1941, that Great Britain has no intention of disputing the position of France in this area. As a result of the elections recently held in the Levant States, democratic governments have emerged, which it is hoped will be sufficiently stable to enable the position to be regularised on a basis of real independence. It has not been possible during the war to regularise the position by the formal termination of the mandate, nor is the form of connexion between France and the Levant States yet settled or agreed. One method, according to our conception, and assuming a stable and co-operative France, might involve the conclusion of treaties between that country and the Levant States, the effect of which would be to put France in a similar position to that which Great Britain enjoys in Iraq. Such treaties have been suggested by the French authorities though the intention of the Levant States to conclude them is more problematical than it seemed at first. But meanwhile it is hoped that substantial self-Government will be granted by the French National Committee of Liberation as the result of General Catroux's negotiations and that an equitable *modus vivendi* will result by which the countries concerned can conduct their day-to-day relations on a mutually agreed basis, at any rate for the duration of the war.

17. The interest of His Majesty's Government in the Levant States is very great during the war, and certain powers reserved in General Catroux's declaration of independence (*e.g.*, security and communications) must clearly remain in Allied hands while the war lasts. The Allied troops in Syria are in practice under the command of a British General Officer Commanding. The British military authorities have constructed a new railway link from Haifa to Tripoli, thus establishing through rail communications between Egypt and the Turkish frontier and Iraq. In general, the political affiliation of the Levant States can never be a

matter of indifference to His Majesty's Government, as a Power with large responsibilities and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the communications of Syria are bound to remain of strategic importance.

18. Syria's production of cereals is of special importance to the economy of the Middle East in war conditions, and a special Anglo-French organisation, the Office des Céréales Panifiables has been established to ensure purchase and distribution of the harvests. Any failure of this organisation would probably result in large shipments of cereals being required from outside the Middle East and in a heavy call on Allied shipping.

19. There has been much talk among Arab leaders recently of the proposed creation of a Greater Syria to bring together some at least of the Arab territories bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean which were separated as the result of the last war. His Majesty's Government do not exclude the possibility of some such arrangement emerging after the present war and they would not wish the existence of mandates in Palestine and Transjordan to stand in the way of it, if the inhabitants of those countries were favourably disposed to the idea and provided that the problems of the Jewish Home and of the strategic needs of the British Empire in this vital area could be met. The belief has even been expressed in some quarters that the solution of the Jewish problem would be assisted by the emergence of a Greater Syria. Agreement with the French National Committee of Liberation would also be required. As yet, however, there does not seem to be any general agreement among the principal personalities of the region as to what they want or what is possible, and the creation of a Greater Syria must in any case present very great practical difficulties. The Prime Minister of Iraq has propounded such a scheme, with which he hopes to combine a larger federation or union of Arabic-speaking States. By arrangement between him and Nahas Pasha, negotiations to ascertain the possibility of realising these plans have for some months past been conducted in Cairo, and Syrian and Lebanese delegations among others have taken part in these discussions.

#### *Iraq.*

20. The relations between His Majesty's Government and Iraq are governed by the Treaty of Alliance of 1930. Extensive economic, administrative, technical and educational help has been given by His Majesty's Government to Iraq, which has made much progress in the last twenty years. But like other Arab countries, its recent history, culminating in the Rashid Ali *coup d'Etat* of 1941, seems to show that its Government is not yet sufficiently broad-based or established to maintain an effective internal control, unless it receives military, economic and technical support and assistance. There are important reserves of oil in Iraq, the development of which has been undertaken by groups representing British, United States and other interests. Iraq will remain of special importance to the British Commonwealth of Nations not only because of her oil resources but also as an essential air and land link between Great Britain, India, Australia and the Far East. By Article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 "His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties," and sites for air bases have, in accordance with this article, been allocated to His Majesty's Government at Shaiba and Habbaniyah.

21. During the war Iraq has acquired a special importance as a base for the forces necessary to operate and protect the Persian Gulf supply routes to the Soviet Union and also as an important source of cereals and food-stuffs for consumption in the Middle East. Special arrangements have been made by His Majesty's Government to purchase the Iraqi surplus of barley and dates for distribution according to the needs of other Middle East countries by the Middle East Supply Centre.

22. British policy in Iraq has to be related to policy in Persia. The Tehran Declaration confirms the hope of His Majesty's Government that the stability and independence of Persia can be maintained unimpaired by anything approaching spheres of influence. His Majesty's Government have greatly appreciated the help of the United States Government to this end. It follows, however, that general security and the defence of oil supplies and communications in the oilfields area must be ensured by forces based on Iraqi or other Arab territory.



### *Saudi Arabia.*

23. Shortly after the conquest of the Hejaz and the expulsion of the Hashimite dynasty by Ibn Saud, a treaty was concluded between him and His Majesty's Government at Jedda on the 20th May, 1927, by which His Majesty's Government recognised Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies. Ibn Saud, for his part, undertook to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the Arab sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, who were in special treaty relations with His Majesty's Government. The maintenance of friendly relations between Ibn Saud and the various Arab principalities in the Arabian peninsula is considered by His Majesty's Government to be an essential requirement for the continuation of stable conditions along the eastern and western coasts of the peninsula.

24. Friendly relations with Ibn Saud are also a matter of particular importance to His Majesty's Government because of the former's influence, as keeper of the shrine at Mecca, with the large Moslem population in India and in other parts of the British Empire, and also because of Saudi Arabia's proximity to the sea route to India. Throughout the war Ibn Saud has made no secret of his sympathy for the cause of the democracies, and on many occasions, notably during the Iraqi rebellion of May 1941, he has used his influence on behalf of His Majesty's Government and the United Nations generally.

25. Saudi Arabia depends for its revenue to a great extent on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and as this pilgrimage was seriously reduced by war conditions, His Majesty's Government undertook early in the war to provide Ibn Saud with a subsidy. This now largely takes the form of a subsidy in kind, essential supplies being provided through the Middle East Supply Centre at the cost of His Majesty's Government. Help in the form of Lease-Lend assistance is also being given by the United States Government. Another source of revenue is provided by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which holds a large concession in Eastern Saudi Arabia. In the course of time Ibn Saud should receive a substantial income from royalties, but at present it is upon financial help from His Majesty's Government that the Saudi Arabian administration mainly depends.

26. In view of the proximity of Saudi Arabia to Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and other territories in which Great Britain is interested, His Majesty's Government are closely concerned in proposals which have been made for allotting increased quantities of modern armaments to Ibn Saud. It is clearly not in the best interests of the Arab peoples that there should be a higher level of armaments in the Arab countries than is necessary to achieve internal security. In view of the mutual suspicion between some of them, any higher level than this is bound to lead to international tension, with harmful results both to the Arab peoples themselves, to the Jews in Palestine and in Arab territories and to the international companies and communications operating in the area. It is hoped that the State Department will take the same view in this matter and will co-operate with the Foreign Office in discouraging any high level of armaments in the Arab countries.

### *The Yemen.*

27. The position of the Yemen on the route to India and on the northern boundary of the Aden Protectorate makes it an interest to His Majesty's Government that no potentially hostile Power should acquire a dominant position in that country. With this object in view, His Majesty's Government concluded in April 1938 an agreement with the Italian Government in which both parties undertook to do nothing which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of the Yemen or Saudi Arabia. The only matter of dispute between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Yemen is the question of the northern boundary of the Protectorate. Although His Majesty's Government maintain that the Yemen, as a succession State of the Ottoman Empire, should accept the frontier agreed in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, the King of the Yemen has refused to admit the validity of this Convention and claims large sections of the Aden Protectorate. By a treaty of the 11th February, 1934, the frontier existing at that date was stabilised pending a final decision. Apart from occasional differences of opinion as to the actual line of the frontier, relations between the two countries have remained consistently friendly.

### *Arab States in the Persian Gulf.*

28. British interest in the Persian Gulf dates from the 17th and 18th centuries, but it was at the beginning of the 19th century that Great Britain

entered upon her greatest task there, at considerable cost to herself, in clearing the Gulf of piracy, in putting down the slave trade and, later, gun-running, and in buoying and beaconing its waters for the peaceful development of the commerce of all nations. In a series of treaties with the local rulers His Majesty's Government have undertaken the conduct of their foreign relations and the responsibility for their military protection, with the result that the States in question have enjoyed a period of political tranquillity and relative prosperity for many years despite the restrictions which the natural poverty of the area has hitherto placed upon economic progress. In return for this, Great Britain has insured herself, so far as she has been able, against the establishment of any potentially aggressive Power in the Gulf to threaten her communications with India. The discovery of oil in the area should greatly improve the prospects of these States, especially at Bahrein. It is of great importance that no international or inter-Arab rivalries should disturb the existing peaceful conditions, and thus impede the development of the oil and other resources of the area, as well as the important cable and air communications which run via the Gulf to India.

### *Persia.*

29. British policy in Persia was explained in some detail in a memorandum communicated to the United States Embassy in London on the 6th January, 1943. The objectives of His Majesty's Government in regard to Persia seemed then, and still seem, to correspond very closely with those of the United States Government, and this fact has been confirmed by the declaration regarding Persia issued at the Tehran Conference in December 1943.

30. Taking a long view, the interests of Persia and of His Majesty's Government in that region are identical. We desire to see a strong, stable and independent Persia, and the common interest of Persia, of His Majesty's Government and of the Soviet Government in this aim was expressed in the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Alliance signed on the 29th January, 1942. According to that Treaty, "the forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier."

31. His Majesty's Government recognise the hardships which the war has brought to Persia, which they have done their utmost to mitigate within the limitations imposed by the world shortage of shipping and commodities, and by the paramount need in the interests of the common war effort to send the maximum possible amount of supplies to Russia. In so far as the difficulties of Persia are due to administrative defects, His Majesty's Government have believed that United States advisers would best be able to exercise a useful influence in Persia. If Americans were not available it would probably be necessary to propose that the Persian Government should seek advisers from some other Power than Britain or the Soviet Union. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have actively encouraged the appointment of United States Advisers and have given them, and will continue to give them, all the support possible to carry out their difficult tasks. They have welcomed United States participation in the organisation and operation of the Persian supply routes to Russia, and, in general, they would be glad of close co-operation with the United States Government in all matters affecting Persia. His Majesty's Government gratefully acknowledge the contribution which the United States Government is making in many ways to the stability of Persia.

32. The principal British commercial interest is the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the oil output of which is of the highest strategic concern to the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. The Trans-Iranian Railway, with its southern termini at Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr and its northern outlet on the Caspian, has proved its value as a supply line to Russia during the War, and its efficient maintenance and administration in the post-war years is likely to be a matter of commercial and political concern to more than one of the United Nations. India also has specially close relations with Persia in the commercial and cultural sphere. Persia is an important market, actual and potential, for India's products, particularly tea and piece-goods. Indian Shiadom worships at Persian and Iraqi shrines while India as a whole, not excluding even branches of Hindu culture, owes much of its literary and artistic inspiration to Persian sources.

33. Persia is also of special strategic concern to His Majesty's Government because it borders on India, for the defence of which they are responsible.



The East Persian route via Zahidan and Meshed assumed importance during the present war and the last (though for different reasons) and it may well become a permanent link between India and Central Asia. Further west, it is naturally a matter of concern to India that the tribes of Fars and other regions bordering on the Gulf and the oilfields should be under a control sufficient to prevent inroads on vital installations and communications, whether by rail, road or air.

#### *Afghanistan.*

34. The maintenance of an independent Afghanistan is fundamental to the defence of India, because of the strategic position which the country occupies across the routes followed by all the past invasions of India by land. Afghanistan must equally remain a matter of close concern to Russia with whose Turcoman subjects the tribes of Afghan Turkistan are closely allied in language and culture. There has been general agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the conduct of their relations with Afghanistan during the war, and the continuance into the peace of an Anglo-Russian entente in this region will contribute materially to the stability of Asia. The existence in Afghanistan of a stable and friendly Government is also essential to the tranquillity of India's North-West Frontier, because a weak Government in Afghanistan could not control the tribes in their own territory and an unfriendly one could very easily stimulate the tribes on both sides of the frontier to hostility against us. Moreover, it is desirable that the Afghan Government should not seek to intrigue in Indian politics, as this could only make it more difficult for Indians to resolve their internal differences. The present régime in Afghanistan is entirely satisfactory in all these respects, and it is a matter for satisfaction that during nearly four years of war the situation on the frontier has remained undisturbed, except in Waziristan, where the activities of hostile gangs instigated by the Faqir of Ipi, who has maintained touch with emissaries of enemy Powers, have caused some trouble to the British authorities.

35. The traditional policy of all Afghan Governments has been to play off Russia against Great Britain. Since Russia's entry into the war they have been unable to do this and instead they sought an alternative balance by straddling the fence between the United Nations and the Axis. So long as the issue of the war remained uncertain, they made it clear that they attached great importance to the maintenance of their diplomatic relations with the Germans and Japanese (although they consented under pressure to expel the German and Italian non-official colonies in 1941), and to the refusal of facilities for us for the transit of supplies to the Soviet Union through their territory. Indeed, these points were regarded by Afghans as symbols of their independence, and their enforced abandonment would have been so unpopular as to weaken the internal position of the Afghan Government. On the other hand, the security of India's North-West Frontier obliged us to maintain pressure on the Afghan Government to ensure that, so long as the enemy Legations remained at Kabul, they were rendered incapable of serious intrigues aimed against us (or against the Afghan Government themselves). But in exerting this pressure it has been essential to avoid driving the Afghan Government to action which would endanger their own stability, the maintenance of which is our first concern. Last autumn, however, as a result of a joint *démarche* with the Russians, we were successful in getting rid of the more dangerous members of the German Legation and several Japanese engineers who were suspected of undesirable activities, and the capacity for harm of the Axis Legations in Kabul has now been almost entirely removed. Since then, growing certainty of the eventual success of the Allies has brought about a striking change in the attitude of the Afghan Government towards us. They are carefully watching the activities of the few German and Japanese representatives who remain in the country, they have obviously been impressed by Anglo-American solidarity, and they have given several indications of their realisation that it is to Great Britain and the United States that they must look for guidance and assistance in educational progress and economic development. The close collaboration between the United States and British Legations in Kabul has undoubtedly contributed much to these satisfactory developments.

#### *Economic Questions in the Middle East.*

36. The value of Anglo-American co-operation has already been strikingly shown through the admirable work of the Middle East Supply Centre. Hitherto, owing to the shortage of available supplies, the activities of the Supply Centre

must have appeared to the Governments of the Middle Eastern countries as mainly restrictive; but it may shortly be possible to relax the existing restrictions, and the time now seems to have come when the future of this Anglo-American organisation might usefully be considered. His Majesty's Government would propose that the first step might be to bring the local Governments gradually into consultation by means of conferences on subjects of interest to them. This policy is already being pursued and conferences have already been held with their participation on subjects such as transport, food production and rationing statistics. Later, provided that the local Governments proved responsive, arrangements might be made to associate them even more closely with the Centre's work. Eventually they might, perhaps, if they wished, be admitted to full participation in all the Centre's activities. There would seem to be great advantage in an endeavour on these lines to make Anglo-American control over supplies and distribution, which will presumably have to remain in being in the Middle East until some considerable time after the end of the war, more acceptable to the local Governments by a progressive process of consultation and partnership, accompanied where possible by a gradual relaxation of restrictions. Finally, as a long-term objective, it may be found desirable to establish a Middle East Economic Council as a consultative body representative of the Middle East Governments and of other Governments with major interests in this region, but His Majesty's Government have not thought it necessary to form definite views on this latter point at the present stage. It is, however, possible that an economic organism might be created which would even in peace time fulfil a unifying economic rôle, at any rate among the Arab countries, and would correspond to their growing sense of racial unity and at the same time provide a useful training ground in modern economic and commercial technique for the peoples of the countries concerned.

#### CONCLUSION.

37. The above sets out British needs and commitments and the international arrangements to which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are parties and which contribute to the security of certain countries in the Middle East. These arrangements place His Majesty's Government under obligations to many of the countries in the Middle East, involving their responsibility in some cases for the defence only, and in others for the defence, internal security, administration and foreign political commitments of the countries concerned. In return for the fulfilment of these obligations, His Majesty's Government receive various degrees of assistance in safeguarding their special needs in the Middle East area. It is the hope and intention of His Majesty's Government that the degree of mutual co-operation thus secured, either by itself or strengthened by new arrangements, will enable the individual nations to develop free institutions, social reforms and better standards of living and education, as well as commercial and other beneficial forms of intercourse with other countries.

*Foreign Office, 27th March, 1944.*

[E 2793/2793/G]

No. 50.

*Mr. Eden to Lord Killearn (Cairo).*

(No. 220.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, 5th May, 1944.*

THE Egyptian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, when he gave me the enclosed document from the Egyptian Prime Minister. I expressed some surprise at its contents. It did not seem to me conceivable that the French would agree to what was here proposed, nor at a first reading could His Majesty's Government recommend that they should do so. Apart from any other consideration, I had no evidence that the States mentioned were in a position to undertake self-government. I added that I found it surprising to receive a document of this kind from the Egyptian Prime Minister at this time. I should have thought that Egypt would have been better occupied setting her own house in order.

2. The Ambassador seemed a little puzzled by my remarks, so I asked him whether he had not received any information of the recent events in Egypt. His Excellency said that he had heard nothing. I then gave him some account, whereupon he expressed due horror at the idea that Hassanein Pasha could have been a successful Prime Minister.



3. Reverting to the document, I commented that while it spoke in eloquent terms of a union of Arab States, so far as I was aware we were still far from such a desirable state of affairs; and as for the active help that the Arab States had given us, we here had not yet forgotten Raschid Ali's rebellion.

4. The Ambassador did not defend his Prime Minister's document with any great vigour and asked me what he was to say to Nahas Pasha. I suggested that it would be enough if he should reply that he had delivered the document to me. His Excellency also mentioned that copies of this had been sent to the French National Committee, the United States Government and the Soviet Government.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 50.

Son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat  
de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les  
Affaires Etrangères, Londres.

Excellence,

Le Caire, le [?] avril 1944.

LES leçons de la guerre et la révolution des esprits ont amené les Etats et les individus à considérer comme une nécessité absolue l'établissement d'un monde meilleur. En effet, tous les peuples pour qui cet avenir est en fonction d'une démocratie épurée et sincère envisagent, à la fois avec espérance et anxiété, la réalité d'une paix qui, non seulement doit mettre fin aux violences de la guerre, mais organiser l'existence des nations et des individus dans l'entente, la confiance et la solidarité.

2. Dans les tragiques circonstances que nous traversons et à cette heure qui précède l'aube de la paix, il est du devoir de chaque homme responsable de prendre une part active à l'élaboration du monde futur, d'exprimer son opinion avec franchise et d'émettre avec netteté ses suggestions. Pour l'Egypte, que des considérations historiques et sociales placent en tête des pays arabes et musulmans, et qui, par sa position géographique et son évolution sociale, est plus que jamais désignée à servir d'agent de liaison, d'entente et de paix entre l'Occident et l'Orient, c'est un devoir, qu'elle ne saurait esquiver, d'élever la voix et de défendre la cause de l'Union arabe, qui est en même temps une cause de coopération entre Etats et peuples liés par d'étroites affinités culturelles, morales et politiques.

3. Quelques-uns de ces peuples ont obtenu leur indépendance et sont devenus aussitôt, dans le concert des nations, d'actifs éléments de paix et de civilisation. D'autres souffrent encore d'être incompris et de traîner le boulet humiliant imposé par des régimes périmés. Ce sont des Etats, ce sont des hommes qui ont le souci de leur dignité, qui nourrissent des aspirations légitimes et qui ne peuvent accepter d'être traités en Etats et en individus inférieurs à qui est refusé le droit d'être respectés, indépendants et libres, et de jouir des bienfaits d'une vraie civilisation.

4. Les peuples arabes, qui, chacun dans sa sphère, ont apporté à la cause des Nations Unies toute l'aide en leur pouvoir, à la fois pour faciliter la victoire et collaborer à une paix juste et durable, ont envisagé comme une impérieuse nécessité la formation de l'Union arabe en sérieuse voie de réalisation. Par cette Union ils ont la certitude qu'un équilibre qui manquait à l'organisation d'un monde meilleur sera trouvé et qu'entre l'Orient et l'Occident sera enfin close l'ère des malentendus.

5. Aussi bien, cette Union serait incomplète et ne produirait pas ses meilleurs effets si les peuples arabes de l'Afrique du Nord s'en trouvaient exclus et continuaient à vivre sous des régimes contraires à leurs droits et à leurs aspirations. L'Algérie, le Maroc, la Tunisie et la Libye entendent bénéficier, à leur tour, des principes pour lesquels se battent les Nations Unies. Il semble qu'on ne saurait, sans injustice, leur refuser un droit naturel et il serait profondément regrettable qu'ils soient les seuls à être tenus à l'écart des peuples libres et indépendants.

6. La Grande-Bretagne, l'Amérique et l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, autant par leurs actes que par leurs déclarations, ont encouragé et aidé la libération et l'indépendance des peuples. La France ne peut pas faire moins et nous apprécions les efforts du Comité d'Alger de modifier la politique

coloniale française. Les dirigeants de sa politique ont déjà prouvé qu'ils sont pénétrés de l'esprit nouveau en reconnaissant l'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban. Cependant, quelle que soit la bonne volonté des autorités d'Alger, les événements exigent également ailleurs des mesures définitives et des décisions complètes. La glorieuse France d'hier, qui redeviendra la glorieuse France de demain, se doit de n'être pas la dernière à manifester en actes son libéralisme et son esprit de démocratie.

7. En accord avec tous les peuples arabes, l'Egypte accomplit un élémentaire devoir de solidarité en soumettant à la France et aux Nations Unies les desiderata des peuples de l'Afrique du Nord. Loin de voir son prestige diminué, la France se grandirait en négociant, dans le cadre des principes alliés et de l'esprit de la Charte de l'Atlantique, les modalités de l'indépendance de l'Algérie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie. Elle trouverait, dans la reconnaissance de leur indépendance, la justification de sa politique nouvelle et établirait, en même temps, avec ces pays, des rapports d'amitié et d'alliance beaucoup plus sincères et productifs que les rapports de dépendance qui sont cause aujourd'hui, et le seront davantage demain, de bien des frictions et de troubles.

8. C'est désormais l'esprit de compréhension, de justice et d'humanité qui devra présider aux relations entre peuples et individus. La vraie paix, la seule paix durable, est à cette condition. Devant l'Occident et l'Orient un avenir particulièrement fécond s'ouvrira si les droits et les intérêts mutuels sont respectés et si la justice est égale pour tous. Une paix qui ne tiendrait pas compte des réalités nouvelles, qui, dans l'organisation du monde futur, ne donnerait pas à l'Orient toute la place qui lui revient et qui ne reconnaîtrait pas ses droits, serait une paix dangereuse. Les peuples espèrent mieux et davantage, l'Orient comme l'Occident, l'ancien monde comme le nouveau.

9. Comme prélude à l'ère nouvelle, les peuples arabes attendent des Nations Unies et plus particulièrement de la France que, revenant sur le passé, il soit mis fin au régime de vexations et de persécutions, que les leaders emprisonnés soient libérés et qu'il soit permis aux représentants authentiques de l'Afrique du Nord d'exprimer, sans crainte de représailles, leurs légitimes aspirations. Ainsi la France nouvelle donnerait une courageuse mesure de son libéralisme et mériterait l'amitié et le respect de tout l'Orient arabe.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL,  
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.



File Number:

T

TREATY.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

(16790)

## Further Correspondence

respecting

# EASTERN AFFAIRS

## PART 58

July to September 1944



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

## Chapter I.—AFGHANISTAN.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
1 Mr. Squire ... No. 56	1944. July 1	Heads of foreign missions in Afghanistan ... Annual report	1
2 Mr. Squire ... No. 76	Sept. 2	Leading personalities in Afghanistan ... Annual report	3

## Chapter II.—IRAQ.

3 Mr. Thompson ... No. 320	1944. Aug. 3	Heads of foreign missions in Iraq ... Annual report	82
4 Mr. Thompson ... No. 332	Aug. 14	Situation in Iraq ... Further account of recent events	36

## Chapter III.—PERSIA.

### (A) Miscellaneous.

5 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 269	1944. June 28	Persian finances ... Revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government for 1943/44: Dr. Millsbaugh's report. The budget for 1944/45	41
6 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 273	July 1	Heads of foreign missions at Tehran ... Annual report	43
7 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 281	July 6	Situation in Persia ... Report on events in Persia during the months of April, May and June 1944	47
8 Mr. Lascelles ... No. 283. E.	July 9	Financial situation in Persia ... Report by the financial counsellor, dated the 3rd July	62
9 Consul-General Skrine	Aug. 1	Situation in Khorasan ... Six-monthly report on the political situation: January-June 1944	67
10 Consul-General Rapp (Tabriz) to Mr. Lascelles (Tehran) No. 27	Aug. 22	Situation in Azerbaijan ... General observations on the course of events in Azerbaijan during the past six months	71
11 Mr. Lascelles ... No. 346	Sept. 4	Political situation in Persia ... Further report on the composition of the 14th Majlis	76

### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

12 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 263	1944. June 26	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 19th June to 25th June, 1944	77
13 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 275	July 3	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the period 26th June to 2nd July, 1944	79

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
14 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 286	1944. July 10	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the period 3rd July to 9th July, 1944	81
15 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 293	July 17	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the period 10th July to 16th July, 1944	83
16 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 298	July 24	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period 17th July to 23rd July, 1944	86
17 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 313	Aug. 7	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period 24th July to 6th August, 1944	88
18 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 320	Aug. 14	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the period 7th August to 13th August, 1944	91
19 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 331	Aug. 21	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period 14th August to 20th August, 1944	93
20 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 338	Aug. 28	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the period 21st August to 27th August, 1944	95
21 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 345	Sept. 4	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period 28th August to 3rd September, 1944	97
22 Sir R. Bullard ... No. 365	Sept. 18	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the period 4th September to 17th September, 1944	99

## Chapter IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

23 Mr. Jordan ... No. 61	1944. July 1	Heads of foreign missions in Saudi Arabia ... Annual report	102
24 ...	...	Leading personalities in Saudi Arabia ... Annual report	104

## Chapter V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

### (A) Miscellaneous.

25 To Sir E. Spears ... No. 53. A.	1944. July 27	British policy in the Levant States ... New instructions to His Majesty's Minister	135
26 Foreign Office	Aug. 23	British and French policy in relation to the Levant States ... Record of conversations with the French Delegation at the Foreign Office on the 23rd August, 1944	136
27 To Mr. Mackereth ... No. 136	Aug. 30	British and French policy in relation to the Levant States ... M. Massigli's note dated 24th August and Foreign Office note dated 26th August in reply	140
28 To Sir E. Spears ... No. 139	Sept. 1	British policy in the Levant States ... Lines on which it is now proposed to conduct His Majesty's Legation and the Spears Mission in the Levant. Importance of a treaty being concluded between the States and the French	143



## (B) Weekly Political Summaries

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
29	1944. ...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 116, 21st June, 1944	144
30	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 117, 28th June, 1944	146
31	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 118, 5th July, 1944	148
32	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 119, 12th July, 1944	149
33	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 120, 19th July, 1944	151
34	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 121, 26th July, 1944	153
35	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 122, 2nd August, 1944	154
36	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 123, 9th August, 1944	156
37	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Weekly Political Summary No. 124, 16th August, 1944	157
38	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 125, 23rd August, 1944	159
39	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 126, 30th August, 1944	160
40	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 127, 6th September, 1944	161
41	...	Situation in the Levant States ... Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 128, 13th September, 1944	162

## Chapter VI.—GENERAL.

42	Sir E. Spears No. 59	1944. June 29	Armenians in the Lebanon ... Memorandum regarding the historical position of the Armenians in the Lebanon, their present position and their future	165
----	-------------------------	------------------	---	-----

## SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

AFGHANISTAN—	SAUDI ARABIA—
Heads of missions.—1.	Heads of missions.—23.
Leading personalities.—2.	Leading personalities.—24.
IRAQ—	SYRIA AND THE LEBANON—
Heads of missions.—3.	British and French policy.—25-28.
Situation.—4.	Situation reports.—29-41.
PERSIA—	GENERAL—
Political and general situation.—7, 11-22.	Armenians in the Lebanon.—42.
Financial situation.—5, 8.	
Situation in Khorasan.—9.	
Situation in Azerbaijan.—10.	
Heads of missions.—6.	



**CONFIDENTIAL.**

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 58.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1944.

**CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.**

[E 4133/904/97]

No. 1.

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th July.)*

(No. 56.)

Kabul, 1st July, 1944.

Sir,  
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul.*

*Egypt (Minister):* M. Mohamed Amin Fouad Bey.

Presented his credentials on the 1st April, 1943. A career diplomatist. Very civilised after the French mode and seems to be well off financially. Has served, among other places, in Angora and Bucharest, in which latter place he was first counsellor and later Minister. After Mr. Engert he is far and away our most helpful colleague. Being the representative of a Mohammedan country with no axe to grind in Afghanistan, he and his busy little wife are able to entertain Afghans more freely than other legations, a concession of which they take full advantage and always to the benefit of the Allied, and especially the British cause, which they warmly support.

*France (Vichy).*

The legation has been closed, and since the 22nd May, 1943, Vichy French interests in Kabul have been transferred to the care of the Turkish Embassy.

*Germany (Minister):* Herr Hans Pilger.

Presented his credentials on the 28th August, 1937.

*Iraq (Minister):* General Khalid Al Zahawi.

Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1943. Served with the Iraqi army and has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he enjoyed himself thoroughly and where he seems to have been very well treated. Before being posted to Kabul he was Director-General of Irrigation in his own country.

A gentle but rather colourless person, seemingly well disposed to Great Britain but of little active assistance to the Allied cause in Kabul. A good linguist, speaking English, French, Persian and Turkish. Has a Turkish wife, who joined him in the autumn of 1943 but who is shortly leaving again for Istanbul, where he has a son studying medicine.



*Italy* (Minister) (until the 8th May, 1944, when he left for Moscow):  
Commendatore P. Quaroni.

Presented his credentials on the 9th December, 1936.

An extremely able and ambitious little man. An accomplished linguist, who seems to have been relegated to Kabul as the result of some past indiscretion. During his seven and a half years in Kabul he has made a close study of Afghan history and archaeology, on which he is now an authority. Has never been a keen Fascist but is prepared to subordinate any convictions he may have to his personal advancement. Was counsellor in the Italian Embassy in Moscow in 1926, when he met and married his Russian wife, a lady with a very malicious tongue. An interesting but untrustworthy and rather dangerous couple.

*Japan* (Minister): Motoharu Shichida.

Presented his credentials on the 3rd November, 1942.

*Persia* (Ambassador): M. Abolghassem Nadjm.

Presented his credentials on the 5th August, 1943. A career diplomat, who has been successively Minister in Berlin, Paris and Tokyo. Friendly but ineffective and appears to have little influence in Kabul. The co-operation which he is on occasion asked to give to His Majesty's Legation on matters of mutual interest is adequate, but not more. As far as I am aware, he has never expressed any enthusiasm for the United Nations. Is learning English, which he understands tolerably well.

*Soviet Union* (Ambassador): M. Ivan Nikolaevich Bakoulin.

Presented his credentials on the 17th February, 1944. Aged 35.

The *enfant terrible* of the Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. Was apparently appointed to the Diplomatic Service from China in about 1938 and, except for a period as consul-general in Sinkiang, has served mostly in Moscow. Burly, outspoken and entirely without polish, he boasts of his peasant origin. Like so many Russians he considers the only test of a friend is the capacity to put away an unlimited number of drinks with no heel taps. Speaks a little very bad English and appears friendly. His wife, who is even less polished than her husband, is a doctor and works as embassy surgeon.

*Turkey* (Ambassador): M. Kemal Koprulu.

Presented his credentials on the 1st June, 1942. Is something of a legal expert. Before the 1914-18 war was secretary to the legal adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in the Turkish Government. He served in the Turkish army as a reserve officer 1914-18, after which he resumed his career of lawyer cum diplomatist. Was first secretary at the London Embassy in 1923. Acted as adviser to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Arbitration Board appointed for the settlement of the frontier dispute between Afghanistan and Persia in 1934. It was then that he visited Afghanistan for the first time. In the next year he was made legal adviser to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a post which he continued to hold till his appointment to Kabul.

M. Koprulu has the prosperous appearance of a wine waiter at a really good London hotel. He uses certain lavatory gestures with his hands as well which are not out of keeping with this appearance. His whole manner, in fact, is so smooth, not to say slippery, that it is hard to know whether there is anything to him or not. On the whole it is thought that there is not. He certainly does not give the impression of being either a profound lawyer or an effective diplomatist. He has, however, succeeded in avoiding even the least intimacy with the various representatives of the United Nations in Kabul, though there is no evidence so far available to show that he is on any more intimate terms with the Axis representatives. Till we can be more certain of his quality, therefore, he is probably worth watching. (Written in 1943.)

On leave in Turkey August 1943 to June 1944. Professes enthusiasm for the Allied cause, but unfortunately commands little respect either from the Afghan Government or from the large Turkish community in Kabul.

*United States of America* (Minister): Mr. Cornelius Van H. Engert.

Presented his credentials on the 25th July, 1942. During the war of 1914-18 he was secretary to the United States Legation in Constantinople, where he rendered the British Government conspicuous assistance in the matter of British prisoners of war in the hands of the Turks. In the interval he has frequently visited London, where he is well known at the Foreign Office. At Tehran and later at Beirut he gave many further proofs of his anxiety to co-operate with

his British colleagues and to further Anglo-American understanding in any way that was in his power. At Beirut, in particular (1940-42), he made himself most useful as an intermediary between the British representatives and those of Vichy France. With him Anglo-American solidarity is almost a religion, and there is at all times the closest co-operation between the United States and British Legations, which is of great assistance to us in Kabul. Mr. Engert's policy of co-operation, however, which at times goes rather beyond that of his own Government, and which he therefore tries to conceal from his own staff, inevitably lands him into difficulties and is not conducive to the securing of loyal support from his subordinates. In spite of his friendliness it must be admitted that he lacks personality and therefore fails to command the respect which he should otherwise enjoy.

[E 5691/904/97]

No. 2.

*Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 18th September.)

(No. 76.)

Kabul, 2nd September, 1944.

Sir,

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch No. L. 3603/405 dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan duly corrected up to the end of June 1944. The list has hitherto shown a tendency to become merely an abridged version of the Military publication "Who's Who in Afghanistan." In the present revision an attempt has been made to give up-to-date details regarding persons of political importance while the names of several individuals of purely military or tribal significance have been omitted.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 2.

#### *Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan.*

(The references in brackets are to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936," issued by the General Staff in India.)

1. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 4).—Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam. Brother of W.W. 63. "Sardar-i-Ala," Ismail Khel Ghilzai; owing to long residence in Wardak, is known as "Wardaki." From 1909 to 1916 was Chief Usher (Arzbegi) to the Ameer. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Kataghan. Was arrested with his brother for complicity in the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was later acquitted. In 1922 was appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah and was a great favourite of his. Sent to Wardak valley during the Mangal rebellion in 1924-25 to maintain loyalty amongst the Wardakis. During Amanullah's absence in Europe was for four months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was relieved and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior November 1928. Supported Amanullah in his efforts, from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of the National Council (Rais-i-Shura) 1930. In November 1931 proceeded to Farah as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Farah and Chakhansur. Returned to Kabul in spring of 1932 and re-elected President, National Council. Is reported to belong to the "Charkhi" family party. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933. Visited Wardak country March 1933 to check pro-Amanullah propaganda. Served on a commission on the Helmand water dispute June 1933. In October 1933 visited North Afghanistan with Prime Minister and others. Re-elected President of National Council 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe for medical treatment. Is suffering from diabetes. Still President of National Council. He is now a very sick man, but continues to carry out his duties. A friend of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Owing to ill-health he is unlikely to



be given any more active appointment, but should retain his position in the Government.

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of sincerity.

2. *Abdul Ahad* (W.W. 5).—Son of Abdul Ahad Khan of Ghazni and brother of W.W. 315. Born 1902 in Kabul. Tajik. He owns property in Kabul and Ghazni. An infantry officer. Was sent to Turkey about 1925 for military training and studied in Military Academy, Istanbul. Returned to Afghanistan via Herat early in 1929; reached Kandahar just after Amanullah fled to India. Returned to Herat. Later joined late King Nadir Khan in Southern Province and took part in fighting there. Appointed Officer Commanding, Arq, after Nadir's succession. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1930. Has more than once been congratulated by the King on his good work as General Officer Commanding, Kandahar. Attended manoeuvres in Delhi, January 1935. After his return held frequent field parades of Kandahar garrison and started seriously to learn English, of which he spoke little. Appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, in June 1935. Came to Kabul, was received by the King and returned to Kandahar and left to take up his new appointment. An intelligent little man, with a great sense of humour, he is a keen student of his profession and from all accounts a capable commander. Popular and loyal. Speaks Turkish well. Was very friendly to British Military Attaché on his visit to India and was much impressed by the friendliness and hospitality of British officers he met. In 1936 he visited Musabad on the Persian frontier to select a site for a post in area given to Afghanistan by the Boundary Commission. Trained men in ambulance work. Takes an interest in medical work and rewards doctors who have done good work. His brother joined Abdul Majid (W.W. 72-A) in Herat for his tour in Europe. Popular in Herat. Appointed commander in Farah Province during Helmand water dispute. Sister married to W.W. 553 in 1936. Royal appreciation presumably in connexion with services in Helmand water dispute. A very hospitable man, polite and enlightened, prepared to discuss any subject but not very communicative on military matters. Appears keen on his profession and anxious to improve training and equipment of the army. Professes loyalty for Central Afghan Government and Government of Herat. Said he was impressed by his visit to Indian manoeuvres in 1935 and with British methods. Reported that he exercised more influence than the Governor of Herat. In absence of the Governor of Herat, he and Mohammad Ali Khan officiated as Governors jointly. He opened a school in Robat-i-Ghurian where officers learn English. Formed a local intelligence corps in Ghurian. Transferred from command of Herat forces, appointed Governor of Ghazni 1937. Inhabitants of Katawaz are said to have confidence in him; has some influence with the various tribal leaders. Accused Indian Government of intrigue with the Ghilzais. Detailed men in Katawaz for pro-Government propaganda. Bribed Suleiman Khel visitors to keep away from rebels. Warned Suleiman Khel against Fakir of Ipi, whom he called a "British agent" working against Afghan interests. Visited Turkey in 1942 for medical treatment and returned in 1943. His visit to Turkey is thought to have had some political motive. Commandant of an infantry division in the Kabul army corps. He is a possible choice for Governorship of a Province or command of troops sent to suppress tribal disturbances or to head a Military Mission abroad or to represent Afghanistan at any International Conference.

3. *Abdul Aziz Khan* (W.W. 13).—Son of the late Ghulam Haidar Charkhi. Born 1891. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishar) of artillery. Was on the Asmar front in 1919. Commanding Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley, 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqavis February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul, via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th July, 1930, to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi (deceased) in Angora. Accompanied ex-King Amanullah to Mecca in 1931. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sisti, but left for Berlin when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1935. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople, but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. *Abdul Hadi Khan* (W.W. 38).—Dawi Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad, a Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Aman-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar (counsellor) in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mussoorie Conference 1920. Arrived Kushk November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan consul. Appointed Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister in London January 1922. Relieved August 1924. On return was appointed Minister of Commerce. Was suspected of "Republican" intrigues during Amanullah's absence in Europe 1928. Went to Russia for three months in 1928 in connexion with Russo-Afghan trade. Retired from Ministry of Commerce in October 1928 to become a candidate for the National Assembly. Joined Amanullah in Kandahar and fled with him to India May 1929. Resided in Karachi and returned to Kabul in November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Berlin December 1929. Resigned in March 1931, as he considered the attitude of the Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met ex-King Amanullah in Venice March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was closely watched by Afghan Government, who doubted his loyalty. In 1933 (December) was arrested and imprisoned on suspicion of pro-Amanullah activities. Still (1943) in jail in Kabul. Has the reputation of being an ardent Nationalist and particularly anti-British, but financially honest. Has also been reported to be pro-Russian.

In June 1935 reported to be sending letters from jail to the Republican party in Kabul, advising them to look to Britain rather than Russia for help.

King Zahir Shah is said to have announced grant of money to his relatives who interviewed him in August 1935.

5. *Abdul Hakim Khan* (W.W. 43).—Was a junior under-secretary at the Afghan Foreign Office; transferred as a junior under-secretary to the Ministry of Education in 1923. Appointed secretary to Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1927. Appointed second secretary, Afghan Legation, Berlin, May 1931. Assistant secretary in western branch of Afghan Foreign Office in 1934 and 1935. Was Rais of the Afghan representatives at Joint Commission at Chaman in April/July 1936. Governor of Eastern Province in September 1939.

1943. Appointed officiating Director of Agriculture 1944. Believed to be anti-British in his sympathies due to lack of courtesy shown to him in India. Does not belong to any important family.

6. *Abdul Hamid Khan* (W.W. 45).—Muhammazai. Born about 1898. Son of the late Abdul Aziz Khan. Brother of Abdul Hussain Khan (Mirza). Educated in France. In Tehran in 1929 with his father, with whom he returned to Kabul in December 1929. Secretary to the Afghan legation in Rome, February 1931-1934. First Secretary Afghan Embassy Moscow 1934. In the Protocol Branch of the Foreign Ministry in 1936. Chef de Protocol in 1937. Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1937. Appointed Afghan Representative in Geneva 1939. Returned to Kabul in November 1939 and re-appointed Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1940. He and his family are not entirely trusted by the Yahya Khel dynasty. He is, however, a possible choice as an Afghan Minister abroad in one of the less important countries.

7. *Abdul Husain Khan* (W.W. 47).—Mirza. Son of the late Abdul Aziz. Born about 1896 and educated in Persia. Accompanied his father to Tehran in 1920. Was Under-Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1924. Dismissed in August 1925, partly for taking heavy commission on goods purchased in India for Afghan Government. Director of Afghan Transport Company, Kabul, 1926. Appointed consul-general, Delhi. In business in Karachi 1929. Returned to Kabul November 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome and presented credentials the 17th May, 1930. Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva 1931-32. Attended Disarmament Conference, Geneva, during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Litvinov.

Transferred as Ambassador to Moscow during 1933. Brought the body of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan to Kabul in June 1933 and returned to Moscow in December.

Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India, where he spent some time during the Great War.



Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Reported to have pro-Amanullah leanings.

Returned to Kabul July 1938. Appointed Minister of Public Works, October 1938. Appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1940. Suspected of intrigues with enemy 1942-43. Left for Washington in April 1943 to take up newly created post of Afghan Minister there. It is believed that he was selected for the appointment in order to get him out of Kabul. Not trusted by the Yayha Khel dynasty, and believed to be anti-British in his political sympathies.

8. *Abdulla Khan*.—Tajik. Son of Ahmad Khan of Ghazni and brother of Gul Ahmad Khan Tajik (W.W. 315) and Abdul Abad (W.W. 5). He was formerly an official in the Government Purchasing Department, and afterwards their agent in Berlin in 1938-39. Appointed as third Secretary (Muin) in the Ministry of National Economy in 1940. Stated to be pro-German in his views. Appointed officiating Governor of Herat in 1941.

9. *Abdul Majid*, alias *Abdul Majidoff* or *Hakimoff* (W.W. 73).—Tarak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1920 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there. Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs officials. In about 1930 he settled in Berlin. Was recalled to Kabul in 1933 by the Afghan Government to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have had a considerable amount of his property confiscated by the Soviet Government. Believed by some to have Soviet tendencies, but this has been officially denied by the Afghan Government. Has tact and is a capable business man.

In spring 1935 carried out an extensive business tour in Northern Afghanistan. Speaks Russian and German.

Has a wife and four children in Berlin.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1936 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Is an ardent Nationalist in his trade negotiations and the most important business man in Afghanistan. Largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and formation of various trading companies. Was also responsible for the propaganda part of the issue of the new currency notes (1935-36). Still in Europe (December 1937) negotiating loans and trade credits and purchasing machinery and armaments. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1937.

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade, September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Left Kabul January 1941 for United States but changed plans at Karachi and went to Germany for medical treatment. Ill and in Switzerland 1943. Shows reluctance to return to Afghanistan but still advises Afghan Government on economic matters. In 1943 sent 210,000 Afghanis for distribution as charity amongst bank employees. His financial affairs in Afghanistan are believed to be controlled by Government.

10. *Abdul Tawab Khan* (W.W. 124).—Muhammadzai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint-Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent one year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1928. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W.W. 366) by British aeroplane January 1929 and went to Europe. Married (1931) in Istanbul Zakiri Khanum, daughter of a retired Turkish naval captain. Still (1943) in Europe and a member of Amanullah's party. Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. *Abdul Wahab* (W.W. 126).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India

and left India with him. Has since lived in Europe. In Rome September 1934 and in close attendance on the ex-King. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In October 1935 was living in Istanbul. In Rome December 1936.

12. *Abdur Rahim Khan* (W.W. 89).—Naib Salar (general). Safi of Reza, Kohistan. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 1886 in Kohistan. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Husain, accountant under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-i-Os (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the Eastern Province. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Ghund Mishar of the Cavalry Ghund. On outbreak of the 1928 revolution returned to Kabul and joined Bacha-i-Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He deposed the Governor and left for Maimana, and thence for Herat, which he reached on the 4th May, 1929, after defeating some Herati forces under Muhammad Ghaus (W.W. 262). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and reappointed later by Nadir Shah October 1929. Said to be very popular with the Heratis and to be governing his province well. His loyalty to the Central Government was at one time uncertain, while the form of administration he set up in Herat was reported (1930) to show signs of Soviet influence. After the success of Shah Mahmud (W.W. 414) in the spring of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he seems to have decided to submit to Nadir Shah, and sent his son, Abdul Halim Khan (W.W. 43A), to Kabul in August. He returned in September, accompanied by Firqa Mishar (Major-General) Muhammad Shuaib Khan (W.W. 611A), who had been appointed General Officer Commanding, Herat, and a Mustaufi (revenue official). In August 1932 visited Kabul, and in September was confirmed in appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Herat.

Dealt firmly with an attempt to incite the Herat garrison to mutiny in 1933. Met the Prime Minister at Maimana at time of Nadir Shah's assassination and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Perso-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.

In 1935 reported to be anti-Russian. Owns a large estate in Kushk.

Arrived in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works. A man of great personality who governed his province well. While he was in Herat rumour was always rife about him: that he was pro-Russian; that he intended to set up an independent kingdom; that he was pro-Republican; that the Afghan Government intended to remove him, &c. His loyalty is doubtful, and he is a man who may play an important rôle should the present régime collapse. In July 1935 awarded 150 acres of land near Kabul. Was being closely watched by the Government (1936), as he was suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies or disloyalty to the Afghan Government.

Reported as being connected with the Republican party. Appointed Assistant to the Prime Minister with status of a Cabinet Minister (1938), which post he still holds. Suspected of intrigues with enemy legations 1943 and still being carefully watched by Afghan Government. Does not take much part in public life.

13. *Abdur Rahman Khan*.—Appointed Afghan Minister at Baghdad early in January 1941, and was on his way to Baghdad when he was recalled from Karachi owing to outspoken criticism of commercial policy of Abdul Majid Khan, Minister of National Economy, in which he had indulged just before his departure. Later reported to Baghdad and presented his credentials to the Regent of Iraq on the 21st October, 1941.

14. *Abdus Samad Khan* (W.W. 118).—Tajik.

Secretary of Afghan Legation in London; returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca en route, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary, November 1928; transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office, Kabul, February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment



in February 1936. Represented King Zahir Shah at coronation in London, 1937. Still in Rome.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English, and believed to be well disposed to us.

15. *Ahmad Ali Jan (or Khan)* (W.W. 140).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleiman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred his displeasure by marrying, without his approval, a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W.W. 461A). Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24. Imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929, but was released in October. Appointed Minister in Paris, November 1929, and transferred to London, June 1931. Represented Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. Returned to Kabul in October 1933. In 1936 Minister of Education. Left Kabul in November 1937 on appointment as Ambassador at Tehran.

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman, but not very capable. Appears to be lazy. Is said to be pro-British and is always very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and writes English perfectly. He himself speaks English, French and Urdu. Has a son born about 1926. Appointed Minister in London (1939). Still Minister in London.

16. *Ahmad Ali Khan* (W.W. 141).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Tajik. Son of Abdul Wahid Khan. Born 1886. Known as Ahmad Ali Khan "Lodin." Appointed Afghan agent at Bombay January 1917. Was in Kabul March 1919. Appointed Afghan consul in Peshawar November 1919, but was not permitted to enter British territory. Wrote to Ameer saying this was due to his having been Mehmandar (entertainment officer) to the Russians in Kabul. Appointed Sarhaddar (frontier officer) at Dakka September 1920. Relieved in March 1921, but remained as a political officer. Was said to be much trusted by the Ameer, who refused to listen to complaints against him. Relieved and returned to Kabul November 1921. Appointed Hakim-i-Kalan (Governor), Kohistan, December 1921. Was Governor of the Eastern Province during the crisis over the Landi Kotal murders, and organised pursuit of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237). Governed his province harshly and disgraced Mir Zaman of Kunar. Appointed Minister, Berlin, September 1925. Returned to Kabul 1927. Chief of Kabul Municipality, November 1928. Sent to Charikar to raise recruits, December 1928, but failed. Fled with Amanullah to India, May 1929, and with Inayatullah to Persia. Returned to Kabul, December 1929. Officiating Minister of Court, January 1930. Deputy War Minister, April 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Kataghan and Badakhshan, July 1930. Relieved by Naib Salar (General) Muhammad Ghaus Khan (W.W. 262) and went to Mazar-i-Sharif as Deputy Governor. On departure of Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) in May 1931 to Russia for medical treatment, was appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Northern Provinces. Returned to Kabul, January 1932, and appointed First Muin (secretary equivalent to adjutant-general), War Office. Granted (1935) some of the Charki family land.

A clever, capable man, with considerable force of character. Whilst in India proved courteous, able and sensible. Always smartly turned out, and is said to be one of the most capable of the Afghan army officers. Speaks German and is popular with the German instructors, whose methods he is said to prefer to those of the Turkish instructors. His attitude to the British is difficult to gauge, but he is invariably courteous. Has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Said to be corrupt and a flatterer. Still Rais-i-Urdu (adjutant-general), but may be pensioned off in the near future, in which event he is a possible choice for a diplomatic or civil appointment.

17. *Ahmad Shah Khan* (W.W. 149).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Asaf Khan. Born at Dehra Dun 1889. Returned to Afghanistan 1901. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah Khan to India in 1907. On the night of the murder of Ameer Habibullah Khan (1919) was in command of the guard. The sepoy of the Ghund-i-Ardalian (an infantry unit), whose colonel, Ali Shah Reza, was executed as the actual murderer, believed that Ahmad Shah Khan was the real murderer and that their colonel had been made a scapegoat. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a sister of the late Shaghassi Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A.D.C. of

ex-King Amanullah. Went to Europe via India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. Appointed Wazir-i-Darbar (Minister of Court) April 1930. In March 1932 went on pilgrimage to Mecca as representative of the King and negotiated a "Treaty of Friendship" with Saudi Arabia. Visited India in the spring of 1933 for medical treatment, where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Speaks English and Urdu and is a pleasant, well-mannered and easy-going man. In 1934 was reported to be on bad terms with the Premier. Visited India in November 1936.

His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghani Khan (W.W. 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (W.W. 161).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran (1939). Still Wazir-i-Darbar. Fond of shooting, fishing and gardening, but suffers from a heart complaint and not therefore very active.

18. *Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza* (W.W. 179).—Born about 1894. A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Commerce November 1928. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935, but was still in London in June 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Termez. Returned to London via India in October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King George V in London January 1936.

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited Tehran (1939) for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince of Iran and to attend the meeting of the Council of the Saadabad Pact. Is still Minister for Foreign Affairs. Speaks English well but no French; is a keen student of English literature and interested particularly in education. Enlightened, capable and genuinely friendly to Britain, but not a strong character and lacks energy. Not being related to the ruling family, he has no great influence with the Government.

19. *Ali Shah Khan* (W.W. 180).—Mohammadzai, Naib Salar and Sardar-i-Ali, son of Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, first cousin of late King Nadir Shah. Son-in-law of S. Musa Khan (W.W. 461A) and brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (W.W. 140). Was commandant of military schools and the military college from 1932 to 1939. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1939. In August 1941 he was transferred to the Southern Province as Governor (Rais-i-Tenzimia) and General Officer Commanding Southern Province army corps and promoted to the rank of Naib Salar (general). He is a pleasant, rather easy-going individual, but has not been very successful as an administrator in the Southern Province, of which post he was relieved in April 1944. At present unemployed in Kabul.

20. *Allah Nawaz* (W.W. 182).—Indian of Multan. Son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, honorary magistrate, Multan. As a student in Lahore ran away to Afghanistan. In Jalalabad (1920) was an assistant editor of the *Ittihad-i-Mashriqi*. A superintendent of schools, Jalalabad Circle. Was agent of the Indian Revolutionary party in Afghanistan and Tashkent and channel of communication between them and the Hindustani Fanatics. In 1927 was employed by the Deutsch-Afghanische Company as an interpreter. Helped Nadir Shah in his advance on Kabul 1929. Appointed Minister of Court October 1929, and equerry November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on Dar-ul-Aman May 1930. In July 1930 accompanied the Minister of Justice (W.W. 256) to Ghazni for negotiations with the Suleiman Khel, in which he is reputed to have done well. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931, ostensibly for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March



1932 again went to Europe for the same reason, and returned in January 1933. In June 1933 was appointed Minister of Public Works, but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in connexion with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe, ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933, but in reality, it is believed, to enquire about the trial of Said Kemal, the murderer of Sardar Muhammad Aziz, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah Wali Khan (W.W. 585). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent to assassinate ex-King Amanullah. In spite of rumours that he was returning to Kabul, was still (1935) in Europe. Appointed Minister, Berlin, 1935, but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Was devotedly attached to the late King Nadir Shah. His life has been threatened by the Amanullah party. Trusted by the Prime Minister (W.W. 337), who considers him very capable. Travelled to Kabul by German monoplane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Suleiman Khel rising of 1938. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Said to be anti-British. Is still Minister in Berlin.

21. *Amanullah Khan* (W.W. 183).—Ex-King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 346). Born the 1st June, 1892. In 1914 married Souriya, daughter of the late Sardar Mahmud Tarzi. In 1916 was reported to be friendly with the German mission in Kabul and in favour of intervention in the war against Britain. When the Court moved to Jalalabad in the winter of 1918-19 he remained behind as Governor of Kabul, and was in a very strong position, with control of the arsenal, treasury and stores, when the Ameer was murdered in February 1919. He proclaimed himself Ameer, declared his uncle Nasrullah a usurper, and accused him of complicity in the murder. The troops in Jalalabad and Kabul sided with him and Nasrullah was compelled to submit. On the 27th February was formally crowned by the Tagao Mullah, and in a speech stated that Inayatullah (W.W. 306) had by his recognition of Nasrullah's usurpation forfeited his claim to the throne. On the 13th April held a special durbār in Kabul for the trial of those accused of the Ameer's murder, and at its conclusion a colonel, named Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded as a mere scapegoat, was sentenced to death and was executed. Sardar Nasrullah and others were sentenced to imprisonment for life. Amanullah soon found his position threatened by intrigue on behalf of Inayatullah and the restiveness of the army who were not satisfied with the enquiry made into the murder of Habibullah. The army was therefore despatched to the Indian frontier, in order to divert its attention and to take advantage of the disturbances in India should these develop into open rebellion. The Commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities, which resulted in the Third Afghan War. A variety of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to Afghanistan, including the recognition of her complete independence. As a result Amanullah Khan was able to claim that he had won the freedom of his country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan on a basis of equality by the Great Powers. These tactics gained him considerable prestige, both in his own country and throughout the East. This prestige tended to increase his natural vanity and render him impatient of advice. Through his wife he had been brought under "Young Turk" influence, and he proceeded to carry out a fantastically rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people, particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning sounded by several rebellions, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army. These tendencies were exaggerated as a result of his European tour of 1927-28, and particularly, it is believed, as a result of his visit to Mustafa Kemal at Angora. In the autumn of 1928 the Shinwaris rose in revolt and were soon followed by other tribes. Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah announced his abdication in favour of Inayatullah on the 14th January and fled to Kandahar a day or two later. At Kandahar attempted to rally support for Durrani dynasty and formally rescinded his abdication. In April he advanced on Kabul, but owing to the hostility of the Ghilzais was repulsed near Ghazni and defeated at Mukur. Arrived at Chaman with his family on the 23rd May, and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June, 1929. Visited Mustafa Kemal in Angora in February

1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Constantinople hurriedly for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jedda to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter decrying King Nadir and his régime. Left Jedda for Suez, the 9th May, 1931. His Mecca party included Muhammad Adib (W.W. 137), brother of Souriya, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W.W. 20A), the late Ghulam Nabi, Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612), and two officials of the Angora Embassy, Fazal Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy, via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland, the 20th June, 1931, stayed at Montreux. Visited Rome in July and returned to Switzerland. Visited Montecatini in September, and was back in Rome by the beginning of November. Left Rome on short visits to Naples in December 1931 and Venice in March 1932. At Venice reported to have met Afghan Minister from Berlin; more likely it was Abdul Hadi Khan (W.W. 38). Said to have definite understandings with Soviet and Persia and to have many friends in Germany. Constant rumours of his whereabouts and intentions were circulated among the tribes on both sides of the border during 1932, culminating in one, which was put about during the Dare Khel revolt in November, to the effect that he was in Gardez. The ex-King was, however, in Italy or Switzerland throughout the year. He was reported to be writing his autobiography, and to be going to Russia when he had finished it to have it published by the Soviet. This has never materialised. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan régime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1933 he visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan régime amongst the North-West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stresa in Northern Italy, and took with him his family and Hasan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in-law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1935. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1943). Reported to have visited Switzerland (1943). After staying at Gstaad and at Villars he returned to Rome. He was accompanied by an Italian mistress. Was in Rome with his family when it was liberated by the Allies.

22. *Asadullah Khan* (W.W. 199).—Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Ameer Habibullah by the Ulya Janab, sister of the late King Nadir Shah. Is thus a half-brother of ex-King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mishar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and



household troops, including the Hazirbashas (personal bodyguards of the Royal family). He is also in charge of the advanced course for officers. Nervous in manner; appears to be intelligent and to take a keen interest in his command. Is important as the lineal representative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar" Sardars. Has a son born in 1934. Unconfirmed reports that he is not entirely loyal to the Yahya Khel have been received from time to time.

Went to Persia to attend the millenary celebrations of the poet Firdausi, October 1934, and returned to Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah.

Left Kabul for Europe (March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937).

Appears to take his profession seriously and is popular. Has acquired more *savoir-faire* of recent years. He visited India again in 1939 for medical treatment, and is learning English (1943). He is not a strong character or likely to be a danger to the Yahya Khel régime. He belongs to the faction of W.W. 414 and is on good terms with most of the members of the Royal Family. On the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939 he was relieved of his appointment as General Officer Commanding Guards Division and became Inspector-General of the Afghan Army, an appointment he still holds. He occasionally officiates as Minister of Defence.

23. *Ata Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 207).—Haji, Tokhi. Son of the late Sardar Abdullah Khan, who was Governor of Mazar in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Order of Astor. Quarrelled with Hashim Khan in the time of Ameer Habibullah. Was in Jalalabad when Ameer Habibullah was murdered; was arrested and condemned to death, but was reprieved at last moment. Again arrested on suspicion of complicity in unsuccessful attempt on Amanullah's life at Paghman in 1920, but released at Mahmud Tarzi's request. Appointed diplomatic representative, Bokhara, but his arrival coincided with the Bolshevik revolt (1920) and he returned to Mazar. Was one of Afghan officials ordered to render secret assistance to Enver Pasha in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years. Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces of Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture Northern Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Appears to have returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during operations against Ibrahim Beg 1931. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor 2nd class, 1931. Appointed a member of the Council of Nobles December 1931. Visited Mecca in 1932. Has a reputation for courage. Is reported to be pro-Russian. Is now (1943) President of the Council of Nobles. Is reported (1943) to have pro-German sympathies.

24. *Ata-ul-Haq* (W.W. 209).—Born about 1885. Eldest son of the late Khwaja Jan of Serai Khwaja, Koh-i-Daman. Brother of the late Sher Jan and the late Muhammad Sadiq Khan, two of the Bacha-i-Saqao's officials. Lived in India until he was 16. Accompanied Ameer Habibullah on his tour in India 1907. In July 1920 appointed to command at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and was suspended in March 1923 for inefficient handling of the Wazirs. Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1923. Spent two years in Moscow in charge of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i-Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Bacha-i-Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir Shah. Is well educated and possesses pleasant manners. Was released from jail in 1938.

25. *Faiz Muhammad Khan* (W.W. 243).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan (W.W. 317). Born about 1899. Was secretary to the late Muhammad Aslam Khan, Afghan Envoy, Tashkent. Returned to Kabul March 1920. Adviser to the late Muhammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1920. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the Suritz party September 1920. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January, 1921, en route to Moscow. Appointed first counsellor to Muhammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921 which visited London, America, Paris and Rome. First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In addition acted as Minister of Education 1923.

Appointed Minister of Education March 1924. A member of Bacha-i-Saqao's "Council for the Maintenance of Order" April 1929, although at one time the Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1933. Well educated and intelligent, has a good name for honesty in financial matters. Is friendly, insincere and self indulgent, particularly as regards drugs, the use of which renders him incapable of sustained mental effort. Prefers airy discourse of abstract principles to discussion of practical details, and is tiresome when he feels obliged to live up to his reputation as a humorist. Was sent to Eastern Province in September 1935 to dissuade Afghans from joining Mohmand Lashkars. Held a jirga at Dakka, and appears to have achieved some success in his object. Returned to Kabul the 23rd September, taking Badshah Gul I (W.W. 224) with him. Left Kabul December 1935 for an extended European tour.

Visited Iraq and Turkey, where he was well received. Later went to Paris, where he saw M. Flandin, and Geneva. In London was received in audience by The King and had conversations with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and India, Mr. Eden and Lord Zetland. Saw Herr Hitler in Berlin and finally reached Kabul in April 1936 via Moscow. Again visited Europe in 1936, and returned in January 1937. Relinquished post of Foreign Minister in 1938 on appointment as ambassador to Turkey, a post which he still holds, though his recall and reappointment as Foreign Minister is anticipated.

26. *Fazl Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 250).—Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1892 at Bakharz in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Qualified as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice *vice* Sher Agha (W.W. 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W.W. 256). Still Minister of Justice.

27. *Fazal-i-Umar (Sher Agha)* (W.W. 256).—A member of the family of Sirhind Pirs established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, deceased, Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter having succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul, but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan, where in 1928 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North-West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security Regulations for preaching against the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amanullah asked him to return to Afghanistan but he refused. After the abdication of King Amanullah he went to the Southern Province where he assisted Nadir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice November 1929. In July 1930 was sent as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Ghazni area and returned to Kabul at the end of August. In June his daughter married Fazal Ahmad Khan, Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat (W.W. 250). In December 1931 tendered his resignation and ceased working as Minister. He was reported at this time to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1935, and was instructed by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms. His wholehearted support of King Zahir Shah is therefore doubtful, and he is not trusted by the Afghan Government. On the other hand, is probably not pro-Amanullah. He appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad." Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship with the British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to be on bad terms with Saivid Hasan (W.W. 546). Prime Minister doubts his loyalty, and would have liked in



1935 to arrest him, but was afraid to do so. Visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March 1940.

Given a fort and 70 acres of land in Chahardeh by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca, 1938. In 1942 expressed a desire for an Allied victory and according to one report asked his followers to pray for such a victory, but was also reported to be in close contact with the Italian Legation at this time. Visited India in 1944.

28. *Fazal Rahim* (see *Rasul Jan, Agha*).

29. *Ghaus-ud-Din* (W.W. 264).—Patulla, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for insolence in 1914. In 1915 was concerned in a conspiracy against Ameer Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex-King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1924 and detained in the Arq whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost, where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir Afghan." Awarded 1½ lakhs of rupees for his services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hariob to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930, from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930. A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man, who is always intriguing for his own ends. Has since been transferred to Kodai Kanal, Madras Presidency, from Burma (1936). Requested permission for his family to return to Afghanistan in 1936, on which the Afghan Government offered to allow him to return also, but on conditions which were unacceptable to him. Offered his assistance to the Afghan Government against Germany and Russia but this was believed to be merely a cloak to cover his real intentions of establishing himself with the Ghilzais.

30. *Ghulam Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 292).—Son of the late Shahghassi Ali Ahmad Jan, and grandson of the late Luinab Khushdil Khan. Married to a niece of Sardar Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243) in 1927. Appointed aide-de-camp to his father when the latter was Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province in 1924. Left Kabul for Kandahar via Peshawar and Quetta, the 10th March, 1929. Returned to Quetta on his father's arrest by Bacha-i-Saqao and proceeded to Peshawar, September 1929. Returned to Kabul on the accession of Nadir Khan. Accompanied Shah Wali (W.W. 585) to Bombay, December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930 (April). In January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in March. Went into partnership with Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Company, and managed the petrol business in Kabul. Visited India five times during the period April–December 1932. Assistant manager of the Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In March 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His stepmother, Suraj-ul-Benat, is a sister of ex-King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new petrol company in 1936. Relieved of his appointment in the Petrol Company in 1938 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1938. Fled to Tirah in September 1939, after discovery of a pro-Amanullah plot, in which he was found to be the ringleader. In November 1939 he was surrendered by a Chamkanni jirga to the political agent, Kurram, and lodged with other leaders in Jamrud Fort. Has since (1940) been transferred to Poona and is still there.

31. *Ghulam Faruq Khan* (W.W. 273).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Sardar Muhammad Usman Khan. Employed in the Afghan Cypher Department 1926. Assistant manager Motorani Company. Arrested with his father at the same time as ex-King Amanullah arrested the Hazrat Sahibs of Shor Bazar, September 1928. Released October 1928. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1929 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahibs, Sanai Maksum. Returned to Afghanistan with Sardar Hashim Khan March 1929. Later was employed on propaganda work for Hashim Khan in Mohmand country.

Arrived Peshawar via Shabkadr, September. Left for Ali Khel via Parachinar October 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior December 1929. Appointed Governor of the Eastern Province December 1930. In January 1932 married the daughter of Ghulam Muhammad (W.W. 289). His first wife, daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridis and Mohmands, including Badshah Gul (W.W. 224). In July the Safis of Kunar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December, 1932, on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (W.W. 506) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W.W. 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and displayed considerable energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. A great favourite of the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). Is capable and hard-working, believed to be loyal to the existing régime. Keen on road and building development (1936). Appointed Governor of Kandahar (1938). Is stated to be in poor health (1939). Relieved of his post of Governor of Kandahar (1939) owing to poor health and appointed officiating Home Minister. In 1941 appointed Governor (Rais-i-Tanzimiah), Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, and in 1942 returned to Kabul to officiate as Home Minister. Relieved of the appointment of Home Minister later in the year, but retained his appointment as Governor of the Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces which he still holds. Incurred the displeasure of the Prime Minister in 1942 owing to a liaison with the wife of his brother-in-law (a son of W.W. 288). He divorced his wife and, much against the wish of the Royal Family, married the wife of his brother-in-law.

32. *Ghulam Muhammad Khan*.—Muhammadzai. A younger brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (W.W. 140) and Ali Shah Khan (W.W. 180). Born about 1907. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Employed as clerk in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs prior to his appointment as Director, Protocol Section, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1939. Friendly and pleasant to deal with, but has an exaggerated idea of his importance. Plays tennis and speaks French.

33. *Ghulam Siddiq Khan* (W.W. 309).—Sardar-i-Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (Commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider, Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W.W. 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India, October 1919, and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie Conference. Left Mussoorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into India owing to his improper behaviour at Mussoorie and intrigues with seditionists. Appointed assistant president to the Muhajarin Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited Europe in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar, October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W.W. 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with the rebels December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Despatched to Russia by Amanullah on a special mission March 1929. Assumed the duties of Afghan Minister, Moscow, April 1929. Returned Kabul December 1929. In Mecca June 1930. In Berlin 1930 engaged in anti-Nadir activities. Set out for Afghanistan under promise of free pardon from the King. Arrived in Kabul the 7th March, 1931. Suspected distributing agent of Amanullah's letters in Kabul April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July, 1931, to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own Government and Britain during his tenure in Berlin, encouraging anti-British propaganda over the Dokalim Boundary question at the beginning of 1932 and granting a visa to Ishar Singh Ghadrite against the wishes of the Afghan Government. Wrote to Nadir professing his loyalty in July 1932. His brother, the late Ghulam Nabi, was staying with him in July 1932 when he was invited to return to Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from his appointment. Visited Mecca during spring 1933 and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the



pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Bovoroi, through his brother, Abdul Aziz Khan (W.W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W.W. 230), sister of ex-Queen Souriya (W.W. 623). Lives in Berlin (1936), and frequently visits Rome, where he is believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan régime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Believed willing to work for Italian interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1940 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance. Plans said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1940 to have arrived in Stalinabad. In 1941 he arrived in Istanbul but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany.

34. *Ghulam Yahya Khan* (W.W. 311).—Muhammadzai. Born 1898. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W.W. 109, and cousin of W.W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Rome, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officiated for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1935. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican party. A pleasant, well-mannered man of no outstanding ability. He has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Speaks German and Turkish. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939, and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940, a post he still holds.

35. *Gul Agha* (see *Siddiq Agha Muhammad*).

36. *Gul Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 315).—Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar, Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 575) to Mazar-i-Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif *vice* Abdul Jamil Khan (W.W. 49) in November 1934, which post he still holds. Appointed Minister of Health in 1939 but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

37. *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W.W. 325).—Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins, W.W. 100 and W.W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Mahmud Tarzi when latter was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris, November 1928. Relieved by Ahmad Ali Jan (W.W. 140) December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Third secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Chief delegate to the Dokalim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and

Islam Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Speaks English fluently; a pleasant, well-mannered man. Returned to Kabul June 1939, and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, a post he was still holding in 1944. He is kept in this position of comparative obscurity as he is believed to be pro-Amanullah, and is therefore not trusted by the present régime.

38. *Hazrat of Shor Bazar* (see *Fazl-i-Umar*).

39. *Inayatullah Khan* (W.W. 366).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 20th October, 1888. Visited India in December 1904. Held the appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan, Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 1,30,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of Habibullah Khan, Sardar Nasrullah went through the form of offering him the throne. He, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the darbar at which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Muin-us-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Safi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1923, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arq. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arq by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England, August 1931, and stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son Khalilullah (W.W. 399). Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 tomans per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, generally to the effect that he has arrived, or is expected to arrive, in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines dignity with pleasant manners, and had a reputation for being honourable and straightforward. An agent of Inayatullah was reported to have visited Afghanistan in May 1935. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of about 5,000 rupees (Afghani) by the Afghan Government (1939). Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money



from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

40. *Mahmud Jan* (W.W. 415).—Sardar-i-Ala, Shahassi, Barakzai. Born 1885. Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin of Abdul Aziz Khan, and the Ulya Hazrat. Officiated as Minister of Public Security in 1922 and as Governor of Kabul in 1925. Was in charge of the Public Works and Secret Service. Also in charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under-Secretary. Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar-ul-Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927. Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927. Captured by rebels near Jalalabad, December 1928, where he had been sent to restore order. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao, February 1929. Released during the Independence celebrations, August 1929. Was appointed officer in charge State Workshops, November 1929, but was deprived of his appointment the following month. Imprisoned in the Arq on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels, January 1930. Under trial for being concerned in the Koh-i-Daman revolt of 1930. Released in January 1931, but rearrested with other members of the Shahgassi family in connexion with the Ghulam Nabi and Dare Khel plots in November 1932. His brother Zobain also arrested. His ears are said to have been trimmed as a punishment. Was released in November 1933 and kept under surveillance. A stout, pleasant gentleman; was friendly to foreigners. A great personal friend of ex-King Amanullah. Speaks Pushtu.

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail.

41. *Mohendra Pratap Singh* (alias *Raja*) (W.W. 437).—Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanshyam Singh, Jat, of Mursan, Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharani of Jhind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917. Endeavoured to come to India, but returned owing to our precautions. In 1918 with a party of Afghans left Mazar-i-Sharif for Russian Turkestan, and proceeded to Tashkent. In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople, where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan. No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts, but supposed to have gone to Tashkent via Bokhara. Came to Kabul with the Suritz Mission December 1919. Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W.W. 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party. Left Kabul and arrived at Wakhan, the 14th June, 1920, en route for China. Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to China by the Ameer. He soon returned as passage to China was refused by the Chinese authorities. In September 1920 he was in the Pamirs. Did a tour in China and Japan and returned to Kabul in autumn of 1923. Left Kabul, the 16th September 1924; visited California, China, attempted to enter Tibet, then went to Japan, whence he was deported. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926. His reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and although he held a number of receptions very few people of importance attended. This was mainly due to the displeasure of the King at Mohendra having styled himself Afghan representative at a Pan-Islamic conference in Japan, photographs describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul for the north, the 31st January, 1927, and arrived Moscow, February 1927. Returned to China but back in Moscow November 1928 preparing to hold "Pan-Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah. Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Allah Nawaz (W.W. 182). He was deported by air to Termez in March 1930. Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May, 1930. Is believed to be of some use to the OGPU. Was in China in 1931 and 1932. (His address there was P.O. Box 20, Peking, China). Published two books: *Afghanistan, the Herat of Aryan*, and *Long Live India!* Moved to Japan at the end of 1933 or beginning of 1934, where he was in touch with the Japanese Government. Continued to spread anti-British propaganda. Left

Japan secretly for Siam in June 1934, believed at Japanese instigation to further their pan-Asiatic policy. Forbidden to lecture in Siam. Turned out of Siam, arrived Tokyo, August 1934, having been deported from Canton.

Was in Manila in February 1935, back in Japan in April 1935 and left for America in July 1935. Has agitated for his own return to India through the Indian Legislatures. Has been regarded as an Afghan subject since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937. Reported to be in Japan (1942).

42. *Muhammad Agha Sami* (W.W. 555).—Brother of Shahgassi Muhammad Yakub Khan (W.W. 675). Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a Munshi to Ameer Habibullah. A Mohmand by birth, but the family have settled in Ghazni for some generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul, 1921. Appointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1923, partly due to escape of Ardali and Daud Shah (W.W. 237) from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in murder of one Abdul Ali. Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924, and sent to the front, where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer. Appointed Mehmandar to Wakils of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1926. Reappointed Commandant of Police, Kabul, August 1926. Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer. Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1926. Appointed officiating Governor of Kabul November 1928. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao February 1929, but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar. Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Duzdap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah in his flight as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul. Arrested and sentenced to banishment for implication in Koh-i-Daman revolt, July 1930, but subsequently released. Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah. On pilgrimage to Mecca, March 1931. Arrived Tehran with W.W. 675 in December 1931. Applied for permission to visit India but was refused. Still in Tehran, where his brother Yakub Khan (W.W. 675) has joined him; also his nephew and niece from Quetta. He and his son, Muhammad Bashir, deprived of Afghan nationality, November 1933. His property in Afghanistan is said to have been confiscated in 1934 and his family deported to Iran.

Is reported (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from Germany to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. Still reported to be in Iran.

43. *Muhammad Akbar Khan* (W.W. 161).—Muhammadzai. Brother of W.W. 113, Minister of Health 1930. Cousin of the late King Nadir Shah, to whom he was Surgeon-General. Director of Medical Services October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome 1935 and presented his credentials in May 1935.

Relieved of appointment as Minister at Rome, March 1936, and returned to Kabul. Is married to a sister of W.W. 149. Civil A.D.C. to the King, 1942.

44. *Muhammad Akram Khan* (W.W. 162A).—Born approximately 1909. Director of the Reception Branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937-39. Appointed Muin I in the Ministry of National Economy 1939, which post he still holds. Is also acting as private secretary to King Zahir Shah in place of No. 49. He is related to the ruling family and enjoys the affection and confidence of the King. A pleasant, well-mannered individual, apparently friendly with the British Legation, but was suspected of having been involved in pro-Axis intrigue in 1942-43.

45. *Muhammad Aminullah Jan* (or *Amin Khan*) (W.W. 186).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born the 12th October, 1885. Third surviving son of Amir Abdul Rahman. His mother was a slave girl belonging to the late Bibi Halima, who was said to have adopted him before her own son was born. Was formerly in charge of the Shara (Muhammadan Law) Department at Kabul, and was also in charge of the Jabba Khana (magazine). In 1917 he held the appointment of Sardar-i-Madafia (director of military defence). Has one son born about 1903, and a daughter said to have been married to Sardar Abdul Qudus August 1919 at Kandahar. Appointed A.D.C. to the King 1926. Arrested by Bacha-i-Saqao in January 1929. Arrived Quetta and left for Lahore the 4th November, 1929. Residing in Tehran 1930 in straitened circumstances. Appealed for an allowance from the Government of India in 1930. Is said to be very eccentric. In Iran 1943.



46. *Muhammad Atio Khan* (W.W. 209A).—Born approximately 1894. Muhammadzai. Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and son-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan, Court Minister (W.W. 149). Brother of Babo Jan *alias* Zulikka, widow of late Sardar Hayatullah Khan, step-brother of ex-King Amanullah. Visited Moscow in 1935. Is an economic expert trained in Germany and holds the post of director of the Industrial Section of the Afghan National Bank. Was kept under surveillance in 1939 for his alleged pro-Amanullah sympathies. Speaks Russian and German fluently and was formerly reputed to be strongly Germanophile and to be responsible for the increased German influence in the Royal Family. Shows no outward signs now (1944) of being pro-German, but is an enlightened Nationalist who works hard and with great ability for the industrial development of his country. A pleasant and intelligent man, friendly to the British Legation and appreciative of the assistance rendered to his country by the British and Indian Governments in industrial matters, particularly the textile industry, during the war. He professes to be anxious that trade connexions thus formed should be maintained and developed after the war.

His brothers are Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 658) and Muhammad Rahim Khan, assistant to the president of Kabul Municipality.

47. *Muhammad Daud Khan* (W.W. 238).—Elder son of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan (brother of King Nadir Shah). Born 1909 in Kabul. Educated at the Amania College, Kabul. Spent nine years in France and returned to Kabul in October 1930. 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, where he worked hard and was well reported on by the senior German instructor. November 1932 promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province. In February 1934 assumed the duties of Governor of the province in addition to his duties as General Officer Commanding. His strictness made him unpopular and he was inclined to be headstrong and hasty. Took a great interest in the training of his troops and the Eastern Province detachment at the Independence celebrations in 1934 was conspicuous for its smartness. In July 1935 was transferred as Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, and General Officer Commanding of the Farah and Chakhansur Division. A strong personality. A keen soldier and energetic. A favourite of his uncle the Prime Minister (W.W. 337). In 1934 married a sister of King Zahir Shah. Is likely to be much heard of in the future. Speaks excellent French, and is very well-mannered and friendly. Governor and General Officer Commanding, Kandahar, in 1936 and 1937. Warned to be more tactful by the Prime Minister. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of the Eastern Province (1938).

Appointed General Officer Commanding Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the Military Schools in Kabul in August 1939, the appointment he still holds. Since the reorganisation of the Kabul Army Corps in 1939-40 his influence has increased. The Kabul Army Corps now has a separate budget and is almost independent of the Ministry of Defence. He promoted some 220 officers in August 1942 with the approval of the King, but without reference to the Minister of Defence (W.W. 414). His corps is improving in efficiency, and his subordinates, though admiring his personality and drive, are somewhat afraid of him. In 1942, when the prospects of the Allied nations appeared not too favourable, he was believed to be advocating an approach to Germany by the Afghan Government. He is stated to be a strong Afghan Nationalist, who is inclined to resent the employment of foreign advisers, but favours seeking the assistance of Great Britain and the United States in training and equipping the Afghan Army.

48. *Muhammad Gul Khan* (W.W. 315A).—Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W.W. 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hisarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Batikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Ghund Mishar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted Firqa Mishar (major-general) and appointed General Officer Commanding, Eastern Province, in 1928. In Jalalabad during the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Baru. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Naib Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in

pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932; was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1932, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim (W.W. 89). Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh, Mazar, Kataghan and Badakhshan and Maimana, November 1932. Relieved at Kandahar by Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273) in January 1933, and left for Mazar. In 1934 there were rumours that his loyalty to the present régime was doubtful and that he was in favour of a republic. A quiet, well-mannered man, but ruthless. Has a strong personality and is ambitious. He is regarded as one of the most capable officials in Afghanistan. Speaks Urdu, Persian, Pushtu, Russian and Turkish. He was very loyal to the late Nadir Shah. Visited Kabul September 1935. Believed to have asked the Prime Minister to help the Mohmands against the British. Refused to visit Eastern Province to explain Mohmand situation to Afghans, and believed to have quarrelled with Prime Minister (W.W. 337) on this subject. Returned to Mazar about the 1st October. Reported to be on bad terms with W.W. 315. Stated to be connected with the Republican party. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of State 1941, a post he still holds though he has withdrawn to his estate at Haibak and remains there in spite of the Prime Minister's attempts to induce him to take a more active part in the Administration. His resignation of the Governorship of the Northern Province is thought to have been due to his dislike of Abdul Majid's (W.W. 73) trade development schemes.

49. *Muhammad Haider Khan* (W.W. 329A).—Born about 1904. Son of Ata Muhammad Khan (Mir, Qazi of Herat). Formerly Afghan representative at the League of Nations and subsequently private secretary to the King. Appointed Afghan Ambassador at Tehran *vice* Muhammad Nauroz Khan in January 1944.

50. *H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan* (W.W. 337).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan (junior) and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of the late King Nadir and of W.W. 414 and W.W. 585. Born 1886. Commanded the Sar-i-Os (bodyguard) at Kabul and accompanied Ameer Habibullah to India in 1907. Appointed Naib Salar (general) of Herat and left Kabul in 1916. Keen on instituting reforms, but checked in this direction by threat of mutiny on the part of the troops. Arrested and sent to Kabul after the murder of Habibullah, but subsequently released. People of Herat refused to have him back after his release and he was relieved. Appointed Governor of Jalalabad December 1919. Governor, Eastern Province, 1920. Went on tour in July 1921 and distributed rewards to the Mohmands and some Bajauri tribesmen, at the same time doing his best to create an atmosphere of hostility to the British; the next month he warned the tribesmen to be ready for "jihad." Summoned jirgas of the Malikdin Khel and Kambar Khel Afridis to Jalalabad in September 1921. Rewards in the shape of money were doled out to the tribesmen, who were informed that Nadir Khan had promised to arrange permanent allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Government. Reported in August 1921 to have engineered, in conjunction with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of the British mission mail bags *en route* from Kabul to India. Went to Kabul from Jalalabad on the 10th November, 1921. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul, January 1922, *vice* Nadir Khan, who proceeded on tour. Went to Europe with his father in 1923. Appointed Minister at Moscow March 1924, when he was unpopular owing to his constant suspicions of Soviet policy. Opposed the military training of Afghans in Russia, and on his views being disclosed by the Afghan Government to the Soviet authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July, 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Nur-us-Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin, Muhammad Hasan Jan (W.W. 342) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult by Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Grasse December 1928. Granted diplomatic visa for India *en route* to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585) on the 8th February, 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern Province 6th March, 1929, where he tried to obtain support for Nadir, but met with little success. Was defeated by Bacha-i-Saqao and arrived Parachinar



19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October, 1929, where he remained under surveillance until 27th October, 1929, when he was permitted by the Indian Government to proceed to Kandahar. Proceeded to Kabul, 9th November, 1929, on his appointment as Premier and Minister of Interior. This appointment he has since held, insisting on a high standard of work and efficiency. High-handed in his dealings with other Government officials he is consequently both feared and hated. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was assassinated and returned immediately to Kabul. Swore allegiance to Zahir Shah, since whose accession he has been the real ruler of Afghanistan. A real patriot and a tremendous worker, he has laboured to improve the stability of the country. So far as can be judged, genuinely dislikes the Russians and is alarmed by the possibility of the spread of bolshevism in Afghanistan. A quiet, dignified man with charming manners and a keen sense of humour. Is quick-tempered, outspoken and, when roused, ruthless. Trusts very few of his fellow-countrymen and tries to do too much himself. He makes up his mind quickly. Is said to have been lately more tactful in his dealings with other officials, but is still unpopular. The danger of his being assassinated is great. Is very friendly to members of the British Legation in Kabul. Understands English well and speaks it fairly. Proceeded to Berlin in October 1936 to undergo an operation for tumour. Operation for tumour successful. Visited London January-February and returned to Kabul via India in March 1937. Still Prime Minister. Had a serious heart attack in November 1943, but recovered and in spring 1944 gradually resumed control of important affairs, leaving routine matters to his nephew (No. 55).

51. *Muhammad Hassan Jan* (W.W. 342).—Muhammadzai. Born 1902. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W.W. 648). A.D.C. to King Amanullah 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala February 1926. Married to Nur-us-Siraj, Amanullah's sister, October 1927. Was well known to the British Legation at Kabul. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1927-28 as Chamberlain. Also went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931 to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933, but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Accompanied Amanullah Khan to the Hejaz in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

52. *Muhammad Ihsan Khan* (W.W. 363).—Tajik of Istalif, Koh-i-Daman, Firqa Mishar (major-general). Born about 1895, son of Ustad Yusuf, an iron-smith. Related to the late Bacha-i-Saqao. Received three years' aeronautical training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan Air Force 1924. Visited Western Command manoeuvres and carried out a tour in India at the invitation of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief November 1926. Was helpful to the Royal Air Force officers who landed at Sherpur in December 1928. Dismissed from his post by Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929, but was reappointed by Nadir Shah on his accession to the throne. Is keen on his profession and works hard and is keen on flying. Is very fat. Speaks Italian and a little French. Is always very friendly to members of the British Legation. Proceeded on tour to India and Europe in September 1936 with a view to purchasing aircraft.

Visited India and Europe 1936-37 with view to purchasing aircraft for Afghan Government. Purchased eight aircraft in Great Britain and twenty-four in Italy. Returned to Kabul in October 1937. Was awarded decoration of "Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy." Received by Herr Hitler during his tour. Since 1937 the Afghan Air Force has achieved a modicum of efficiency mainly due to his drive, the assistance of British instructors, and the despatch of Air Force personnel to India for training, the latter being a policy he consistently supports. In 1942 he proceeded to India for medical treatment, returning in March 1943. After his return he gave out that he was in favour of retaining the British connexion with his Air Force, and asked for the supply of nine more Hind aircraft.

He resents the fact that the Air Force is under War Ministry control, and wishes to have it independent under the King. Suffers from ill-health but is still the dominating personality in the Air Force.

53. *Muhammad Ismail Khan* (W.W. 377A).—Wardaki, Totu Khel, Ghilzai. Son of Abdullah Khan (W.W. 63) and nephew of W.W. 4. At one time Director of the Eastern Branch, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor (Hakim-i-Kalan) of the Northern District, Kabul Province. Officiating Governor, Kataghan and

Badakhshan. Wali of Kabul 1939. Has pleasant manners and is friendly in his attitude towards British Legation. Not on good terms with His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud (No. 72).

54. *Muhammad Khan, Mirza* (W.W. 450).—Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Ghulam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook and was not noticeably pro-Soviet. Under-Secretary in Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King for his work. Was put under secret surveillance as a result of the plot discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the War Minister. Since he has been in office, the customs revenue of the country has increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashami Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Ameer Habibullah, was given in marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti-British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdullah Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935. Appointed Minister of Revenue (1938). Still Minister of Revenue.

55. *Muhammad Naim Khan* (W.W. 464A).—Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1929 with Asadullah Khan (W.W. 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932; recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935.

Officiating Foreign Minister December 1935 and again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad in Europe.

Also acting as managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W.W. 73) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937.

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Still Minister of Education. Visited Khanabad as head of an investigation committee (1939).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of W.W. 73 in Europe in addition to his own duties. Officiated as Prime Minister in the winter of 1943 during the illness of his uncle, Muhammad Hashim Khan (No. 50), with whom he is a great favourite. Easy-going and pleasant mannered and friendly to British Legation, but somewhat reserved, perhaps as a result of a tendency to deafness. Speaks French fluently and English tolerably. It is generally believed that he is destined to succeed his uncle as Prime Minister, but it is doubtful if he has either the brains, physical fitness or strength of character for the task.

56. *Muhammad Nauroz Khan* (W.W. 470).—Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1929. Was on bad terms with Muhammad Yakub (W.W. 675). More inclined to friendship with Germany than with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Court Minister in 1936. Appointed Ambassador, Tehran, in 1939. Relieved of appointment of Ambassador at Tehran in 1942. Appointed Minister of Interior 1943.



Has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Entertains Republican tendencies. Has ability and capacity and speaks a little English. Since his appointment as Minister of the Interior has become more influential and popular, the latter said to be due to his patience when investigating complaints.

57. *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W.W. 506).—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Faruq (W.W. 273). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921–25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (assistant secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed officiating Hakim-i-Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the General Officer Commanding, Daud Khan (W.W. 238). Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province. Is said to be an efficient and capable man, but lacks presence and personality. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and very good Pushtu. His father died January 1936.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1938). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds.

58. *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W.W. 507a) (F.M. Muhammadzai).—Born approximately 1904. Director of Intelligence in the War Ministry 1935. Chief of Staff, Guards Division, 1936. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Kataghan and Badakhshan Division, 1936. Promoted Firka Mishar 1937. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1937. General Officer Commanding, Herat Division, 1937–40. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding of the Southern Province in May 1944 at the time of the Zadran disturbances. A tactful, popular and efficient officer who has pleasant manners, is intelligent and speaks little English. A staunch supporter of Shah Mahmud (No. 72).

58a. *Muhammad Sadiq Khan (Mir)*.—Son of Mir Sikandar Khan. Born about 1893. His father was a Court official with the honorary rank of general in the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan and left Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War and lived first in Bagdad, where Muhammad Sadiq was born, and later in India, where the boy was educated. Mir Muhammad Sadiq returned to Afghanistan during the reign of ex-King Amanullah, and held minor appointments in the Educational and Agricultural Departments of the Southern Province and in Northern Afghanistan. During the reign of the late King Nadir Shah, he became First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, an appointment he held for three years. When he returned to Kabul, he was appointed Director-General of International Affairs in the Foreign Office. In March 1943 he was appointed Afghan Consul-General at Meshed. He is described as patient and cautious; speaks English, Urdu and a little Russian; is reasonably well disposed towards the British.

59. *Muhammad Sarwar Khan* (W.W. 560).—Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sidiq Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276), Muhammad Shuaib (W.W. 611) and Juma Khan. First secretary in the Afghan Embassy in Tehran. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Ameer Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns, and appointed superintendent, Kabul Arsenal. Promoted major-general 1913. In March 1919 appointed Naib Salar by Ameer Amanullah Khan, and later in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukmah (Governor), Turkestan. Granted both civil and military powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922, where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who, originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Ameer, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent." Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1928, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1929.

Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles) December 1931. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276) at Maruf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed since 1931. Still believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly, but Amanullah's description (above) fits him. Still a member of the Council of Nobles.

60. *Muhammad Shafi Khan* (W.W. 569) (Sultan Muhammad Khel).—Born approximately 1900. Son of Muhammad Isa Khan. A relative of S. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Was a Mudir in the Afghan Foreign Office 1934–35. Appointed Afghan Consul, Karachi, 1935. Believed to be loyal to present régime. Afghan Consul-General in India *vice* Salah-ud-Din (No. 71) 1939. Still Afghan Consul-General. A pleasant official who speaks English and is always friendly towards the British Legation.

61. *Muhammad Shuaib Khan* (W.W. 611).—Born approximately 1904. Younger brother of Muhammad Sarwar Khan (No. 59). Appointed Yawar to the Governor of Kandahar and Mudir of Agriculture 1934. Incapable and lazy. The Amir dismissed him during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, October 1925. Employed as third assistant to the Minister of Court in 1931. Resigned in August 1932 and became Kandahar manager to Chandan Khan, agent for Burma Shell Oil Company in Afghanistan. Agent for the Shirkat in Kandahar for importing Japanese goods. Brother also of Ghulam Haidar (W.W. 276). Appointed Afghan Consul at Karachi 1940. Still Afghan Consul at Karachi.

62. *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W.W. 652).—Firqa Mishar (major-general). Yusufzai of the "Topchi" family. Born 1898. Appointed Chief of Staff 1924. Visited Delhi manoeuvres December 1924 at the invitation of the Commander-in-chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez *en route* to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and Italy 1928. Was at one time military attaché in Berlin. Appointed chief of Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe to attend the Disarmament Conference, Geneva. Visited Paris December 1933. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934; was a spectator of the 1st January parade at Peshawar. Lunched with the officers of the Gordon Highlanders in the Khyber on his way back. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left once more for Geneva in May 1934. A keen and intelligent officer, but said to have had little experience in the field or handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Said to have been recalled to Kabul (1936) owing to his immoral conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff and a close friend of W.W. 414. He has the confidence of the Royal Family except in matters of a very secret nature. He is not a forceful character or likely to prove a leader of troops in the field. He makes out that he is a great Nationalist, and neither anti- or pro-Russian, British or German.

63. *Muhammad Usman Khan* (W.W. 661).—Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command at Asmar, where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes" to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1920, reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1920. Chief Staff Officer to Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy, Tehran, in 1930. Appointed Muin II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musabad Perso-Afghan Commission 1934–35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican Party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post, July 1942, for alleged malpractice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. A capable man with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments.



Believed to be addicted to drink; and to be showing signs of disloyalty to the Yahya Khel. Took up directorship of several public trading concerns in 1944.

64. *Muhammad Yunus Khan* (W.W. 685).—Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always showed himself helpful and well disposed and was profuse with pro-British sentiments, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to January 1930. Energetically opposed Shuja-ud-Daulah's (W.W. 612) attempts to dispose of Legation property July-September 1929. Left London for United States of America on Shah Wali's (W.W. 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to return to Afghanistan. Believed to be (1936) in United States of America. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America.

65. *Muhammad Zahir Shah*. (W.W. 688a).—Muhammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France in 1924 and was educated in that country. Returned to Afghanistan in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W.W. 149). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power being wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1938 he rarely left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He spends two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital, to which the Government does not move. His birthday is celebrated on the 15th October each year. Has had three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born 1933, died 1942; Ahmad Shah, born 1934; Muhammad Nadir, born 1941; and two daughters born in 1932 and 1936. He is taking an increased interest in affairs, including the development of the army and air force, and has been known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State business.

66. *Najibullah Khan* (W.W. 465b). Born approximately 1906. Director-General of the Political Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Related to the late Amir Abdul Rahman through his mother. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Speaks French fluently and is now able also to converse intelligently in English. Has considerable ability and influence. He appears to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister and is probably closer to the centre of Afghan foreign and political affairs than the present Foreign Minister himself (No. 18). Ambitious and somewhat conceited but unfailingly courteous. Had the reputation of being strongly anti-British, but, largely as a result of the kindness and courtesy shown to him on his visit to India in April 1944, is now extremely well disposed towards us. He could be more fairly described as a strong Nationalist. Dabbles in cultural matters and is a keen student of literature. If the present régime remains in power is likely to become a most important personage.

67. *Obeidullah Khan* (W.W. 492).—Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat; younger brother of ex-King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W.W. 646), who employed a German tutor for him. Sent by Amanullah to Kandahar December 1928 with his family. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1933. In October 1935 was living with his mother W.W. 646 in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933.

68. *Rahimullah Khan* (W.W. 518).—Tajik. Son of Ataulah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became Foreign Agent in Mazar. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in charge Visa Section, Afghan Foreign Office, December 1930.

Relieved July 1931. In July 1932 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1935.

Reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, but this is probably due to the help he obtained from German engineers up to 1941, in developing communications, &c. His attitude towards the British Legation has always been friendly. Relieved of the appointment of Minister for Public Works in May 1944 owing to ill-health, but retained portfolio of the Ministry of Mines. Said to have pro-German sympathies.

69. *Rahmatullah Jan* (W.W. 519).—Muhammadzai. Eldest son of ex-King Amanullah and Queen Souriya. Born 1922. Proceeded to Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex-King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931, and is believed to be there now (1943). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

70. *Saiyid Qasim* (W.W. 548).—Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Saiyid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W.W. 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925, and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W.W. 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan consul-general, Delhi, October 1926, *vice* Haji Muhammad Akbar (W.W. 153) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November, 1926. Awarded Order of Astor, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W.W. 686a.

71. *Salah-ud-Din Khan* (W.W. 553).—Born about 1893. Son of Mufti Siraj-ud-Din of Herat; native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W.W. 612) brought him to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat* (Commerce). Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed consul in Bombay 1930. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed consul-general in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Nadir propaganda amongst the Ghilzais. His father, Mufti Siraj-ud-Din, left Delhi for Herat in February 1934. Pays periodical visits to Kabul. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1940, which post he still (1943) holds. Has at various times stated that, when consul and consul-general in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. Is believed to have attempted to introduce news on the Kabul Radio and in the press with an anti-British tone, but the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Government prevented publication on most occasions.

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti-British sentiments.

72. *H.R.H. Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan)* (W.W. 414).—Sardar Muhammadzai. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half-brother of W.W. 337 and brother of W.W. 585. Appointed Sar Sar-i-Os, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919.



Was in great favour with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the Simat-i-Janubi (Southern Provinces) September 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Makin and Haji Abdur Razaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921, and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rations and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Wana Wazirs and Mahsuds. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921, accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding, Badakhshan and Kataghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1926, and promised them similar treatment to that given by his brother, Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Morgha July 1926. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unrest with King November 1926. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927; visited Pesh Bolak and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha-i-Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Joined Nadir Khan on his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha-i-Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah November 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in January 1931 was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving Ibrahim Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Almar-i-Ala September 1931 and appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Aiyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered from goitre and hoped to take a cure for it in Germany in the autumn of 1932, but his visit to Europe was postponed owing to the Dare Khel outbreak in November 1932, during which he commanded a force of about two divisions in addition to tribal levies. His success in this affair was perhaps due as much to money as to fighting. Up to December 1932 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over control to Nasrullah (W.W. 469a), the new Governor. Spent the spring and summer of 1933 in the Southern Province, visiting Kabul on one occasion. On Nadir Shah's murder displayed great presence of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Proclaimed Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander-in-chief and Minister of War. Appears to possess considerable energy and force of character and is believed to be popular with the army. He is probably better fitted for the command of irregulars than of regular troops, having no real military education. He is vain, though at the same time shy and sensitive; is fond of sport and games and friendly to members of the British Legation. In addition to his military duties, is in charge of the Southern Province. He is said to be jealous of H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W.W. 337), his half-brother, and not always to agree with him in matters of policy.

Betrothed his two daughters to the two sons of the late Hayatullah, brother of ex-King Amanullah, December 1935. Sons were born to him in 1922, 1924, 1932, 1936 and 1939. Left for Europe March 1936 for medical treatment and has since been successfully operated upon for goitre in Berlin. Visited England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Returned to Kabul December 1936. Now (1937) said to be taking less interest in his work. Still (1943) War Minister. Developed heart trouble in 1943 and was unable to carry out his duties for some time, but his health is said to be improving. Was in Gardez from April to June 1944, where he succeeded in isolating Mazarak (W.W. 423) and obtained support for the Government of the majority of the tribal leaders."

73. *H.R.H. Shah Wali Khan* (W.W. 585).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Born 1885. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of W.W. 414 and half-brother of W.W. 337. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to Ameer Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in 1907. After the Ameer's murder in February 1919 was arrested and sent to Kabul, but was acquitted and released. Commanded troops on Kharlachi front July–October 1919. Promoted general for good services on the Tochi border. Married a sister of ex-King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to command 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on intimate terms with ex-King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1921. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1923. Appointed Yawar Hazuri

(equerry to the King) December 1924. Visited India in May 1925 and again in December 1925, when he persuaded Muhammad Umar (W.W. 648) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded troops Logar during the Mangal rebellion 1924–25, and for his services was created "Taj-i-Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grasse. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) February 1929, and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 13th October, 1929. Appointed Regent October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929. Reached England the 10th January, 1930. Transferred to Paris June 1931. Came to Kabul on leave September 1932, bringing with him, under safe conduct, the late Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1933. Able and quick-witted. A friendly and pleasant man. Very popular in Kabul, and consequently reported to be regarded with jealousy by his brother, the Prime Minister, Hashim Khan (W.W. 337). His popularity has somewhat diminished owing to the execution of Ghulam Nabi. Returned to Kabul February 1935, and appointed Acting Minister of Defence during absence of Shah Mahmud in Europe. His wife refused to accompany him and is still in Paris. Objects to the monopoly system of the Ashami Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939, and returned to Paris June 1939. Still (1943) Minister in Vichy.

74. *Sher Agha* (see *Fazal-i-Umar*).

75. *Sher Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 598).—Sardar, Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan. Born 1885. Acted in the appointment of Ishaq-Aghassi Nizami (Military Chamberlain) 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhui 1920. Suspended and arrived Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921, and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October *en route* with a large party of Afghan students who were proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms until the summer of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expressed distaste for his own country. Appointed President of the Shaura (National Council) 1924. Leader of the party in favour of peaceful tactics during Urta Tagai crisis, January 1926. Cordially detested the late Mahmud Tarzi. With King Amanullah in Europe 1928. Appointed to still-born post of Prime Minister September 1928, and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jalalabad for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Councillor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. A man of some ability, but indolent and corrupt. Said to entertain a profound contempt and dislike for the Persians, and to be very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1935, on a visit. Returned Tehran December 1935. Visited Kabul 1936, using a German aeroplane. Betrothed his nephew Muhammad Umar to Sultan, fourth sister of King Zahir Shah, October 1935.

Relieved by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937. Still (1943) Minister of State.

76. *Shuja-ud-Daulah* (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.—Comes of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1896. Was Ghulam Bacha (page) in 1916, and was employed looking after the German mission in Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazuri (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Ameer Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul and Amin-i-Asas (chief of police) by Amanullah. Commanded 2nd Division in Kabul January 1921. One of the delegates at the British-Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Appointed Minister of Security, and appeared to be a man of considerable ability. In close confidence of the Ameer. Officiated as Governor of Herat January 1921. Relieved and returned to Kabul at the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Minister at London August 1924, and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed to have made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble by failing to settle debts due by the Afghan Legation for rent, &c. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah February 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929, and assumed duties as Governor on behalf of Amanullah. Fled to Meshed on arrival of Abdur



Rahim (W.W. 89), Bacha-i-Saqao's nominee, May 1929. Returned to London via Tashkent-Moscow, and arrived the 11th July, 1929. Attempted to dispose of Afghan Government property, and on this account was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931, returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters. Is believed to be the actual murderer of the late Ameer Habibullah. Proved himself on all occasions ill-mannered and anti-British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. 289. In Russia February 1936.

77. *Siddiq Agha Muhammad (Gul Agha)* (W.W. 613).—Son of Qaiyum Jan Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 347), and half-brother of Fazl-i-Umar (Sher Agha) (W.W. 256). On the death of Qaiyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1925 the title was assumed by Muhammad Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother, Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested, with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost, September 1928. Later released, and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined in the Arq, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peshawar, *en route*, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April 1931, to watch Amanullah. In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister. Sher Agha (W.W. 256) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to Egypt in September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, in addition to duties as Minister, Egypt, April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced no sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister, Egypt. Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt, and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in connexion with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo (1943).

78. *Sultan Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 624).—Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600). Assistant to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450). Ambassador at Moscow, August 1920. Head of the Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku, March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namazie, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the necessity for unity throughout the whole Moslem world, in order that the encroachments and intrigues of European Powers might be successfully resisted. Prayers were offered for the victory of the Turkish arms, and Sultan Ahmad Khan gave a donation of 2,000 liras to the Red Crescent. The Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul, Raskolnikov, instructed his Government early in September 1921, at the request of the Afghan Government, to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment to be adjusted in Kabul. Returned to Kabul, April 1926, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign Office. Officiated as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta Tagai Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary, Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary, October 1926. Granted title of "Sardar-i-Ala," February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran, October 1928. Relieved November 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed to be in charge of State guests Kabul, January 1930. Went to Turkey as Ambassador, *vice* the late Ghulam Nabi, in December 1930. Took with him as secretary Faiz Muhammad Khan (W.W. 243). Suspected of pro-Amanullah tendencies. Was on intimate terms with the late Ghulam Nabi during his visit to Constantinople in December 1931. Visited Europe in 1933, and, as Afghan representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1933. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Still (1936) Ambassador in Turkey. Visited Kabul, August 1935. To be Minister, Egypt, in addition to his other duties. A conceited, dissolute man, but appears to possess some ability. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V, January 1936. Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Angora June 1937. Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). Still (1943) Ambassador at Moscow. During 1941-42 stated to have shown some concern for his personal safety, and to have given depressing accounts of Russian ability to resist the Germans.

79. *Ulya Hazrat* (W.W. 646).—Siraj-ul-Khawatin (Her Majesty the Sun of the Ladies). Step-sister of Luinab Khushdil Khan, daughter of the late Luinab Sherdil Khan, and step-daughter of Ishaq Aghassi Muhammad Sarwar Khan. Her name is Sarwar Sultan. Chief wife of Ameer Habibullah and mother of ex-King Amanullah Khan (W.W. 183). In 1915 said to be strongly in favour of neutrality. Very strong character and dabbled in politics. Said to have refused to help Turco-German mission in 1916. In 1917 and 1918 had numerous quarrels with Ameer Habibullah owing to her interference in political matters, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arq. After the murder of Habibullah, left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, Amanullah. Is believed by many to have been, with Amanullah, the organiser of the plot which resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W.W. 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Souriya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Souriya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay, May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah, June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Has remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visits Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Obeidullah Khan (W.W. 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W.W. 309) villa in Berlin.

Still (1943), so far as is known, in Europe.

80. *Yakub Khan* (W.W. 675).—Mohmand. Son of Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Sami (W.W. 555). Born 1889. Was page to Ameer Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah. Appointed a Musahib-i-Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and Shahgassi Huzuri 1927. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister of Court. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Accompanied Amanullah to Kandahar, January 1929, and to Bombay, May 1929. Left Bombay, June 1929, for Duzdap. Arrived Meshed, August 1929. Returned to Kabul 1929. Ordered to be deported for complicity in the Koh-i-Daman revolt 1930, but was detained in Jalalabad and later released. Said to be propagating in favour of Amanullah. Went to Mecca on pilgrimage, April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother W.W. 555, December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan, born in 1916, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May 1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

81. *Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad* (W.W. 697).—Muhammadzai. Of no important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 337) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Parachinar, where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (W.W. 585). Counsellor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1931. Returned to Kabul, September 1931, and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. A talkative little man, speaks English fluently, and is very friendly towards members of the British Legation, Kabul. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul, April 1936. Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo.



## CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 4884/4884/93]

No. 3.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th August.)*

(No. 320. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 3rd August, 1944.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 278 Confidential of the 1st August, 1943, I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Iraq for 1944.

I have, &amp;c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 3.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions at Bagdad.*

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

*Afghanistan:* Abdur Rahman Khan, Minister (21st October, 1941).

\*Although an Iraqi mission, headed by a chargé d'affaires, has been established at Kabul since November 1940, I received no warning that it was proposed to appoint an Afghan representative to Bagdad. The arrival of Abdur Rahman Khan, complete with a secretary, on the 11th October came as a surprise both to my colleagues and myself. The new Minister is said to have served as a consul in Bombay and at the Afghan Legation in Paris, but he appears to be somewhat ignorant of diplomatic usage. He speaks English. (Written in 1941.)

\*Owing to the Court mourning for the late mother of His Majesty Zahir Shah, the legation has done no entertaining, but Abdur Rahman has turned up regularly at diplomatic functions and always seems to be friendly and anxious to please, though his stock of conversational topics is small. He appears to have no work to do beyond aiding the occasional student coming home from Europe on his way back to Afghanistan. He has only one hat, a somewhat battered blue Homburg, which has to serve even for funerals. (Written in 1942.)

The death of the Afghan Crown Prince in November 1942 served to keep the legation in the background of Bagdad social life for a further period. Abdur Rahman is still to be seen at various functions, however, and continues to radiate friendliness. He has just returned from leave in Palestine and Syria and is loud in his praise of the many kindnesses shown to him by prominent British officials in those countries. He now has, in addition to the blue Homburg, a rather tired-looking Panamá. (Written in 1943.)

During 1944 his extremely good-looking and well-groomed wife has emerged once or twice from her hitherto strict purdah.

*Egypt:* Mohammed Husni Omar Effendi, Minister (23rd January, 1943).

Came to Bagdad from the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where he was head of the Consular Department with the rank of chargé d'affaires. His early career was spent in the Ministry, but he has served at Angora and Rome as a secretary and at Tehran as counsellor.

He is a conceited little man, but seems energetic. He is a devotee of "la vie sportive" and is much in evidence at the Alwiyah Club in company with his Turkish and Saudi colleagues. He plays tennis with vigour and dances with zeal. He is very proud of the fact that while at Angora he won a prize for the best tango on the floor. It is possibly on this account that he regards himself as God's gift to women.

He plays his part in the promotion of closer Egypto-Iraqi cultural relations, but his style is somewhat cramped by the behaviour of the many Egyptian teachers here, who make no effort to conceal their contempt for this country, its climate, its institutions and its inhabitants. (Written in 1943.)

His Excellency has had a busy year teaching Mrs. Loy Henderson and other attractive ladies to play tennis.

*Persia:* M. Mohsen Raïs, Minister (28th July, 1943).

He was consul-general-designate for Delhi, but it was decided at the last moment to transfer him to Bagdad in view of the objections raised to the appointment of M. Mehdi Farrokh to the Iraqi capital.

He was Persian representative to the Vichy Government and latterly held a ministerial post for a short time under the Qavam-es-Sultaneh.

I have not yet met him. (Written in 1943.)

During the past year I have got to know the Minister well. He and his wife are nice people, distinct social assets in Bagdad, having travelled extensively. The Persian Legation is one of the very few places in this shabby capital where one may count on spending an amusing evening.

*Saudi Arabia:* Assad-al-Faqih, Minister (9th May, 1943).

In an attempt to improve Saudi-Iraqi relations, King Abdul Aziz decided this spring to put the Bagdad Legation in charge of a Minister. Assad Bey, the chargé d'affaires, was accordingly promoted and presented his letters on the 9th May. It cannot be said that relations have shown any signs of improvement yet—on the contrary, they seem to have deteriorated.

Assad Bey, who is a smooth Syrian, is friendly and co-operative in such matters as jointly affect our two missions. He is perhaps a little too eager to find fault with the Iraqis and not interested enough in sending correct reports to his Sovereign or in preventing misunderstandings. He is probably more concerned with feathering his own nest while he can. In fact, it was recently reported that he was using his diplomatic bag for the purpose of smuggling gold to Syria; one of his secretaries is certainly engaged in the traffic. (Written in 1943.)

*Turkey:* M. Ahmed Cavad Ustün, Minister (September 1939).

\*He has served in Vienna and at The Hague. He and his wife are an agreeable couple, but both are congenitally nervous, and it may be said without exaggeration that M. Cavad Ustün is a confirmed hypochondriac. Continued ill-health, whether real or imagined, has not been without its influence on his morale, and he has on several occasions shocked both Iraqis and his colleagues by giving expression to defeatist views. While he may not be fundamentally ill-disposed, I have not found him a helpful colleague in times when robust courage and cheerful confidence are qualities to be desired in the representatives of countries having close relations with ourselves. Nevertheless, he and his wife are at times friendly. (Written in 1940.)

\*Until the Rashid Ali rebellion he is reported to have made some feeble attempts to dissuade the pro-German politicians from taking the course they had planned. When the final break came he busied himself feverishly in efforts to reconcile the two parties to each other and so stave off an armed conflict. He and his wife still suffer from perpetual fear and ill-health. Two months after the collapse of the rebellion he hurried back to Turkey on sick leave, and has not since returned to Bagdad. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Ustün returned to Bagdad in late 1941 with a new phobia—Russia. He made every effort to enlist the sympathy of leading Iraqis, the Persian Chargé d'affaires and even the late United States Minister in regard to the Russian danger, if Germany should be defeated. He suggested that the Russian zone in Persia should be taken over by the British. His views were not well received generally, and the Iraqi Prime Minister at one time talked of getting him removed, but soundings taken at Angora did not evoke a favourable response.

He has been very busy personally supervising the onward despatch of goods passing through Iraq in transit to Turkey, even to the extent of haunting the railway goods yard, which has tended to keep him out of mischief. (Written in 1942.)

Relations with M. Ustün have been somewhat complicated at times during the last year owing to a number of unfortunate incidents at the Syro-Iraqi frontier involving the search of Turkish diplomats and other travellers by the F. S. S. authorities. M. Ustün was himself questioned about his baggage in November last and appears to have behaved very childishly.

It was recently rumoured that he had been appointed to Tokyo, but refused to go because Tokyo would soon become a war zone. This, if true, at least indicates M. Ustün's growing confidence in our ability to carry the war into the enemy's territory. (Written in 1943.)

The Ustüns are still here.

*United States of America:* Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Minister.

Born 1892. Entered Foreign Service 1922. Has occupied the following posts: Vice-Consul, Dublin, 1923–24, Vice-Consul, Queenstown, State Department Division of European Affairs, 1934–38, Third Secretary at Riga, Kovno, Tallinn, Moscow (acting as chargé d'affaires in the absence of Mr. Davies).

[29955]

D



1938-43, State Department, Assistant Chief of European Affairs Department. Accompanied Mr. Winston Churchill's party on its trip to Russia for the Stalin Conference in 1942. Appointed Bagdad 24th June, 1943. Presented his credentials 20th November, 1943.

Has travelled extensively in Iraq since his appointment. Is very energetic. Pleasant and friendly to deal with, but chafes a bit at what he considers his unduly junior position here in contrast to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. Would like to be promoted Ambassador. Is married to an attractive but highly indiscreet Latvian lady who, while charming socially, is inclined to be anti-British. Both are rabidly hostile to the Soviet.

*Representatives Accredited to Iraq but Resident elsewhere.*

*Belgium:* M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (27th April, 1938).

\*He is also Belgian Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

He pays periodical visits to Bagdad and always shows a keen desire to co-operate closely with this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Graeffe visited Bagdad this spring. I find him as hearty and keen as ever. (Written in 1942.)

M. Graeffe performed his annual pilgrimage to Iraq in April. His capacity for telling tall stories seems to be unimpaired. He has the customary Gallic appreciation of the many politico-military errors invariably committed by the Anglo-Saxons in moments of crisis. (Written in 1943.)

Illness prevented M. Graeffe from visiting Bagdad this spring.

*China:* Mr. Li Tieh-tseng, Minister.

Also Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

Presented credentials on the 8th April, 1944.

Outline of career as given by Tehran, is as follows: He was born in 1905 and started his official career as a district magistrate in Nanchien. Since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service and has served in London for four years, during which period he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference, and was also secretary to the Chinese delegation to the League Assembly in 1934 and 1935. He was a member of the Chinese delegation in the abortive negotiations for an immigration agreement in Burma in 1941.

Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* Mr. Yu Houo-Joei, second secretary. Polish wife. Amiable, ineffective, speaks good French and some English. Rather a pathetic couple.

*Czechoslovakia:* Mr. Josef M. Kadlec, Minister (11th April, 1944).

Accredited also at Tehran, where he resides.

The Czechoslovak Legation in Bagdad had been closed since 1941. Mr. Kadlec was formerly Czechoslovak Consul-General at Jerusalem and was appointed consul-general at Bagdad in 1941.

*Denmark:* Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Chargé d'Affaires (17th June, 1939.)

\*Resides at Tehran. He struck me as a good and typically friendly Danish type. He is married. (Written in 1939.)

\*In February the Iraqi Government received a communication from the Danish Government stating that Dr. Fensmark was no longer held to be their representative and that a new minister would be appointed. The Iraqi Government were at first inclined to withdraw their recognition of Dr. Fensmark, but, as the result of my representations, finally agreed to maintain their former attitude towards him. Dr. Fensmark visited Bagdad in April on his way to Syria and the Lebanon. He is undeniably pro-Allied in outlook, but he is rather tiresome to have to deal with. He talks good English, but he talks it too much. He is very gallant. (Written in 1942.)

Dr. Fensmark has fortunately not been to Bagdad this year. (Written in 1943.)

Has only paid a fleeting visit to Bagdad this year.

*Netherlands:* Dr. P. L. C. Visser, Minister (7th August, 1941).

\*He is Netherlands Minister at Angora, where he resides. He stayed only a week in Bagdad for the purpose of presenting his credentials, and gave me to understand that he would not often visit this capital. He is a friendly man and created a most favourable impression both in British and Iraqi circles. (Written in 1941.)

\*Dr. Visser visited Bagdad this spring. He further increased his popularity by a lecture he gave at the British Institute on his mountaineering exploits in the Karakorums. His wife, who accompanied him on this visit, did not create such a good impression, and many people were tempted to label her as pro-German. (Written in 1942.)

He has not visited Bagdad this year. The city does not seem to appeal to either M. Visser or his lady. (Written in 1943.)

Dr. and Mme. Visser visited Bagdad in the autumn of last year. They were as usual very friendly.

*Poland:* M. Jan Karszo Siedlewski, Minister (27th March, 1939).

He is also Minister at Tehran and Kabul and resides at Tehran.

\*He has visited Bagdad occasionally during the past year. He seems to be a confused little man, friendly, but weak and gullible. He makes no attempt to look after his nationals, and the greater part of his work in this connexion, therefore, falls on this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. Henryk Malhomme arrived early this year to be counsellor to the legation, with residence in Bagdad. He has served in the Polish Foreign Office and in Japan. A friendly individual who talks French and some English. He is active on behalf of his compatriots who are at present passing through this country on their way from Russia. He likes to "drop in for a chat" with members of my staff, but rarely appears to have anything interesting to say. (Written in 1942.)

M. Malhomme has had a busy year. Largely due to his initiative, the Polish forces in this country staged a number of concerts and variety shows in Bagdad during the winter months and M. Malhomme did all he could to popularise his not too popular countrymen. The entertainment provided was welcome to British and Iraqis alike until the novelty wore off. The late General Sikorski's visit also threw the spot-light on M. Malhomme for a brief space. I think he enjoys being in the public eye. He is energetic but so full of complaints as to be tiresome. Rather unduly fond of the bottle and rabidly anti-Russian. (Written in 1943.)

Bagdad has been an independent post since last year without a Minister. M. Malhomme is chargé d'affaires (*not ad interim*).

*Sweden:* M. Sven Harald Pousette, Chargé d'Affaires (3rd December, 1941).

\*M. Hugo von Heidenstam was recalled in December last and left the legation at Tehran in the charge of M. Pousette, who was formerly counsellor of the Swedish Legation in London. He has not been here. (Written in 1942.)

M. Pousette has still not visited Bagdad. (Written in 1943.)

We have still to welcome M. Pousette.

*Holy See:*—Mgr. Georges de Jonghe d'Ardoye, Apostolic Delegate.

He is Belgian. Although not officially recognised by the Iraqi Government as a member of the Diplomatic Corps, he is invited to, and attends, all diplomatic functions. He has served for years in the Far East and travelled extensively in China and Burma.

A charming and friendly prelate with a dignified presence and a twinkle in his eye, he is somewhat sensitive about the fact that he does not enjoy diplomatic status. Moreover, the present restrictions placed on his use of cyphers and bags irk him so that he frequently appeals to this embassy for reconsideration of his case. He maintains that his essential work is much hampered by his inability to communicate quickly and secretly with the Vatican. I believe him to be genuinely pro-Allied in sentiment, though he has on occasion listened without a murmur to bitter and hostile criticism of Great Britain. Admittedly, this was in 1941 and 1942 when we were meeting with many defeats. (Written in 1943.)

Mgr. de Jonghe d'Ardoye continues to twinkle pleasantly in the social firmament of Bagdad.



*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th August.)*

(No. 332.)  
Sir,

*Bagdad, 14th August, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch No. 225 of the 8th June, a further account of recent events in Iraq.

2. The new Prime Minister, Hamdi Pachachi, made a short statement in the Chamber on the Government's policy on the 18th June. He said that he and his colleagues had set themselves three principal tasks, namely—

- (a) to improve the control and distribution of supplies;
- (b) to take all necessary measures to establish normal security and order throughout the country; and
- (c) to improve the efficiency and probity of Government officials.

3. A few days later his Excellency reaffirmed this policy in the Senate and, in addition, he spoke about the Kurdish situation. He declared that the new Cabinet upheld the decision taken by their predecessors concerning Mulla Mustafa Barzani and intended to carry out an extensive programme of development and construction in the northern areas. There was, he maintained, no truth in the allegations that the Government would do nothing for the Kurds. On the contrary, the Administration wished to serve all Iraqis equally without discrimination, and in particular to bring happiness and contentment to their Kurdish brothers.

4. So far the Government have made no very striking progress in the accomplishment of any of the three tasks which they set themselves. This is not because they are not trying, but because of the nature of the difficulties which lie in their path and because they had very little in the way of plans when they took office. They knew, rather vaguely, what they wished to achieve, but had not thought out how to go about it.

5. The formation of Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet was the signal for a stream of telegrams from many Kurdish notables, reminding the Prime Minister of the representations which had been put forward from the Kurdish districts in May and calling upon the new Government to complete the reforms and works contemplated by their predecessors. Mulla Mustafa joined in the chorus and disturbed ministers by the somewhat menacing tone of his message. The advice which the ambassador had given to the Government from the beginning was that they should go ahead quickly with useful public works in the Kurdish districts generally and thereby give tangible evidence of their desire to meet the Kurdish complaints of neglect which were the main cause of the popular sympathy and support enjoyed by Mulla Mustafa. Once this had been done, Mustafa's case would be undermined and it would be easier to deal with him and bring him to a more reasonable and less exalted frame of mind.

6. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis repeated this advice when the Minister of the Interior consulted him about Mulla Mustafa's message, and at the former's request (and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs) he again sent word to the Mulla through the acting political adviser in the north warning him that he should keep quiet and not meddle in politics.

7. On the 12th July, by which date the ambassador had proceeded on leave, the Regent discussed the Barzani situation with me. His Royal Highness put forward the proposal that the acting political adviser of the northern area (Major Kinch) should make one of his routine tours of the Barzan and adjacent districts, and while doing this visit Mulla Mustafa, in the hope of persuading him to disperse his armed bands and to hand in more of the rifles captured during the operations of last autumn, it being understood that in return for this gesture the Iraqi troops at Bille would be withdrawn.

8. Major Kinch (the acting political adviser), when consulted on this plan, advised that the troops at Bille should be withdrawn without any previous gesture being required from Mulla Mustafa, in the belief that if this were done the Mulla would of his own accord become more co-operative.

9. I did not wish, however, to adopt too negative an attitude towards the Regent's appeal for help by seeking to insist on such a condition and so, after further talks with ministers and others, I agreed, at the joint request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior, to instruct the acting political adviser to proceed without more ado on the proposed tour to acquaint himself with the situation and, in particular, to report on the existing relations between the Barzanis and the local officials.

10. Major Kinch arrived in the area towards the end of July, the Iraqi Government having in the meanwhile suddenly decided for military and health reasons to withdraw their troops from Bille. He found Mulla Mustafa in a more than usually truculent mood and all the local Iraqi officials and police in a state of nervousness bordering on panic. He found also that an alliance had been established (and cemented by marriage) between the Barzanis and their strong neighbours the Zibaris, and that Mulla Mustafa and his brother, Shaikh Ahmed, ruled unquestioned all over the country east of the Amadiya Qadha to the Persian frontier and north of Aqra and Rowanduz. Major Kinch advised that, in order to forestall the flight or capture of the remaining officials in the Zibari Qadha, they should be withdrawn, and that at the same time the administration in the neighbouring districts should be consolidated to prevent further disintegration.

11. I gave a copy of Major Kinch's report to the Regent on the 31st July, and during the following week discussed it with the Acting Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Major Kinch, whom I directed to come down from Mosul for the purpose, also conferred at length with the Acting Prime Minister and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior. The upshot was that the Government, who had also, as a result of their study of General Renton's report on the Iraqi army, satisfied themselves of their inability to intervene by force in the situation at the present time without the virtual certainty of disaster, decided that it was necessary for them to be very patient in dealing with the Kurdish problem and do nothing to cause a crisis. They also determined to send Taufiq Wahabi on a tour of the northern liwas to try to convince all and sundry that the Government genuinely desire to remedy legitimate Kurdish grievances as far as possible. I have lost no opportunity to impress on ministers the wisdom of a waiting policy. While agreeing with the request of the Acting Prime Minister that the political advisory staff and the area liaison officers in the affected districts should make it clear to all and sundry that this embassy had no sympathy for any who sought to stir up trouble in Kurdistan, I have also emphasised in my talks with ministers that neither Taufiq Wahabi nor anyone else is likely to be able to influence Kurdish opinion very deeply unless he can point to things which the Government are actually doing to implement their many promises. I have recommended, too, that the Administration should seek to reach some informal agreement with Shaikh Ahmed of Barzan under which it would pay him personally to keep the peace and, furthermore, that they should lose no opportunity of supporting with money and arms tribal chieftains not so far allied with Mulla Mustafa. The latter, whose outlook at the moment may be compared with that of Hitler after Munich, is not interested in the politico-economic welfare of the Kurds, nor does he care about hospitals or schools. The man is a bandit chieftain, and all he wants is freedom to live feudally in leadership over his armed followers while levying tribute on the cowed and the defenceless.

12. From Sulaimani it is reported that chieftains representing a large number of Southern Kurdish tribes recently met there to draw up a list of demands to be presented to the Government. Their petition has not yet reached Bagdad, but their action is a symptom of the continued disaffection of the Kurds.

13. The Regent prorogued Parliament on the 28th June. In spite of having been in session for over six months the legislature accomplished relatively little. Twenty-two laws were passed, but of these only four were of importance; the Law Creating the Ministry of Supply, the Loan Law, the Budget for 1944-45 and The Railways Capital Works Law.

14. Towards the end of June the Iraqi Government received an invitation from Nahas Pasha to send a representative to a Preparatory Committee, which the Egyptian Prime Minister proposed should meet in Alexandria at the end of July or the beginning of August to prepare the way for the summoning of a General Conference on Arab Unity. The Iraqi Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs both discussed this invitation with the ambassador before his departure on leave, and both agreed that the proper course for the Committee to take concerning Palestine was to pass a resolution postponing consideration of the future status of the country until after the war. As regards Arab unity the Prime Minister, who is a moderate but sincere nationalist, took the view that it was important that the Arab States should lose no time in coming to an agreement which would ensure a common foreign policy and also improve their economic, cultural and other relations.

15. Early in July the Iraqi Government notified Nahas Pasha of their acceptance of his invitation and informed him that the Iraqi delegates would be Nuri Pasha and Ata Amin (the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign



Affairs). Only a few days later, however, Nahas Pasha sent a telegram to say that, as replies had not been received from all the Arab countries invited to attend the Preparatory Committee, he proposed that the meeting should be put off until after the month of Ramadhan. The Iraqi Government agreed to this proposal and the committee is not now expected to meet before the 25th September.

16. The Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs does not himself think that the Arab countries are capable of political unity. He points to the many States into which the Arabs have been divided throughout their history and maintains that nobody but another Muhammad could unite them. Nevertheless, the subject is exciting the minds of his colleagues to an increasing extent, and I expect we will hear much about it during coming months.

17. The resolution of the Republican party of the United States adopted at Chicago at the end of June, calling for the opening of unrestricted Jewish immigration and land ownership in Palestine and stating that His Majesty's Government had not carried out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate for Palestine, was censored in all news agency telegrams received in Iraq. The telegrams were, however, seen by ministers and many others, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the ambassador that he was perturbed by this resolution. He stressed that, though Arab friendship for Great Britain was stronger and more sincere than it had ever been before, it could not be expected to survive the loss of Palestine. Towards the end of July the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me in somewhat similar terms about the Palestine resolution of the American Democratic party, and soon afterwards the two resolutions, which had by now become known through the Egyptian press, were reproduced in the Iraqi newspapers. Some articles followed expressing displeasure with the action taken by both the American parties but no campaign was worked up against them. For this the influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was no doubt in some measure responsible. He himself is satisfied that these resolutions are election gambits to catch the Jewish vote and takes the line that the less said about them at present, the less the next President, whether a Republican or a Democrat, will be committed to act on them. The tactics which he advises are that the Arabs should keep quiet about Palestine until after the election of the new President and then begin to try to bring home to the public in the United States, as well as in the United Kingdom, the chief points of the Arab cause. For this purpose his Excellency envisages the formation of representative Arab Committees in London and Washington (or New York), and he is also considering the appointment of Iraqi Ambassadors in Britain and the United States. The somewhat complex issues raised by these tentative plans are being dealt with in current correspondence and need not be described in this despatch.

18. As briefly mentioned in paragraph 11 above, General Renton, the newly appointed head of the British Military Mission, has prepared a plan for the drastic reorganisation of the Iraqi army. Briefly, he recommends the reduction of the strength of the army from four divisions to two divisions and one training division, and the placing on pension of a considerable number of elderly out-of-date and useless senior officers, together with the "axing" of a number of inefficient or superfluous officers of more junior rank and permanent-staff n.c.os. The Regent gave the plan his blessing, but the senior officers themselves naturally resisted and were supported by the Minister of Defence, Tahsin Ali. Heated discussions in the Cabinet on this subject on the 2nd August ended in the resignation of the Minister of Defence, but, after reference to the Regent (who was away in his summer villa north of Mosul), the crisis was solved by internal Cabinet changes: Tahsin Ali went from Defence to Communications and Works, Abdul Amir al Uzri went from Communications and Works to Supply and Salih Jabr became Acting Minister of Defence, in addition to being Minister of Finance and Acting Prime Minister (in the absence on leave of Hamdi Pachachi). I gather that Salih Jabr hopes that, so soon as he has finished the unpopular work of ridding the army of a large number of officers and other ranks, it will be possible to find a new Minister for Defence. First public reactions to the policy of reorganisation seem generally to have been favourable and it may be hoped that the better prospects now opening before many officers whose promotion has been delayed by the bottleneck at the top of the seniority list may improve the morale of the officer corps.

19. The budgetary estimates which were dealt with in paragraph 7 of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch under reference were finally approved by the Senate on the 25th June—with very slight modifications—after one Senator had pointed out that the late Government had sought to cover up a deficit of 5 million dinars by amalgamating the Capital Works with the General Budget,

and by including in the estimates the receipts from the supply administration (put at I.D. 2,150,000) and the proceeds of the sales of State lands.

20. The Iraqi Government sent a strong delegation to the International Monetary Conference held in the United States at the beginning of July. This was composed of Ibrahim Kemal, a Senator and former Minister of Finance; Mr. Swan, the British Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, and Mr. Loombe, the Secretary of the Exchange Control Committee. Iraq's contribution to the funds of the World Bank is to be 8 million dollars, according to newspaper reports.

21. The Eastern Bank was instructed to suspend sales of gold on account of His Majesty's Government on the 19th June, largely owing to the heavy sales effected in Syria. The total stocks held in Bagdad, amounting to roughly half a million sterling, were sent to Tehran by air on the 7th August on Treasury instructions. The anti-inflationary effect of this experiment has been negligible in this country.

22. The Government's cash credit balance on the 20th July stood at I.D. 3,646,275, while the total amount of currency in circulation at the end of the month was I.D. 41,305,831 (notes 39,874,785).

23. There is no progress to record in the matter of the flotation of internal loans, that entirely novel departure in the realm of Iraqi State finance, one of the difficulties at all events being connected with the procurement of the bonds themselves.

24. The Minister of Finance approached His Majesty's Ambassador during June in regard to the disposal of Iraq's surplus barley which Salih Jabr assessed at 250,000 tons. He indicated a price of I.D. 18 at collecting centres, which he was told was altogether too high, being I.D. 2 to 3 higher than the price at which the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation had effected recent purchases of 46/48,000 tons, and only I.D. 2/500 lower than the inflated price at which 231,000 tons were bought last year. By a telegram from the Foreign Office dated the 8th July I was surprised and disconcerted to learn that His Majesty's Government were not then in a position to discuss the details of a definite contract for the 1944 crop surplus seeing that, contrary to all expectations, there was no immediate market in the Middle East for any further large quantity of adulterants, neither could any more be accepted for stock piles (the U.K.C.C.'s local stocks having remained fairly constant at roughly 50,000 tons). Since then there has been a great deal of correspondence on this thorny subject in which I have felt obliged strongly to represent the extremely serious situation which is bound to arise in the field of local economics, with inevitable political repercussions, were His Majesty's Government not to buy the great bulk of the exportable surplus. In the present exceptional circumstances there is no other outlet for this crop, apart from the fact that ever since 1941 it has been consistently impressed upon the Iraqis that their main contribution to the war effort was the production of cereals. While consultations have been actively proceeding between Bagdad, Cairo and London, I have also been engaged in numerous conferences with ministers, whose ideas on price have in the process become more realistic. The whole question, which if mishandled would certainly react dangerously on Anglo-Iraqi relations, has been causing me the greatest anxiety at the very hottest and most trying period of the year. Happily at the time of writing there is prospect of His Majesty's Government reaching an early decision on their policy.

25. Supply problems in general have been giving this embassy much concern, not only because of the paucity of stocks available for distribution—cotton piece-goods in particular—but because the catastrophic failure of the all-embracing control policy of Colonel Bayliss, the Director-General of Imports, and his series of violent disagreements with Arshad al Umari, Acting Minister of Supply in the new Government, finally led to the former's summary dismissal. This development, quite apart from its bearing on British prestige in this country, has naturally been hailed with glee by those forces who look to a policy of decontrol and wild speculation for opportunities of enrichment. Actually the Government's policy seems to be to maintain the prices of essentials at a low level and to intercept the profits made on luxury or semi-luxury articles, maintaining the prices of such articles at a sufficiently high (controlled) level to discourage smuggling out of the country. The mechanism is unfortunately lacking and here again a serious situation is likely to occur if a competent successor to Colonel Bayliss, assisted by an adequate staff, does not materialise in the very near future. Meanwhile, Colonel Le Blanc, Director-General of Transport, is temporarily occupying the chair vacated by Colonel Bayliss. The former is quietly reorganising this department and applying much-needed discipline among the British staff of



"controllers," at least one of whom has been abruptly recalled to his military duties. I confess to being delighted over the exit of Colonel Bayliss, who throughout was a sore trial to this embassy. I have never known a clever man behave with such crass stupidity, nor create more trouble without cause.

26. The Mosul Liwa continues to be the seat of a number of tribal problems. The Mazui-Brifkani trouble started by the abduction of Nuri Brifkani's daughter by the son of Haji Malo (Mazui) is still unsettled; and Said, son of Nuri Brifkani, who murdered Haji Malo, remains at large. Ali Agha, son of Haji Malo, was however persuaded to come into Mosul towards the end of June and the authorities continue their efforts to patch up the feud. On the 3rd June Shaikh Sufuq, the leading Shaikh of the Shamar in Iraq, was badly poisoned by arsenic put in his food. Fortunately the dose was too big to be fatal and medical attention restored him to health after a week or so in bed. The police arrested several of the Shaikh's near relations, including Ahmed his younger brother, with whom Sufuq has had a grave quarrel about the sharing of their late father's property. These men were, however, soon released and the case now seems to have been dropped.

27. Sheep raiding has, as usual, broken out on the Turkish frontier in the Barwari Bala district and seems likely to increase unless better co-operation can be arranged between the Turkish and Iraqi frontier authorities.

28. In June and July the Mutasarrif of Mosul spent twenty days at Deir-ez-Zor attending a tribal conference organised to settle outstanding disputes between several Syrian and Iraqi nomadic tribes of the northern Jezirah. The results achieved were generally considered to be satisfactory, and the Mutasarrif's contribution to the discussions was, I am advised, competent and effective.

29. A clerk employed in the Ministry of Defence was arrested in June for supplying information about the Allied forces in Iraq to an Iraqi student in Istanbul, who is known to be in the employ of the German Intelligence Service. His house was searched and on being confronted with secret ink and other incriminating evidence found there, he made a full confession. Some weeks later an officer of the Turkish army was arrested, together with a confederate, for supplying military information about Iraq to a receiving centre in Turkey. The evidence against them was overwhelming and they confessed their guilt. They remain under detention, presumably awaiting trial.

30. About the 14th June, fifty-one persons were arrested in Basra, Amara and Diwaniyah for being active members of secret societies formed by supporters of Rashid Ali to carry on pro-German and anti-British propaganda. One of the arrested men admitted that, in addition to propaganda, he had committed many thefts of British military stores and minor acts of sabotage. The arrested men are mainly junior ranks in the Iraqi army, subordinate officials, small shopkeepers, artisans and the like. No doubt they will be tried in due course.

31. The Minister of the Interior is thinking of releasing some more of the men interned at Amara, and I recently found it necessary to complain to the Regent (who agreed) that three of his selections were deplorable. There are few men left now who have not thoroughly bad records and for that reason it is fortunate that the Regent has so far given a cool reception to Mustafa al Umari's suggestions.

32. The trial of the internees returned from Rhodesia drags on without result and seems unlikely to reach conclusion for several months.

33. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Tehran and Beirut, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Minister Resident in the Middle East at Cairo, the Government of India, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East, and to His Majesty's consular officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

### CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

#### (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 3958/54/34]

No. 5.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th July.)

(No. 269.)

Sir,

Tehran, 28th June, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to address you as follows on (I) the revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government for the year 1322 (the 21st March, 1943, to the 20th March, 1944), which are covered in the enclosed copy of the report<sup>(1)</sup> of the Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia, Dr. Millspaugh, for the month of Farvardin 1323 (the 21st March to the 20th April, 1944) and for the year 1322; and (II) the budget for the year 1323 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944), which has recently been presented to the Majlis.

#### I.—Revenue and Expenditure for 1322.

2. The report of Dr. Millspaugh, which may well be his last, follows on that for the month of Esfand (the 21st February to the 20th March, 1944), which was summarised in my despatch No. 249 of the 11th June. It is, he states, deliberately brief and, therefore, in general terms owing to the lack of full printing facilities. It gives, however, a cool and balanced account of the financial and economic position in Persia as it existed when Dr. Millspaugh arrived in the country for the second time; of the difficulties which he and his mission have experienced in carrying out the task for which they were engaged; and of the considerable extent to which these difficulties have been surmounted in the last fifteen months.

3. The following figures, taken from the report, show the out-turn of the financial year 1322. That for 1321 and the original budget estimate for 1322 are given for comparison:—

	(1) Actual, 1321.	(2) Actual, 1322.	(3) Estimate, 1322.
	Million Rials.		
Ordinary expenditure ...	2,603	3,990	3,297
Ordinary revenue ...	2,484	3,551	1,890
Deficit ...	119	439	1,407
Commercial expenditure ...	3,003	3,903	5,896
Commercial revenue ...	2,369	2,970	5,795
Deficit ...	634	933	101
Total expenditure ...	5,606	7,893	9,193
Total revenue ...	4,853	6,521	7,685
Deficit ...	753	1,372	1,508

Details of the figures given in columns (1) and (2) are not yet available.

4. It is to be noted that, over the ordinary and commercial budgets taken as a whole, the deficit for the year 1322 is very much as originally estimated, even though some 340 million rials were later added to the expenditure side of the ordinary budget to provide increased salaries for Government servants. Owing to an under-estimate of revenue and to the transfer of certain sums from the commercial to the ordinary budget, the deficit on this budget has been considerably less than estimated. On the other hand, the commercial budget has turned out badly owing to (a) the necessity for subsidising food-stuffs, and (b) the incompetent administration of the industrial undertakings operated by the Government. It was, however, recognised at the time the commercial estimates were prepared that they were hardly more than conjectural. The Government industrial plants, says the report, have been "sadly mismanaged." Dr. Millspaugh's proposals for their reorganisation were given in his report for the month of Bahman 1322, covered by my despatch No. 217 of the 18th May.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



5. It has to be added that the figures given in the third paragraph above are still not final. There is at present no governmental audit system; and no appropriation accounts have been published within memory. There is said to be a "Persian Accounts Tribunal" constituted for the preparation of such accounts, but it is not known ever to have functioned.

## II.—Budget for 1323.

6. The budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—

	Million Rials.
Ordinary budget—	
Expenditure ... ..	4,569
Revenue ... ..	3,958
Deficit ... ..	611
Commercial budget—	
Expenditure ... ..	5,755
Revenue ... ..	6,367
Surplus ... ..	612

The overall surplus is 470,391 rials.

7. As from the beginning of this year revenue and expenditure under the opium and tobacco monopolies are transferred from the commercial to the ordinary budget. The figures for both taken together are:—

	Estimate, 1322.	1323.
	Million Rials.	
Revenue ... ..	1,051	1,425
Expenditure ... ..	258	359

8. The main increase in revenue for 1323 comes from income tax, which is estimated to produce 885 million as compared with the estimate for 1322 of 290; owing, however, to expected delays in payment as the result of corresponding delays on the part of the Government in passing the tax regulations, Dr. Millspaugh has had additional direct taxation under consideration. There is also, apart from the increase in the receipts from opium and tobacco, an estimated 111 million additional from the sugar and tea monopolies and an increase of 84 million from the export and import tax. As is to be expected, the estimate for customs receipts is reduced, from 234 million in 1322 to 185 million in 1323. The 3 per cent. tax on goods brought into the municipalities (the estimated receipts for which were 150 million in 1322) is abolished, following on the introduction of higher income tax rates as from the beginning of the year. In general, it appears clear that the estimate of revenue is a conservative one.

9. Expenditure under the ordinary budget is placed at 4,569 million for 1323 as against the estimate for 1322 of 3,758. The estimates as originally put forward by the Departments have been cut by the Administrator-General to the extent of 1,770 million. The principal cuts made have been 532 million from the Army estimates, 382 million from the estimates for the Gendarmerie and 77 million from those for the Police; the figures having been brought down to the 1322 estimates of 1,000, 298 and 187 million respectively. It remains to be seen how far these cuts will survive the deliberations of the Majlis. Other reductions made in the departmental estimates are 45 million on the vote for the Ministry of Health, 108 on that for Education, 40 on that for Agriculture and 250 on the vote for Government Buildings. On each of these four votes, however, increases have been allowed on the estimates for 1322 of 40 (improved sanitation and mobile dispensaries), 50 (provision of new schools), 23 and 50 million respectively. There are also increases in expenditure on the opium and tobacco monopolies, which are more than offset by increased revenue (see paragraph 7 above), of 40 million for staff required to administer the income tax regulations and of 64 million for communications. There is the novel provision in the Budget Bill that "the payment of cost-of-living allowances to officials is dependent on the economies provided for in the estimates of each Ministry being faithfully carried out."

10. As stated in paragraph 6, the commercial budget shows a slight surplus of 612 million with revenue estimated at 6,367 million and expenditure at 5,755.

This compares as follows with the figures for 1322, the first year in which the separation into the ordinary and commercial budgets was made:—

	1322, Estimated.	1322, Actual.
Revenue ... ..	5,795	2,970
Expenditure ... ..	5,896	3,903
Deficit ... ..	101	933

11. The figures as between 1322 and 1323 require, as stated earlier, certain adjustments owing to the transfer of the opium and tobacco monopolies to the ordinary budget; but the large discrepancy between the estimated and actual figures for 1322 shows the extreme difficulty experienced by the Financial Mission in forecasting the outcome of the trading and industrial undertakings of the Government.

12. In the commercial budget for 1323 Dr. Millspaugh has had in mind (a) price stabilisation and the governmental purchase and improved distribution of food-stuffs and other goods on a large scale, with a view to reducing prices, and incidentally in due course relieving the budget itself, and (b) the transfer to private enterprise of those undertakings which are not proper to Government control and the competent management of the remainder. Dr. Millspaugh's resignation (given after long provocation, and assumed in the writing of this despatch to be final) will not only probably have the effect that his commercial budget for 1323 becomes so much waste paper (unless it should so happen that he is adequately replaced), but will result in a maladministration which makes it impossible at the present stage to forecast the course of the budget for 1323 as a whole.

13. In the meantime, the Majlis has transferred the budget to its Budgetary Commission for consideration. The commission have, it is understood, so far refused to approve it on the ground that the detailed estimates for Government Departments in the budget for the year 1322 have not been approved by them.

14. The following appendices<sup>(\*)</sup> are attached to this despatch:—

- (A) Ordinary budget. Estimated revenue for 1322 and 1323.
- (B) Ordinary budget. Estimated expenditure for 1322 and 1323.
- (C) Commercial budget. Estimated revenue for 1322 and 1323.
- (D) Commercial budget. Estimated expenditure for 1322 and 1323.

15. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

(\*) Not printed.

[E 4041/4041/34]

No. 6.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 273.)

Tehran, 1st July, 1944.

Sir,  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 6th August, 1943, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Tehran.

[Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.]

Afghanistan (Ambassador): M. Mohamed Heydar Khan Hosseini (5th January, 1944).

A young man for the post—born probably about 1904. Has always served in diplomatic posts or in the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has served in Paris and Geneva.

Talks French well, and a little English. Wife in purdah. Amiable but colourless.



*Belgium (Minister):* M. Egbert Graeffe (17th January, 1937).

Born about 1890 but looks older. A diplomat by profession but was in the Belgian intelligence service during the last war, and after that specialised in commercial and financial affairs, especially in Berlin. Has much energy and determination and is outspoken in his discussions with the Persian Government. Unfortunately he is vain and boastful and lays claim to omniscience, and this leads many people to underrate his abilities.

When the King of the Belgians surrendered to the Germans, M. Graeffe, though a keen Royalist, supported the Belgian Government in exile, and continued to do so, in spite of the defeat of France.

Graeffe has been in closer touch with the Shah than most of his colleagues. He and the Shah have met frequently for shooting and tennis, pastimes for which, as for dabbling in Persian intrigue, he has always had plenty of leisure. M. Graeffe is absent for long periods, on holiday in Egypt or on the Caspian or at his other post in Bagdad. For the last six months he has been very ill and it is not yet certain that he will ever recover full working capacity. Too long residence at this high altitude, and anxiety about his country and about a son in Belgium, may have contributed to the decline of his health.

M. Graeffe speaks excellent English, as does his wife, who is half American.

*Brazil (Minister):* M. Renato de la Serda Lago.

Has just arrived and has not yet presented his credentials.

*China (Minister):* Mr. Li Tieh-Tseng (28th June, 1942).

Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He was born at Changsha in 1905 and started his career as a magistrate in Nanchang, but since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service. He spent four years in London, where he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference and in his spare time attended courses at the London School of Economics.

He talks English well and is learning French.

Mr. Li has always been friendly to His Majesty's Legation (embassy), but since he gets from this very much more than he can give, too great credit should not be given to him for it. He is very touchy and protocolaire. He has just given proof of dishonesty, in that he sold in the open market at an immense profit, a few days after he received it, a car which the Middle East Supply Centre had obtained for him from India out of the Persian quota.

Mr. Li has with him an attractive and sensible wife and three out of his eight children; the other five children are in China.

*\*Czechoslovakia (Minister):* M. Josef M. Kadlec (14th April, 1943).

M. Kadlec served as Czechoslovak Consul-General in Jerusalem for some years. He seems anxious to ingratiate himself with everyone he meets, and is the perfect stage diplomat. He is accompanied by a henna-haired wife of Bulgarian origin and a cripple step-daughter (Italian father) who acts as his private secretary. He speaks quite good English and seems genuinely grateful to the British for the part they played when France collapsed. (Written in 1943.)

*Denmark (Chargé d'Affaires):* M. A. E. C. Fensmark (13th April, 1939).

\*Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is chargé d'affaires *en pied*. Born about 1890. Formerly in Angora, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English (has an English wife). Energetic, able, helpful and straightforward. Very strongly pro-Ally and detests the Germans and their policy towards his country. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941.)

\*He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations, and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942.)

Those to whom M. Fensmark pours out his troubles often find him lacking in a sense of proportion. Allowance must, however, be made for difficulties which he has encountered in his efforts to get Danish volunteers accepted as sappers in the British forces.

*Egypt (Ambassador):* M. Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha (17th February, 1943).

\*Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha was educated at the Jesuit Fathers' College at Cairo and the Egyptian School of Law. He has served in the magistracy in Egypt, in the Royal Household of King Fuad and in the Egyptian Legation at The Hague and Madrid. He was Minister in Persia in 1938 and was withdrawn when Zulficar Pasha was appointed first ambassador in March 1939.

Although Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha should play an important rôle in this country owing to the fact that the Queen is a sister of the King of Egypt, he has apparently only seen her once. The Court seems anxious to keep him at arm's length. He is a sad and lonely figure, which may be due to the fact that his wife has not come with him. In any case, he seems frankly bored with Persia and hankers after his own country. He has great personal charm and culture once one gets beneath the surface of his rather shy exterior. He speaks some English. (Written in 1943.)

He has been abroad for the last nine months or so, and shows no inclination to return.

*France (Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation):* M. Pierre Lafond (29th March, 1944).

M. Lafond was born probably about 1895. He fought in the 1914-18 war and then entered the diplomatic service. He returned to the army in 1939, but after the defeat of France he obtained an appointment in Tunisia. His open antagonism to Vichy caused him to be arrested by the Germans and sent back to France, whence he escaped back to Tunis after the occupation of North Africa by the Allies.

From all British sources we have good reports of M. Lafond. He is rather effusive in language but not the less sincere for that. He is an interesting and cultivated man, and a pleasant addition to the diplomatic corps. He speaks English quite well. His large family is still in Tunis.

*Greece (Chargé d'Affaires):* M. Georges Coustas (13th September, 1943).

M. Coustas has the rank of first secretary, though both he and his wife think that he ought to be a Minister. Agreeable but vain and with no character. His wife, a Greek from Istanbul, is young and very silly.

*Holy See (Apostolic Delegate):* Mgr. A. Marina (29th October, 1936).

\*The position of the apostolic delegate is rather anomalous. His diplomatic status is not fully recognised by the Persian Government, and his name is not included in the diplomatic list. He is, however, invited by the Persian authorities to gatherings attended by "chefs de missions." Mgr. Marina appears to be mainly interested in the religious and charitable side of his functions. He has a friendly and sympathetic character. (Written in 1938.)

\*Mgr. Marina was bitterly disappointed when Italy entered the war. Very friendly to us and openly shows his disapproval of the Nazi attitude towards religion. (Written in 1940.)

After the withdrawal of bag and cypher facilities from the apostolic delegate in 1942 relations were for a time a little less friendly, but they are again very good, though according to a Roman Catholic colleague Mgr. Marina is convinced that His Majesty's Government are bent upon reducing the diplomatic status of the Papacy at the end of the war.

*Iraq (Minister):* M. Abbas Mahdi (7th April, 1943).

M. Abbas Mahdi, who is a Shia, previously held the post of Rais of the Royal Diwan in Bagdad. He is always ready to co-operate with this embassy. He is a pleasant individual, but somewhat dull and unintelligent. He speaks English and French well. He married late in life and has brought with him his wife and baby. His wife, who appears in public, is learning English, but says little in any language.

*Netherlands (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim):* Jonkheer de Brauw (11th March, 1942).

Came here from Simla, where he held a consular post. He and his wife, who both talk English well, are very friendly. They have an only son in the Netherlands forces in England.

M. de Brauw is not a great character, but as he has nothing to do this does not matter.

*Norway (Minister):* M. Rolf Otto Andvord (20th April, 1942).

Born 1890. M. Andvord is also Minister in Moscow. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly,



sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visits to Tehran are short as most of his time is spent in Moscow.

*Poland (Minister):* Dr. Karol Bader (18th July, 1942).

\*M. Bader was born in 1897 and during the last war was head of the Press Bureau of the Polish National Committee at Berne. Later he was counsellor and chargé d'affaires at Prague, and he was Minister at Angora from 1926 to 1931, when he retired owing to his opposition to the policy of Marshal Pilsudski. At the time of the German invasion he made his way from Poland to Angora and since June 1940 has served alternatively at Beirut and Istanbul.

\*M. Bader is a great relief after his silly and most voluble predecessor, M. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski. He is a co-operative and businesslike colleague and his judgment is sound and balanced. In view of wartime conditions he only entertains on a modest scale; owing to the number of Polish refugees here and the present state of Polish-Soviet relations, he has no easy task, but he works with great tact and discretion. He speaks excellent French and good English. His wife is still in Poland. (Written in 1943.)

*Soviet Union (Ambassador):* M. Mikhail Alexeevitch Maximov (is just about to present his credentials).

M. Maximov's appointment as ambassador was very sudden. He was counsellor to the Soviet Embassy, but was promoted to succeed M. Constantine Alexandrovitch Mikhailov, who retired "ill" after three months.

M. Maximov was born about 1900. He served for several years in Afghanistan and was then for several years consul-general in Meshed, where His Majesty's consular officers got on well with him. He talks Persian well and is beginning to learn English.

M. Maximov has the reputation of being an exceedingly cunning man and of being mainly responsible for the election of a number of pro-Russian and pro-Communist Deputies to the Majlis in 1943. I believe that this reputation is deserved. Nevertheless, M. Maximov is business-like and is sufficiently well informed about Persia to be able to give an opinion without fear, and, as he is also amusing and can grin at a fair hit, he is as good a Soviet colleague as one could expect to have in this country.

*Sweden (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim):* M. Sven Harald Pousette (14th October, 1941).

M. Pousette, who is in charge of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian interests, was previously counsellor at the Swedish Legation in London. He of course speaks excellent English. I have always found him a helpful and sympathetic colleague, and I am sure that he is a friend of Great Britain, though in his early days here the delicacy of his task sometimes compelled him to adopt an attitude of careful neutrality which some of his colleagues regarded with a very critical eye.

His wife and children are in Sweden.

*Switzerland (Chargé d'Affaires):* Dr. Armin Daeniker (6th June, 1936).

Is in charge of Italian interests, which he protects with discretion. Is a sound and sensible man. Undoubtedly pro-Ally, though so long as the Axis representatives were here he took great pains to be polite to them. His wife, who is a lawyer by profession, is believed to have been secretary to an anti-Nazi society in Switzerland before her marriage to M. Daeniker in 1938.

M. Daeniker, who talks English very well, is learning Russian with great assiduity, and is believed to covet the post of first Swiss representative to the Soviet Union.

*Turkey (Ambassador):* M. Cemal Hüsnü Taray (7th December, 1941).

Born about 1890. Formerly manager of a bank in Turkey and a Minister in one of Atatürk's Cabinets and later ambassador in Warsaw and afterwards in Athens. He wields considerable influence in Tehran as the representative of an important neutral Power and of the senior partner in the Saadabad Pact. He is a clever man, but has done himself harm by his foolish behaviour as a *couteur de femmes* and more recently by trying in his pan-Turanian enthusiasm to dictate to the Persian Government as to their policy towards the Qashgai tribe. He has always professed to be an enthusiastic supporter of the alliance with Great Britain, but his interference in the matter of the Qashgai, which, though it affected our military interests, was undertaken without notice being given to me, might have embarrassed the British war effort very seriously. M. Taray is much criticised by Persians for suspicious deals in carpets, and by the Allies for

having sold soon after receiving it, at a profit of hundreds per cent., a new car which the United States Government had allowed him to buy in America. Among the Persian suspects arrested in August 1943 were two or three who were frequenters of the Turkish Embassy, and M. Taray regarded their arrest as a British attempt to "get at" him. Altogether a man whose abilities are largely cancelled by regrettable faults of character. His health is bad, but not worse than the bridge and poker which he plays assiduously.

*United States (Ambassador):* Mr. Leland Morris.

The arrival of Mr. Morris, the first United States Ambassador to Persia, is still awaited. His last post was that of Minister in Iceland.

Mr. Morris, who was born about 1886, began his career at Constantinople in about 1908 as a student interpreter. He was consul-general at Alexandria for some time. He was in Vienna when the war began and was very helpful to our people there. When Germany declared war on the United States, Mr. Morris, as Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, was summoned by Ribbentrop to receive the declaration.

Mr. Morris should be a great improvement on his predecessor, Mr. Dreyfus, in that he knows something about the Near and Middle East and is an able and straightforward man.

*Yugoslavia (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim):* M. Milovan Tomaseo (24th July, 1943).

M. Tomaseo is a pleasant, friendly man. He talks French well and English a little. He is pulled all ways in his mind. Like his wife, he is from Split, which is being knocked to pieces. He is a Croat, but is for the Government and violently against Pavelich and all his works; and he is anti-Bolshevik and for that reason if for no other he is bitterly opposed to Tito. Very pessimistic about the future of his country.

[E 4241/189/34]

No. 7.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th July.)*

(No. 281.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 6th July, 1944.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 156 of the 6th April, I have the honour to convey to you herewith a report on events in Persia during the months of April, May and June 1944.

*Allied Co-operation in Persia.*

2. During their visit to London in April Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Wallace Murray raised the question of Allied co-operation in Persia. It was agreed, on the proposal of Mr. Murray, to suggest to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held between the Allied representatives in Tehran to implement more fully the provisions of the Declaration of the Tehran Conference regarding economic assistance to Persia. The Foreign Office in turn suggested that an agreed plan for the improvement of the Persian forces should be communicated to the Persian authorities by the United States and British Ambassadors in Tehran together with an undertaking to supply the necessary equipment; the Soviet Government should be informed before the offer was made and invited to furnish corresponding information regarding any Soviet proposals to supply arms to Persia. Both the British and American delegations agreed that their aim was to help Persia to be stable, prosperous and secure and that to this end the American advisers should be actively supported.

3. The Soviet Government agreed to take part in the economic discussions proposed by Mr. Murray and the first meeting between the British, Soviet and American representatives was held in Tehran on the 3rd June. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Embassy should be represented on the new Inter-Allied Higher Supplies Committee (described in the Economic Section of this despatch). The inclusion of representatives of the Soviet Embassy would ensure that co-operation between all four Allies which is essential if the best use is to be made of local and imported supplies and prices are to be kept as low as possible. The Soviet Ambassador asked for time for consideration of this proposal.

4. The second meeting was held on the 21st June. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador impressed on the Soviet Ambassador that Persia needed economic assistance and that it was in the Soviet's own ultimate interests, if only as beneficiaries of the Trans-Persia route, to contribute



to Persia's well-being. The American Charge d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador proceeded cautiously with the proposal which had been made by the State Department that the Soviet Ambassador should be pressed to support the American advisers, since the latter are still mistrusted by the Soviet authorities and it was not desirable to endanger the future of the joint economic discussions by bringing up this dangerous matter too brusquely. The meeting then discussed the grain situation and agreed that all possible help must be given by the Allies to ensure the collection of the Persian Government's share of the grain. The Soviet Ambassador, on instructions from Moscow, asked for further information about the proposed Higher Supplies Committee. It was clear that the Soviet Government were afraid that they might be voted down. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador made it quite clear that the Committee would not vote and would have no executive powers, but would only try to ascertain Persia's resources and needs and the possibility of meeting these needs from Allied sources. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador also hinted that any questions which might involve divergence of opinion between the United Kingdom, American and Soviet Governments should be discussed outside the Higher Supplies Committee as far as possible. It is essential that these meetings should not be used by the Persians as an opportunity to arraign the Russians before the British and the Americans. In the course of June, the American Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Soviet Ambassador a scheme by the American Director of Road Transport for the management of road transport in the north. The Soviet Ambassador promised to study this, but he was guarded and tended to throw doubt on the need for Americans. Nevertheless, the local Russian authorities show signs of departing from their complete obstruction of the activities of the Millspaugh Mission in their zone. They seem more disposed in fact to co-operate with the local American transport representatives, notwithstanding the unforthcoming reception given by the Soviet Ambassador to the American Charge d'Affaires' approach. Again, the American at last admitted to Azerbaijan for grain collection seems to have been left a free hand by the Russians. It is true that they remain aloof from the work of local collection but they have offered to help with the long-distance haulage of grain southwards. Yet again, the American Director of Finance in Meshed, for whom the Russians have given a delayed and grudging residence permit, reports good co-operation by the local Russian authorities.

5. On the other hand, the examination by the Soviet section of the Tripartite Censorship of Persia of British and American books and periodicals has recently exceeded all bounds, and the British section have found torn wrappers addressed to His Majesty's Embassy, the American Embassy, other diplomatic missions of countries in relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dr. Millspaugh and various Persian Government departments. The British section of the Censorship, in consultation with His Majesty's Embassy and Censorship, Middle East, have taken up the matter strongly and the Soviet section have promised, subject to approval by higher authority, not to interfere with books and periodicals addressed to bodies such as those described above or to British and American nationals. An opportunity has been taken of examining the publications recently condemned, and while a few condemnations are clearly reasonable, the majority can be described as frivolous. The Soviet censors are in future to be required to show cause why a book should not be delivered to the addressee, and when they cannot be persuaded to withdraw their objections, the book will be returned to the sender. The whole question is still under active consideration by the British authorities concerned.

6. Finally, Soviet obstructionism reached its climax at the end of June when the Soviet authorities, in spite of strong pressure by His Majesty's Embassy, delayed to grant permission for Sir Olaf Caroe and Sir Denys Pilditch to fly to Meshed (where the Government of India have large interests) until the visitors had left on their return journey to India. (Their visit to Persia is described in the Indian Section of this despatch.)

7. However, the foregoing paragraphs, generally speaking, give an unduly gloomy view of Anglo-American-Soviet relations in this country. Persia is the one country where British, American and Soviet military and civil authorities meet on a broad land front, and the many day-to-day contacts proceed smoothly, or at any rate smoothly enough for the despatch of business.

#### *Relations with India.*

8. The Persian Cultural Mission which travelled to India in February returned to Persia in April. They professed to have been delighted at their

reception both in official and non-official circles and greatly impressed by what they saw. In particular, they were impressed by the enormous number of valuable Persian manuscripts in India—exceeding anything to be found in Persia itself; by university, school and public buildings; by the vast progress made in industry; by the fact that the majority of ministers are Indians and that British and Indian officials work side by side, sometimes one being senior and sometimes the other; and by the high morale of the Indian people as a whole in the face of the Axis Powers. Most of these points may seem obvious, but they are not obvious to the Persians, who like to regard the Indians as a nation of helots trodden down by the British, and the mission has undoubtedly had a beneficial effect, particularly as its members have been emphasising these points in speeches and broadcasts since their return.

9. Four members of the Indian Defence Consultative Committee travelled to Persia in May to visit the Indian troops here.

10. Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the External Affairs Department of the Government of India, and Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of Intelligence of the Home Department of the Government of India, arrived in Persia on the 27th June to stay at His Majesty's Embassy and discuss problems of mutual interest. They were also entertained by the Persian Government. They left on the 2nd July.

11. In view of the great demand for teachers of English in Persia and the impossibility of supplying enough teachers from the United Kingdom, arrangements are being made for five Indians to come to Persia for the purpose. Two will be stationed in Meshed and one each in Kerman, Yazd and Ahwaz.

#### *American Interests.*

12. On various occasions during the period under review His Majesty's Embassy recommended that His Majesty's Government should urge the United States Government to send their new Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, to Tehran without delay. The reasons for this recommendation were, first, that Dr. Millspaugh was being increasingly criticised by both official and unofficial Persians for failure to solve the economic situation, and, secondly, that the Ambassador might be able to bring about co-operation between Dr. Millspaugh and the American advisers to the Persian army, gendarmerie and police regarding the funds which should be allotted to those forces. His Majesty's Government took action on His Majesty's Embassy's recommendation but, although the United States Government agreed in principle to accelerate Mr. Morris's arrival in Tehran, he will not in fact be here until the end of July.

13. From April onwards a regular campaign against Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues was launched both in the Majlis and the press. The more important criticisms were:—

(1) That the mission had not reorganised the finances nor prevented a rise in prices nor assured supplies. (This charge is in many ways entirely unfair. Dr. Millspaugh is doing his best during a period of inflation to increase revenue and reduce expenditure, but is faced, through no fault of his own, with a deficit on last year's working of some 77 per cent. of the total revenue of the country. The rise in prices is largely due to the presence of the Allied forces in this country and it is unlikely that the price level will fall until they are withdrawn; meanwhile, the rate of increase in prices has diminished considerably during the last few months. There is more substance in the third part of the charge—that supplies have not been ensured. Although large quantities of commodities such as piece-goods, tea, sugar and drugs are in the country and under Government control, they are not yet reaching the consumer at reasonable prices. Dr. Millspaugh is, however, confident that the steps taken by the Distribution Department will show definite results shortly.)

(2) That the expenditure of Persian Government money on the running of the Supply Department, the Price Stabilisation Section, Road Transport Organisation, &c., was excessive. (The expenditure on American personnel in these departments is no doubt large, but if the desired objects are obtained, the expenditure will have been well worth while.)

(3) That some of the members of the mission were incompetent and unsuited to their work. (This is true to some extent, although at least a dozen of them are capable and suitable men).



14. Dr. Millspaugh's qualities may be described as follows: he is scrupulously honest and tenacious, but is strong headed to the verge of obstinacy. He has administrative ability up to a point, except that (a) he tends to centralise all powers himself: this hampers and offends his American colleagues and causes delay; (b) he is inclined not to discuss proposals sufficiently before issuing orders: this leads to the commission of avoidable mistakes; (c) his obstinacy has led to the resignation of several of his best men.

15. The mission undoubtedly has many enemies. The Shah is opposed to Dr. Millspaugh, who is unwilling as well as unable to provide money for so large an army as the Shah would like to have, and has been imprudent enough to say in an interview to the press that the security forces of Persia were not worth the money expended on them. (This led the Ministry of War to issue a statement asking why Dr. Millspaugh made such strictures without consulting General Ridley, the American adviser to the army). The Russians, in turn, are still suspicious of the mission. Finally, there are the many powerful Persians who stand to lose by the mission's efforts to bring down prices and to control financial abuses.

16. At the end of May the American Chargé d'Affaires, under instructions from his Government, presented a note to the Persian Prime Minister expressing anxiety at the attacks on the American advisers and at the lack of support by the Persian Government. The note reminded the Persian Government that the United States Government only assented to the engagement of Dr. Millspaugh and his assistants because the Persian Government insisted and undertook to support them. The object was not to provide a political buffer but to afford economic assistance. The note added that harmony was essential and if the Persian Government did not want assistance the United States Government did not intend to press it upon them. The Persian Government in their reply declared (quite falsely) that they had given full support to Dr. Millspaugh. On the 22nd June the Prime Minister brought before the Majlis a Bill providing for the repeal of the law which gave Dr. Millspaugh his powers and providing for the transfer of these powers to the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries. The next day Dr. Millspaugh tendered his resignation. At the same time the Road Transport Department, which owing to the failure of the Persian Government to appoint a Persian president now consists of British and Americans only, decided that until the situation cleared, a consignment of about one hundred Lease-Lend lorries which had arrived for the Persian Government should not be issued (there was justification in this in that the Persian Government have paid for very little of the Lend-Lease material received, and that if Dr. Millspaugh went, the Americans who are running road transport for the Persian Government with some success would leave with him). The Persian Government were severely shaken by this and by the prospect of incurring the serious displeasure of the United States Government, and at the end of the period under review it was virtually certain that the difference between Dr. Millspaugh and the Persian Government would be composed.

17. It need hardly be said that His Majesty's Embassy have given Dr. Millspaugh their full support and would regard his departure as a calamity, in spite of his faults (which would prevent his receiving our full support if he was a British subject).

#### *Soviet Interests.*

18. The new Soviet Ambassador, M. Constantin Mikhailov, who had presented his credentials in January, left Persia in May ostensibly for medical treatment and has not returned. There is ground for suspicion that his departure was not due to illness alone. The Persian Prime Minister saw the Ambassador the day after the Persian Government had refused to accept the conditions attached to the offer of war material made by Stalin to the Shah at the Tehran Conference, and he found the Ambassador "looking like a man condemned to death," yet maintaining that he was perfectly well. From that moment the Ambassador was never seen again except presumably by Russians, and it seems likely that he had fallen into disgrace for failing to complete a transaction initiated by Marshal Stalin himself. Neither the British nor the American Embassies regret his departure. He was cold and suspicious, and they failed to get a word out of him either for or against anything they said. M. Mikhailov has been succeeded by the former chargé d'affaires, M. Maximov, who is an old Persian hand and a clever intriguer, but is human, has a sense of humour, and can often be teased into taking action. The change therefore is for the better.

19. The Persian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union has issued some impressive statutes, but so far little appears to have been done to implement the programme laid down in them, and the sole activity has been to organise classes for learning Russian; about ninety persons have been enrolled so far. It is too early to estimate what response the Persian public will give to the new society once it has begun to function properly. In Isfahan Russian is being taught to Armenian schoolchildren.

#### *Polish Interests.*

20. At the opening of the period under review there were about 8,200 Polish refugees in Persia. Since then some 300 boys and girls have been incorporated into the Polish army in the Middle East as enlisted boys and P.S.K. (= A.T.S.), and about 1,100 have left for India and other destinations overseas. There are thus about 6,800 at the present time, and this number should be reduced by about 1,000 in the course of the next few days by the departure of another group for India.

21. Of the 5,800 odd then remaining, about 2,000 will be in Isfahan, 2,800 in Tehran, and 1,000 in the transit camp at Ahwaz.

22. The period has been generally devoid of incident, and the health of the refugees has been satisfactory. The arrival from Soviet Russia of a mission of Poles masquerading as Polish Patriots does not appear to have had any influence on the Polish community.

23. It should be noticed also that the problem of Polish refugees in Persia has assumed a different aspect in the last few months. In the past it was a matter of putting pressure on the shipping authorities to provide transports to get the refugees away, and it was their inability to provide enough shipping owing to operations and other causes that has made the evacuation drag on the unconscionable time it has. Now, however, practically all the refugees who are not in some way employed here, or are the relations of employees, have left; so under existing conditions only one more transport—referred to above—can be filled. Those remaining will then be either the employees of British and American civil and military organisations, and their dependants (whom it has been decided not to move for the time being), the various Polish staffs, and the children's school at Isfahan. This last can only be moved when some place overseas can be found where it can be received in its entirety or in perhaps two halves. The view has been generally taken that this institution is doing such good work in forming a new generation of Poles that it would be a pity to break it up.

#### *Anglo-Persian Public Relations.*

24. The reopening of the second front in Western Europe made a profound impression on Persian public opinion. The importance and significance of this event was pressed home through the various propaganda channels followed by the Public Relations Bureau and steps were taken at the same time to curb the wave of undue optimism regarding the early cessation of hostilities which swept the country.

25. The vernacular press continued on the whole to be friendly, and Allied successes on the various fronts were reported favourably. In general, however, the main preoccupation of the press centred round the internal troubles of the country and the need for Persia to prepare plans for arguing her case at the peace conference.

26. On the occasion of "United Nations Day" on the 14th June, a special celebration was arranged at "Victory House." The reception, which was attended by members of the Persian Cabinet and Government and representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, concluded with a showing of the film "The Gentle Sex," depicting the part played by girls of the A.T.S.

27. During the period under review the various activities of the Public Relations Bureau were examined in detail with a view to deciding the lines along which propaganda policy in Persia should be directed in the future in order to meet the change in the war situation and the need for long-term plans for the post-war period.

#### *British Council Activities.*

28. *General.*—Professor Boase, the Middle East representative of the British Council, arrived in May and stayed a month in Persia inspecting the Council's work. He lectured at the Tehran University and at the institutes in Tehran and Isfahan, and broadcasted from the Tehran State radio. It has been decided to open a new institute in Shiraz and a director has been sent there to



make the necessary preparations, but an assistant will not be available till September. 40,000 English textbooks have been ordered by the Ministry of Education for use in the schools throughout Persia: they are on their way from London. 30,000 text books for adults have been ordered from Cairo for sale to the public. The broadcasting of English lessons on five evenings a week was started in April, for which 5,000 textbooks were specially written by a member of the Council staff and printed locally: these were distributed to the shops in Tehran and the provinces and sold immediately. The first two numbers of "Ahang," a bilingual quarterly published by the Ministry of Information in Delhi with the co-operation of the Council, were received here and all copies were sold without delay. The Tehran Medical Association continued their regular fortnightly clinical meetings and held a successful reception at the Tehran Institute. There are now about 200 members of different nationalities. As the showing of educational films to the University, schools and colleges of all kinds had grown too large for the Council to handle with their limited staff and equipment, it was decided to leave all film work to the Public Relations Bureau in Tehran until the Council can take it over themselves. At the request of the chancellor of the university 1,500 copies of a lecture by the British Ambassador (on "Dr. Johnson") were printed in English and Persian for distribution to the university and schools.

29. *Anglo-Persian Institutes.*—The institutes in Tehran and Isfahan and a branch in Tehran are now teaching over 1,500 adult students of both sexes and assist in the teaching of 500 in the university, schools and other institutions. Further expansion of English classes is limited by the number of teachers, although they are helped by all the available part-time teachers from the British and American communities. In Shemran, a summer resort near Tehran, the Summer Institute was opened in June with 200 students. At Isfahan factory owners have been approached to form workers' clubs in which English classes will be organised. The weekly concerts, film shows and lectures continued as usual, although lecturers are becoming increasingly hard to find. An exhibition by the Isfahan Arts Group, of work both traditional and modern, was viewed by 2,500 visitors at the Isfahan Institute.

#### *British Army Interests.*

30. The Indian Army Motor Transport Companies, who for some eighteen months had maintained a high record of efficiency in carrying "Aid to Russia" supplies, often in very arduous conditions of road and winter weather, from Khanakin, on the Iraq frontier, to Tabriz, have now been withdrawn. The operation of that route was taken over by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, but the Russians have now elected that with effect from the 1st August the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation shall carry to Pahlavi only and not to Tabriz. The maintenance of the Takistan-Tabriz road, for long the responsibility of British engineers, has now been handed over to the Russian authorities, and the new Mianeh Bridge, the last work to be completed by the Royal Engineers on that road, was recently opened for traffic. The connexion of the British Army with Azerbaijan appears now to have come to an end, and the Russians may perhaps be congratulating themselves that British officials have no further justification for penetrating that part of their zone in Persia except on business connected with the Consulate-General in Tabriz.

31. Thefts of British Army telephone and telegraph wires recently reached such alarming proportions that it seemed necessary to address a sharp note to the Persian Government which has led to the assumption by the Persian Army of responsibility for the protection of certain sectors. Pilfering from trains and dumps still continues in spite of stern measures taken to check it. The value of wire and of the goods that can be pilfered is so high that thieves willingly risk death to obtain this valuable loot.

#### *Security.*

32. After further prolonged negotiations, the surrender by the Qashgai tribe of the four Germans whom they had been harbouring was followed by the surrender to the British security authorities of the Persian Deputy, Naubakht, in the month of May. Naubakht had fled from Tehran and taken sanctuary with the Qashgai in August 1943, after His Majesty's Embassy had informed the Persian Government that they had documents showing that he was one of the chief instigators of the anti-Ally plot of 1942. Naubakht has been sent to the internment camp at Sultanabad for interrogation by the Anglo-Persian Commission.

33. In June the British security authorities located the Mullah Kashani in a villa in the hills north of Tehran, and effected his arrest in collaboration with the Persian police. Kashani was also implicated in the anti-Ally plot mentioned above. Kashani, too, has been sent to Sultanabad for interrogation. It is probable that there are now no more prominent Persians at large in Persia whose internment is required by the British security authorities, but some have escaped to Turkey and beyond with the connivance of Persian officials.

#### *Internal Politics and Majlis.*

34. On the 6th April the Prime Minister, Saed, presented to the Shah and to the Majlis his reconstituted Cabinet. The two young men, Mahmud Fateh and Mahmud Nariman, were dropped, and also General Riazi; Abdul-Qasim Ferouhar became Minister of Finance, Dr. Ghani Minister of Education in place of Riazi; Nasir E'timadi became Minister of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs remained vacant, the Under-Secretary, Hakimi, being considered quite capable of carrying on as he had done on many occasions before.

35. Public Health was given to Dr. Saed Malik, who had not previously held Cabinet rank. The Cabinet did not appear to be much stronger than its predecessor, and could not be regarded as including any true representative of the young and progressive elements, except possibly Hajhir. He, however, seems at the moment of writing to be estranged from his chief to some extent. Perhaps it is impossible in this intriguing country to appoint young Ministers because such appointments raise storms of jealousy and hostility from all the disappointed young men. The Cabinet was not greeted with any enthusiasm either in the Majlis or in the country, and since its inception everyone, even its members, seem to agree that the Government has no authority or force. Before the end of April Dr. Ghani had resigned, and his place was not filled by the end of June, Vahid, the Under-Secretary, acting for him. Nevertheless the Majlis gave the new Cabinet a vote of confidence on the 16th April. Saed has let it be known that if his Cabinet was rejected this time he would resign; but perhaps the Majlis vote was due not so much to that fact as to the absence of any obvious alternative to Saed.

36. During the following three months the vigorous personality of Seyyid Zia has caused some stir. He has kept aloof from the Shah and is evidently on the worst possible terms with His Majesty, whom he accuses of aiding his principal critics, the Tudeh party. His newspapers, the chief of which is *Fa'd i Imruz*, edited by the unstable firebrand, Mazaffar Firouz, have carried on a ceaseless polemic against the Tudeh party, who have replied in the same vein. Supported by wealthy friends, Seyyid Zia has obtained large premises in Tehran for his party, which is as yet nameless and, indeed, programmeless. He has also been angling for support from the tribes, on the grounds that they are a virile element who must be conciliated and brought into willing submission to the Persian Government after the settlement of their just grievances. He has also gained the support of some officers in the army, including Razmara, the Chief of the Staff. He is in favour of a limitation of the Shah's powers and a revision of the Constitution on that point, with a view to a more strict assertion of the limits of the powers of the Monarch. Seyyid Zia's greatest difficulty lies in the determined hostility of the Russians, who cannot get out of their heads the theory that Seyyid Zia is a creature of the British. Seyyid Zia seems obstinate, and to judge from some of his supporters is a poor judge of men; but he is a power to be reckoned with and it is unfortunate that the opposition of the Shah and the Russians has caused the Shah to take in this matter the same side as the Russians, a course which is bad for the Shah and might be dangerous for the stability of the country.

37. One of the features of the political life of Persia during the last three months has been the rise of several labour unions throughout the country. Such unions have existed for some time in the Russian-occupied zone, where they are affiliated with the Tudeh party; and similar unions exist in Isfahan, in Tehran, amongst railway workers, and in Khuzistan. In Isfahan the power of the Tudeh and the Workers' Union combined caused alarm to the Government, who sent down a new Governor-General, Reza Afsbar, to deal with the situation. The Tudeh party, backed in many ways by the Russians, has remained the one strong party in the country. Other parties exist, but hardly more than in name; the much advertised "Hamrahan," the creation of Mustafa Fateh, has already disintegrated. The various "fractions" in the Majlis continued to exist and to function, but they were more like associations of friends than political parties. Thus the "Iran" fraction is composed of eleven members, all from Khorassan.



The "Mihaan" fraction consists of the friends of Dr. Taheri of Yezd, to the number of nineteen; the Democrats were started by the egregious Farrukh and comprised nineteen members till they absorbed the Azerbaijan non-Tudeh Deputies when these were elected at the end of May and changed their name to "Azadi" or "Liberty," thus reaching a membership of thirty. The other fraction is the "Ittihad i Milli," with thirteen members. A few Deputies remain unattached, and the President of the Majlis, Seyyid Muhammad Sadegh Tabatabai, has been endeavouring, hitherto without much success, to combine them and found by their support a central party of Liberal views.

38. Early in May the Prime Minister asserted himself sufficiently to deliver a sensible and salutary lecture to journalists concerning their duties towards the public; it appeared that his admonitions had some slight effect, for a short time, on their irresponsible virulence and shameless blackmail. Nevertheless, the newspaper *Demavand* published a personal attack on a member of the Embassy but was not suspended as a result.

39. Saed also dropped a bomb-shell into the Majlis by introducing, early in May, a Bill proposing that the officials of all Ministries should, for the period of the war, be considered to have the same liabilities as officers and soldiers called to the colours; that factories, whether Government-owned or private, and their workmen should similarly be considered to have been mobilised for national service, and that restrictions should be imposed on the place of residence of persons acting against the war-time interests of Persia or her Allies or committing breaches of the peace. This Bill was not passed by the end of the quarter. The Bill was attacked by the Tudeh press as reactionary, and it was suggested in some papers that the Minister of the Interior, who as Minister of Communications had paid a long visit to London, had drafted this Bill under British inspiration.

40. The new Governor-General of Isfahan was the cause of an interpellation by the Deputy Farivar on the 17th May. Farivar's argument was based on the fact that Afshar had been tried and condemned for fraud in the time of Reza Shah, and had been deprived permanently of the right to hold a Government post. The Government survived the interpellation, as the Prime Minister gave as his reply the reason that Afshar was a strong Governor who appeared the most suitable man available for the task of restoring order in Isfahan—a task which he had accomplished—and that legal opinion, which the Prime Minister had taken, was against the argument of the interpellator on the point of deprivation from the right of entering Government service. However, the Prime Minister promised to submit the question to the High Court of Appeal; and when this promise was fulfilled the court decided against Afshar, and he had to be recalled.

41. The elections in Azerbaijan Province were practically finished before the end of the quarter. Two Communist Deputies, Ipekjian and Pishavari, secured election with Soviet support at Tabriz, and the Armenian Deputy for the North, Ardashez Hovanessiantz, is a well-known Communist who was imprisoned as such for many years under Reza Shah. The election at Ardebil also resulted in a victory for a creature of the Russians, Sheikh Hussein Lankurani; in this case the intervention of the Russians in the conduct of the elections was unusually open. The elections in Fars have also been finished, except for Abadeh and Firuzabad. For Shiraz town the candidates who were agreed to by Qawam-ul-Mulk were successful, while the Qashgais were not. At Jahrum also a local man, Hazaqi, was successful, and at La Azadi, the previous member defeated his rival Faramarzi. Whether Nasir Qashgai will now stand for the Majlis is doubtful; his natural constituency would be Firuzabad; he might also stand for Abadeh. But the fact that he did not visit the Shah during his trip to the south was not a good augury for the submission to the Persian Government which we hoped he would make.

42. Anti-Bahai riots were reported in June at Abadeh, Hamadan and Senneh. A marked wave of anti-Bahai feeling seems to have begun, though the reasons for it are obscure. Certain mullas are known to have expressed surprise that the Shah when at Shiraz visited the Bahai Deputy Dehqan, and the credentials of the latter were opposed in the Majlis on account of his religion.

43. The Shah had shown little sign of fulfilling the promise he is known to have made of keeping clear of politics; for instance, he seems to have sent his Minister of Court to reprove the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice for receiving British visitors on matters of departmental business; a step which brings back unpleasant memories of the foolish and irritating restrictions under which all diplomats in Persia had to work in the latter years of Reza Shah's reign.

44. Several new newspapers appeared during the quarter, one of which, named *Darya*, uttered the purest of pure Marxian doctrines, though these were explained by M. Maximov, the Soviet Ambassador, as being the work of a crypto-Fascist. The rest of the papers were for the most part scurrilous and ephemeral publications, full of sound and fury, but signifying hardly more than that the Shah, who subsidised a lot of them, did not like Seyyid Zia.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

45. The tribes have recently come in for some attention in the political arena in Tehran. Seyyid Zia, with the object of gaining tribal support, made known his sympathy with the tribes for the neglect and oppression they had suffered in recent years and his view that they merited much greater consideration from the Government and that they should be allowed to retain their arms to protect themselves against oppression until they were assured of just administration. This put the Tudeh party, always in opposition to Seyyid Zia, into a difficult position. They had themselves for political purposes been championing the cause of the tribes, but their hostility to Seyyid Zia obliged them to cry loudly against what they alleged was incitement of the tribes to rearm and oppose the Government. The Shah, too, was disturbed by the thought that Seyyid Zia was trying to secure the support of the tribes with a view to using them to bring off a *coup d'Etat* as the Bakhtiari had done in 1909. For a time it seemed that he was himself going to make a bid for popularity among the tribes, but he seems to have reverted to his father's idea that they must be disarmed as soon and as ruthlessly as possible and kept in a state of weakness lest they become a dangerous instrument in the hands of foreigners or schemers against the throne.

46. The Government, perhaps as the result of nearly three years' persuasion by this embassy, has also condescended to recognise that among the people of Persia for whose welfare they are responsible are tribal communities—outlandish barbarians in the opinion of most of the Ministers—whose conditions of life require special consideration. A tribal commission has been formed, composed of the two Ministers without portfolio and two tribal Deputies, one a Bakhtiari and one a Kurd. This commission has recommended the formation in the Ministry of Interior of a tribal department which would be represented in the provinces by committees for tribal affairs under the supervision of Governors-General and Governors. Plans for the formation of this department with its subsidiary committees are now being drawn up in conferences between representatives of the Ministries of the Interior and War. The Chief of the Staff has advocated the assembly in Tehran of a commission to be composed of representatives of the Ministries that would be concerned with projects for the improvement of conditions in tribal areas—Agriculture, Public Health, Education—and delegates from the principal tribes, to make recommendations to the Government regarding the policy to be followed in tribal territory. The decisions of the Government, he proposes, should be implemented in the provinces by similar commissions assembled from time to time as required. The proposal that the tribes should be allowed to speak for themselves may be too revolutionary for a democratic Persian Government, but the attitude of the Chief of the Staff, if sincere, gives reason for faint hope that the Persian army may, if it should ever become bold enough to fight the tribes again, act with greater moderation than it did in Reza Shah's day.

47. It is unlikely that the tribes have interpreted the light that has shined on them in Tehran as the dawning of a new day in their relations with the Central Government. Only actions over a considerable period will convince them that conciliatory actions by Government officials are more than a trick to keep them quiet while the Government is weak. For the time being they are, with a few exceptions, being unusually orderly.

48. With the surrender by the Qashgai of the Germans in March and of Naubakht in May it became politic for British officials to show a less sceptical face to the protestations of friendship of Nasir Qashgai and his brothers. Nasir made more appropriate advances than he has yet done by visiting Shiraz and calling on the acting Governor-General and His Majesty's Consul, to whom he gave fervent assurances of his desire to act in accordance with British wishes. It suits him for the present to demonstrate his power for good in Fars by using his influence to restrain the lawless inclinations of the Qashgai tribes; and their behaviour during the spring migration and subsequently has been unusually good. But Nasir's change of heart did not extend so far as to induce him to pay homage to his Sovereign during the latter's visit to Shiraz in May. On hearing that it was impending, Nasir retired to his mountains. He had offered to call on



the Shah if His Majesty's Embassy would give him a safe-conduct, but this, for obvious reasons was refused.

49. A development that should lead to greater stability in Fars is an agreement between Qavam-ul-Mulk on the one hand and Nasir Qashgai and his brothers on the other to the effect that in future they will co-operate with rather than oppose each other in Fars. The Qavam has made his co-operation dependent on two conditions: that no action should be taken injurious to the general interests of Fars and of Persia; that no action shall be taken against British interests or British wishes. The motives behind this reconciliation are, in the first place, the Qavam's conviction that he cannot rely on the Government to protect against the Qashgai such interests as he and his family still have left in Fars; in the second place, the fear common to all men of property in Persia of a Russian-sponsored revolution in the north and the resulting desire to create some stability in the still feudal south that might be developed into some form of local autonomy; and, in the third place, the hope of being able to present a united front against a possible return of a tyrannical dictatorship of the Crown and the army.

50. In Bakhtiari assiduous attempts were made by all Morteza Quli's jealous relatives among the khans to aggravate the grounds of complaint, unimportant in themselves, against his rather autocratic rule. In spite of this the situation remained satisfactorily quiet, and Morteza Quli Khan appears to be well in control of the tribe. The embassy reminded the disgruntled khans that they had themselves unanimously indicated Morteza Quli Khan as the most suitable among them to govern the tribe and advised them that their attempts to discredit him now were not likely to encourage the Government to make further experiments in appointing a Bakhtiari khan to an important post nor the embassy to approve such an appointment. The khans seem to be taking this advice to heart and to be trying to come to agreement among themselves. But as the cause of their discontent is that Morteza Quli Khan has not allowed them opportunities of extracting money from Bakhtiari and as greed is an ineradicable quality in the khans of the older generation that has led for years to family quarrels, concord among them is not likely to be of long duration.

51. On the borders of the northern oil-field area in Khuzistan the Bahmai tribe of Kuhgalu has been indulging in some minor raiding. Earlier in the year plans had been made by the local Persian commanders for the disarmament of this tribe and the western Janeki tribe, but at the last moment fears that the Bahmai might be supported by other Kuhgalu tribes modified the plan, and only the Janeki lost some arms. It is through their territory that the Bahmai are now raiding, and the Janeki plead their disarmament as justification for being unable to prevent them.

52. The Arabs of Khuzistan have for some time been giving cause for anxious thought. They have recently acquired many arms, and, in spite of the fact that large numbers of them are employed at good rates of pay by the Allied forces, they have been unable to refrain from smuggling, thieving on a large scale and brigandage. The local Persian authorities have for long been urging the necessity of operations for their disarmament, and it is indeed evident that the establishment of order and the restoration of their authority is likely to be a very serious problem for the Persian Government when Allied troops are withdrawn and the steadying influence of large-scale employment is removed. The satisfactory solution of the problem is obviously of considerable importance to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In the interests of the future it is desirable that the Persian Government should now be allowed and encouraged to assert their authority, to establish control of the frontier and take active measures to suppress brigandage. But immediate Allied military interests demand that the Persian authorities should be restrained from taking action against the Arabs that might disturb the labour employed by the Allied forces. The Arabs have not been slow to take advantage of this situation, and brigandage in the Ahu Dasht area, where are situated some of the lands being developed by the Khuzistan Agricultural Society, had become so bad, Colonel Noel, the director of the society, having been himself attacked and robbed, that the Persian authorities were allowed to take punitive action with strictly limited objectives which is still in progress.

#### *Persian Land Forces.*

53.—(1) *Army*.—At the beginning of this year the higher direction of the army was in the hands of a number of officers, headed by General Ahmadi as Minister for War, who were firmly of the opinion that the best safeguards for

the interests of Persia and themselves lay in close co-operation with the British authorities and the American advisers. The dangers to those interests they saw in the internal disorder of the country and in the opportunity that that gave for the furtherance of what they were convinced were Russian designs against Persia's independence. It was consequently perhaps not surprising that they were not well regarded by the Russians. On the other hand, they were a disappointment to the Shah, who had certainly hoped that their obvious goodwill towards the British would induce the latter to provide some assistance in the re-equipment of his army. Consequently when Stalin made his offer of tanks and aircraft, to which it is believed he attached the condition that changes should be made in the higher direction of the army, the Shah, on one pretext or another, gradually removed the more important of these officers and in April appointed as Chief of the General Staff the Russian choice, General Razmara.

54. This officer, since his resignation from the same post in August 1943 in a fit of angry resentment against the British, had succeeded in ingratiating himself with the Russians. It may, however, be assumed that Razmara curried favour with the Russians solely to serve his own ends. He is primarily ambitious for himself and then in less degree patriotic, strongly nationalist and anti-foreign. He is capable and energetic and has made an extensive study of conditions in his own country. In his heart he is hostile to us, but at present finds it good policy to conceal that hostility and to make a show of a genuine desire to co-operate with a view to giving us as little excuse as possible for interfering in internal affairs. He is fundamentally opposed to the American Advisory Mission, believing that he and his friends are better able to devise a military organisation suitable to Persia than are American officers, but he tolerates them while they are the means of procuring equipment from America and is at present lavish in assurances to them of co-operation.

55. The American military advisers, who have now reached their full complement of twenty, have unfortunately not succeeded in gaining the confidence or support of any considerable number of Persian officers. By their presence they have undoubtedly restricted the grosser abuses and corruption and may even have helped towards the establishment of the beginnings of an ideal of honesty. In that they can certainly claim to have rendered service to Persia. But the prospect of fundamental and lasting reforms in the Persian forces being achieved through their endeavours grows less as the end of the war grows nearer and with it the expectation of unlimited quantities of arms being available to the Shah and his army.

56. The Shah, although less obviously interfering in the affairs of the army, still looks forward to the day when, Allied troops and American advisers having gone, he will, as Commander-in-chief in fact, rule this country as his father did. But it is already being said that he is beginning to distrust his restlessly ambitious and intriguing Chief of Staff, and the usual dissensions have begun to reappear between the General Staff and the Ministry for War.

57. All plans for the army for the current year, whether American or Persian, are at a standstill owing to lack of funds. Dr. Millspangh, in the budget which he recently laid before Parliament, has allotted only 100 million tomans against the 153 millions estimated to be necessary for the organisation approved by General Ridley. If the 100 millions is not increased the size of the army will have to be reduced, a measure which is likely to be strongly opposed by the Shah, or the underpaid officer will have to be allowed to prey on the people as he has done before.

58. Stalin's tanks and aircraft have never materialised. The conditions subsequently attached to the offer stipulated that the units of mixed Russian and Persian personnel which were to be formed for the purpose of training in these arms were to be under the command of Soviet officers, who were themselves to be under the command of the Red Army; that the Persian personnel were to be selected with the approval of the Russian commander, and that the units were not to be removed from their appointed places of training—Meshed and Kazvin—nor could the material be used for any other purpose without the approval of the Red Army. These conditions were too full of alarming possibilities to be acceptable to the Persian Government.

59.—(2) *Gendarmerie*.—In the gendarmerie, as in the army, plans for improvement are held up by lack of funds. The credit demanded by Colonel Schwarzkopf for the modified organisation he had in view for the current year, that is, eighteen regiments of gendarmerie with a total strength of 28,000—the number he considers to be really necessary is 40,000—amounted to 60 million tomans. The amount allotted in the budget by Dr. Millspangh is 29 million



tomans, which is the bare cost of ten regiments at the increased rates of pay, which are in fact the minimum at which officers and men can be expected to refrain from partnership with brigands and thieves. Even among gendarmerie officers the opinion is forming that in the present financial and economic situation of the country the interests of internal security would be better served by devoting the available resources to the army and the police. Colonel Schwarzkopf's insistence that the gendarmerie should be independent of the army has accentuated the lack of co-operation that became immediately evident when the force passed from the control of the Ministry for War to that of the Interior.

60. Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission has now been completed to the maximum strength of six officers sanctioned by the United States. Although Colonel Schwarzkopf has extensive powers, it is obvious that six officers can exercise no very effective influence over the actions of personnel scattered in small packets over an area of 628,000 square miles, and consequently in the provinces the gendarmerie shows no improvement as the result of Colonel Schwarzkopf's eighteen months' hard work.

61.—(3) *Police*.—There is as yet no indication that the Persian Government intend to ask for an American adviser to replace Mr. Timmerman, who died in May. Indeed, their experience of Mr. Timmerman is not likely to encourage them to do so. In spite of his record as an efficient police officer in the United States, the problem of the Persian police was far beyond his capacity. Indeed, it is beyond the capacity of any one single foreign adviser.

62. The police, like the other security forces, is now faced with a cut in its budget demands which will necessitate either the cancellation of the inadequate increases of pay recently granted or a reduction in numbers that will remove all chances of the force being able to perform the duties required of it.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

63. The fifteen Anson aircraft for the Persian Air Force are in course of delivery and erection in the Middle East, whither a party of ten pilots and five technical officers and men are shortly proceeding to be taught how to fly and maintain them. The Persians have not been able to nominate a suitable officer for the summer course at the Middle East Staff College.

64. The Persians have now taken over the repair and maintenance of their aircraft which was previously done, under agreement, by the Royal Air Force at Doshan Tappeh. They are being assisted in this and in their general organisation by Royal Air Force personnel.

65. Efforts are being made by the Persians to establish a rudimentary meteorological service. The Persian meteorological officers have returned after attempting, with partial success, to follow a course in Middle East.

66. Sarlashkar Hussein Firouz is relinquishing the command of the air force on appointment as Governor-General and Officer Commanding Troops in Fars. His successor-designate is Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakhchevan, who is said to be accepting the post with reluctance under pressure from the Shah. Nakhchevan was largely responsible for building up the air force, which he virtually ran from 1927-36. Since he was Minister of War in 1941-42, he has held no active command and shown more interest in cards than aircraft. He is unlikely to infuse much discipline or energy into the air force, which sadly needs both.

#### *Civil Air Lines.*

67. The Persian State Airline has asked and obtained leave to use Mehrabad airfield as its terminal. This airfield is used by British Overseas Airways, and the arrangement should serve, together with the shortly expected delivery of three de Havilland aircraft of the Rapide type, to maintain British influence in Persian air communications. Meanwhile, an experimental service to Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire has been started with a light aircraft of the Flying Club.

68. The Russians, apparently without previous notice to the Persian Government, have started air services with Douglas C.47's between Tehran and Meshed, Tabriz and Resht. These are professedly official in character but are much used and appreciated by Persians on a commercial basis as the aircraft are comfortable and the fares moderate. The present frequency is about twice weekly to Meshed and once a week on the other services. This may be increased.

#### *Finance.*

69. During the last few weeks the outturn for the financial year 1322 (ending on the 20th March, 1944) has been published. The deficit on the ordinary and commercial budgets taken together is 1,372 million rials (as

compared with 753 million for the year 1321), which is not far from the deficit of 1,058 million originally estimated. The commercial budget is responsible for 933 million of the total deficit.

70. The budget for the year 1323 is shortly coming under discussion by the Majlis. It shows ordinary revenue as 3,958 million rials against estimated expenditure of 4,569; while in the commercial budget revenue is placed at 6,367 million and expenditure at 5,735. The surplus is 470,391 rials. How far this estimate is accurate will depend largely on the extent to which the Administrator-General of the Finances, Dr. Millsaugh, will be able to carry out his intention of turning over part of the Government industrial undertakings to private enterprise and reforming the management of the remainder. In general his task should be less difficult than it was a year or even six months ago. It is true that prices are still rising, the cost of living index in Tehran, which was 1,082 in February, having been 1,083 in March, 1,167 in April and 1,201 in May. Over the last seven or eight months, however, the increase in the price indices has been much less steep than formerly, and there are signs that a certain stabilisation of prices may be reached and maintained within a reasonable period and the figures may then turn downward, provided that the Millsaugh Mission remains without serious curtailment of its powers. The improved distribution of food and other goods, promised by Dr. Millsaugh, will assist in improving the situation. Favourable war news has also already had some effect in decreasing prices.

71. The note circulation is still on the increase; it was 5,701 million rials in February, 6,056 in March, 6,119 in April, 6,222 in May and 6,261 million in June.

72. The Persian Government was represented by a small delegation headed by M. Ibtehaj, the Governor of the National Bank, at the Middle East Financial Conference held in Cairo during April, and it was a party to all the resolutions passed. Some of them would admittedly be difficult to apply in Persia; but it is certain that Dr. Millsaugh, who already knows well the measures required to restore the Persian economy, will continue to press the Government to adopt those measures as and when possible. In this pressure he is assisted by His Majesty's Embassy. He is in particular considering additional direct taxation, partly because owing to governmental delays the increased rates of income tax will not for the present produce the full revenue required.

73. The Millsaugh Mission is also undertaking a survey of post-war problems—among them budgetary, fiscal and banking matters; trade and tariff policy; agriculture and industry; public works and unemployment; and general economic planning. This survey is being carried out by a number of committees each made up of Persian officials and members of the mission together with Persian merchants and others of standing in cases in which they will be of assistance.

74. Sales of gold on His Majesty's Government's account have continued during the last three months, although it is impossible to provide any exact figure to show their effect in combating inflation. Their proceeds were equivalent to £321,400 in March, £334,800 in April, £442,400 in May and £478,000 in June. It is to be hoped that they may be further increased partly as a result of the curtailment of sales in other Middle Eastern countries. As is known, the rial proceeds of these sales are at present being transferred to the United States Government.

75. The financial agreements with the Persian Government covering the use of the railway system since the 1st September, 1941, by the Allied nations has not yet been signed. Some points raised on it by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have, it is believed, been settled; but approval of certain of the clauses in the agreement is at present being withheld by the United States Government who, it appears, may be unwilling to share financial responsibility for the railway with the two other Governments, except in so far as they operate the system south of Tehran as agents of His Majesty's Government. Meanwhile, it has not been possible to place the draft agreement before the Persian Government, who have for some time been pressing for a settlement.

76. The purchase of 600 tons of silver by the Government of India from the National Bank of Persia is under negotiation. This is in addition to the 500 tons so purchased a few months ago, the cost of which to India was increased by the necessity for paying Persian taxation before the silver could be exported. It is hoped to arrange that no taxation will be charged in respect of the second sale.

77. The expenditure on Polish refugees in Persia is decreasing substantially, mainly owing to the reduction in numbers. There has undoubtedly



been extravagance on this service in the past, but steps are now being taken by His Majesty's Embassy to impose a tighter control by requiring from the local Polish delegation explanations on doubtful items of expenditure.

#### *Economics.*

78. Notwithstanding the Persian criticisms of Dr. Millspaugh, the period under review had shown a steady reinforcement of the personnel and organisation of his mission. Dr. H. G. Black, a prominent former member of the United States Administration, came from Washington to become Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Section; and a number of other Americans arrived to take over posts in Tehran and the provinces—notably in Meshed and Tabriz in the northern zones. There was thus a good chance that the work of introducing order into Persian economic affairs would now be extended progressively to the northern zones, which have hitherto been practically inaccessible to the mission, owing to Russian obstruction. Labour troubles increased, especially in Isfahan, where riots occurred among employees in the textile mills, in which workers were injured and output was considerably reduced. The Government continued to hold adequate stocks of the monopolised goods on which the civil population depends for its existence; but distribution was bad and large sections of the population received inadequate and in some districts no rations. Distribution, in fact, remained the weakest feature of the economic system.

79. An effort was made during the last few months to widen the scope of the various Anglo-American committees centreing round the Middle East Supply Centre and dealing with supply and industrial problems. It is hoped to arrange for representatives of the Soviet and Persian Governments to sit on a new "Higher Supply Committee." (This would supersede the present Combined Supplies Committee which, apart from being only Anglo-American, confines its attention so far as imports are concerned to goods entering the country from the south or east.) Arrangements would also be made to have similar representation on the various sub-committees dealing with transport, industries, food supplies, import licensing, &c., which would be reorganised to fit in better with present requirements.

79A. The instruments of ratification of the Commercial Agreement between Persia and the United States which was signed in April 1943, were exchanged in Washington on the 31st May. The agreement came into force thirty days later. Certain existing duties of interest to both parties are consolidated and a number of tariff concessions are made on both sides, but the agreement contains nothing discriminatory in favour of either party. Persian exports of gums, opium and handicraft products and United States exports of motor vehicles, tyres, machinery and lubricants are among the goods affected.

#### *Cereals.*

80. Grain collection at the end of June was satisfactory. Total stocks in the country on the 21st June amounted to 110,617 tons; estimated requirements until this year's harvest begins to come in, including a reserve stock in hand of one month's requirements, amounted to 69,154 tons; the surplus available to supplement this year's harvest therefore amounted to 41,465 tons. The immediate future is assured and it is unlikely that there will be any shortage during the next six months. The Middle East Supply Centre are, nevertheless, considering the possibility of holding at a Gulf port a reserve of grain with which to meet any possible crisis that might arise. Factors liable to upset plans for the future are the possibility that the agitation against the Millspaugh Mission, which is dying down, may spring up again presently; the need to supply areas such as Khuzistan and Bushire, where, owing to crop failure this year, there will be a considerable deficit; and the dependence of the success of grain collection on the efficient distribution of cotton-piece goods, sugar and tea. There is no doubt that this would be a wise precaution to take provided that the international grain and shipping situation makes it feasible. There is also a considerable quantity of grain awaiting transport southwards from Azerbaijan. Of a total of 25,800 tons in that province purchased by the Government, about 5,000 tons are being brought down; 10,000 tons could be carried under existing arrangements during the next two months; but for the remaining 10,000 tons there seems to be no possibility of moving it with the transport now available. In addition, it is believed that another 15,000 tons could still be purchased from the 1943-44 harvest surplus in that area. Arrangements are therefore being made to increase the amount of transport available for this purpose by reinforcing the vehicles belonging to the Persian Road Transport Administration working

locally on collection, and by Transovtrans vehicles to carry the grain south to Tehran. If this can be successfully arranged the cereals situation for the future will be greatly strengthened.

#### *Transport.*

81. The transport by rail of civil goods and cereals from the Persian Gulf and intermediate places to Tehran continued steadily under the supervision of the Millspaugh Mission and with the help of Paiforce. The wagons allotted for civil goods were on the whole efficiently used and the future prospects are good. Very little grain now remains to be transported from the south. Similarly the oil stock position throughout the country was satisfactory.

82. Mr. Shields and his American and British associates in the Road Transport Administration effected considerable improvement in the organisation of road transport. Freight rates have been revised and a system of payment instituted which gives less opportunity for bribery and corruption. The British military personnel at present supervising the control of road transport in the provinces will stay until November, the Americans were due to be withdrawn in August, but efforts are being made to retain their services also until November. This should enable a good start to be made with cereals collection for 1944-45. The Road Transport Administration now has European representatives in Meshed and Tabriz, where the local Government Road Transport offices had earned a reputation for inefficiency and corruption unequalled elsewhere in the country.

83. Persia has been allotted 540 medium-sized lorries from the Middle East quota for 1944. One hundred arrived recently in Tehran, but delivery to the Persian Government was held up by the Office of the Foreign Economic Administration on the authority of the Road Transport Board, on account of the Millspaugh crisis (as described above in the section on American interests). Another one hundred vehicles, also for the Persian Government, are due to arrive soon. The remainder of the quota for Persia is intended for acquisition by private importers; but the Government retains the right to take over some of these vehicles if replacements are required for the Government fleet.

84. There is a severe shortage of passenger-car tyres. Paiforce, however, have agreed to advance 400 until shipments for the Persian Government begin to arrive.

85. It is planned to organise a National Bus Service to carry passengers and mail regularly on the principal routes. Delays in the transport of mail have for some time been a serious cause of complaint and this and certain other plans now on foot to improve this service will be very welcome.

#### *Desert Locust Control.*

86. At the beginning of the June quarter all the entomologists in Persia (Persian, British and Russian) were anxiously awaiting some indication of the scale of the current invasion of desert locust swarms from Arabia. The Soviet anti-locust mission particularly entertained fears of an influx through eastern Persia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

87. However, the reports which filtered in during April made it clear that these swarms were small and scattered but also that they did not migrate with great impetus. Personal investigation by a Soviet entomologist proved that they had not penetrated further north than Seistan, and there and elsewhere they were shown by later reports to have scattered and probably lost their gregarious instinct, except in Laristan, the mountainous country north of Lingeh.

88. Owing to the difficulty of conveying news from that district the Persian Ministry of Agriculture are still unaware with what success their work-parties have controlled the 4,500 hectares which were infested with eggs, but there is every reason to expect that an insignificant number of locusts will escape.

89. The present situation in Persia is, therefore, very satisfactory, and there was every justification for the withdrawal (in late April) of the British ground and air detachments from the Bandar Abbas area. Mr. Lean, the British locust control officer in Persia, has returned to the United Kingdom, and the other British entomologist, Mr. H. S. Darling, is being transferred to Uganda.

90. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.



[E 4243/54/34]

No. 8.

*Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th July.)*

(No. 283 E.)

Sir,

Tehran, 9th July, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a report by the financial counsellor of this embassy, on the financial situation in Persia.

Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &amp;c.

D. W. LASCELLES.

Enclosure in No. 8.

*Financial Situation.*

THERE are, to some slight extent, repetitions in this report of matter contained in previous despatches. It is, however, desirable to try and present, in one document, a general picture of the present situation.

*Public Finance.*

2. The budget has been out of balance since the beginning of the war. The figures for the last four years are—

	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Deficit.
	(100 million rials.)		
1940-41 ... ..	30.9	32.1	1.2
1941-42 ... ..	36.1	43.2	7.1
1942-43 ... ..	48.5	56.0	7.5
1943-44 <sup>(1)</sup> ... ..	65.2	78.9	13.7

3. Since the beginning of the year 1943-44 and the arrival in the country of the American Financial Mission under Dr. Millspaugh, the budget has been divided into two parts, the ordinary budget and the commercial budget; the latter covering the trading activities and industrial undertakings of the Government. The following are the separate figures for 1943-44:—

	Estimate.	Actual.
	(Million rials.)	
Ordinary budget—		
Revenue ... ..	1,890	3,551
Expenditure ... ..	3,297	3,990
Deficit ... ..	1,407	439
Commercial budget—		
Revenue ... ..	5,795	2,970
Expenditure ... ..	5,896	3,903
Deficit ... ..	101	933
Total deficit ... ..	1,508	1,372

4. The considerable discrepancy between estimate and out-turn under the commercial budget will be noted. The budget for this year, however, was prepared when Dr. Millspaugh had held only a very short time his office of Administrator-General of the Finances; and he himself stated that, owing to inadequate data, the commercial estimates could hardly be more than conjecture. The deficit is the result of (a) the necessity for subsidising food-stuffs and (b) the incompetent and, in a number of cases, dishonest management of the Government industrial undertakings. The budgetary deficit for this year, as for previous years, was met by borrowing from the National Bank.

<sup>(1)</sup> The financial year, like the calendar year, runs from the 21st March to 20th March. These four years by Persian reckoning are 1319, 1320, 1321 and 1322.

5. The budget for the year 1944-45 was recently presented to the Parliament. The estimates are—

	(Million rials.)		(Million rials.)
Ordinary budget—		Commercial budget—	
Revenue ... ..	3,958	Revenue ... ..	6,367
Expenditure ... ..	4,569	Expenditure ... ..	5,755
Deficit ... ..	611 <sup>(2)</sup>	Surplus ... ..	612 <sup>(2)</sup>

6. The ordinary budget provides for receipts from income tax under considerably higher scales than formerly. They were adopted reluctantly by the Government last autumn in face of Dr. Millspaugh's threatened resignation. Nevertheless, direct taxation bears a proportion of no more than 20 per cent. to total revenue. The opium, tobacco, sugar and tea monopolies provide 40 per cent., customs and other indirect taxation 14 per cent., and Anglo-Persian oil royalties 13 per cent. On the expenditure side, no less than 25 per cent. is taken up by the Persian army and 12 per cent. by the gendarmerie and police; even so, heavy cuts were made in the draft estimates for these services. The monopolies account for another 15 per cent. of expenditure, and agriculture and industry for 12 per cent. Education and public health bring up the rear with 6 per cent. and 4 per cent. respectively.

7. Under the commercial budget for 1944-45 the financial mission has provided for (a) the purchase and distribution by the Government of food-stuffs and other goods on a large scale with a view to bringing down prices, and (b) the transfer to private enterprise of part of the Government industrial undertakings, and either discontinuance or the competent financial and general management of the remainder. These undertakings are mainly an inheritance from the grandiose, but somewhat unbalanced, schemes of Shah Reza. They have been inefficiently managed and are in some cases honeycombed with graft. The whole system of Government industrial undertakings admittedly needs fundamental reorganisation.

8. At the end of the year 1943-44 the Government debt to the National Bank was 3,882 million rials and its total internal debt 4,440 million rials. Its external debt consisted of one item only, the Sterling Loan of May 1911. The original amount of this loan was £1,250,000, the rate of interest being 5 per cent. The balance outstanding at the end of 1943-44 was £876,816. In his speech to Parliament on the budget for 1944-45 the Minister of Finance (M. Forodhar) stated that he had no intention of borrowing either from abroad or internally. The observation as regards internal borrowing shows how little he understands his business.

*Banking, Currency, Prices Indices.*

9. The following table shows the increase of notes in circulation and bank deposits since the beginning of the war:—

	Notes.	Deposits.
	(Million rials)	
August 1939 ... ..	936	(not known)
June 1941 ... ..	1,312	671
June 1942 ... ..	1,913	1,222
June 1943 ... ..	4,070	4,553
December 1943 ... ..	5,195	6,103
March 1944 ... ..	6,056	7,341
May 1944 ... ..	6,222	8,619

10. The indices of wholesale prices and the cost of living, prepared by the National Bank, follow much the same pattern:—

	Wholesale Prices.	Cost of Living.
	(1939 = 100)	
June 1940 ... ..	108	113
June 1941 ... ..	141	145
June 1942 ... ..	239	254
June 1943 ... ..	422	629
September 1943 ... ..	483	714
December 1943 ... ..	495	774
March 1944 ... ..	493	781
May 1944 ... ..	527	862

<sup>(2)</sup> The overall surplus is 470,391 rials.



The discrepancy between the two sets of prices is due to the facts that (a) they are compiled by somewhat different methods, (b) in particular the figure for rents, in which the increase has been very large, is included in the cost-of-living figures but not, of course, in those for wholesale prices, and (c) profits by retailers on the black market have been enormous. The National Bank is considering a more uniform method of compilation, but there is not much doubt that the figures given substantially represent the increase in the level of prices.

11. Responsibility for the serious situation disclosed by these figures is to be divided between—

- (i) Allied military expenditure since the occupation of August 1941<sup>(\*)</sup>;
- (ii) Budgetary deficits and the failure of the Government to take adequate steps for the control of inflation; and also
- (iii) The closing of trade channels owing to the war, the partial failure of the harvest in 1941-42 and the disorganisation of internal transport.

It is clear, however, that the major cause of the existing position has been the military expenditure of the Allies.<sup>(†)</sup>

12. It was decided a year ago to sell gold in Persia for the account of His Majesty's Government, with the double object of (i) absorbing part of the surplus of the country's purchasing power, and (ii) providing some of the currency required for military expenditure without a corresponding expansion of the note issue. The results of sales in Persia, however, have been disappointing compared with those in other Middle Eastern countries in which the same policy was later followed. They amounted to £3.9 million up to the end of June 1944, and have been very greatly less than Allied or British military expenditure, and than the increase in the note issue. The sales have had no tangible effect in lowering the price of commodities (although real estate values have fallen because investors have put their money into gold instead); nevertheless, it can justly be said that if gold had not been sold the situation would have been still more difficult than it is. There are signs, however, in the last few weeks that sales in Persia may go up considerably owing to the policy of His Majesty's Government, adopted recently, of curtailing them in neighbouring countries. The additional sales are no doubt increasing the volume of smuggling from South-West Persia to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the only or main effective limit to this traffic being the amount of suitable goods which can be obtained in exchange.

13. It may be added here that up to September 1943 the rial proceeds of gold sales for the account of His Majesty's Government were used by the British military authorities towards meeting their local expenditure. This arrangement provided a considerable saving compared with the purchase of rials at 128 to the pound sterling, the rate fixed under the Anglo-Persian Financial Agreement of May 1942; a rate which is now something like one-sixth of the internal purchasing power of the rial. For the last nine months the proceeds of gold sales have been transferred to the United States authorities. Sales have not been sufficient to meet the United States requirements for rials and there has therefore been no surplus (except in one comparatively small instance) for British military expenditure.

#### *The Millspaugh Mission.*

14. It will be apparent that when Dr. Millspaugh reached Persia with his mission in the spring of 1943, the situation was gradually but surely getting out of control. In such a situation it was, of course, impossible to arrest immediately (as the Persians expected) the progress of the disease, apart from the fact that in this case wholesale administrative reorganisation was required as well as the specific measures necessary to check the inflationary process. In the last fifteen months Dr. Millspaugh has faced squarely the twin problems of absorbing purchasing power, whether by taxation or borrowing; and of price control, equitable distribution and the prevention of speculation. His powers were increased in the autumn of 1943 by the addition of economic to financial control; the two are, of course, inseparable and he was rightly unwilling to leave the former in Persian hands while only the latter was in his own.

(\*) An additional cause was expenditure, financed by His Majesty's Government, on the considerable number of Polish refugees who came into Persia from Russia in 1942. This expenditure, however, has recently decreased considerably.

(†) It is hardly possible to show this in figures. The theoretical calculation would be—Allied expenditure less import surplus plus budget deficits; but exact data are hard to obtain. Very roughly Allied expenditure is probably 66 per cent. responsible.

15. His difficult task has been made more difficult for two reasons. The first concerns his own personality and his staff. Dr. Millspaugh is in his sixties, and not in good health. Perhaps because of this, although to an outsider he shows the greatest charm of manner, it is credibly said that this is by no means always the case to his own staff; and he certainly is sometimes far from diplomatic in his dealings with the Persian Government and its Ministers, although it is easy to excuse impatience or irritation in anyone who is in constant contact at close quarters with the Persian official character. He has not been able to obtain as large a staff from the United States as he requires, and some of them, engaged without being known to him before, have turned out to be unsatisfactory. Others found the country not what they had imagined it to be and left after a short time. In addition, Dr. Millspaugh is by training a theorist rather than an administrator, and one of the not unjustified complaints against him is that he centralises the work of the mission unduly in his own hands.

16. The second difficulty is even more important, viz., the enemies whom he has made because he is doing his work conscientiously and well. The Shah is against him; for no one has ever before dared to interfere with the army estimates, and Dr. Millspaugh will not give back the huge sums misappropriated by Shah Reza, which the present Shah handed over to the Government and would now like returned to him in order that he may continue his present scale of living, subsidise worthless politicians and newspapers and bolster his popularity by well-advertised charitable endowments. The Russians are against Dr. Millspaugh because they dislike any influence on the affairs of Persia, even though invited, except their own whether invited or not. Many of the well-to-do Persians, in politics or not, are against him because of his intention that they should pay more in taxation; only half realising that a ruined country will bring them down with it. The press, subsidised and egged on by these various elements, is nearly uniformly unfavourable to him. Worse possibly than this unconcealed opposition is the pusillanimity of the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, whose intentionally half-hearted efforts in defending him against public criticism in Parliament where he cannot defend himself have passed into a determination to subject him to Persian control.

17. One particular and bitter opponent of Dr. Millspaugh must be mentioned. He is M. Ibtihaj, the successful Governor of the National Bank. M. Ibtihaj's powers of intrigue are levelled equally against the Imperial Bank of Persia, where he was once employed in a subordinate post, and Dr. Millspaugh. By open opposition, by intensive and unscrupulous (though not always very subtle) propaganda, M. Ibtihaj is bending all his efforts to undermine Dr. Millspaugh's influence and force his retirement. He stated publicly that within five days after his arrival in the United States, where he is now leading the Government delegation to the Monetary Conference,<sup>(\*)</sup> he would "have Dr. Millspaugh out." While M. Ibtihaj is handicapped by the inability to control his temper, he is, on the other hand, a person of mental vigour, powerful concentration and high ambition. He says that he was recently offered and refused the post of Minister of Finance, which is very possibly true. In any case, if he wishes, his power to influence Persian affairs in the future is likely to be substantial.

#### *The Civil Service.*

18. Even in normal times the pay of the ordinary official was low; and the Persian's natural acquisitiveness has been intensified in the case of the civil servants by the fact that owing to the rise in prices it is long since many of them have received a living wage. In addition, the practice of making numerous Government appointments for political services, given or expected, or from nepotism, has resulted in a service which is, in general, well below even the modest average standard of Persian competence. The outcome is a combination of inefficiency and corruption which, although it always existed, has grown steadily over the last few years. The diversion of taxation receipts to the officials' own pockets, thefts and embezzlement of public money and stores by public servants, collusion between dishonest officials and tax-payers or contractors, have had their effect both on revenue and on such morale as the service possesses.

19. Soon after the American Mission's arrival, expenditure at the rate of 500 million rials a year was added to the budget for increased pay to civil servants, but this did not fully compensate them for the higher cost of living, and additional amounts (not yet specified) are being provided in the current year.

(\*) It may be remarked that the Prime Minister gave this mission to M. Ibtihaj without consulting Dr. Millspaugh.



Further, a Civil Service Bill is being introduced which will revise existing methods of appointment, salaries and increments, methods of promotion, pension rates, &c. This measure is being prepared by Mr. Brownrigg, a member of the mission, who has had long experience of similar work in the United States. An American field inspection system is being set up in the provinces to supervise in particular the administration of the Government's commercial undertakings. Efforts are being made to improve methods of accounting and audit. A number of prosecutions for the misappropriation of public funds or property are already in hand.

20. Plainly the civil service, as it at present exists, is an inadequate instrument for financial or any other administration. The mission is doing all that it can; but to create an efficient and honest public service might well take something like a generation, if indeed in Persia such a thing (without continuous and intensive foreign supervision) is possible at all.

#### *Prospective Position.*

21. The resolutions of the Middle East Financial Conference held in Cairo during April cover fully the measures necessary in the countries concerned, including Persia, for (a) the balancing of the budget, (b) absorption of surplus purchasing power by taxation, internal loans and savings, and (c) the progressive reduction of prices. Persia was represented at the conference by a small delegation headed by M. Ibtihaj, which was a party to all the resolutions passed; although there was at times a tendency on the part of each delegation, even the Persian, to regard the others as the only legitimate targets for criticism.

22. How far is Persia ready to face the changes which will take place in its economy at the end of hostilities with Germany, or indeed earlier, if the development of the war in Europe makes it no longer necessary to use Persia as a transit route to Russia? Dr. Millspaugh is fully alive to the situation. He has put in hand arrangements for post-war planning by the appointment of a variety of interlocking committees to cover the main problems which will arise—involving, to use his own words, currency, foreign exchange, falling prices, foreign trade policy, budgetary readjustment, unemployment, settlement of claims, property transfers and internal security. The committees consist of Persian officials and members of the American Mission, together with Persian merchants and others in cases in which they are likely to be of use.

23. Although there is no doubt of the progress made by Dr. Millspaugh since he came to the country, both in laying the foundations required for financial reform and erecting in part the superstructure, there is much still to be put in hand. Persia can well stand higher rates of direct taxation than those now levied; and an increase is necessary to absorb purchasing power and stabilise prices. Methods of tax collection seriously need reform. Internal borrowing, alien as it is to the country's tradition, needs to be tackled with greater success.<sup>(\*)</sup> As to prices, it appears likely that the peak has nearly or quite been reached, and that with the improved methods of purchase and improved distribution and transport, which are coming into being as the result of Dr. Millspaugh's powers of economic control, they should turn downward slowly. The effect, in addition, of the recent favourable war news has been to bring long-boarded goods on to the market and materially to depress the prices of certain articles.<sup>(†)</sup> All in all, and given that in Persia it is necessary to hasten slowly, the financial mission has reason to be content with its work so far.

24. Further, the recent crisis caused by the resignation of Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues, as the result of the Government's proposal to deprive him of the economic powers given him by Parliament last autumn, has cleared the air. The Government have decided that for the present they cannot do without him; nor could they face the probable displeasure of the United States Government with its possible practical effect on lease-lend supplies. In his turn Dr. Millspaugh proposed that he should appoint two members of his mission, Mr. Pixley and Mr. Black, as his deputies for finance and economic control respectively; this has been accepted, and he and his mission are remaining for the present with their existing powers. It has been a wise decision on both

<sup>(\*)</sup> (a) The deposits in the Government Savings Bank were 146 million rials at the end of 1943-44 as against 54 million at the end of 1942-43, a large increase but a very small total.

(b) In September 1943 an issue of 500 million rials in Treasury bills was authorised—the first internal loan in Persian history. So far only about 160 million have been taken up, of which about 50 have been subscribed by Government departments.

<sup>(†)</sup> Although the less scrupulous merchants have been spreading rumours of German successes in the hope of keeping prices up!

sides; and on the assumption that Dr. Millspaugh is able to carry on his work with only that modicum of opposition and interference which is to be expected in any case, it seems reasonable to take the view that within a year to eighteen months (although hardly earlier) the economy of Persia will be on a sufficiently stable basis for the country to face its future problems successfully. It is, however, indispensable to this success that there should be foreign advisers to guide it through the post-war period.

E. N. R. TRENTHAM,  
*Financial Counsellor.*

*Tehran, 3rd July, 1944.*

[E 5112/187/34]

No. 9.

*Six-Monthly Political Situation Report: January-June 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 23rd August.)*

(Secret and Confidential.)

DURING the period under review Khorasan remained quiet under the firm if selfish rule of Agha Ali Mansur and his colleagues, who continued to enrich themselves and the profiteers in spite of the challenge to their monopoly described in paragraphs 9-13 below. Thanks to last year's bumper harvest, food was comparatively plentiful and the agriculturists prospered, but the fantastically high prices of other necessities caused more distress than ever to the fixed-income class and the multitudes living on the margin of subsistence.

2. *Security.*—The improvement noted in the last report was maintained on the whole. Baluch outlaws from across the Afghan border staged one large-scale raid on grazing camels and several hold-ups of U.K.C.C. and other trucks in the neighbourhood of Zahidan, but at the beginning of May the arrival of a long-range squadron from Quetta effectively curtailed their activities. In the hill country between Quchan and Bajgiran on the Turkmenistan border the robber gangs which had been holding up U.K.C.C. trucks were finally rounded up in February by the Persian gendarmerie, who claimed to have killed eight of the bandits in clashes. In the Turbat-i-Haidari district, which is notorious for raiding, Captain Baluch continued to keep good order on the roads with the help of the 3-ton truck supplied by the Government of India and placed at his disposal by His Majesty's Consul-General. The two other trucks supplied at the same time have been very useful to the gendarmerie at Zahidan and Birjand respectively.

3. *Political Parties.*—The Tudeh party continued to interest themselves in the affairs of workers, especially motor drivers, agricultural labourers and the employees of the Khusravi Mills. Recently, the arrival of emissaries from Syed Zia to start a branch of his party at Meshed has provoked reaction among the Tudeh supporters, whose leader, Baqir Amili, has gone to Tehran to consult the higher command. Agha Tamaddun-ul-Mulk Sajjadi (as he now calls himself) became more and more disillusioned about his Dadgustaran party). Little new blood came in, and it became more and more evident that members cared for nothing but their own skins and pockets. Tamaddun continues to publish excellent articles inviting the execrations of the public on profiteers and supporting administrative reform, the American advisers, the Lutfi Commission, and any other agency that seems to be working in the country's interest; but this policy does not bring in new subscribers and he is losing heavily on his paper. Even the marks of approval he has received from the Soviet Consulate-General (which he has been cultivating very tactfully) have not encouraged the public to join his party in large numbers, as he hoped. He is a candidate for employment in the Finance Department under Mr. Gordon, and is prepared to give up his party and paper to get it. Like almost every thinking Persian he deplores the complete absence of patriotism and public spirit from the make-up of 99 per cent. of his compatriots. His opinion carries more weight than most, because he does definitely belong to the 1 per cent.

4. *Elections.*—The postponed Mekran elections were completed at last in June. There was quite a struggle (though on lines very different from an English election campaign) between the sitting Deputy, Murad Rigi, and a rich Yezdi merchant called Mehdi Arbab. As was to be expected of a member of the gang, the Arbab enlisted the enthusiastic support of the greedy and ambitious Governor of Mekran, Khozaima-Alam, and is said to have spent over 100,000 tomans buying votes. But Murad Rigi, a genuine tribesman and son of the most outstanding Persian Baluch of the last thirty years, Khan Sahib Idu Khan, was



obviously preferable as a Deputy and His Majesty's consular officers gave him such discreet support as they could. The Baluch candidate has at last, after many delays and complications (including the murder of an agent of the Arbab's by tribesmen near Iranshahr) been declared elected by a substantial majority. But his credentials will certainly be contested by financially-interested partisans of Mehdi Arbab in the Majlis, and it is quite likely that the election will have to be held again. This would be highly undesirable, as it might easily lead to dangerous tribal disturbances in a district bordering on British Baluchistan and the Kalat State.

5. *Anglo-Persian Relations*.—Social relations between British residents and the numerous official and non-official Persians with whom they come nowadays in contact are excellent. Apart from the many and various activities of the P.R.B., the cumulative effect of which in Meshed is very noticeable, members of the British community co-operate with Persian ladies and gentlemen in enterprises such as the recently formed Meshed Amateur Dramatic Society, of which Mrs. Skrine is vice-president and producer, the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, the Shir o Khurshid Club, the Victory Cup Football Tournament, occasional charity fêtes and gala nights, and so on. But in the minds of the great bulk of the population there is no doubt that much of the old dislike and suspicion of imaginary British designs on Persia remains. This is due partly no doubt to enemy propaganda, but mostly to mere xenophobia and a deep-seated inferiority complex. It is useless for us to try and abdicate. No matter how tactfully our leaders defer to the Persian Government, to the Russians, to the American advisers, the man in the street persists in ascribing everything of importance that happens in Persia to us. We are regarded as responsible for the Americans; that is to say, their failure will be our failure, though, of course, their success will be due to nothing but Persia's innate capacity for self-government. We are responsible for the Shah; if he goes the way of his father, or crashes in trying to imitate him, Persians will ascribe their country's troubles to us, saying, "Why, having got rid of the usurper, did you saddle us with his son? The Qajar dynasty has more right to the throne than the Pahlavi. You should have let us have a regency for the duration of the war, and then we could have chosen a king for ourselves." This attitude will have to be reckoned with in the difficult years that will follow the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops.

6. *Russian Affairs*.—The period under review saw a notable increase in Soviet military activity in Khorasan. In March the Russians organised a lend-lease supply route of their own between Shahrud and Bajgiran, and by April upwards of 300 trucks a day were passing each way. At the same time, extensive survey operations commenced and parties with military escorts spread all over the province. As yet, none of the parties have appeared south of the Kal-i-Shur River which bisects the Amran plain between Gunabad and Turbat-i-Haidari. The Soviet Consul-General has assured me that there is no intention to extend the operations to the Gunabad and Birjand districts which are evidently regarded, as in the days of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, as a no-man's land between the British and Russian spheres of influence.

7. As was to be expected this expansion of Soviet activities, especially the surveying, combined with an influx of civilians including many women and children into Meshed, Kuchan, and certain other towns, has strengthened Persian fears that the Russian military occupation will be permanent and that the eventual Sovietisation of the country is inevitable. This fear is based on little but ignorance of present-day trends in Russia and an extreme pessimism as to Persia's future under the present régime. Conjecture in Russian affairs is futile; all that can be said is that it is not necessary to postulate imperialistic aims as an explanation of Soviet military activities in Khorasan.

8. *Anglo-Russian Relations*.—Possibly because the Soviet garrisons, consular officers and trade agencies in East Persia contain a large proportion of personnel from the Transcaspian States instead of from the more Anglophobe Caucasus, the Russian authorities in this area have been since the occupation considerably less "difficult" than those in North-West Persia. Officially we had very little to complain of during the period under review, socially, nothing could be more friendly and natural than their attitude both to this consulate-general and to the U.K.C.C. General Bourriachenko, a sincere Anglophile, took over temporarily from General V. Kozlov in January and was relieved by General Abramov on the 18th July. The latter, who has been a member of the Soviet diplomatic mission at Naples, speaks only Russian, but the vice-consul he has brought with him, Uzhurov, speaks Persian, having been consul at Kermanshah since the occupation. They came to call on me the very afternoon of their arrival, a gesture which was doubtless not lost upon the gossips of Meshed.

9. *Economic and General*.—Welcome signs of a tendency on the part of the Central Government and their Allied advisers to assert themselves in East Persia were:—

(i) The appointment in January of Messrs. von Stemmann and Kahr, Danes, to direct the Edareh-i-Barbari Ram fleet in Khorasan;

(ii) The deputation at about the same time of Lieutenant Joel, a member of the team of officers lent by Paiforce to the Persian Government, to supervise grain collection in Zabul, a responsibility which had for the previous two years been a thankless task of His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul and his Indian assistant;

(iii) The arrival at Meshed of Mr. P. W. Gordon, one of Dr. Millspaugh's most trusted assistants, towards the end of April to take over the finance and connected departments;

(iv) The appearance early in April of a Judicial Commission headed by Agha Lutfi of the Ministry of Justice to investigate the grain, sugar, and other scandals mentioned in paragraph 9 of my last report.

Unfortunately, thanks to the machinations of the "gang" (*ibid.*, paragraph 11) only the first of these measures has hitherto shown any positive results.

10. Mr. von Stemmann displayed from the outset great energy and courage in tackling the "black transport" racket which has figured so frequently in this consulate-general's despatches. He met with marked official coldness and even obstruction at first, for control of the civil transport bottleneck is one of the chief means by which the gang complicate the distribution problem and force the prices of the commodities they control ever higher and higher. In spite of this, and of a most unaccountable lenience on the part of the E.B.R. Central Office (Adviser: Mr. Shields) towards the owners of the illicitly-operated trucks and smuggled trucks caught by Mr. von Stemmann, the latter had within two months effected an 8 per cent. improvement in the working of the E.B.R. fleet. This, combined with a certain amount of back-loading by U.K.C.C. trucks, went far to deprive the local administration of their chief excuse, lack of transport, for not sending grain to Tehran or rationed goods to outlying centres.

11. Mr. Gordon's appointment, like that of the Danes, was made in January, but the Soviet authorities in Tehran kept him waiting till the end of April for a permit of unlimited duration to work in Khorasan. It is highly probable that this was connected with the objection of the gang to any "muscling in" by the American advisers on their profitable operations in Khorasan. However this may be, they used the three months' delay in Mr. Gordon's arrival to ensure that when he did come he should have his hands full and his ambars empty. They went so far as to sabotage their own grain collection programme, with the result that Mr. Gordon found himself faced on arrival with a serious food shortage at Meshed, which a hastily-convoked committee of officials and landowners graciously offered to meet by themselves arranging for the supply of 800 tons of grain at a price which works out at two and a half times the Government rates. Not all of Mr. Gordon's difficulties, however, were of the local gang's making. Since his arrival he has more than once complained to me—

- (a) that he is seriously hampered by lack of funds for financing the distribution of rationed commodities, and even for the payment of salaries which have been at times three months in arrears;
- (b) that the Millspaugh resignation crisis and the uncertainty as to what will happen after the three months' "grace" has elapsed have made his position even weaker than it was before;
- (c) that the Persians whom he is expected to teach how to administer the province's finances simply will not learn. Their standards are so low and their ignorance so abysmal that they seem genuinely to imagine that a foreigner, merely because he does not speak the language of the country, has nothing to teach them.

There are many who wish Mr. Gordon well and would like to see him succeed in his task, but their inevitable comment is "What can one man do, however experienced, energetic and honest he may be?"

12. The Lutfi Commission aroused hopes at first in the hearts of even the most disillusioned. They caused a sensation by insisting on the arrest of the outgoing Director of Finance, Farzad, a notorious ex-Director, Dehimi, Major Arvin, head of the city police, Aruzi, manager of the sugar factory, two senior officials in the Finance Department, and three well-known non-official profiteers.



The proceedings dragged on for three and a half months and Agha Lutfi has now returned to Tehran after releasing Farzad and Aruzi, against whom it is understood no case has been proved. The gang breathe again. No one expects that anything serious will happen to any of the big men as a result of the commission's labours, though some believe that the Governor-General, Ali Mansur, has been in serious danger of losing his job. If this were to happen it would be ascribed to the machinations of Amir Taimur Kalali and Ali Iqbal, who headed the poll in last autumn's Majlis elections. They are said to have been behind the commission, the former coveting the governor-generalship and the latter the immensely lucrative managership of the Shrine.

13. If the work of the Lutfi Commission had been co-ordinated from the outset with the reorganisation of the Finance and connected Departments by Mr. Gordon; if, better still, the commission's appointment had followed instead of preceding that of Mr. Gordon and had been the result, ostensibly at any rate, of his investigations, a really useful purpose might have been served by that tribunal. In co-operation with him (and through him, be it said, with this consulate-general which is well informed as to the various personalities concerned and the ramifications of the various rackets) the commission could have produced a comprehensive report which would have provided Dr. Millspaugh with most valuable ammunition for his battle with corruption. As it was, Mr. Gordon seems not to have been consulted or in any way taken into co-operation by the commission, which merely added to his difficulties by imprisoning the man from whom he was in the process of taking over.

14. To sum up, the "show-down" between the gang and the advisers foreseen in the final paragraph of my last six-monthly report has occurred and the result is as yet uncertain. In this province the struggle is, of course, part of the nation-wide reaction of the enormously wealthy official-commercial vested interests, reinforced in the political field by Persian *amour propre* and xenophobia, against Allied tutelage and economic pressure. Discontent with the ever-increasing cost of living, disappointment with the policy and achievements of the American advisers, and apprehension as to the future of the country are genuine and profound. It must be admitted that Dr. Millspaugh has chiefly himself to thank for his growing load of troubles. His income-tax scheme, the keystone of his fiscal policy, is not only quite unworkable but so unpopular with the upper classes, who alone count politically, that they have shown themselves prepared to throw him out and risk losing American goodwill rather than submit to it. He seems to have thought he could conciliate the official class by exempting it from the tax, thereby showing his ignorance of the all-important fact that the bureaucracy is in close partnership with big business and derives the great bulk of its income not from its miserably inadequate official salaries but from its share in the profits of various food-stuff hoarding, smuggling, black market, illicit transport and other "rackets."

15. I cannot help thinking that if Dr. Millspaugh had devoted the first few months of his time to studying Persia's economic and fiscal problems in the province instead of concentrating almost entirely on Tehran, and had deferred the issue of his laws and regulations until he was fully acquainted with the actual working of the Pahlevi "reforms," the situation might have been very different now. He would have realised how thin a layer of ferro-concrete and asphalt covers yesterday's Persia of mud-brick and cobbles and he would not, perhaps, have staked the country's solvency on a tax which even highly-industrialised France is notoriously unable to collect and which we in India have refrained from substituting, in respect of agricultural incomes, for the land revenue system which we inherited.

16. One of the worst of the many disservices the late Shah did to his unfortunate country was to abolish, instead of reforming, the land revenues and to substitute for them a system of indirect taxation through State monopolies admirably designed to squeeze the masses dry and concentrate the country's wealth in the hands of a completely heartless official-commercial oligarchy. In my humble opinion there is no hope for Persia until its people are cured by misfortune and disaster of their snobbish contempt for what they regard as a *démodé* economy and consent to the reintroduction of their ancient and well-understood land revenue system in an improved and modernised form.

C. P. SKRINE,  
Consul-General for Khorasan.

1st August, 1944.

[E 5568/138/34]

No. 10.

Consul-General Rapp to Mr. Lascelles (Tehran).—(Received in Foreign Office 12th September.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Tabriz, 22nd August, 1944.

WITH reference to embassy circular despatch No. 38 of the 10th June last, I have the honour to submit certain general observations on the course of events in Azerbaijan during the past six months.

2. *Relations between the Soviet and Persian Authorities.*—From whatever angle these relations are viewed they can hardly be considered satisfactory or in conformity with the spirit of the Tehran Declaration. On the one hand, the Russians, by showing a marked preference for subservient Persian officials and objecting to the appointment of officials of any independence of character, have contributed largely to the continued ineffectiveness of Persian administration, particularly as regards the security services. There has, moreover, been constant interference in internal affairs on matters unconnected with occupation necessities, which can reasonably be ascribed to a desire to assert Soviet authority both in the eyes of the administration and the populace. On the other hand, Soviet officials assert in and out of season that internal affairs are the exclusive responsibility of the Persian administration, on whom they cast the blame for all disorders and maladministration which their own action has helped to render inevitable. Neither in Eastern nor Western Azerbaijan has there been any sign of a loyal collaboration, which would have safeguarded essential Russian interests in the prosecution of their war effort, while at the same time heightening the prestige, authority and efficiency of the local government.

3. *Objects of Soviet Policy in Azerbaijan.*—The misgivings to which Soviet duplicity in local affairs has naturally given rise have been confirmed and strengthened by Soviet intrigues, played on a wider stage, to secure the return of their own nominees in the recent Azerbaijan elections. There is certainly no abatement of anxiety as to their ulterior motives and it would be difficult to find a single Azerbaijani of any consequence ready to assert with any show of certainty that the Russians intend to honour their pledge to evacuate Azerbaijan at the end of the war. The Russians, by their attitude, have succeeded in creating a general impression that their permanent interests in Azerbaijan are definitely political as well as cultural and economic and that their political ambitions are of a nature incompatible with Persian sovereignty. It is quite possible that by systematic undermining of the authority of the Persian Government in Azerbaijan they may hope to bring about a situation where subversive elements in the two provinces will, with their surreptitious support, declare their independence of Persia and link their future with Soviet Azerbaijan. This is what is often hinted at by Tudeh Iran orators, hoped for by the Armenian and Assyrian minorities as a whole and feared by most Muslims of any standing. My own view is that while the professions of Soviet officials strongly deny any such intentions, Soviet practice aims at maintaining a fluid situation such as will easily lend itself to whatever definite line of policy is eventually decided. It will be easy to terminate the occupation, but it will be equally easy to find a pretext for its prolongation. A third alternative, perhaps the most likely, is that the Soviet Government will continue to occupy a predominant position short of actual military occupation, maintaining a large number of officials and exercising through its influence in Azerbaijan a kind of permanent pressure on the Persian Government, especially in connexion with the elimination of other foreign interests, whether economic or otherwise, from Northern Persia.

4. *Soviet Officials.*—It should be noted that during the period under review suspicions of Soviet designs have been undoubtedly heightened by the conduct of individual Soviet officials, and in particular by that of M. Serge Marchenko, the acting Soviet Consul-General at Tabriz. The sinister activities of M. Marchenko had previously come under notice at the time when he was vice-consul and the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had secured his temporary removal from Tabriz. That he later returned without, so far as is known, the consent of the Persian Government, is evidence that he is approved in responsible Soviet quarters. M. Marchenko has been particularly active in pressing the local authorities to secure the election of Soviet candidates for the Majlis, but as this enterprise clearly enjoyed the blessing of his superiors in Tehran they cannot be exonerated from responsibility for the methods employed. The intervention of M. Marchenko and his immediate collaborators has been



equally mischievous in other matters, for example, the local labour troubles, where by maintaining close relations with professional agitators and other undesirable elements the impression has, with good reason, been created that they have Soviet support both against the factory owners and, more important, against the local authorities. Both as regards their election candidates and in other matters the Russians have shown singularly little judgment in the people they have chosen to promote their interests, and this fact alone suffices to account for much of the suspicion attaching to their actions. If undesirables are chosen, plans are suspect. If, on the other hand, their intentions are honourable, they have been singularly unfortunate in having representatives unable to inspire the confidence and secure the collaboration of the best elements of the population. Throughout Azerbaijan in varying degrees it has been the same story. Another reflection on Soviet representatives is to be found in the frequent stories of Soviet officials who have succumbed to the lure of private gain in collusion with Persian officials and others. These reports are too numerous and circumstantial to be entirely discounted. A new Soviet Consul-General, M. Fedor Matveev, has recently arrived in Tabriz, but it is yet too early to judge whether this signifies a change of policy in spite of a profession of principles to which no one could take exception.

5. *Soviet Propaganda*.—Tudeh Iran, with its affiliated or semi-affiliated organisations, continues to be the main channel of pro-Soviet propaganda. This propaganda is characterised by an almost entire lack of ideological content and the name of Marx, for example, is never mentioned. It is directed mainly towards (a) emphasising the injustices and exploitation suffered by the peasants and workers of Azerbaijan at the hands of landlords, factory owners, and, last but not least, the Tehran-directed Persian administration, whose venality and inefficiency is a perpetual source of bitter criticism with the underlying suggestion that Azerbaijan could well be rid of the Persian nexus; (b) pointing to the military achievements of the Soviet Union and their advances in the cultural and economic spheres as compared with the backwardness of this country, thus encouraging gravitation towards the stronger and more prosperous neighbour; (c) protesting against the activities of Seyyid Zia and other persons supposed to represent anti-Soviet interests in Persia.

6. Other forms of propaganda also flourish under the direct control of the Soviet authorities, consular and military. The principal function of the Turki newspaper *Vatan Yolinda*, edited by persons from Baku, is the dissemination of Soviet news, particularly those of Soviet Azerbaijan, whose bonds with Persian Azerbaijan are constantly stressed. A Persian newspaper, the *Kharvar Nov*, whose publication has recently been started in Tabriz, is also subsidised by the Russians. A large Soviet hospital accepting patients from the local population is shortly to be opened, the buildings acquired for the purpose having been radically transformed at considerable expense. Other projects in course of realisation include a school, a large cinema to show exclusively Russian films and a branch of the Soviet-Persian Cultural Society with the large pavilion in the municipal gardens for its premises. There have been periodical visits of artists from Baku. The Soviet Consulate-General has also been making determined efforts to bring Azerbaijan mullahs under its influence by encouraging them to develop relations with their *confrères* in Soviet Azerbaijan, but the local fish have proved wary. Mention must also be made of the fact that a large proportion of the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan are of Caucasian origin and are fervent propagators of the idea of a Greater Azerbaijan.

7. On the whole it can, however, be said with certainty that, leaving out of account the minorities, and those elements who seek material benefits in a closer Russian connexion, the results of Soviet propaganda have not been markedly successful. Muslim suspicion of Soviet Russia remains deep-rooted, and the present Russian influence in Azerbaijan is due to fear, not affinity. The population as a whole desire nothing better than a speedy evacuation of Russian troops and a cessation of Russian interference in their affairs. This feeling has been somewhat heightened in the past few weeks by a forced levy made on merchants, officials and others under the guise of a garden party in aid of the Red Army's victory fund. By pressure of different kinds about L.15,000 was raised in Tabriz alone.

8. *Persian Administration in Eastern Azerbaijan*.—After various efforts to find a Governor-General acceptable to the Russians and at the same time willing to acquiesce in the present limited prerogatives and restricted dignity of the post, Mehdi Dadvar (Vussuq-es-Sultaneh) was finally appointed and took up his duties on the 23rd March last. His age and vacillating temperament alike unfit him to cope successfully with Tabriz, and he has failed either to improve the

administration or to achieve popularity. Sartip Jawadi, commander of the Persian troops in Azerbaijan, after complaining for many months of the impotence to which Russian control condemned him, has been replaced at Russian behest. The present strength of Persian troops in Azerbaijan is estimated at about 6,000. The Russians do not allow reinforcement from outside, and all movements in Azerbaijan, of whatever nature, are subject to their permission. It is reported, however, that some concession may shortly be made as regards the movement of troops of a given garrison within its allotted area. In Tabriz the police remain useless and corrupt, but the obsequiousness of their acting chief and various commissars, whose replacement by persons animated by a stronger sense of public duty is a crying need, seems to have secured them Russian protection. Public security has, however, been noticeably improved by the formation of mixed Persian-Soviet patrols for night duty. The Tabriz Municipality, whose finances are now controlled by Dr. Millsbaugh, has suffered from an acute shortage of funds and no serious effort is being made to repair the streets or perform essential services, such as the removal of garbage. Water has been in short supply throughout the summer, to a large extent due to the non-maintenance of "ganats" and illicit diversion. The Supply Department has failed to supply the population in Tabriz, as elsewhere, with regular supplies of rationed goods, the principal obstacles being defective organisation, lack of transport and official corruption rather than shortage of stocks. Health services have remained entirely neglected, but a mild winter and bread in plenty have limited the incidence of disease.

9. *Situation in Western Azerbaijan*.—On the 19th July last Dr. Hussein Marzban was succeeded as Governor-General by Sarhang Ali Akbar Durakhshani, a former commander of the troops at Rezaieh and later of the 3rd Division at Tabriz. This change followed some weeks of disorder, of a nature considerably more serious than is usual at each harvest season, among the Kurdish tribes to the north and south of Rezaieh, culminating in a threat to sack Rezaieh by Kurds of the Herki tribe under Zero Beg. The population of Rezaieh reacted by demonstrating against the Persian and, indirectly, the Russian authorities for their failure to maintain order. In the course of these demonstrations Dr. Marzban was assaulted by the crowd, suffering minor injuries. He thereupon resigned, rightly considering a further tenure of office impossible. Sarhang Durakhshani is now striving to increase the authority of the Administration and to reach a good understanding with the Russians, which is an indispensable condition. He proposes also to apply the law of the land equally to all Persian citizens without distinction, whether they are Muslims or members of racial minorities. So far he has met with some success and the situation is at present quiet.

10. Prior to the arrival of Sarhang Durakhshani the authority of the Persian Administration among the tribes had been to all intents and purposes non-existent, and Kurdish chiefs were able with impunity to behave with extreme insolence towards the authorities. In practice it was only the Russians who could exert any real control over these fully armed tribes, but they for their part, while maintaining close relations with the Kurds through their consulate at Rezaieh and political officers, declined to accept any sort of responsibility for Kurdish conduct, always alleging that it was the concern of the Persians and only intervening when the Persians had signally failed to deal with a potentially dangerous situation. At the same time the Russians denied the Persians the possibility of effective armed intervention by which alone, unless the Russians were prepared loyally to support the Administration, the authority of that Administration could be vindicated. The only Persian garrison in Western Azerbaijan is stationed at Rezaieh, has a total strength of about 1,400 and is poorly equipped. Each time that it was proposed to use this garrison against Kurdish breakers of the peace Soviet permission was not forthcoming, the Soviet authorities themselves dismissing the tribesmen when they thought they had had enough rope. As no punishment has been meted out to the unruly Kurds there is a natural tendency for them to see how far they can go, knowing that at the worst they will only be sent home like naughty boys by the Russians. The gendarmerie as at present constituted has, for its part, proved of little, if any, use in the preservation of order. Weak in effectives—the two extra battalions considered necessary for this province will remain a paper project—they are of poor quality and low in morale. Their small pay, of which a proportion is often retained by their officers, obliges them to live to a great extent on the country. Little loved by the Persian villagers, they are an object of intense hatred to the Kurds, to whom their presence is an outrage and constant provocation. They are



detested by the Kurds, in fact, far more intensely than the Persian army, whose visitations in the past have often been painful but were not continuous.

11. The quietest part of Western Azerbaijan in recent months has been the Mahabad district, where there are neither gendarmes nor troops, either Persian or Russian, and where Soviet representation has been limited to a single political officer. The Farmandar is inactive to the extent that his presence is hardly noticed, and his few police do not appear after dark, when security is assured by guards organised by the local Kurdish chief, Ghazi Mohammed. The Kurdish chiefs in this district are therefore left fairly well to themselves and, in spite of their mutual jealousies, any serious incidents have been avoided. It is only fair to add, however, that the population is more purely Kurdish and the tribes noticeably less bellicose than further north.

12. *Majlis Elections.*—The Majlis elections in Azerbaijan have thrown an interesting light on the close connexion between the action of Soviet officials in Azerbaijan and the policy of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. While, after considerable wrangling, the list of Russian protégés whose successful candidature was to be promoted was decided with the Persian Government in Tehran, it was left to the Soviet consuls in Azerbaijan to see that the local authorities carried out their instructions for rigging the elections. Thus, for example, electoral committees and individual officials were subjected to constant personal pressure, even remote districts being visited by Soviet officials for this purpose. Pressure bordering on intimidation was likewise exercised through Tudeh Iran and many voters who favoured independent candidates were kept from the polls by fear of violence. The better elements of the population, moreover, took exception to the Russian nominees on grounds of their general qualifications. As regards Tabriz, Pishivari was previously an unknown person and unaided could not have gathered more than a handful of votes. Ipekehian is a merchant of no particular standing and semi-illiterate. The climax of Soviet intervention was, however, reached in the elections at Ardebil and for the Armenian and Assyrian Deputy. In the former, the Soviet candidate, Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani, who has been described by the Governor-General at Tabriz as an unknown adventurer, received 18,406 votes out of a total poll of 20,122. In the latter, Ardashez Hovhannasian, the Armenian Tudeh Iran candidate, was elected by 5,056 votes, no more than 12 being cast against him, thus providing an almost perfect example of a true Soviet election. It was often suggested in the course of these elections that, if the Russians really desired to combine the protection of their interests with the welfare of Persia, it would have been possible to have found and backed more reputable candidates convinced of the necessity of closer relations between the two countries to their mutual advantage. As it is, their preference has been given to persons with little or nothing to lose—opportunists and adventurers, willing to sacrifice their country at the word of command. It is an unfortunate fact that, in the political as in other spheres, the Russians have appeared anxious to attract to themselves those who, whatever their personal defects, can be relied on to serve as instruments of their policy.

13. *Labour Situation.*—Just as in Western Azerbaijan it is the Kurdish problem, so in Eastern Azerbaijan it is the labour unrest in Tabriz that represents the greatest threat to public order. The Soviet attitude to both these questions is practically identical. Officially, they are matters concerning the Persian Administration; in actual practice Soviet officials maintain close relations with both Kurds and labour organisations, which are equally amenable to their lead. For some months after the visit to Tabriz in August 1943 of Dr. Sheikh of the Ministry of Labour, when a settlement highly favourable to the workers was reached, there was a period of comparative calm. But prices continued to rise while the distribution of monopoly goods remained uncertain, thus gradually nullifying some of the benefits of the award. Since April last the workers have been formulating demand after demand, to which the owners have replied with concession after concession, feeling that the workers have a backing too strong to withstand and being unable to rely on any effective mediation by the local authorities. With every concession, however, the attitude of the workers has become more aggressive, while their output has sunk to a fraction of the normal. Conditions are now entirely anarchical; almost daily incidents are reported, such as stay-in strikes, expulsion of the managements and threats to kill the owners. A last effort is to be made by the owners to reach a firm agreement with the workers and to obtain the overt support of the local and Soviet authorities for the agreement when reached, but success appears very doubtful.

14. The background to this unrest is largely political. For the purpose of the Majlis elections, Tudeh Iran, with Soviet encouragement, attempted, with a

considerable degree of success, to form a pro-Soviet common front with the two labour unions and other Leftish organisations, like the Anti-Fascist party. The politico-economic agitation thus started has lately been given a fresh and more dangerous impetus by the rejection of Pishivari's mandate by the Majlis. A labour agitator, named Khalil Inqilab, assured with some reason of Soviet support, flouted the local authorities, who wished to expel him, and addressed mass meetings of an increasingly violent and revolutionary character. Finally, on the 14th July, with the acquiescence of the Soviet Consul-General, he was arrested by the local police and military to the accompaniment of considerable bloodshed, for which the authorities blame the workers, who resisted his arrest, while the workers and Russians blame the authorities. After a short interval to take stock of the position and decide a line of action, Tudeh Iran and others organised mass meetings of protest, demanding retribution for the workers' blood spilt and at the same time Majlis acceptance of Pishivari and other Russian-sponsored Deputies. Although at the moment of writing the campaign has lost much of its intensity, a significant step has just been taken in the arbitrary amalgamation of the Tudeh Union, the Workers' Union and the Anti-Fascist party in the Tudeh-directed Workers' Council of Azerbaijan under the presidency of Birya, an unprincipled scavenger-lampoonist, whose Soviet connexions have brought him to comparative affluence. Admittedly, there is considerable divergence of views among the twenty-seven members of the committee of the new body, but, as its leaders are under Soviet control, the Russians cannot escape responsibility for its actions in the future.

15. *Economic Situation.*—The immediate post-war period, with the accompanying adjustment of local prices to some workable relationship with world levels, is likely to prove of considerable hardship to most classes. But it is fortunate that the excellent harvests of the last two years have provided a reserve of grain which should be sufficient to guarantee the population against actual hunger, while the surplus can be disposed of within Persia at the internal price level. The situation as regards dried fruits, Azerbaijan's principal export, is much less favourable. War conditions (Germany was previously the chief buyer) and Soviet restrictions on export have caused a considerable part of last year's crop to remain unsold and the bulk of this year's crop is likely to be wasted through insufficient demand at remunerative prices. Although the Soviet Union has been taking increasing quantities of these products, the prices paid, which they are able to fix for themselves by their method of export control, represent little or no profit to the cultivators, whose costs have been greatly increased by inflation. Costs in the local carpet industry, also working for export, have risen by many hundred per cent., about half the looms have already been closed down in consequence, and it is difficult to see how Tabriz carpets with their inferior artistic merit will be able to compete with machine-made goods, when again available, at anything like the present prices. Tabriz textile and other factories, working for the home market, likewise seem predestined to difficult times. In their early days they owed what success they had to cheap labour and high protective tariffs, but wages have now risen 1,200 to 1,500 per cent. and other costs in about the same proportion. Because of restricted imports there is still a market for their low-quality products, but it is likely that when peace is restored they will be undersold by Soviet and other imported goods as well as by the protective tariffs, but wages have now risen 1,200 to 1,500 per cent. and other costs in about the same proportion. Because of restricted imports there is still a balance between production and selling costs is reached. The unemployment thus occasioned may well add to the political troubles of Azerbaijan.

16. The Soviet Trade Agency is acquiring an increasing share of all import and export business and the Soviet Union seems destined to replace Germany as principal supplier and customer. There is, however, a seemingly excellent opportunity for Great Britain to increase its pre-war trade, particularly in drugs, better quality textiles, bicycles, radios, &c., and several local merchants have expressed a desire to develop British connexions. It is not merely, however, the proximity of Soviet Russia but also the methods at present adopted, which, if continued, may render successful competition difficult. At the moment, for example, the Soviet Trade Agency pays scant regard to such matters as Persian import licences. Whatever the Russians want to import, they import whether authorised or not, and Persian customs officials are powerless to withstand them. The prices of their imports have, moreover, no relation to world prices, but are what the local market will bear. Thus, at the present time Russian sugar is being sold at Rls. 110 (17s. 2d.) per kilo, customs duty paid.



17. There is continued lack of confidence in the future of Azerbaijan on the part of the merchant classes. Those who left Tabriz at the time of the Soviet occupation for Tehran and other places in the south have unanimously decided not to return, and several have recently liquidated their remaining interests. Others are also transferring their capital southwards for security against possible Soviet designs. For the same reason, shares of Tabriz factories are quoted at not more than 40 per cent. of the price of shares of corresponding factories in Ispahan. The price of property is low compared with the south and buyers are few.

18. *Local Attitude to Great Britain.*—Among foreign Powers, Germany easily held pride of place in Azerbaijan, and her impending defeat, which is now reluctantly taken for granted, is causing profound disappointment, especially among the business classes. Self-interest now demands a new orientation and there are many who, wishing to escape the clutches of the Russian bear, look to Great Britain for political and economic help. It is frequently asserted that as it was the British who brought the Russians here it is their bounden duty to ensure their departure, or else suffer final eclipse in Persian eyes.

19. Much good work has been done in making known the British viewpoint through the publicity shop in Tabriz, maintained by the Public Relations Bureau in Tehran. The increasing distribution of literature covers not only Tabriz but Rezaieh and various country towns. The window displays attract much interest and many hundreds daily listen to the news broadcasts from London and other stations. There is a widespread desire to learn English, but there is an acute shortage of textbooks and teachers. It is very necessary, in my opinion, to arrange adequate facilities for the study of English and for the dissemination of pro-British literature as permanent features of our economic and cultural propaganda in Azerbaijan. From a trade point of view alone this should prove a remunerative investment.

20. *Conclusion.*—The future of Azerbaijan depends on two interrelated factors: (1) The post-war policy of Soviet Russia, and (2) the ability or otherwise of the Persian Government to develop a strong and efficient local administration. The immediate post-war period is likely to prove a time of economic crisis with which the present administration will almost certainly be unable to cope. The resulting anarchical conditions may well afford a pretext for the detachment of Azerbaijan from Persia or for the continuance of the present status. To avoid the possibility of such a contingency it should be the urgent duty of the Tehran authorities to overhaul the administrative machine, appointing the best officials at its disposal to key posts. It is in any event seemingly inevitable that the economic and cultural bonds between Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan should be drawn much closer. Further than that it can only be hoped that a basis of loyal understanding will be reached between the Persian and Soviet Governments which will render unwarranted the somewhat gloomy forebodings of this despatch.

21. In accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch under reference, I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Office, the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, the Minister Resident in Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora, His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah, C.I.C.I. sub-centre, Tehran, and G.S.I. (a) (1), G.H.Q., New Delhi.

I have, &c.  
T. C. RAPP.

[E 5847/189/34]

No. 11.

*Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 25th September.)

(No. 346.)

Sir,

Tehran, 4th September, 1944.

WITH reference to Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 148 of the 3rd April, I have the honour to submit a further report<sup>(1)</sup> on the composition of the 14th Majlis, together with lists<sup>(1)</sup> showing the position at the 31st August, 1944. The first list shows the constituencies and their members: the second, the Deputies in alphabetical order, classified according to their economic and political activities.

2. The number of Deputies elected up to the 31st August, 1944, whose credentials have not been rejected by the Majlis, is 128. Elections have not been

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

completed at Abadeh, Firuzabad and Saqqiz. I'timad ut-Tauliyn has been elected for Rey, but his credentials have not yet been brought before the Majlis. New elections are due for two of the Tabriz seats, and for Darajiz; the credentials of the three Deputies concerned having been rejected by the Chamber. One Tehran seat is unoccupied, pending a decision in the case of the German agent Abul Qasim Kashani, who was among the twelve elected for Tehran.

3. Of the 128 Deputies so far elected, 44 sat in the 13th Majlis. Of these 36 have been re-elected for the same constituencies.

4. According to the classification shown on list 2, 65 of the present Deputies are landowners; 13 are connected with commerce and industry; 4 are mullas deriving their power from local religious influence; and 46 depend on various forms of political activity. The last category includes a number who were elected to serve the interests of landlords, merchants and industrialists.

5. The Tudeh group has been reduced from 8 to 7 members, owing to the expulsion from the party of Rahman Quli Khal Atbari. The Tudeh-sponsored Tabriz Deputy, Pishavari, was rejected by the Majlis.

6. The other Majlis groups fluctuate in membership, and are not worth reporting on in detail. About a quarter of the total number of Deputies, including some of the most influential, do not belong to any Majlis group.

7. During the first six months of its life the 14th Majlis has passed very little legislation, having been preoccupied with intrigues over the composition of Cabinets, the Millspaugh problem and the credentials of elected Deputies. Since the bulk of the members are actuated by no political principle, it is not surprising that efforts to form a stable majority in the Majlis have so far been unsuccessful.

I am sending copies of this despatch, together with its enclosures, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, &c.

D. W. LASCELLES.

#### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 3954/422/34]

No. 12.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.*—(Received 6th July.)

(No. 263.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period the 19th to the 25th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 26th June, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 12.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 19th to 25th June, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

DR. MILLSPAUGH and all the members of his mission have resigned. This followed on the presentation by the Government to members of the Majlis for discussion the draft of a Bill cancelling the law of the 3rd April, 1943, from which Dr. Millspaugh derived his autocratic powers. In his letter of resignation he accuses the Government of having failed to carry out their obligations under that law, of having withheld assistance and support from the American mission, of having encouraged those elements who desired to destroy the mission or to prevent it from working effectively, and of being unwilling even to consider the evidence that could be produced of the good progress made by the mission. From their previous conversations with Dr. Millspaugh the Government must have realised that their proposed Bill would result in his resignation, but it seems that they are trying to persuade him and other American advisers to stay on.



2. Dr. Millspaugh's resignation takes effect from the 29th June. It is unlikely that the Persian Government have any plans for the operation of the various organisations and administrations now in charge of the American advisers, of whom there are now thirty-nine. Since objections to Dr. Millspaugh's plans for the collection of cereals, the distribution of monopoly goods and the levying of taxation was the cause of the agitation for the abolition of his powers it is presumably intended to modify his policy in some respects. This will almost certainly lead to great dislocation in the finance and economy of the country, to inevitable delay in the improvement of the economic situation, if not to definite retrogression. His resignation has been greeted with rejoicing by all corrupt elements in the country.

3. A party calling itself Mehan has been formed by the already existing parties Peikar, Istiqal, Mehan Parastan and Azadikhahan. These are composed mostly of young men with strongly nationalistic and xenophobic views, whose policy is claimed to be pro-Persian and neither pro-British nor pro-Russian. The new party is believed to have the support of the Shah. It has no representation in the Majlis. Other attempts are being made to form parties to oppose the allegedly pro-British Seyyid Zia, on the one hand, and the pro-Russian Tudeh party, on the other.

4. Seyyid Abul Qasem Kashani, a well-known mullah who is deeply implicated in German plots in Persia and who has been evading arrest since last August, was run to ground by the British security authorities and is now in British custody. An attempt was made to persuade shopkeepers in Tehran to close their shops as a protest against the arrest by foreigners of a prominent priest and a question was asked in the Majlis, but on the whole the arrest has been taken calmly.

5. A new paper, *Darya*, has appeared, the tone of whose articles is indistinguishable from pre-war Russian revolutionary propaganda. It is frankly pro-Russian, communistic and revolutionary. It preaches class war; the *bourgeoisie* must first be made to fight the capitalists so that the proletariat can finally triumph over both. Great Britain and America are mentioned as capitalist nations. It refers to alleged British support of pan-Arabism, with special reference to Khuzestan, and stresses the danger this is to Persia. It prints extracts from Karl Marx's *British Rule in India*.

6. A reception was held at the Municipality on the 22nd June to celebrate the re-naming of three streets in Tehran, which are in the vicinity of the embassies concerned, as Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt Avenues. This is to commemorate the Tehran Conference.

#### Economic.

7. The budget for the current year—the 21st March, 1944, to the 20th March, 1945—was presented to the Majlis on the 18th June. General revenue is estimated at 3,957,619,660 rials and general expenditure at 4,569,482,444 rials, showing a deficit of 611,862,284 rials. Commercial and industrial revenue is estimated at 6,367,182,450 rials and expenditure at 5,754,849,275 rials, giving a surplus of 613,333,175 rials. The amounts demanded by the Ministries concerned for the security forces are:—

	Million rials.
Army ... ..	1,532
Gendarmerie ... ..	680
Police ... ..	265

But in the budget as presented these have been cut down by Millspaugh to:—

	Million rials.
Army ... ..	1,000
Gendarmerie ... ..	298
Police ... ..	187

8. The National Aero Club, a civil flying club, is operating with Polish S.P.N.B.Y. machines a weekly postal service between Tehran and Bushire. The machines can carry three passengers in addition to mail.

#### Appointments—Civil.

- 9.—(i) Muhsin Nassr, to be Governor-General of Mazamderan.  
(ii) Jahanshah Samsam (son of Morteza Quli Khan), to be Deputy Governor of Bakhtiari.

#### Internal Security.

##### Khuzestan.

10. The Bahmai tribe of Kuhgalu have been guilty of a few minor raids in the vicinity of Masjid-i-Suleiman. An abortive attempt to disarm this tribe was made in April 1944—see Summary No. 14/44, paragraph 10—as it was expected that sooner or later they would be unable to refrain from lawlessness.

##### Russian Affairs.

11. The Russians have succeeded in frightening away all candidates for the Ardebil elections except their own choice, Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani—see Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 14—so that there appears to be no doubt of his election in spite of the fact that he has no connexion whatever with Ardebil. The Russians presumably intend to use him for their campaign against Seyyid Zia. The Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz recently asked for the expulsion from Tabriz of a minor Persian official who had dared to send a telegram of congratulation to Seyyid Zia and, the Governor-General having refused to comply with this request, the offending official is now being subjected to the abuse and threats of Soviet hirelings.

12. At the request of the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz the Governor-General of Azerbaijan has published a notice to the effect that the Soviet authorities had complained that Persians were purchasing arms from Russian troops and warning the people that anyone found in possession of Russian arms would be severely punished.

Tehran, 25th June, 1944.

[E 4043/422/34]

No. 13.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 275.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the period of the 26th June to 2nd July, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 3rd July, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 13.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the Period  
26th June–2nd July, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

THE Government refused to accept Dr. Millspaugh's resignation and requested him to stay on for the purpose for which he was originally engaged, that is, as Financial Adviser. The Deputies, of whom a majority, inspired by profiteers, or the Tudeh, or the Shah, or the Russians, were originally opposed to Dr. Millspaugh even to the extent of being prepared to face his departure, have on reflection become frightened of the possible effect it might have on Perso-American relations and on Lease-Lend supplies, and an increasing number are veering round in favour of his retention. Dr. Millspaugh has reiterated his refusal to accept any limitation of his powers, but he has made some conciliatory proposals, and the Government is showing some signs of wavering and of lacking the courage to face the consequences of the departure of the American Mission. This question has absorbed the attention of press and Parliament during the past week. It is generally considered that, if Dr. Millspaugh stays on his own terms, Sa'ed's Government will have to go. The uncertainty has, as usual, paralysed the administration. Ministers are unwilling to give decisions on any matter. It



is understood that the final decision of the Government is to be announced on the 3rd July. Meanwhile, Dr. Millspaugh and his mission have continued at their duties.

2. In Isfahan the Tudeh and the Vatan parties (the latter is alleged to be inspired by Seyyid Zia) are struggling hard with each other for control of the mill-workers and for political influence in Isfahan. The Tudeh party is reliably reported to be losing ground, and the Vatan party, which is supported by mill- and landowners because it is opposed to the Tudeh, if for no other reason, to be gaining adherents. The struggle between the two parties may lead to disturbances in Isfahan.

3. The paper *Darya*, of which mention was made in Summary No. 42/25, paragraph 5, has in recent issues drawn attention to alleged Turkish plans for the disintegration of Persia by the improper interest Turkish officials have been showing in minorities in Persia of Turki stock and by the renewal of their "revisionist claims." Reference is probably intended to the foolish championing of the Qashgai tribes by the Turkish Ambassador at the time the Persian army were carrying out operations against them and by the even more foolish suggestion he made to the Qashgai chiefs that they should migrate to a welcoming Turkey. Revolutionary propaganda continues. The proletariat should do all it can to weaken the Government; the weaker the Government, the greater the opportunity for the proletariat. At all costs, the *bourgeoisie*, the capitalists and the head of the State must be prevented from uniting. Mr. Churchill had said that fascism would not be allowed in the "conquered" countries, which presumably meant that the British Government would have no objection to its establishment in other countries. It might suit the "capitalist" countries (Great Britain had already been included in this category) to strengthen fascism in countries adjacent to Soviet Russia. Perhaps that was why men "with twenty years' training" were being sent to countries of the Middle East. (The reference is clearly to Seyyid Zia.) The Comintern had been abolished, but, if after the war the occupying armies of the Allies were to be used to suppress social revolutions or communism, Russia would not co-operate. "If Russia could not help the Communists, she would refrain from using arms against them."

#### Internal Security.

##### Fars.

4. A reconciliation has recently been made between the Qavam-ul-Mulk on the one hand and Nasir Qashgai and his brothers on the other, and they have agreed to co-operate in the interests of Fars rather than to oppose each other. As conditions of his co-operation, the Qavam has stipulated that no action shall be taken against the interests of the Persian Government or against the interests or wishes of the British Government. The Qashgai brothers have agreed to these conditions. The reconciliation has the approval of the Governor-General-elect of Fars, General Firuz, and it should improve for the time being the situation in Fars. The motive that has induced the Qavam-ul-Mulk to respond to the advances of the Qashgai brothers was the conviction that the Government would do nothing to protect such interests as are left to him and his family in Fars against the Qashgai. The motive that inspired Nasir Qashgai may have been nothing more than to prove his friendship for the British by becoming friends with their friend and his former enemy. He will break any engagements into which he has entered when it suits him.

##### Khuzestan.

5. Operations are now in progress in the Ahu Dasht area of Northern Khuzestan for the suppression of bands of Arab brigands who have been a nuisance in that area (see Summary No. 21/44, paragraph 9). Sections of the Chaab, of the Abdolkhani and the Beni Tamim resisted the Persian troops, and punitive air operations were carried out, which are said to have resulted in the death of sixty to eighty Arabs. The surrender of all arms in the area has been demanded by the Persian Commander and the submission of the sheikhs. The Persian authorities report that 100 arms have been handed in and that some, but not all, of the sheikhs have submitted.

##### Kerman.

6. The roads in the Kerman Province have been unsafe of late, particularly the road Kerman-Bam-Zahidan and the road Kerman-Sirjan-Bandar Abbas,

on both of which travellers have been held up by armed brigands and robbed. The robbers are said to be Baluchi tribesmen who have enlisted in the gendarmerie and supplement their meagre pay by highway robbery.

#### Belgian Affairs.

7. The Belgian Military Attaché has been given a Persian decoration for having lectured at the Persian Staff College.

Tehran, 2nd July, 1944.

[E 4244/422/34]

No. 14.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th July.)

(No. 286.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the period the 3rd to 9th July, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 10th July, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 14.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the Period  
3rd to 9th July, 1944.

#### Political.

##### Persian Affairs.

IN spite of the Prime Minister's insistence that the powers of Dr. Millspaugh must be modified in such a manner as to recognise the full responsibility of the Government for the financial and economic affairs of the country, and in spite of the fact that he originally had the support of a majority of the Deputies for this attitude, in the end it was agreed that Dr. Millspaugh should carry on for an undefined period of "three or four" months with undiminished powers. At the end of that period the matter should again be reviewed. Dr. Millspaugh has agreed that he will consult the Minister of Finance on important financial matters and before issuing regulations, and will keep him informed of the course of affairs so that he can reply to questions in the Majlis; that he will collaborate with the Prime Minister in the formation of a committee, which would include a Cabinet Minister, to conduct negotiations with the Allied authorities concerning current problems connected with import quotas, navigation, transport and the feeding of the country; that he will appoint two Deputies to himself from among the American advisers, one of whom would be concerned solely with finance, the other with economic questions, with a view to accelerating decisions. The Prime Minister, in accepting the arrangement, points out, however, that it does not accord with the view of the Government and the Majlis that the Minister of Finance should control the economic and financial affairs of the country.

2. The conversion of the Deputies to support of the retention of Dr. Millspaugh on his own terms was due in part to the fear that assailed them on considering the possible economic calamities that might follow on the departure of the American mission and in part to the knowledge that his departure was ardently desired by the Russians and the Shah. That consideration alone was sufficient to dispose a number of Deputies in his favour. The annoyance of the Russians at his retention has been clearly shown in the Tudeh press, and Dr. Musaddiq, one of the Shah's spokesmen on these matters in the Majlis, has attacked the Government for yielding, and has argued that Dr. Millspaugh's powers are incompatible with the Constitution, since the Minister of Finance is deprived of all responsibility and is reduced to the position of an adviser.

3. Saed's Government may not fall immediately, but by having had to abandon the position he had apparently firmly taken up as regards the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's powers, he has lost much ground. The Cabinet was



divided on the question, and that is likely to increase already existing dissensions. The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Deputies, especially Seyyid Zia, who played an important part in turning Majlis opinion against forcing Dr. Millsaugh's resignation, will all have earned the displeasure of the Shah.

4. The paper *Daria*, to which reference has been made in Summary No. 26/44, paragraph 3, and which is strongly suspected of being subsidised by the Russians, accuses Dr. Millsaugh of being an agent of the American Government, a kind of American High Commissioner ruling and exploiting Persia in the interests of the United States. The intervention of the American Government, it says, had frightened the Deputies from their original intention. What would happen if Persia's two neighbours were to follow America's example and, taking advantage of the weakness of the Majlis, treat Persia as if she were their colony?

5. Under the auspices of the Tudeh party there has been formed a "Central Council of Iranian Workers' and Toilers' Unions," to which it is hoped to affiliate all existing Labour unions. Its official organ is the newspaper *Zafar*, printed at the Tudeh press. It urges the necessity for all workers to enter the field of politics and to unite, for only in unity will they find the strength to fight the reactionaries.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 6.—(i) Ghulam Hussein Miftah, to be Farmandar of Easban
- (ii) Ismail Nawab, to be Farmandar of Khu'i.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Appointments—Military.*

- 7.—(i) Sarlashkar Ali Riazi (F.O.: 190), to be Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat.
- (ii) Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakchevan (F.O.: 159; M.A.: 193), to command the Persian Air Force.
- (iii) Sartip Ahmad Khusrovani (F.O.: 118), to command the 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division.
- (iv) Sarhang Sayyid Hussein Hashimi, to command the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade.

#### *Bakhtiari.*

#### *Internal Security.*

8. Mortesa Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, has now reached Tehran to answer to the Government for the many complaints that have been made against him, and to endeavour to come to terms with all the other Khans who have been agitating against him because they have not been allowed to extract from Bakhtiari the share of the pickings which they had hoped for on the appointment of one of themselves as Governor of the tribe. A number of petty khans with complaints against Morteza Quli have also reached Tehran. That some of these complaints are justified there is little doubt, but it will be regrettable if Morteza Quli Khan is removed from the Governorship as, whatever just causes of complaint there may be against him, he probably maintains better order than anyone else is likely to do.

9. Troops have moved out from Isfahan for the disarmament of certain small outlying sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari—see Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 11. From such reports as have been received of the operations hitherto, it seems that the commander of the troops—General Qadar—is now waiting to see what offers are made by the tribes concerned to buy him off.

#### *Fars.*

10. Reports from Fars say that Nazir Qashgai is becoming doubtful of his chances of maintaining the position, which he likes to think he holds, of paramount influence in Fars. Having failed to get elected for Shiras, he hesitates now to stand for election for either of the vacant seats of Firuzabad or Abadeh, being fearful lest the great tribal leader should come to be regarded as a mere deputy. He is suspicious, too, of his two brothers, Muhammad Hussein and Khusrow, who, spending much of their time in Tehran, have made many contacts and are already on apparently good terms with Qawam ul Mulk and the Governor-General elect, General Firuz. However much contempt the tribesmen may express for Tehran and the Government, there is still a tendency to attach some importance to what Tehran is saying, and Nazir does not know while his brothers do. He recently attempted to intervene in the dispute between Morteza

Quli Khan and the other Bakhtiari Khans, to meet with a rebuff. He has also been trying to rent the lands of the Dushmanziari tribe with a view to increasing the sphere of his influence. This has aroused protests from the Dushmanziari chiefs who have no desire to have a Qashgai overlord.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

11. The opening of a Soviet Consulate at Kazvin was reported in Summary No. 20/44, paragraph 15. A consular agency has now been opened at Kabul.

12. A member of Dr. Millsaugh's mission has recently made an extended tour of Western Azerbaijan, investigating the harvest. He was born in Rezzieh and knows well the local people. He has returned convinced that in Western Azerbaijan the Tudeh party is definitely working for the separation of Azerbaijan from Persia. The Armenians, he considers, are the driving force. He could not find any clear evidence of Russian direction behind this movement, but having regard to the proved connexions of the Russians with the Tudeh party it is unlikely that the movement is being carried on without their approval. On more than one occasion the Russians have not hesitated to represent hostility to the Tudeh party as hostility to themselves. In Isfahan they have trumped up charges against the opposition party, the Vatas, as a pretext for asking the police to take action against that party.

13. In Summary No. 22/44, paragraph 11, it was reported that a party of Russians had visited the Georgian villages of the Feraiiden district. Later reports say that the main concern of the Russians seemed to be to convince the villagers how much better off were the Georgians under Soviet rule. A Russian musical composer is now to visit Bakhtiari to study Bakhtiari folk music. Other reports had previously been received of Russian attempts to get into touch with Bakhtiari and other tribal chiefs. Having regard to Seyyid Zia's attempts to gain tribal support, to Seyyid Zia's supposed connexion with the British and to the close relations of British officials with the tribes, it is not surprising that the Russians should want to know what is going on.

#### *British Affairs.*

14. Aid-to-Russia supplies are no longer to be carried to Tabriz by British military or U.K.C.C. transport, the Russians having requested that British-operated motor transport should deliver to Pahlevi only. The British Consulate now remains the only British interest in Azerbaijan to justify the entry of British officials to this part of the Russian zone.

*Tehran, 9th July, 1944.*

[E 4405/422/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th July.)*

(No. 293.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the period the 10th July to the 16th July, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 17th July, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 15.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period the 10th July to the 16th July, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

#### *Political.*

IT is reliably reported that the Tudeh party recently proposed to Seyyid Zia that he should collaborate with them in the formation of a Government to be constituted of Ministers selected half by the Tudeh party and half by Seyyid Zia. They undertook to secure Russian support for, or at least neutrality towards,

[29955]

G 2



such a Government. It is almost inconceivable that the Tudeh party had the intention of collaborating sincerely with Seyyid Zia in the government of the country, and it is more probable that they felt confident that with members of the party occupying half the seats in the Cabinet they would in time be in a position to oust and discredit Seyyid Zia. It is noteworthy that for some days the Tudeh papers ceased their previously incessant attacks on him. Approaches have also been made to Seyyid Zia by certain military officers in close touch with the Shah with the suggestion that they would support him in forming a Government if he undertook to leave the army in the unfettered control of the Shah. Seyyid Zia has already had experience of the impotence of a Government which does not control the army. There is now some talk of an intention on the part of the Shah and this military cabal to seek Russian support for the formation of a military Government. They are enraged by their failure to get rid of Millspaugh and the restrictions he imposes on the army by his financial control.

2. There was a serious fire on the night of the 10th-11th July in the Sabzeh Maidan quarter of Tehran which destroyed a number of shops and caused considerable damage. The American troops in Tehran sent two fire engines to assist the Persian Fire Brigade, but shortage of water severely handicapped attempts to fight the fire.

3. The munition factories making arms and ammunition for the Russians, which had been transferred from the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, have now been retransferred to the Ministry of War.

#### *Economic.*

4. Mr. Gresham, Director-General of Customs, and Mr. Lamb, Director of the Price Stabilisation Section, members of Dr. Millspaugh's Mission who had informed the Persian Government that they would be willing to continue in service if Dr. Millspaugh resigned, have now been obliged to resign. The Price Stabilisation Section has been abolished.

5. The Shahrstan of Shahravar has been transferred from the 1st Ustan to the 2nd (Mazanderan) Ustan.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 6.—(i) Fazlullah Bahrami (F.O. 45) to be Governor-General of Kerman Province.
- (ii) Muhammad Ali Varasteh to be Governor-General of Isfahan.
- (iii) Ibrahim Shahyan to be Farmandar of Sari and Deputy Governor-General of Mazanderan.
- (iv) Hassan Khusrow Panah to be Farmandar of Isfahan and Deputy Governor-General of the Province.
- (v) Ghulam Hussein Khushbin to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Justice.
- (vi) Dr. Black to be Economic Assistant to Dr. Millspaugh.
- (vii) Mr. Pixley to be Financial Assistant to Dr. Millspaugh.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Appointments—Military.*

- 7.—(i) Sipahbod Amir Ahmadi (F.O. 16; M.A. 23) and Sarlashkars Hadi Shaghi (F.O. 210; M.A. 270), Amanullah Jahanbani (F.O. 103; M.A. 132), and Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30; M.A. 37) to be inspectors of the army.
- (ii) Sarhang Musa Shahquli to be Military Prosecutor-General.
- (iii) Sartip Abdullah Qalehbegi to be President of the Permanent Military Court of Appeal.

#### *Internal Security.*

#### *Azerbaijan.*

8. A well-known agitator, Khalil Inqilab, has been holding mass meetings in the streets of Tabriz, violently attacking the local authorities, the Government and Seyyid Zia, and championing the two Russian-supported Deputies, Pishavari and Ipekchian. It was inevitably believed that the agitation had Russian backing and that the object was to frighten the Majlis into approving the credentials of these two Deputies (see paragraph 17 of this Summary). After discussion with the Soviet authorities the Governor-General plucked up courage to order the arrest of Inqilab by Persian troops. The mob resisted and the troops were obliged to open fire, killing Inqilab's principal lieutenant.

9. In Western Azerbaijan the Kurds have again been on the warpath, attacking and looting villages in the neighbourhood of Rezaieh and even entering that town and occupying a hotel in the centre. Villagers flocked into Rezaieh to demand protection. The Russian garrison took no action against the tribesmen, but Major-General Gliniski, commanding Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, has left Tabriz for Rezaieh presumably to restore order.

#### *Fars.*

10. The Darashuri section of the Qashgai tribe has been encroaching on Bakhtiari territory, has carried off grain from some villages in that territory and came into conflict with a Bakhtiari shooting party which resulted in the exchange of shots and the wounding of a Bakhtiari Khan. Morteza Quli Khan, who is not on good terms with Nasir Qashgai and was usually hostile to Nasir's father, professing the greatest contempt for them both and for all Qashgais, is greatly incensed and has asked Nasir whether these hostile acts had his approval or whether he, Morteza Quli, should assume that Nasir was unable to control his tribe. It would be interesting to know the true answer to this query.

#### *Isfahan.*

11. The operations for the disarmament of certain sections of the Bakhtiari (see Summary No. 27/44, paragraph 9) have been suspended. The Persian Commander is believed to have profited largely from sums paid by some of the chiefs whom it was intended to disarm.

#### *Khuzestan.*

12. The punitive operation against the Arabs of the Mianab district (see Summary No. 26/44, paragraph 5) appears to be proceeding satisfactorily as judged by Persian standards; and so far there have been no repercussions in other Arab areas. It seems generally to be accepted that the Mianab Sheikhs have got only what they deserve. A statement issued to the press by the General Staff claims that some forty Arabs have been killed by the Persian forces, that the chiefs have submitted and that 540 rifles have been collected from the Arabs. More reliable reports state that the four principal offenders among the chiefs are still at large and put the number of rifles collected at a more moderate figure. The punishment meted out will probably have a salutary effect on the Arabs generally, who may have been under the impression that the British authorities would restrain the Persian army from taking action.

13. In a statement to the press the General Staff claimed that the army has made the following contributions to internal security:—

- (i) In Fars, near Fasa, the well-known bandit Jan Firuzi has been killed, eleven of his men captured and stolen animals recovered. At Kazarun the troops are taking action against local bandits.
- (ii) Near Kermanshah, brigands who recently held up U.K.C.C. lorries have been captured. The well-known brigand, Habib Hussein of the Kalhur tribe, has been killed.
- (iii) On the Bam-Kerman road the brigands who have recently been holding up the road have been captured.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

14. Newspapers known to be enjoying Russian support have recently been advocating revolution as the only means of delivering the Persian people from the oppression of the present ruling classes. Preparations for a red revolution, they say, should be made now, so that when the time comes it can be directed towards the immediate establishment of a new régime on the ruins of the old. The same papers have also been giving some attention to the matter of further oil concessions, for which applicants are now in Tehran. The general line taken is that it is not sufficient to take commercial considerations only into account and to give concessions to the highest bidder; the political effects of giving a concession to a foreign country should be carefully weighed; if it were to go to America it was likely that Persia would find herself in political difficulties in the future.

15. Reports are again current in Azerbaijan of an increase of Soviet armoured units on the Turkish frontier and of a general increase of Soviet troops in Tabriz and elsewhere in Azerbaijan.



16. The Russians are now reported to have extended their surveys (see Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 13) to the Gunabad district south of the Kal-i-Shur River, which has hitherto formed the southern limit of Soviet penetration in Khorassan.

17. The Majlis has, to the great annoyance of the Tudeh party, invalidated the election of Pishavari, one of the Deputies forced on Tabriz by the Russians (see Summary No. 18/44, paragraph 7).

18. Major-General Rossof has succeeded Lieutenant-General Yarmaskevitch as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-General Sovietnikov, commanding all Russian forces in Persia.

#### *French Affairs.*

19. The Persian Government has recognised the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France.

[E 4569/422/34]

No. 16.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st July.)*  
(No. 298.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period of 17th to 23rd July, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this embassy.

*Tehran, 24th July, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 16.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the Period 17th July to 23rd July, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. There have been no developments of importance during the week. Dissensions continue in the Cabinet. The Majlis is inflated with pride at its courage in braving Russian anger by throwing out the Tabriz Deputy, Pishavari (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 17), and is now preparing itself to eject the other Deputy forced on Tabriz, Ipekchian, and the even more scandalously-elected member for Ardebil, Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani. The Majlis has seen telegrams sent by Soheily, when Prime Minister, to the president of the Election Committee in Tabriz giving the names of four Deputies whom the Russians insisted on having elected for Tabriz, the president's reply that the "election" of these four would provoke a revolution in Tabriz and a further telegram from the Prime Minister saying that he had persuaded the Russians to be content with Pishavari and Ipekchian, whom the president must get elected.

##### *Economic.*

2. The Government tabled a Labour Bill in the Majlis on the 16th July, of which the principal points are:—

No employment of children under 13; a 48-hour week; one day's holiday with pay per week; a fortnight's holiday with pay per year; no night work for children under 15 or for women; minimum wage in each Shahrstan to be fixed by special tribunal; permission to workers to form unions; differences between employers and employees to be referred to regional tribunals; prohibition of the use of force or threats to coerce workers to strike or to join unions.

3. The Shah has donated 3 million rials for the construction of wells in the southern quarters of Tehran which have suffered greatly this year from lack of water.

4. Two American experts have been engaged by the Persian Government to advise them on questions connected with the exploitation of Persian oil. They have arrived in Tehran.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

5.—(i) Sarhang Ali Akbar Darakshawi, to be Governor-General of Western Azarbaijan.

(ii) Isa Iteshami, to be Farmandar of Shahrud.

(iii) The appointment of Hassan Khosrow Panah to be Farmandar and Deputy Governor-General of Isfahan (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 6) has been cancelled.

(iv) Faqieh Zadeh, to be Farmandar of Qasvin.

(v) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Firuz has arrived in Shiraz and taken up his appointment as Governor-General.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Appointment—Military.*

6. Sarhang Hussein Hashimi Hairi, to command the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Western Azarbaijan.*

7. The situation in Western Azarbaijan (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 9) is now reported to have quietened down as the result of Russian insistence that the Kurds should return to their villages. But they did not take this action until disorder had become widespread, many villages suffering from Kurdish pillaging and several small gendarmerie posts being disarmed by Kurds. The Soviet authorities refused to allow the Persian military authorities to take action; reinforcements of two companies of Persian troops sent from Tabriz to Khoi, with the permission of the Soviet authorities in Tabriz, were sent back by the Soviet commander in Khoi; and the proposal of the Persian Government to send reinforcements from Tehran to Rezaieh was vetoed by the Soviet authorities. It was not until the Persian authorities had been thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the Kurds and of the villagers and townspeople of Western Azarbaijan that the Russians said the word that would have checked the Kurds at any time. The Persian Government has now appointed a military governor-general for Western Azarbaijan.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

8. It has been decided to modify the plans for the disarmament of outlying sections of the Chaharlang tribes (see Summary No. 27/44, paragraph 9) and to postpone action against the more truculent sections—the Abdulvand and Hajivand—until they move down to their more vulnerable winter quarters. Pressure is, however, to continue to be applied to Khajeh Mehdi Quli, of the Moghui, to induce him to hand over his arms or more money.

##### *Khuzistan.*

9. The operation against the Mian Ab Arabs (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 12) has apparently been satisfactorily concluded. Over 600 rifles have been collected and, with a few exceptions, the worst offenders have been arrested. The troops have now begun the disarmament of the Chananeh and some of the Western Chaab.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

10. Soviet policy in Azarbaijan is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Consul-General, fairly consistently designed to undermine and discredit the authority of the Persian Government. If the recent disturbances at Tabriz (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 8) and the disorder in Western Azarbaijan (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 9) were not deliberately instigated by the Russians, they were tolerated for the reason that they furthered Russian designs. They do not attempt to conceal their opposition to the American advisers and they thereby acquire some merit with the landlords and capitalists whose favour they seek equally with that of the proletariat. The departure of British military and U.K.C.C. personnel has been interpreted as being due to the Russian desire to eliminate all other foreign influence from Azarbaijan. A further indication of the desire to interest Moslems of Persian Azarbaijan in Soviet Azarbaijan is the proposal to send 200 young Persian Moslems to Baku for a year's training in administration and economics.



11. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports recent arrivals in Tabriz of additional guns and tanks for the Soviet forces and an increase in the number of aircraft from about thirty to about sixty. See also Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 15.

12. The report in Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 16, that the Russians are now surveying south of the Kal i Shur River in Khorassan has been proved to be untrue. Their survey parties have not yet crossed that river.

13. The matter of further oil concessions in Persia continues to receive attention in newspapers under obligations to the Russians. These are now claiming that the Soviet Government have still certain rights as regards the exploitation of oil in the Northern Provinces and that these provinces are closed to any other foreign Power. Every attempt is being made to arouse fear in the Persians of the possible political consequences of granting concessions to Americans, who, for the time being, are evidently regarded as being more dangerous than the British. Dr. Millspaugh is represented as having been forced on the Persian Government to further the interests of American oil hunters.

14. A new Soviet Consul-General, Abranov, and Vice-Consul, Uzhurov, have arrived in Meshed. The former was at Naples with the Soviet Mission to the Badoglio Government. Uzhurov was previously at Kermanshah.

#### *British Affairs.*

15. The Shah and the Queen attended a hockey match between two Indian military teams, and the Queen gave away the prizes.

[E 4997/422/34]

No. 17.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd August.)*

(No. 313.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period of the 24th July to 6th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 7th August, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 17.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the Period  
24th July-6th August, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

ALTHOUGH Deputies express much discontent with the ineffectiveness of the Cabinet and there is much talk of the necessity for a reconstruction with some new Ministers, there appears still to be a majority in favour of the retention of Sa'ed as Prime Minister for the time being. Seyyid Zia is gaining increasing respect, but it seems to be generally considered that it is not yet time for him to make a bid for power. The Tudeh members, supported, it is commonly said, by the Shah, are trying to get a revision of the rejection of the credentials of Pishavari (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 17) and to prevent the rejection of the credentials of Ipekchian and Shukh Hussein Lenkorani when they are considered by the Majlis. Meanwhile, very little legislative work gets done. Of twenty-eight Bills laid before the Majlis during the life of the present Government, only seven have been passed. One—the Bill to mobilise Government employees and factory workers, which was mentioned in Summary No. 18/44, paragraph 1—has been rejected. None of the others has passed the first reading.

2. The ex-Shah, Reza Pahlevi, died at Johannesburg on the 26th July. Conventional mourning customs have been ordered and observed in Tehran. The Tudeh Deputies refused to be associated with the Majlis' conventional message of sympathy to the Shah. The Tudeh press and some other papers have objected to any demonstration of mourning.

3. Hassan Taqizadeh, Majid Ahi and Anoshirvan Sipahbodi, Persian Ambassadors in London, Moscow and Angora respectively, have been summoned to Tehran for consultation. Mahmud Jam, Persian Ambassador in Egypt, has already arrived in Tehran.

##### *Economic.*

4. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis that would have nullified that part of Dr. Millspaugh's regulations governing the collection of the coming harvest that related to the right of the Government to take the surplus grain of the peasant as well as of the landlord. Dr. Millspaugh has, however, anticipated the decision of the Majlis by agreeing to cancel the regulation as far as it relates to the peasant's surplus. It was estimated that 50,000 tons of grain would have been obtained from that source.

5. The weekly postal service between Tehran and Bushire, to which reference was made in Summary No. 25/44, paragraph 8, has been suspended.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

6. Hassan Suraj Hijazi to be Farmandar of Arak (Sultanabad).

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *South Persia.*

7. A meeting will shortly take place near Qumisheh between Qavam-ul-Mulk, Nasir Qashgai, Morteza Quli Bakhtiari and a representative of the Haji Ilkhani family of the Bakhtiari Khans. Nasir Qashgai wishes to invite Abdullah Khan Zarghampur Boir Ahmadi to attend, but this is not regarded with favour by the others, since Abdullah Khan has not yet made his peace officially with the Government. The purpose of the meeting is to confirm the pact of friendship and co-operation made between Qavam-ul-Mulk and the Qashgai brothers, which was reported in Summary No. 26/44, paragraph 4, and to extend it to include the Bakhtiari Khans. The meeting is no secret; the Governor-General of Fars has been invited to attend and the Shah is aware that it is to take place. It will almost certainly appear to the Russians as a step in a plan for the formation of a pro-British bloc of tribes in South Persia. Resistance to subversive Tudeh and Russian influence is admittedly one of the objects of the originators, and for that reason it is viewed with favour by property owners in the south.

##### *Fars.*

8. Some activity is being shown by Government forces in the pursuit of minor bandits. The General Staff, in a communiqué to the press, report the capture of five leaders of robber bands.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

9. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, who was summoned to Tehran to answer complaints made against him (see Summary No. 27/44, paragraph 8), has now returned to Bakhtiari with the renewed confidence of the Government, though not of the Shah. He discomfited his enemies and made an armistice with his quarrelsome relatives which is unlikely to develop into a lasting peace. He has agreed to accept a representative of the rival branch of the family, the Haji Ilkhani, as a subordinate associate in the Government of the tribe. Dissension is, however, likely to break out again unless the Government comes to a decision on the matter of claims the Khans have for the restitution of, or compensation for, lands exchanged or sold under compulsion on the orders of Reza Shah. The fate of these lands is not of great interest to the Bakhtiari tribesmen, but as long as the Khans are dissatisfied with the Government or with each other there is the danger of their stirring up the tribes to disorder. The Shah, perhaps mindful of the part the Bakhtiari tribe has played in the past against would-be dictatorial Shahs, is reported to have been none too content when he heard that the Khans had come to an agreement among themselves and that Morteza Quli Khan had rather strengthened his position. In order to limit his sphere of influence, it has been suggested that the Chahar Lang tribes should be separated from the Haft Lang and given a separate Governor. This proposal has the support of some of the Chahar Lang Khans and of the General Staff.

##### *Khuzestan.*

10. The Persian General Staff reports that 850 rifles had been collected from the Mianab Arabs and about twenty of the sheikhs had been arrested. From the Chananeh some 300 rifles had been collected with little or no opposition. (See Summary No. 29/44, paragraph 9.)



## Russian Affairs.

11. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan reports that, in spite of all their efforts to ingratiate themselves with the populace, the Russians are still regarded with mistrust and suspicion by the great majority of the Moslems of Azerbaijan. Soviet officials have not attempted to conceal their annoyance at the rejection by the Majlis of Pishavari's credentials (see Summary No. 28/44, paragraph 17) and have taken the Governor-General roundly to task. Soviet agents in Tabriz are now attempting to work up demonstrations, and perhaps even a general strike, in the hope of stampeding the Government into obliging the Majlis to revise its decision.

12. After much discussion between the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, the Russians have now agreed that Persian forces in Azerbaijan may have liberty of action to suppress disorder, but they have stipulated that one garrison may not be reinforced from another, nor may reinforcements be sent from outside the province. As Persian garrisons in Azerbaijan are very weak, their actions for the suppression of disorder are not likely to be effective.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan reports that Persian officials in Western Azerbaijan profess to have seen recently signs of growing Soviet hostility to Turkey and that Turkish officials were showing some nervousness about possible Soviet plans. (This was before Turkey broke off relations with Germany.) In Summary No. 26/44, paragraph 3, it was reported that the Russian-inspired newspaper *Darya* had accused Turkey of plotting against the integrity of Persia by claiming that there were in the country minorities with special affinities with the Turks. The consul-general in Azerbaijan comments that Turkish officials in that province show remarkably little political activity and not the slightest evidence of any desire to acquire influence among Persian subjects of Turki stock.

14. The newspaper *Darya*, to which reference has been made in previous Summaries, has ceased publication. Its promoters seem to have decided to anticipate the suppression that could not have been long delayed having regard to the strong protests made by the British Embassy against its provocatively anti-British (but always pro-Russian) tone.

15. In Summary No. 27/44, paragraph 13, some evidence was given of Russian interest in the Bakhtiari tribe. A party of Russian officers and soldiers with motor transport was recently noticed at Shalamzar, 20 miles south of Shahr Kurd, in Bakhtiari tribal country. The purpose of their visit there is not known.

## French Affairs.

16. 1,500 Alsations, who had been conscripted into the German army and later taken prisoner in Russia, have passed through Tehran from Russia en route for North Africa.

## Polish Affairs.

17. The Polish Prime Minister, Mikolajczyk, and the Foreign Minister, Romer, arrived in Tehran from London and left for Moscow on the 30th July.

18. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 29th July, 1944, was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	436	1,561	410	2,407
Isfahan ...	115	741	1,146	2,002
Ahwaz ...	126	715	300	1,141
Meshed ...	2	2	...	4
	679	3,019	1,856	5,554

Tehran, 6th August, 1944.

[E 5116/422/34]

No. 18.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd August.)

(No. 320.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31, for the period of the 7th to 13th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 14th August, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 18.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31, for the period 7th August to 13th August, 1944.

## Persian Affairs.

## Political.

1. The Government is to be interpellated on the 17th August on a matter connected with the administration of the State railways. It is expected that the Prime Minister will survive the interpellation, but that he will be obliged to make some changes in his Cabinet. He will be urged to change, among others, the Minister of War, who is regarded by the Majlis as being a mere cypher, subservient to the Shah.

2. A new party, calling itself "Mardum," has been formed under the leadership of Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, the President of the Majlis. It includes nine members of the National Union (the Ittifaq-i-Milli) group in the Majlis—see Summary No. 13/44, paragraph 2—eight other Deputies and Amanullah Ardalan, Minister of Commerce, Ibrahim Zand, Minister for War, and Murteza Quli Bayat, Minister without portfolio. Its manifesto, which bears some 160 names, says that the aim of the party is to achieve the unity of the nation for the preservation of the freedom and independence of Persia and the restoration of the true principles of democratic government. It calls for the observance of social principles which it labels in brackets as "socialism." The party includes some known Shah's men, and it is likely that the Shah has favoured its formation. The list of names attached to the manifesto is not impressive, and it is not considered likely that the party will be constructive or will support the American mission.

3. Much attention has been given in the Persian press to an interview given by Dr. Millspaugh to the newspaper *Sitara*, where he is quoted as having said that his mission had been sent to safeguard the independence of Persia. America was the only country that had consistently championed the independence of Persia. If the American Mission had not come, disorders would have broken out all over the country and that would have resulted either in the complete occupation of North and South Persia by the British and Russian armies respectively; or in the occupation of Persia by an international army; or in the re-establishment of dictatorship. Dr. Millspaugh has been very severely criticised by the Persian press for these statements. The position of the American mission has not visibly improved. There is even suspicion, voiced in no uncertain terms by the Shah himself, that Dr. Millspaugh is deliberately trying to ruin the economy of Persia in order to give America the excuse for taking control of it. This is Russian propaganda.

4. The Tudeh party is now holding its first General Conference in Tehran. It is attended by 170 delegates, of whom the great majority is from the Northern Provinces. Isfahan sends seven, and there are representatives from Qum, Saveh, Sultanabad, Ahwaz, Durud and Andimezhk. The conference has expelled from the party the Deputy for Babul because he took part in mourning ceremonies for Reza Shah; has dissolved the local committee at Shahravar for the same reason and expelled another member for "co-operation with reactionaries."

5. As it becomes more apparent to Persians that the war will end not merely in the defeat of Germany but in the complete destruction of German power, their vision of the future is filled by a Russia, free of anxiety in the West and the East, and of unchallengeable supremacy in Central Asia. In Russia's regard for her pledged word they have no confidence whatever. Of Russia's



designs on the Northern Provinces they are convinced. Of the efficacy of British or American support they are doubtful. In Russian policy in Persian Azarbaijan combined with Russian opposition to appointments or measures that might lead to the strength of stability of the Central Government they see the resolve to create a situation that will lead to the outbreak on the withdrawal of Russian troops of a greater disorder than the Persian Government can remedy and an appeal from tutored parties in Azarbaijan for Russian intervention. It is not difficult to find evidence on which to base such a theory. What Russia may do overshadows all other considerations in the minds of men of property and wealth. Some such as Qavam es Sultaneh and General Muqaddam, lately Governor-General of Azarbaijan, toady to the Russians; others are considering liquidating their property with a view to transferring their capital abroad.

#### *Economic.*

6. In reply to a question in the Majlis asking for information about the Government's negotiations with oil-concession hunters known to be in Tehran the Prime Minister replied: In October and November 1943 two representatives of the Shell Company arrived in Tehran with proposals for the grant of a concession in South-East Persia. They were followed in February 1944 by a representative of the Standard Oil Company with proposals for the same area and about the same time the Sinclair Oil Company informed the Government that they were also making proposals for a concession. To assist the Government in studying these various proposals for a concession two American experts, Messrs. Hoover and Curtis, were engaged as advisers and they were now in Tehran.

The leader of the Tudeh party in the Majlis protested against the engagement of Americans to advise on a question in which American oil companies were interested.

#### *Appointments—civil.*

7. Muhsin Turbati to be Farmandar of Dasht-i-Mishan in Khuzestan.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

8. The Minister for War has tabled two Bills, one of which makes it now a crime for an officer to draw pay for imaginary employees or to employ as his servants more men paid from army sources than the regulations permit or to hire out men paid from the army budget for his own profit; the other specified punishments awardable to military personnel who use army transport for their own profit.

##### *Gendarmerie.*

9. In an interview with the reporter of a Persian newspaper Col. Schwarzkopf gave an outline of his ambitious scheme for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie. He said that after a lengthy study of social, economic and agricultural conditions his plans were now nearly ready to be put into execution. He did not mention that they require more than twice as much money as Dr. Millspaugh is prepared to allot. He said he had already instituted schools for officers and n.c.o.s. Asked what he had done to improve the morale tone of the gendarmerie, Col. Schwarzkopf replied that only in rare cases was he able to get definite evidence of corruption. He admitted that he had not yet succeeded in eliminating all theft, bribery and oppression, but he claimed that he had reduced these crimes.

#### *Appointments—military.*

- 10.—(i) Sarhang Muhammed Reza Shahandeh to command the 19th (Kwash) Brigade.
- (ii) Sarhang Abdul Hussein Hijazi to be Military Governor of Tehran.
- (iii) Staff Sarhang Abbas Hidayet to be Deputy Director of Army Transport.

#### *Internal Security.*

11. Two of the Arabs arrested after the operations in the Mianab area—see Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 10—have been hanged for highway robbery and several others have been condemned to death. The effect, as far as it is known at present, has been good.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

12. Reports from so many sources speak of considerable recent increases in the number of Russian troops in the Sharpur-Maku area of Western Azerbaijan that it may be accepted that there has been some increase. From fairly reliable sources it is reported that there are Soviet tanks in notable numbers in Sharpur, Khoi and at Bazergan on the Turkish frontier. Under orders from the Soviet commander air raid precautions have been instituted in Sharpur. These dispositions are interpreted locally as Russian menaces against Turkey. Russian policy towards the Kurds is also suspected of being directed with a view to their being used against the Turks.

13. A party of Russian officers and n.c.o.s. recently visited Bushire for a few days and stayed at the old Russian Consulate. This is probably the party reported in Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 15.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

14. M. Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, and his party returned from Moscow on the 10th August and left for London on the following day.

#### *American Affairs.*

15. Mr. Leland Morris, American Ambassador designate to Persia, has arrived in Tehran.

*Tehran, 13th August, 1944.*

[E 5317/422/34]

No. 19.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st August.)*  
(No. 331.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period of the 14th to the 20th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 21st August, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 19.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period  
14th to 20th August, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The interpellation of the Government has been postponed until next week, the Deputies having been unable to make up their minds as to what they want in the way of a Cabinet. They wished the Prime Minister to reconstitute the Cabinet before the interpellation, but he prefers to wait and see if he will be given a vote of confidence.

2. Yet another political party has been formed, the "Kar," under the leadership of Dr. Musharraf Nafisi (F.O. 154, M.A. 190). It published the usual admirable programme with perhaps less than the usual insincerity, for Dr. Nafisi, although unpopular on account of his blunt, ungracious manner, is genuine in his desire for better things. He believes, and includes it in his party programme, that Persia should be administered by Persians for the benefit of Persians. He disagrees strongly with some of Dr. Millspaugh's measures. The first issue of the party newspaper, *Pand*, enquires why the Allies should keep so many troops in Persia, especially in places like Khorassan which are very remotely concerned with the war.



3. The matter of Dr. Millspaugh's remarks published in the *Sitara*, to which reference was made in Summary No. 31/44, paragraph 3, has been raised in the Majlis. Strong exception was taken to Dr. Millspaugh's claim to be the defender of Persian independence against Persia's allies. The Prime Minister was asked what action was being taken by the Government since the Government was responsible for public statements made by its employees, of whom Dr. Millspaugh was one.

4. The meeting between the three potentates of South Persia, referred to in paragraph 8 below, attracted some attention in the press, meeting with the approval of some newspapers and provoking others to suggestions that it was a dangerous plot against the independence of Persia organised by foreigners. There is some anxiety lest the Russians, believing the agreement between the Southern tribes to be a British move, may attempt to form a similar union, under their influence, among the tribes of Azerbaijan. The Shah is suspicious that unity in the south may not be in his ultimate interest.

#### *Economic.*

5. The Cabinet has approved the formation of a Supreme Economic Council to act in an advisory capacity to the Government. It will be composed of twenty-four members, of whom eighteen will be nominated for a period of three years by a decree of the Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister and six will be elected by those eighteen. The duty of this council will be to advise the Government on all those matters which are within the province of Dr. Millspaugh's mission.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 6.—(i) Ghulam Hussein Ibtehaj (F.O. 89, M.A. 117) to be Mayor of Tehran.
- (ii) Zein-ul-Abidin Rahnema (F.O. 186, M.A. 237) to be Persian Minister at the headquarters of the Fighting French at Algiers.

#### *Persian Forces.*

7. Ten of the fifteen Anson aircraft to be given to the Persian Government in exchange for the Mohawk aircraft taken from them in 1941 have been delivered in Tehran, having been flown from Cairo by Persian pilots—see also Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 6.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *South Persia.*

8. The meeting between the Qavam-ul-Mulk, Morteza Quli Bakhtiari and Nasir Qashgai, referred to in Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 7, resulted in satisfaction to at least the two former. Nasir's views are not known. It was conducted in a friendly spirit and all three signed a document pledging themselves not to act against the interests of the Allies, to consult together before taking any action affecting each other's or their mutual interests and to stand together to protect their common interests. At Nasir's request a paragraph was added to the effect that Abdullah Zarghampur Boir Ahmadi would be allowed to adhere to this pact if he wished to do so. Abdullah Zarghampur is at present meeting with much opposition in his own tribes and it is doubtful whether his adherence will be of much value. He has appealed to Nasir for assistance, but it is reported that Nasir would now willingly get rid of his long-standing commitment to stand by Abdullah Zarghampur.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

9. The Persian General Staff report some 300 rifles have been collected without opposition from Moghul and Zilleki sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari—each tribe has been allowed to keep twenty-five for its own protection. The troops are now being withdrawn to Isfahan. See Summary No. 29/44, paragraph 8.

##### *Khuzestan.*

10. Five more of the Arabs arrested after the disarmament operations in Mianab have been hanged, making seven in all—see Summary No. 31/44, paragraph 11. All reliable reports agree that the effect on the Arabs generally has been good.

*Kurdistan.* 11. Some sections of the Jaf tribes who had migrated from Iraq to Persia refused to obey the orders of the Persian Government regarding the payment of grazing fees. Troops of the Saqqiz and Senneh garrisons were sent to enforce obedience. In the ensuing clash the Jaf suffered twenty to thirty casualties and were driven into Iraq. The Persian troops report two casualties and the death of a khan of the Tilekuh tribe who were supporting the troops.

##### *Shahrud.*

12. An anti-Bahai riot occurred at Shahrud in which several persons were killed. Order was restored by the Persian and Russian authorities.

*Tehran, 20th August, 1944.*

[E 5426/422/34]

No. 20.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th September.)*

(No. 338.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the period of the 21st to 27th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 28th August, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the Period 21st August to 27th August, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The Government resigned on the 26th August and Sa'ed, promised the support of eighty-five Deputies of the Azad, Mihan and Ittifaq-i-Melli groups, has been entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet. Presumably the three groups above mentioned will dictate its composition. Some Deputies, perhaps a majority, are demanding a complete change. It is unlikely that the unity of these groups in support of Sa'ed or of any aim will last for long, and it is generally considered that the new Cabinet, however composed, will be but a stop-gap Administration. Seyyid Zia is being spoken of more and more as the eventual most suitable successor to Sa'ed; but Seyyid Zia himself does not think that he can yet count on sufficient solid support. Relations between him and the Shah have recently improved outwardly, and Seyyid Zia's supporters find cause for optimism in a recent long interview he had with the Shah which he reported as having been satisfactory and as having resulted in a large measure of agreement on important points of policy. The Russians, however, show no signs of reducing their opposition to Seyyid Zia, and it is too early yet to accept as genuine the Shah's apparent inclination towards faith in his virtues.

2. An analysis of the 128 Deputies who have taken their seats in the Majlis shows that sixty-five are themselves landowners, thirteen come from the commercial and industrial classes, four are priests. Of the remaining forty-six a number have been elected through the influence of landlords and merchants whose interests they serve. The majority of the Deputies, therefore, represent no political party, nor do they stand for any political principle, nor even for the interests of the constituency from which they have been elected. Indeed, some of them are not even known in their constituencies. It is consequently not surprising that attempts to form a stable party in the Majlis have hitherto met with no success. Groups are formed which coalesce or disintegrate for some purely temporary or local reason. The 14th Majlis has shown even less sense of public responsibility and less unity than the 13th, and during the six months of its life it has passed practically no legislation. (See also Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 1.) The three years of parliamentary government that the country



has experienced since the abdication of Reza Shah have done nothing to dispel doubts of Persia's fitness for democratic government. Indeed, the conviction grows that no Government can function effectively while dependent for approval on so mercurial and irresponsible a body. The Shah wishes to form the Senate, which is provided for in the Constitution, possibly with the idea of closing the Majlis while preserving in the Senate some slight appearance of regard for the Constitution. He is the more inclined to this idea in that he has the right of appointing thirty of the sixty members of the Senate.

3. A report on the proceedings of the Tudeh party conference (see Summary No. 31/44, paragraph 4) has been published in the party press. Among the resolutions passed were: to fight Seyyid Zia and other dictatorial elements; to oppose all foreign advisers from whatever country they come; to oppose the grant of any economic concession that may weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation; to support friendly relations with all freedom-loving nations on a basis of mutual respect and complete recognition of the political and economic independence of Persia; to encourage the development and consolidation of labour unions and organise peasants and officials. Approval was given to the action of the Tudeh Deputies in fighting Seyyid Zia and the illegal actions of the American advisers. Dissatisfaction with the present control and organisation of the party was shown by resolutions to ensure better accounting for the party's funds, to tighten up party discipline, to ensure better co-operation between the centre and branches, and to purge the party of doubtful elements. The dominating personalities at the conference appear to have been Ovanasian, the Deputy for Armenians of the north, and Radmanish, Deputy for Lahijan. The former was trained at the Sociological College in Moscow and has spent many years in prison for Communist activity.

4. The Government has decided to prohibit the pilgrimage to Mecca this year as far as Persian subjects are concerned.

#### *Economic.*

5. The National Bank reports that notes in circulation now amount to 6,199,590,740 rials out of a total of notes printed to the value of 8,212,495,684 rials.

6. That prominent Deputy, Dr. Musaddiq, recently proposed in the Majlis that the Government should charge the Allies twice the cost price of any wheat delivered to them. He alleged that in the twelve months April 1943 to March 1944 the Allies had taken 100,000 tons of wheat. It is now a recognised Persian practice to use the word "Allies" when complaining of Russian actions, but to refer categorically to British and Americans in similar circumstances. The proposal was unanimously approved.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

- 7.—(i) Sherif Darakchi to be Farmandar of Birjand.
- (ii) Hadi Shahnaze to be Farmandar of Shafarud.
- (iii) Shahpur Mihan to be Farmandar of the new Shahrstan of Pahlevi.
- (iv) Ahmad Zelli to be Director-General of Customs.

#### *Persian Forces.*

#### *Appointments—Military.*

8. Army—
- (i) Sartip Baharmast to be Quartermaster-General of the Army.
- (ii) Sartip Mahdevi to be President of Military Tribunals.
- (iii) Sarhang Mihna to be Director of Personnel.

#### *Gendarmerie—*

- (iv) Sarhang Humayun to be Chief of Staff.
- (v) Sarhang Musherri to be Director of Operations.
- (vi) Sarhang Gudarzi to be Director of Personnel.
- (vii) Sarhang Jahansuzi to be Director of Plans.
- (viii) Sarhang Mu'tazadi to command the 1st (Central) District.
- (ix) Sarhang Shams Mulk Arai to command the Khuzestan District.
- (x) Sarhang Ma'zi to command the Isfahan Regiment.
- (xi) Sarhang Maulavi to command the Kermanshah Regiment.
- (xii) Sarhang Nurbaksh to command the Kerman Regiment.
- (xiii) Sarhang Fariburz to command the Shiraz Regiment.
- (xiv) Sarhang Ishqi to command the Mazandaran Regiment.
- (xv) Naib Sarhang Amir Parvizi to command the Tabriz Regiment.

#### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

#### *Internal Security.*

9. The opposition to Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, which was mentioned in Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 8, is being encouraged by the Persian military authorities in Khuzestan, who appear to be endeavouring to form a coalition of those Boir Ahmadi chiefs who resent Abdullah Khan's attempts to impose himself as chief on all the Boir Ahmadi tribes. The chief of one section of the Mamassani also shows some inclination to join the opposition, who are alleged to be receiving ammunition from the Persian military authorities. Abdullah Khan has appealed to Nasir Qashgai to implement his promise of support. The object of the Khuzestan military authorities, which is said to have the approval of the Shah, is to break up the combination of the southern tribes and to weaken them by provoking them to fight each other. The Governor-General of Fars is, however, of the opinion that this provocation is likely only to create disorder and he is recommending the abandonment of this policy.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

10. At a meeting in the Armenian Club in Tehran it was decided that Persian Armenians should be asked to contribute funds for the equipment of a tank regiment for the Soviet Army, to be named after the Armenian general, Bagramian.

11. During the current month 2,400 Russian ex-prisoners of war, liberated on European fronts, have been handed over to the Soviet authorities in Tehran by the British military authorities.

#### *Czechoslovak Affairs.*

12. A mixed military and civil official mission, including a representative of the Czechoslovak Government and three general officers, passed through Tehran on their way to Moscow.

*Tehran, 27th August, 1944.*

[E 5646/422/34]

No. 21.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th September.)*

(No. 345.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period of the 28th August to the 3rd September, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 4th September, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 21.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the Period 28th August to 3rd September, 1944.*

#### *Political.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

1. THE following Cabinet was presented to the Shah on the 31st August:—  
 Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed Maragheh.  
 War: General Muhammad Hussein Firuz (F.O. 72; M.A. 94).  
 Education: Baqir Kazemi (F.O. 110; M.A. 142).  
 Justice: Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198; M.A. 253).  
 Finance: Ali Asghar Zarinkafsh (F.O. 236; M.A. 309).  
 Commerce and Industry: Dr. Muhammad Nakhai (F.O. 157).  
 Interior: Muhammad Sururi (F.O. 219).  
 Posts and Telegraphs: Yusuf Mushar.  
 Communications: Muhammad Nariman.  
 Health: Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal (Acting) (F.O. 94).  
 Agriculture: Vacant.  
 Without Portfolio: Khalil Fahimi (F.O. 59; M.A. 82).

[29955]

H



Only the Prime Minister and the Minister without Portfolio were in the previous Cabinet. Of the others Baqir Kazemi, Allahyar Saleh and Muhammad Nariman have previously held Cabinet rank, the two last-named for very brief periods. Zarinkafsh, Nakhai, Sururi and Iqbal have recently been relatively satisfactory Under-Secretaries.

2. The ministers were selected from the list of twenty-five presented to the Prime Minister by the three groups, referred to in Summary No. 33/44, paragraph 1, who had combined for the purpose of Cabinet-making. The Tudeh party and the independent members were strongly opposed to the intervention of the Majlis in the selection of ministers, and the former were opposed to the return of Sa'ed as Prime Minister. When the Cabinet came to be presented to the Majlis the Tudeh and independent members absented themselves, with the result that there was not the necessary quorum to make the presentation legal. No one prophesies more than a short life, measured by most prophets in days, for this Cabinet. General Firuz has not yet accepted his nomination.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

3. Ismail Mehdi to be Persian Consul-General in Baku.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Kuh-i-Galu.*

4. The Persian Government has enjoined caution on its military authorities in Khuzestan in their encouragement of the coalition opposed to Abdullah Zarghampur, since they are not yet in a position to take advantage of hostilities which might involve the Mamassani and Qashgai tribes on opposite sides and might lead to a situation which the Persian authorities could not control. At the same time they want to keep the Opposition simmering and they will probably not discourage resistance by other Boir Ahmadi chiefs to Abdullah Zarghampur's attempts to impose his authority over them. See Summary No. 33/44, paragraph 9.

##### *Western Azerbaijan.*

5. Following on action by the Persian authorities in ejecting Persian Herki Kurds under the troublesome chief Zero Beg from several villages in the Daranduz district and the establishment there of gendarmerie posts, reports were current that Herki tribesmen from Iraq and armed followers of Mullah Mustafa had crossed the Persian frontier and were being joined by Mamesh and Begzadeh tribesmen. Their intention was said to be to drive the Persian authorities from Rezaieh and to set up a Kurdish administration. A later report said that, after negotiations between the tribes, who had concentrated in Margivar, and the commander of the Persian gendarmerie in Rezaieh, supported by a Russian official, the tribes had dispersed peacefully.

#### *Syrian Affairs.*

6. The Persian Government has recognised the Government of Syria.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

7. The Russian military party which was recently reported in Bakhtiari—see Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 15—made enquiries as to the number of arms in possession of the southern tribes and whether arms are reaching these tribes from any source. From comments in the Tudeh press it seems that the Russians believe the pact recently made between the three tribal representatives of the south (although Qavam ul Mulk can hardly be said to represent the Khamseh tribes nowadays) to have been engineered by the British as a defensive or perhaps offensive measure against the Tudeh. On the other hand, the Shah has given as reason for the recent collection of arms from certain sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari his belief that Russian agents had recently been intriguing among those tribes.

8. At a garden party held in Tabriz in aid of Red Army charities the sum of 1½ million rials is said to have been collected. The methods used to extort subscriptions were the usual blackmail and threats.

Tehran, 3rd September, 1944.

[E 5955/422/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th September.)*

(No. 365.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the period of the 4th to 17th September, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 18th September, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 22.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the Period  
4th-17th September, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

OPPOSITION in the Majlis has successfully managed to prolong the Cabinet crisis by a spate of talk and criticism which has lasted throughout the week and postponed the taking of a vote on the Government's programme. It is generally expected that the Government will have a majority when the vote is taken, but it can have no confidence that it will long be able to enjoy the support of a majority. General Firuz has not accepted his appointment as Minister for War. Indeed, it is reported that he has definitely refused on the grounds that he does not wish to be associated with a Government which has no hope of any effective achievement.

2. The Cabinet has adopted the programme of its predecessor (see Summary No. 13, paragraph 3) with the following additions:—

- The safeguarding of public security by putting into execution the principle of law; the autonomy of the judiciary and the suppression of all elements of disorder.
- The stabilisation of prices and the reduction of the cost of living; energetic suppression of hoarding.
- The execution of the law of compulsory primary education and the revision of programmes of instruction.
- Restrictions on the cultivation of opium.
- Reform of the electoral law.

##### *Economic.*

3. The Persian press states that the value of imports in the year March 1943–March 1944 was 1,527,233,572 rials and in the previous year 1,313,910,532 rials. The value of exports in 1943–44 was 703,986,178 rials and in the previous year 557,719,058 rials.

4. The Ministry of Health gives the following figures of the incidence of certain diseases in Persia:—

	Number of Cases reported.		Deaths.
Typhus (December 1942 to December 1943) ...	12,912		1,617
Smallpox (March 1943 to March 1944) ...	1,253		425
Malaria (March 1942 to March 1943) ...	208,559		735

The number of unreported cases probably exceeds the above figures in the case of malaria.

#### *Persian Forces.*

##### *Army.*

5. It has been decided not to proceed with General Ridley's scheme for the organisation at each divisional headquarters of independent recruit training centres under the control of a central training staff. The scheme was never popular with the present Chief of Staff, or with divisional commanders. Only in Tehran had such a centre been fully organised, but during the months it was in operation it had never been provided with efficient instructors or with



necessary equipment. It has now been abolished. Recruits will in future be trained, as before, in regiments.

6. According to the Chief of the Staff, Dr. Millsbaugh has agreed to find a further 15 million tomans for the army budget for the remaining six months of the current financial year. It is not yet known from what source this amount is to be obtained—whether by reducing the allotments to other Ministries, by increased taxation or by borrowing.

7. The remaining five Anson aircraft due to the Persian Government have now arrived in Tehran and have been delivered to the Persian air force (see Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 7).

#### *Appointments—Military.*

8.—(i) Sartip 'Ali Akbar She'ri to command 7th (Kerman and Mekran) Division.

(ii) Sarhang Mir Hussein Hashimi to command 5th (Luristan) Division.

(iii) Sarhang Muhammad Ahmad Sartipi to be Provost Marshal.

(iv) Sartip Ghulam 'Ali Ansari to be an Army Inspector.

(v) Sarhang Neisar to be Military Governor of Mahabad.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Western Azerbaijan.*

9. From several sources reports have been received to the effect that the movement for Kurdish independence is gaining strength in the Mahabad area. Five issues have now been made of the paper of the movement, the *Nishtman*, which is believed to be written mostly in Mahabad and is known to be printed in Tabriz with the help of the Russians. The Russians are generally suspected of being behind the movement; they are certainly watching it without disapproval. The Persian authorities are growing increasingly anxious. They are still trying to get Russian approval to the location of an adequate Persian garrison at Mahabad. Meanwhile, they have posted military officers as Governors of Mahabad and Sardasht, although their authority is likely to be only nominal. They are also considering plans for the extension of Government's authority in those parts of Kurdistan where the Russians do not impose restrictions on military movements.

##### *Kermanshah.*

10. A report has been received that Hama Rashid of Baneh, who was in revolt against the Persian Government in 1942, has attacked another Kurdish chief, Mahmud Kanisenani, and driven him out of his village of Merivan. Both these chiefs have for the past two years enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in their areas and have accepted responsibility and subsidies for the maintenance of order. Mahmud Kanisenani is now appealing for the intervention of Persian troops. Kurdish chiefs cannot for long refrain from demonstrating to the Persian Government the necessity for the establishment of firm Government authority in Kurdish territory.

11. Two Kalkhani chiefs, Rashid-es-Sultaneh and Rashid Agha, who had for some months been under detention by the Persian authorities, recently absconded and returned to their tribal country. Operations for their recapture were initiated by Persian troops, and these may have helped to drive the absconders into the territory of a hostile tribe, where one was killed and the other wounded and captured. The prestige of the Persian Government is now considered to have been vindicated.

##### *Bakhtiari.*

12. The Persian Chief of Staff reports that the operations for the collection of arms from the Moghui and certain sections of the Mamivand Chahar Lang have now been completed and that the troops have been withdrawn. His information is that about 700 rifles have been collected in all and that there are still some 2,000 rifles with the Mamivand.

##### *Fars.*

13. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, travelling by car on the 10th September, was shot up about 6 miles north of Shiraz. A Persian Government lorry which was following him was held up and rifled. The brigands have not yet been identified.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

14. The Russians are increasing the scope of their activities in Persia. They recently opened a hospital in Tabriz for the benefit of Persians, and there are rumours that they are considering opening hospitals in Isfahan and Shiraz. They have announced that Iransovtrans, the Soviet transport organisation operating in Persia for the carriage of supplies to Russia and for Russian military needs, is organising services in South Persia. An office has been opened in Isfahan, and owners of transport under contract to the Persian Road Transport Department are being bribed or otherwise induced to transfer their services to Iransovtrans. Merchants are being canvassed and are being offered rates cheaper than those of the Persian Transport Department, with no obligation to pay anything until the goods are safely delivered. In East Persia also, now that that route is no longer to be operated for supplies to Russia, lorry drivers employed by the U.K.C.C. are joining the Tudeh party and offering their services to Iransovtrans. The Persian Government has been persuaded to engage two Russian experts for the Ministry of Agriculture to combat the spread of epizootic diseases. These experts will have ample excuse for travelling and making investigations all over Persia. Some anxious excitement has been caused among Persians by the opening of a Russian military camp near the old city of Ray, 6 miles south of Tehran, and by reports that the Russian military authorities are renting houses in the town of Tehran which are all sited so as to command some important building or the residence of some important person. The Russians say that their camp near Ray is for the reception of further parties of ex-prisoners of war whom they expect from Egypt. After investigation at the camp those for repatriation to Russia will be entrained at the adjacent station. Confirmation has not yet been obtained of the reports of the renting of houses.

#### *British Affairs.*

15. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard returned to Tehran on the 8th September and reassumed charge of His Majesty's Embassy.

P.S.—The Cabinet was given a vote of confidence on the evening of the 17th September, 73 of the 100 Deputies present voting in their favour.



## CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 3985/3985/25]

No. 23.

*Mr. Jordan to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th July.)*

(No. 61.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

*Jedda, 1st July, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 23.

*Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1st July, 1944.*

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports.)

*Fighting France.*

\*M. Roger Maigret has returned to Jedda as "Délégué" of Fighting France. He was chargé d'affaires and later French Minister in Jedda from 1929 to 1938 (see report for 1937). He is being accorded by the Saudi Arabian Government, as a personal courtesy, all or nearly all the privileges of the head of a foreign mission.

It is difficult to see what useful rôle can be played by a representative of Fighting France in this country at present. France, whether Fighting or not, has lost any prestige she ever had here, and Ibn Saud has described the Fighting French as "just another slice from the same old loaf."

M. Maigret professes to be a firm adherent of the Allied cause, and it is believed that he was one of the first in Syria to rally to de Gaulle. His mentality, however, is revealed by the fact that he considers that any representative of France in Jedda, even an admittedly incompetent and shiftless M. Ballereau with his declared hostility to the Allies, is better than none.

As far as is known, M. Maigret holds no communication with his Vichy colleague. (Written in January 1943.)

Since his return from leave in December 1943 he has remained very much to himself, taking no part in social activities. His health is feeble and was further impaired by a long illness in the spring of 1944. The running of the délégation has been left in the slippery hands of Maître Bouez, a Syrian lawyer educated in France.

*Iraq.*

\*Jamil Pasha Ar-Rawi was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After two years at Kabul he has now returned to Jedda as Minister. He presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943.

He served during the war of 1914-18 first in the Turkish forces and then with his close friend Nuri Pasha as Saïd in the Arab forces. Was principal military aide-de-camp to King Hussein.

Jamil Pasha is a very pleasant and friendly colleague, but his health is not good. He is married, but his wife does not appear in masculine society. (Written in 1943.) She has now (1944) started "coming out" however.

*Netherlands.*

\*Daniel van der Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular chargé d'affaires, Dr. Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1926 to 1931 he was consul and later chargé d'affaires. He had just been promoted resident in the Dutch Colonial Service, and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs and speaks good English

and French. He is a most loyal supporter of the Allied cause. His wife, who is said to have some Javanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in counteracting her husband's occasional tendency to pessimism. Four of their children are in Holland. (Written in 1941.)

\*M. van der Meulen made a trip to the Yemen by land in the summer of 1942. In his opinion his trip did much to counteract Axis propaganda in the Yemen and served to show the Yemenis that the Netherlands was still a power in the world. (Written in 1943.)

He was made Minister Plenipotentiary and presented his letters on the 5th November, 1943. In January and February 1944 he made a tour of the Hadhramaut.

*Turkey.*

M. Ayashli (see report for 1943) left in 1943, and was replaced as Minister Plenipotentiary by M. Amin Ali Sipahi in January 1944. He presented his credentials on the 3rd February, 1944. He wife is a welcome addition to English-speaking feminine society in Jedda although she left for Egypt with her 11 year old son after only a short time. M. Sipahi himself is a pleasant and friendly colleague if somewhat inquisitive.

*United States.*

A permanent United States Legation was established at Jedda on the 1st May, 1942, the Minister being Mr. Alexander Kirk who was also Minister to Cairo, where he resided.

The resident chargé d'affaires in Jedda, Mr. James S. Moose (Junior), has now been appointed Minister Resident and presented his credentials on the 18th July, 1943. The United States Legation's connexion with Cairo has thus now ceased.

Mr. Moose is married, but his wife and family are in America. He is a pleasant colleague socially but inclined to display a certain reserve in matters where close co-operation is desirable. He was frequently absent in the spring of 1944 owing to the Cairo discussions.

*Representatives accredited also to other Governments.**Afghanistan.*

\*Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi, is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He came to Mecca on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was not seen by his Christian colleagues. (Written in January 1943.) Did not come to the Hejaz for the 1943 pilgrimage.

*Egypt.*

\*Bahrawi Bey has been transferred to a post in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has been succeeded by Mohammed Hosni Omar, who is also Minister to Iraq. He has not yet presented his credentials and nothing is known of him in Jedda.

The Egyptian Legation is in the charge of Abdul Hamid Monir Bey, a most friendly and helpful colleague who co-operates willingly over such questions as the pilgrimage. (Written in January 1943.)

Mohammed Hosni Omar visited Jedda for the 1943 pilgrimage. Owing to the absence on leave of Monir Bey in 1944 the legation was in charge of Ali Fahmi Al Amroussi, a pleasant if colourless person.

*Persia.*

\*Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission in both countries on an unspecified date in 1942, and, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet. (Written in January 1943.)



Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd August, 1944.)

## INDEX.

## Note on Titles, &amp;c.

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of 'Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheikh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, e.g., Sheikh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheikh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheikh" with age or desert life, e.g., Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, e.g., Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheikh or anything equally honorific, e.g., Muhammad Effendi 'Ali Ridha.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "al," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahman al (son of) Faysal al (of the house of) Sa'ud," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abu*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Colonel Glubb is known in the desert as "Abu Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

'Abadila. 52  
'Abbās 'Aqil. 27 (3)  
'Abbās ibn Yusuf Qattān. 44 (2)  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdurrahman. King. 1 (1)  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Hasan Qusaibi. 45 (1)  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim. 2  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammār. 3  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Muhammad al Idrisi. 36 (5)  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musā'id ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ud. 4  
'Abdul-'Aziz as-Sdayri. 50 (3)  
'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Zayd. 5  
'Abdul Kerim ibn Zayd. 59  
'Abdullah ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (6)  
'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahman. Amir. 1 (30)  
'Abdullah ibn Blayhid. 6

'Abdullah ibn Hasan. 12 (1)  
'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim al-Fadhl. 21 (4)  
'Abdullah ibn Hasan Qusaibi. 45 (3)  
'Abdullah ibn Huseyn. Amir. 52 (9)  
'Abdullah Kāzim. 7  
'Abdullah Khawaitir. 60  
'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil. 8  
'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl. 9  
'Abdullah an-Naffai. 10  
'Abdullah as-Sdayri. 50 (1)  
'Abdullah Suleyman el Hamdān. 11  
'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mādhl. 55  
'Abdul-Latif family. 12 (3)  
'Abdul-Majid ibn 'Ali Haydar, Sherif. 52 (1)  
'Abdul-Muhsin ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (7)  
'Abdul-Wahhāb family. 12

'Abdul-Wahhāb Abū Malha. 13  
'Abdul-Wahhāb ibn Muhammad al-Idrisi. 34 (4)  
'Abdur-Rahmān ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (8)  
'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Hasan Qusaibi. 45 (2)  
'Abdur-Ra'uf as-Sabbān. 14  
'Abid ibn Sūsai al-Idrisi. 36 (9)  
'Abū'l-Kilāb. 29 (1)  
Abū Tuqayqa family. 54  
Ahmed ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān. Amir. 1 (21)  
'Ajemi as-Suwayt. 53 (2)  
'Ali ibn 'Abdullah. Sherif. 52 (6)  
M. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh. 19 (4)  
'Ali ibn Ahmed ibn Mansūr. Sherif. 52 (15)  
M. 'Ali al Bedeywi. Sherif. 52 (18)  
'Ali Haydar. Sherif. 52 (1)  
'Ali ibn Huseyn. King. 52 (7)  
'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi. 52 (16)  
'Ali J'far. Sherif. 52 (2)  
'Ali ibn Muhammad al Idrisi. 36 (3)  
'Ali Tāha. 17  
'Aqil. ibn. 8, 80  
'Arabi ibn 'Abdul-'Al al Idrisi. 36 (7)  
'Arafa. 1  
'Araif. (Branch of Royal Family.) 1  
Asad al Faqih. 74  
Asaf ibn Huseyn. 61  
'Awayni. al. 30  
Bandar ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (11)  
Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish. 20 (1)  
Bashir as Sa'dāwi. 81  
Bedeywi. Sherifs. 52 (18) and (19)  
Blayhid. ibn. 6  
Bujād family. 18  
Dabbāgh family. 19  
Dawish family. 20  
Dhāwi 'Aun. 52 (b)  
Dhāwi Barakat. 52 (c)  
Dhāwi Zayd. 52 (a)  
Fadhl family. 21  
Fahad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (8)  
Fahad ibn Zu'ayr. 22  
Fawzan, as-Sābiq. 23  
Fawzan, Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah. al. 80  
Fawzan, 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn. 84  
Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (8)  
Faisal ibn Huseyn. King. 52 (8)  
Fuad Hamza. 24  
Ghauth. al. 28  
Hāfiz Wahba. 25  
Hamad ibn Suleyman al Hamdān. 26  
Hamdān. 11 and 26  
Hamdi Bey. 27  
Hamūd ibn Zayd. Sherif. 52 (13)  
Hamza al Ghauth al Madani, Seyyid. 28  
Harithi. al. 52 (16)  
Hasan ibn 'Ali al Idrisi. 36 (2)  
Hasan ibn Ibrahim Qusaibi. 45 (4)  
Hāzim ibn Hithlayn. 29 (2)  
Hithlayn family. 29  
Humayd family. 18  
Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish. 20 (2)  
Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh. 19 (3)  
Huseyn al 'Awayni. 30  
Huseyn al Harithi. Sherif. 52 (16)  
M. Huseyn Nasif. 31  
M. Huseyn Sha'ibi. 51 (2)  
Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh. 19 (1)  
Ibrahim ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān al Fadhl. 21 (2)  
Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammār. 32  
Ibrahim ibn Suleymān al 'Aqil. 21 (5)  
Ibrahim ibn Suleymān ibn Rifāda. 47  
Ibrahim Shura. 62  
Idrisi family. 36  
'Isa ibn 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh. 19 (1)  
Ja'adān as Suwayt. 53 (1)  
Ja'far. Sherif. 52 (2)  
Jamil Daud al Mussalimi. 63  
Jiluwi, Sa'ud ibn 'Abdullah ibn. 70  
Kamil al Qassāb. 64

Khairuddin Zuraikli. 65  
Khālid, Sherif. 52 (5)  
Khālid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (5)  
Khālib ibn Muhammad Hithlayn. 29 (3)  
Khālid al Qarqani. 37  
Khalil Hajjan. 75  
Khuraji, Shaikh Muhammad al. 76  
Kurdi, al. 15  
Mādhl. ibn. 55  
Mahmūd ibn Ahmed Abu Tuqayqa. 54 (2)  
Malha, Abū. 13  
Mansūr ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (9)  
Mansūr ibn 'Asaf. 46 (3)  
Mash'al ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (14)  
Mehdi Bey. 39  
Mirghani ibn M. Sherif al Idrisi. 36 (8)  
Mish'al ibn Rashid. 46 (2)  
Mu'ammār, ibn. 3  
Mu'ammār, ibn. 32  
Mubārak, ibn 'Abdur-Rahman. 40  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (4)  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mādhl. 38  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sheikh. 12 (2)  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah al Fadhl. 21 (1)  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman Abū Tuqayqa. 54 (1)  
Muhammad ibn 'Ali al Idrisi. 36 (1)  
Muhammad ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān al Fadhl. 21 (3)  
Muhammad al Bedeywi. Sherif. 52 (19)  
Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf. 35  
Muhammad Sādiq ibn 'Abdullah. 66  
Muhammad Sa'id al Kurdi. 15  
Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi. 51 (1)  
Muhammad Shata, Seyyid. 67  
Muhammad Surūr as-Sabbān. 58  
Muhammad at Tawil. 41  
Muhanna. Sherifs. 52 (17)  
Muhsin at Tayyeb. 68  
Musā'id. ibn. 4  
Musā'id ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (13)  
Musā'id ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān. Amir. 1 (32)  
Mustafa Badruddin. 42  
Mustafa al Idrisi. 36 (6)  
Mutayyib ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (17)  
Naffai, an-. 10  
Najib Ibrahim Sālha. 69  
Nanib, Suleyman. 83  
Nasif. 31  
Nasir ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amir. 1 (6)  
Nasir ibn 'Asaf. 46 (4)  
Nāif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd. 18 (2)  
Nāif ibn Hithlayn Abū'l-Kilāb. 29 (1)  
Neshimi, Ibrahim. 43  
Qarqani, al-. 37  
Qattān family. 44  
Qusaibi family. 45  
Rashid family. 46  
Rifāda family. 47  
Rushdi Malhas. 48  
Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim Qusaibi. 45 (5)  
Sabbān, as-. 14  
Sābiq, as-. 23  
Sa'd ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz, Amir. 1 (7)  
Sa'd ibn Faisal. 77  
Sālih ibn 'Abu Bakr Shata. 49  
Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz al 'Arafa. Amir. 1 (35)  
Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdurrahman. Amir. 1 (2)  
Sa'ud ibn Hedhlul. 71  
Sabābi, as-. 12 (2)  
Sa'dāwi, as-. 81  
Sdayri family. 50  
Sha'ibi family. 51  
Shaikh al Ardhi. 78  
Shaikh, Muhammad. 79  
Shākir ibn Zayd. Sherif. 52 (12)  
Sharaf Adnan, Sherif. 52 (3)  
Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin. Sherif. 52 (11)



Sharaf ibn Rājih. Sherif. 52 (14)  
 Sharaf Ridha. Sherif. 52 (4)  
 Sherifian family. 52  
 Sheykh. 12 (2)  
 Sultān ibn Rashid. 46 (1)  
 Sultān ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amīr. (1) 12  
 Sultān ibn Humayd ibn Bujād. 18 (1)  
 Suwayt family. 53  
 Tāha. 'Alī. 17  
 M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd ad-Dabbāgh. 19 (5)  
 Tala'at Wafa. 72  
 Talāl ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. Amīr. 1 (18)

Tuqayqa (Abu-) family. 54  
 Turki ibn Mādhi. 55  
 Turki as Sāyri. 50 (2)  
 Yahya an-Nasri. 56  
 Yasin Rawwaf. 35  
 Yusuf ibn Abdullah al Fauzan. 80  
 Yusuf ibn Salim Quattān. 44 (1)  
 Yusuf Yasin. 57  
 Zeyd, ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz. 5  
 Zeyd, ibn 'Abdul Kerim. 50  
 Zeyd ibn Huseyn, Sherif. 52 (10)  
 Zu'ayr, ibn-. 22

### 1. Royal Family.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmān al-Faysal al Sa'ūd*.—King of Sa'ūdi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ūd.

Born probably in 1882. Accompanied father on flight from Riyādh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyādh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmān survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Hail in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Alī. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrān. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ūd has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amir of Nejd and Imām of the Wahhābis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ūdi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhābism. His own Wahhābism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting. In 1938 it was observed that he walked slowly and stiffly, and Mr. Philby stated that he was not only averse to physical exertion, but also indifferent to public affairs; but he subsequently showed great activity of mind in the Palestine discussions.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish. Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyādh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great

Britain have been mainly friendly, and since 1939 he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asseverations, that his interests and those of the Arabs in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting much for love, but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937-39 entitles him to the cancellation of that description. He has been unwavering in his sympathy for the Allied cause throughout the present war and he has proved by his acts that he is ready to give "his friends, the British Government," every support possible in his peculiar and only partly civilised country short of involving Sa'ūdi Arabia in the war, which, he convincingly argues, would be less useful to His Majesty's Government than his present "neutrality."

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best English authority on the Sa'ūd family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

Throughout the past year (1943-44) Ibn Sa'ūd has shown himself to be as energetic and statesmanlike as ever in the conduct of the internal and external affairs of his kingdom. He, moreover, revealed a desire to reorganise the financial and economic administration of his kingdom by requesting His Majesty's Government to provide him with a Moslem financial adviser as also a military mission to train his army on more modern lines. His loyalty and friendship towards His Majesty's Government remained as steadfast as before and his desire not to prejudice their war effort is shown by his advice to Arab leaders to postpone discussions on Arab unity until after the war.

### Sons. All Amirs.

(2) *Sa'ūd ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Born at Kuwait in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Saudi stock. Has for some years been Viceroy of Nejd, and until 1934 seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was less travelled than his half-brother, Amir Faysal, having only left the country once when he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal" incident of 1926. In 1935, however, he visited Europe and visited several capitals including London where he stayed about five weeks (he received the G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited India.

Sa'ūd's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ūd's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damlūji and Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Saudi-Yemen war. He now affects a European style of entertaining—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ūd the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'ūdi Arabia progress on Western lines (e.g., introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and gives regular showings of British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ūd broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner. His eldest son, Fahad, was born about 1925, and was married to a daughter of the Amir Faysal, No. 1 (3), in May 1943. Is being allowed by his father to take an increasing share in the internal administration of the country and was present at many of the audiences between His Majesty's Minister and the King in September 1943 and March 1944. Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Saudi Army in March 1944.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhāb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe: in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England,



France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'udi mission which visited London and many other capitals. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards. At first very listless and rather nervous in European company, but could rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. His decorum is not known to have broken down until he reached Kuwait, where his indulgence in night-life scandalised the Sheykh and his subjects. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ud's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleymân, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymân had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyâdh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura. Represented Saudi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years or so he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of Europeans whom he knows. He has none of his father's picturesqueness of language, but speaks a very pure Arabic, clearly enunciated, with little trace of the Nejdî accent which all his brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942. Visited America and England from September to December 1943 with his brother, Khalid (No. 1 (5)). The two Amirs, who were accompanied by the Shaikh Hafiz Wahba (No. 25), travelled all the way by air. On their return journey, in December 1943, visited the battlefields in North Africa.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz*.—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'udi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khâlid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Saud in 1937 and 1938. Lives mostly at Riyâdh, visiting the Hejaz only for the pilgrimage. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually into his father's counsels; was present, together with the Amir Sa'ud, at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyâdh in March 1942. Visited India for health reasons in June 1943 together with Mansur No. 1 (9) and Shaikh Abdullah Suleiman (No. 11). Owing to their indiscreet and extravagant living their visit was not a success. Returned in October 1943.

(5) *Khâlid ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

(6) to (27). Sons of 20 and less in 1939 numbered twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nâsir (1920), Sa'd (1921), Fahad (1921), Mansûr (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sultân (1924), Musâ'id (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul-Muhsin (1928), Mûshari (1932), Muteb (1933), Talâl (1933), 'Abdur-Rahman (1933), Turki (1934), Badr (1934), Nawwâf (1934), Nayef (1935), Fawwâz (1936), Ma'jid (1937), Sulmân (1938) and (?) (1939). Two of them, Mish'al and Sultân, are said to be adopted sons, of the family of the Beni Rashid.

Mansûr, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyâdh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyâdh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyâdh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India, for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother, Muhammad and Abdullah Suleiman. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for

further medical treatment, returning with Faysal, whom he joined in Egypt, in December 1943. Appointed Minister of Defence in March 1944.

Talal, No. 1 (18).—One of the King's favourite sons. His mother, Umm Talal, one of the royal concubines, is the King's favourite. Talal went to Egypt in August 1944, on board H.M.S. *Sagitta*, for medical treatment. He was found to be suffering from syphilis, and after not very successful treatment returned by air in October.

#### Brothers. All Amirs.

No. 28 in 1943 report, *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahmân*.—Died July 1943 (see obituary).

(28) and (29) Sa'd and Sa'ud, who died in 1916 and 1939 respectively. The former left three sons: Faysal, Sa'ud and Fahad; and the latter two: Muhammad and Faysal.

(30) *'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahmân*.—Born about 1894. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him also well in hand. Seems to like ships, as he visited H.M.S. *Emerald* by special request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928. He takes a keen interest in agriculture. Accompanied King on pilgrimage and visit to Jedda in 1942 and in 1943.

(31) to (34) *Ahmad, Musâ'id, Sa'd and 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Younger men, the children of the old age of 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Faysal.

#### 'Arâif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arâif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ud ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyâdh. Their generic name of 'Arâif is one applied to raided camels, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ud in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(35) *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Sa'ud ibn Faysal*.—Married the King's sister Nûra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ud's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ud al-'Arafa who was described in a recent report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ud. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (q.v.) in October 1935.

#### 2. 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Ibrahim.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor *vice* the King's son Amir Khâlid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwân and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

#### 3. 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Mu'ammâr.

Governor of Jedda until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 1 (3)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammâr of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhâbi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyâdh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport until afflicted by paralysis in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941, but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.



## 4. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musd'id ibn Jiluwi ibn Sa'ud.

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hail since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyadh to 'Abha and Jizân, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hail. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'udi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hail. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyadh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

## 5. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamud) ibn Zeyd.

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hail family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammân in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'udi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'udi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jeddah. Sent to 'Ammân in August 1930 as Sa'udi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Beduin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Rusheyd Pasha.

## 6. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid.

A leading figure among the Wahhâbi Ulama. Comes from Hail. Qâdhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ud, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qâdhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhâbi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejd delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 12 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hail. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwan movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihâd at the time of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932.

## 7. 'Abdullah Kâzim.

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'udi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

## 8. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqeyil).

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifâda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebûk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Ikhwan mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifâda.

## 9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl.

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jeddah. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jeddah. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ud at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ud and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ud by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymân by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1939 and again during Faisal's absence in the winter of 1943.

## 10. 'Abdullah an-Nafisi.

Important as being Ibn Sa'ud's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

## 11. 'Abdullah ibn Suleymân al-Hamdân.

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwân. Rose to be head of the Diwân. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jeddah. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al-Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazir, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935 to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. In recent years has often spent long periods at Jeddah acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking turns in that duty with Yusuf Yasin. His relations with His Majesty's Minister improved greatly as contacts increased after the outbreak of war. On all occasions he has expressed pro-British sympathies, and, no doubt because he realises more clearly than any other of the King's advisers his country's complete dependence on British aid, has shown himself very reasonable and co-operative.



The main burden of dealing with the Italian Minister's procrastinations and evasions in January and February 1942 fell on him and he acquitted himself very creditably. He is the originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Kharj and shows great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much hostility, envy and ill-natured criticism from his brother advisers. A keen fisherman and a tireless traveller, his other pleasures include tobacco, and, it is rumoured, the bottle. He has a good sense of humour and repartee sharpened in many verbal battles with his rivals. His position was weakened somewhat by the dismissal in April 1944 of his friend and protégé Najib Salha (No. 69) whose pro-American enthusiasm he is thought to share. Was a very harassed and worried man during 1944 when faced with the prospect of having to reorganise the country's finances and economy on sounder lines.

12. *Abdul-Wahhâb, Descendants of.*

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhâbism:—

(1) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan.*—Is one of the leading Wahhâbi Ulema in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926, with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhâbi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwân extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihâd at the time of the Ibn Rifâda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qadhi. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Azîz ibn Sheykh,* nicknamed as-Sahâbi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyâdh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amîr Sa'ûd.

(3) *'Abdul-Latif Family.*—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihad referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amîr Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

13. *'Abdul-Wahhâb Abû Malha.*

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ûd to negotiate with the Imâm Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ûdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

14. *'Abdur-Ra'ûf as-Sabbân.*

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jedda, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ûdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbâghs. Given a post by the Amîr 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr-al-Hijâzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ûd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amîr 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad-al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director-General of Waqfs in December 1942 in succession to Seyyid Abdul-Wahhâb.

15. *Muhammad Sa'id al-Kurdi.*

Formerly Director of Police in Jedda. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the Legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jedda in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Seems to be supported by persons in high quarters, including probably Mehdi Bey (*q.v.*), and, not improbably, the Amîr Faysal and Fuad Bey Hamza. A man to watch but not to judge too hastily. Rides a horse, a thing now unusual in Jedda, and looks well on it. Was removed from his post in Jedda and

apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jedda in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

16. *'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassâm.*

Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English versions of the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements signed at Jedda in April 1942.

17. *'Ali Taha.*

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928, and, in addition, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since early in 1932. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence, but frightened of his own shadow. Completely ineffective, except on the rarest possible occasions, in connexion with foreign affairs. Normally serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jedda from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with His Majesty's Legation. Has a working knowledge of French but is afraid to use it.

18. *Bujâd (or Humayd) Family.*

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe. A confusing effect is produced by the use in past reports of the names Sultân ibn Bujâd, ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd and ibn Bujâd *tout court*, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is assumed in what follows regarding:—

(1) *Sultân ibn Humayd ibn Bujâd.*—Once one of Ibn Sa'ûd's stalwarts and one of the commanders of his troops when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a daughter married to the King's brother Muhammad. Noted early in 1927 as one of the extremists who were then inclining against the King. Became reconciled with him later, but finally stood in with Ibn Sa'ûd's opponents in the Nejd rebellion of 1929 and was accounted second only to Faysal ad-Dawish in importance. Was one of the earlier leaders to fall into the King's hands and was imprisoned at Riyâdh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close confinement, as no record has been found of the death of Sultân ibn Bujâd, the best known of the names cited above, and "ibn Humayd" was mentioned in a recent report as one of the prisoners who were receiving more lenient treatment than before, though, unlike the others, he was still not allowed to see his womenfolk. May still prove important, as he had a strong hold on his tribesmen, some of whom have been reported sullen over his imprisonment.

(2) *Nâif ibn Faysal ibn Humayd.*—A pretender to the chieftainship of the 'Ateyba, but moved to 'Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by No. (1). Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 and sent a minor relative, 'Obeyd, to spy out the land, but was apparently dissuaded by King Faisal from going ahead. Mentioned in 1932 as being still a refugee in 'Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mazyûna, sister of Faysal ad-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

19. *Dabbâgh Family.*

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (*i.e.*, some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifâda and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyâdh in June-July 1932, viz:—

(1) *Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah* and

(2) *'Isa ibn 'Abdullah*

More important are the following persons abroad:—

(3) *Huseyn ibn 'Abdullah*, brother of the above. Migrated to Mokalla in or about 1926. Has since done school-mastering in South-West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ûd. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al-Hijâzi and their National Pact. Sought, and



probably enlisted, the support of Shauqat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently at loggerheads with Ibn Sa'ūd at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrār seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jami'at ad Dif'a lil Hijāz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse attitude of British authorities and seems to have since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians. Arrested in the Hadhramaut in June 1942. Deported and handed over to the Saudi authorities who detained him in Jizan. Attempted to escape early in 1944 but was unsuccessful and has been kept in chains ever since. Otherwise well-treated by the local Amir.

(4) *M. 'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drowned at Jizān, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. Tāhir ibn Mas'ūd*, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg-shaped man." Born in 1890. Had some employment under King Huseyn. Obtained British-protected passport at Cairo in 1926 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahej to Amir Shākir of the 20th February, 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ūdi Government and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and 'Iraq. Was excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'ūdi Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education. Suspected of being involved in the Sherifian plot, 1940-41, but later pardoned by the King.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated, but they all seem to hang together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ūd, a hanger-on at 'Ammān, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifāda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifāda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisi, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Huseyn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbāgh al-Idrisi.

#### 20. *Dawish Family.*

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyādh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheikh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ūd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyādh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajmān, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubārak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ūd's brother 'Abdullah.

#### 21. *Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family.*

Nejdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original

'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ūd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ūd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jedda and does a tidy trade in grain. Disinherited by his father in 1943 as a result of a quarrel.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahman*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amir Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amir Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jedda and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amir Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a Legation there with the Sa'ūdi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymān. Later became Director of Finance in Jedda, then Government representative to the California-Arabia Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and now Saudi representative for supply matters in Bahrein. Speaks English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Suleymān al 'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-ul-Diwan of the Amir Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1930 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners.

#### 22. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr.*

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ūd. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ūd with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizān. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

#### 23. *Fawzan as-Sābiq.*

Sa'ūdi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August, 1936, upon the conclusion of the Sa'ūdi-Egyptian Treaty of May, 1936. Previously Sa'ūdi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqeyl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammān. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ūd's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Sir Walter Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the races in Cairo and Alexandria.



24. *Fuad Bey Hamza.*

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'id was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May, 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a Certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Danlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Danlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Prefers to call himself in English Deputy Minister. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'ûdi Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of more than elementary French. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ûd as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as his instrument for foreign affairs, and makes the most of his position, but probably does not enjoy Ibn Sa'ûd's full confidence, so that his power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'ûdi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Likes drafting laws. Would go to great lengths for the causes he has at heart, but is seldom, if ever, dishonest in diplomacy. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Has been spoken of as anti-British, and as pro-Soviet; probably wrongly. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ûd. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'ûdi Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after collapse of France in 1940. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'ûdi Minister in Angora where he proceeded in April 1943. It is clear that the King does not want him to return to Sa'ûdi Arabia, and the great power he once wielded has passed entirely into the hands of his rival, Yusuf Yasin.

Incurred the King's displeasure by intrigues and attempts at mediating between the French and the Syrians and the latter and the Lebanese when on a visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Saudi Arabia in April 1944 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Saud in April and May. He continues to remain with the King, who seems to attach greater importance to his counsels. It was rumoured in July 1944 that he was to be appointed first Saudi Minister in Washington.

25. *Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba.*

Sa'ûdi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ûd's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ûd's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ûd's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ûd at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the Legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'ûdi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hâfiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ûd, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has on occasion been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ûd on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhâbi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect he commands, but not probably his entire confidence. He was on leave in Sa'ûdi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Koweit, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faysal and Khalid on their visit to America and England in the winter of 1943. He returned with them to Saudi Arabia in December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely concerned at state of country's finances and general corruption of Saudi officials. The King appeared to consider him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944.

26. *Hamad Suleymân.*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khâlid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ûd's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'ûdi mission to the Yemen in



1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'udi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'udi delegation which visited Bahrain, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'udi blockade of that neighbouring state. Whilst at Bahrain he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the Political Agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ud in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah. Of even meaner appearance than his brother, a poor talker and not, apparently, very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his favourite outdoor sport was throwing stones. His eldest son, Suleymān-al-Hamad, born about 1917, takes some part in public affairs: he was for a time director of the agricultural project at Al-Kharj, and early in 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machinery and spare parts for the Minister of Finance; Suleyman represented Shaikh Yusuf Yasin as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's absence in October and November 1943. Visited Egypt again from May to July 1944, ostensibly on Government business, but managed to find time to indulge in lavish personal expenditure on the Government's account. He is a shallow, self-seeking young man.

#### 27. Hamdi Bey.

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ud and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became Officer Commanding in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Fawzi Bey Kawokji. Presents all the appearance of a man who might be good in a rough and tumble; none of having the education necessary to create anything serious out of the embryo regular army, as Faudhi Bey might have done had he not lost favour. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British Staff of the Hejaz Air Force in 1931-32. Acts on occasion as A.D.C. to the King, attending him on his visits to Jedda and being sent to meet sloops, &c. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's Albanian step-father-in-law, Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous uniform gives an impression of seediness and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan of two riyals.

#### 28. Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani.

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Saudi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the 'Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwān in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage, and is now frequently present at meetings of the "cabinet."

#### 29. Hithlayn Family.

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydān ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in

April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Nāif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed Abū 'l Kilāb).—Succeeded Dhaydān and carried on the revolt, but surrendered in January 1930 to the British authorities in Kuwait, and was in due course handed over to Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyādh, closely confined.

(2) *Hāzim ibn Hithlayn* also took an active part in the revolt, and was one of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Nāif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khālid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "debonair and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and 'Ajman Sheikhs living in 'Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair, apparently to size up the chances of new anti-Sa'udi action. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud and returned to Sa'udi Arabia towards the end of 1934. Appointed Amīr al Bādiya or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at 'Aweyma (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif) in 1936.

#### 30. Huseyn al 'Awayni (or Aouzini).

A young Syrian merchant established in Jedda. An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin and having connexions in Manchester; notably with another Syrian, 'Abdul-Ghāni Ydlibi, the naturalised British head of a small company there. This association was close early in 1932, when Ydlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire, and specifically that of the Calico Printers' Association (Limited). It was understood in 1932 that 'Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he still returns occasionally. Now lives principally at Haifa. In February or March 1933 he went to Riyādh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a National Bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune, in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used. Appears to be closely associated in business with Najib Salha (q.v.). Has spent the last year or so in Beirut, where he is said to act as Ibn Sa'ud's semi-official purchasing agent. Although nothing has yet been proved against him, the British security authorities have regarded him for a long time as suspect and only reluctantly agreed to his return to the Lebanon. Visited Ibn Sa'ud in February 1944 and returned to Beirut in April. Ibn Sa'ud wished to appoint him first Saudi Minister in Beirut, but later agreed with His Majesty's Government that his appointment would be unsuitable.

#### 31. M. Huseyn Nasif.

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the 'Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhābi by conviction, even before the Sa'udi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ud up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace." Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'udi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38.

#### 32. Ibrahim al Mu'ammār.

Qaimmaqam of Jedda 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammār, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ud's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ud in 1932. In



1933 was appointed *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Faysal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920, formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1943) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad. Another son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, born about 1923, is a student at the American University of Beirut. A hearty rogue, he was dismissed in April 1944 as a result of a scandal connected with a slave-girl and his unblushing peculation of Government stores and smuggling activities.

### 33. Ibrahim Shakir.

Born about 1903 in the Hejaz of Turkish-Syrian parents. Was employed as chief clerk in the Jedda Quarantine Department during the latter part of the Hashimite régime. Next heard of as partner of Hussain-al-Awayni (*q.v.*) in 1927. Has since managed Awayni's piece-goods business in Jedda and acquired a considerable personal fortune in conjunction with Awayni and Najib Salha (*q.v.*). Acts as land agent for the Amir Faysal. In 1943 built a large mansion outside Jedda, which he has now (July 1944) let to the United States Legation at an exorbitant rental. Has also built a luxurious villa in Cairo. A close friend of Yusuf Yasin.

### 34. Izzet Din Shawa.


Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after the rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ud provided he refrained from political activities. He has been in Sa'udi Arabia ever since and has kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Kharj early in 1944 and in April Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda in succession to Najib Salha. A sincere nationalist, he is outspoken about his views on Palestine, but is not really anti-British. The legation has found him to be an intelligent and co-operative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'udi officials. Has a son at Victoria College.

### 35. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf.

Formerly Sa'udi consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ud and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ud as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwaf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'udi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (*q.v.*) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Qaimmaqam, not Amir) of Jedda, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammir. Ceased to be *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad in 1938, when a Saudi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

### 36. Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisi supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abū 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with 'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth:—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ud in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abhā.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ud by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ud, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud in November 1932, and on its collapse in due course took refuge in Yemen. After strenuous efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ud agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imām's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masāriha and other tribes in 1924 against an attempt to displace him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeyda, then an Idrisi possession. 'Ali, in turn, lost Hodeyda to the Imām in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a *coup* in 'Asir. Recently attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1935, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul-Al or 'Abdul-Mutāl. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia in recent years:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin 'Ali, No. (3). Died in Egypt in 1930.



(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Has been politically active for many years. Works normally, it is alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'ūdi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ūd's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jedda on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stonehewer Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'ūdi, but not pro-Wahhābi. Accused by the Sa'ūdi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizān at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Kamaran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senūsi, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisis have also a connexion with the Mirghāni family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

### 37. *Khālid Al Qarqani* (alias *Al Hūd*, alias *Abu'l Walid*).

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senūsi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmān 'Azzām Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senūsi cause, former Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'ūdi Arabia. Al Qarqani was brought to Ibn Sa'ūd's notice, it is said, by Sheikh Hāfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German consul, de Haas. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleymān (*q.v.*) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ūd's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with Turki al Madhi, formed an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'ūdi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'ūdi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Koweit Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'ūdi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Saudi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amir Sa'ūd, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ūd. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a mission to purchase arms for Sa'ūdi Arabia. Had an interview with Hitler, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French and perhaps Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by Ibn Sa'ūd as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti-British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab. Is now in poor health (1943). It was rumoured in July 1944 that he was to be appointed Sa'ūdi Minister in Angora in place of Fuad Hamza. Speaks fair Turkish.

### 38. *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi*.

A Nejdi, formerly Governor of Jizān. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar, which post he now holds. A friend of the Qaimmaqam of Jedda, but without the latter's knowledge of the world outside Arabia. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejdi accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited

Dhahran in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their aircraft forcedlanded on Tarūt Island in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al-Qatīf, and another brother, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mādhi, is Governor of Dhiba.

### 39. *Mehdi Bey*.

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An 'Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in 'Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Huseyn's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'ūdi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Sa'ūd the title of *al Muslih* (The Reformer).

### 40. *'Abdur-Rahmān ibn Mubārak*.

Governor of Wejh. Little known to the Legation, but worth mentioning because of the importance of his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubārak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

### 41. *Muhammad at-Tawil*.

A native of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jedda under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Ali in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqāf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jedda, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi, but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ūd after an absence at Riyādh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hasa. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations and trodden on Qusaibi corns in the process, but not to have made the Hasa Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrain, but he fell foul of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hāshim was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At-Tawil was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport Company. Since 1943 appears to have lived in retirement on his estate in Hasa. The company is now defunct.

### 42. *Mustafa Badruddin*.

Director of Customs in Jedda. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jedda custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jedda in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, but was reported not long ago to be disconcertingly honest. If so, he has not seriously infected the custom-house as a whole with this malady. Popularly supposed to hold "Axis views" and certainly conceals very well any affection he may have for the British. Is reputed to be well in with gangs of dhow-men smuggling goods across the Red Sea. Arrested in May 1944 when a large consignment of gold was caught being smuggled out of Jedda to Egypt. Released shortly after.

### 43. *Ibrahim an-Neshmi*.

Formerly Amir of Jauf. Said to be a Nejdi; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it;



and to have escaped to the Sa'udi side, where his knowledge of the situation in Medina was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at Tebuk and perhaps at Yanbu' in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musâ'id (q.v.) about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al-'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933. Is now (May 1934) one of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Saudi-Yemen border. Governor of Turâba in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Najrân.

#### 44. Qattân Family.

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salim Qattân*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original Qattân family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter Alif from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under King Huseyn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *'Abbâs Qattân*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Sheykh 'Abdullah Suleymân, Minister of Finance, and is chief organiser of the hotels recently opened at Mecca, Jedda and Medina.

#### 45. Qusaibi Family.

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The Legation is indebted to the Political Agent in Bahrein for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931, and of which the following is a summary:—

Said to be descended from a butcher of Riyâdh. Composed of the five brothers mentioned below; children of the same mother by two brothers, Hasan and Ibrahim, who married her successively; partners in business and property; engaged in trade between Bahrein, their headquarters, Hasa and Nejd. Accounted, despite the acquisition of wealth, extremely plebeian and disqualified by Arab custom from intermarriage with women of better birth.

(1) *'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Hasan*, simple and wise; the mainstay of the firm; reputed pious; respected by Ibn Sa'ûd. Was Sa'ûdi delegate to the abortive Blockade Conference at Kuwait in 1935.

(2) *'Abdur-Rahmân ibn Hasan*, more enlightened and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possessed of some knowledge of French and English and accustomed to go to Paris on pearl business. Sensible but conceited.

(3) *'Abdullah ibn Hasan*, intelligent and sharp, but of mean and low character and meddlesome. Inclined to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ûd.

(4) *Hasan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character as (3). Hot tempered.

(5) *Sa'ad ibn Ibrahim*, permanently resident in Hasa. Not personally known to Captain Prior. Said to be a good "mixer," but similar in character to (3) and (4).

When the above information was supplied in 1931 the Qusaibis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ûd in Bahrein and buyers of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahmân was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'ûdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Qusaibis with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by Muhammad at-Tawil (q.v.). They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Qusaibis of their general agency for him at Bahrein. The Amir Sa'ûd frequently employed

the Qusaibis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

#### 46. Rashid Family.

Former rulers of Hâil. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, e.g., if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ûd. It is understood that, after the fall of Hâil, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the Beni Rashid, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashid lady, whom Ibn Sa'ûd married after their birth. Their names are—

- (1) *Sultân* and
- (2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling ibn Rashid, as given in the 1917 volume of Personalities in Arabia. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the Beni Rashid, viz.—

(3) *Mansûr ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ûd's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebuk; and his brother—

(4) *Nâsir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ûd, but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied Ibn Sa'ûd from Riyâdh to Jedda in March, 1934:—

(5) *Muhammad ibn Talâl* (a daughter of his was married to Ibn Sa'ûd in 1938).

(6) *Mash'al ibn Mas'ûd ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz*.

(7) *Rashid al Muheysin al Jabr*.

(8) *Sultân ibn Talâl al Jabr*.

(9) *Fahad ibn Hamûd al Jabr*.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the Beni Rashid who came to the Hejâz with Ibn Sa'ûd in March of that year. This list gave all the names, except (6), unless the name *Mash'al al Sa'ûd* in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

(10) *'Abdullah al Mit'ib*.

(11) *'Ubaid al 'Abdullah*.

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ûd's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ûdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid*, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hâil, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

#### 47. Rifâda Family.

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, *Suleymân Afân*, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the Great War, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, *Ibrahim* and *Ahmed*. His brother *Salim*, who had died earlier, left a son, *Hamid*. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. *Hamid* made a bid for the Sheykhship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheykh who



approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a *coup* at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Wejh is now Ibn Mubarak (see No. 40). The family have *attaches* with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

#### 48. *Rushdi Malhas.*

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'udi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1936, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief he is affable and talkative. Well read in Arabic literature and history. Speaks good Turkish and some French.

#### 49. *Sālih ibn Abu Bakr Shāta.*

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jedda after the Sa'udi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ud. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Sālih Shāta was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 67. Referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

#### 50. *Sdayri Family.*

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ud through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Five members of the family have come to notice in recent years, viz. :—

(1) *'Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tebūk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).

(2) *Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Asir, with headquarters at Abha.

(3) *'Abdul 'Aziz as-Sdayri*, Governor of Jauif, with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is the best known and most important member of the family.

(4) *Muhammad as-Sdayri*, younger brother of (3), Governor of Sakaka.

(5) *Ahmad ibn Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Al-Qunfida.

#### 51. *Sha'ibi Family.*

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) *Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi*, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

#### 52. *Sherifian Family.*

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Alī, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Alī, and whole clans known collectively as Ashrāf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz. :—

The Dhāwī Zeyd,

The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhāwī 'Aun, and

The Dhāwī Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhāwī Zeyd and Dhāwī 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhāwī 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'udi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who have come to notice in recent years :—

#### (A) *Dhāwī Zeyd.*

(1) *'Alī Haydar*.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support in obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ud. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in the last Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Alī Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St. Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'afar Haidar*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Alī Ja'far who lived at Lahej in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul-Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf 'Adnān Pasha al Ghālib as-Zeyd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ud won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Alī brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ud in 1927 at conference at Jizān to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1943) to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(5) *Khālid*.—A nephew of the 'Alī Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khālid Sadiq Adnān.

#### (B) *Dhāwī 'Aun.*

(6) *'Alī ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār al Hijāzi.



(7) *'Ali ibn Huseyn*.—Ex-King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jedda in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) *Faysal ibn Huseyn*.—King of 'Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Násir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10A) *'Abdul Hamid Al 'Aun*. Understood to be a grandson of (6). Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ud in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyádh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) *Dhāwī Barakat*.

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ud and became Amir-al-Arbān, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Recently returned to Mecca from Egypt, but his present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stock though not of the Dhāwī 'Aun*.

(12) *Shākir ibn Zeyd ibn Fawwāz*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ud and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamūd ibn Zeyd*, brother of the preceding.—Probably the same as the 'Sharif Hamūd' who joined the plot with No. (10A) and was carried off to Riyádh, dying, it is said, on the road.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Rājih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tāhir ad-Dabbāgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'udi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*.

(15) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansūr*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyádh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyádh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jedda family, one member of which was Chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyádh at the time of the Ibn Rifāda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. 'Ali and Muhammad al-Bedeywi* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyna tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the

similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related, persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifāda affair in 1932. M. 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the 'Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhāba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifāda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

53. *Suwayt Family*.

Leaders in the Dhāfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

(1) *Ja'dān*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ud and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajemī*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ud.

54. *Abu Tuqayqa Family*.

Formerly chiefs of the Tihāma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytāt tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhāba. Rafī'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafī'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhāba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ud," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifāda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'udi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifāda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahīm ibn Alwān ibn Rafī'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifāda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmūd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafī'a*, who ratted on Ibn Rifāda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ud.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ud, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

55. *Turki ibn Madhi*.

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ud realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhāb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imām Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imām early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ud's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'udi Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943.

56. *Yahya an Nasri*.

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'udi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the Legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'udi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmūd Hamdi Hamūda.

57. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh*.

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the



'Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ud in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejd delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damluji, who resigned that year, and of Hafiz Wahba (*q.v.*). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwan in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'udi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers except 'Abdullah Suleyman. Is probably a more convinced Wahhabi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of 'Abdullah al Suleyman and of the latter's powerful assistant, Najib Salha. Since 1941 has lived almost continuously in the Hejaz, spending most of his time in Jeddah. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the Legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Faysal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'udi Arabia of the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements which he signed at Jeddah on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the *Umm-ul-Qura* and drafts official communiqués for publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ud to England for the coronation of King George VI. Speaks Arabic with perhaps greater rapidity than any other man in Arabia and retains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Lattaqia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najib Salha (No. 69) in 1943 and he bitterly opposed the latter's dismissal in April 1944, remaining in close touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussions between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ud early in 1944 on the reorganisation of Sa'udi finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported Abdullah Suleiman in opposing any proposals for reform. A pompous busybody, his loyalty to the King appears to be genuine though it occasionally serves as a cloak to hide personal motives. A difficult colleague with the small-mindedness of a Latakian grocer but not unpleasant if taken with a pinch of salt. His English continues to improve, thanks to the successive efforts of legation secretaries.

#### 58. Muhammad Surur as-Sabban.

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabban family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ud when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyadh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Is nowadays second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of recently formed Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936

to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surur had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najib Salha (*q.v.*) has rapidly regained his influence.

#### 59. 'Abdul Kerim ibn Zeyd.

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936. Nephew of 'Abdul-Azis ibn Zeyd (No. 5).

#### 60. 'Abdullah Khawaiter.

Of Nejd origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Suleyman and Hamad Suleyman with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surur (No. 58).

#### 61. Asaf ibn Huseyn.

Appointed Governor of Najran and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Rus.

#### 62. Ibrahim Shura.

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Sheikh Hafiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'udi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

#### 63. Jamil Da'ud al Musallimi.

Legal adviser, or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. A Hejazi trained in Egypt. Good knowledge of English. Received his present appointment *vice* 'Id Rawwaf (No. 35) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejazi encroachment on what has been for some time almost a Syrian preserve, and was attributed to the influence of Amir Feysal. Jamil Da'ud is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the Legation. Has been found on many occasions obstructive and tactless. Is probably neither very intelligent nor energetic. Has shown himself latterly (1944) to be more co-operative in his dealings with the legation.

#### 64. Kamil al Qassab.

Syrian. Born about 1875. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Huseyn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ud and became Sa'udi propagandist. Prominent in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa'ud's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he went from Egypt when charged with communications from Ibn Sa'ud. Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine. In 1942 was fishing for the post of Syrian representative to Sa'udi Arabia.

#### 65. Khairuddin Zuraikli.

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ud. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'udi Agency in Cairo in 1935. Now (1943) Secretary of the Saudi Legation there. Counsellor of the legation in 1944. One of Najib Salha's associates.

#### 66. Muhammad Sadiq ibn 'Abdullah.

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was Commandant of the Jeddah garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tahir ad-Dabbagh in anti-Sa'udi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'udi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tahir to Saudi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqaf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.



67. *Seyyid Muhammad Shata.*

Younger brother of Sâlih ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 49). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia' Courts.

68. *Muhsin at Tayyeb.*

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime. Under Ibn Sa'ûd he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'ûdi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence. Attached as liaison officer to the British R.A.C. training unit which arrived in Taif in May 1944 to instruct the Sa'ûdi army in the handling of armoured cars presented to the Sa'ûdi Arabian Government by His Majesty's Government. An intriguer who is not popular with his colleagues and who is now (July 1944) about to be replaced by a younger officer.

69. *Najib Ibrahim Sâhâ.*

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) (Limited). After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jeddah, he entered the Ministry of Finance. Speaking English well and of pleasant manners, he made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'ûdi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surûr, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions. Has now become indispensable to the Minister of Finance and has been specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but finds it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. Since the outbreak of war he has been in constant contact with the Legation and has shown himself intelligent and frank. He works very hard and has co-operated most helpfully with the Legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Is free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa'ûdi Government and has made many enemies but is loyally backed by 'Abdullah al Suleymân, and is probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He is said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhabi or even a very devout Moslem. Early in 1944 evidence came to light which showed him in his true colours. It was found that he had made use of his position to enrich himself, and one of his associates in crime now estimates his personal fortune at £360,000, in addition to a handsome account in the Guarantee Trust Bank of New York. It transpires that he had deliberately misinformed the legation about the true supply and financial situation of the country in order to ensure the continuance of His Majesty's Government's generous assistance to Sa'ûdi Arabia and thereby to increase his own fortune. When in Cairo early in 1944 he began intriguing with the Americans, whom he had always sought to play off against the British, and warned His Majesty's Minister that the Sa'ûdi Arabian Government would ask for his recall if he were not more complacent over the matter of supplies and finance. Ibn Sa'ûd, who learned of Najib's activities, was furious and dismissed him in April, in spite of strong pressure from Abdullah Suleiman and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, telling His Majesty's Minister that he had always disliked Najib and had only kept him on because he enjoyed British support. He is at present (July 1944) in Cairo, where he has started a transport company. Ibn Sa'ûd, always generous to those that have served him, is said to be paying him a "retaining fee." His place as Director of the Office of Public Works at Jeddah has been taken by Izzet Din Shawa (No. 34).

70. *Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi.*

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of

ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrein to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

71. *Sa'ûd ibn Hedhlâl.*

Appointed Governor of Tabûk in 1936 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

72. *Tala'at Wafa.*

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'ûdi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'ûdi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najrân, and O.C. regular forces in Najrân and Abha in 1936. Appointed Deputy Director of Public Security in 1943.

73. *Ibrahim Tâsân.*

A Nejdî born and brought up in Asir. Formerly in the Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the Jeddah military district and "Director of the Air Force." Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

74. *Asad al Faqih.*

A young Syrian. Counsellor to the Saudi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards Chargé d'Affaires and appointed in 1943 to be Minister there. Has some knowledge of English. A native of 'Aley in the Lebanon.

75. *Khalil Hajjan.*

Director of Police, Jeddah. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ûd after the fall of Jeddah in 1925. A heavy drinker.

76. *Khurâijî, Shaikh Muhammad al-*

Brother-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

77. *Sa'd ibn Faisal.*

Governor of Duwadmi, 1938. Born about 1898. Son of a Royal slave.

78. *Shaikh al Ardî.*

Family name of two young Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, who is doctor of the Royal ladies, accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee. He came to Riyâdh as a penniless refugee and is known to have become rich in a few years, not by doctoring. Stated on very good evidence to have brought with him from Syria as maid to his wife an Armenian girl (entered on his passport as his sister) and to have handed over the unwilling girl to Ibn Sa'ûd as a concubine. Accompanied the Amir Mansûr on a visit to Egypt in March 1942. The younger brother, Fakhri, who describes himself as an agricultural expert, was in charge of a small experimental garden at Riyâdh in 1939, and was also employed that year as Courier to Paris. Fakhri was appointed first secretary to the Sa'ûdi Legation in Bagdad in 1942 and transferred in 1943 as first Sa'ûdi Consul to Basra. Midhat was dismissed by the King in July 1943 but later reinstated at the request of Yusuf Yasin (*q.v.*) and other Syrians in the Sa'ûdi Government.

79. *Shaikh, Muhammad.*

One of the numerous young Syrians in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ûd to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Sa'ûdi Government. Assisted Yusuf Yasin in negotiating the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements at Jeddah in 1940-42.

80. *Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah al Fauzan.*

Formerly lived in Bombay, where he acted as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ûd. Appointed Consul-General at Jerusalem in February 1941. An intelligent young man with pleasing manners. Speaks English well.



81. *Bashir as-Sa'dāwi*.

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khālid al Qarqani (*q.v.*). Like Khālid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ūd as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyādh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyādh in March 1942, nor during his visits to the King in the spring of 1944.

82. *Nāsir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil*.

Director of Finance at Jedda. A cousin of Ibrahim al Suleyman ibn 'Aqil.

83. *Suleyman Nanth*.

Director of Coastguards. A Nejdī, like nearly all the rest of the service. Friendly and helpful. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz.

84. *'Abdul Aziz ibn Fawzān*.

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyādh. A Koweiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ūd, of the Sa'ūdi army's mechanised transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time that he has a pretty accurate knowledge of what goes on in the King's councils. He is much in contact with the Amir Mansūr who frequents the garage.

## Obituary.

(Died since last report—June 1943.)

*Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahmān*, No. 28 in 1943 report.

## CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND LEBANON.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 4229/2154/89]

No. 25.

*Mr. Eden to Sir E. Spears (Beirut).*

(No. 53A.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 27th July, 1943.*

WITH the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, our relations with the French will shortly enter a new phase, and I think it may be useful if I review the instructions sent to you in my despatch of the 6th February, 1942, on your first appointment as His Majesty's Minister, and redefine in broad outline the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Syria and the Lebanon, and to the French position in those countries.

2. While the overriding consideration for the period of the war must be the necessities of the war effort, it was laid down in your original instructions that it was not our aim to remove the French from the Levant or to substitute British authority for that of France. The pledges given to General de Gaulle by Mr. Lyttelton and reaffirmed by the Prime Minister, that once the essential step of giving independence to Syria and the Lebanon has been taken, France shall retain her pre-eminent position in the Levant, still stand. Our main interest in the political development of the Levant States is, therefore, to ensure that the promise of independence, in which we have associated ourselves with the Fighting French, should gradually be fulfilled. While it would be contrary to the general policy of the United Nations to allow a definitive treaty between the parties concerned to be negotiated before the end of the war or to regard the French Committee of Liberation as entitled to conclude such a treaty in the name of France, we should welcome the eventual conclusion of a treaty between France and the two States which would bring the French position in the Levant after the war into line with that which we ourselves hold in Iraq.

3. Broadly speaking, therefore, we are thus entitled to intervene in the Levant on two main grounds. One is to ensure that all measures are taken, whether political, military, or economic, which, for reasons of military security, are considered essential by the Minister of State and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The second is to ensure that no action is taken which would imply that the pledges of independence are not to be fulfilled. But our intervention (properly so-called and as distinct from friendly and informal representations) should be confined to these two points, and the interpretation of our policy must not be stretched to cover matters which cannot directly affect military security or engage British good faith. We can claim partnership with the French in all matters affecting the war effort, but we do not seek equal status, or claim partnership with them in the Levant. This last principle must determine the attitude we should adopt towards the forthcoming elections. No doubt many or most of the candidates sponsored, however improperly, by the French are scallywags like Mokaddam, and it is perhaps inevitable that other and possibly better candidates should be alleged in some quarters, however incorrectly, to have the support of our own local authorities. But we should take steps to combat any suggestion that the election is in any way a trial of strength between the French and ourselves.

4. It has on several occasions been suggested that the wide powers exercised by the French in the Levant to-day are derived from the state of war, and that if our wishes on certain points are not met, these powers should be withdrawn and should be reassumed by the supreme military authority. This is not the view of His Majesty's Government. As I explained in my telegram No. 89, Saving, of the 15th September, 1942, the 9th Army cannot be regarded as an army of occupation, nor can His Majesty's Government claim to be an occupying Power in the Levant States. Our relations with the French are based on the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements of the 24th and 25th July, 1941, and on the public statements by the Prime Minister quoted in your original instructions. These and other supplementary agreements must govern our relations unless and until they are replaced or otherwise terminated. It is important, as stated in paragraph 3 of my despatch of the 6th February, 1942, that any demands made to the French authorities should be clearly based on the relevant provision of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements.

[29955]

K 4



5. I fully realise that we are faced with a certain degree of misgovernment and maladministration in the Levant States, and that in so far as popular discontent might involve local complications affecting military security, we cannot divest ourselves of a close concern in all current events. The same considerations apply with equal force to political, military and economic questions. Now that the French representatives in Beirut are to be controlled from Algiers, however, it is more than ever necessary that our policy in Syria should be considered in relation, not only to our policy in the Middle East as a whole, but also to the French as a whole. It is essential that our interventions in Levant affairs should be so framed as not to give legitimate grounds to the French, either in the Levant or outside, to consider them to be part of a plan to oust them from the Levant altogether contrary to the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements or to whittle away and encroach upon their position for reasons of our own. The French are all too prone to suspicions of this sort. I shall, therefore, count on you to see that everything is done to allay such suspicion locally so that Levant questions may not undesirably complicate our relations with the French and United States authorities in North Africa.

6. These instructions should be read in conjunction with those contained in my despatch of the 6th February, 1942. I wish in particular to reaffirm that, while the needs of the military situation must remain the dominant responsibility of the British authorities, it is still the policy of His Majesty's Government to foster the independence of the Levant States which we have guaranteed. As stated in paragraphs 9 and 10 of your original instructions, it should be possible, within the framework of our essential military requirements, for an increasing share of the internal administration of the Levant States and an increasing responsibility for their own administration to be handed over to them.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 5185/23/89]

No. 26.

*Record of Conversations with the French Delegation at the Foreign Office,  
23rd August, 1944.*

The following were present:—

The Secretary of State.	M. Massigli (Commissaire for Foreign Affairs).
Sir M. Peterson.	
Mr. Baxter.	M. Ostrogog (French Delegation-General, Beirut).
Mr. Hankey.	M. Bérard (Commissariat for Foreign Affairs).
	M. Paris (French Delegation, London).
	M. Francfort (French Delegation, London).

#### *General Policy in the Levant States.*

The Secretary of State, opening the discussion, said he thought that it would be useful at the outset to discuss the broad position in the Levant States. He wished to make it clear that His Majesty's Government had no desire to replace the French in the Levant States. If, as was alleged, our local activities were at variance with this statement, he would be glad to have the evidence for such allegations and to examine it. It seemed to him that French and British interests were parallel in the Levant States. He emphasised that both France and Great Britain were committed to the grant of independence to the Levant States and that it would not under any circumstances be possible to go back to the pre-war position. He asked M. Massigli if he confirmed this general view.

M. Massigli said that everything that had happened since Syria was occupied by the Allies in 1941 had been based on the assumption that independence would be granted. He emphasised that this was still the case.

He recalled, however, that it had always been assumed that the final grant of independence would be confirmed by treaties to be concluded between France and the Levant States. His Majesty's Government had agreed with this view, which found expression in the proclamation of independence in the autumn of 1941. In March 1943 General Catroux had suggested that the time had come for the conclusion of treaties, but His Majesty's Government had expressed the view that this should await the end of the war.

Then had come the crisis of November 1943. General Catroux, in transferring the *intérêts communs* to the Levant States, had told both the Presidents that this was a *modus vivendi* of a provisional nature only and that a treaty should ultimately be concluded to regularise the position.

M. Massigli concluded that the French Committee of National Liberation were aiming at securing for France a position analogous to that held by Great Britain in Iraq. Never, he emphasised, had they aimed at anything else. But until the position was regularised and the mandate formally terminated (he recognised that the mandate was not at present practically operative) the position would remain provisional.

Sir M. Peterson recalled that in March 1943 the French National Committee was not in the position of a Government which would be able to conclude binding treaties and the Levant States were aware of the position. In reply to a question by the Secretary of State, he confirmed that if there were a Government of France able to conclude such treaties, there would be no further objection on part of His Majesty's Government, but there was understood to be reluctance on the part of the Levant States to conclude such treaties.

M. Massigli said that the situation in the Levant States varied according to the state of Anglo-French relations. If the English and French were agreed on any given subject, matters were very much more simple to deal with. In the last few months, he thought that French relations with the Levant States had got more difficult, but if Anglo-French agreement were to be achieved, the difficulties would disappear.

#### *Spears Mission.*

M. Massigli explicitly said that what he would now say had nothing to do with any personalities, but he felt that he must refer to the organisation of the Spears Mission. It was natural in 1941, when General Catroux established the authority of the French National Committee, that there should be a British liaison mission to the French. It was also natural, after the proclamation of independence, that His Majesty's Government should establish diplomatic relations with the Levant States. It might have been thought at that moment that the Spears Mission had finished its rôle of liaison with the French authorities. But, on the contrary, it subsisted quite independently of His Majesty's Legation. Political officers were appointed in many parts of the country and little by little an organisation was created parallel to the French delegation with administrative functions. Instead of being a liaison mission to the French, the Spears Mission had become an administrative organism in direct relations with the local Governments. This was true in the economic and military spheres, as well as in the administrative sphere. In the military sphere, for instance, it might have been expected that, as the war progressed, British troops would be reduced. Nevertheless, there were area commanders and a security mission and in short a complete British organisation for what the French called territorial command. The dispute about the gendarmerie was a typical instance of what was going on. Although the subject was known to be under discussion between London and Algiers, some arms had been supplied already for purposes of instruction and in this, as in other matters, the French authorities had been short-circuited.

M. Massigli concluded that a state of affairs had been created in which the British authorities had in fact assumed the rôle of expert adviser which should normally have been held by the French. An impression had got around that the States were being tacitly, if not in fact, discouraged from making a treaty with the French. A whole nexus of Anglo-French misunderstandings had thus been created. He accepted entirely what the Secretary of State said about British intentions, but thought he should know how the French regarded the actual development of events.

Sir M. Peterson said that it was true the Spears Mission was originally accredited to the French and no doubt the present position was rather



confused. But he felt obliged to point out that there were many war-time functions which in practice had to be performed by some organisation or other and that in no country did the diplomatic mission perform all these functions. He wished to emphasise that this was a special organisation for meeting war needs and it would clearly not continue in peace-time. He recalled that many of the economic activities (e.g. the Office des Céréales Panifiables) were exercised in close co-operation and association with the French authorities.

The Secretary of State said that, if he understood the French complaint aright, it might be summed up as saying that the British were carrying out functions which the French would do if the treaty had been concluded between them and the Levant States.

M. Massigli confirmed this. He said that it would have been natural enough if we had put personnel at the French disposal to enable them to perform these functions. But instead of this, the Spears Mission had become completely independent.

M. Massigli recalled the case of the censorship. The British had put in a British censor in Damascus, and the Syrian Government had then eliminated the French censor, saying that he was no longer necessary. He did not contest British good faith; he just wished to draw attention to the result.

Sir M. Peterson, referring to the answer sent to M. Massigli's previous reply (Foreign Office telegram No. 1143 to Algiers) recalled that the French authorities themselves had made arrangements to hand over press censorship to the Syrian and Lebanese authorities under the transfer powers in December 1943. He recalled that the British censor had only dealt with military censorship, not political censorship.

M. Ostrorog denied that any arrangements had been made to hand over censorship questions to the Levant States. He said that the arrangement of the 22nd December only applied to certain services and did not constitute a clean sweep of all the administrative powers of the French, nor, indeed, did it put a formal end to the mandate, as was suggested in some local circles. When the Secretary of State enquired whether, if the French censor had stayed, he would have been able to stop Syrian press attacks, M. Ostrorog replied that he would have been able to do so, but that he could not stay because the Syrians had pushed him out.

Sir M. Peterson, referring to the references to the mandate, said that His Majesty's Government took the view that it would be necessary to refer formally to the mandate once more, namely for the purpose of its termination. Formally, the mandate might still be in existence, but it must certainly be regarded as in suspense for all practical purposes.

The Secretary of State agreed with M. Massigli that there should be an examination of the functions of the Spears Mission and suggested that it might be made by Sir M. Peterson and M. Ostrorog, with, of course, the assistance of His Majesty's Minister, Beirut.

#### Gendarmerie.

M. Massigli, reverting to the question of the gendarmerie, said that if it were possible to agree on certain principles, he thought it would be easier to find a solution for the present difficulties.

Sir M. Peterson said that one consideration which had to be taken into account in dealing with the question was the position of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. Naturally, whatever was decided in London, we must be careful not to override his authority.

M. Massigli agreed, but said that it might possibly be useful to remind the Commander-in-Chief of certain considerations which should not be lost sight of. He recalled, for instance, that the gendarmerie question fell within the definition of territorial command and was a question which fell primarily to the French to deal with. The British authorities had, however, taken the opposite view. It seemed to him that there were perhaps too many authorities dealing with the question in the Levant States.

Sir M. Peterson said that he thought M. Massigli's view did less than justice to the line which the Secretary of State had taken in the question of the gendarmerie. He recalled that by arrangement between His Majesty's Government and the French Committee of National Liberation, a joint Anglo-French military *ad hoc* committee had been set up in Beirut. The proceedings of the committee had never been very clear to him but, so far as he had been able to understand, the officers who were members of the committee had taken the Commander-in-Chief's views as a military order.

M. Ostrorog said that the position of the French Commander had been very difficult. The course proposed had been contrary to the normal order of things under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, since the British were to give arms to the Levant States.

Sir M. Peterson said that the position under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement might be as M. Massigli had stated, but in practice it was inevitable that the Commander-in-Chief should take a close interest in internal security in the area under his operational command. He recalled that in Serial 2, which had recently been agreed with the French authorities, it had been recognised that the maintenance of order was the responsibility of the Levant States. As regards the supply of rifles, Sir M. Peterson pointed out that the French authorities had had their chance and had missed it, since they had offered to supply only 200 very old rifles at an unacceptable price. That was how the question of the supply of arms came to the British. His Majesty's Government were, however, anxious for the French to participate in the supply of arms and he suggested that the best way to settle the matter would be to get the *ad hoc* committee together again and to arrange for the joint supply of the arms agreed on. The basis should be an immediate issue as a first instalment of 2,000 rifles and a proportion of automatics.

M. Ostrorog said that General Beynet thought there should be no automatics. It was undesirable to put these weapons in the hands of the gendarmerie when no one could be quite sure against whom they would be used.

M. Massigli said that General Beynet was sure that at the bottom of all this there was the feeling which the Levant States had that they could play us off against the French. If it were clear that the French and British were agreed, three-quarters of the present difficulties would disappear. If he might say so, the position was that the Syrians were trying to use the British to turn out the French and then, no doubt, they would try to use someone else to turn out the British.

As for the automatics, M. Massigli pointed out that they might even possibly be used in forceful measures against the French. French forces were very much reduced and the British military authorities in Cairo had in recent months objected to any reinforcements being sent to the Levant States. Even a few sick people from among the French prisoners repatriated from Russia had not been allowed in. He thought there should be an issue of 2,000 rifles and some transport and nothing more.

Sir M. Peterson said that we were trying to help so far as the few sick repatriates were concerned. As regards the others, it had been felt by the British military authorities in the Middle East that a security check on Frenchmen who had been taken prisoner while serving among the German armies in Russia was certainly needed and that this had better be done in North Africa under the close supervision of Algiers.

The Secretary of State, after some further discussion, suggested the following procedure, which was agreed on:—

- (a) M. Massigli was invited to state in writing the principles which he thought should be agreed.
- (b) The question of quantities and types of arms to be supplied to the gendarmerie should, he thought, be discussed on a military level between General Homes and General Bapst. Sir M. Peterson and M. Ostrorog should, he suggested, be there.
- (c) There should be a discussion of the question of the Spears Mission, at which, of course, Sir E. Spears should be present.



*Troupes Spéciales.*

Sir M. Peterson drew attention to the question of the Troupes Spéciales and said that His Majesty's Government would like to see the negotiations carried forward soon to a successful conclusion.

M. Massigli said that, if the gendarmerie question could be satisfactorily disposed of, the atmosphere for this would no doubt be improved.

The Secretary of State said he would revert to the question later.

*Appointment of Syrian Minister in London.*

Sir M. Peterson told M. Massigli that the Syrians had asked for the agrément of His Majesty's Government for the appointment of Dr. Kayali as Minister in London. He wished to inform the French of this, as had been done when M. Camille Chamoun had been appointed Lebanese Minister.

M. Massigli said that an application for an agrément for a Syrian Minister in Algiers had also just been presented.

[E 5144/23/89]

No. 27.

*Mr. Eden to Mr. MacKereth (Beirut).*

(No. 136.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 30th August, 1944.*

I ENCLOSE herewith a copy of M. Massigli's note of the 24th August, which he communicated to me in response to my suggestion made at our meeting on the 23rd August that he should let me have a statement of the principles which he wished to see established regarding British and French policy in relation to the Levant States (see my despatch No. 131 of the 25th August).

2. I also enclose a copy of my reply to M. Massigli's note. I understand M. Massigli regarded this as satisfactory.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Algiers and to the Resident Minister in the Middle East.

I am, &amp;c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 27.

*Note communicated by M. Massigli, 24th August, 1944.*

DES l'arrivée des Forces alliées en Syrie au mois de juin 1941 et l'établissement des autorités de la France Libre, la politique française concernant les Etats du Levant sous mandat français a été clairement définie. Elle est fondée sur deux principes :

- (1) Indépendance des Etats de Syrie et du Liban.
- (2) Consécration de cette indépendance par la conclusion de traités entre la France et les deux Etats du Levant mettant juridiquement fin au régime du mandat.

C'est compte tenu de ces principes, exprimés dans toutes les déclarations du Général Catroux, qu'ont été conclus les accords franco-britanniques qui définissent la position de la France dans les Etats du Levant en lui reconnaissant une position "prédominante et privilégiée."

Les circonstances n'ont pas permis de négocier jusqu'ici ces traités. Consulté à ce sujet, le Gouvernement britannique a indiqué d'ailleurs qu'il lui paraissait préférable d'attendre la fin des hostilités.

La prolongation de cette situation équivoque où le mandat était suspendu sans être abrogé, a donné lieu à des difficultés diverses qui sont allées croissant. La présence d'autorités britanniques intervenant dans des questions administratives locales sans consultation avec et même à l'insu des autorités administratives françaises a provoqué un trouble dans les esprits. Syriens et Libanais ont vu dans cette situation la preuve d'une opposition franco-britannique et l'ont exploitée.

Le trouble a été aggravé lorsque, tant dans l'ordre politique que sur le plan militaire, se sont produits certains empiètements des autorités britanniques contre lesquels les autorités françaises ont eu à s'élever.

Sur le plan de la politique intérieure des relations directes se sont établies et tendent à se renforcer entre les autorités britanniques et les autorités locales dans des questions qui ne concernent à aucun degré les rapports normaux entre les Gouvernements, ni même les problèmes connexes à l'effort de guerre. Les incidents du 27 avril ont fâcheusement illustré cette situation.

Dans le domaine militaire ces empiètements se sont produits dans des questions qui relèvent expressément de la compétence du commandement territorial réservé au commandement militaire français par les accords Lyttelton-de Gaulle.

Tout se passe comme si, à la suite de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1943 entre le Général Catroux et les Etats, en vue du transfert à ceux-ci de services gérés jusque-là par l'administration française, certaines autorités britanniques avaient estimé que leur Gouvernement considérait désormais l'indépendance des Etats comme pleinement réalisée. Il n'y aurait plus dès lors obligation de mettre régulièrement fin au mandat et la conclusion d'un traité à cet effet entre la Puissance mandataire et les Etats serait désormais superflue. La France aurait en Syrie et au Levant une situation analogue à celle de toute autre Puissance et non plus une situation prééminente. Dès lors la Grande-Bretagne serait libre de pousser ses avantages et de profiter de la situation d'infériorité où les circonstances ont momentanément placé la France.

C'est en partant de cette conception qu'un certain nombre d'initiatives ont été prises, depuis huit mois, qui sont incompatibles avec les accords franco-britanniques et qui portent gravement atteinte à la position prééminente reconnue à la France.

Puisque cette doctrine n'est point celle du Gouvernement britannique, suivant les assurances que le Premier Ministre et le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères ont bien voulu donner eux-mêmes à diverses reprises, et qu'au surplus elle est contraire aux engagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne et toujours valides, il y aurait grand intérêt à ce que toutes mesures utiles soient prises pour dissiper toute équivoque, tant aux yeux des autorités locales françaises et britanniques que de l'opinion publique au Levant.

Dans ce sens, il importe :

(a) sur le plan civil que les organismes britanniques, dont les effectifs sont très supérieurs à ce qu'exige la situation, se conforment à l'instruction qui leur serait donnée de ne plus intervenir dans les questions de politique intérieure; quant aux affaires économiques ou autres pouvant intéresser l'effort de guerre, il importe que ces organismes n'y interviennent que dans des conditions qui respectent les droits reconnus aux autorités françaises et, par conséquent, que celles-ci ne soient pas constamment placées devant des faits accomplis;

(b) que, sur le plan militaire, on en revienne à l'application exacte des stipulations de l'accord Lyttelton-de Gaulle, le commandement des opérations demeurant aux autorités militaires britanniques, qui éviteraient toute intervention dans les questions relevant du commandement territorial, lequel doit être sans conteste exercé par les autorités militaires françaises.

(c) La sauvegarde de la position reconnue à la France est d'autre part à la longue incompatible avec la situation qui lui est faite au point de vue économique. Le Gouvernement français doit participer plus activement aux décisions d'ordre économique à intervenir dans le Levant; il doit donc insister pour être représenté au sein du Middle East Supply Centre.

(d) Enfin, du point de vue de la politique générale, l'affirmation de la concordance de vues maintenue entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement britannique quant à la nécessité de mettre régulièrement fin au mandat et de consacrer l'indépendance déjà reconnue à la Syrie et au Liban, par la conclusion entre ces Etats et la France de traités analogues au traité anglo-irakien, aurait un effet décisif sur l'attitude des Gouvernements locaux.

24 août 1944.

Enclosure 2 in No. 27.

*Note handed to M. Ostrorog, 28th August, 1944.*

THE memorandum communicated to Mr. Eden by M. Massigli on the 24th August calls for certain comments on the part of His Majesty's Government.

2. His Majesty's Government note with satisfaction the statement of French policy contained in the first three paragraphs which seem to confirm the view already expressed by Mr. Eden that, fundamentally, French and British interests



in the Levant run parallel and do not conflict. They also note from paragraph 4 of the French note that in the opinion of the French Committee of National Liberation consultation between the French and British authorities on the spot has not been adequate in the past, and that a local impression has been created that French and British interests are in opposition there. While making all possible reserves in regard to the assertion that British authorities have wrongly interfered in local administrative questions (see in this connexion paragraphs 3 and 6 below), His Majesty's Government confirm that for their part they are anxious for the closest possible local consultation and co-operation, and that so long as both His Majesty's Government and the French Committee of National Liberation pursue the policy set forth in the first three paragraphs of M. Massigli's note there seems to be no reason to fear any serious disagreement.

3. His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot accept the statements in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the French note regarding alleged encroachments on the French position. It is normal and indeed inevitable that British representatives in the Levant States should be in close relations with the local Governments. This is especially the case as regards various economic matters (*e.g.* control of hoarding) in which the efficiency of local administrative controls is of vital importance to the planning of the economy of the whole Middle East in the interests of the common war effort, and also in questions of military importance such as frontier control, counter-espionage, &c., in which the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, is in practice obliged to take a close concern. It is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to supplant French influence in the Levant States, and they do not intend that British influence in regard to the types of questions mentioned above should be in any way used against French interests. In practice, every effort has been made to ensure the closest co-ordination. In economic questions the French authorities are fully represented on the Higher Supply Council and on the various advisory economic boards, and nothing in the organisation set up prevents the French authorities from exercising their influence. As for the military questions mentioned, these have been the subject of prolonged Anglo-French staff conversations and the conclusions have been fully agreed with the French authorities before any action has been taken with the Levant States. His Majesty's Government believe that the statement of the position in the French note does serious injustice to themselves.

4. With regard to paragraph 8 of the French memorandum, His Majesty's Government are aware that the French contention is that in certain respects British authorities in the Levant States have misinterpreted their policy. His Majesty's Government must, however, reject the quite unwarranted suggestion in paragraph 8 of the French memorandum—particularly in the concluding sentence of that paragraph—that His Majesty's Government might appear to be misrepresenting the degree of independence achieved by the Levant States, in order themselves to profit by France's misfortunes in the present war. His Majesty's Government cannot accept the argument by which this conclusion is reached. No good purpose would be served by conducting a theoretical discussion on the degree of independence which may or may not be held to have been conferred on the Levant States by the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943. Suffice it is to say that His Majesty's Government sincerely and earnestly welcomed the conclusion of that agreement, which appeared to them to be a wise and statesmanlike measure and one which greatly improved French relations with the Levant States. Indeed, except for the holding of the elections, the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, was almost the first real indication that the French Committee of National Liberation intended to carry out their obligations which His Majesty's Government endorsed at the time, to grant independence to the Levant States and to allow them to manage their own day-to-day affairs. Before the conclusion of that agreement, it was difficult to find any practical answer to the complaint that the French Committee of National Liberation were delaying unreasonably the implementation of their promises or even that they were seeking excuses to evade carrying them out. His Majesty's Government earnestly welcome the progress made towards the conclusion of a practical *modus vivendi*, which it is hoped will place relations between the French and the Levant authorities on a new basis of mutual confidence and ultimately enable the position to be regularised by the free conclusion of treaties. They trust that this policy will be continued and that outstanding questions, such as the future of the Troupes Spéciales, will be the subject of early agreements.

5. Nevertheless, His Majesty's Government are glad to make it plain that in recommending the French Committee of National Liberation to pursue a policy

of making such agreements with the two States, they do not lose sight of the fact that the natural course will be for such agreements to be embodied at the appropriate moment in a definitive treaty settlement.

6. As regards the principles mentioned in paragraph 11 of the French note, it will be convenient to deal with them in turn:—

(a) As already explained, His Majesty's Government must expressly reserve the right to conduct direct relations with the Levant States, especially on economic questions which are of importance to the war effort. They will be glad, however, to conduct these relations wherever possible in the closest association with the French authorities and within the framework of the advisory boards and other economic organisations, on which the French authorities and also British authorities are represented. They earnestly hope that the French authorities will continue to co-operate in preserving the economy of the Levant States from disruption by the impact of the severe economic difficulties which the war has brought. His Majesty's Government, for their part, are glad to make it plain that they have not the slightest intention of attempting to regulate the internal political affairs of the Levant States, although the existence of diplomatic relations between these States and His Majesty's Government together with the continuation of the state of war make it impracticable for His Majesty's Government to renounce the right to direct contact.

(b) His Majesty's Government do not challenge the interest of the French authorities in matters covered by the definition of territorial command in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement. They freely recognise and confirm the provisions of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements of the 25th July, 1941, and subsequent interpretations agreed between us which continue to govern the relations between the respective military authorities. But His Majesty's Government must ask the French Committee to recognise that while the war lasts the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, is entitled and, indeed, obliged to take a close interest in all matters of military importance, especially those affecting military security within the area under his command and that the French territorial command should always be ready to co-operate with the Commander-in-Chief on questions of this nature.

(c) It has been explained why, after a most careful and exhaustive enquiry, His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot support the French request for membership of the Middle East Supply Centre. Every possible attempt will be made to take account of French interests and special arrangements have been made so that the French point of view may be fully expressed and considered both in the Levant States and in Cairo.

(d) His Majesty's Government, so far as they are concerned, would welcome an agreement between France and the Levant States freely to conclude the treaties foreseen in the Declarations of Independence as a convenient method of determining their future relations.

7. His Majesty's Government willingly undertake to give consideration to the advisability at a suitable moment of making some new declaration in the sense of (d) above, as defining their policy in the Levant. At the same time, they are also prepared to consider whether they can do anything, so long as the war lasts, to meet the views expressed on the French side that British organisations within the Levant States are both more numerous and more extensive in their scope than the situation requires.

*Foreign Office, 26th August, 1944.*

[E 5415/5178/89]

No. 28.

*Mr. Eden to Sir E. Spears (Beirut).*

(No. 139.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 1st September, 1944.*

ON your forthcoming return to your post after the conversations you have had with myself and my Department in London, I think it well to lay down as shortly as possible the lines on which it is now the wish of His Majesty's Government that the Legation and Spears Mission in the Levant should be conducted.

2. In the first place and with the end of the war in view it is most important that our efforts should be used to the fullest possible extent to pave the way for an eventual agreement between the States and the French which will permit



the conduct of their future relations on an ordinary diplomatic basis. I have not been able to convince myself that any less formal agreement than a treaty is likely to attain this object.

3. You will therefore neglect no opportunity of impressing on the local Governments that the conclusion of an agreement with the French is in our view not only the best but perhaps the sole method of securing full and unchallenged independence. You should also do everything possible to promote the establishment of a practical *modus vivendi* between the States and the French which will pave the way for such treaties.

4. It is not my intention, in addressing this despatch to you, to supersede the previous directives with which you have been furnished on your successive returns to your post. These directives bear on such matters as your day-to-day conduct of affairs with the French and on our general relations with the Levant States. I must, however, add that, as regards the somewhat complex relationship existing between the Spears Mission and His Majesty's Legation, it is my desire that the latter should from now on be brought more and more into the foreground in order that we may be able to pass in the post-war period into a purely diplomatic relationship without too abrupt an apparent change. I shall therefore shortly enter into communication both with the Minister Resident, Cairo, and with yourself in order to ensure that the Spears Mission shall be gradually reduced, whether by absorption into the Legation or, as regards certain of its officers, into the military command or by simple suppression, so that the end of the war will find us in a position to conduct our relations with the Levant States on a basis which is scarcely, if at all, different from that of ordinary diplomacy.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

#### (B) Weekly Political Summaries.

[E 3987/23/89]

No. 29.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 116, Syria and the Lebanon, 21st June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 7th July.)*

##### 1. General.

The French and Syrians resumed negotiations on the 15th June for the transfer of the Sûreté and the Troupes Spéciales.

As regards the Sûreté, although the French had already accepted Ninth Army Serial III (see W.S. No. 106) they persisted in a demand that French nationals recommended by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should be allowed to enter Syria without visas. The Syrians refused this clause, on the grounds that it would lead to demands for most-favoured-nation treatment on the part of other Powers, and on their side raised objections regarding the transit of Jewish refugees through Syria. The French asked for a further postponement on the flimsy pretext that they could not continue discussions in the absence of the head of the British Security Mission. After a heated discussion, the Prime Minister declared that if he did not receive a definite statement from the French by the 20th June he would put into operation his own plan for co-operation with the Allies on matters of military security. He agreed, however, to await the arrival of His Majesty's Minister on that day, and the latter, on seeing the President and Prime Minister, advised them that they should avoid any precipitate action.

A much more serious situation was, however, developing over the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. The French and Syrians had failed to reach agreement over the question of the date on which the transfer should take effect. The French refused to accept any formula based on the final removal of all danger of war from the Levant (see W.S. No. 114), nor would they now agree to the principle of arbitration, which General Beynet had himself suggested at one moment.

A complete deadlock having been reached, the Syrians threatened to break off negotiations and on the 20th June the Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Minister that the President intended taking advantage of the fact he was to make the first speech since his illness to representatives from all over Syria in Damascus on the 22nd, to inform them of the breakdown of the negotiations for the transfer of the army owing to French obstruction. He would announce a special meeting of the Syrian Parliament to deal with the situation. It was

clear that this was no idle threat. The tempers in the Syrian Cabinet ran very high and it was certain that such a declaration, made by the President through loud-speakers to very large and excitable crowds, would have unpredictable though undoubtedly extremely grave results.

A review of Troupes Spéciales, gendarmerie and boy scouts was to have been held on the same occasion. The Syrian Government cancelled the invitation to the Troupes Spéciales and requested the French military authorities to confine them to barracks.

At this point His Majesty's Minister offered to use his influence to bring the two parties together to avert a serious crisis, and General Beynet personally asked him to negotiate with the Syrians on the basis of a formula for the transfer of the army three months after the armistice with Germany. The reaction of the Syrians to this proposal was unfavourable, but His Majesty's Minister succeeded in persuading the President to refer in anodyne terms to the negotiations in his speech. Thanks to this intervention, serious trouble was momentarily averted, and discussions were resumed through His Majesty's Minister on the basis of a new formula for the transfer of the armed forces by stages. His Majesty's Minister was also able to arrange that General Beynet should attend both the ceremony of the President's speech and the review, on the promise he obtained that nothing wounding should be said about France and that everything possible should be done to avoid incidents or hostile demonstrations.

The arming of the Syrian gendarmerie (see W.S. No. 115) has been carried one stage further, the British military authorities having decided that in the interest of military security they shall be equipped forthwith with British material.

The independence of Syria has now been officially recognised by both the Chinese and the Polish Governments.

##### 2. Wheat.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is also president of the Cereals Commission, recently told the press that the Syrian Government intended to make the O.C.P. a purely Syrian service under complete Syrian Government control.

Proposals for modifying the protocol of the 10th March, 1943, upon which the present constitution of the O.C.P. is based, have been drawn up for this purpose. These proposals provide for the nomination by the Syrian Government of the president of the commission, giving him the casting vote and the power to nominate all higher O.C.P. officials. The management of the O.C.P., under the direction of the commission, would be carried out by a French and a British co-director and two French and two British inspectors would be appointed. Other personnel would be Syrian or Lebanese.

The proposals have been put before the Lebanese Government, who are discussing the matter with the Syrians.

The proposal in its present form is unacceptable to us. The Syrians have not at present the personnel to run the O.C.P. efficiently, and there is little doubt that had they the power to do so they would hold the Lebanon to ransom.

##### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The Mohafez of Lattakia has recommended that Suleiman Murshid (who was reported to be in Beirut) should be detained in Damascus during the period of the arbitration agreement (see W.S. No. 115), and the Syrian Government have accordingly asked the Lebanese to hand him over to them.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Alaouites is again serious. Villagers engaged in harvesting their crops are being intimidated, and an attempt by the gendarmerie to arrest some of Suleiman Murshid's followers has been resisted by force. The Mohafez has complained to Damascus that the French, in spite of previous assurances (see W.S. No. 106), are stirring up trouble, and he has again recommended the removal of Capitaine Boussiquet and his secretary. There is undoubtedly much substance in the Mohafez's contention that the French are still engaged in undermining the authority of the Syrian administration in this area, and it is a fact that the latter are unable to make any headway against Suleiman Murshid unless there are British troops stationed near his villages.



11. *The Lebanon.*

The political lull continues and the country is generally quiet. The cases arising out of the incidents of the 27th April have now been transferred to the Lebanese National Court.

On the 15th June in Beirut a protocol was signed between the French authorities and the Lebanese Government placing a battalion of Chasseurs Libanais and a squadron of armoured cars at the Government's disposal, pending the signature of the definite transfer of the Troupes Spéciales to the States's Governments. On the 17th June the President presented the battalion with the Lebanese flag.

[E 4059/23/89]

No. 30.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, Syria and the Lebanon, No. 117 of 28th June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th July.)*

*General.*

FOLLOWING the deadlock in the Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, which was reported last week, His Majesty's Minister induced the Syrians on the 23rd June to accept, as a basis for negotiation with the French, proposals for a gradual transfer of troops from French to Syrian command, to be completed before the signature of the armistice with Germany.

General Beynet informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd June that he was going to Algiers very shortly. The Syrians received this news very badly and, after a Cabinet meeting, sent a message to the French insisting on the immediate resumption of negotiations. These were accordingly resumed on the 25th. On the morning of the 27th the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a message to the Political Officer that agreement had been reached for the transfer of the Sûreté, but the details were not stated. The Syrian Government have been reminded that, whatever protocol is signed, the British military authorities will only consider themselves bound by the terms of Ninth Army Memorandum Serial III. Negotiations for the transfer of the army are still in progress.

The French National Committee have protested in violent terms at the Commander-in-chief's decision to equip the gendarmerie (see Weekly Summary No. 116, section 1). Instructions have been sent to Mr. Duff Cooper to inform the Committee of His Majesty's Government's close interest in this problem, which is considered to be of concern to the British as well as French authorities.

The Syrian Government have informed His Majesty's Minister that they sent one of their ex-Ministers to Cairo to establish contact with the Soviet Legation in order to discuss the proposal, as conveyed to them by the French, that Soviet diplomatic representatives should be appointed to the Levant States (see Weekly Summary No. 115, paragraph 1). It appears that the Soviet Minister was either unwilling to impart information or was ignorant of any such proposal, and that the Syrian Government have come to the conclusion that the project of Soviet recognition of Syria was a French idea to introduce Soviet representatives into the Levant who might further French interests.

Some months ago it became known that the Greek Orthodox Church in the Lebanon intended to send a delegation to visit the Soviets. It is now confirmed that this initiative was due to the Délégation Générale, in collaboration with the Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut. The plan was thwarted by the Patriarch and will not now be followed, but only recently General Beynet renewed the French offer of assistance in producing air transport, &c., for the visit if it were decided upon.

The activities of the local Communist parties appear to be strongly encouraged by the French, who are evidently under the impression that they are backed by the Russians. *L'Orient* of the 16th June published an eulogistic article on these parties, and invariably gives considerable publicity to their meetings. The Lebanese President has twice recently received Communist leaders, who seem to have taken the opportunity to prejudice him against the "Parti Populaire Syrien," and there is a strong suggestion that the interviews were arranged at the instance of the French.

*Syria—Damascus.*

The ceremony on the 22nd June to celebrate the President's recovery took place without incident. General Beynet was present. There were large crowds to welcome the President and the town was beflagged. A holiday spirit prevailed for several days.

The President made the following points in his speech:—

With regard to the Sûreté, he said that it was expected that this would be transferred very shortly, perhaps this week.

The transfer of the army had been delayed until now because the Syrians were anxious that it should be a Syrian national army in reality as well as in appearance. They hoped that the French would come to an understanding with them without delay, which would meet their desires so that Syrian independence would be complete.

The President alluded to the recent disturbances, characterising the instigators as short-sighted and condemning the incident, particularly because it had occurred at a time when all the efforts of the nation must be united and consolidated. He paid a tribute to the way in which the Government had dealt with the situation and stated that he was prepared to crush the movement which had led to the incident with an iron hand. He said he himself was the supreme legal representative of the nation whose full confidence he enjoyed.

*Alaouite Territory.*

When summoned to give evidence before the Court of Arbiters in Lattakia, Suleiman Murshid refused and took refuge in Beirut (see Weekly Summary No. 116). The Syrians having asked the Lebanese to hand him over, an imbroglio then arose between the two Governments. The Lebanese disliked the responsibility of making the arrest, and the Syrians were afraid of offending Lebanese susceptibilities by making it themselves. There was a good deal of hawing, but in the end Suleiman Murshid was brought to Damascus under arrest on Sunday morning, the 25th.

The President of the Chamber raised some objection to a Deputy being placed under arrest, but it was pointed out that Parliamentary immunity only covers Deputies while the Chamber is in session.

Suleiman Murshid is now under detention in the gendarmerie barracks in Damascus. The present intention is that he should remain under arrest in Damascus until the Arbitration proceedings have been concluded.

The situation in the Alaouites meanwhile remains serious and the supporters of Murshid continue to offer armed resistance to the gendarmerie. Colonel Oliva-Roget requested an interview with the army commander to discuss the danger to security arising from this situation, but was unable to attend, having been recalled to Damascus on account of the deadlock in the Franco-Syrian negotiations. He was represented at the interview by Colonel Gausso, the Délégué Adjoint for the Alaouites. The army commander explained to Colonel Gausso that the French alone were responsible for the dangerous state of affairs in the Alaouites, which they themselves had brought about over a long period, and that they should, therefore, do everything possible to assist the Syrian authorities in dealing with the situation. Colonel Gausso admitted that the French had supported Suleiman Murshid, but maintained that that was now past history. General Holmes pointed out that he had been obliged on frequent occasions to complain of the French policy in the Alaouites to General Catroux, General Monclar, Colonel des Essars and to Colonel Gausso himself. He considered that both Capitaine Boussiquet and his secretary (see Weekly Summary No. 116 of the 21st June) should be removed immediately, that a definite assurance should be given to the Syrian Government by the French that Murshid no longer received their support and that there should be no further issue of arms permits in Alaouite territory. Colonel Gausso agreed with regard to the removal of the secretary, subject to the concurrence of the délégation, but said that the removal of Capitaine Boussiquet could not be considered.

*Euphrates and Jezireh.*

*Euphrates.*—Nothing to report.

*Jezireh.*—Tribal disturbances which are normal in springtime have this year proved more serious and have lasted longer than usual. It is evident that this state of affairs will continue so long as the forces of the Contrôle Bédouin, nominally in Syrian hands, are commanded by French officers. The latter have,



during recent months, shown themselves to be inefficient and dilatory and are believed by the local Syrian authorities to have stirred up tribal warfare. These officers, many of whom were originally clerks in the Délégation Générale, have ample scope for meddling in local disputes concerning the ownership of land, which has increased many times in value. There are indications, though proof is almost impossible to obtain, that French authorities have distributed arms on a small scale to tribal and minority leaders in the Jezireh.

#### *The Lebanon.*

A Ministerial crisis began on the 22nd June, when a delegation of Deputies, representing about half the Chamber, visited the President to demand an extraordinary session. They informed him that they had decided to raise the question of confidence. The President agreed to call the session, the opening date of which has since been fixed by decree as the 5th July, and indicated that he would invite the Government to resign and reform before that date.

So far the Government have not resigned, though they are expected to do so shortly. The President's intention is understood to be to ask Riad es-Sulh to form a new Government, as he considers that no other suitable Sunni is available. In that event it is thought that Riad es-Sulh would like to recall all the present Ministers except Camille Shamoun, who is due to leave for London in the near future and would be replaced by Hamid Frangieh. He wishes, however, in addition to move Adel Osseyran from the Ministry of Supply, but the latter has stated his intention of either retaining that Ministry or retiring from the Government, and there are objections to all other Shia replacements. It is also by no means certain the malcontent Deputies, who claim to be in the majority, would accept any such solution, as at present they are pressing for a complete change of Ministry. Discussions continue.

The appointment of a Mohafez for the Bekaa was at last announced on the 23rd June.

#### *Press and Propaganda.*

The Press Syndicate Committee which has been advising the Government on press matters resigned on the 23rd June as a protest against what they describe as the Government's unfair distribution of newsprint, arbitrary suspension of newspapers, over-strict censorship, and failure to suppress worthless newspapers.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—No significant change.

[E 4173/23/89]

No. 31.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 118, Syria and the Lebanon, dated 5th July, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th July.)*

#### *General.*

THE Lebanese Cabinet resigned on the 1st July and, as expected, the President immediately asked Riad-es-Sulh to form a new Government, the composition of which was announced late on the 3rd July. The Prime Minister was found to have followed the lines which had for some time been anticipated (see Weekly Summary No. 117, paragraph 11). Camille Shamoun has left the Government, Hamid Frangieh has been brought in and taken over the Ministry of Finance, and Adel Osseyran has been replaced by a young and unknown Shia from South Lebanon named Mohammed-el-Fadl. The problem of filling the Ministry of Supply, left vacant by the departure of Adel Osseyran, was solved by the Prime Minister taking the portfolio himself and appointing the Emir Jamil Shehab, the most experienced of the Lebanese permanent civil servants, as Director-General. The Prime Minister also took the portfolio of the Interior previously held by Camille Shamoun.

It has now been announced that the Chamber will meet on the 8th July, when a vote of confidence in the new Ministry will presumably be moved. The general impression is that the new combination is not so strong as the old and is unlikely to survive beyond the summer, since its composition gives little satisfaction to Deputies' criticisms of former Ministers. The Prime Minister has given many assurances that he intends henceforth to overhaul the Administration and to direct internal affairs with a firm hand.

Little progress has been made in the Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of powers. An agreement having been reached, as reported last week, for the transfer of the Sûreté, the text of a protocol was communicated by the French to the British military authorities, but when it was pointed out that it did not conform to the Ninth Army Memorandum Serial III the French withdrew their agreement and on the 30th June presented to the Syrians a new draft which included almost textually paragraph 7 of Serial III, which gives both the French and British military authorities the right to arrest and intern. The Syrians refused to accept this, as they are not prepared to give the French the right to arrest Syrian nationals. It was pointed out to them that, as a British signature was required, no internment could take place without British knowledge and consent; but they were adamant. Basing themselves on quite recent incidents, they averred that the French would take advantage of any powers given them to carry out arrests as in the past. A complete *impasse* was reached, and the Syrians stated that there was no alternative but for them to form their own Sûreté, which, however, they declared would co-operate in every way with the Allied military authorities.

Meanwhile General Beynet left for Algiers, but M. Chataigneau was given powers to sign any agreement come to on the question of the Sûreté, provided the British military authorities agreed. To break the *impasse*, it was suggested from the British side that the French protocol should not include the article referred to above, but that it should be clearly understood by all concerned that the requirements in the serial were maintained. This would mean, in effect, that the powers claimed by the Army Commander would be maintained, but that the Syrians (who have never been asked to sign receipt of the Serials) would not be required to appose their signature to a document containing a clause unacceptable to them.

British and French liaison officers to the Sûreté have been presented to the Syrian Director-General of Police, but the Prime Minister has refused to accept the French officer on the grounds that the British officer adequately represents the Army Commander.

Negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales have been delayed pending the conclusion of an agreement on the Sûreté.

#### *Alaouite Territory.*

The arrest of Suleiman Murshid (see Weekly Summary No. 117), coinciding with the arrival of British troops at Slenffe, has, at least temporarily, changed the situation in the Alaouites, and Murshid's armed followers are no longer to be seen.

The Court of Arbiters has produced a report, together with certain recommendations, which the Mohafez intends to convey personally to the Prime Minister in Damascus. It is reported that in all cases brought before the court the transfers of land to Murshid have been made under pressure, and that physical torture had been used to extract from the victims blank deeds of transfer, which were then filled in and recorded in the Cadastral Register.

Other dark deeds have been brought to light which, in the opinion of the Mohafez, must lead to Murshid's arraignment before Parliament.

[E 4384/23/87]

No. 32.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 119, Syria and the Lebanon, 12th July, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 24th July.)*

#### *1. General.*

The Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of the Sûreté, as reported last week, had once more reached a deadlock when His Majesty's Minister intervened and suggested to both the Syrians and the French that negotiations might be resumed if the article in the draft Protocol concerning internment were omitted, but that it should be clearly understood by all concerned that the

[29955]

L 3



requirements of the Ninth Army Serial were maintained. Negotiations were resumed on this basis, and protocols were signed on the 7th July by M. Chataigneau and the Prime Ministers of Syria and the Lebanon.

The question of the Sûreté would then have been settled satisfactorily had not M. Chataigneau addressed a letter to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments asserting that, in so far as the British authorities maintained reservations in respect of the requirements of military security, the French authorities must make similar reservations. The Syrians have informed His Majesty's Minister that they cannot accept this statement by the French and will contest once more the right of the French to arrest Syrian citizens, which they claim they did not concede at any time during the negotiations. They explained that they had not attached undue significance to the details of the Serial, believing that it would at all times be possible to come to an understanding with the supreme military authority, since that authority is always fair, and they reaffirm their desire not only not to impede, but to help the war effort. The precise terms of their proposed reply are not known. Meanwhile, the negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales remained at a standstill pending the return of General Beynet, who arrived from Algiers on the 12th July.

The issue of equipment to the gendarmerie has still not taken place. Following the decision that the question should be referred to an Anglo-French Committee, a meeting was held on the 11th July between General Officer Commanding Ninth Army and General Humblot. The army commander informed General Humblot of the Commander-in-Chief's decision and explained the reasons for it. He gave him a list of the items to be issued. After discussion General Humblot stated that he did not question the Commander-in-Chief's decision but requested that various objections should be placed on record. This has been reported to London.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 11th July, when a vote of confidence was passed by the surprisingly high majority of forty-one to six. Three Deputies abstained and three voted against the Government, one of whom was Joseph Karam, of Zghorta, who has demanded a debate on the disturbances of the 27th April. The trial of twenty persons accused of participation in those disturbances has now been concluded, six of the defendants having been acquitted, seven sentenced to imprisonment or fines and seven to imprisonment *avec sursis*; the heaviest sentence was one of two years. The relatively light nature of the sentences has been attributed in some quarters to a desire on the part of the Government to secure the support, or at least the neutrality, of the Eddé party, to which most of the accused belong, before the vote of confidence was moved in Parliament. A Syrian presidential decree issued during the same week has granted an amnesty to all persons arrested during the recent disturbances in Syria. It has been noticeable that the general reaction in Syria to the change in the Lebanese Government has been slight.

The recent decision of the Lebanese Government to allow the "Parti Populaire Syrien" to resume activities as a political party has given rise to a series of press polemics from the Communist party, which characterises its rivals, somewhat unfairly, as still being pro-Axis. The Government is understood to have received protests from all parts of the Levant States, and there is some evidence that the French authorities, who oppose the "Parti Populaire Syrien" on account of its ardent nationalism, are encouraging these protests. A mass meeting of the Communist and Anti-Fascist parties was held in Beirut recently, when speeches expressing enthusiasm for the opening of the Second Front and other Allied victories were pronounced. Signs were displayed with the words "Down with Fascism."

The Soviet Minister in Cairo has arrived in Damascus to discuss with the Syrian Government the question of their relations with the Soviet Government (see W.S. No. 117).

#### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The Alaouite Territory remains quiet. The Mohafez has returned from Damascus after discussing the question of Suleiman Murshid with the Central Government. It was decided that Murshid must not be allowed to return to the Alaouites either now or after the war, and that Capitaine Boussiquet and his secretary must be removed from the Mohafezat. The Syrian Government, moreover, is to submit a law to Parliament, following a recommendation by the Court of Arbiters, to annul all transfers of land to Murshid or his dependants which have taken place during the past six years.

Colonel Oliva-Roget is reported to have opposed strongly the demand for the removal of Capitaine Boussiquet, but the reasons on the Syrian side were incontestable and eventually he agreed to transfer both this officer and his secretary. The new Chef du Bureau Politique at Lattakia is to be Capitaine Massot, a recent arrival from North Africa.

#### 9. Tribal.

The terms of the Shammar-Agaidat agreement recently concluded are to be executed within two months. It became clear during the course of the proceedings at Deir ez-Zor that it was the policy of certain French elements to use the distrust of Abbud el-Hiffel and his Agaidat tribesmen to unite them against the Shammar, in the hope of ruining a conference held under Syrian presidency. Provided, however, it can be shown that the Syrian Government possess enough power to implement their authority, the tribal sheikhs may be expected quickly to adopt a more loyal attitude.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

At the opening of the extraordinary session of Parliament on the 11th July a vote of confidence was passed in the new Ministry by a majority of forty-one votes to six (see under "General" above). Among the measures of reform already instituted by the Prime Minister are the closing of a number of gambling dens, the exclusion from the Sérail of all persons without appointments and the prohibition of the use of firearms at public celebrations. One Deputy in the debate on the 11th July criticised the financial agreement as being against Lebanese national interests. This parliamentary criticism appears to reflect an opinion that is gaining ground both in the Lebanon and in Syria.

The newly acquired Lebanese battalion of Troupes Spéciales was used on the morning of the 10th July to reinforce the gendarmerie in a raid on Becharre, with the object of arresting fifteen inhabitants suspected of complicity in the recent disturbances in that area. The raid was evidently well conducted and, although only six men have so far been arrested, a salutary impression has been made on the villagers.

The Sixth Arab Medical Congress was opened in Beirut on the 8th July, with an attendance of over 800 doctors, representing all the Arab States. A vote of thanks to Spears Clinics and a resolution that their work should be developed and assisted was passed.

The Lebanese Government have informed the French that they propose, as from this year, to break the tradition by which the Lebanese President called on the French Representative on the 14th July. Contrary to past mandatory practice the Lebanese Government offices will be open on that day.

#### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The reception accorded by the press to the new Government was at first expressive of some disappointment, but became more favourable when it was learnt that the Prime Minister would himself take over the portfolios of Supply and the Interior, upon which the bitterest criticism had been concentrated, and when drastic reforms in internal administration were announced.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Enemy broadcasts have issued pronouncements in favour of the "Parti Populaire Syrien," which is still being attacked in the local press, chiefly by the Communist newspaper *Saut-esh-Shaab* (see paragraph 1 above).

[E 4499/23/89]

No. 33.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 120, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, of 19th July, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 28th July.)*

#### General.

ON the 14th July the French held military reviews in both Syria and the Lebanon in celebration of their National Festival. They did so in spite of requests by the Governments of both States that reviews should not take place, and in disregard of their promise to the Lebanese after the celebrations of St. Joan of Arc's Day that they would never again hold a review on Lebanese soil without first seeking permission of the Government (see Weekly Summary No. 112



of the 24th May). The two Governments decided, when informed of the French intention, which they considered to be a violation of the independence of their respective States, that they could not be represented at the reviews. In deference to them, a similar decision was taken by the Diplomatic Body and the British military authorities. Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have protested to the French. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments as well as the Diplomatic Corps attended the French Délégué's receptions held in the afternoon, and His Majesty's Minister also attended a fête held that evening, at which he was received with military honours.

The Soviet Minister in Cairo, M. Novakov, who arrived in Syria last week (see Weekly Summary No. 119) has transmitted to Moscow on behalf of the Syrian Government a telegram proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It is expected that a favourable reply may shortly be received. The Lebanese Government have also signified that they would wish to exchange diplomatic missions with the Soviet Government, and M. Novakov is understood to be referring this proposal to Moscow. Both the Syrian and the Lebanese Foreign Ministers had been approached previously by M. Chataigneau regarding the visit of the Soviet representative, but made it clear to him that they were prepared to open negotiations with the Soviet representative direct, implying that French intervention was not desired. M. Chataigneau explained that the French interest in this matter was due to the fact that the question had been raised with the French Committee of National Liberation by the Soviet representatives in Algiers. The two Ministers are believed to have accepted this statement with some reserve.

The discussions of the Anglo-French Military Committee concerning the issue of equipment to the gendarmerie continue. An instruction now received from G.H.Q. to proceed with the issue of boots, clothing and immediate necessities may be regarded as opportune, since, should the local Governments suspect that the French are obstructing the negotiations, serious consequences might arise.

#### Wheat.

Total purchases from the 1944 crop up to the 15th July amounted to 6,400 tons.

The protests of the agriculturists regarding the price paid for wheat, particularly in the Jezireh, where, contrary to expectations, the crop is only mediocre, have increased in volume. A deputation of prominent agriculturists from the Jezireh has been in Damascus and has been granted interviews by the President of the Republic, by Jamil Bey Mardem Bey, president of the Cereals Commission, and by the Minister of National Economy. To-day a circular telegram has been addressed to all the Mohafezes in the country informing them that no changes will be made in the prices already fixed, and telling them that they must give every assistance to the O.C.P. in collecting the quantities due from each village.

#### Alaouite Territory.

The area remains quiet. Suleiman Murshid's eldest son has failed in an endeavour to induce certain prominent Alaouite Deputies to appeal for the return of his father, who remains under guard in the Omayyad Hotel in Damascus. Murshid's lawyer, Yussef Tacla of Homs, attempted to bring a hundred Alaouites to Damascus to demand his release, but the party was successfully headed off before it reached the capital.

#### Tribal.

It is apparent that there are certain difficulties concerning the administration of the Bedouin Control which have not yet been overcome. Under the present system, requests for the use of force must be referred by the Mohafez to the Central Government, who must then approach the French Délégué in Damascus. The delays involved in this clumsy procedure can only be avoided if the French Military Commander in Deir ez-Zor takes action in anticipation of orders from the French Military Headquarters. This he is frequently obliged to do, and the impression is therefore created among the Bedouin that the French still retain their former responsibility and authority. It is understood that the Prime Minister intends to issue orders that the provincial Bedouin Control officers must now come directly under the orders of the Mohafezes.

#### The Lebanon.

The new Ministry which Riad es-Sulh presented to the Chamber at the extraordinary session on the 11th July gives at least an impression of determination, and the Prime Minister's promises of administrative and fiscal reform have been well received, though it would be unwise to count on their fulfilment.

Lebanese gendarmes, together with British troops, have carried out a search for arms in the North Lebanon villages of Zghorta, Becharré and Ehden. Though few weapons were found and many no doubt remain hidden, the moral effect of the search has been satisfactory.

On the 14th July a Lebanese agent employed by the Sûreté, whilst discharging his revolver from the balcony of the port Sûreté office in celebration of the French National Holiday, accidentally wounded a passer-by. The Lebanese authorities arrested him and intend to try him for illegal use of firearms and causing injury. The French have protested strongly on the grounds that the man was one of the employees whom they have the right to retain, for purposes of military security, under the protocol for the transfer of the Sûreté. In subsequent discussions it became clear that the French intended to retain a much larger number of Sûreté agents (about 300) than was considered by the Lebanese to be justifiable for this purpose, and, in any case, it is known that the man now under arrest is a purely political agent. The Government are determined to pursue the matter, and, indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the French intend to retain the "Sûreté aux Armées" as a political instrument. The matter will probably be considered by the Franco-British Joint Security Council, and it is understood that, if the French confirm in writing their intention to retain the 300 agents mentioned above, the Lebanese Government will protest.

[E 4747/23/89]

No. 34.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 121, Syria and the Lebanon, 26th July, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 8th August.)*

#### 1. General.

THE Syrian and Lebanese notes of protest couched in similar terms against the French action in holding military parades on the 14th July without obtaining the consent of the two Governments were presented on the 19th July and included, in both cases, a further complaint that the French Delegate-General, in continuing to issue arrêtés, even though they only purported to deal with French nationals and protégés, disregarded the sovereign rights of the States.

The Syrian press had in the meantime conducted a violent campaign of criticism against the French not only for their actions on the 14th July, but for their continued delay in handing over the Troupes Spéciales, and the Mohafezes announced through the local newspapers that the arrêtés issued by the Delegate-General were illegal. A similar announcement was subsequently made in the Lebanon.

The French Advisers to the Syrians have been informed by the Prime Minister that they are servants of the Syrian Government, and must not communicate with the French Delegation in the course of their work. Offered the choice of conforming or resigning, the advisers all accepted the Prime Minister's ruling.

The Syrian Government have received a telegram from Moscow agreeing to an exchange of diplomatic missions with the Soviet Union, and it is understood that a similar communication may soon be sent to the Lebanese who are soliciting it.

On the 24th July His Majesty's Minister left Beirut for London for consultation.

The destruction of the hashish crop is proceeding satisfactorily.

#### 3. Syria-Damascus.

A hardening of the Syrian Government's attitude towards the French, as indicated by the recent press campaign mentioned in paragraph 1, has led to the dismissal of certain officials believed to be too much under French influence, and there have been a number of changes in the judiciary.



## 9. Tribal.

A minor dispute between the Feddagha (a subsection of the Shamar of Zor) and the Baggara has been settled satisfactorily by the Mohafez of Euphrates who, in the absence of the Bedouin Control Officer, employed gendarmes to restore order and to arrest Mohammed ibn Teit, chief of the Feddagha, who were the aggressors. The Mohafez has stated to the Political Officer that he considers that he has no need of a Bedouin Control Officer, and that he could keep the Euphrates tribes quiet were he to command a few more gendarmes with proper equipment and the necessary transport.

## 12. Press and Propaganda.

The principal development of interest has been the Syrian press campaign (see under "General" above) following the incident of the French military reviews on the 14th July. The press pointed out that the troops employed in the reviews were Syrian nationals, whose equipment had been supplied to the French by another nation, and suggested that French oppression in Syria appeared to be in contrast to the spirit of liberty associated with the celebrations.

[E 4967/23/89]

No. 35.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 122, Syria and the Lebanon, 2nd August, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th August.)

## 1. General.

M. NOVIKOV, the Soviet Minister in Cairo, has informed both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that the policy of the U.S.S.R. is favourable to the complete restoration of French government in France but not to the maintenance of French government in colonial territories or to other French imperialistic designs.

The publication in the local press of those parts of the American Republican and Democratic party programmes which advocate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine has caused the expression of considerable anti-American sentiment. At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber a motion condemning any such policy was carried without a division, and the Syrian Prime Minister, when addressing a meeting in Aleppo, stated that the Syrian Government would strive always to ensure that Palestine did not become Jewish.

The French Delegate-General arrived in Damascus on the 22nd July to continue discussions for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian Government. Since, however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President were not in Damascus, and the Prime Minister was unwilling to undertake negotiations alone, General Beynet was obliged to return to Beirut the following day.

A potentially serious dislocation of traffic in North Syria has been brought about by a strike of employees of the D.H.P. Railway at Aleppo. The cause of the strike, which arises out of the different wages paid to Syrian and Lebanese employees of the company since the recent grant of wage increases by the Lebanese Government, is under investigation. Meanwhile the French Délégation Générale has informed the Mohafez of Aleppo that, unless order is kept by the Syrian gendarmerie, they will intervene to ensure security for military traffic, and the British military authorities have a railway operating company standing by to take over the line for military purposes if need arises. The Syrian Government and the French Délégation have both declared their determination to do everything in their power to ensure that important military traffic is not hindered. A novel element in the situation is that the British, French and Syrian authorities, military and civil, are working harmoniously together to the same end.

## 2. Wheat.

Total purchases during the period the 16th-27th July amounted to 17,977 tons, a daily average of 1,498 tons.

In South Lebanon purchases are disappointing, and it appears that the estimate made earlier in the year of a 5 to 1 mean yield for the wheat crop in

that area was optimistic. In many cases the wheat harvested will be unacceptable to the O.C.P. on account of the prevalence of "rust," and many farmers may not even have sufficient seed wheat to meet their requirements for this year's sowing.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

With the President of the Republic convalescing in Zebdani and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sofar recovering, it is said, from an attack of blood pressure brought on by his 20-year-old son's firm intention of marrying a lady ten years his senior, there has been little political activity.

On the 27th July the British military authorities began the delivery of equipment, in the form of boots, to the Syrian gendarmerie.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. C. Weld-Forester assumed charge of the Consulate and Political Office at Damascus on the 27th July.

## 6. Jebel Druze.

Consternation was caused by the arrival in the Jebel Druze of a mixed patrol of British other ranks and Syrian gendarmes, under orders of the British military authorities, to locate and destroy hashish. The leading branch of the Atrash family have apparently cultivated hashish on a considerable scale and Soltan Pasha el-Atrash, the Mohafez (the Emir Hassan) and the Commandant of Gendarmerie (Hael Bek el-Atrash) are all implicated. The Mohafez, however, has agreed to co-operate with the British authorities, and it is expected that the destruction of the crop will proceed without opposition.

## 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

*Euphrates.*—Colonel des Essars, Délégué Adjoint for East Syria, gave a reception to French, British and Syrian officers at Deir ez-Zor on the 14th July and spoke warmly of France's debt to the British. Had not the British fought alone in 1940, he said, France would not now be in the process of being liberated. He referred also to the part played by the British in the present fighting and said that true Frenchmen did not reject the hand of those who had helped them and saved their lives. He enjoined everyone to work for good relations. The undoubted sincerity of the speech made a deep impression.

*Jezireh.*—Wajih el-Azhari, a Sunni from Lattakia, is designated as Mohafez to the Jezireh.

## 11. The Lebanon.

Criticism of the Government has subsided, while public opinion is endeavouring to estimate the ability of the administration to carry out the promised reforms. The almost complete lack of contact between the Government and the French authorities continues, and the Political Officer reports that the Government undoubtedly have a majority both in the Chamber and the country in favour of the attitude they have adopted.

## 12. Press and Propaganda.

The Arab press has reacted strongly to the recent announcement of the American Republican and Democratic parties in favour of the unrestricted immigration of Jews into Palestine (see paragraph 1), asserting that the Arabs will defend the cause of Arab Palestine to the last. *El Ayyam* describes the Atlantic Charter as a legend that has been drowned in the sea of Darkness (the Arab name for the Atlantic Ocean).

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Axis broadcasts have attacked the French for working against Arab unity and for the re-establishment of their own predominant position in the Levant.



[E 5029/23/89]

No. 36.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 123, Syria and Lebanon, 9th August, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 19th August.)*

1. *General.*

The Soviet Minister in Cairo paid an official call on the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 3rd August and M. Takla afterwards read to the press the exchange of telegrams between M. Molotov and himself in which the Soviet Government expressed their agreement to the exchange of diplomatic representatives. This event is welcomed as tending to establish more firmly the independent status of the Lebanon (see also under "The Lebanon").

The recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the Soviet Union implicit in the agreement to the exchange of diplomatic representatives is generally regarded as a boomerang which has recoiled on the French, who claim to have launched it and whose propaganda has for so long played up the Soviet Union as a political factor favourable to their own interests in these countries.

The railway strike at Aleppo reported in Weekly Summary No. 122 of the 2nd August ended on the 3rd August when on the D.H.P., at instance of French Délégation Générale, confirming their promise that the workers' wages would be increased, the strikers returned to work, the Syrian Government having in the meantime arrested some 200 strikers who were preventing those willing to return to work to enter the workshops. The settlement provided a welcome if somewhat rare example of cordial co-operation between British, French and Syrian authorities.

The news of Turkey's decision to break off relations with Germany has caused little comment.

3. *Syria-Damascus.*

The Acting General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, accompanied by His Majesty's Consul, visited the President of the Republic at his summer residence on the 29th July. The President and the Prime Minister, who was also present, gave repeated assurances of the Syrian Government's wish to co-operate to the full in the allied war effort, but at the same time made it clear that their main object in doing so was to attain complete independence. Winning the war seemed less important.

The Syrian Government has invited the Minister of Justice, Dr. Kayali, to take the post of Syrian Minister to the Court of St. James (though it is not yet known whether he will accept) and it is also rumoured that they have asked Naim Antaki (Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ata Ayoubi's Government last summer) to go to Moscow.

7. *Alaouite Territory.*

The Political Officer reports that in reply to the Mohafez's protest over the presence of Senegalese troops at the summer resort of Slenfé (where there is in any case this season an acute shortage of water), the French through their délégué have offered to make a bargain by which if the present press campaign in Syria is stopped, the troops will be removed. The Political Officer adds that both the Minister of the Interior, who is at present in Lattakia in connexion with this presence of the Senegalese, and the Mohafez are very indignant at such a suggestion.

11. *The Lebanon.*

General Beynet refused on the grounds of ill-health to attend the official Government lunch given on the 5th August in honour of the Soviet Minister in Cairo. This caused offence to the Government (he was known to have lunched with Eddé on that day) and to M. Novikov who, when invited at a Red Cross Charity Ball next evening to sit at the official table, refused to do so on learning that General and Mme. Beynet were expected. This incident led to a remonstrance from the Lebanese and to a meeting between the President of the Republic, and three of his ministers on the one hand and M. Bart, the French Délégué to the Lebanon on the other, at which each side gave vent to its

grievances. M. Bart accused the Lebanese of being hostile to the French while the Lebanese accused the French of failing to treat them as an independent nation and of seeking to reassume by underground methods the powers which they had relinquished. The Political Officer reports that this exchange may have cleared the air as both sides are now showing signs of wishing to improve their relations now that they have both blown off steam.

12. *Press and Propaganda.*

The Soviet recognition of Lebanese and Syrian independence has filled the columns of local press during the week and has been hailed as the most important event in the history of the States. Some sections of the press emphasise that it shatters any hope the French might have had of re-establishing, with Soviet support, their ascendancy over these countries.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Axis broadcasts state that the Soviet Minister from Cairo is at present engaged in drawing up plans for the establishment of a Bolshevik régime in North Africa, Egypt, Iraq and the Levant States.

[E 5238/23/89]

No. 37.

*Weekly Political Summary No. 124, Syria and the Lebanon, 16th August, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 28th August.)*

1. *General.*

THE Syrian Government are showing some anxiety at not having received the arms for the gendarmerie promised to them by the British authorities, and they are apprehensive also on account of the French delay in handing over the Troupes Spéciales.

The Syrian Government have published a *démenti* of the news broadcast by the Near East Broadcasting Station (Sharq al 'Adna) that Nuri Pasha Said and the Syrian Prime Minister had agreed to "a project for the unification of Syria and the Lebanon into a single State and the formation of a Federation consisting of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine with one Council elected by the States represented in the Federation." A similar denial has been issued by the Lebanese authorities and belatedly by the Iraqis.

At the opening of the Arab Lawyers' Conference by the Syrian President at Damascus the leaders of the Egyptian, Transjordanian, Iraqi, Lebanese and Syrian delegations all spoke in favour of Arab unity and denounced Zionism. The Lebanese Prime Minister, in addressing the conference, emphasised that any project for Arab collaboration must be based on a guarantee of the independence of each individual State.

A keener interest is now being shown by the Syrian Government in local administration. As reported in recent Summaries, the Mohafezes of the Jezireh and of Hama have been dismissed. The Mohafez of Aleppo has been placed on the retired list for reasons of health.

2. *Wheat.*

Total cereals purchases during the period the 28th July to the 14th August amounted to 34,074 tons, a daily average of 1,893 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 58,451 tons.

3. *Syria-Damascus.*

See under "General" above.

4. *Aleppo.*

A Government scheme, fostered by the Textile Advisory Board, for the control of the cotton spinning industry is meeting with opposition from the "Société Syrienne de Filature et Tissage," supported by local interests.

A strike occurred on the 6th August among textile weavers on account of unemployment caused by a shortage of yarn, but ended on the following day when the Director of Ravitaillement promised to take steps to solve their difficulties.

5. *Homs and Hama.*

Khaled Baghdash, secretary of the Syrian Communist party, arrived in Homs during the week and held meetings at which several speeches were made mainly against the "Parti Populaire Syrien." On being informed by the



Mohafez that political meetings were banned in Homs. Baghdash convoked a further meeting in a village some 5 miles distant from the town. The Mohafez then obtained orders from the Central Government for the immediate return of Baghdash to Damascus. The visit appears to have had no consequences other than a protest from the Ulema.

#### 6. *Jebel Druze.*

The head of the gendarmerie at Soueida, Hael Bey el-Atrash, is to be replaced by Zeid Bey el-Atrash, younger brother of Soltan Pasha and at present *Commandant des Gendarmes Mobiles* at Damascus. It is not known whether this change has been decided upon by the Syrian Government, who may have heard of Hael Bey's recent anti-governmental activities, or whether it is due to the Emir Hassan's known personal liking for Zeid Bey.

It is reported that Aref Bey el-Nakadi, Director-General of the Syrian Ministry of Justice, is to be sent to Soueida by the Syrian Government to make an investigation into the state of the local administration. It is believed that he will also be charged with the additional unofficial mission of endeavouring to bring about a reconciliation between the Atrash family and the Government.

#### 7. *Alaouite Territory.*

Nothing to report.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

Nothing to report.

#### 9. *Tribal.*

Nothing to report.

#### 10. *Frontier.*

The French *Officier Frontalier* at Jisr esh-Shoghhour near Aleppo has reported that the Turkish Qaimaqam of Yayla Dagi recently informed him that, in matters concerning the frontier, he would deal with no one except the *Officier Frontalier*, and that, if a Syrian representative is to be present at frontier commission meetings, he must take no part in the proceedings, but act purely as an observer.

#### 11. *The Lebanon.*

On the 13th August the French arrested Naim Moghabghab, who wounded a French Troupe Spéciale during the riots on the 27th April (see Weekly Summary No. 109, section 1), on a charge of attempted murder. A warrant has been out against Moghabghab since the incident, but he escaped arrest by remaining in hiding in his village in the mountains. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, on learning of the arrest, sent for the French Delegate to the Lebanon and expressed the hope that, as the Lebanese had dealt leniently with the persons they had arrested as a result of the 27th April, the French would follow their example. He suggested that it was in the interests of the French themselves that they should not make a martyr of this man, who was already something of a national figure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then drew the attention of the delegate to the provocative action of the French authorities in, two days later, sending Senegalese troops to Moghabghab's village "for estivage," and said that this was bound to excite the local population. If the French persisted in their intention to keep them there, the Lebanese Government would feel compelled to send a force of gendarmerie to prevent violence. The delegate, who appeared to be totally ignorant of the presence of the Senegalese troops, merely replied that he hoped these questions would be settled during the visit (the first for many months) which General Beynet is paying the Lebanese Prime Minister at the end of the week.

#### 12. *Press and Propaganda.*

Recent rumours of a project for the unification of Syria and the Lebanon (see paragraph 1) have caused a strong reaction in the Levant press, which appears to reflect the local conviction that "Arab union" must be based on respect for the full independence and national sovereignty of each Arab State.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—No significant change.

[E 5412/23/89]

No. 38.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 125, Syria and the Lebanon, 23rd August, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th September.)*

#### 1. *General.*

The week has been quiet; the summer heat, the start of Ramadan, and, in Syria, a holiday on the anniversary of the election of the President of the Republic, have all combined to reduce political activity to a minimum.

The Arab Lawyers' Conference, held in Damascus from the 12th–18th August, was attended by representatives from the surrounding countries (including Palestine) and Egypt. Many of the proceedings were purely political in character and several of the speakers hailed the conference as "the corner-stone of Arab unity." The Lebanese delegation, maintaining that they had been given to understand that the discussions were to be entirely of a professional nature, were opposed to any discussion of Arab unity and threatened to withdraw unless a statement was made by the Prime Minister defining the position of the Lebanon. Accordingly, Riad Sulh made a speech in Beirut in which he declared that the Lebanon was determined to preserve its independence within its present frontiers and, while prepared to co-operate with other Arab States, would only do so as an independent entity and on an equal footing with them.

Two attitudes could be discerned during the discussions; members who were Government officials or those who one day hoped to hold posts, stressed the need for each country to achieve separate independence as a preliminary to Arab union—a viewpoint strongly supported by the Egyptian and the Lebanese delegates—while members without responsibility were in favour of immediate union. The Palestine delegates appeared to think that they had the sympathy of Great Britain, partly because they imagined that it is in the interest of His Majesty's Government's policy in the Middle East to support the Arabs, and partly because they feel that the Jews are now looking towards America. Altogether, less fanaticism against foreigners was expressed than might have been expected. Needless to say, the conference achieved nothing, either from the political or juridical point of view.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, private secretary to Ibn Saud, paid private visits to Beirut and Damascus, ostensibly for the purpose of reconciling the views of the Syrians and Lebanese on the Arab question with those lately expressed by Ibn Saud.

#### 3. *Syria-Damascus.*

The anniversary of the election of Shukri Quwatli as President of the Republic was celebrated as a holiday on the 17th August. The President himself returned to Damascus from his summer residence, and diplomatic and consular representatives paid congratulatory calls. The President later gave a reception in the garden of the Chamber of Deputies, to which some 500 Syrian guests were invited.

M. Zawadowski presented his letters of credence as Polish Minister to Syria on the 14th August. It is understood that Dr. Kayali, for whose *agrément* as Syrian Minister to the Court of St. James's the Syrian Government has asked, will also be the representative to the Polish Government.

#### 4. *Aleppo.*

The cotton workers' strike (see Weekly Summary No. 124) ended when the Government promised to arrange for a more regular supply of cotton yarn and to postpone their attempt to collect income tax on the workers' wages.

#### 5. *Homs and Hama.*

After the visit of the head of the Communist party in Syria, Khaled Baghdash (see Weekly Summary No. 124), opposition meetings were held under the aegis of Sheikh Safa el Sebai. The local Communists, remarking on the fact that the Mohafez did not attempt to stop these meetings, sent a protest to the President of the Republic against the behaviour of the Mohafez and police during their leader's visit. Under censorship rules the local police refused to permit the transmission of the telegram.

Some 300 Polish and Rumanian Jewish refugees passed through Homs during the week but there was no evidence of popular agitation against them.



Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 126, Syria and the Lebanon, 30th August, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th September.)

### 1. General.

THE French authorities celebrated with enthusiasm the liberation of Paris. French flags were displayed and distributed in abundance and French military transport used to bring Lebanese to the Délégué Général's reception, which was held with some discretion at Aley instead of in Beirut. The Lebanese Government, on British advice, behaved in a friendly manner, calling on the French Delegate-General and despatching congratulatory telegrams from the President to Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and General de Gaulle. The Government later gave a garden party for the liberation of Paris, and members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, dignitaries, &c., were invited.

The Syrian Government adopted a similar attitude. There was at first some attempt both in Damascus and elsewhere to prevent pro-French sympathisers from displaying their flags, but the Government issued instructions, it is believed on the initiative of Shukri Quwatli, that there must be no interference. As in Beirut, the French, in questionable taste, dropped leaflets over Damascus on the occasion both of the first announcement of the liberation of Paris and the rebirth of French greatness.

Though nearly all Syrians expect and desire an Allied victory, many of the Moslem nationalists view with some apprehension the possibility of a strengthening of the French position as a result of the successes in France. On the other hand, the minorities, particularly in Lebanon and Northern Syria, tend to regard the prospect of any lessening of European influence with mixed feelings.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires went to Damascus on the 23rd August and called on the Prime Minister to convey to him the negative reply from His Majesty's Government to the Syrian request that a special delegation should be sent to London, and to give Saadullah Bey assurances from His Majesty's Government that no change in British policy toward Syrian independence was contemplated. A similar message was conveyed to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

A decree has been published granting Adel Bey Azmeh, who in April 1940 was condemned to twenty years' imprisonment for conspiring to overthrow the Council of Directors, and is believed to have taken part in the rising in Iraq whence he fled to Turkey, a pension of £Syr. 121 (basic salary) as from the 1st April, 1939. He was also an active fomentor of trouble in Palestine in 1937-38.

There is speculation in high Syrian quarters as to whether the new British army "amenity" building programme in the Mezze and Qatana areas near Damascus indicates a prolonged stay by the British army in Syria, even after the war in Europe is over.

Abdul Moneim Bey el Rifa'i, appointed Consul for Transjordan in Syria and the Lebanon, assumed his functions in Damascus on the 24th August.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

Some friction is reported in the Sûreté at Dera'a, where the French assistant claims that the Syrians have failed to carry out the requirements laid down in the protocol for the checking of passports.

At Dera'a station the seals on a W.D. box wagon were recently broken, probably by small boys who frequent the station yards. When approached on the matter, the Syrian Police Commissioner stated that he could not exercise adequate control owing to shortage of personnel.

### 11. The Lebanon.

Camille Shamoun, Lebanese Minister to London, accompanied by his family and his staff, left for Egypt en route for his new post on the 27th August.

The Beirut Merchants' Association have finally produced a guarantee for the payment of the sum agreed with the Government compounding arrears of War Profits Tax, and a Bill to promulgate the agreement is being submitted to the Chamber.

The following comment on the present political situation in the Lebanon appeared in the editorial of *Al-Nahar*, one of the leading Beirut daily newspapers, on the 30th August: "We, Lebanese, suffer from a sick mentality which has been, and will always be, at the root of all our sorrows and misfortune until we are cured of it. The rivalry between two of our political parties has reached such a stage that a compromise seems no longer possible. What is still worse, each party claims the support of an 'ally' who, they believe, will not fail them in time of need."

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The local Arabic press considers the recent rumours of the preliminary merging of certain Arab States to have been caused by a Zionist attempt to test the strength of the Arab Union Movement, and strong disapproval is expressed of the alleged project to create a Greater Syria destined to become an area of exploitation for the Jews.

The tendency of local French newspapers to over-emphasise the part played by the French in the liberation of Paris has aroused resentment in nationalist circles.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 127, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 6th September, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 19th September.)

### 1. General.

#### Little to report.

The Persian Delegate in Beirut (who is accredited to the French Delegate-General but not to the Syrian or Lebanese Governments) is reported to have called on the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs recently to deliver a letter from his Government recognising Syrian independence, and it is believed that an exchange of diplomatic representatives may be arranged shortly. The Lebanese Prime Minister has stated that the Persian Delegate has expressed the Persian Government's readiness to accord recognition as soon as a Lebanese delegation visits Tehran in the way they have visited other neighbouring countries. Riad Bey Sulh added that Brazil and Ethiopia have signified their recognition of the Lebanon. The press in Damascus also reports that Ethiopia has recognised Syrian independence.

Mme. Sheerawi, the Egyptian feminist leader, who has been in these parts, informed a newspaper correspondent that the forthcoming Arab Women's Congress, which is to be held in Cairo in December, would discuss the rights of women and endeavour by every means available to have these rights recognised in the Arab States, and would also support Arabism in Palestine by endeavouring to arrange for the representation of Palestine Arab women in the Congress.

### 2. Economic.

The price of gold sovereigns fell during the week to £Syr. 41.85; at the close of the market on the 26th August, however, the price had risen to £Syr. 43.15, still £Syr. 1.50 lower than last week.

Bar gold also fell by approximately £Syr. 2 during the week.

Textiles and commodity prices have shown a slight reduction, while food prices are stable.

The Regional Director of the O.C.P. has expressed the view that the wheat situation in the Homs-Hama area has reached a serious condition. They are about 5,000 tons behind schedule; reasons being: (1) the war situation, which has led most landowners to risk hoarding to get better prices at the end of the season, when, they believe, the O.C.P. will pass into Syrian hands; (2) the bad season in the eastern areas; and (3) the smuggling of considerable quantities to the Palmyra area.

Prices show a downward trend as a result of the war news.

### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The President of the Republic has still not completely recovered. He has to use a stick to support him owing to the phlebitis in his leg, but returns to Damascus three or four days each week for the transaction of current business.



### 7. *Alaouite Territory.*

It is reported that the celebration of Ramadan has occasioned considerable fanaticism amongst Moslems, and Christians and Alaouites have commented upon the lack of consideration shown. They allege that in Haffe Moslems insisted on places at the head of the queues for rations.

The Senegalese Battalion left Slenfé on the 29th August (see Summary No. 123 of the 9th August, item 7). There have been no incidents.

### 11. *The Lebanon.*

The anniversary of the creation of the Lebanon in 1920 was celebrated on the 1st September, and the President of the Republic gave a reception attended by the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, the British and French army commanders and local notables. Lebanese flags were lavishly displayed, partly as a counterblast to the display of French flags at the time of the liberation of Paris.

Relations between the Lebanese Government and the French authorities are no better. Riad Bey Sulh, in an interview with the British Political Officer at Beirut, accused the French of systematically encouraging the opponents of the present régime and of spreading propaganda against them; he added that the French themselves had made no advances. The Government's position in the country is growing weaker, and intrigues between Deputies similar to those which produced the reshuffle of last July seem likely to come to a head early in the October session of the Chamber. These intrigues are largely due to the personal ambitions of Deputies; but the Government themselves are presenting a target for criticism by their continued failure to tackle the numerous outstanding problems or to show any tangible sign of improving the administration. The Minister of Finance, alone amongst his colleagues, is said to be displaying energy in the preparation of new measures of taxation, which, however, have not yet come before the Chamber.

[E 5951/23/89]

No. 41.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 128, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th September, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 29th September.)*

#### 1. *General.*

His Majesty's Minister returned on the 6th September and since his return has paid calls on the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and Ministers for Foreign Affairs and on the French Delegate.

On the occasion of the liberation of Brussels the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent his Chef de Protocole and Chef de Cabinet to express the congratulations of the Syrian Government to the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus. Government buildings were beflagged and flood-lit in celebration. In Beirut the Lebanese Government also sent their congratulations and the Minister for Foreign Affairs represented the Government at a Te Deum held under the auspices of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires and attended by members of the diplomatic corps.

M. Chataigneau, formerly secretary-general at the French Delegation, but latterly *en disponibilité*, left for Algiers to take up the post of Governor-General there. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a farewell dinner party in his honour.

#### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

Nassouhi Bukhari, Minister of Defence and Education, tendered his resignation on the 7th September. The consul in Damascus reports that it has not yet been definitely accepted but understands that Mr. Bukhari has refused to withdraw it.

The Council of Ministers is considering the 1945 draft budget in preparation for submission to the Chamber in the next regular session. The budget is planned to make provision for an expansion of some £Syr. 6 million—an increase of approximately 20 per cent. on this year's budget, but includes provision for the *intérêts communs*.

The Transjordan consul, who fell ill on his arrival in Damascus on the 29th August, opened the offices of his consulate on the 11th September.

The consul reports that a children's welfare society has been organised to look after vagrant children. The founders of this society include the wives of prominent citizens of Damascus, including Naim Antaki, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Adnan Atassi.

#### 4. *Aleppo.*

Trouble occurred on the evening of the 5th September when three troupes spéciales were arrested by the police for interfering with a theatre show. Next evening some hundred troupes spéciales beat up eight gendarmes in retaliation and casualties among civilians occurred when the crowd attacked and disarmed a French sentry. French flags (including the flag on the Intendance headquarters) were torn down and dragged along the streets by the mob, and a knife was thrown at the French délégué's car. Crowds continued in the streets till late in the evening and damage was done to shops believed to be French. Similar damage was done next morning, but on the afternoon of the 7th the town was quiet. Reports that troupes spéciales (who are mostly recruited from the minorities) had pursued their opponents into the mosques have caused great offence, and the consul in Aleppo reports that French prestige which had risen recently is now lower than ever. The funerals of the victims passed off without incident.

The Syrian Minister of the Interior and the French delegate for Syria arrived in Aleppo on the 7th. The French delegate left as soon as the town was quiet, but the Minister of the Interior remained to instal the new Mohafez, Ihsan Charif, who arrived at very short notice in the midst of trouble. The appointment has been generally welcomed.

The French have demanded the presence of Syrian representatives, especially of gendarmerie, at the rehoisting of the flag on their Intendance, and the Minister of the Interior promised to send a reply from Damascus, to which he returned on the 9th.

#### 6. *Jebel Druze.*

The Administrative Council of the Jebel Druze met on the 7th of September and passed a unanimous vote for the abrogation of the present financial and administrative Statute of Autonomy and the annexation of the Jebel Druze into the Syrian Republic.

This decision was greeted with great enthusiasm in Soneida and the notables, including former opponents of the present Mohafez, called on him to express their delight.

#### 8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

The political officer reports that the new Mohafez is anxious to have Nuri, the son of the Emir Nujhim, arrested and tried in the civil courts for the murder of six members of the Howeiat. He is evidently afraid of French opposition (since the Emir Nujhim, a recipient of the Legion d'Honneur, is a well-known French protégé), lack of support from the Central Government in Damascus, and the defeat of any gendarmerie force he might send against the Emir's notorious machine guns.

The Mohafez is, however, not prepared to ask the French to carry out the arrest since he is disgusted with the disloyalty shown by the French Bedouin Control Officer to his Syrian employers and has left for Damascus to take the matter up with the Syrian Government.

The fact that the crime was carried out with automatic weapons has caused considerable dismay among the semi-sedentaries and in particular among the Wulda. The British military representative in East Syria states that the acting French délégué denied that Nuri had any automatics, but the fact remains that some of the corpses are reliably reported to have as many as twenty-two bullet holes in them.

#### 9. *Tribal.*

A dispute arose during the past week between the Kikieh and the Baggara tribes. Goats were stolen and crops destroyed. A gendarmerie platoon in Kamechlie, under a n.c.o., was sent to restore order and arrange for the stolen animals to be returned to their owners. In the ensuing operations a n.c.o. was



killed while pursuing the goat thieves. Subsequently the gendarmerie intervened and nineteen arrests took place. The consul at Deir-ez-Zor reports that these arrests have had a salutary effect and is of the opinion that the best solution would be the calling of a Majlis to settle the tribal differences.

The quarrel is apparently due to a land dispute which dates back many years and had its origin when the French, after favouring the nomads, then allocated some villages in their possession to their opponents.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 5th September, a number of Deputies criticised the severity of the Government censorship on internal news, and particularly the suppression of all criticism of the Government. The Prime Minister's defence of the Government was not well received, but the matter dropped without a formal debate.

At the same sitting, a Bill was passed providing for compulsory increases of between 30 per cent. and 12 per cent. on the minimum wages of all workers in commerce and industry as calculated on the 1st January, 1944. These increases, which are substantially larger than those recommended by the Government Committee at present examining labour questions, were imposed by the Legislative Committee of the Chamber on the Government, which in its present somewhat insecure position was not disposed to resist.

At a further sitting of the Chamber on the 11th September, a law was passed modifying certain articles of the Code du Commerce regarding limited companies. The principal classes of this modification are those forbidding the formation of any company without the prior assent of the Government and obliging all companies to include at least 30 per cent. of Lebanese in their boards of directors.

The arrangement recently arrived at between the Government and the Beirut Merchants' Association in regard to the arrears of War Profits Tax has still not been promulgated. The Financial Committee of the Chamber are not satisfied with the guarantees of payment put forward by the merchants, and the opinion is being once more expressed in many circles that the Government should have obtained a considerably larger sum from the merchants.

General Beynet made another of his flag-showing tours, this time through the Chouf, on the 7th September. It is understood that he again ignored a request from the Lebanese Government that the tour should not be made in view of the danger of incidents. The visit was, however, everywhere ignored by the local population, who showed no enthusiasm, and was generally adjudged to have been a failure. The Lebanese Prime Minister made a similar tour of South Lebanon on the 10th September.

## CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[E 4033/149/65]

No. 42.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)*

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Beirut, 29th June, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a memorandum on Armenians in the Lebanon.

This paper contains much information which is not otherwise accessible and provides a summary of one of the most intricate and difficult problems of the Levant. I am indebted for the compilation of this information to the staff of His Majesty's Consulate-General and to my press attaché.

I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

Enclosure in No. 42.

### ARMENIANS IN THE LEBANON.

#### I.—General Background.

Before 1918 the Armenian population of the Lebanon numbered about 1,000, most of whom were artisans and merchants. They had no political significance and the Turks, generally speaking, treated them with tolerance, allowing them to establish schools and churches of their own. Between 1918 and 1921 this community was joined by a number of former exiles attracted by the French promise of sanctuary in Cilicia. Their expectations were disappointed when the French were driven out of Cilicia and an exodus of the Armenians already settled there took place. It is estimated that over 40,000 of these came to the Lebanon, where the French, acting nominally in the interests of the League of Nations, but motivated perhaps in part by an appreciation of the advantages to be gained by obtaining a Christian minority of this size, made arrangements for their settlement.

2. With the exception of about 1,000 evacuees from Smyrna in 1922, no further Armenians entered the country until the cession of the Sandjak of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1937, when almost the entire Armenian population fled to Syria and the Lebanon. According to some sources, the panic which led to this exodus was inspired by the French; it is reasonable to assume, however, that the Armenians, with Turkish persecution still fresh in their minds, would have evacuated the Sandjak in any case.

3. The refugees who came to the Lebanon were settled in two main centres: at Anjar (in the Bekaa), and in the neighbourhood of Tyre. Anti-French Armenians maintain that these two districts, which are highly malarial, were purposely chosen because their inhabitants are predominantly Moslem: the French, they state, wished to create enclaves of Christian aliens who could be relied upon to support them in any conflict with the often turbulent local population. Complaints are also often heard regarding the primitive nature of the accommodation provided: they have some justification, but it must be admitted that both the Anjar and the Tyre settlements compare very favourably indeed with the extremely unhygienic "tin town" near Beirut river which had been the home of Beirut Armenians since the end of the last war.

#### II.—Armenian Institutions in the Lebanon.

##### (A) The Churches.

4. In the absence of any permanent temporal power, Armenians came, through the centuries, to regard their Church as their bastion against foreign invaders and as the custodian of their language and their national traditions. The main preoccupation of the 1921 refugees was, therefore, the establishment in the Lebanon of the Armenian Church and of the schools which it controlled.

5. The Orthodox Gregorian Church is the one to which the majority of Armenians belong. Its primate is the Catholicos of Cilicia; he resides at



Antelias, north of Beirut, where a cathedral has been built, with a school and seminary attached. Next in importance to the Catholics comes the Armenian Archbishop of Beirut, who controls the twenty or so Gregorian churches in the Lebanon and in addition is responsible for liaison with the Lebanese Government. He is assisted by, and responsible to, a communal council which is divided into committees entrusted with the management of lay affairs. The council is elected by the laity, who thus have not only a measure of control over the higher ecclesiastics but also a share in the administration of charitable and educational institutions.

6. The present Catholicos is Karekin Hovsepian, who, owing to his absence in the United States, has not yet been enthroned. His *locum tenens* is Khat Atchababian. The Archbishop of Beirut is Ardavast Surmeyer, a fearless and strong-willed prelate who exhibits markedly pro-British sentiments.

7. The Armenian Catholic Church has been established for two centuries in the Lebanon and most of its members have become assimilated to the surrounding population, have taken Arabic names and only hear Armenian in the Church ritual. In 1921 they gave effective help to all such refugees as were prepared, in return, to be converted. They have installed schools and monastic orders, have certain connections with Rome and the Jesuits, and regard themselves as the channel of communication between the French and the Armenians. Their Patriarch is also styled "Catholicos of Cilicia." The present incumbent is Gregory Peter XV Agagianian.

8. The Armenian Protestant Church dates back to the early nineteenth century and owes its existence to the efforts of foreign missionaries. In Beirut, Armenian Protestants, until recently, formed part of the Syrian Protestant Church. A considerable increase in their numbers decided them to secede and they now possess numerous schools and churches of their own. They are looked down upon by the Gregorians, who regard them as their social inferiors.

#### (B) Political Parties.

9. There were no Armenian political parties until the latter half of the nineteenth century. At that time, under the influence of European Liberal movements, a number of secret societies were founded, with headquarters in the various capitals of Europe and underground branches all over Armenia. Their principal common aim was the liberation of their country from foreign domination.

10. The Tashnags, founded in 1890, were a fighting party of nationalists and social reformers. In Russia they collaborated with socialist or radical parties and in Turkey actively supported the Young Turks in the overthrow of Abdul Hamid. They had a reputation for terrorism which they have to this day not entirely lost.

11. During the war 1914-18 they organised legions of anti-Turkish volunteers whose task was to hold back the Turks long enough for the Armenian population to take refuge in the Caucasus. In 1917, the strongest party in Armenia, they came forward with a programme of agrarian reform and nationalist self-determination and it was they who dominated politics in the shortlived Armenian Republic of 1918-20. When the Bolsheviks overran their country they were ruthlessly persecuted, but those who could make their escape continued their militant and conspiratorial activities abroad.

12. Anti-Russian and anti-Turk as they were, they favoured any foreign Power which might be expected to assist them in realising their national aspirations. They pinned their hopes at first on the Allies, but when Hitler came to power and revealed himself as the strongest force against bolshevism they turned pro-German and remained so until 1939. The Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact came as a rude awakening, and the Tashnags, bewildered at finding their would-be protector and one of their principal enemies apparently making common cause, transferred their sympathies to the Western Powers. When Russia was attacked, the Tashnag Central Committee in Cairo resolved to sink their previous differences with the Soviets and to align themselves with the Anglo-Russian Allies. They undertook at the same time to refrain from any act which might embarrass Turkey as long as she remained loyal to her undertakings to Great Britain.

13. By the end of 1941 the hold of the Central Committee over its various sub-committees was weakening, largely as a result of the difficulty of maintaining normal communications with them, but partly owing to their failure to come to terms with the Soviets or to obtain active support from the United Nations. A tendency is noticeable on the part of many of the younger members to look to Russia as their sole protector against Turkey in the future. Nevertheless, the

Tashnags probably constitute the strongest and best disciplined Armenian party in the Lebanon. They publish a newspaper (*Aztag*) and control a high school and a well-organised athletic club (Homenetmen), whose members are subject to rigid discipline.

14. The Hunchag party was originally formed prior to the Tashnag party. When the latter was formed large numbers of the Hunchag members went over to the Tashnags and the party slowly disintegrated and ceased to wield any power. It has shown signs of revival during the past two years, but its activities, such as they are, are confined to the Lebanon. Elsewhere it has no importance. Its headquarters is in the United States, where it publishes a journal entitled *Yeridassart Hayasdan* (Young Armenia). In this country it publishes a paper called *Ararat*. At one time the Hunchags in this country were closely associated with Artin Madoyan, a Russian Communist, who has since quarrelled with them and joined the local Communist party. The sentiments of the Hunchags are definitely pro-Soviet, whilst they style themselves intellectual Marxists.

15. The Ramgavar party consists of the wealthier elements of the community. It favours close co-operation with the local Government and is opposed to the extremist parties, whose methods, it fears, might arouse hostility and thus endanger the safety of the whole Armenian community. It controls a newspaper, *Zartonk*, an athletic club, Antranik, and a charitable organisation, which is financed by Armenians all over the world. The increase in the numbers of the wealthy and the support it enjoys from the Gregorian Church have given this so-called Conservative party an importance unprecedented in its history.

16. The Armenian Communist party was founded as soon as the refugees arrived in the Levant States and remained a separate entity until 1935, when it was affiliated to the Lebanese Communists. An overwhelming majority of the militant Lebanese Communists are Armenians.

17. Although the power of the Communists is on the increase—recent Soviet successes having added considerably to their numbers and prestige—they are not yet strong enough to present their own candidates in elections. Their electoral policy is to give backing to any party except the Tashnags. They have their own newspaper, *Jogovourti Zain*, and a clandestine press for use in case of emergency.

18. The Chezok party is composed of neutrals who belong to none of the main Armenian political parties. Its members wish Soviet Armenia well, but give their allegiance to the country of their adoption. Their relations with the Lebanese are friendly and enable them, in times of crisis, to act as peacemakers between the local population and the more extremist Armenians. Their candidate in the recent elections, Chamlian, was the only Armenian to be elected in the first ballot.

19. Whilst the ideological differences subsist between the various Armenian parties and are accentuated not a little by the mutual animosity of their leader and newspaper editors, it may be said that on issues of world import Armenian as a whole are of one mind. Thus the great majority—

- (a) hope for an Allied victory;
- (b) are loyal to the country of their adoption;
- (c) nourish fear and hatred of the Turks; this may be said to be the one compelling instinct which dominates, consciously or unconsciously, the mental outlook of every Armenian.

Non-Tashnags have a further bond in their opposition to the Tashnags.

#### III.—Lebano-Armenian Relations, 1919-43.

20. During the Great War Armenians in exile had thrown in their lot with the Allies and the French had formed an Armenian Legion which saw service under General Allenby. After the armistice these levies, many of whom found themselves at the time in Beirut, took steps to secure the release of Armenian girls who had been sold to Moslem harems. The search for the girls was in some instances made an excuse for looting; passions rose on both sides, and in 1919 riots broke out in which a certain number of people lost their lives.

21. A more serious incident occurred in 1926. A Moslem Deputy, fearing the outbreak of an epidemic as a result of the unhygienic conditions in the Armenian settlement within the perimeter of Beirut, made a speech in the Chamber demanding the transfer of the Armenians outside the limits of the city. The press (deliberately or inadvertently) published incorrect versions of the speech, stating that the Deputy was aiming at the expulsion of the Armenians from the country. Although this account was subsequently discovered to be false,



the alarm aroused was considerable. Anti-French Armenians believe the French to have been responsible for the incident and to have made use of it as a warning to any Armenian showing an inclination to establish friendly relations with the Moslems.

22. In 1935 appeared a High Commission decree which, for the first time, allowed the Armenian Orthodox two seats in Parliament. The French made sure that both the successful candidates in the 1935 elections were their nominees. One was a Tashnag, the other allegedly a neutral although actually a French tool. Both the members elected were insignificant and their political influence was negligible.

23. Perhaps the most serious crisis in which the Armenians were involved occurred in November 1936, directly after the signature of the draft Franco-Lebanese Treaty. *Agents provocateurs* seized the opportunity afforded by a violent polemic between a Moslem and Maronite newspaper simultaneously to incite the Moslems against the Christians and to encourage the Armenians to believe that they themselves were in danger of a Moslem attack. In the ensuing Christian-Moslem riots Armenians went to the help of the Christians. Their participation in the incident was greatly magnified and for a time very considerable hostility was shown towards them in Moslem circles.

#### IV.—Armenians in the 1943 Elections.

24. With the return of the Lebanon to a constitutional life in 1943 it was decided at first to allow the Armenian Orthodox three seats in the Chamber. As a result, however, of the Moslem-Maronite conflict over the allocation of seats, the Armenians were sacrificed and found themselves, as in 1935, with two only. As under Lebanese Electoral Law voting is carried out by lists, each Armenian candidate made his own arrangements with the candidates of other communities for inclusion on their lists. The following Armenians stood for election:—

- (a) A Communist representative, who, however, withdrew before the first ballot in favour of all but the Tashnag candidate;
- (b) Der Kaloustian (Tashnag). He was an officer in the French army during the Vichy régime and has the reputation of being completely loyal to France. His many enemies accuse him of pro-Axis leanings;
- (c) Iskanderian (Hunchag). His name figured on the same list as that of Der Kaloustian and he was also a French nominee, although pains were taken to make him more palatable to the Moslems by representing him as hostile to Armenian nationalism;
- (d) Chamlian (Chezok); and
- (e) Misirlian (Ramgavar). Both these candidates had the backing of the Communists, of the Church and of all those Armenians who favoured the election of neutral representatives rather than of professional politicians.

25. Armenian Catholics and Protestants were not allowed to stand for election since they were classed under the Electoral Law as forming part of the minorities.

26. In the first ballot Chamlian was returned, whilst Misirlian missed election by five votes. In the second ballot, Der Kaloustian, who would certainly not have been elected by the Armenians alone, was returned as a result of the strong support given to him by the French and, according to some sources, of an intervention by the Syrian Prime Minister, who, himself violently anti-Turkish, was assiduously seeking all possible allies in an irredentist campaign against the Turks in the Sandjak.

#### V.—Armenians and the Franco-Lebanese Crisis, November 1943.

27. Der Kaloustian showed himself loyal to the French and, as the author of a pro-French statement immediately after his election and as one of the five members of the Chamber who abstained from voting for the amendment of the Constitution, became one of the most unpopular figures of the day. As he was considered by many to represent Armenians as a whole, much of the indignation aroused against him at the time of the arrest of the Government was visited also upon his community. *Agents provocateurs* exploited this situation in an attempt to widen the breach between Armenians and Lebanese by an intensive propaganda campaign calculated to inspire fear and hatred on both sides.

28. Fortunately for themselves the Armenians were genuinely shocked by the French "Putsch," and many of them took an early opportunity of showing it. The Communists issued an anti-French tract, Armenian women of all parties went in deputations to condole with Ministers' wives on their husbands' arrest, and when the Government were released the Armenians took their full share in the rejoicings. Der Kaloustian, whose pro-French conduct was subsequently repudiated by the Tashnag Central Committee in Cairo, was obliged, much against his will, to join other Armenian notables in congratulating the Government on their release.

#### VI.—The Future of Armenians in the Lebanon.

29. At present between 60,000 and 70,000 Armenians are living in the Lebanon. On the whole, they have done well for themselves. They were, of course, assisted by the League of Nations and other organisations, but they are largely justified in their claim that they have risen from the status of refugees to that of citizens chiefly by their own efforts. They are a capable and hard-working nation, extremely intelligent and individually ambitious to make good. The two settlements at Anjar and Tyre still exist, but in Beirut the insanitary tin town has seen a steady exodus as people have been able to improve their conditions and remove to better quarters. Several of them have made their names in the professional class, in particular as doctors and lawyers, much of the town's trade is now in their hands, and as artisans (in particular as mechanics) they are second to none. Their boast that not a single Armenian beggar is to be met with in the streets of Beirut is hardly exaggerated.

30. With their bitter memories of Turkish persecution, and with their feeling of having been betrayed by foreign Powers still uppermost in their minds, the main preoccupation of Armenians is to avoid at all costs being involved in any trouble and to become as far as possible citizens in the full sense of the word of the country in which they are, at least for the present, installed. The hope is occasionally expressed that they may gradually, now that they are living in a largely Christian country, lose that aloofness which their outlawry by the Turks necessarily created in them and that, through inter-marriage and common interests, they will eventually surrender their language and traditions and become completely assimilated into the local population. There is no indication, however, that such a movement is in progress or is likely to start in the near future. The concentration of the majority of Armenians in separate settlements, the existence of separate Armenian schools, churches, newspapers, athletic clubs and other institutions, are all calculated to foster their racial spirit. There are consequently few cases of inter-marriage with the local inhabitants, and Armenian and Turkish are the languages generally spoken by Armenians amongst themselves. Moreover, the Armenians, with their ready adoption of Western ideas, undoubtedly feel and evince a certain superiority over the more backward Lebanese.

31. The Lebanese on their side, generally speaking, dislike the Armenians, whom they regard as alien interlopers and of whose commercial success they are jealous. Broadly speaking, the Christian elements look upon them as potential political allies and the Moslems as potential enemies in the event of a major communal conflict. Meanwhile the Lebanese appear to be satisfied, despite Der Kaloustian's attitude, with the behaviour of the Armenians as a whole and there is no sign of any real desire to get rid of them.

32. Armenians are not, for all their recent wanderings, a nomadic race and their principal aim is to find security and a permanent resting-place. They do not, however, appear to look forward with great enthusiasm to an indefinite sojourn in the Lebanon, where opportunities are limited and where, they fear, they may be exposed, with other Christian elements, to persecution at the hands of the Moslems. A number would gladly emigrate to the United States or to the British Empire, and even more, in the heat of their present enthusiasm for Russia, would, if offered reasonable chances of work and security, remove to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the meantime, they may be expected to stand aside from all major political issues and so avoid drawing unnecessary attention to themselves.



File Number:

T

TREATY.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

(16881)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 59

October to December 1944



# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
<b>Chapter I.—IRAQ.</b>			
1 Mr. Thompson (Bagdad) No. 643. Tel.	1944. Aug. 2	Situation in Kurdistan ... Discussion of the situation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who regarded it as grave	1
2 Mr. Thompson No. 657. Tel.	Aug. 6	Situation in Kurdistan ... Conversation with the Acting Prime Minister. His policy towards Kurdistan and Mullah Mustafa	2
3 Mr. Thompson No. 752. Tel.	Sept. 1	Situation in Kurdistan ... Visit of Taufiq Wahbi to Mullah Mustafa, and his proposed recommendations to the Iraqi Government for the distribution of relief in Kurdistan	2
4 Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad) No. 476.	Sept. 28	Situation in Kurdistan ... Further provocation by Mullah Mustafa—Iraqi Government's desire to despatch troops to deal with the situation. Their reluctant agreement that nothing must be done without full Anglo-Iraqi consultation. Mullah Mustafa's appeal to His Majesty's Ambassador for relief	3
5 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 510.	Oct. 31	Situation in Iraq ... Report on the main events in Iraq since the 14th August	5
<b>Chapter II.—PALESTINE.</b>			
6 Earl of Halifax (Washington) No. 5608. Tel.	1944. Oct. 16	Palestine and the Jews ... Text of letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner regarding the Democratic party resolution in favour of the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonisation	11
7 Mr. Jordan (Jedda) No. 487. Tel.	Dec. 11	Palestine and the Arabs ... Translation of message from Ibn Saud to Mr. Eden requesting the views of His Majesty's Government on the Arab unity discussions regarding Palestine, and the attitude to be adopted by the Saudi delegates	11
8 To Mr. Jordan No. 297. Tel.	Dec. 23	Palestine and the Arabs ... Instructions to His Majesty's Minister regarding the reply to be returned to Ibn Saud's message to Mr. Eden	12
<b>Chapter III.—PERSIA.</b>			
<b>(A) Miscellaneous.</b>			
9 Telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Representatives at Tehran, Washington and Moscow	1944. Sept. 21—Nov. 8	Soviet policy in Persia ... Soviet campaign for the acquisition of oil concessions in Persia. General Soviet policy in Persia, leading to a political crisis in that country	13
10 Telegraphic correspondence with His Majesty's Representatives at Tehran, Washington and Moscow	Nov. 9—Nov. 20	Political crisis in Persia ... Resignation of the Persian Prime Minister, as the result of Soviet pressure; and subsequent events. The oil question	30

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
11 Correspondence with His Majesty's Representatives at Tehran and Washington	1944. Nov. 21—Dec. 29	Soviet policy in Persia ... Policy of the new Persian Government regarding oil concessions. Passing of a bill by the Majlis. Expected resumption of oil campaign by the Soviet Government. General Soviet activities in Persia	34
12 Mr. Lascelles (Tehran) No. 723. Tel.	July 27	Fifth column activities in Persia ... Report on Persian Government's communiqué which establishes the guilt of Kashani and Naubakht of fifth column activities	46
13 Mr. Lascelles No. 34. Saving. Tel.	July 27	Fifth column activities in Persia ... Summary of a report submitted by the investigation authorities to the Cabinet about Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani and Naubakht	47
14 Sir R. Bullard (Tehran) No. 395.	Oct. 10	Soviet economic policy in Persia ... Dr. Millsaugh's letter to the United States Ambassador in Tehran regarding the Soviet proposal to obtain rice from Persia in exchange for piece-goods and miscellaneous articles. Ruinous Soviet economic policy in Persia	48
15 Sir R. Bullard No. 401.	Oct. 18	Situation in Persia ... Report on events in Persia during the months of July, August and September 1944	50
16 Sir R. Bullard No. 410.	Oct. 26	Financial situation in Persia ... Report by the financial counsellor	64
17 Sir R. Bullard No. 1199. Tel.	Nov. 15	British troops in East Persia ... Question of future policy regarding the strength of British patrols in East Persia, taking Soviet policy into consideration	67
18 To Sir R. Bullard No. 854. Tel.	Dec. 18	Persian supply route to the Soviet Union ... Question of the closure of this route	68
<b>(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.</b>			
19 Sir R. Bullard No. 374.	1944. Sept. 25	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36 for the week ending the 24th September, 1944	68
20 Sir R. Bullard No. 384.	Oct. 2	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37 for the week ending the 1st October, 1944	70
21 Sir R. Bullard No. 391.	Oct. 9	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the week ending the 8th October, 1944	72
22 Sir R. Bullard No. 399.	Oct. 16	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the week ending the 15th October, 1944	74
23 Sir R. Bullard No. 405.	Oct. 23	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the week ending the 22nd October, 1944	77
24 Sir R. Bullard No. 419.	Oct. 30	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the week ending the 29th October, 1944	80
25 Sir R. Bullard No. 430.	Nov. 6	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the week ending the 5th November, 1944	82
26 Sir R. Bullard No. 439.	Nov. 13	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the week ending the 12th November, 1944	86
27 Sir R. Bullard No. 447.	Nov. 20	Situation in Persia ... Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the week ending the 19th November, 1944	88



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
28 Sir R. Bullard No. 456.	1944. Nov. 27	Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the week ending the 26th November, 1944	90
29 Sir R. Bullard No. 464.	Dec. 4	Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 46 for the week ending the 3rd December, 1944	93
30 Sir R. Bullard No. 472.	Dec. 11	Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the week ending the 10th December, 1944	95

## Chapter IV.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

31 Sir E. Spears (Beirut) No. 103.	1944. Oct. 17	Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations Letter to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 16th October setting out the views of His Majesty's Government regarding the conclusion of a treaty between the Syrian and French Governments	99
32 Sir E. Spears No. 119.	Nov. 10	Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations Letter dated the 7th November from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in reply to Sir E. Spears's letter dated the 16th October	100
33 To Mr. Shone (Beirut) No. 208.	Dec. 15	Proposed Franco-Syrian treaty Guidance to His Majesty's Minister regarding the reply to be returned to the note from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs	102
34 To Mr. Shone No. 210.	Dec. 20	British policy regarding the Levant States Exposition of the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards the Levant States, for the guidance of Mr. Shone on his appointment as His Majesty's Minister at Beirut	104
35 Sir E. Spears No. 135.	Dec. 8	Political situation in the Levant States Review of the present political situation and developments during the last three and a half years in the attitude of the populations towards other nations, particularly Great Britain	107

## (B) Weekly Political Summaries.

35A	1944.	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly Political Summary No. 102 dated the 15th March, 1944	111*
36		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 129 dated the 20th September, 1944	111
37		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 130 dated the 27th September, 1944	113
38		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 131 for the week ending the 4th October, 1944	116
39		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 132 dated the 11th October, 1944	118
40		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 133 for the week ending on the 18th October, 1944	120
41		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 134 for the week ending the 25th October, 1944	124

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
42	1944.	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly Political Summary No. 135 for the week ending the 1st November, 1944	127
43		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 136 for the week ending the 8th November	129
44		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 137 for the week ending the 15th November, 1944	132
45		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 138 for the week ending the 22nd November, 1944	134
46		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 139 dated the 29th November, 1944	136
47		Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 140 for the week ending the 6th December, 1944	138

## Chapter V.—GENERAL.

48 Foreign Office	1944. Oct. 12	Arab unity Convocation of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress. General attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the question of Arab unity	141
49 Mr. Shone (Cairo) No. 1997. Tel.	Oct. 8	Arab unity Summary of the resolution of the protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress	141
50		Arab unity English translation of the Protocol signed at Alexandria on the 7th October, 1944, at the conclusion of the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress	142
51 Mr. Shone No. 1179.	Oct. 10	Arab unity French version of the Protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress. Further observations on the resolutions adopted	145
52 Lord Moyne (Cairo) to Mr. Eden	Oct. 19	Arab unity and policy of His Majesty's Government Comments on the Protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and the implications of its various clauses. Special importance of His Majesty's Government not adopting local policies in any part of the Middle East which are unacceptable to the majority of Middle Eastern opinion	150
53 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 517.	Nov. 5	Iraqi attitude to Arab unity Analysis of Iraqi reactions to the decisions of the Preliminary Conference on Arab unity held in Alexandria	152

## SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

IRAQ—	PERIA (continued)—
Kurdistan.—1-4.	Supply route to the Soviet Union.—18.
Political and general.—5.	General.—15, 19-30.
PALESTINE—	SYRIA AND THE LEBANON—
Jewish immigration.—6.	British policy.—34.
Saudi Arabian attitude.—7, 8.	Foreign relations.—35.
PERIA—	Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations.—31-33.
British troops.—17.	Political.—35-47.
Fifth column activities.—12, 13.	GENERAL—
Financial.—16.	Arab unity (Protocol of the Arab Committee).—
Oil concessions.—9-11.	48-53.
Political.—9-11, 15, 19-30.	British policy in the Middle East.—52.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING  
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 59.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1944.

**CHAPTER I.—IRAQ.**

[E 4663/26/93]

No. 1.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd August.)*

(No. 643.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, 2nd August, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 628.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to discuss the situation in Kurdistan which he regarded as grave. He feared that there was every possibility of serious trouble not later than the autumn, and that what was being planned was a general move embracing not only Kurdish tribesmen in Iraq but also those in Persia and Turkey. Reports he had lately received from Tabriz show clearly that Russia had a hand in all this and while he did not suggest Soviet agents were active in Barzan area he had good reason to suspect the emissaries from Mullah Mustafa had been sent across the border to contact subversive elements in Persia. I think that there may well be some substance in this contention, two Kurdish "liaison officers" having lately vanished across the border.

2. Proceeding, Minister for Foreign Affairs said if any widespread uprising occurred, the Turks certainly would not remain idle, however powerless Persians (because of the Russians) and Iraqis (because of their military weakness) might be. This might lead to a Turkish incursion into Iraqi territory for the purpose of "restoring order." In all these circumstances and also because he felt it intolerable that Mullah Mustafa should deliberately flout the friendliness of the present Administration, he felt some action should be taken soon to restore the situation before it got worse.

3. I replied that facts must be faced. Although I had personally reached the conclusion that Mullah Mustafa was now in a mood very similar to that which had inspired Hitler after Munich, head of British Military Mission and all others who knew the truth were convinced that Iraqi army was in no condition to intervene except with the certainty of disaster. It was mainly for this reason that I had urged the Regent yesterday to take seriously Major Kinch's advice about the evacuation of the affected area, which could, if necessary, be sealed off and isolated economically. At the same time, the Iraqi Government should give immediate effect to General Renton's recommendations for reorganisation and training of the army, with particular reference to the formation of a mountain division capable of effective use, without further spreading if circumstances so dictated.

4. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that His Majesty's Government might possibly help if only with a few aircraft I made it absolutely plain that there could be no question of any such participation on our part. We had quite enough on our hands at the moment and had neither men nor equipment to spare for adventures in Kurdistan. I concluded by intimating that the Cabinet

12930 [30547]

B



would only put themselves in the wrong if in the light of existing realities they resorted to any provocative action at the present time.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs listened carefully but registered a certain gloom. I fear that some of his colleagues are anxious for a show-down with Mullah Mustafa. I am instructing Major Kinch to visit Bagdad as soon as possible.

[E 4716/26/93]

No. 2.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th August.)*

(No. 657.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 654.

Following is text of Saving telegram addressed to Major Kinch, repeated to you for information:—

"Acting Prime Minister called this morning. After describing in some detail the action he is taking [group undecipherable: ? as] Minister of Defence to get started with reorganisation of the army (as a first step thirty-four senior officers are being retired), his Excellency explained that he had impressed upon his Cabinet colleagues to-day the necessity of being patient towards the Kurdish problem and of exhausting every possibility of keeping on friendly terms with Mullah Mustafa. They must do nothing to precipitate a crisis. To this end Tewfik Wahabi would be leaving shortly for the north, where he would contact local Iraqi officials, tribal chieftains and possibly Mullah Mustafa himself, his main object being to convince all and sundry that the Government are in earnest in their desire to remedy legitimate Kurdish grievances so far as possible. As an example, he would be able to say that, while the last Cabinet had provided nothing in the budget for hospitals, schools, &c., present Minister of Finance has on his own responsibility authorised extraordinary disbursements for such construction.

"2. In asking that you be informed accordingly, Saleh Jabr expressed the hope that Political Advisory Staff and area liaison officers would lose no opportunity of impressing on Kurdish nationalists and tribal elements, including such people as the Zibaris, that neither this embassy nor any other British authority has the least sympathy with those who are tempted to create disorder in Barzan or any other area. In agreeing to instruct you and others concerned accordingly, I made it clear that in doing so I took note of his Excellency's assurances of Government's constructive intentions. You may make such use as you think fit of this statement.

"3. Minister had discussed with Colonel Le Blanc the latter's scheme mentioned to you in my presence for an early distribution on practical lines, of clothing in Mosul Erbil [group undecipherable: ? Kh] was to which, he said, he had agreed in principle. If or when this takes place you may be able to use it as evidence of Cabinet's will to act.

"4. I reminded the Acting Prime Minister that the Government should try to get together with Sheik Ahmed and furthermore that they should encourage and support tribal elements opposed to—or at any rate not yet allied with—Mullah Mustafa. He replied that every endeavour would be made to follow these suggestions."

[E 5374/26/93]

No. 3.

*Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st September.)*

(No. 752.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 657.

Taufiq Wahbi returned 30th August from tour through Suleimani and Arbil Liwas, during the course of which, in company with Major Kin[group undecipherable], he visited Mullah Mustafa at Bille on 24th August.

2. He reports that there is among the Kurds general distrust of the present Government and the latter's cheap beneficence falls so far short of its expressed benevolence. Food is short in Shirwana Kilin, Mergasur and Izezan, and little

or no cloth has been distributed. Political adviser confirms this appreciation of the situation.

3. Taufiq Wahbi has seen the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, who expressed readiness to do whatever he recommended and asked for paper for the Cabinet.

4. His intention is to recommend the administrative redistribution of Zibar, Shirwana Kilin and Mergasur districts, immediate redistribution of food, grain and cloth and plan for provision of seed grain and plough cattle to enable villagers to start to cultivate in them. At present agriculture in all these districts (except Zibar) seems to be at a standstill.

5. Meanwhile news has been received to-day that Mullah Mustafa has surrounded the district headquarters at Mergasur and has demanded the surrender to him of 100 tons of wheat held there in the Government store.

6. It seems that the Iraqi Government will have to yield to this demand as small police force on the spot cannot be expected to fight and the two battalions of Iraqi troops at Rowanduz are unfit to move out to drive off Mullah Mustafa's men.

7. The General Officer Commanding-in-chief is at present paying a short visit to the Regent up country. Before the former proceeded we discussed the Kurdistan question briefly and Sir A. Smith agreed to urge upon His Royal Highness the absolute necessity of early and positive implementation of the Government's declared policy of relief, &c.

[E 6247/26/93]

No. 4.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th October.)*

(No. 476.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 28th September, 1944.*

YOU will recollect that in his telegram No. 643 of the 1st August last Mr. Thompson reported a conversation with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which he had found it necessary to represent to Arshad al Umari the inadvisability of any military initiative at the present time against Mulla Mustafa, this advice being based on the knowledge that at least for some months the Iraqi army can be in no condition to undertake, without the certainty of disaster, active operations in mountainous country. This unpalatable fact was accepted at the time by the Regent, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance and led to the decision of the Cabinet to implement with all energy General Renton's scheme for the reorganisation of the Iraqi army, with special regard to the formation of a mountain division, which, after strenuous winter training, might be ready for effective employment next spring if circumstances so dictated. Furthermore, and as a corollary to the foregoing, the then Acting Prime Minister—see Mr. Thompson's telegram No. 657 of the 5th August—impressed upon his Cabinet colleagues the necessity of being patient towards the Kurdish problem, of exhausting every possibility of keeping on friendly terms with Mulla Mustafa, and of doing nothing to precipitate a crisis. While there was reason to suppose that the Minister of the Interior, Mustafa al Umari, was not unduly enthusiastic over this patient policy, his opposition was sufficiently luke-warm to permit him to stand by his colleagues when its only really violent opponent, Tahsin Ali, was first transferred from the Ministry of Defence, and subsequently dropped from the Cabinet altogether.

2. Since then considerable progress has been made with army reform and certain action, such as distribution of textiles and grain, has been taken in relief of the depressed Kurdish areas. The extent and scope of these latter measures, however, have not been very striking, and it cannot be said that they have had any appreciable effect in the lessening of Kurdish discontent. For his part, Mulla Mustafa, who I shrewdly suspect is being exploited by Kurdish "intellectuals" interested in making difficulties for the Iraqi Government, has been restive and, indeed, provocative. As foreshadowed in Mr. Thompson's telegram No. 752 of the 1st September, the small police post at Mergasur was unable to resist the Mulla's "request" for grain, and ninety tons were handed to him early this month. Not content with this success, he sent me on the 16th September a message that he and his people were in sore need of help of every kind and begging that I would persuade the Iraqi Government to meet their requirements. While this appeal was under consideration, the Minister of the Interior telephoned that Mulla Mustafa's men had by threats stopped

[30547]



certain public work that was being carried out at Shirwana Mazin, and would I instruct Colonel Lyon to use his influence to put an end to this nuisance? It also came to my knowledge that the Minister was toying with the idea of despatching troops to deal with the situation. On investigation, it transpired that the alleged incident had not taken place at Shirwana Mazin, but at Mazna, where an agent of Mulla Mustafa was obstructing the rebuilding of the police post. I thereupon sent a firmly-worded message to Mulla Mustafa, a copy of which is enclosed, together with a translation of his earlier communication above mentioned.

3. The use of troops to cope with this minor affair could only have led to undesirable complications, more especially since there has naturally not yet been time to get them fit for even so minor an undertaking as the one envisaged by the Minister of the Interior. Indeed, both General Sir Arthur Smith and General Renton have impressed upon me the folly of any such move from the military point of view. I therefore told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Minister of Justice) that the situation did not seem to me to justify any precipitate action. His Excellency replied that there had been no Cabinet decision to use force, and while he was speaking I learnt by telephone from Mr. Edmonds that the Minister of the Interior had, on his own initiative, given orders for a brigade of the Southern Division to stand by. I reminded the Minister that the war was not yet over and that we were not prepared to contemplate the possibility of diverting men and equipment to rescue the Iraqi army from the difficulties in which they would inevitably become entangled if thrown into any adventure in their present untrained condition. I therefore expected the Iraqi Government, as Allies, to give me full warning of any intention to embark on operations and to consult me before coming to any decision. It was, I added, obviously to the advantage of the Iraqi Government to work in close harmony with ourselves in such matters, since it was our policy to uphold ordered government in this country. He no doubt realised how much the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the British Military Mission were helping forward the reorganisation of the Iraqi army. I concluded by emphasising that the Administration would have no right to look to me for any sympathy or support if they got into trouble through ignoring my advice.

4. Although the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his general agreement with the views I had expressed and undertook to represent them to the Minister of the Interior, I found the latter in a difficult mood when he called upon me yesterday. While pleased with the tone and content of my reply to Mulla Mustafa, and although he admitted the necessity to investigate the facts of the recent incident at Mazna, his Excellency indicated his belief that the Mulla intended to resist the erection of a police post at that place. He then expatiated on the "intolerable" insults to which the Government were being subjected and on the necessity for maintaining their prestige, and so on. He had conferred with the Acting Prime Minister (Saleh Jabr) and the Iraqi General Staff, who together felt that even if operations were impossible at the present time, there was no reason why a "defensive force" should not be stationed at Mazna while building was in progress (although, in point of fact, such work is probably out of the question once winter sets in), and he spoke of sending a brigade from Diwaniyah. I answered that I thought it extremely unlikely either the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief or General Renton would see any merit in this idea. I then went over once more in great detail the ground I had already covered with his colleague of foreign affairs, warning him particularly of the consequences of going ahead in defiance of our agreement. The Minister did not take very kindly to what I said, but finally agreed that there must be full Anglo-Iraqi consultation. The truth is that he is—not entirely without excuse—rabid about Mulla Mustafa and anxious now (as at the beginning of August) for a "showdown" with that troublesome and primitive individual. The Minister of the Interior is, indeed, a prey to rather dangerous wishful-thinking, and in the absence of the Regent, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Alexandria, seems inclined to take the bit between his teeth.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister-Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Persia/Iraq Force, and General Renton.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

(Translation.)

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mulla Mustafa (Barzan).*

*Bagdad, 27th September, 1944.*

After compliments,

I HAVE received your letter of the 16th September in which you say that you are in need of more help from the Government.

Already you have been given ninety tons of grain from Mergasur and to-day I learn that supplies of cloth have been sent to Billeh. This should convince you of the Government's desire to help you and your people.

Further help will depend very largely on yourself. If you co-operate with the officials of the Government they will co-operate with you.

You should keep in touch with them and explain exactly what help you need, because you and your people must make a special effort to plough and sow as much as possible this autumn and winter so that you will all have food next year.

I have heard that some of your tribesmen have been interfering with Government building work at Mazna. You should not let this sort of thing happen. It causes serious misunderstandings and is most harmful to your own interests. Remember that you and your tribesmen are dependent on the help of the Government to obtain many of the things you need and that this help will only be given to you if you are obedient to the Government and maintain good relations with their officials.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS,

*His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

(Translation.)

*Mulla Mustafa to Sir K. Cornwallis.*

*Barzan, 16th September, 1944.*

After compliments,

YOU ordered me to keep quiet and I have done so and obeyed your orders. But now we are obliged to appeal to you on account of our difficult circumstances. The time for working in the fields has nearly passed and we are in the direst need of the Government's help in every way.

We therefore beg your Excellency to respond to our appeal without delay so that the last opportunity to sow our fields may not escape us, otherwise we shall not be able to live in this area but be obliged to go elsewhere and some of our people will be driven to cross the frontier and commit robbery.

If this happens, then your Excellency will hold us responsible. I therefore lay our case before your Excellency and beg leave to invoke your kind help.

May God grant victory to the British army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MULLA MUSTAFA AL BARZANI.

[E 7011/37/93]

No. 5.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th November.)*

(No. 510.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 31st October, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to Mr. Thompson's despatch No. 332 of the 14th August, the following report on the main events that have occurred in this country since that date. Mr. Thompson was in charge of this mission until my return from leave on the 20th September.

2. During the last week in August the continued opposition of Tahsin Ali to the new scheme for the Iraqi army led to further heated altercations which finally resulted in the resignation of the Cabinet. The Regent at once asked Hamdi al Pachaci to form a new administration. He did so without difficulty, retaining all his old colleagues except Tahsin Ali. To fill the gap left by the latter's departure, Arshad al Umari took over Defence in addition to Foreign

[30547]



Affairs, Salih Jabr added the portfolio of Supply to that of Finance, and Abdul Amir al Uzri returned to Communications and Works. There was no change in the Cabinet's policy.

3. On the 16th August sentence was somewhat unexpectedly passed on six more of Rashid Ali's coadjutors in his *coup d'Etat* in 1941. Kamil Shabib, one of the four senior Iraqi army officers once known as the Golden Square, was treated in the same way as his two colleagues, Fahmi Said and Mahmoud Salman, who were sent to the gallows in May 1942. Only one of the four, Salah-ud-Din Sabbagh, now survives as a fugitive in Turkey. Muhammad Ali Mahmoud and Musa Shahbandar, both Ministers in Rashid Ali's Cabinet, were sentenced to five years' imprisonment; Sharif Sharaf, the usurper Regent, and Rauf Bahrani, another of Rashid Ali's Cabinet colleagues, went to prison for three and two years respectively, and the property of all up to a total of ID.1,602,436 was confiscated to the State as a contribution to the damage which these people had caused to the State. Abdul Qadir Gailani, a Court official accused of having insulted the Queen Mother, was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The sentences evoked little or no public interest.

4. On the occasion of the 'Id al Fitr holiday, eight of the internees sent back from Southern Rhodesia were released. They were men of no consequence except for Abdul Qadir Gailani. He has served his sentence in addition to his period of internment in Southern Rhodesia and is not the sort of individual to become politically dangerous in present circumstances.

5. In late August the Minister of the Interior released nineteen further internees from Amara and four more were set free with the Rhodesian detainees mentioned above. His list was based on the recommendations of the "Edmonds" Committee and the few additions which he had made included no men likely to cause mischief under existing conditions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many of them have undergone a change of heart and the tougher men will probably have emerged from their internment more embittered and fanatical than they were before they suffered this unpleasant experience. It is to be expected, therefore, that so soon as war-time restraints are relaxed many of them will again become actively antagonistic towards Great Britain and to the special relations of His Majesty's Government with the Iraqi Government. There are at the time of writing some 130 persons yet incarcerated in the Amara concentration camp, of whom the release of yet another nineteen is at present under consideration. As is the case in the United Kingdom, the records of political prisoners are periodically reviewed and it must be anticipated that with the continued victorious progress of Allied arms, more and more will gradually be released. My policy is to ensure if possible that the more dangerous characters remain as long as possible behind the wire and that when ultimately they emerge to see to it that they are subjected to police surveillance.

6. The Iraqi Government continue to be much exercised about the future of Palestine and to regard with apprehension the influence of the Zionists over public opinion in Great Britain and the United States. To combat this influence they are pressing forward plans for the creation in London and New York of representative propaganda committees to be financed and staffed by all the Arab Governments. Plans for the appointment of Ambassadors to Washington and London are, however, apparently in abeyance, if only for the time being. The Iraqi Government themselves are willing to contribute £300,000 to start the committees in question, and probably another £200,000 for the second year's work. They hope that plans will be far enough advanced to enable the committees to be set up immediately after the conclusion of the presidential election in the United States.

7. The various pronouncements in favour of Zionism made by both the presidential candidates, and by other leading American politicians, have naturally produced an unfavourable reaction here. The statements themselves (and one or two others emanating from British personalities) were widely quoted in the press; but I represented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the only possible effect of unduly hostile publicity would be to arouse animosity against America and Britain in this country, and to reduce rather than increase the number of Iraq's foreign friends. While I will continue to use my influence to ensure, if possible, a responsible tone in the press, it will be realised that local interest in Palestine is such that it is useless to expect the vernacular newspapers to ignore the subject, more especially as there is no such reticence in Palestine or Egypt.

8. Our own relations with our American colleagues remain close and personal. On the occasion of the withdrawal of British troops from Arnhem

the American Minister, Mr. Henderson, took occasion to write a letter to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Persia-Iraq Force, expressing the admiration "which all of us here feel for the members of the British paratroop division whose heroism at Arnhem will undoubtedly be regarded as one of the outstanding exploits of this war. Every intelligent person must have respect for an Empire and a culture which can produce men of such calibre." This letter was published both in the *Trunk Call* (the service weekly) and in the *Iraq Times*, and was much appreciated.

9. American interest in politico-economic trends in this country and, I believe, throughout the Middle East, continues to grow. During October the trade mission headed by Mr. Culbertson, sometime United States Ambassador in Chile and before then Minister in Roumania, visited Bagdad. The object of the mission was to investigate the chances of increasing trade exchanges between Iraq and the United States, and there is evident anxiety in American circles to think out means by which this country can acquire more dollars to spend on American products. I have reported separately on the particular interest that is being shown in future supplies for the Iraqi State Railways and to the evident American desire to short-circuit the Crown Agents as the channel for the handling of orders from Iraqi Government departments. I should mention that Mr. Culbertson also asked many questions on political matters and expressed himself, I think sincerely, as in favour of Anglo-American co-operation in this part of the world. He reflected, however, grave suspicion of Russian policies, both political and economic.

10. The Government's preoccupation with Syria and the Lebanon becomes keener as time passes. In August, Tahsin Qadri, the Iraqi Minister in the Levant States, visited Bagdad, and having explained that the French authorities had disarmed the local forces before handing them over to the Syrians and Lebanese, suggested that the Iraqi Government should help them out of the difficulty by giving them rifles and ammunition from the war material which the Vichy Government had given to Rashid Ali's Government in 1941. Under your instructions, Mr. Thompson explained that His Majesty's Government were themselves providing the necessary weapons and that consequently there was no need for the Iraqis to intervene. The Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed in the circumstances to let the matter rest, but at the same time he spoke bitterly about the French, whom he accused of a determination to create a state of affairs in which it would be impossible for the Syrian and Lebanese Governments to maintain and develop their independence.

11. The Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity, which met between the 25th September and the 7th October in Alexandria, served greatly to concentrate attention on Palestine and Syria. Iraqi concern with Arab unity is not entirely idealistic or academic. This country looks to the Mediterranean as a commercial outlet, particularly for its oil, and it is much disturbed lest ports such as Tripoli, Haifa and Beirut should be in unfriendly hands, i.e., under French or Jewish control. Moreover, it so happens that some of the staunchest and most consistent protagonists of Arab unity, such as Nuri Pasha, are Iraqis. The outcome of the conference gave great satisfaction in political circles here. It achieved far more practical results than were expected. This has naturally increased the feeling both of Iraq's solidarity with other Arab countries and of the power of the Arab world as a whole, when it acts in unison. As regards the mention of Palestine in the Alexandria discussions, the Iraqi Government have shown commendable restraint. In commenting on the conference, for instance, the newspapers were allowed to publish one leading article each on Palestine, and then only in general terms. In regard to Syria, greater latitude is allowed and an increasing number of articles strongly critical of French policy have appeared. Nor is North Africa being forgotten. One sequel of the conference was that the change of ministries in Cairo, Amman and Damascus produced a very strong rumour in Bagdad that the Pachachi Government also had fallen. These were encouraged by Berlin radio, but have proved quite unfounded.

12. The Kurdish situation has not fundamentally changed. Taufiq Wahbi, the (Kurdish) Minister of Economics, toured the Arbil and Sulaimani Liwas in August with the object of explaining to the people the good intentions of the Government. He also met Mulla Mustafa at Bille (near Barzan) and sought to bring him into a more reasonable frame of mind. Hardly had the minister returned to Bagdad, however, before news was received that Mulla Mustafa had arrived with an armed band at the nahiyah headquarters at Mergasur and demanded the surrender to him of the 100 tons of grain which was stored there.



He made it clear that if the grain were not given to him he would take it as he and his people had nothing to eat. The Government, having no other means of dealing with the situation, gave up the grain and Mulla Mustafa undertook to pay for it; an undertaking that he is never likely to fulfil. Towards the end of September news about the egregious Mulla again threw the Cabinet into a flutter. He was reported to have used threats of violence to stop the rebuilding of the Government's *serai* at Shirwana Mazin, and for a day or two there was wild talk of sending Iraqi troops to deal with the situation. Fortunately a report from the political adviser revealed that nothing had in fact happened at Shirwana Mazin, but that Mulla Mustafa's agent had been interfering with a Government building contractor at Mazna (between Rowanduz and Mergasur).

13. Armed with these facts I was able to persuade the Iraqis to take a calmer view and to cancel the orders which the Minister of the Interior (and temporarily acting Minister of Defence) had given for a brigade to stand by. I also reminded the ministers that as Iraq's ally in war I expected to be fully consulted before the Iraqi Government undertook military operations. In my despatch No. 499 of the 23rd October, I transmitted to you a copy of a letter I had received from Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Persia/Iraq Force, supporting the view and deprecating the use of Imperial troops to help the Iraq army out of any difficulties if through lack of training or some other reason their plans went awry. I expressed my agreement with General Sir Arthur Smith's views, with the proviso that it might, in certain circumstances, be necessary, as it was last year, to use Imperial troops defensively.

14. The report which Taufiq Wahbi made to the Cabinet on his return from the tour mentioned in paragraph 12 stressed the need for urgent relief for many poverty-stricken districts, and his views were supported by reports to the embassy from the officers of the political advisory staff in the northern area. Mr. Thompson took up the matter vigorously with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and at the time of writing it is possible to report some progress. Grain and cloth have been made available in most areas, and the immediate need of the people for food and clothing has been considerably alleviated. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Persia/Iraq Force has at my suggestion asked the War Office to approve the sale to the Iraqi Government of 6,500 suits of unserviceable underclothing and 45 tons of old tents from which winter clothing can be made. The Government has made little progress in improving the public services in the Kurdish areas, nor have they begun any of the public works which I urged them to undertake four months ago. Work has, however, started on the approach road to the site of the Bekhme dam. The implementation of a constructive policy in Kurdistan would proceed more rapidly and more successfully if the Regent could be persuaded to let all and sundry know that this would be in accord with his wishes. Up to date His Royal Highness has proved stubborn on this point, but I shall continue to press him as and when possible.

15. During the month of October the Iraqi army, under the guidance of Major-General Renton, have been conducting a series of three exercises in northern Iraq. These exercises have revealed certain deficiencies in personnel and equipment. Major-General Renton nevertheless is favourably impressed with the quality both of the majority of the younger officers and of the men, and considers that if his recommendations are adopted an effective force can be put in the field by next March. The Regent, who is supporting General Renton in his reorganisation, attended the last of these exercises.

16. Ever since assuming command of Persia/Iraq Force General Sir Arthur Smith has done all in his power to foster good relations between the British forces and the Iraq army. His efforts and those of his officers have done much to combat the atmosphere of suspicion and hostility which even a year ago endured in certain Iraqi military circles, particularly among the young officers.

17. During the annual migration, the Roghzadi section of the Jaf tribe came into conflict with the Persian authorities at Saqqiz. The Jaf claim that the Persians invited a number of the tribal leaders to a conference and then seized and imprisoned them on the pretext that the tribe had ignored the Persian rules for their migration, and confiscated their sheep. Some fighting followed, in which the Roghzadi seem to have been roughly handled before they withdrew over the border into Iraq. The Iraqi Government have at last been induced to make a strong protest to the Persian Government and to demand the release of the imprisoned tribesmen and reparation for the stolen flocks. I have asked His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran to support these representations.

18. Said, son of Nuri Brifkani, who murdered Haji Malo, gave himself up to the authorities at the end of August and has been sentenced under the Tribal Code to seven years' imprisonment. His surrender ends a state of affairs which was a threat to the peace and order of a large part of the Mosul Liwa.

19. On the 11th September the press published the texts of telegrams exchanged between the Iraqi and Soviet Ministers for Foreign Affairs, whereby diplomatic relations were established between Iraq and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As reported to you by Mr. Thompson, the Regent and the Iraqi Government have shown themselves nervous of closer contacts with Russia. In a country where the Government is almost entirely in the hands of the rich, the "Communist" bogey seems a very dangerous beast. They eventually grasped the nettle of establishing relations, mainly on the ground, I believe, that Russia cannot be ignored in the post-war world. But the suspicion is still there. It largely, I understand, influenced the attitude of the recent Arab Unity Conference to foreign policy; nor has recent Russian action in regard to the Persian oil concessions done anything to allay it. The establishment of diplomatic relations, therefore, attracted much notice and became the topic of the hour in all places where politics are discussed. Press comment was uniformly favourable and the younger generation hailed the event with glee, seeing in it the opening of a new field for entertaining, and perhaps profitable, political activity.

20. Representatives of Iraq and Saudi Arabia met at Jadaidat el Arar on the Nadj border early in October to settle tribal claims outstanding between the two countries. The proceedings opened on the 5th October. 177 Saudi claims and twenty-five Iraqi claims were dealt with and the atmosphere appears to have been cordial and businesslike. Only one case, which had been outstanding since May 1941, caused disagreement.

21. In the sphere of economics the quieter public tone that became apparent almost immediately after the dismissal of Colonel Bayliss has persisted, and the general outlook now causes me far less anxiety than was the case only three months back. The assistant British adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Grice, soon succeeded Colonel Le Blanc (who had taken over on the fall of Colonel Bayliss) as Acting Director-General of Supply, and for the last two months has been giving effect to the more liberal tendencies that have replaced the all-embracing and restrictive policies of Colonel Bayliss. The result is that a wide variety of articles have been decontrolled to the general satisfaction of merchants and public, prices having in the process fallen rather than risen. Piece-goods are arriving in fair quantities from India and more are expected from the United States and Britain, and this has enabled the authorities to start effective distribution in the provinces. As a consequence, criticism of the Administration's handling of supply is less vocal and there is far less of a tendency to lay all the country's economic tribulations at our door.

22. Nevertheless, there is still a widespread feeling, based largely on the easier conditions in Syria and the Lebanon, which during each summer are visited by many Iraqis, that this country remains the Cinderella of the Middle East in supply matters. A recent reduction in the tea and sugar ration has accentuated this feeling and has led to public comment to the effect that "the British" have not shown sufficient appreciation of Iraq's whole-hearted contribution to the war effort, particularly in the furnishing of grain, dates and oil.

23. With this in mind I arranged, when the barley negotiations were finally successfully concluded through the issue on the 28th October of an official notification fixing prices at ID.19/500 f.o.b. Basra cleaned and bagged, and at ID.15/000 and ID.14/500 for barley not exceeding 10 per cent. dirt on sief at Basra and Bagdad respectively, for the publication in *The Iraq Times* and the vernacular press of a statement showing how His Majesty's Government had come to Iraq's assistance in finding a market for the greater part of the crop surplus at a price markedly lower than that paid last year, but yet considerably above the world level. The quantity to be purchased is 200,000 tons.

24. I consider that the barley agreement is fair and reasonable to both sides, since it takes into account not only the interests of the British taxpayer but also those of the Iraqi producer, who would have had cause for ill-will had His Majesty's Government forced too drastic a cut on last year's admittedly exaggerated price. But the uncertainties and delays which preceded our offer to buy on the 29th August, and which more than once threatened Cabinet complications on what would have been a purely Anglo-Iraqi issue for the first time since 1941, coupled with the loss of eight subsequent weeks while the Minister of Finance struggled in vain for better terms, have probably forfeited us much of the



goodwill we might have obtained had we been in a position to make our offer earlier in the summer. I trust that next year the policy of His Majesty's Government will be better co-ordinated and more rapidly decided and that, if for any reason we should not be in the market for any appreciable quantity of barley, it may be possible to give the Iraqi Government ample warning, with an undertaking to assist with transport and other facilities in the finding of other markets. With our present complete stranglehold over all forms of transport here, not a ton of barley can be exported without our authority, a fact which not unnaturally causes resentment.

25. King Faisal, together with his mother and other members of the Royal Family, returned from Egypt on the 10th October. The Regent had flown to Cairo on the 20th September and returned with the King as far as Palestine, whence His Royal Highness flew back to Bagdad on the 5th October. The Regent's intended visit to the United States of America planned for September was cancelled, largely because of the Presidential campaign. It will probably now take place next Spring.

26. On the 3rd October Captain Holt left Bagdad on transfer to the Foreign Office after twenty-five years in Iraq. Captain Holt succeeded the late Miss Gertrude Bell as Oriental Secretary in the year 1926. His intimate knowledge of the country and its people, his scholarly command of both Arabic and Kurdish and the experience of eighteen years in this Mission had made him an adviser of rare qualifications. He will be much missed throughout the country.

27. As I have already reported in a recent despatch, the Royal Air Force organised a display and tattoo on the 12th and 13th October. Both events were most successful, particularly the air display, which seemed to be attended by almost everyone in Bagdad. In general, the relations between the British Armed Forces and the Iraqi people remain very satisfactory, although during recent weeks there has been criticism in Ministerial circles because of the unilateral suspension by General Headquarters of provisional monthly on account payments to the Iraqi State Railways made under an agreement concluded in 1942. At the time of writing there is, however, a good prospect of this dispute being settled by a readjustment of rates going back to the 1st April, 1943, and the resumption of monthly payments on the basis of 50 per cent. of traffic charges in lieu of on the scale of 65 per cent. which has existed hitherto. Since complex negotiations are about to be opened for the settlement of the rebate to be granted to the British Army over the whole period from 1941 onwards, it is very desirable to get this irritant out of the way before the main issue is joined on the diplomatic level.

28. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Minister Resident in the Middle East at Cairo, the Government of India, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.,

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

## CHAPTER II.—PALESTINE.

[E 6310/67/31]

No. 6.

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th October.)*

(No. 5608.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 16th October, 1944.*

SENATOR WAGNER (Democrat, New York) released on 15th October text of a letter from the President, which he read to the National Convention of the Zionist Organisation now being held at Atlantic City. Text of letter as read by Senator Wagner is as follows: "Dear Bob, knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh Annual Convention of the Zionist Organisation of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my most cordial greetings. Please express my satisfaction, that in accord with traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the four freedoms, the democratic party at its July Convention this year included the following plank in its platform—we favour the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonisation and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth—efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected, I shall help to bring about its realisation. With cordial regards and best wishes.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT."

[E 7573/41/65]

No. 7.

*Mr. Jordan to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th December.)*

(No. 487.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Jedda, 11th December, 1944*

MY telegram No. 456, paragraph 5.

Following is translation of message which Ibn Saud has sent for transmission to you and on which he requests your views:—

"I have received a number of communications from the Syrians and other Arabs concerning the visits of Nuri Pasha Said and Musa Alami to Arab countries to exhort the people to work for the Arabs in Palestine. His Majesty's Government are aware of my attitude towards the Jews and know I regard the Jewish question from the point of view of an Arab and a Moslem. I am, more than any one else, concerned to keep the Jews out of Palestine and to prevent them from gaining any authority in that country. The above-mentioned, however, are out to [group omitted] a hue and cry about Palestine. My policy differs from their policy of exhortation and I do not associate myself with this policy because His Majesty's Government and also the Americans are concerned. His Majesty's Government is aware of the letter which I addressed to President Roosevelt and of his reply. Palestine is a matter between the British and the Jews and is at His Majesty's Government's disposal. I have recently heard over the radio that His Majesty's Government are going to open the door to Jewish immigration into Palestine. I may send a protest to the Americans and they will probably reply as before. I am not inclined, however, to join in the clamouring for the Arab cause, for if I encouraged them and they rose against the Jews and I then abandoned them without further help it would be shameful, and if I support them difficulties will arise in view of His Majesty's Government's policy. I do not wish to take any action which would displease His Majesty's Government and would therefore like to know His Majesty's Government's views on my attitude towards the Jews and whether the question merely concerns the Arabs and the Jews. If it concerns the Jews and the Americans it is another matter. If, however, the question is bound up with His Majesty's Government then I would like to know their views on the question."

2. Full translation follows by bag.



3. It would appear from this communication that Ibn Saud feels that the Palestinian question is entering an acute phase and that unless he receives some assurance from His Majesty's Government regarding the future of that country, he can no longer hang back and continue to advocate patience on the part of the Arabs without losing face in the Arab and Moslem world.

4. Ibn Saud is undoubtedly sincere in his desire to collaborate with His Majesty's Government about Palestine but only in so far, I imagine, as to ensure a solution not unfavourable to the Arabs. It could hardly be otherwise if he is to retain the respect of his own people, the Arabs as a whole and of the world's Moslems.

5. I should be grateful for instructions.

[E 7573/41/65]

No. 8.

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Jordan (Jedda).*

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 23rd December, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 487 [of 11th December: Ibn Saud's request for His Majesty's Government's views on Arab unity discussions regarding Palestine].

You should thank Ibn Saud for consulting His Majesty's Government and say that I quite understand his difficulties on this point. If certain Arab delegates raise Palestine questions, as they well may, during Arab unity discussions, Ibn Saud and his representative are admittedly faced with a real dilemma. If they acquiesce, they may commit themselves to a Palestine policy which may be opposed to that of His Majesty's Government. This would not be in the real interests of the Arabs and would be most unwelcome to His Majesty's Government. If, on the other hand, they oppose the proposals favoured by other Arab delegates, they risk misunderstandings as regards their zeal for the Arab cause.

2. His Majesty's Government are, of course, not aware what Arab delegates will propose, but they suggest that Ibn Saud might instruct his representative, if Palestine questions are raised, to advise moderation and possibly even postponement until the end of hostilities in Europe. He could point out that His Majesty's Government have not taken any new decision regarding Palestine and that there is no reason why the Arabs should do so either at this stage. The essential thing is to take no decision and to make no pronouncements which might in any way increase tension in Palestine and thus make the political and the military position there more difficult. In the interests of all parts of the community, including Jews, Arabs and Christians, His Majesty's Government are bound to oppose any agitation likely to lead to disturbances there, and we hope the Arab leaders will remember necessity for acting in a responsible manner, especially at the present time.

3. You may at your discretion add that His Majesty's Government have been profoundly shocked by the murder of Lord Moyne and that they are taking energetic steps to root out the terrorist bands responsible for this act and for the previous attempt on the life of Sir H. MacMichael.

# CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

[W 13635/34/76]

No. 9.

(1)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st September.)*

(No. 930.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 21st September, 1944.*

ASSISTANT Commissar for Foreign Affairs Kavtaradze arrived here from Moscow a few days ago. According to Persian Prime Minister, Kavtaradze has with him experts who are going to examine oil wells which were dug in connexion with so-called Khourian concession but has not raised the question of principle. Prime Minister says that agreement with Russians was obtained by bribery and was never ratified. He spoke of references to concession in exchange of letters after occupation of 1941 and I informed him that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government these letters were superseded by treaty of 1942.

2. For Soviet point of view see my despatch No. 126 of 20th March (not repeated).

[E 5959/94/34]

(2)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th September.)*

(No. 960.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 29th September, 1944.*

PRIME Minister is disturbed about Russian attitude and activities. He gives these instances.

2. Soviet Assistant Commissar (my telegram No. 930) has informed him that the Soviet Government would like an oil concession in the north.

3. Official Soviet transport organisation Transovtrans is beginning to operate as though it were a commercial transport company, but is disregarding Persian transport regulations.

4. Soviet authorities have still not given permission for additional Persian troops to go to Rezaian, but have offered, if necessary, to maintain order. Thus Kurds in the north talk independence behind a Soviet screen at the moment when some Kurds in the south are in conflict with Persian troops.

5. Soviet hospital and school in Tabriz have been opened without the permission of the Persian Government having been asked. Soviet Embassy say that the school is for Soviet children, but according to information received by the Prime Minister (and by His Majesty's Consul-General, Tabriz) Persian subjects also are accepted. Moreover, Turki is the main language and Persian only subsidiary.

6. This telegram will be supplemented by detailed telegram about oil, Kurds and Soviet transport organisation.

[E 6016/615/G]

(3)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st October.)*

(No. 977. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 1st October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 960.

Oil concession in North Persia.

2. Version given to me by M. Ala, who has just brought me message from the Shah, places the matter in another and more serious light. Message was to the following effect:—

3. The Shah received Kavtaradze and Soviet Ambassador, 1st October. They said that Soviet Government wanted permission to explore for oil in North Persia over an area of 210,000 (half 420,000) square kilometres during a period of five years, at the end of which they would indicate areas which they proposed



to exploit. They made no reference to arrangement in the past [group undecypherable] *ad hoc* or any other old rights. Area was described as from Azerbaijan to Kuchan. The Shah said that this was a matter for his Government and that, even if the Government agreed, the matter would have to go to Majlis for approval. They said that they had been to the Prime Minister, and as they found the Government slow to move, they had come to ask the Shah to use his influence to hasten a decision. They spoke very seriously; they indicated that Stalin was not satisfied with the present state of Soviet-Persian relations, and said that on the reply to Soviet application might depend the whole future economic relations (the Shah noticed at least they said "economic" relations) between the two countries. The Shah gathered that Kavtaradze was prolonging his stay in Persia, and that he would like to have reply to take back with him. The Russians brushed aside the Shah's remarks about need for careful consideration of a question so important and so highly technical. When the Shah [group undecypherable] applications now under consideration for oil concessions in the south, the reply was: "But that is quite different. Those applicants are companies, but this is Soviet Government."

4. M. Ala will inform American Ambassador 2nd October.

5. See my immediately following telegram.

[E 6058/615/G]

(4)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd October.)*

(No. 978. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 2nd October, 1944.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

It was difficult to reply to M. Ala off-hand on a subject of such delicacy but I assumed that His Majesty's Government would not regard the Soviet proposal with complete detachment and that I should be justified in advising the Persian Government to stand on their rights.

2. I said there might be very valuable oil deposits in the north and Persian Government could not be expected to sign away their rights over them at a moment's notice. Persian Government had engaged American experts to advise them about oil concessions in the south and were entitled to exercise equal caution about oil in the north. I hoped that concession in the south would be granted to Shell Company and granted soon, but I could not object any more than the company had objected to the care with which the Persian Government were examining the competing offers. In reply to question whether British companies were interested in oil in North Persia I said I did not know: I certainly could not say that they were not interested and would not apply if concessions there were open to the world. If the situation were reversed and a Russian company competed for a concession in the south, the Shell Company could not object so long as Society of Commerce had agreed that it would be for the Persian Government to say whether they wanted a foreign Government exploitation of oil deposits in its territory.

3. M. Ala asked whether it would not be reasonable for the Persian Government to tell the Soviet Government that they would like to await the conclusion of the international oil conversations which had been proceeding between United States and British Governments with, he understood, the knowledge of the Soviet Government. I said I did not know that this was relevant: the natural desire to examine carefully any question relating to national oil resources was a legitimate and a better [group undecypherable] for delay.

4. Finally M. Ala asked would it not be reasonable to make use of publicity—a weapon the Soviet Government feared. I said that several newspapers had referred to oil concessions in the south and had urged the Government to exercise the greatest caution and that any application for a concession in the north called for equal publicity.

5. M. Ala left in a very sombre mood. The day before, the Shah, according to a reliable informant who had had a long talk with him, had spoken airily of driving a bargain with the Soviet Government and implied that he might let them have an oil concession in return for a promise of better behaviour in Azerbaijan and in the north generally. If the Shah ever had such a plan his talk with the Soviet representatives on [group undecypherable] will have induced a more serious mood.

6. The Persian Government will expect advice from His Majesty's Government and doubtless from United States Government also. It seems to me that if Russians are given, without competition, the concession they ask for they will have taken a long step towards conversion of North Persia into an autonomous Soviet republic. I am not one of those who believe that the Soviet troops will stay in Persia in contravention of the tripartite treaty, but there are ways of encouraging spontaneous applications creating for annexation and economic enclaves in the north of Persia under the guise of oil concerns, and exclusion of other foreign companies from that area would be a potent weapon.

7. I shall be glad to receive your instructions as soon as possible. I consider that we are entitled to say openly that—

(1) Oil resources being a valuable but wasting asset, applications for concessions need to be examined with greatest care.

(2) If competition in the south is encouraged by Persian Government why not in the north also?

8. Your telegram No. 141 (not repeated) gives me discretion to use as an argument in favour of immediate grant of a concession in the south, that the Russians at present, while claiming exclusive oil rights in the north, have expressly declared that they are not interested in the oil in the south. I have not yet used this argument and I must point out that it implies that we are prepared to leave the oil in the north entirely to the Russians with all economic and political consequences involved. If this is the considered view of His Majesty's Government now that the Russians have shown their hand, I can only say that we must then recognise that we shall be worse off than under the 1907 agreement. Moreover, if the Persian Government are forced to give all the oil in the north to Russia, then natural tendency will surely be to give a concession in the south to an American company so as to enlist the interest of United States Government in their precarious independence and integrity. The first card, I am sure, will be to try to postpone the grant of any new oil concessions until foreign troops have been withdrawn. Since we want a concession badly, that would be somewhat of a victory for the Russians, but it would be better than our getting no oil and Russians having a free hand in the north.

9. All Persians in Tehran have been excited and anxious lately about the Soviet penetration, sometimes with, sometimes without, justification. If the Russians succeed in their present demand, Persians will conclude, I think, that His Majesty's Government are a spent force so far as Persia is concerned and will rush to conciliate the Russians by every possible means.

[E 6136/615/G]

(5)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th October.)*

(No. 997.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 6th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 978.

Russians are pulling possible wires to influence Persian opinion in favour of their oil proposal and several newspapers are supporting them. Kavtaradze has given an interview on the subject.

He implies that joint representation is based on Khourian agreement. The same misleading impression is conveyed in the newspapers. Reason for this is probably that Russians had only a half-share in Khourian agreement.

2. The Shah has asked to see me on 8th October. Unless in the meantime I receive instructions in another sense, I shall use the language I used to M. Ala. Moreover I shall say that, in my personal opinion, Persian Government have a right to consider proposal that Soviet Government should operate a concession in Persian territory in the light of reply which Persian Government would get if it applied for permission for a Persian company or individual to operate a concession in Russia.



[E 6186/615/G]

(6)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th October.)*

(No. 1005. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 10th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 997.

I am informed by the Shah that the Persian Government will not grant the Russian request for oil rights in the north, but in order to make the refusal more palatable will say that no grant of oil rights anywhere in Persia will be made until the war is over. I pointed out that the British application was from a company and therefore not on all fours with the application from the Soviet Government, but having received no instructions from His Majesty's Government since the Soviet demand came to their knowledge, I did not urge that the Shell application should be granted regardless of all other considerations because I am sure that Persia cannot have the Soviet Government exploiting the oil in its territory and remain the buffer State His Majesty's Government wish it to be and because the Persian Government would never at this juncture give a concession to a British or American Company in the south while rejecting a Russian demand over the oil rights in the north.

2. We have yet to see whether in the last resort the Persian Government will have courage enough to go even as far as the Shah says they will and will not try to [group undecypherable] Soviet anger by giving rights over a relatively small area. The Shah seemed convinced that the grant of any oil rights to the Soviet Government would mean the end of Persian authority in North Persia. I did not say that I agreed (though I do agree most heartily) but said that if he and the Persian Government held the conviction they had a right to act on it. I added that the proposal that one Government should work a concession in the territory of another was unprecedented and that to expect it to be accepted in a few days did not seem to be reasonable.

3. If the Government and the Majlis do in fact decide to postpone all oil concessions until after the war the Russians can hardly fail to be annoyed since they sent an assistant Commissar to carry away a concession and he has advertised his purpose very widely. Russians may claim the Khourian agreement to be still alive and may insist on exploiting at least that area. If they accept defeat gracefully we may expect them to explain that they have saved Persia from capitalists who had designs on Persian oil in the south.

[E 6262/615/G]

(7)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 12th October.)*

(No. 1027A.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 12th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1005.

According to the Prime Minister his final conversation with Kavtoradze was to this effect.

2. The Prime Minister said that it had been decided by the Government to postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions. The Soviet Government could make definite proposals if they wished, but no decision could be taken so long as the war lasted. K. said that there might be unpleasant consequences. The Prime Minister replied, that if that was the spirit in which K. looked at the question, what would have happened if the Persian Government had accepted in principle but had then objected to any of the detailed conditions put forward by the Government; the consequences would presumably have been even more unpleasant.

[E 6287/615/G]

(8)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th October.)*

(No. 1028.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 13th October, 1944.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

There is no doubt that the Government's decision represents the will of the Persian people so far as it can be ascertained. At secret session of the Majlis the only speech strongly in favour of the acceptance of the Russian request was

by [group undecypherable] Murtash, son of the former Minister of the Court who made money buying for the Russians in Meshed and was elected with their help. Tudeh members are [group undecypherable]; in concert with the Russians but are embarrassed by the fact that some weeks ago, when only British and American approaches had been made, one of the most prominent of Tudeh Deputies made violent speech demanding that no oil concession should be given until after the war. Perhaps it is for this reason that the chief Tudeh newspaper is giving indirect support by reproducing pro-Russian material from other papers. Small group of secondary newspapers are backing the Russian application violently with material which they are quite incapable of writing themselves.

2. More than one newspaper has stated that the Russians do not need oil and made their offer solely for the sake of the Persians. K. seems to have uttered similar cant to the Prime Minister, who unfortunately forgot or at least omitted to suggest that the Soviet Government should assist Persia by paying an economic price for munitions and rice.

[E 6367/615/G]

(9)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th October.)*

(No. 1049.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 16th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1028.

Russian-inspired Persian papers are taking the line—

- (1) That Government decision to postpone examination of oil concessions until after the war is aimed at Russia, since until Russian offer was made Government was seriously considering offers from other applicants for oil in the south; and
- (2) That since Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have a concession in the south, policy of balance of power requires that a concession should be given to the Russians in the north.

Rest of press with one or two minor exceptions does not dare to support Government strongly on this issue.

2. Balance of power argument can be met with obvious rejoinder that Persia should think of herself as a member of the United Nations, not as football between two of her neighbours. Best defence against Russian demand is, however, in my opinion, to say frankly that no efficient State can be expected to allow Government of another State to work a concession in the former's territory; and that it is impracticable and contrary to principle of reciprocity that U.S.S.R., whose organisation excludes foreign firms and individuals from its industry, should wish to exploit essential resources in a foreign country through one of its State Departments. I await your instructions which I hope will not be long delayed before using these arguments quite so baldly, but when I find Persians, e.g., the Prime Minister, using such arguments I certainly do not contradict them. This is going to be a test case and I feel we are entitled to object on principle to Soviet demand, though we must be prepared to face retort that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is really the British Government, because of our official shares in its capital. It may be that oil from North Persia can never compete with oil from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession or from Persian Gulf and that its natural market is Russia. Point however, is not where oil would find a market, but who is to exploit the oil area in Persia. That it should be exploited by Soviet Government seems to me entirely incompatible with Persian independence.

3. We cannot say what the unpleasant consequences may be that Kavtoradze had in mind when he threatened the Prime Minister. A less courageous Prime Minister than Saed might succumb to pressure, while a less honest one, e.g., Qawam Al Saltana, might give way even without much pressure. Saed, however, will I think hold out. He believes (rightly, I consider) that it is better to have your country taken away than to give it away and that to concede to Soviet demand now would mean making Russia a present firstly of part and then of whole of the north, and once the north goes the rest could hardly hold out if only because it is economically dependent on the north. I trust I shall not be thought alarmist. My opinion is shared by all observers, Persian and foreign, whose opinion His Majesty's Government would think worth having. If His Majesty's Government consider it necessary to let Russians have a free hand in this matter for the sake of advantages which it is hoped to gain elsewhere, let us at least do it with the



realisation that life of Persia as an independent State and a buffer for our protection is not likely to be long.

4. It has been suggested that Persian Government should establish immediately a geological survey staffed by experts of unimpeachable reputation recruited from various countries. This would be justified since Persian Government knows little about its own resources and is therefore at a loss when asked to grant concessions; it would meet objection that Persian Government is neither developing its own resources nor willing that others should develop them; and it would afford a breathing-space. Inspection, if taken up at all, would have to be taken up seriously, and at once. I should be glad to have your instructions whether to support it strongly. Until then I shall give it only the personal approval of a layman in science. You will probably wish to hear the views of Mr. Boyle on this point when he reaches home.

5. This oil controversy strengthens widespread belief here that until Soviet troops have left the country the Persian Government cannot hope to have a soul of its own. It is true that Saed has acted with courage and independence but he will get little overt help from his own people so long as Soviet troops are so much in evidence. I hope the moment Persia ceases to be a road for aid to Russia our troops will be withdrawn from Tehran and kept as far south as is compatible with protection of our oil interests during period until defeat of Japan and complete evacuation of Persia; and that every endeavour will be made to induce the Russians to reduce to a minimum the area in which they keep troops. However small that area, it will still be too large for peace of mind of the Persian Government and the people.

[E 6262/615/G]

(10)

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 672. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 18th October, 1944.

YOUR telegram No. 1027A and previous correspondence.

If the Persian Government can maintain their refusal to grant any concessions during the war, I agree that it would not be in our interest to press them to reverse their decision, although this would mean the abandonment of hope of a concession for Shell in South Persia, so long as the war continues.

2. But we must consider what should be our attitude in the not unlikely event of the Russians refusing to accept the Persian decision and applying stronger pressure. In this connexion, you should know that Russia's desire to obtain new oil rights may lead the Soviet Government to go to considerable lengths to force the Persian Government to give way.

3. Should this occur, we might well get the worst of all worlds if we were to urge the Persian Government to resist. Not only would it be morally certain that the Persians would give away to the Russians the fact that we were pressing them to resist; but we might well find ourselves in a position where the oil concession in the south had been withheld, while we had aroused Russian resentment by obstruction which could only be based on political grounds, and had failed to achieve our object of keeping the Russians out.

4. I share your apprehensions about Russian intentions in North Persia. But if it is, in fact, the Soviet intention to dominate the northern provinces of Persia, there are other methods, political, strategic and economic, by which the Soviet Government could in all probability achieve their aim whenever they wished. In that event, it is doubtful whether refusal of oil concession would seriously affect the outlook.

5. Our case *vis-à-vis* of the Russians is undoubtedly weakened by the existence of the A.I.O.C. concession in South Persia. We could hardly sustain against the Russians the argument that the cases are quite different because the British concession is held by a British company, in which His Majesty's Government have a large interest, while under the Russian system the Russian concession in the north would be held by the Soviet Government or an official organ thereof.

6. Finally, if oil deposits in North Persia are to be exploited, the only suitable market in practice would be the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, it is most unlikely that any British or American company would wish at present to compete for a concession in that area.

7. If therefore you learn that the Soviet Government are preparing to press matters further with the Persian Government, and if the latter ask your advice, you should say that because of their appreciation of Persian difficulties, His

Majesty's Government for their part do not wish to dispute the Persian Government's decision to grant no further concessions during the war, always on the assumption that this decision is fairly and equally maintained. His Majesty's Government are not, however, prepared to advise the Persian Government as to the lengths to which they should go to maintain their decision, and should it for any reason be revised, His Majesty's Government would expect that an application by their nationals for a concession would again receive proper consideration.

8. For your own information, if Russian pressure were to take a form clearly incompatible with Persian independence, thus constituting a breach of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty, I should certainly be prepared to consider taking the matter up with the Soviet Government direct. But the Persian Government should not be given any assurance in advance in this sense, since such an assurance would be almost certain to reach the Russians in garbled form, with results similar to those foreseen in paragraph 3 above.

9. I will telegraph again shortly with reference to your telegram No. 1049.

[E 6461/615/G]

(11)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st October.)

(No. 1072.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 21st October, 1944.

MY telegram No. 1049.

Persian Government now declares by way of deprecating Russian wrath that decision to postpone consideration of applications for oil concessions was taken before Russians applied for oil rights over the whole of the north. Before he arrived and for some days after, object of K.'s journey was stated by the Russians to be the examination of Khourian business.

2. Pro-Russian campaign in certain newspapers is now accompanied by ferocious attacks on the Prime Minister who is accused of being opposed adversely to Russian interests. According to the Prime Minister the Soviet Embassy yesterday asked radio Tehran to broadcast particularly scurrilous attack on the Prime Minister which had appeared in an obscure paper and the Prime Minister had to issue specific orders that the article should not be broadcast. Editors of three newspapers who mildly supported Government's policy have informed our press attaché that they were summoned by the Soviet First Secretary and told that they had better stop opposing Russian demand. Sayid Zia reports having received message from Soviet Embassy that if anyone opposed the Russians they had means of dealing with him. Astounding point of fact was that Sayid Zia's papers had not taken a strong line in the matter. It is characteristic that this threat was conveyed by a Persian diplomat who has just been appointed Minister to Lisbon. There is no reason why the Persians should take notice of such threats, but being cowards they are naturally greatly influenced by them. Prime Minister is unmoved, being sustained not only by moral courage but by experience of the Russians, which has taught him that the only thing to do is to resist the first unjust demand, otherwise you have to give in to a series of demands each more unreasonable and peremptory than the one before until everything has been given away.

3. Yesterday the Prime Minister made a statement in Majlis explaining and defending the Government's attitude. He tells me that he had the House with him with very few exceptions and that agrees with reports from other sources. No vote was, however, taken and I asked him how the public were to be convinced that he had support of Deputies. This had apparently not occurred to him. He said he would take a vote and was sure of a large majority. I am not so sure though I agree that the Persians in general are entirely against the grant of a concession to the Russians.

4. I have received your telegram No. 672 and have carefully noted contents. Before making any comments I await later telegram promised in paragraph 9.

[30547]

c 2



[E 6367/615/G]

(12)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 685.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 22nd October, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1049 and my telegram No. 672.

For the reasons given in my telegram under reference I would prefer that you should not yourself use the arguments in your paragraph 2, though you need not object if they are used by Persian Government. Our own line should continue to be that it is up to the Persian Government, having taken their decision, to see that it is fairly enforced all round.

2. Your paragraph 3. The real choice does not appear to me to lie between "letting the Russians have a free hand" and ourselves inciting Persian Government to resist. Should it ultimately prove necessary for us to seek to restrain the Soviet Government's action, this had far better be done by direct approach to Soviet Government themselves.

3. Proposal that Persian Government should establish geological survey to report on Persian resources will be discussed with Boyle as you suggest. But I think it is for the Persian Government themselves to make up their minds regarding a course which Russians may regard as merely a pretext for procrastination, and I doubt whether His Majesty's Government would be well advised to support it strongly, though they need certainly not oppose it.

4. Have you yet discussed position with Millsaugh or your American colleague? I should be grateful for some indication of their views.

[E 6515/615/G]

(13)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd October.)*

(No. 1079. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 23rd October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1072.

Soviet authorities are continuing war of nerves. Yesterday lorry-loads of armed Russian troops ranged about streets, in particular, past the Majlis. Deputies are being subjected to pressure, and one states that he was informed by Russians that they consider relations with Persian Government were "severed." Violent attacks on the Prime Minister continue and the story is spread that he is hostile, his Cabinet is one-sided and so on. On 19th October, in a Persian broadcast, which purported to be by Persian-Soviet Cultural Society, Soviet Embassy broadcast extracts from two Persian newspapers (one of them published by embassy) giving the Russian version of oil dispute.

2. Minister at Court has just been talking this over. He says the Shah feels that it would be fatal to give way. When informing Kavtaradze of decision to wait until after the war, Prime Minister had said to him that the Government had offers from American and British firms for oil in the south and that if Kavtaradze would let him know what terms Russians proposed for the north, Government would examine them. The Russians, however, refused present terms and wanted an acceptance in principle of their very wide demand, saying that they were no longer interested in Khourian. If, said M. Ala, Persian Government accede to this demand, they may be forced by similar methods to accept detailed proposals however unfavourable to Persia. Prime Minister was quite ready to resign if that would relieve tension, but the Shah felt that Saed should stay in office as long as possible, since in this matter he enjoyed the confidence of the Shah and of the Majlis. If Saed had to go his departure should be so arranged as not to be connected with the oil dispute and any successor must take the same line and postpone oil concessions until after the war. Could anything be done to ease tension? Perhaps Kavtaradze was being stiffer than Soviet Government intended and Persian Government should send a special negotiator to Moscow to explain the situation. Could British and United States Governments—perhaps in connexion with oil talks which were to be resumed after presidential election—say a word to Soviet Government?

3. I did not feel that the moment had come to give reply set forth in paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 672. I said I would inform His Majesty's Government but Ala must realise that they were interested in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and that one point made by the pro-Russians (though I myself did not admit an analogy) was that this justified grant of oil rights in the north to the Russians. I doubted whether it would be wise to offer to send special negotiator

to Moscow when Kavtaradze was still here: would it not answer better to instruct Persian Ambassador in Moscow to take the matter up with Soviet Government? If reports given by Ala of threatening attitude of the Russians were correct I could not say that wise course for the Persian Government would be to give way, though it was for the Persian Government to decide. As to Saed, I had found him honest and on the whole co-operative and should continue to support him so long as he was supported by Majlis. It was unfortunate that he had not taken a vote in the Majlis after his latest statement about oil since he had no proof of his contention that he had the Deputies with him, though I contested [*sic*] he had. I did not think if Saed resigned it would be easy to find successor who would agree to follow the same policy except possibly Taqizadeh who, I heard, had not refused to come back if urgently needed.

4. Ala left to see United States Ambassador.

5. I venture to think condition laid down in paragraph 8 of your above-mentioned telegram has been fulfilled. Soviet Government have sent Assistant Under-Secretary to stay in Persia until Persian Government give him, without competition and without disclosure by Russians of any financial or other terms, exclusive rights over all the oil in an immense area which is probably the richest in oil in the country and happens to be occupied by Soviet troops; they use Persian Government's own radio to broadcast Soviet point of view in a most violent form, alleging falsely that broadcast comes from Persian-Soviet Cultural Society; and they support their demand by military demonstrations. We cannot quote other forms of pressure which we know exist, viz., subsidising of gutter press, threats to journalists and Deputies and so on, but if what is being done openly is not incompatible with the independence of Persia, what is?

6. Although I see a fundamental difference (as to the Persians) between our sleeping partnership in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and exploitation of oil in Persia by a department of Soviet Government, I fully realise the delicacy of our position. So, of course, do the Russians, and they want what will eventually give them everything to be secured now, while they have troops in the country, a stranglehold on news going to other countries and the comfortable feeling that loyalty and policy will probably compel Great Britain and America to keep silence. Nevertheless, as I believe that what happens now will settle the fate of Persia I deprecate our accepting without further examination arguments set forth in your paragraph 4. What strategic difficulties you have in mind I do not know, but I believe that if Persia can stick to her decision to postpone grant of oil concessions until after the war she has some chance of resisting political pressure in the press, when even if there is no League of Nations there will be the weapon of publicity which the Russians so much dislike and fear. As to economic weapon, I believe Persia could be made much less dependent on Russia than she was in the time of the late Shah.

7. If in spite of tripartite agreement and three-Power declaration about Persia made at Tehran last year Russia secures the oil rights she demands by means she is now using, it will have a disastrous effect on the morale of the Persian people. Our efforts to encourage best elements will no longer have any effect, for every Persian will feel that in a moment of crisis he might be thrown to the Russian wolf, and the only men who will take office will be those who are prepared to do what the Russians tell them.

8. As to our economic interests, is it likely that Persian Government would give us another oil concession in the south if they had any hope of securing sympathy of United States Government by granting a concession to an American company? After all they would be tempted to say, America cannot do less than nothing for us.

[E 6516/615/G]

(14)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd October.)*

(No. 1081.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 23rd October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1079.

Reuter telegram from Moscow received to-day quotes from newspaper *Trud* grossly unfair attack on Persian Prime Minister accusing him of trying to break up democratic and workers' organisations and of general "Fascist" wickedness. Our censor has stopped this telegram here, but I suppose it will be published everywhere else whereas other side gets no hearing. This is most injurious to our interests. Is there any remedy?



[E 6530/615/G]

(15)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th October.)*

(No. 1086. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 24th October, 1944.*

MY immediately preceding telegram, not repeated.

The Shah yesterday had Kavtoradze and Soviet Ambassador to dine with Ala, Minister of Court and Yazdan Panah. The Shah did not invite Prime Minister, as Russians had been saying openly that they had broken off relations with Saed. Account of what happened has been given to me by Ala.

2. The Shah tried to make the Russians believe that the decision of the Government was in no way directed against Russia and was in accordance with the wishes of the Majlis and the Persian people. The Russians repeatedly represented their proposal as having been put forward mainly in the interest of the Persians. They said that acceptance would help the Persians at the Peace Conference and—an amazing argument—would show the world that the northern part of the country really did belong to Persia. They talked much about dismissal of general manager of the railways (my telegram No. 1082) and represented it as a proof that the Government was hostile to the "Allies."

3. Ala thinks that perhaps some good was done by the talk. The Persians did not give way at all, but conversations are to be resumed.

4. According to my information, Majlis is almost entirely behind Saed in this matter and even some of Tudeh members admit in private that he is right. The Russians, however, seem determined to get him out. I regard it as a significant feature of the campaign that chief Tudeh newspaper is also attacking Taqizadeh as a sinister figure like Saiyidzia. Russians are evidently anxious to forestall possibility of him becoming Prime Minister, probably because to judge by his reputation he, like Saed, would be above corruption by money and intimidation by threats.

5. No grain is moving to Tehran on northern railways. On 16th October orders were issued under instructions of Soviet Director of Movements that no waggons should be loaded except for Soviet military or commercial traffic and that any already loaded should not be moved. If Government made it public that Soviet authorities proposed to try to deprive Tehran of bread unless their demands for oil rights were granted, it would not necessarily advance Soviet cause. Effect of Soviet prohibition, if maintained, would be awkward but not ruinous. Thanks to the efforts of Americans and of British grain collecting officers, there is so large a stock of grain in Tehran that Persia could just manage until next harvest even if no more grain reached Tehran from the north. Mills-paugh would, however, be obliged to impose several unpopular measures which he had abandoned as no longer necessary, e.g., collection of part of peasants' share and restriction on movements of private grain and also to increase proportion of barley in controlled bread. If time came when His Majesty's Government thought that an approach to Soviet Government was justified they could hardly find better excuse than above-mentioned Soviet order, which cannot be justified by any military necessity.

[E 6575/6058/34]

(16)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th October.)*

(No. 1095.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 25th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1086.

Kavtoradze gave an interview to Tehran press on 24th October. After setting forth advantages to Persia in vague terms, he stated that "Saed in the course of conversations with me not only signified complete agreement and understanding; but promised his help for satisfactory solution." He says that subsequent refusal was "received in a negative manner in Soviet circles" irrespective of darkened relations between the two countries. He expresses confidence that the question will be settled and calls for co-operation of Persian public opinion "as represented by liberal press of Persia."

2. Saed, whom I saw to-day, repeats that neither before Kavtoradze's arrival nor in talks when he arrived was anything mentioned but Khourian business. It was this that Saed was prepared to discuss, but when Kavtoradze made his wider proposals Kavtoradze said he was no longer interested in Khourian.

3. Prime Minister says that so long as he enjoys the confidence of the Majlis he does not propose to resign. He gave me the names of forty-three leading members of Tudeh party who, he says, have told him in private that they agree with his policy. This agrees with news from other sources. Majlis seems to be standing surprisingly firm. I believe that if some Government granted a concession to the Russians, the Majlis would not confirm it.

[E 6605/6058/34]

(17)

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th October.)*

(No. 5809.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 26th October, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 674 to Tehran.

In the absence of instructions from you I have so far refrained from discussing with State Department Soviet-Persian oil question, but Wallace Murray has now raised it and asked for views. He says that State Department have received disquieting reports (a) of attitude of Soviet representative at Tehran and (b) of tone of Soviet press, which as soon as Mr. Churchill and yourself left, Moscow began to speak of fascism in Persia and of failure of Persian authorities to punish those guilty of sabotage and pilfering of supplies for Russia going through Persia. State Department are anxious lest this portends the working up by the Russians of a case against Persia on classic German model. United States Government are for their part prepared to accept Persian attitude of refusing applications for oil concessions from any foreign Power during the war. If the Russians try to compel Persia to grant a concession against her will, this would in view of State Department raise question of Anglo-American-Russian statement of December 1943 concerning the independence and sovereignty of Persia. If this statement were to be brushed aside as a scrap of paper, it would be an extremely serious matter and a bad omen for future agreements with the Russians. The United States Government could hardly allow the matter to go by default and State Department wonder whether before matters go too far it might be desirable for Americans and ourselves to ask questions or to make some representations in Moscow. They would be most grateful for your very early views.

[E 6603/6058/34]

(18)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th October.)*

(No. 1103.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 26th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1095.

K.'s interview is generally regarded by Persians as outrageous, as, indeed, it was. Newspapers defending the Russian point of view are still the loudest, and their articles are obviously written under skilful coaching, but context is less one-sided than it was. Six or seven newspapers support the Persian Government and *Bakhtar* of 26th October has a very strong article, which if it could be published all over the world, would place the Russians in an awkward position. The writer reminds K. that when Persia was herself starving two years ago she spared wheat and rice for Russia, then hard pressed by the Germans. He tells K. that contrary to rumours spread by Persian quislings who will take money from anyone, Saed and his Cabinet are patriotic and honest and enjoy public support. Persians know that the U.S.S.R. can use the mailed fist but if when she is fighting for freedom she uses it against Persia, will it not wound Persia's feelings?

2. Raadi Imruz describes the pressure which Russia is using as intolerable and says that any patriotic Persian would have behaved as Saed behaved.

3. Procession of lorries of armed men through the streets a few days ago did not have the effect of cowering the Persians but aroused indignation.

4. At the ceremony of congratulations to-day for the Shah's birthday, instead of appearing with six or seven members of his staff in accordance with the practice of the larger missions, the Soviet Ambassador produced a swarm of seventeen. This was obviously part of the war of nerves and looked ridiculous.



[E 6515/615/G]

(19)

*Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax (Washington).*(No. 9394.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, 28th October, 1944.*

TEHERAN telegram No. 1079 and your telegram No. 5809.

I share State Department's apprehensions about Soviet intentions in Persia and was about to enquire views of United States Government on this question.

2. You may inform State Department that, in view of undertakings in Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and in Tehran Declaration of 6th December, 1943 (to which latter United States Government are signatories), His Majesty's Government are considering approach to Soviet Government. General lines of such approach would be that His Majesty's Government in no way contest the right of Soviet Government to seek an oil concession in North Persia. They consider, however, that this is a question on which Persian Government have a right to take their own decisions and they have for their part accepted without demur the Persian decision to grant no further oil concession during the war. They understand that United States Government have taken a similar attitude. They feel that it would not be in accordance with the above-mentioned undertakings if the Persian Government were forced against their will to concede during the war the very extensive rights which the Soviet Government are now demanding.

3. We would propose that any initial approach to Soviet Government should be based on the foregoing general lines, namely, that it is a necessary condition of Persian independence that Persian Government should not be expected to dispose of Persian property otherwise than by free negotiation. If Soviet Government then deny that methods used by them are open to objection on these grounds, we should quote evidence in Sir Reader Bullard's telegrams and from Soviet sources, e.g., attacks on Persian Prime Minister in Soviet press.

4. Would the United States Government be prepared to take an approximately similar line with the Soviet Government?

[E 6684/6058/34]

(20)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th October.)*(No. 1110.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 28th October, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1105.

Prime Minister, on whom I called at his request, informed me that demonstrators yesterday were accompanied by lorries of armed Russian soldiers. This is true and it arouses suspicions that if Persian police or troops had to use force to disperse a dangerous crowd or to protect public buildings they might be fired on by Russians. Prime Minister reminded me that in December 1942, when there were street disorders in Tehran, we brought in troops to help maintain order. Was it, he enquired, the business of the Russians only to maintain order and not rather of Russians, British and Americans? I said I did not think a solution of the problem was to be sought there, though I promised to inform you.

2. During the demonstration British military police were at hand to prevent any British soldiers from getting mixed up in the crowd and a small body of troops was standing to to rescue any British soldier who might get into trouble. American military police were very numerous.

3. It is interesting if disgusting to see the whole technique of Hitler in Sudetenland unrolling itself before one's eyes. I have advised the Prime Minister to be extremely careful lest an incident be provoked. He has promised to take care, but says the Cabinet have decided that the next time groups of demonstrators are to be broken up while they are small.

4. Effect of K's interview and of street demonstration has been to consolidate support for the Prime Minister in Majlis and among the public. Prime Minister's publicity has been poor and always late, but he intends I gather, to issue a statement in which he will deny that he promised Russians a concession and he may take a vote of Majlis to-morrow. Russian-controlled papers have [? group omitted] this by declaring elections were not properly conducted.

[E 6305/187/34]

(21)

*His Majesty's Consul, Meshed, to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th October.)*(No. 45.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Meshed, 28th October, 1944.*

SITUATION Report No. 42.

Soviet activities in Khorasan, including publicity, cultural work, support of workers' movements, and military security, have notably increased lately and Persian apprehensions have correspondingly increased. An unfortunate incident which I am reporting separately is an ominous indication of jealousy and mistrust of our publicity and cultural work here on the part of Russian military authorities.

2. Yesterday speakers from balcony of Tudeh Headquarters addressed the crowd of several thousand, which completely blocked the main avenue. Speeches were repeated from lorries in other parts of the town. They violently attacked Saad Cabinet for trying to sell to Americans, "who are partners with other Powers," oil wanted by Persia's "northern neighbours."

3. Trouble is again brewing among Bujnurd tribes and Persian efforts to send troops to the area are still frustrated by Russian [group undecipherable: ? demand].

[E 6661/6058/34]

(22)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th October.)*(No. 1115.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 30th October, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 702.

Representative of Reuter and two American agencies has secured approval of the Prime Minister to telegrams which he has now to get past the Russian censors. I will watch and report the result. The Prime Minister has also given, in a talk with the Persian press, complete reply to interview granted to a Persian newspaper by Ka . . . . He informs me it will be broadcast this evening in English and Russian.

2. The Prime Minister informs me over twenty newspaper editors have signed a declaration in support of his policy in regard to oil.

3. Military Governor has issued a warning that gatherings of more than three persons in the streets will be dispersed and that any persons resisting the order to disperse will be arrested. This is in accordance with Military Government relations which have been in force since the occupation. Warning will, doubtless, be represented by Tass as terroristic attempt to prevent lovers of U.S.S.R. from demonstrating in favour of oil concession, but on the other hand when 3,000 or 4,000 people paid for the purpose and encouraged by the presence of armed Red soldiers in lorries made a demonstration, telegrams from Moscow reported 20,000 and represented Persian Government as trying to overawe them with tanks and troops.

4. The oil question was debated in Majlis meetings. Dr. Musaddiq, demagogue but with a good reputation, supported Sa . . . . The other three speeches were all hostile. Reason for these three members of an opposition of perhaps twelve to speak was that when Sa . . . made first statement to the Majlis there was no debate and Molotov complained to Persian Ambassador in Moscow that the Persian Government had prevented supporters of Soviet proposal from speaking.

[E 6670/615/G]

(23)

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st October.)*(No. 5874.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Washington, 31st October, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 9394.

State Department agree with lines of approach to Soviet Government over Persian oil which you propose, but they suggest that it would be wiser to omit any reference to United States (see fourth sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram) in order to avoid giving Russians more strongly than can be avoided the feeling that we are ganging up on them.



2. State Department are telegraphing to-night instructions to United States representative at Moscow to make communication to Soviet Government on the following lines:—

"United States Government have noticed the public statements made by Kavtaradze in Tehran at a press conference and arguments used by the press in Moscow. They wish to let the Soviet Government know the action which United States Government has taken in the matter of applications [group undecypherable] by American oil firms. Although Persian Government have refused to grant them concessions during the war, the United States Government recognise that Persians have conducted negotiations in good faith and they have only asked that when negotiations are recommenced American interests should not receive less favourable treatment than the others. United States Government feel that sovereign and independent countries such as Persia have the right to withhold or grant concessions in their own territory. The United States Government are particularly concerned over concurrence in this principle in view of Tehran declaration and would not feel able to concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in Persian internal affairs."

3. The foregoing is a rough summary only.

4. State Department are not instructing their representative at Moscow to concert action with His Majesty's Ambassador for reason given in paragraph 1 above but presume that he will in fact keep in touch with him.

[E 6673/6058/34]

(24)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st October.)*

(No. 1123. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 31st October, 1944.*

ACCORDING to a reliable informant, Kavtaradze summoned a Persian who is both a Deputy and a newspaper proprietor, and after vague threats directed against him and the Persians, more or less talked to the following effect:—

2. Russia was the only country that would protect Persia. She wanted oil in North Persia in order to be able to protect Persia against Great Britain and the United States, who, after the war, would follow an imperialistic policy. Russia was extremely powerful. Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt had to go running off to Stalin whenever they wanted anything. The Persians were of course hoping to postpone granting concession until after the war because they thought that the Russians would then be less free to act. That was precisely why Russia wanted to secure concession now.

[E 6717/94/34]

(25)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st November.)*

(No. 1129.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 1st November 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1121.

Besides the troubles in Tabriz reported by acting British Consul-General in his Situation Report No. 110, shops in Resht have been closed, in protest, it is alleged, against attitude of Persian Prime Minister towards the Russians. There has also been some trouble in Isfahan, but I have no report from His Majesty's Consul.

2. Minister of Court informed United States Ambassador to-day that the Shah would have to sacrifice Saed unless he could be assured of American and British support. United States Ambassador said he could give no such assurance on behalf of his Government. To me M. Ala spoke less directly, though he asked whether I could give him any reply to representations reported in my telegram No. 1079, which of course I could not. Ala said that at a council held at the palace last night it was decided that if Saed was forced to go, there was nothing to be done but to replace him by another Prime Minister who, in the matter of oil, would follow the same policy and so on indefinitely.

3. Saed, who is very tired, informed me to-day that he intended to submit his resignation in the hope that that might win his Government a few weeks' respite. This seems optimistic. He is, however, seeing representatives of Majlis parties to find out how far he can still count on support. Had he taken a vote at the beginning, he could have resigned as *non persona grata* to the Russians without prejudice to the attitude taken up by the Government and the Majlis, but events in Tabriz will have shaken the Deputies and he might not get so large a majority now, though the real feeling of Majlis has not changed.

4. Radio Moscow, 31st October, broadcast a ferocious and baseless attack on Saed. He has drawn my attention to a passage which accuses him and other "reactionaries" unnamed of wishing to make Persia into a base for a line of attack on Russia. Saed associates this with a reference to North Persia by Kavtaradze as a "zone of security" in a recent talk between Kavtaradze and Persian Ambassador to Moscow, who is now here. Saed says that he has also been informed by a Persian in close contact with the Soviet Government that the Government are talking to this effect: "It is true that we asked for an oil concession, but the real point is that North Persia is a zone of security for us and we shall not let any foreigner show his nose there. It is a pity that Saed did not understand. We wanted to make the pill as palatable as possible."

[E 6670/615/G]

(26)

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow.)*

(No. 4060.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 1st November, 1944.*

WASHINGTON telegram No. 5874 of 30th October.

I shall be glad if you will now approach Soviet Government on the lines of paragraph 2 and if necessary paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 9394 to Washington of 28th October, but omitting reference to United States Government.

2. You will probably think it best to avoid being drawn into any irrelevant discussion either regarding the alleged benefits which the Soviet proposal would entail for Persia's economy or regarding the attitude of the Persian press or public opinion. Our information is that Saed has the support of responsible elements in Persia, and the fact that he has remained in office bears this out. But the important facts are that his Government is the legally constituted Government of Persia, that it has fulfilled its treaty obligations and that it consequently has the right to expect that the Soviet Government and ourselves will do the same. We know of nothing that supports the assertion, which we have seen in Soviet-inspired comment, that Saed's Government have obstructed passage of supplies to Russia.

[E 6783/6058/34]

(27)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th November.)*

(No. 1143.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 4th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1141.

There are signs that the Soviet demand for oil is to be dropped. Indeed the Soviet Ambassador told me to-day that the oil question had never been raised between Kavtaradze and Saed, though the rage with which he uttered this stupendous falsehood was painful to witness. The Soviet demand for the head of Saed is however being pursued with greater violence. Saed is quite prepared to resign at once if he can secure postponement of oil issue.

[E 6769/6058/34]

(28)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)*

(No. 732.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 4th November, 1944.*

PERSIAN Ambassador called on Sir A. Cadogan on the 3rd November to discuss Russian demand for oil concession in North Persia.

2. He did not add anything to what you have already reported, but he emphasised the gravity of the situation and the unexpectedness of the Russian



demands. He said that his Government were standing firmly on their decision not to grant any concession until after the war, and that even if the Government were to change, the new Government would maintain the same attitude.

3. Sir A. Cadogan said that he fully realised the difficult position in which the Persian Government found themselves. His Majesty's Government for their part had signed the Tripartite Treaty with Persia and had joined in the Tehran declaration of last year, and their position was therefore perfectly clear. They had also accepted the Persian Government's decision in regard to oil concessions and found no fault with it.

4. Ambassador concluded by expressing the hope that His Majesty's Government might be able to afford his Government some help and support. Sir A. Cadogan replied that we should of course like to do so and would consider very seriously what the Ambassador had said; but this was a very delicate matter if what he desired was that we should intervene with the Soviet Government. The latter might resent any appearance of our putting pressure on them, and any friendly representation would have to be made with the utmost caution and with complete secrecy. The Ambassador said he fully understood this point.

5. If Persian Government again ask you what support His Majesty's Government will give them in the matter, it would be well not to divulge action taken at Moscow, but you may of course speak in the lines of the preceding paragraph.

[N 6957/60/38]

(29)

*Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th November.)*

(No. 3309.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Moscow, 6th November, 1944.*

MY telegrams Nos. 3303 and 3306.

You will have noticed in the latter part of *Izvestiya* article of the 4th November inveighing against the attitude of the Persian Government towards Soviet demand for an oil concession that a recent reference in newspaper *Raad* to a letter on this subject from United States Ambassador, Tehran, is made the occasion for an ironical enquiry as to how the presence of American troops in Persia without any treaty arrangement, such as exists in the case of Soviet Union and Britain, can be held to tally with Persian sovereignty and independence.

2. United States Chargé d'Affaires tells me that this sally published on the eve of election Sunday in United States has caused a considerable stir amongst local American correspondents. Several of them have expressed their bitter indignation at this unwarrantable attack on American Transport Units who, everyone knows, are stationed in Persia for the sole purpose of assisting delivery of lease-lend supplies to Soviet Union.

3. Yesterday's *Izvestiya* article on presidential election has given my United States colleague further cause for distress. As you will have seen, it describes the core of the Republican party as pro-Fascist and pro-German; berates Dewey for encouraging a "campaign of pogrom against communism"; and, on basis of an alleged rumour in United States, declares that Republican bosses are scheming to stage a fake Communist attempt on Dewey's life in a last desperate attempt to gain him the popular vote. Last sentence of the article insinuates that Dewey is himself a party to this plot.

4. Bludgeon tactics are the normal mode of offensive of Government-controlled Soviet press, and it can always be counted upon to use them upon the slightest provocation. To this extent the above-mentioned *Izvestiya* utterances run true to form. It is an index however of the clumsy insensitiveness of those in authority here that they should have allowed official organ of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to choose this particular moment to belabour American Eagle in a way which is nicely calculated to embarrass President Roosevelt whose election they so ardently desire. This outburst is all the more remarkable as during recent weeks Soviet press has refrained from expressing a direct preference for Roosevelt and has confined itself to giving its public a consistently one-sided picture of the election campaign based upon appropriate quotations from speeches of the President and democratic leaders.

[E 6862/6058/34]

(30)

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th November.)*

(No. 6005. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 7th November, 1944.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 1143.

Wallace Murray said on 4th November that State Department had received a report of a remarkable and sudden change for the better in Soviet attitude. While it was only an assumption, he thought that it was fair to deduce that our common attitude and representations to [sic: ! of] our two Governments in Moscow had had something to do with it. He felt much encouraged by this and thought that it would be an object lesson to those here who thought that it was useless to try and exercise influence so far [group undecipherable] and that there was nothing to be done but let position after position go by default. This may be premature or even wide of the mark, but it seemed undesirable to discourage his conclusion that to work closely with us is the only right policy for the United States.

2. Wallace Murray is, as you know, constantly preoccupied with the fear of Russian penetration in the Balkans and Middle East. It is clearly undesirable to encourage him to be anti-Russian on general principles and on every issue, but his views about Russia are increasing the desire which I believe he has [group undecipherable] formed more and more definitely lately to co-operate with us on every issue. The opportunity was taken to impress upon him advantage of our consulting in advance on all matters and concerting our action. He expressed full agreement. It was also put to him that recent events showed even more conclusively the desirability of our helping the Persians to set their own house in order over the police and other matters. He said that he fully agreed and he would do his best to speed matters up. I have not yet heard anything further about the police since my telegram No. 5809.

[E 6868/6058/34]

(31)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th November.)*

(No. 1156.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 7th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1151.

It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Government embarked on their campaign for oil concession if they did not intend to carry it through at all costs. Its failure cannot but damage their credit abroad especially if all details came out and their use of Hitler technique becomes known. In this country Persians have seen what they thought impossible, viz., a Russian diplomatic defeat, and although they may feel the Russians will take revenge sooner or later, they have learnt that to stand up to the Russians is not necessarily to commit suicide. For the first time since the occupation of Persia the press, which was always ready to criticise us and later the Americans, has told the Russians some home truths, and it is hoped that this process will continue and not only tend to keep the Russians in order but also prevent the Russians supposing that the whole country is with them.

2. The death blow to the Russian scheme was of course dealt by British and American representations in Moscow, but some credit must go to the Persian Prime Minister who refused to resign even when many Deputies and high officials wavered and Radio Moscow accused him of wanting to use Persia as a base for Fascist aggression against Soviet Russia. His tranquillity made Russian blustering seem slightly ridiculous and his reply to Kavtoradze received wider credence than Kavtoradze's accusations.

3. Soviet Embassy are still supporting the demand for Saed's resignation, but they and their Tudeh followers are gravely discredited. It is not known whether Kavtoradze has left or will leave. But for him the Soviet Government could save their face by repudiating the Soviet Ambassador who may well have misled them as to the support Kavtoradze could count upon, but it is less easy to repudiate an assistant who was sent here on a special mission which he carried out under the glare of world publicity.

4. Russians can hardly sit down under this defeat, but, for the moment, the situation is better than it was before they made their extraordinary demand for an oil concession without offering any payment or anything in exchange except a vague promise of support at the Peace Conference.



[E 6938/6058/34]

(32)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th November.)*

(No. 1167.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 8th November, 1944.*

ALTHOUGH Soviet Ambassador on 3rd November defended the retention by the Soviet censor of a telegram in plain language addressed by the Persian Government to five of its missions abroad, he stated that there could, of course, be no objection to the despatch of cypher telegrams by the Persian Government to their representatives in other countries.

2. On the morning of 7th November British censor informed me that the Soviet censor had for twenty-four hours been holding up two Persian Government telegrams, one to the Persian Ambassador, London, and one to the Persian Ambassador, Washington, and that two others received 7th November were also being held up. I called on the Soviet Ambassador as soon as possible. He professed surprise and promised to investigate and let me know at once. He did not communicate with me, and to-day he is alleged to be on holiday. The Soviet censor has, however, just informed his British colleague that the two earlier messages have been stopped, the latter ones passed. From [group undecypherable] I have no doubt that messages which have been stopped were cypher version of message in plain language which was stopped by the Soviet Ambassador.

3. As you are aware, our censorship agreement with Soviet authorities here provides for exemption of all Persian Government messages from censorship. Action of the Soviet censors which has of course been carried out under orders of the Soviet Ambassador is therefore serious breach of agreement with us as well as a particularly mean attempt to stifle the Persian case while giving world publicity to one-sided Soviet reports as in the article in *Investiya* of 4th November.

4. I have informed my United States colleague from whom I learned that the Persian representative in Washington has been enquiring about the missing telegrams from Tehran.

5. I shall protest to the Soviet Ambassador about the breach of the agreement.

[E 6908/189/34]

No. 10.

(1)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th November.)*

(No. 1168.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 9th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1167.

Persian Prime Minister says that he is receiving information from Russians by roundabout means, that if he resigns, oil question will be dropped and K. will leave a few days later. He is thinking of resigning after setting forth the history of the oil question for Majlis and for publication. He agrees that owing to methods which the Russians have been employing, it will not be easy to find a successor. He is convinced that neither the Shah nor the Majlis will accept Qawam Al Saltana who is first choice of Soviet Embassy.

2. Referring to Moscow campaign against Prime Minister, I told the Soviet Ambassador yesterday that I myself had not noticed signs of fascism in the Prime Minister. M. Masimov professed not to know such an expression had been used about Saltana, but said that his Cabinet had behaved badly. Pressed for details he could only quote matters of relatively minor importance. Finally he alleged that Saltana "would not even consider Soviet terms for oil concession." It is, of course, important part of Prime Minister's case that he was pressed to promise concession in principle without declaration of Soviet conditions. This is supported by K.'s statement to the press.

3. Prime Minister refused to allow Tudeh party to make a demonstration 7th November. [Group undecypherable: ? Several] of their supporters who have been violent were arrested but released at night.

4. Newspapers which attacked the Prime Minister with particular scurrility, including the chief Tudeh organ, have been suppressed, but each has been immediately replaced by a paper bearing another name for which a licence had already been obtained. Prime Minister says there are 200 licensed newspaper titles still not utilised, and that he proposes to have a decree issued by Military Governor that all newspaper licences which have not yet been used are cancelled.

[E 6916/6058/34]

(2)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 9th November.)*

(No. 1169.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 9th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1124.

Various outgoing telegrams about crisis addressed to Reuter and American agencies (one in reply to cabled request for reports) were stopped by Soviet censor 8th November.

[E 6965/189/34]

(3)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th November.)*

(No. 1175.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 10th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1168.

Saed resigned 3rd November. Although he was still assured of support of the Majlis he felt he ought to submit his resignation as it might give the Russians an excuse to declare themselves satisfied and resume relations in due course, dropping oil question at least [two groups undecypherable] it is known who will succeed him. The Shah still hopes to secure Taqizadeh some time but for the present various nonentities are being mentioned.

2. The Shah, whom I saw to-day [group undecypherable: ? at his request], spoke highly of Saed and informed me that his resignation had finally been accepted merely out of fear lest the Russians should take some extreme action such as encouraging a separatist move in Azerbaijan. Great thing was to gain time.

3. I showed the Shah extract published in *Iraq Times* from an article which appeared on 3rd November in the *Times* of London. The Shah was very happy to see that Russian propaganda was not being accepted in London at its face-value. He however suggested that the *Times* might have misunderstood the situation to say that there was no particular reason why negotiations should have to wait till the end of the war. He said freedom to discuss the oil [group undecypherable: ? question] would come not with the end of the war but with the departure of foreign troops, and that he was in favour of that being made clear. He is right on this point, for as he said there could be no equality in [group undecypherable: ? negotiations] while Russians when they could not get what they wanted were able to, and as they had proved, willing to cut off food supplies of the capital and stop the Persian Government telegrams in violation of censorship agreement.

4. The Shah said with reason that the crisis had not been all loss. Persians had shown that with all their faults and weaknesses they were [group undecypherable: ? patriotic] when it came to the pinch; and the fact that for the first time some newspapers had begun to criticise the misdeeds of the Russians in Persia was a great gain.

5. I evaded discussion of the oil question, but I told the Shah that from press extracts I had seen I gathered that there was a general opinion in England that the methods used by the Russians were mistake. At the same time I deprecated talk of dishonesty in the press and urged that Persia should look rather to the United Nations scheme in which Russia would, we hoped, be a partner with Great Britain and the United States.

[E 6978/6058/34]

(4)

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow).*

(No. 4241.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 11th November, 1944.*

TEHRAN telegram No. 1168 of 8th November.

Though the fall of Persian Government may in the circumstances have been inevitable, and situation on the whole has improved, it cannot be assumed that crisis is completely over. If you have not yet had a reply to our representations to Soviet Government, I shall be glad if you will consider desirability of pressing for some statement of their attitude.

In any case please watch the situation and keep me informed.



[E 6938/6058/34]

(5)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)*(No. 752.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, 11th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1167 of 8th November.

Action of Soviet authorities in stopping these telegrams is inexcusable. You should press your representations to Soviet Ambassador strongly and inform me if he fails to authorise release of cypher messages.

[E 6996/189/34]

(6)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th November.)*(No. 1184.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 13th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1175.

Most of the Deputies seem to favour Dr. Musaddiq as Persian Prime Minister, but he will only accept as a stop-gap and on condition that he is allowed to return to his seat in the Majlis on completion of his mission. This raises difficult constitutional question. Musaddiq would be hopeless at ordinary business and to show his independence might be a nuisance to us and to the Americans but it is believed that he would not sign a Russian oil concession.

2. Not only is Kavtoradze still here but he is emerging from Soviet Embassy where he had remained quietly for some time. Ministry of Agriculture were so ill-advised as to organise totally unnecessary lunch to celebrate the Persian, British, Soviet anti-locust campaign and to invite the Soviet Ambassador and members of his staff. Ambassador replied that he would bring M. Kavtoradze. I have [group undecipherable: ? another] engagement for that day and shall be represented by legal counsellor.

[E 7021/6058/34]

(7)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th November.)*(No. 1187.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 14th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 752

I made protest to the Soviet Ambassador in your name and asked whether the Soviet authorities intended to observe the censorship agreement which had been in force for three years or not. The ambassador alleged that the Soviet military authorities, finding that Saed was adopting a hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R., ordered the Soviet censorship to stop certain telegrams. He would, however, consult K., who was in Tehran as the representative of Molotov. I said I was unaware of the status of K. here, but that the censorship agreement was clear and Persian Government telegrams were exempted from the censorship.

2. M. Maximov said that the Soviet Government had a right to expect co-operation from us when they were exposed to the hostility of the Persian Government. It was difficult to treat this seriously, but I did so, pointing out that our co-operation was always to be had in matters relating to aid to the Russians and all that that involved, but the Soviet Embassy could not expect us to support them in a dispute with the Persian Government about an oil concession. Maximov said that there were many other counts in the charge against Saed and he became almost lachrymose about the need for co-operation. I quoted a Russian proverb which I had invented for the occasion: "Cut the sheep's throat, but let it bleat," and the interview ended amicably; but I await M. Maximov's reply after his consultation with K.

[E 7071/6058/34]

(8)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th November.)*(No. 1208.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 16th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1187.

The impression I gained from my last interview with the Soviet Ambassador is that in spite of the Soviet decoration which he received on the 7th November,

he is not at all easy in his mind about the oil business and this is supported by information from a person who meets many people on the fringe of the Soviet Embassy. According to informant, opinion of these Russians is that set-back in Soviet plan was due to the ambassador who, puffed up with his rapid advancement, persuaded himself that he could secure concession and recommended that K. should come for the purpose. Whether this is true or not, it would seem that any publicity which suggests that Soviet authority in Tehran went too far, that Moscow was not fully informed, and so on, is to be welcomed since it gives the Soviet Government a way out if they need one.

[E 7101/6058/34]

(9)

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow.)*(No. 4306.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, 16th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 4241 of 11th November and Tehran telegrams Nos. 1175, 1184, and 1187 of 10th and 13th November.

The fact that Kavtaradze is still in Tehran and again showing signs of activity does not suggest that Soviet Government have in fact decided to drop the oil question. Indeed, it appears that having hinted to Persian Prime Minister that they would do so if he resigned, they are now preparing to renew pressure on Persian Government. Press attacks on Saed reported in your telegram No. 3391 seem to bear this out.

2. If you have still received no reaction from Soviet Government to your representations, please speak to Molotov personally and impress upon him that this is a question in which His Majesty's Government are bound to take a close interest, in view of the joint guarantees of Persian integrity to which they are a party. I accordingly wish to have an explanation of the continued pressure which is being put on the Persian Government.

To Washington only: "Please inform State Department."

[E 7093/189/34]

(10)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th November.)*(No. 1212.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tehran, 17th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1184.

Musaddiq's conditions have proved to be unacceptable to Deputies, who are now looking elsewhere for a Prime Minister. Meanwhile complete stagnation reigns in all departments of the Government.

[E 7101/6058/34]

(11)

*Mr. Eden to the Earl of Halifax (Washington.)*(No. 9859.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, 17th November, 1944.*

MY telegram 4306 to Moscow of 16th November.

Please suggest to State Department that they should send similar instructions to American Ambassador in Moscow. The situation seems unlikely to deteriorate if there is undue delay in making Soviet Government realise strength of our common views on this subject.

[E 7115/6058/34]

(12)

*Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow.)*(No. 4350.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, 19th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 3442 of 18th November.

You will have seen my telegram No. 4345 of 18th November recording Sir A. Cadogan's interview with Soviet Counsellor. We thought it only right to

[30547]



make Soviet Government aware of our feelings and of the probable development of public opinion here.

2. If you think it better to write rather than speak to Molotov, I have no objection. If your United States colleague is prepared to do the same, so much the better.

3. I cannot, however, yet authorise you to write on the lines of the last sentence of your paragraph 5, since this would entail consulting the President.

[E 7093/189/34]

(13)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)*

(No. 779.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 19th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1212.

The fact that there is still no news of a new Persian Government is somewhat disturbing. Is there any evidence that the Russians are planning to install a government of their own nominees?

2. Please keep me informed of any action which you are taking to promote formation of an independent Persian Government.

[E 7121/6058/34]

(14)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)*

(No. 781.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 20th November, 1944.*

YOU will have seen from my recent telegrams to Moscow that we are doing all we can to restrain Soviet Government. Meanwhile you should do everything possible to keep the Persians in heart.

2. Your telegram No. 1220 of 18th November. You have discretion to send through embassy channels any press messages which you think would be useful.

[E 7153/6058/34]

(15)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th November.)*

(No. 1229.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 20th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 779.

General expectation was that Samii (No. 199 in Personalities) would become the Persian Prime Minister, but at the last moment he withdrew. Choice then fell upon Bayat (No. 47) who has just been asked by the Shah to form a Ministry. Delay was largely due to the futility of the Deputies but partly no doubt to their feeling that something in their favour might turn up.

2. Bayat is a nonentity but is not considered dishonest. He is however talking of being able to find a solution of the disagreement with the Russians, and one well-informed source interprets this as meaning that the Russians will be given promise of first refusal of any oil concession in the North. Since Saed refused to give any opinion [*sic*: 1 option] during the war even if the Russians submitted terms, this would constitute victory for the Russians and would completely justify in their eyes methods by which they secured Saed's retirement.

[E 7153/6058/34]

No. 11.

(1)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)*

(No. 788.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 21st November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1229.

I agree that it will have a bad effect if Russian methods against Saed appear to have achieved their object. For your information and guidance our aim should be to secure appointment of a Prime Minister who will follow the same policy as Saed in regard to concessions.

2. You may, at your discretion, inform the Shah in confidence, either direct or through the Minister of Court, of representations we have made in Moscow and London to Soviet Government.

3. It is not certain that it would be practicable as suggested by His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow to place Persian question on the agenda of next meeting of the Prime Minister, President and Stalin, the date of which is not yet settled. But in case it should prove possible, I shall be glad of your urgent observations on the effect it would have in stiffening the Persians if they could be told that this was intended.

[E 7177/6058/34]

(2)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd November.)*

(No. 1233.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 22nd November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1229.

New Persian Prime Minister has sent me a message that there will be no change in policy on oil question. His light-hearted remark to a British journalist had induced me to let him know through a friend of his that if there was to be any change of policy, about which Persian Government had hitherto taken a strong line and His Majesty's Government and British press had been sympathetic, he must let me know immediately so that I might warn you.

2. Article by *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent which is summarised in your telegram No. 770 has given the Shah the greatest satisfaction and will have great influence in other quarters too.

[E 7186/615/G]

(3)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd November.)*

(No. 1241.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 22nd November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 788.

Persians are already hoping that crisis in Soviet Persian affairs may be discussed at the forthcoming conference of the three leaders and it has even been mentioned in the press. It would undoubtedly give great and much-needed encouragement to the Shah and Persian Prime Minister if they could be told that His Majesty's Government would raise the question. If they knew the United States Government intended to associate themselves with the approach the happy effect would of course be even greater.

[E 7207/6058/34]

(4)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd November, 1944.)*

(No. 1243.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 23rd November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1241.

New Persian Prime Minister, whom I have just seen, says he cannot do otherwise than follow the policy of his predecessor in the matter of oil concessions since that is the policy which is desired by the Majlis and the great bulk of the population. At the same time he is nervous and I gathered if the Russians try to press for immediate grant or promise of a concession, he would resign. If, however, he secures the majority he hopes for (he was for many years a Deputy and knows the ropes) it would, I think, be a mistake for him to resign so long as he keeps his majority, for whereas he seems to believe Persia could produce an unlimited number of Cabinets who would refuse the Russian demand, I am not so sure. However, the Shah, whom I also saw to-day, seems to favour this method of bending before the blast, and of showing up the Russian demand as thoroughly unpopular. I did my best to encourage both of them by saying that the attitude adopted by former Government was fully understood in Great Britain and had apparently won general sympathy.

[30547]

D 2



[E 7186/615/G]

(5)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 797.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 23rd November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 788 and your telegram No. 1241.

Have you yet taken action authorised in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference? If not, I think the time has now come to do so.

2. Unless there is any strong reason to the contrary, you should yourself see the new Persian Prime Minister as soon as possible, sound him as to the line he intends to take, and encourage him to maintain the policy of his predecessor.

[E 7271/615/G]

(6)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 262.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, 23rd November, 1944.*

THE Persian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, when his Excellency said that he was much troubled by the situation which had developed in his country. As I knew, he had been home on leave at the time when the incidents began. The Russians had brought in a few lorry loads of agitators from outside Tehran and had staged a wholly unreal demonstration. His Excellency said that he was much disturbed that this action should have been taken so soon after our departure from Moscow and he was apprehensive as to what the real Russian intentions were.

2. I told the Ambassador that we too had been taken by surprise by these events. It was true that Persia had not been discussed at Moscow and, indeed, there was no reason why it should have been since our relations, like those of the Soviet Union, towards Persia were governed by our joint agreement. The Ambassador agreed. I continued that in view of recent developments, however, we had thought it right to approach the Russians in the matter but I asked his Excellency not to telegraph about this since I had instructed you to inform the Persian Government direct and I thought that the fewer telegrams on this delicate topic the better. His Excellency expressed his great relief and said that he certainly would not telegraph about any action that we had taken with the Russians, but he would like to make it plain to his Government that we were closely watching the situation and would do what we could. I agreed to this.

3. I then asked the Ambassador about the new Prime Minister. M. Taqizadeh did not seem very enthusiastic about him, but said that he was sure that on the main question of oil concessions he would maintain the policy of his predecessor. I said that I was interested to learn this and that you had already given me some indication to the same effect. In all the circumstances I thought that this was right.

4. At the close of the interview the Ambassador expressed his warm thanks for the action which His Majesty's Government had taken and also for the statements put out by the B.B.C., and for the remarks in *The Times* a few days ago. His Excellency undertook to keep me informed of any developments of which he learnt from Persia. Though his anxiety seemed less on leaving, M. Taqizadeh, who has himself several times refused the post of Prime Minister in Persia, did not conceal his anxiety about his country's future or his dislike of Russian behaviour in Persian territories.

I am, &amp;c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

[E 7241/6058/34]

(7)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th November.)*

(No. 1251.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 24th November, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 797.

I informed M. Ala to-day that His Majesty's Government, basing their representations on Tripartite Treaty declaration of Tehran about Persia, &c., had expressed their concern to the Soviet Government both in Moscow and in London at the deterioration of relations between Russia and Persia and had asked for information. M. Ala was greatly relieved and pleased.

2. Soviet Ambassador being ill, Soviet Counsellor called on new Persian Prime Minister the 23rd November. Fortified I trust by my visit of the previous day, Prime Minister (according to M. Ala) gave a firm though conciliatory reply to counsellor on oil question saying this had been decided by the Majlis and public opinion (see my immediately following telegram).

3. I had delayed to reply to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 788 because I wished first to see American Ambassador. I have now seen him. He had no up-to-date instructions from his Government and even seemed doubtful what to say if he should be asked by the Prime Minister what line to take with Russia. It will weaken our case very much if Persians think we are acting alone. After our conversation I hope my American colleague will at least tell Persians that they cannot now change their minds about oil concessions without making American public sceptical about any cry of distress that may reach America from this country.

[E 7225/6058/34]

(8)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th November.)*

(No. 1252. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 24th November, 1944.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

According to M. Ala conversation between the Soviet Counsellor Avalov and the Persian Prime Minister went as follows:—

2. Avalov, a Georgian with a quiet diffident manner, was very conciliatory. He said that brusque hostile treatment accorded by Saed to the Soviet offer had caused great surprise and resentment. British and American companies had been allowed to negotiate for a long time whereas the offer from Russia was rejected at once as though she were, e.g., Mexico (Foreign Office will hear the echo of Litvinov in this) instead of a great and friendly neighbour. Kavtoradze had asked Moscow whether he might leave but had been instructed to remain until the formation of the new Government. Russia wanted good relations, &c. The object was mutual benefit.

3. The Prime Minister expressed equal desire for good relations. His Cabinet was not yet definitely formed, and he could not speak for the Government but so far as he himself was concerned the question of an oil concession was settled. Saed had merely expressed the desire of the great majority of the Majlis and of the people in saying that the matter must await the end of the war and (he added) the departure of foreign troops, and as the new Prime Minister, he could only give the same reply. On all other points he hoped that there would be friendly discussion.

4. According to M. Ala, Avalov did not contest this but he questioned the Prime Minister closely as to the composition of the new Cabinet. He wished to know whether it would include any member of the outgoing Cabinet. The Prime Minister evaded this question. In fact he will probably continue Sururi who enjoys the support of Majlis as Minister of the Interior. Avalov was also anxious to know whether Ahmedi (Personalities No. 16) would be included, and was so inept as to say Ahmedi was reputed to be pro-Russian. It is well known that Ahmedi was ejected from the Ministry of War not so long ago because the Russians held him to be "pro-British" and they might well [group undecypherable] he would not permit demonstrations and would suppress violent newspapers fearlessly. The Prime Minister however has no intention to prefer so decided a character and told Avalov that Ahmedi would not be in the Cabinet.

[E 7266/6058/34]

(9)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th November.)*

(No. 1261.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 26th November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1251.

The Shah expresses deep gratification at the friendly and helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government at this difficult moment.

[30547]



2. Being now in good heart himself the Shah will I hope encourage his new Cabinet. My impression is that he helped to force Sa . . . to resign, hoping thereby to propitiate the Russians, but at that time he did not know whether to expect support from Great Britain and America or not. He is still unaware of the attitude of the American Government.

[E 7335/6058/34]

(10)

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th November.)*

(No. 6372.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 29th November, 1944.*

TEHRAN telegrams to Foreign Office, Nos. 1251 and 1261.

I am pressing the State Department to instruct the United States Ambassador, Tehran, to say something encouraging to the Persians. They expect Harriman to reach Tehran in a few days' time and are at present inclined to await a report from him. I have suggested that they should either—

- (a) authorise the United States Ambassador to say something to the Persians before then, either of his own accord or if questioned; or
- (b) authorise Harriman to say something.

[E 7383/6058/34]

(11)

*Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd December.)*

(No. 6426.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, 1st December, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 10051.

In response to our suggestion that United States Government should [group undecypherable: ? say] something to Persian Government to encourage them, State Department have instructed United States Ambassador at Tehran to inform Persian Prime Minister of the fact of the American *démarche* in Moscow saying it was made in the spirit of declaration of 1st December, 1943.

2. State Department have also asked Mr. Harriman for an early report.

[E 7414/6058/34]

(12)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd December.)*

(No. 1283.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 3rd December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1260.

I have no doubt that as soon as Bayat has obtained vote of confidence in Majlis, Soviet Embassy will make another attempt to obtain oil rights in some form or other. Persian Prime Minister has included among his Ministers two members of Saed's Cabinet and it is believed that if he secures vote of confidence he will appoint as Minister of Agriculture Nakhai, who was Saed's Minister of Commerce and Industry. Soviet Embassy, though they refused to invite Sururi to their party, have not made his presence in the Cabinet reason for refusing to have relations with new Prime Minister and Russians in general are outwardly more discreet. Thus they are unlikely to behave in regard to Tudeh demonstrations as they did in Tehran and Tabriz. Nevertheless there are not lacking signs of intimidation. Many persons, official and private, have recently been ejected from Northern Zone by Russians as hostile to them and Prime Minister is receiving from those parts a stream of obviously inspired [group undecypherable: ? telegrams] asking for security for "liberal" parties, death for Saed, exile for [group undecypherable: ? Sai] yid Zia and so on. Intimidation took grotesque form first day of debate on programme of new Government when diplomatic box in Majlis contained six (later increased to nine) Russians, and of the six several were unknown to this embassy [group undecypherable: ? and had] that *well-known underground look*. This demonstration did not prevent one Tudeh orator from receiving so hostile a reception that he had to moderate his tone considerably. Meanwhile pro-Russian papers are trying with some success to confuse simple issue, viz., the right of Persian Government to postpone talks about oil concessions until foreign troops have left the country.

2. Question which is doubtless a feeler from Russians has been put to the Shah by Iraj Iskandari, leader of the Tudeh Deputies in Majlis. According to Minister of [group undecypherable], who spoke to me on instructions from Shah, Iraj Iskandari asked whether an interesting suggestion made by Dr. Musaddiq in a speech in Majlis on 29th October might not form basis of settlement with Persian Government. Suggestion was that oil in North Persia should be exploited by a Persian company and surplus sold to Russia at average international price. (Alternative suggestion made in same speech, viz., that oil should be exploited by an international company was not mentioned by Iraj Iskandari). In discussion with Ala I found him suspicious that this was merely a device by which Russians might secure control in practice under a Persian cloak, since so long as they had troops in the north they would not allow Persian Government or a Persian company to employ there any person to whom they objected. I said that exploitation by a native company was natural way to retain control of resources, but if Persians could not produce oil experts with required experience and in adequate numbers, Persian Government must consider whether they would have free hand to recruit them elsewhere. If Prime Minister speaks to me about Iraj Iskandari's scheme, I shall not conceal my opinion that sensible course is to stick to his declared policy not to discuss oil until foreign troops have gone.

[E 7415/6058/34]

(13)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd December.)*

(No. 1284.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 3rd November, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1283.

Oil question took unexpected turn on 2nd December when Dr. Musaddiq presented a Bill which was rushed through under double urgency procedure. Article 1 provides that no Prime Minister, Minister, &c., shall enter into negotiations about oil having official or legal parity with any foreign Governments or with any oil companies or any person or sign any agreement connected with oil. Article 2, however, permits the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to discuss the sale of oil and manner in which Persian Government should exploit and manage its oil deposits but must inform the Majlis of such conversations. Article 3 fixes penalty for infringement of this law at solitary confinement for from three to eight years and permanent dismissal from Government service.

[E 7424/6058/34]

(14)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th December.)*

(No. 1289.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 4th December, 1944.*

DEPUTY Rahimian tried 3rd December to find backers for a Bill providing for cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession. He found none and no other arrangement, so project was dropped.

2. R., who is a member for Kuchan at Eastern end area over which Russians demanded exploring rights, is not officially a member of Tu . . . party but he owes his election entirely to Russians.

[E 7439/6058/34]

(15)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th December.)*

(No. 1290.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 5th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1286.

Mr. Harriman happened to call on the Soviet Ambassador just after receipt of news of passing of the Oil Concession Bill by Majlis. He tells me that Maximov was very angry and Kavtaradze, though more contained in his language, was equally definite in his opinion that this rebuff could not be accepted. Maximov suggested to Harriman that the law was directed against America and Russia since Great Britain already had a concession, but Harriman said that his Government were not interested in that but in the application of the declaration about Persia and the independence of small nations. Maximov's line was that the land

[30547]

D 4



of the country was owned by 300 families, that Majlis represented only 5 per cent. of the population and that the Government must become more democratic. Harriman gained the impression that Maximov intended to exercise influence over the next elections.

2. I understand that Tudeh Deputies opposed the Bill and mustered only 7 votes whereas about 80 voted for it.

[E 7425/6058/34]

(16)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th December.)*

(No. 1291.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 4th December, 1944.*

WASHINGTON telegram No. 6426.

Harriman saw Shah to-day. By agreement with American Ambassador who was present he informed the Shah that United States Government had expressed to Soviet Government its concern at crisis in Persia. He added, however, that while United States Government and presumably British Government viewed the matter with concern and sympathy it was a Persian-Russian problem.

2. Harriman who gave me this account of interview found Shah firm if anxious. The Shah was particularly worried at reports that demonstrators had been collected in Russian lorries for meetings in northern towns which talked about autonomy though he claimed that spectators showed no interest. Harriman had then told Shah that Persian Government could not expect sympathy unless they could offer the population prospects which could compete with those held out by Russian sympathisers. Shah agreed. I told Harriman I had been giving Shah and Persian military authorities similar warnings for three years and that in particular I suggested to them long ago that in order to forestall demands for autonomy which they feared might be received from northern provinces they should spontaneously apply to all provinces provision in Constitution for creation of provincial councils.

3. H. referred to his interview with Maximov (my telegram No. 1290) and again spoke of M.'s anger and of determination of M. to express that Persian Government and Majlis should be made more "democratic." My fear is that M. has been told by his Government that he can only redeem the mistake he made by bringing off a success, and that he is therefore prepared to go to any lengths to secure oil concession. His latest measure is to demand from Ministry for Foreign Affairs suppression of five of leading newspapers which have opposed Russian demand.

[E 7524/189/34]

(17)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th December.)*

(No. 1312.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 8th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1291.

Tudeh broadsheet published Tehran gives foretaste of what is doubtless the Russian policy. It quotes manifesto of an alleged meeting of 50,000 people at Tabriz on 1st December and refers to other meetings in towns and villages in Azerbaijan. Oaths are said to have been taken on the blood of martyrs of freedom to form Constitution, and put fundamental laws into operation. Manifesto demands (a) provincial councils, (b) trial of Saed and exile of Saiyid Zia, (c) abrogation of Military Governorship of Tehran, (d) exclusion of agents of dictatorship from administration, (e) formation of a coalition Government including lovers of freedom, (f) foreign policy based on policy of equilibrium, (g) good relations and friendship with Soviet people, (h) reforms in regard to workmen, peasants and social insurance. The manifesto declares that Deputies who were imposed by salaries and money on the people are not true representatives of the people and that the people will not be sacrificed to one-sided policy of the agents of dictatorship. Azerbaijanis will take speedy steps to put manifesto into operation. If the Government agree, so much the better, if they oppose, the duty of the people towards the Government is clear.

2. Broadsheet ends with congratulations to freedom lovers of Persia from Central United Council [group omitted] workmen, workers and toilers of Persia and a promise of active support.

[E 7546/6058/34]

(18)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th December.)*

(No. 1316.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 10th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1291.

According to new Minister for Foreign Affairs Intizam with whom I have just had my first interview, Maximov and Kavtoradze called on the Prime Minister on 7th December, and Maximov read from a paper statement to the effect that the Soviet Government were dissatisfied with relations between the two countries and that the passing of the Oil Concession Bill had increased the difficulties. Kavtoradze informed the Prime Minister that he was leaving for Moscow by first aircraft. He is in fact leaving to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs is seeing him off at the airfield.

2. As the United States Ambassador is informing the Prime Minister of the approach of United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government about the crisis here (this is in addition to message given to the Shah by Harriman) I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government had expressed to the Soviet Government, both in Moscow and through the Soviet Ambassador in London, their concern at the crisis and their desire for information.

[E 7546/6058/34]

(19)

*Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).*

(No. 848.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 14th December, 1944.*

YOUR telegram No. 1316 of 9th December.

With Kavtaradze's departure there may be a lull in the Soviet-Persian dispute, but in view of Soviet attitude as described by Soviet Ambassador in your telegram under reference, no long respite can be expected, and Russians may well return to the charge shortly.

2. Persians have been able to resist the first Russian attack largely because it was clumsily made. Russians cannot be expected to repeat their mistakes, and it seems likely that when they renew pressure on the Persian Government they will do so by more insidious means. They may, for instance, try to blackmail Persian Government by means of threat of social disturbances or separatist movements in northern provinces (compare your telegrams No. 1312 of 8th December and No. 1320 of 10th December).

3. It therefore seems important that Persian Government should consider urgently means by which they can improve their position *vis-à-vis* of Soviet Government before pressure is resumed. In particular, it seems desirable that they should (a) take immediate steps to implement measures of social reform on the lines advocated by Mr. Harriman and yourself (your telegram No. 1291 of 4th December), (b) take steps granted under the powers granted by article 2 of the Bill reported in your telegram No. 1284 of 3rd December which would show that they are seriously contemplating alternative methods of exploiting Persian oil deposits. Mr. Butler spoke in the above sense to Persian Ambassador, who called on 13th December to say that the new Government intended to continue their predecessor's policy, and to seek information as to the action which His Majesty's Government had taken in Moscow. If Persian Government do nothing in directions indicated Russians could represent their attitude as being purely obstructive and dog-in-the-manger. It is therefore essential that Persian Government should lose no time in taking action.

4. If you see no objection please speak to the Shah and Persian Prime Minister in this sense. I should at the same time be grateful for your observations on the action which Persian Government can most usefully take under paragraph 3 (b).

5. For your own information it is unlikely that Persian Government will be able indefinitely to debar Russians from participation in some form or other in the exploitation of oil deposits in North Persia. But they can hope to postpone negotiations until such time as these can take place in conditions which would enable Persian Government to obtain reasonable terms, *i.e.*, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. If they are to hold the Russians off until then, it is important that they should lose no opportunity of strengthening their case and that their general line of action should be one which would justify support of His Majesty's Government should this again be required.



[E 7550/189/34]

(20)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th December.)*

(No. 1320.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 10th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1312.

His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports actual number of demonstrators was 4,000 or 5,000. Tudeh hopes to secure attendance of Kurdish and [Shah-controlled] tribesmen were completely falsified, and only about 500 villagers were collected though some Russian vehicles were used for the purpose, and people with letters from Tudeh travelled from one place on the railway free. Governor-General (who is entirely in the pockets of the Russians) announced afterwards that the meeting was held with his permission. Persian troops were confined to barracks and few police were seen.

2. His Majesty's Consul-General adds, while Tudeh accounts are exaggerated to cover disappointment at the poor attendance, they appear to show that Tudeh are serious in their intention to set up provincial councils in Azerbaijan.

[E 7623/6058/34]

(21)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 12th December.)*

(No. 1325.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 12th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1316.

Persian Government are very nervous and their anxiety was increased when Kavtoradze evaded all attempts of Ministry for Foreign Affairs to have a meeting for discussion with Kavtoradze before he left.

2. Russians have now given Court a hint by declaring on Moscow radio that Ala as well as Saed was behind the law about oil concessions.

3. In my telegram No. 1290 I mentioned what Harriman described as a clumsy attempt by Maximov to cause dissension between British and Americans. According to United States Ambassador [? group omitted] is continuing this policy though in a slightly more discreet way. Same note is struck in a venomous article about British policy in Belgium, Italy and Greece in which it is suggested that if American troops had not been present in Rome blood of Italian people would have been shed like Greeks.

4. Tudeh newspaper *Rahbar* published 10th December leading article from which following points are taken. Kavtoradze has left Persia because no Persian authority would even consider his proposals and because the ruling classes were adding to his difficulties. Object of Russian Government was not to obtain imperialist concession, but to prevent imperialist influence in Persia. Who could guarantee that there might not appear another dictator like Reza Khan who stifled all democratic tendencies and friendly feelings towards Russia? Soviet Government had not made so many sacrifices only to find another reactionary barrier erected against her and a Government like the hired Government of Poland or the dictatorship Reza established. If after the war armies of the three Powers left Persia, only the influence of Russia would in fact be removed for as everyone knew Persian Government, Majlis and politicians did not belong to the Persian people but were merely agents with no will of their own. The Majlis and Dr. Musaddiq had not done away with the problem, but only removed it from competence of Persian Government and handed it over to foreign circles.

5. A few days ago a Caucasus Armenian was murdered before witnesses by five masked men. At least seven Caucasians murdered or disappeared about three years ago, and there was another batch of cases two years ago. Whether, as the public believe, Soviet authorities were connected with these incidents or not, the latest murder is being taken by many Persians as a warning.

[E 7654/6058/34]

(22)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December.)*

(No. 1330.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 14th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1325.

The Persian Prime Minister informs me that the newspaper which published offensive article on British policy in Greece, &c., viz., *Azhir*, is to be suspended.

2. While Maximov was ill, Avalov, the counsellor, asked whether anything could be done to moderate the tone of the press. He agreed campaign had been begun by Tudeh papers, which he volunteered had enhanced reputation of Saed by the violence of their attacks. For my view I said I had always been in favour of moderation in the press and avoidance of personalities and that I would suggest to the Prime Minister that he should begin by recommending moderation to journalists of all parties. I did so, but Maximov chose rather to demand (with success) the suppression of three newspapers which supported Saed policy.

3. During the last few weeks newspapers on both sides have been suppressed, but the Military Governor, in spite of the fact that he is the best and most courageous we have had, has allowed all pro-Russian papers to reappear, whereas several on the other side have had to adopt subterfuge of appearing under another name. For this reason when *Azhir* published venomous attack on British policy in Greece, I informed the new Minister for Foreign Affairs that the attitude of the new Government to this article would be a test case.

4. Prime Minister assures me that he intends to check the violence of the press of all parties, but I shall be surprised if he proves to be able to apply this policy impartially.

[E 7654/6058/34]

(23)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December.)*

(No. 1332.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 14th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1330.

I have received the following additional information from the Persian Prime Minister. Maximov also said that the Soviet Government expected oil concession law to be amended but suggested as an alternative that the Shah should refuse to ratify the law. The Prime Minister pointed out the difficulties attending these suggestions, but said that the law permitted the Persian Government to discuss the sale of oil. M. said that the Persian Government had no capital for exploitation of oil and that the only practical way was the one the Soviet Government had proposed. The Prime Minister reminded him that the late Shah built the railway out of [group undecipherable: ? Persian] money.

2. Since the demonstration at Tabriz on the 1st December there have been no more demonstrations and no telegrams of protest have been addressed to the Government. The Prime Minister believes with some reason that the Tudeh are waiting while the Soviet Government make up their mind after hearing K.'s report what to do next.

[E 7654/6058/34]

(24)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December.)*

(No. 1337.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, 14th December, 1944.*

MY telegram No. 1332.

In its issue of 13th December Persian newspaper published by Soviet Embassy reports the following statement which K. is alleged to have made to certain Deputies about his parting conversation with the Persian Prime Minister:—

2. The passing of oil concession law must be considered a mistake caused by pressure exercised by enemies of Persian-Soviet friendship, such as Sa . . . . and Saiyid Zia. The law was inconsistent with the existence of foreign concessions in Persia. Soviet Government are confident that the Majlis will correct the mistake. The concession asked for by the U.S.S.R. was not like a capitalist concession. It would help Persia to overcome unemployment and develop the economic life of the country. After the expiration of the concession the equipment would belong to Persia. Recent developments and creation by certain Deputies of an atmosphere hostile to the U.S.S.R. had aggravated the difficulties and K. was therefore leaving for Moscow.



[E 7697/6058/34] (25)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th December.)*  
(No. 1340. Secret.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 15th December, 1944.

MY telegram No. 1325.

Minister of Court has brought message from the Shah saying how much His Majesty admired Mr. Churchill's speech about Greece in the House of Commons and the determination it expressed not to allow a minority to impose its will on the country by force. The Shah, according to Ala, feared that some such attempt might be made here with support from the outside.

2. Events in Greece are being utilised by the pro-Russian press, which, in articles of the greatest virulence, draws parallels between what international reactionary capitalists and imperialists are alleged to be doing in liberated countries and what Saed, Saiyid Zia and their "masters" are represented as having tried to do here, viz.: to hold down mass of Persian people who demand closer relations with Russia, the defender of freedom. This propaganda is not without effect on the public, but it is perhaps of more use to the Soviet authorities as providing them with an excuse for any policy they may decide to adopt here in defence of "rights of oppressed majority."

3. Persian authorities are very nervous. They have tales that Russians have within the last few months rented large premises in various parts of Tehran and that in all of them are garrisoned troops ready, they suggest, to intervene if the Government tries to repress disorder created by Tudeh. Russians have undoubtedly rented a number of houses for undefined purposes, but if they wish to intervene in street disturbances, they do not need special premises for the purpose. It seems to me that the easiest course is for them to encourage autonomous move in Azerbaijan. Provision in the Constitution for provincial councils and the admitted neglect of the provinces and particularly of Azerbaijan by Persian Government provides quite good pretexts, while the leadership taken by Azerbaijan in the constitutional struggle against the central Government and Tsarist Russian influence nearly forty years ago affords a valuable precedent which would enable the Russians to fake an air of verisimilitude to an otherwise unconvincing narrative. Nothing that the Russian could carry off successfully is excluded, but something that would look well to "advanced" circles in Great Britain and America would probably be preferred. Persian Government may, however, out of fear of lack of skill in negotiation make such forms of pressure superfluous, by entrusting effective control of exploitation of the northern oil to the Russian experts working for a nominal Persian company.

[E 7822/6058/34] (26)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st December.)*  
(No. 1356.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 21st December, 1944.

MY telegram No. 1337 and your telegram No. 848.

Soviet Ambassador has informed the Persian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs that according to telegraphed instructions which he has received from Moscow Soviet Government share the opinion expressed by Kavtoradze on eve of his departure from Tehran and that nothing has occurred since to cause them to change their mind. This means that relations with U.S.S.R. cannot be good until oil concession law has been amended.

2. I have spoken strongly to the Shah and Prime Minister on lines laid down in your paragraph 3. Shah has always pressed for reforms including the breaking up of big estates (he has no estates) and heartily welcomed your recommendation on this point. Prime Minister foresees excellent results not expected by many other people from transfer of Millspaugh's economic powers to himself or his nominees which he hopes to bring about and claims to have planned to distribute essential commodities to rural and tribal areas. He professes to be ready to break up State lands into small holdings especially for persons displaced by a plan he has in mind to have fewer but better-paid officials.

3. Both the Shah and Prime Minister said they realised that northern oil could not be left undeveloped indefinitely. Prime Minister said that he had already planned a Bill for presentation to Majlis providing for the formation of a Persian company to bore for oil. He did not seem to think it mattered that in

wartime it might be difficult to find foreign experts, other than Russian, British and American. Persia, he said, possessed experts—by which he appeared to mean Persians trained by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. I asked whether a survey would be made to determine establishment of sites for borings and Prime Minister said that borings would be made at two sites indicated in papers handed by Amiranian Company. This company abandoned its concession activities, I understand, not because they found no oil, but because it could not profitably be brought to Persian Gulf.

4. I did not feel that the Prime Minister appreciated the difficulty of exploiting oil deposits. Many Persians suspect, however, that he proposes to give Russians a concession in everything but name. It will doubtless be necessary, as you point out, to give Russians an interest in northern oil, but [group undecipherable: ? Majlis] seems likely to be jealous as to the manner and extent of Russian participation. Whether Bayat's Government will survive long enough to accomplish anything is uncertain. He has a wire-puller's majority in Majlis at present, but no one forecasts long life for his Cabinet. If, however, he seems to be making genuine attempt to solve the two problems stated in your above-mentioned telegram, we should do nothing to accelerate his fall, for every Cabinet crisis tends to weaken Government in general in Persia.

5. Last sentence of your paragraph 4. I hope to reply in two or three days.

[E 7847/6058/34] (27)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd December.)*  
(No. 1363.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 22nd December, 1944.

MY telegram No. 1325, paragraph 2.

In a speech in the Majlis on the 19th December, Dr. Musaddiq denied that he had any communication with Saed, or Ala, or Saiyid Zia, or, indeed, anyone before tabling his Oil Concession Bill. He admitted that one of the things that prompted his action was a leader in *The Times*. This was, doubtless, the leading article of the 3rd November. Suggestion of *The Times* that Russia ought not to have acted in Persia as she did without consulting Great Britain and America has been interpreted by some newspapers as a hint that the three Powers should dispose of Persian oil between themselves.

2. Musaddiq defended his action in refusing to back the Bill for cancellation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession (my telegram No. 1289). Existing agreements could not be cancelled by unilateral action or there would next be a Bill for cancellation of Persian-Soviet Treaty of 1921. Musaddiq concluded by dealing with demand for a policy of equilibrium by which supporters of Russia mean that because the British have a concession the Russians ought to have one. Persia must not try to settle old accounts with her neighbours by taking away what is considered too much or by giving to others on the ground that they have received too little. Policy of "passive balance" requires that in future nothing shall be given to any Government if it involves harm to Persian interests.

[E 7943/6058/34] (28)

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th December.)*  
(No. 1384.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 29th December, 1944.

YOUR telegram No. 848.

It is a question whether Russian participation in exploitation of Persian oil can ever be reasonable. For Russia to buy surplus of North Persian oil on reasonable terms would be easy since world prices afford a criterion. When it comes to exploitation no Persian Government except one nominated by the Russians will ever regard this as reasonable, not merely because terms cannot be competitive (since Russian demand is for exclusive rights in the north), but for reasons which can be summarised as follows: any Soviet company or organisation is a branch of Soviet Government and exploitation of oil deposits in Persia by any such company or organisation would involve encroachment on Persian sovereignty. (Fact that His Majesty's Government have a controlling financial interest in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company does not in reality constitute a parallel, and is not



regarded by Persians as doing so; they are well aware that despite British governmental shareholding Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is *not* a branch of His Majesty's Government). No great Power, and no other Power which was out of Russia's reach, would permit such encroachment and if Persia has to submit it will be because she is weak and because assurance in Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and Three-Power Declaration about Persia which was made at Tehran Conference are worthless. Even mere participation by the Russians in exploitation of northern oil means effective Russian control of exploitation since other partners, Persian or foreign, could not withstand Russian pressure. Control of exploitation of oil involves control of oil area. It is a short step from this to control of North Persia by Russians and after that independence of Persia is gone.

2. In my opinion this Persian reasoning is correct. In peace time it could be used with effect since the press of the world would take it up, but it cannot be used now at the moment of greatest need. Russian pressure in the north is tremendous, and whereas at first Russians demanded oil knowing, doubtless, that political control would follow, they have now reversed the process and are using measures little short of political control in order to obtain oil.

3. To keep oil question simmering until foreign troops have gone it is not sufficient to form a Persian company, since it is agreed that it is exploitation that matters and one of the Russian arguments is her need for security, *i.e.*, assurance against establishment of potential hostile influence in Northern Persia. Only suggestion I have heard that holds out any hope is that Persian Government should invite Soviet Government to choose, to assist Persian Government in exploitation of their northern oil resources, experts from any country or countries neutral in the matter, *i.e.*, any but Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R., Persian Government would probably have to retain right of veto lest Soviet Government should select politically undesirable [group undecipherable] trained by them at Baku; but high standard of education and skill required would act as a filter to some extent.

4. I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you approve of this suggestion.

5. It cannot be denied that unless she obtains concession in the north, Russia will attempt to secure cancellation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in the south and may well prove successful. Against this risk, however, must be set far graver risks inherent in her obtaining of northern concession. For reasons set forth above this would lead eventually to termination of Persia's independence and hence incidentally termination of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. But even before this happened Russia could, and in my opinion would, use her concessionary powers in the north to render position of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company impossible, *e.g.*, by running northern concession on an uneconomic basis which would disrupt Anglo-Iranian Oil Company labour market; and she would also be able to export Baku oil at cut-throat competitive rates by using Persian oil for her internal needs. Apart from their intrinsic advantages to Russia, such preliminary manoeuvres would facilitate achievement of her ultimate objective.

[E 4471/155/34]

No. 12.

*Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th July.)*

(No. 723.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 27th July, 1944.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador's telegrams Nos. 458 and 614.

Persian Government to-day published as from themselves a long communiqué (text follows by bag) which fully establishes the guilt of both Kashani and Naubakht in fifth column activities.

2. Both these persons had broken down under interrogation (in Kashani's case upon production of a letter from him to Rashid Ali and Mufti in Berlin) and Persian members of joint commission had perforce to neglect cogent evidence. I therefore proposed issuing a joint communiqué, for which there are precedents, and submitted draft. The Prime Minister however insisted on cutting out all indications of joint nature of the interrogation and of the fact that the Persian side were equally satisfied regarding the findings. He also insisted on a unilateral Persian communiqué ostensibly in order to assume full responsibility before Majlis but in reality, we suspect, in order to make it appear as though the Government were merely acting at our dictation. Furthermore he watered down the text by omitting a passage implicating Qawam es Saltaneh and references to

"guilt" of the accused (on grounds that only a legally constituted court could establish the guilt). He and the Cabinet have shown moral cowardice throughout the discussions but even in its present form communiqué is sufficiently damning for our purposes.

3. The Government are under strong pressure to bring Kashani and Naubakht to Tehran for internment and to allow them various privileges. Internees at Tehran are inadequately guarded (one of them has even been able to secure publication in the press of articles attacking the Prime Minister himself) and in these circumstances I propose to resist all proposals for further transfers from Sultanabad at least until the security has been radically improved. I am also protesting strongly to the Prime Minister at the release on his personal instructions of a number of internees before we had obtained the Persian Government's written assurance for which we had asked that they would not be re-employed on the railway.

[E 4889/155/34]

No. 13.

*Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th August.)*

(No. 34. Saving.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 27th July, 1944.

THE following is a summary of a report which the investigation authorities have submitted to the Cabinet about Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani and Naubakht:—

Habibullah Naubakht said that just before the Japanese Mission left Persia he was told by the Japanese Minister that a German had remained behind after the events of Shahrivar. He discovered later that this was Franz Mayr when he met him along with Mohammed Hasein Hissam-Viziri and Hussein Neivandi at the latter's house in the Khiabaneh Shahpour. The first political discussion Naubakht admitted to having with the Mayr group was a week or two later at the house of Sayid Naghibzadeh Mushayekh. He said that Franz Meyr, Mohammed Hasein Hissam-Vaziri, Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani and Ahmad Namdar (representing General Zahidi) were present and that they discussed the founding of a new society called the Hisb-i-Mellie. Naubakht had several more meetings with the Vaziri and Mayr and learnt that a German colleague of Mayr called Berthold Schulze, who was a major in the Luftwaffe, was to go to join the Qashgai tribe. Naubakht admitted to having accompanied this man on the journey and said that when they reached their destination Schulze produced a radio transmitting set, which he had brought with him. On his return, Naubakht continued to keep in touch with Mayr until he went down to the south again. It was while he was returning from this journey that he heard, in Isfahan, how a German had had a quarrel with his Armenian collaborator, that a suitcase full of documents had come into the possession of the Allies, and that General Zahidi had been arrested. Since he knew that Mayr had had relations with Zahidi he inferred that the German was no other than Mayr. Worried about what had happened, he accepted Vaziri's invitation to meet Mayr again, when Vaziri saw him again in Tehran and told him that Mayr had been able to escape to the capital. At this meeting with Mayr, which took place at the Dowshantappeh Gate in a closed car, Mayr and Naubakht discussed the arrival of German parachutists who had landed at Siah Kuh and in the Qashgai country. Mayr informed Naubakht that he intended to send some of these parachutists to the Bakhtiari tribe. Naubakht was in contact with Mayr up to the time of the latter's arrest in August 1943 and his statement implicated many of Mayr's collaborators, including Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani as well as *detenus* now in the internment camp of the Imperial Iranian Government.

Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani admitted to having written a letter which is now in the possession of the Allied authorities to Rashid Ali Gailani and the Mufti of Jerusalem while they were both in Berlin; in this letter he declared his identity of aim with them and assured them that he was at work and was ready to arrange special couriers to Iraq on their behalf and to do what they required.

This, along with a German translation, was found in the Isfahan documents mentioned by Naubakht attached to a letter from Vaziri to Mayr for transmission to the German authorities in Turkey. Kashani also admitted that he wrote a note on the back of one of his visiting cards, which is in the possession of the Allies, and which he addressed to Javad Aliabadi, Mayr's henchman now in



detention. This card was found in Isfahan in an envelope addressed to Mayr. Finally Kashani said he had heard from General Aghevili of the arrival of the German parachutists at Siah Kuh.

Besides conducting these enquiries, the investigating authorities examined several documents in the handwriting of Mayr, Schulze and Vaziri which showed the important part both Naubakht and Kashani had played in the fifth column.

The investigating authorities were satisfied that Habibullah Naubakht and Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani were collaborating with Germans who were working against the interests of the Allies at the time when—as had been publicly announced in the press and on the radio—every Persian was in duty bound to report to the Persian Police the unauthorised presence of any German.

[E 6494/94/34]

No. 14.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd October.)*

(No. 395.)

Sir,

*Tehran, 10th October, 1944.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter which has been sent to the United States Ambassador in Tehran by Dr. Millspaugh about the Soviet proposal to obtain rice from Persia in exchange for piece-goods and miscellaneous articles.

2. We are no nearer than we were when your telegram No. 421 of the 13th July was despatched to securing Russian co-operation in economic matters affecting Persia. The Soviet Embassy have still received no reply to the British-American proposals that there should be set up in Tehran a Higher Supplies Committee on which Soviet representatives, as well as representatives of Persia, Great Britain and the United States, would sit. The information given in Dr. Millspaugh's letter reveals—or rather confirms, for we knew it before—one reason for the delay: the Soviet Government cannot afford to have their shabby commercial methods discussed by an international body. Economic imperialism never showed itself in a meaner light than in the policy of the Soviet Government in this country since the occupation.

3. Soviet Russia was a considerable customer of Persia during the period between the two wars, taking rice, sheep and on occasion wool, cotton and other raw materials, and when, owing to a dispute as to terms, the Soviet Government refused to renew the commercial agreement in July 1935, the Persians considered it a disaster, and so did the Shah, who depended on Russia as a market for much of the rice grown on his estates. Moreover, having made ordinary commercial transactions almost impossible by his absurd exchange regulations, the Shah had to depend to a great extent on barter—a procedure which placed him at the mercy of Germany and Russia. The Russians have taken full advantage of their position as a Power, if not in occupation, at least much in evidence in the north of Persia, to acquire goods and local currency on terms favourable to them. The Persian Government would have been glad if the Soviet Government could have refrained from buying sheep and cattle during the last year or two, but the purchase went on. This embassy has reported more than once, as have various consular posts in Persia, how the Soviet authorities sell to merchants piece-goods, sugar and other goods at the highest possible prices, thereby helping to keep up prices and to embarrass the Persian Government and the American advisers in their effort to bring about a fall in the cost of living; winning the support of the merchants whom they favour with their goods; and making large sums in rials, some of which certainly go to subsidise that part of the press which is hostile to His Majesty's Government, to America and to the American advisers. Dr. Millspaugh now reveals the dilemma in which he finds himself: either he must accept a barter arrangement as ruinous as the one which was forced on Persia last year, or else the goods which he refuses to accept at the prices fixed by the Soviet authorities will be sold direct to the merchants with the results which I have mentioned above. The Russians would probably retreat if faced with the prospect of a full statement in the Majlis followed by the airing of the matter in the Tehran press, but they know quite well that the terror which attends them will prevent any such exposure of their arbitrary and greedy attitude, and that, while keeping silence about Russian ill-treatment and even praising Russia for real or imaginary virtues, Persians will eagerly rush into print to accuse Great Britain and America of interference in their affairs, of lack of generosity and of any other crime that comes into their heads or the heads of those who pay them.

4. It is particularly galling to know that the sugar which the Soviet authorities have sold in this country in large quantities is almost certainly Lend-Lease sugar. I do not think that there is any doubt that it is Lend-Lease sugar, but even if it were not, it could only be at best Russian sugar set free by the receipt of a corresponding quantity of sugar under Lend-Lease arrangements. It is said that the United States Government have hitherto shown indifference to the fate of Lend-Lease goods supplied to Russia: so long as they reached Russian hands the obligation of the United States Government had been discharged, and it was for the Russians to decide how they should be used. As Dr. Millspaugh points out, however, Russian policy upsets completely our attempts to strike a fair balance between Persia's needs and world supplies. The American and British forces are desperately short of tyres. On the supposition that Russia needs tyres, supplies are denied to Persia (as to other Allied countries) except in strictly-controlled quantities, even for some urgent needs recognised as such by the American advisers to the Persian Government. The Russians sell to private individuals in Persia tyres received under Lend-Lease at a profit of many hundreds per cent. These tyres are then used not for purposes judged to be essential, e.g., carrying grain, but by private individuals who can only recover the immense cost by running as pirates and carrying opium or any other private goods that can bear the highest charges.

5. Given the situation which I have described, it is amusing to learn, when asking for an oil concession recently, the Russians are reported to have said that on the reply might depend the economic relations between the two countries. It is doubtful whether Persia ever gained much by her exchanges with Russia, and with a slight increase in the level of prosperity of her own people she could probably consume all the food-stuffs and raw material that she has hitherto exported to Russia. However, so long as Russia wants to buy from Persia, the Persians are not likely to refuse to allow them to do so. Nor, as I have said, will they use the best weapon of defence—publicity, though it is presumed that after the war American, if not British, journalists will have some interesting revelations to make about the behaviour of the Russians in North Persia. The sale of sugar and Lend-Lease tyres should interest the American public.

I have, &c.

R. M. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 14.

*Dr. Millspaugh to Mr. Morris.*

Dear Mr. Morris,

*30th September, 1944.*

YOU may already know of our negotiations with the Soviet Trade Delegation concerning the sale of rice to them. On the ground that they lack rials, they demand that we buy from them cotton piece-goods and miscellaneous articles. In principle, these barter transactions are unsound, and they are almost invariably to the disadvantage of the weaker country. Last year we sold rice to them and bought goods from them at a big loss to the Persian Government; and we do not intend to repeat such a transaction this year. The Government is in agreement with us on this policy. We are willing to sell the rice at a fair price and buy the piece-goods at a fair price; but we are not willing to buy miscellaneous goods. It is practically certain, however, that we cannot reach an agreement on goods or prices unless the Soviet Trade Delegation finds itself able to make considerable concessions.

You should, I feel, take into consideration the fact that the Soviets have sold sugar and tyres (Lend-Lease, it may be assumed) on the Persian black-market. We have, as you know, little or no control over their imports in the north and, if these goods are imported as military goods, we have no control over them in the south.

It would appear that any sugar or cotton piece-goods imported by the Soviets with our agreement and transferred to us would and should be deducted from Persia's quota; but, if such importations are not delivered to us and are sold in the black-market, but are nevertheless deducted from our quota, the result would obviously be to destroy our distribution programme. We cannot, of course, take responsibility for any monopoly goods that are illegally imported and sold by the Soviets. Such importations and sales would be because of *force majeure* and in contravention of the guarantees of sovereignty given by the Allies. It would quite obviously be unfair for M.E.S.C. to deduct any such importations



from the quota. Persia should not be penalised for being too weak to enforce its laws and regulations against one of the Allies. In view of Persia's weakness, it would seem appropriate for the Allies, and particularly the United States, to prevent the misuse of Lend-Lease shipments to Russia and to prevent likewise the disruption by one of the Allies of a programme of quotas, rationing and distribution that has been accepted by the other Allies and is included within the sovereign rights of this country.

It is quite probable that we can make no agreement this year with the Soviets relative to the sale of rice or the purchase of goods. If so, the result will be that we shall permit them to buy rice in the north directly from the growers; and, most probably, they will sell sugar and piece-goods in disregard of the customs law and our regulations. During the last few days I have received reliable reports that they have been negotiating or making sales of considerable quantities of sugar in the Tehran black-market.

I wish you to know the situation, since it appears that it concerns all three Allies, and particularly the United States.

Sincerely yours,  
A. C. MILLSPAUGH,  
Administrator-General of the Finances.

[E 6809/189/34]

No. 15.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th November.)*

(No. 401.)

Tehran, 18th October, 1944.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 281 of the 6th July, I have the honour to convey to you herein a report on events in Persia during the months of July, August and September 1944.

*American Affairs and the American Advisory Missions.*

2. The long-heralded arrival of the new American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, at last took place on the 12th August. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires took an early opportunity to emphasise to him the urgent need for co-ordinating the views and policies of the American Advisers to the Persian Government. If the ambassador had come with any instructions in that sense, he did not reveal the fact, but he seemed to be impressed by the arguments used; in particular, he admitted the need for revision of the policy whereby the advisers were left by the United States authorities to fend for themselves without guidance, as servants of the Persian Government. This was getting the worst of both worlds as the Persian authorities never credited the United States Government with such disinterestedness. The Counsellor of the American Embassy, who was present at the interview, suggested that the United States Government had scruples about taking a hand in a sphere which they regarded as ours; adding, however, that he had done his best to convince the State Department of the complete willingness of the British to back the American Advisers in so far as the latter represented something homogeneous to back.

3. As foreshadowed in my despatch under reference, the Persian Government decided early in July to allow Dr. Millspaugh to continue with his existing powers for four months or so—the idea being to give him a last chance to show his worth. His stock, however, fell steadily during the subsequent weeks and early in August His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires reported that he appeared to be accomplishing nothing which would justify his continued retention in public service. Dr. Millspaugh injured his reputation further by an undiplomatic interview granted to a Tehran newspaper, in which he was reported to have said that the United States was the only country which had championed Persia's freedom and that if his mission had not been present in Persia one of the three things would have happened:—

- (a) Disturbances leading to the occupation of North and South Persia by the Russians and the British respectively;
- (b) the occupation of the country by an international force;
- (c) a dictatorship even more rigorous than Reza Shah's.

The Soviet Ambassador thereupon proposed to Mr. Lascelles that they should make a joint *démarché* to the United States Chargé d'Affaires asking him whether he considered these utterances as compatible with the spirit of the Tehran Conference Declaration. Mr. Lascelles declined, feeling that such an

assault on the Americans was a poor way of demonstrating an Anglo-Russian solidarity for which the Soviet authorities here had hitherto shown little desire; but he undertook to remonstrate privately with the chargé d'affaires. When he did so, he found the chargé d'affaires most embarrassed and inclined to the view that the State Department had been awaiting just such a pretext for recalling Dr. Millspaugh. In fact, at the end of August, the State Department informed a member of His Majesty's Embassy at Washington that Dr. Millspaugh had been recalled for consultation; they wished to defer a decision about his return to Persia until they had talked to him, but they thought that they thought it might well end in Dr. Black—the second in command—taking over. Mr. Lascelles's comment on this was that the only possible course at this stage was for Dr. Millspaugh to be retained in the United States on some face-saving pretext and that although the fault was his in part only, his personal position was past praying for. Mr. Lascelles added that the new American Ambassador had reached the conclusion that no foreign adviser ought to be given the powers and responsibilities which were entrusted to Dr. Millspaugh, on the grounds that this stultified the Persian Constitution and was basically incompatible with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Dr. Millspaugh should share these responsibilities with the Majlis; all decrees should be signed jointly by both, and in the event of disagreement the Prime Minister should decide between them. At this point, however, Dr. Millspaugh's obstinacy stood him in good stead; he refused to go to the United States, fearing some trap to keep him there and being certain that at best his powers would be reduced during his absence; he expressed the intention to retire next February after two years' service, and meanwhile a successor should be brought out soon to be trained by him. The fact is that lately, owing to the war news, economic developments in Persia appear to be on the point of taking a favourable turn for Dr. Millspaugh and he is shrewd enough to see that if he hangs on for a few more months he may leave with much less discredit than now.

4. The future of all the American Advisory Missions was under review during the present period. The United States Chargé d'Affaires told Mr. Lascelles at the beginning of August that the United States Government were extremely irritated by the lack of Persian co-operation with the missions and might withdraw them before long. His Majesty's Government thereupon explained to the United States Government that they were most anxious for the American Missions to remain, and in certain cases to be strengthened, since they were convinced that Persia's need for foreign assistance would continue to be great, particularly in the immediate post-war period; they were especially concerned about the future of the Persian police; when Allied troops are withdrawn a large measure of responsibility for internal security would fall on the police, which, in its present state, was quite unable to bear it; this might have particularly serious consequences in the oil area. His Majesty's Government were anxious, therefore, that reforms should be put in hand before the departure of British troops. These could not be carried out without foreign assistance and they would prefer that this should be provided by the United States, if possible; if, however, the United States Government felt unable to provide it, His Majesty's Government would have to consider advising the Persian Government to look elsewhere. His Majesty's Government added that if the American Military Mission was going to be withdrawn, the Anglo-American plan for the supply of equipment for the Persian army would need to be reconsidered. The State Department replied that the United States Government were not losing interest in Persia, but they had no fixed policy of retaining advisory missions there. They had, for instance, always made it clear to the Persian Government that American advisers must not be exposed to vilification: if attacked, the Persian Government must defend them, otherwise they would be withdrawn and would not be replaced. The following decisions had been recently taken by the United States Government:—

- (1) Colonel Schwarzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further year with the gendarmerie.
- (2) Instructions would be sent to the United States Ambassador in Tehran to investigate whether Colonel Schwarzkopf might take over the police as well.
- (3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945, by which date the War Department thought that he would have done all he could to accomplish his task; the War Department would probably decline to appoint a successor and were inclined to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police.

[30547]

E 2



His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires' comment on these decisions was that Colonel Schwarzkopf could not take over the police unless he obtained five additional men of his own choosing; he had, however, been told that he could not have them while the war lasted. Mr. Lascelles added that General Ridley would not have accomplished by the 1st March, 1945, all the work covered by his contract. This work comprised the drawing up of plans of organisation under numerous heads and supervising their execution; and under the majority of these heads even the planning stage had not been reached. In the opinion of the military attaché to his embassy such work as General Ridley had achieved would rapidly be undone if he left next spring. Mr. Lascelles went on to discuss how far the possession of an efficient army would really be useful and necessary to Persia in post-war conditions, given a reformed and larger gendarmerie. As long as the present Shah remained on the throne, the army would play a preponderant rôle in the country's affairs and remain the chief instrument of internal security; for the Americans to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police would be all very well if they obtained an increasing share of the revenue at the expense of the Shah's ideas for his army; the continued presence of General Ridley's mission would not entirely solve this problem, but would at least alleviate it sufficiently to give Colonel Schwarzkopf a fair chance. His Majesty's Government thereupon urged the United States Government to let Colonel Schwarzkopf have his five extra men so as to enable him to take over the police. His Majesty's Government found it difficult, however, to contest General Ridley's estimate that he would have finished his work by March 1945, so they confined themselves to asking whether, in the event of his task not being completed by that date, the War Department would let him stay on until he had finished. As regards the gendarmerie and police, the State Department agreed (a) that this was of first importance; (b) that reforms should be pressed before the departure of the Allied troops; (c) that the probable departure of General Ridley made it desirable for action to be started at once, and they urged the War Department to provide the five extra men needed by Colonel Schwarzkopf. As regards General Ridley, they stated that the War Department did not hold out much hope of keeping him on beyond March 1945 unless he himself recommended it. His Majesty's Government took the opportunity to repeat that the problem of co-ordinating the work of the American Advisers in Persia was still a pressing one, and that the future success of the American Missions would depend very largely on the degree of cohesion which the American Ambassador was able to bring about. The State Department agreed to this and said that the United States Ambassador would do his best.

5. A Military Air Attaché has been appointed to the United States Embassy in Tehran and to the United States Legation in Bagdad.

#### *Soviet Affairs.*

6. The censorship controversy between the British and Soviet authorities in Persia came to a head during the period under review. On the 30th June the British Joint Director of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship had made the following requests to his Soviet colleague:—

- (a) That British and United States publications exported to British and United States companies and residents in Persia respectively should invariably be released.
- (b) That article 5 of memorandum establishing the joint censorship should be strictly observed. (This gives exemption from censorship to the Persian Government and to the missions of foreign Governments with which the British, Soviet and Persian Governments are all in diplomatic relations.)
- (c) That publications condemned by the Soviet section should be returned to the sender through the British section.

The Soviet director undertook to convey these requests to Moscow for instructions. When informing the Foreign Office of this I added that the Russians should be called upon to justify their request for the condemnation of any British publication exported from the United Kingdom under censorship permit and that objection should be made from our side to anything casting a slight upon British history, institutions or personalities. In the course of July the British section of the censorship acquired a competent Russian reader, with

a result that they were now able to study the Russian material coming into this country. The offensive material divides broadly into three categories:—

- (a) Maps showing the 1941 Soviet boundaries. (The Soviet section are suppressing all British maps showing any other Soviet boundaries, even though they are expressly marked as showing pre-1939 boundaries.)
- (b) Disparaging references to the Polish Government. (This is forbidden by Middle East censorship stops.)
- (c) Books criticising capitalism as exemplified by the British Empire. (The Soviet censor has been condemning a great mass of British material—including several copies of *Punch*—on vague ideological grounds.)

When two months had passed and the Soviet censor had still received no instructions from Moscow, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires informed His Majesty's Government that retaliation alone would cure the present unsatisfactory situation. His Majesty's Government approved the policy of retaliation, but suggested that Mr. Lascelles should first try to induce the Soviet Embassy to call the battle off, taking the line that censorship of this kind was now out of date and should be discontinued, and adding a hint that this was a game that two could play. As a first step, Mr. Lascelles requested the British censor to attempt to settle the matter with his Soviet colleague on the basis prescribed by the Foreign Office. This failed, so Mr. Lascelles took the matter up with the Soviet Ambassador, pointing out in addition that the discrepancy between their interpretation and ours was having a most undesirable effect on the Persian population. It was giving them an entirely one-sided picture of all those ideological questions on which the Russians and ourselves thought differently and this could not be allowed to go on. M. Maximov replied that before admitting that the Soviet censor was being too strict he must have copious examples of his methods to study, as also examples of the British censor's more liberal attitude. His impression was that, on the contrary, British papers and periodicals were highly critical of the Soviet Union, while Soviet papers and periodicals permitted themselves no criticism of their Allies. Mr. Lascelles undertook to supply material on both points. This he did in a letter repeating the points prescribed by the Foreign Office. As it was evident, however, that the Soviet Ambassador was playing for time, Mr. Lascelles added that in order to redress the present unequal balance pending a settlement of the controversy, he had authorised the British censor to hold up the release of certain Soviet publications which were unacceptable to the British authorities on the basis of a purely political censorship.

7. Another point of discord was that the Soviet censor, in the course of September took to vetoing practically all the material provided by the Polish Legation for their weekly broadcast on Tehran radio.

8. At the end of the period under review the Persian Prime Minister informed me that he was disturbed about the Soviet attitude and activities. For instance:—

- (a) The Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs had come to Tehran to request an oil concession for the Soviet Government in North Persia.
- (b) The Soviet Transport Organisation, "Transovtrans," was beginning to operate as though it were a commercial transport company, but was disregarding Persian transport regulations.
- (c) The Soviet authorities had still not given permission for additional Persian troops to go to Rezaieh, but instead had offered to help maintain order among the Kurds.
- (d) A Soviet hospital and school in Tabriz has been opened without the permission of the Persian Government having been asked. The school was allegedly for Soviet children only, but in point of fact Persian subjects were also accepted. Moreover, Turki was the main language and Persian only subsidiary.

(Please see also sections entitled "Economic Situation," "Transport" and "Oil Concessions" for further details of Russian penetration.)

#### *Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.*

9. The controversy with the Soviet authorities regarding the condemnation of publications on ideological grounds is described under the heading "Soviet Affairs."

10. The British authorities concerned are now considering what should happen to this censorship after Germany's defeat, and the British Director has



collected the views of the British organisations in Persia interested in the matter. The view of this embassy is that the interests of the security authorities concerned will be adequately safeguarded by a censorship covering telegrams and letters only. Probably, indeed, the censorship of letters could be abandoned without risk, since the only subjects likely to interest the Japanese are the movements of shipping in the Persian Gulf and sabotage of the oil-fields, and information on the former subject must be transmitted rapidly to be of any use. The embassy have, however, no great objection to the continuance of letter censorship from the political point of view, and it would have some theoretical justification as long as Turkey and Afghanistan continue to provide bases for Japanese diplomats. The embassy are particularly anxious, on the other hand, to abolish the political and ideological censorship of newspapers and periodicals, since this leads to Anglo-Russian friction.

#### *Aid to Russia.*

11. The month of July beat all records for tonnage delivered to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. August and September were also very heavy months, and in all cases the target plan figures for transport by rail and truck were exceeded.

In July the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation commenced to hand over its Lend-Lease trucks to United States Motor Transport Service and the balance of these Lend-Lease trucks were handed over in the latter half of August, leaving only the Persian contractors' vehicles, about 400, which are clearing up the small balance of Aid-to-Russia cargo left over at the end of September. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation have therefore ceased to lift Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' cargo and are awaiting final instructions from London to close down their truck operations both in Western and in Eastern Persia.

Owing to the small number of ships with Aid-to-Russia cargo arriving at Persian Gulf ports in October Basra will not discharge any of these ships and the British Army Vehicle Assembly Plant at Rafidiyah will cease to assemble imported vehicles for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The total target for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' cargo in October is considerably lower than for preceding months. This is no doubt due to the convoys by the northern route having started again under cover of the longer nights.

#### *Polish Affairs.*

12. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration took over the handling of the Polish evacuees from Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration during the period under review.

At the opening of the period there were about 6,800 Poles in Persia altogether. Early in July nearly 1,200 left for India and East Africa. About 100, mostly young girls, have left to join the Polish army. The total number at present in Persia is 5,440, of whom about 2,400 are in the Tehran area (800 being in the camp, the remainder in the town), 1,000 at Ahwaz, and just under 2,000 at the school at Isfahan. Some five months ago the New Zealand Government extended an invitation through the Polish Government for 700 children to come to New Zealand. After protracted discussion and a good deal of confusion and delay, this offer was accepted and 700 children escorted by 140 grown-ups left for New Zealand on the 2nd October.

Mr. Haluch, the delegate of the Ministry of Social Welfare, who was in charge of the refugees, was relieved of his duties with effect from the 1st September. His successor is a M. Pokladski, who is easy to deal with and not inefficient. The change has had a beneficial effect on the relations of the delegation with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and with the Polish community.

#### *Indian Affairs.*

13. The considerable interest in India aroused by the visit of the Persian Cultural Mission has been maintained and steps have been taken to place cultural relations between the two countries on a firmer basis by the creation of a Standing Committee in Tehran, which will have its counterpart in India and which will concern itself with the advancement of cultural relations of every kind between Persia and India. An offer by the Government of India of a series of scholarships for technical education of Persian students has been accepted by the Persian Government, and the grant of further scholarships for training in agriculture is under consideration. Arrangements have been completed for the deputation

of four Indian teachers of English to organise classes in Meshed, Kerman and Yazd and the teachers are on their way to take up their appointments. The demand for facilities for learning English is widespread, and the appointment of these Indian teachers should assist materially in an important activity which is primarily the concern of the British Council, but which, through lack of staff, they are unable to pursue adequately.

14. India's interest in the expansion of her post-war export trade is evidenced by the establishment of a Trade Commissioner in Tehran. The first Indian Trade Commissioner is expected to take up his duties in about two months' time.

15. The Indian community in the capital, having been purged of its most undesirable elements, is beginning to show a greater interest in the part which its members must play as ambassadors of their country, and their change of heart has been shown in the very generous contributions which the community has made to India's war effort, in the form of donations and investments in Government of India war bonds.

#### *Anglo-Persian Public Relations.*

16. Allied successes in Western Europe have created optimism as to the likelihood of an early peace. The fall in prices, towards the end of this period, resulting from the war news, has probably tended to make the man-in-the-street slightly less critical of British policy in Iran. Fear of possible Russian post-war designs against Persia have not been reflected in an any more liberal outlook towards Great Britain by the public or in the press, although it is no doubt hoped that Great Britain will restrain any aggressive designs by Russians against Persia.

17. The vernacular press, while preoccupied with internal problems, has given favourable notice to Allied successes. The left press and certain other minor papers have endeavoured to represent the efforts of the *mullas* to regain political power as being inspired by international capitalism and imperialist powers, but this appears to have had little effect on the more sober elements constituting public opinion. Their claims that the ground is being prepared for a new dictatorship by Seyyid Zia, under the tutelage of these same elements have perhaps received rather more credence. This propaganda tends to prejudice the public against Great Britain.

18. Mr. Savidge's period of secondment from the Government of India having come to an end, Mr. Graham took over the post of Director of Public Relations at the beginning of the period under review. Under Mr. Savidge the Bureau did better propaganda at a greatly diminished cost, and since even the Persian is now convinced that the Allies are going to win the war, it is considered that economies can continue to be made without harm to the interests of His Majesty's Government.

#### *Post-War Propaganda Policy of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.*

19. The probable early conclusion of hostilities in Europe has led to a reconsideration of propaganda policy in Persia. Emphasis has been laid on the need for greater concentration on such long-term matters as publicity for British and Commonwealth trade in the post-war period, and active steps have already been taken by the Government of India to implement this policy so far as India is concerned.

#### *British Council Activities.*

20. The departure of the Council's representative in Persia, Mr. Bingley, was the occasion of a farewell reception held at the Anglo-Persian Institute, Tehran. Over 500 members and students attended including representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet. Many tributes were paid to the work done by Mr. Bingley during his two years in Iran. Mr. C. H. Owen has been appointed representative.

21. The total number of books handled during the quarter exceeded 21,000. Open-air film shows at Tehran and the provinces at institutes, schools and sports organisations were attended by over 20,000 persons. Despite the hottest recorded summer in fifty years, summer courses were held in the Tehran Institute in



addition to the Alborz College evening classes. Twenty classes for 244 students were held at the Shemran Summer School outside Tehran. A soirée given by the Council in commemoration of Anton Tchekov was attended by the Russian Ambassador and other notabilities and the drama section produced a scene from *Hamlet* and *The Seagull* in the open-air theatre for the occasion. A production of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in the open air was an unqualified success, playing for two nights to over 600 people. Members of the Isfahan Institute totalled 424. Summer courses included a men's teachers' class and a class for hospital nurses. Teaching of Polish children was continued and English classes for the Armenian colony at Julfa have been started. Some 500 students have been enrolled and twenty classes started at the new Anglo-Persian Institute at Shiraz.

#### *Internal Politics and Majlis.*

22. The position of the Cabinet remained precarious throughout July and August, and it was only the absence of any general agreement as to who should succeed Sa'id that kept it in office. Several candidates were mentioned including Hajhir, Ardalan, Ahi, Soheily, Hussein Sami'i, and Qawam-es-Saltaneh. Our objections to the latter had previously been explained to the Shah, the then Prime Minister, and the Soviet Ambassador, and were made clear to an intermediary sent to this embassy in mid-August. It was generally considered that Seyyid Zia had too much opposition against him for his appointment to be possible. He himself was understood to favour the appointment of Hussein Sami'i with a team of young men.

23. The Cabinet started the period badly. Having first of all, at the behest of the Majlis, taken a strong line against Millspaugh, it eventually found itself explaining to the Majlis that it had agreed to keep him for another few months to see whether he could produce any results. The change of front by the Majlis majority appears to have been due as much to the reflection that since the Shah and the Russians both wanted Millspaugh removed there might be some value in him after all, as to the fear that the American Government might cut off supplies.

24. By the middle of August Majlis opinion had come round to the view that the best temporary solution would be for Sa'id to reshuffle his Cabinet. An interpellation which was to have taken place on the 17th August was accordingly postponed to the 28th August to enable him to make any changes he thought fit. In the interval Sa'id, after prolonged discussions, having obtained a promise of support from a coalition of eighty-five Deputies of the Mihaan, Ittehad-i-Milli and Azadi fractions, resigned on the 26th August and was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet.

25. The new Cabinet, chosen by Sa'id in consultation with his supporters in the Majlis, was presented to the Shah on the 31st August. Apart from the Prime Minister himself the only other member of the previous Cabinet to be included was Khalil Fahimi, Minister without Portfolio. Three other members of the new Cabinet, Baqir Kazimi, Allahyar Saleh and Muhammad Nariman, who became Ministers of Education, Justice and Communications respectively, had previously held Cabinet rank. Ali Asghar Zarinkafsh, Dr. Muhammad Nakhai and Muhammad Sururi, who had been satisfactory Under-Secretaries, were appointed Ministers of Finance, Commerce and Industry, and Interior, and Dr. Manuchihr Iqbal became Acting Minister of Health. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was given to a comparatively unknown official named Yusuf Mushar, and the Ministry of Agriculture was left vacant. The Prime Minister himself took over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, Governor-General of Fars, was offered the Ministry of War but after a visit to Tehran he refused.

26. Opposition to the new Cabinet was immediately encountered from the Tudeh party, who objected to the return of Sa'id, and from the Independents in the Majlis, who resented the fact that they had not been consulted. When Sa'id attempted on the 2nd September to introduce his Cabinet to the Majlis the Opposition elements absented themselves from the Chamber, with the result that the necessary quorum was lacking. Discussions lasting a fortnight followed before the Cabinet finally obtained its vote of confidence from the Majlis on the 17th September, 73 out of the 100 members present voting in its favour. Although Sa'id continued to enjoy the support of the coalition majority up to the end of September, the position of his Government remained unstable owing to the opposition of the Tudeh and the Russians. The Shah also was not favourably disposed to it because it contained none of his nominees.

27. During the period under review the Majlis itself spent little time on legislation, being more occupied with intrigue over the composition of Cabinets and the credentials of Deputies. Some excitement was caused in July by the rejection by a narrow majority of the credentials of a Tudeh-sponsored Deputy from Tabriz, the way having been prepared by the prior rejection of those of an independent Deputy who headed the poll. The rejection of Pishavari's credentials was greeted with a storm of criticism in the Tudeh press; there was considerable agitation in Tabriz and the acting Soviet Consul-General expressed his displeasure. The excitement was short lived, however, and by the end of August there was general indifference in Tabriz to the fate of the Soviet-supported Deputies. The credentials of the other Communist Deputies of Azerbaijan who were elected with the support of the Russians have not yet come up for examination, but it is possible that they too will be rejected by a Majlis emboldened by its success in rejecting Pishavari, though the Soviet Embassy are working hard to prevent this.

28. Elections have not yet been completed at Abadeh and Rey. New elections are due for two Tabriz seats, for Darajiz and for Lar, where the death of Azadi has left a vacancy. The credentials of Dr. Falsafi, Deputy for Gorgan, were accepted by the Majlis. The number of Deputies so far elected whose credentials have not been rejected by the Majlis is 128.

29. There was some party activity during the period under review. From the 1st-12th August the Tudeh party held its first general conference at Tehran. Decisions were taken to tighten up party discipline, purge the membership, and set up an Inspection Committee, to deal with disciplinary matters and watch the Central Committee of the party. The resolutions passed confirmed the hostility of the party to Seyyid Zia, all foreign advisers, and the grant of economic concessions "which constrict or weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation," such as presumably the grant of new oil concessions to American or British companies.

30. The President of the Majlis, Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, enlarged his Majlis group into a party entitled "Mardum" (people), which adopted as its programme union in the defence of true constitutional and democratic Government. A party called "Kar" (work) was formed by Dr. Musharraf Nafisi; it had a lengthy programme of good intentions but its real aim seemed to be to promote its founder's candidature for the post of Prime Minister, an ambition which has little chance of being realised in view of Dr. Nafisi's unpopularity in the Majlis.

31. Towards the end of August efforts to form a Government majority in the Majlis appeared at last to be successful. Some eighty-five Deputies of the three fractions, the Mihaan, the Azadi, and the Ittehad-i-Milli (which is more or less identical with the Mardum group) agreed to combine to support Sa'id's reconstituted Cabinet. The coalition thus formed survived, rather surprisingly up to the end of September, in spite of the efforts of the Tudeh and the Russians to break it up.

32. The death of the ex-Shah, on the 26th July, caused no grief except in the Pahlavi family circle, and the present Shah was much criticised on the grounds that the mourning which he ordered was too elaborate. Some papers criticised Reza Shah's work and régime severely, and no section of the press made any attempt to reach a balanced appraisal of his life and work. The Tudeh party publicly dissociated themselves from any mourning (many of their leaders had been imprisoned by the ex-Shah), and expelled from their party one of their Deputies who had attended a mourning ceremony.

33. Seyyid Zia, however, took the opportunity to attempt to establish better relations with the Shah and called specially to condole. The effect was somewhat spoiled by violent criticism of the ex-Shah in *Rad-i-Imruz*, which is regarded as the Seyyid's paper. Signs were, however, not lacking that the Shah's hostility to Seyyid Zia was decreasing, and by the end of August a definite reconciliation appeared to have been effected. After several interviews a considerable measure of agreement was believed to have been reached between them, and the Shah spoke of Seyyid Zia as a man with whom it should be possible to work. The Shah's attitude was undoubtedly influenced by his realisation that the Tudeh were not to be appeased, and by increasing fears of Soviet intentions in Azerbaijan, with the consequent need for a strong man to arrest the deterioration in the political situation. After considering all other possible candidates, including Taqizadeh, who was thought to be unwilling to accept the task, and Ahi, who could not be spared from Moscow, the Shah appeared to be coming to the conclusion that he might perhaps be well advised to make use of the vigorous personality of Seyyid



Zia in an effort to stand up to the Russians. When the reconciliation became known Seyyid Zia's stock rose in Tehran, but there were many who doubted whether the Shah's professed desire to co-operate with him was genuine.

34. The Persian Ambassadors in London, Angora, Moscow and Cairo were summoned to Tehran for consultation with their Government on post-war problems concerning Persia. The two former arrived in September. Majid Ahi did not come from Moscow as he was said to be too ill to travel, and Jam has not yet arrived from Cairo. In many quarters hopes were expressed that Taqizadeh might prove to be the man to take charge of his country's fortunes in her present hour of need, but Taqizadeh is apparently anxious to return to London.

#### *Tribal Situation.*

35. The tribes of Fars, except for some fighting between sections of the Boir Ahmadi, have remained remarkably quiet during the period under review. Brigandage is endemic in Fars, but incidents have been rarer than usual; and few can be attributed to the Qashgai. There has also been an absence of the usual summer raiding by Boir Ahmadi across the Abadeh-Isfahan road and into the district of Yazd. Some credit for the unusual order prevailing may fairly be given to the influence of British officials and to the belief that British influence in Tehran will be used in favour of these tribes who have not misbehaved. The pact of friendship to which reference was made in my despatch under reference between Qavam ul Mulk and Nasir Qashgai, later joined by Morteza Quli Khan, the Bakhtiari Governor of Bakhtiari, has also contributed to peace by removing, for the time being at least, some of the causes of unrest that lay in long-standing mutual antagonisms. This pact has been represented as an alliance of the tribes of the south. It is hardly that, since Qavam-ul Mulk, although still retaining some influence among the Khamseh tribes, cannot be said to be a tribal leader; he is concerned mainly with the protection against the Qashgai of the remaining interests of his family in Fars. We are, of course, suspected of having fathered the pact as part of a plan to form a zone of British influence in the south in opposition to the supposedly increasing influence of the Russian-inspired Tudeh party.

36. The Boir Ahmadi tribes of Kuh-i-Galu are at loggerheads with each other. Since unity between these turbulent tribes usually means trouble for their neighbours, it is no bad thing in present circumstances that they should work off their pugnacity on each other, provided that disturbance can be restricted to the limits of their own territory. The present quarrels arise from the high-handed actions of Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, a chief of the tribe, an absconder from Persian detention in Tehran and a close associate of Nasir Qashgai, who has been attempting to impose himself as paramount chief and to seize land claimed by other chiefs. The opposition to him is being encouraged by Persian officials, but, in view of Abdullah Khan's association with Nasir Qashgai, the necessity for caution has been impressed on the Persian Government lest the Qashgai should be driven to intervene, involving other tribes in Fars hostile to them and so extending disorder beyond the limits of the Boir Ahmadi country.

37. In Bakhtiari rumblings of discontent against Morteza Quli Khan have continued, but peace has been maintained. Some rather futile operations were carried out by the Persian army for the disarmament of the Moghui and Mamivand sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari, most of whom lie outside the limits of Morteza Quli Khan's jurisdiction. Some arms were collected, but, it seems, mostly from the settled elements of the tribes, and the Mamivand nomads remain in possession of some 2,000-2,500 rifles.

38. In Khuzestan the operation for the disarmament of the disorderly Arabs of the Ahu Dasht area, which was referred to in my last despatch, was completed by the Persian forces with unusual efficiency and creditable moderation. In all, some 1,000 rifles were collected. A number of Arabs were arrested, and seven of them were hanged, with good effect on the Arabs in general, who did not question the justice of the punishment. Both civil and military Persian officials in Khuzestan are insistent that advantage should be taken of the mood induced in the Arabs by this display of Persian authority to extend the collection of arms, of which there are estimated still to be some 6,000-7,000 in Khuzestan, to other Arab tribes; and they are confident that, given a suitable show of force, the collection can be made without opposition. Since it is important for the post-war security of Khuzestan, and particularly of the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, that the number of unlicensed rifles

in the hands of the Arabs should be reduced, I have raised no objection to the Bani Turuf being summoned to surrender their arms. My information, admittedly somewhat conjectural, is that they are likely to make some show of complying.

39. Kurdistan, particularly that part of it that lies within the Russian zone of occupation in Persia, has been causing the Persian Government increasing anxiety. Reports, probably exaggerated, have been reaching Tehran of Russian encouragement of Kurdish aspirations to autonomy. Persian suspicions of Russian designs have been intensified by the refusal of the Russians to allow the Persian Government to maintain in Azerbaijan forces of sufficient strength to take effective action against Kurdish lawlessness. The popular theory in Persian circles is that on the withdrawal of Russian troops the Kurds will be incited to launch out on a campaign of pillaging which the Persian authorities will be unable to suppress; the people of Azerbaijan will then appeal to the Soviet Government to come to their protection. So that they can play their part in this plan, the Kurds must be protected against Persian attempts to subdue or disarm them.

40. The alleged movement for Kurdish independence is reported to be directed, as far as Persian Kurdistan is concerned, by a Kurdish notable, Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad. He is supposed to be in alliance with Hama Rashid of Baneh, and both are reported to have received visits from Soviet officials. Hama Rashid was in rebellion against the Persian Government in 1942 and was successful in wresting from them a settlement which left him in effective control of the Baneh district, with no semblance of Persian authority, and with a subsidy nominally for the maintenance of order. For some time past some Persian authorities have held the view that the autonomous position secured by Hama Rashid was a dangerous encouragement to Kurdish aspirations; and they have been considering the advisability of establishing, by force if necessary, an administration in Baneh with some outward evidence of Persian Government authority. My advice was that any such measure should be preceded or accompanied by an announcement of Government policy and some concrete evidence of an intention to provide some benefits to the Kurdish tribes. Hama Rashid, however, played into the hands of the Persian General Staff, who were the principal advocates of a forward policy, by attacking the village of Merivan, the headquarters of another Kurdish chief whom the Persian Government had voluntarily put into a position similar to that occupied by Hama Rashid at Baneh. The Persian Government accepted the view that this was a direct challenge to their authority, and they ordered the despatch of a column to expel Hama Rashid's followers from Merivan. This has been accomplished with little or no opposition. At the end of the period under review operations were being initiated for the occupation of Baneh, though there are Persians in and outside the Government who are averse from provoking the Kurds at present.

#### *Persian Land Forces.*

41. The army has made little progress. There is perhaps a slight improvement in morale, due to a few minor operations having been carried out without disaster, and corruption and embezzlement are less in evidence. The Government has not as yet decided on a policy as regards its forces, and the size of both the army and gendarmerie is considerably above what can be efficiently maintained on the funds available. In both forces there is much discontent and among the better officers a feeling of despair and of disappointment at the failure of the American advisers to effect any lasting reforms. General Ridley now takes a very restricted view of the scope of his mission, much narrower than he is authorised to do by the terms of his engagement. His influence is less and less in evidence. The activities of his mission are now limited to matters of transport, of supply and to giving unheeded advice about the medical services. His scheme for the centralised training of recruits has been abandoned after a limited and unhappy trial. He says that his task, which he now interprets as little more than the organisation of systems of supply, transport and accounting, will be finished in a few months. If, however, he could be persuaded that his task is not only to inaugurate a system but to remain long enough to see it firmly established, the effect would, I feel sure, be quickly evident.

42. The forceful personality of General Razmara, the Chief of the Staff, in contrast with the inertia of the Government is pushing the army into greater prominence in the affairs of the provinces, particularly in tribal areas. He is



shamelessly filling all important appointments with his own friends; his self-confidence and his ambition increase, but he is, I think genuinely, anxious to co-operate with us for the present.

43. Colonel Schwarzkopf continues to work with great energy, and regrettably little visible result. Encouraged by some Deputies and other influential persons who would like to see the gendarmerie established in a more important position than the army, he aims at an organisation which he estimates would require three years to build up and whose cost would be justifiable only if the army were reduced to a small striking force. However desirable that might be, it does not seem to be realisable in the near future; and it is the efficiency of the gendarmerie in the near future that is of primary interest to us. Towards that very little progress is evident. But it is reasonable to expect that Colonel Schwarzkopf's energy and drive will produce results in time. Handicapped as he is by inadequate funds, inadequate American staff, the lack of any co-ordinated policy on the part of the Government and an unwillingness on his part to admit that the best may sometimes be the enemy of the good, he could perhaps not fairly be expected to have effected much improvement in the time in an organisation as demoralised, as lethargic and as lacking in any laudable ideal as the Persian gendarmerie.

#### *Persian Air Force.*

44. The fifteen Anson aircraft have now been delivered but, as the air force has virtually no petrol, little use is being made of them.

45. The Persian Air Attaché in London, Sarhang Bayendor, is in Tehran discussing His Majesty's Government's offer to sell Hurricane aircraft to the Persian Air Force and to provide training facilities for Persian officers.

46. Sarlashkar Nakchevan has now been in charge of the air force for some two months producing no noticeable change in its efficiency. He talks good sense about present and future policy, but there is little reason to hope that his practice will be as good as his precept.

#### *Civil Airlines.*

47. None of the three Dominies ordered by the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones for the State Airline has yet been delivered. In consequence the airline has been obliged to discontinue its one service between Tehran and Bagdad, while its sole remaining aircraft undergoes annual overhaul.

48. There is considerable interest in future civil airlines. A powerful group, including Sarlashkar Nakhchevan, G. H. Ebtehaj (Mayor of Tehran and Director of "Irantour," the Persian tourist agency), an independent Deputy called Panahi and a merchant, Kooros, is talking about separating the State airline from Government control and setting up a commercial company for which they hope to obtain the Government mail contract. Representatives of British Overseas Airways Corporation have recently visited Tehran to discuss the possibilities of British co-operation in Persian air transport.

49. Meanwhile the Russians continue to operate their internal services. They have had one serious accident in which a British officer was among those killed.

#### *Finance.*

50. The new Minister of Finance, Zarinkafsh, is a considerable improvement on his predecessor. In particular, he seems far more prepared than his predecessor to co-operate with Dr. Millspaugh.

51. The budget for the year 1323 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944) has been under consideration by the Budgetary Commission of the Majlis for some months past, and has not yet been before the Majlis itself. According to the present figures, revenue and expenditure under the ordinary budget are estimated at 3,958 and 4,569 million rials respectively; and revenue and expenditure under the commercial budget at 6,367 and 5,755 million. No figures of revenue or expenditure for the current year have yet been published, but the financial counsellor is informed that for the first five months of the year, i.e., up to the 22nd August, they have been as follows. The figures for the same months in the preceding year are given for comparison.

#### *Ordinary Budget.*

	(Millions of rials.)	
	1322.	1323.
Revenue ... ..	1534	1170
Expenditure ... ..	1349	1317

#### *Commercial Budget.*

	(Millions of rials.)	
	1322.	1323.
Revenue ... ..	1169	1911
Expenditure ... ..	1382	1867

52. In the meantime, as the budget has not yet been approved by the Majlis, expenditure has been financed by votes on account; sometimes, however, passed so late that the salaries due to the unhappy Government servants have been in arrear. It is impossible, of course, at the present stage, to make any forecast of the out-turn for the year as a whole. Revenue is behind-hand because of the delay in passing the income tax regulations, and it appears quite certain that the estimate of 885 million rials from this source for the year will not be reached. At the present time the Government have only been able to tide over their difficulties by obtaining an advance of £770,000 from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in respect of royalties, and the exchequer is in debit nearly up to the limit of its authorised overdraft of 500 millions with the National Bank. Similarly, the municipalities are in financial difficulty; the 3 per cent. tax on goods coming into their areas was abolished as from the end of the last financial year, and has been replaced by a surtax on the income tax, which they have not yet received. They have been given short-term loans amounting in all to 36 million rials from the funds of the National Bank.

53. During the quarter the price index has gone down slightly. The cost of living figure, which was 1,124 in May, was 1,122 in June, 1,100 in July, 1,121 in August, and 1,095 in September (1936=100). Note circulation, which was 6,261 million rials in June, was 6,235 million in July and 6,125 million in August.

54. Sales of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government were high in the first part of the quarter, having amounted to 56 million rials in the four weeks ending the 27th July, and 92 million in the five weeks ending the 31st August. Since then sales have declined substantially. In the weeks ending the 7th and 14th September they were 1.2 and 1.6 million rials respectively. In the week ending the 21st September they were 35,840 rials only. This decline is clearly the result of the course of the war. The price has been reduced in the hope of stimulating sales.

55. A delegation, led by A. H. Ebtehaj, the governor of the National Bank, was sent by the Government to the International Financial and Monetary Conference at Bretton Woods during July. The contribution of Persia to the stabilisation fund was fixed at 25 million dollars, and its contribution to the capital of the bank at 24 million dollars. These contributions, of course, require ratification by the Majlis.

56. As was expected at the time the last report was written, the United States Government have declared that they do not wish to be a signatory to the agreement for the operation of the Persian railway system, which will therefore, when the time comes, be signed by the British, Russian and Persian Governments only. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are, however, still delaying their decisions on two points of detail arising on the draft agreement, and it is impossible for the Russian and British Missions in Tehran to present it to the Persian authorities until these points have been settled. The continued delay is most unfavourable.

#### *Economic Situation.*

57. At the end of the quarter wholesale prices had fallen, in the case of some commodities quite considerably, so that even a number of bankruptcies were reported from different parts of the country; but this was almost certainly more the result of the war news than of measures applied by Dr. Millspaugh or any other authority. Retail prices showed little signs of following suit and the shops are plainly determined to extract the last penny from the long-suffering



public. As part of the general effort to oust the Millspaugh Mission, the Sa'ed Cabinet, before it fell in August, approved a proposal to set up a Supreme Economic Council to advise the Government on those matters that are at present the responsibility of the mission. More recently the press reported that the Government, this time in agreement with Dr. Millspaugh, were preparing a Bill to modify his powers. In accordance with popular demand, Dr. Millspaugh in July appointed Dr. Black, Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Department, his deputy for economic affairs and Mr. Pixley, of the Treasury-General, his deputy for financial affairs. Mr. Lamb, head of the Price Stabilisation Section, resigned following a serious difference with Dr. Millspaugh and his department has been abolished.

58. An American, Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, has taken over the post of Chief Representative in Persia of the Middle East Supply Centre and Foreign Economic Administration (*i.e.*, Lend-Lease), and the latter organisation has at last joined forces completely with the Middle East Supply Centre. Stocks of the most essential imported commodities, as well indeed of most others, were adequate for the country's basic needs, and the shortages that occurred were the result of inefficient distribution or lack of transport facilities. Distribution, Dr. Millspaugh's main task in recent months, improved slightly, especially as regards pharmaceuticals, but still fell short of what was required.

59. Russian economic penetration is increasing, particularly in the northern provinces. Once again the Soviets are trying to impose an inequitable bargain on the Persian Government in connexion with the purchase of rice in the north. The Russians continue to sell cotton piece-goods, sugar (believed to be lend-lease) and other goods on the open market for what they will fetch, and still show no signs of wishing to co-operate with the other Allies on supply matters. Nothing more has been heard from them about the proposal to set up with the Persians a Higher Supply Committee to co-ordinate civil supplies for this country.

#### *Cereals and Agricultural Development.*

60. The grain situation in the country as a whole was satisfactory at the end of September. Total stocks held on the 22nd September amounted to 109,905 tons, and the grain available in the Tehran Silo constituted sixty-four days' supply for the capital. The current harvest is generally satisfactory and no shortage of grain is expected during the coming winter. The difficulty of making available a sufficient quantity of seed-wheat for deficit areas of the Persian Gulf littoral has been partly overcome by the provision of 1,000 tons of seed at reasonable rates by the Government of India.

61. Various projects for the development of agriculture in the country, chiefly by the construction of irrigation works, have been under consideration by the Central Government. Requests for supplies of machinery and other equipment for these projects have led to the deputation by the Middle East Supply Centre of two experts to enquire into the soundness of the schemes and the need for the plant demanded. Such investigation is very necessary in order to prevent the initiation of projects such as the Hamidiyah Farm scheme in Khuzistan which are fundamentally unsound and which have little hope of proving successful.

#### *Transport.*

62. Railway traffic on the Trans-Iranian Railway was adequate for civil needs in spite of the great volume of aid-to-Russia goods carried northwards. Oil stocks for civil consumption remained adequate throughout the country. Road transport was still precarious and was maintained at its comparatively low level of efficiency only by the unremitting efforts of the Persian Government's Road Transport Administration, which has a number of American and British staff. Vehicles belonging to the Road Transport Administration are wearing out quicker than they are being replaced, in spite of the arrival so far this year of over 200 new trucks. The arrival and distribution of a large consignment of spare parts has, however, eased the position temporarily. Lack of passenger cars is greatly hampering the work of the administration, but the Government still do not appear to be strong enough to mobilise private cars, which still tour the country in considerable numbers.

63. In this sphere also the Russians are pursuing their own designs regardless of anybody else. Iransovtrans, the Soviet transport agency, are

opening up in those parts of the country accessible to them, with the intention of competing for ordinary civil traffic with the Road Transport Administration; this on trucks and tyres supplied under lease-lend for war purposes!

#### *Oil Concessions.*

64. In paragraph 22 (b) of my despatch No. 156 of the 6th April, I mentioned that the Standard Vacuum Company and the Shell Group—backed by the American and British Governments respectively—were competing for oil concessions in Persia. (To them was later added the American Sinclair Company.) His Majesty's Government agreed at an early stage with the United States Government that neither would put pressure on the Persian Government, and His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to support the Shell Group but not to go further than was usual on behalf of reputable British interests and not to go further than United States Embassy. Late in June His Majesty's Government expressed disappointment regarding the delay in reaching a decision and this embassy replied that the situation involved three fundamental points: (a) whether the Persian Government intended to grant a concession before the end of the war; (b) whether on political grounds they would prefer to increase the British stake in this country; and (c) what basis for the grant of a concession would be most attractive to them. As to (a), the Persian Government's difficulty was apprehension as to the attitude of the Russians towards the grant of an oil concession. As to (b), there were conflicting views and it was difficult to judge which would prevail. As to (c), Persian statesmen, always timorous and suspicious, were particularly so in this case, where they felt that in technical matters they were at a disadvantage. The Persian Government had stated that they must have the advice of Dr. Millspaugh on the terms offered and Dr. Millspaugh had recommended the engagement of technical advisers. These technical advisers, Messrs. Hoover and Curtice—who are directors of an American firm which specialises in giving disinterested advice to Governments on the merits of proposed oil concessions—arrived in July. The Persian Government then settled down to examine the various proposals thoroughly in collaboration with a Committee whose members the Government—subsequently alarmed by the suspicious reaction of the Majlis towards concession hunting—continually increased in an endeavour to cover themselves from every angle. On the 22nd September the Foreign Office observed to this embassy that the United States Embassy were giving the American companies considerably greater support than the Foreign Office had supposed. It might be doubtful whether this support was to the ultimate advantage of the American companies concerned, but it justified His Majesty's Government in giving more active support to the Shell Group should prompt and active intervention be required.

65. Meanwhile, however, the whole matter had been put into the melting pot owing to the arrival, a few days earlier, from Moscow, of M. Kavtaradze, an Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, with the scarifying request that the Persian Government should permit the Soviet Government to prospect for oil for five years in North Persia and then to take up a concession in such areas as they might select. The Persian Government were still considering the matter at the end of the period under review, with a strong inclination towards postponing the grant of any oil concessions until after the war.

#### *Locust Control.*

66. Throughout the quarter under review Persia was virtually free of locusts. The hopper campaign during May in Laristan prevented the development of Desert (*i.e.*, migrating) Locust swarms, and apart from one or two small bands which crossed and re-crossed to the Indo-Persian frontier no Desert Locusts entered the country. The final report on the Moroccan (*i.e.*, non-migrating) Locust campaign, which was received in July, states that Persian and Soviet parties in Azerbaijan and Gorgan prevented serious damage to crops, but were unable to forestall widespread egg-laying. The eggs will hatch in spring 1945 and preparations are being made for an extensive campaign with Soviet participation.

67. Judging from Indian reports there is every prospect that no Desert Locust swarms will invade Persia from the east during the coming winter. However, the Chief Locust Officer of the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (who visited Tehran in September) expects a considerable influx of swarms from Africa into



Arabia during the autumn of 1944 and preparations will have to be made to protect Persia against invasion from that direction at the beginning of 1945. The extent of possible British assistance has yet to be fixed.

68. Copies of this despatch are going to the Minister-Resident in Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow, to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

[E 6882/54/34]

No. 16.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th November.)

(No. 410.)

Sir,

Tehran, 26th October, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 283 E. of the 9th July, 1944, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report by the financial counsellor to this mission on the Persian financial situation.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 16.

PERSIA.

Financial Situation.

1. The present report brings up to date my report of the 3rd July (enclosed with despatch No. 283 E. of the 9th July, 1944) on the financial situation in Persia.

#### Public Finance.

2. Revised figures have been issued by the Government for the out-turn of the financial year 1943-44 (*i.e.*, the Persian year 1322, beginning on the 21st March, 1943); and the deficit for the year is now given as 1,052 million rials instead of 1,372 million as stated in my last report. The detailed figures are as follows:—

Ordinary budget—				Million rials.
Revenue	...	...	...	3,377
Expenditure	...	...	...	3,215
Surplus	...	...	...	162
Commercial budget—				
Revenue	...	...	...	3,141
Expenditure	...	...	...	4,355
Deficit	...	...	...	1,214
Total Revenue	...	...	...	6,518
Total Expenditure	...	...	...	7,570
Deficit	...	...	...	1,052

The earlier figures had included the profits from the tobacco and opium monopolies under the heading of expenditure.

3. Even though seven months of the current financial year have passed, the budget is still under consideration of the Budgetary Commission of the Parliament, and has not yet been before Parliament itself: although the commission has endeavoured to accelerate its deliberations by the threat of stopping the salaries of the Ministers and senior officials of those departments which are dilatory in supplying the budgetary details which it requires. This threat has, however,

been partly discounted by the fact that the monthly votes on account, on which the Government have been subsisting, have on some occasions been passed too late for Government salaries to be paid punctually in any case. Moreover, the supplements to official salaries in order to meet the full increase in the cost of living are only to be paid if the money can be made available from savings on the departmental budgets.

4. The civil service has, however, other methods of compensating itself. The Minister of Justice recently informed the Prime Minister that the amounts involved in corruption cases, in which Government servants were concerned, reached a total of 650 million rials (nearly 5 million sterling). This figure is equivalent to over one-sixth of the revenue under the ordinary budget for the past financial year.

5. Revenue and expenditure for the first six months of the year 1944-45 have been as follows. Figures for the corresponding months of 1943-44 are given for comparison:—

	1943-44.	1944-45.
	(million rials.)	
Ordinary Revenue	1,843	1,333
Ordinary Expenditure	1,445	1,479
Surplus	398	Deficit 146
Commercial Revenue	1,430	2,516
Commercial Expenditure	1,537	2,318
Deficit	107	Surplus 198

The higher figures under the commercial budget compared with last year are due to increased purchases and sales of food-stuffs and other goods; not to any increased activity in the Government-owned factories.

6. It is not yet possible, however, to make any reliable forecast of the out-turn for the year. The budget as prepared (see paragraph 5 of my report of the 3rd July) showed a small deficit on the Ordinary and a small surplus on the Commercial Accounts (611 and 612 million respectively), *i.e.*, the budget was, in effect, in balance. Dr. Millspaugh at the moment expects no deficit, or only a small one; but receipts from direct taxation will almost certainly be below the estimate. At the present time the Government are embarrassed financially owing to these receipts for the earlier part of the year not having come up to expectation, and have only been able to pay their way by obtaining an advance on royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company; but income tax receipts should increase materially in the coming months. There remain, however, the difficulties in collecting full revenue from that part of Persia, and by far the richest part, occupied by the U.S.S.R.

7. The municipalities are similarly embarrassed, since the 3 per cent. tax on goods entering their areas was abolished at the end of last year and the 10 per cent. surtax on income tax payments which was to replace it has not yet come in. They are being assisted by short-term loans from the Central Government to an amount of 36 million rials, the loan in the case of Tehran being 9 million. Much effective work is being done by the American financial directors in the provincial districts. In one instance taxation receipts have gone up by nearly two and a half times as a result of more efficiency and less corruption in collection. The municipal authorities need considerable guidance in financial affairs; they are liable to produce a draft budget in which often as much as 80 per cent., and sometimes the full 100 per cent., of revenue is taken up by the salaries of officials and other staff.

8. Some six weeks ago, among other Cabinet changes, M. Ferochar was succeeded as Minister of Finance by M. Zarrinkafsh. Although M. Zarrinkafsh could not be called a strong man, he is a great improvement on his predecessor. He has served in London and Washington as well as on the Continent, and has a wider knowledge of the world; and, more important, the relations between him and Dr. Millspaugh are excellent. He deplores the high percentage of expenditure (25 per cent.) on the army, that maladministered and useless body, when, as a result, services such as agriculture, public health and education are starved—although this year a beginning is, it is hoped, to be made with a system of compulsory education. How far, however, he or Dr. Millspaugh can succeed in redressing the present lack of proportion in the expenditure on the different Government services is another matter.

[30547]



### Banking, Currency, Price Indices.

9. The following figures show the amount of notes in circulation and of bank deposits over the last three years and in recent months:—

	Notes.	Deposits.
	(million rials.)	
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	1,222
June 1943	4,070	4,553
June 1944	6,262	8,753
July 1944	6,234	8,933
August 1944	6,125	8,511
September 1944	6,215	8,388

10. The following are the index figures, prepared by the National Bank, for wholesale prices and the cost of living over the same period:—

	Wholesale Prices.	Cost of Living.
	(1939 = 100.)	
June 1941	141	145
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	629
June 1944	513	850
July 1944	507	846
August 1944	534	855
September 1944	506	796

The reasons for which the cost-of-living figures have outstripped those for wholesale prices were given in paragraph 10 of my report of the 3rd July.

11. The recent fall in prices has been due in part to improvements in distribution, but mainly to the favourable course of the war, and apart from possible seasonal causes it may be expected to continue. Until about a month ago the fall in wholesale prices was not reflected in the retail market, since the retailer, although he could now buy more cheaply, was unwilling to deplete the huge gains which he had made in the past by foregoing previous rates of profit on stocks in hand. There are now signs that he is bowing to the inevitable, with the exception for the moment of the important semi-industrial district of Isfahan. A certain number of bankruptcies are to be expected, but according to the most recent reports of bankers through the country no immediate economic dislocation is likely; although a sudden ending of the European war at the present juncture and an attendant steep decline in the price level might well result in a crisis of considerable severity.

12. As stated in the last report, the proceeds of the sale of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government amounted to £3.9 million up to the end of June 1944. For the period from the 1st July to the 15th October they were £1.6 million. During this period fluctuations in sales have been considerable, owing partly to the war news and partly to an interruption in the smuggling traffic into Iraq by the temporary arrest of some prospective smugglers. It is estimated that at the present time gold to the value of some £150,000 a week is leaving Persia for Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These sales of gold have had no important effect in combating inflation in Persia, but are useful in providing rials at a cheaper rate than that of 128 to the £1 fixed under the financial agreement with the Persian Government.

### The Future.

13. When, by agreement with the Persian Government, Dr. Millspaugh withdrew his resignation last July he informed the Government that he expected within a few months to be able to show more palpable results than had been possible so far. A week or two ago he addressed a letter to the Prime Minister, which was also published in the press, to the effect that—

- (1) Every possible action had been taken to obtain adequate imports.
- (2) Prices are falling.
- (3) Distribution and transport have steadily improved.
- (4) Persia has the largest stocks of grain in its history.
- (5) Revenue has greatly increased.
- (6) Sound plans for the post-war period are in hand.

14. In the meantime, fair consideration of this letter has been obscured by one of Dr. Millspaugh's characteristic errors of judgment. In my last report (paragraph 17) I referred to the unveiled hostility between M. Ibtihaj, the governor of the National Bank, and himself. Some weeks ago Dr. Millspaugh requested that his staff be permitted to examine certain of the bank's accounts. M. Ibtihaj refused, whereupon Dr. Millspaugh wrote to him dismissing him from his position. The Council of Ministers decided by a majority vote (M. Zarrinkafsh voting with the minority) that Dr. Millspaugh had exceeded his powers and that his dismissal of M. Ibtihaj was invalid. Whether or not Dr. Millspaugh was within his powers is doubtful; but there is no doubt that his action was high-handed, most inexpedient politically, and is likely to have a lasting effect on his credit in the country. It is such ill-judged actions on his part that make it sometimes difficult for the American Embassy and this embassy to give him full support. On the other side of the scales, his position has to some extent been improved by a recent letter from President Roosevelt to the Shah in which, to all accounts, the President commended the work which the American Mission is doing.

15. The statement of the present economic position given in Dr. Millspaugh's letter to the Prime Minister is accurate enough—except that revenue has not "greatly increased." But the improvement in the situation is in fact due to the development of the war in Europe to a greater extent than to the efforts of the mission. There are still many difficulties ahead; revenue from income tax will fall greatly short of the estimates; all idea of raising an internal loan has had to be abandoned, largely owing to the high rates of interest current in the country generally; plans to cushion an eventual sharp fall in prices and to relieve post-war unemployment are not yet formulated.

16. Two other matters, mainly involving finance, are understood to be in hand. One is a detailed statement of claims on the part of the Persian Government for what the Shah in a recent speech called quite seriously the immense sacrifices endured by Persia during the war and her incalculable assistance to the Allied cause. The other is a document to be laid in due course before the Peace Conference setting out Persia's claims for compensation in general. Both no doubt will be drafted with a practised eye on the procedure of bazaar negotiation.

17. It may well be that Dr. Millspaugh will have left Persia before these documents see the light. He is at the moment anxious to leave in February 1945, when he will have completed two years as Administrator-General of the Finances, and to train his successor during the interval. This successor may be one of the additional staff whom he hopes shortly to import from the United States; or it may be Dr. Black, who is at present his deputy in charge of distribution, but, in the view of some people at least, has hardly proved himself adequate to fill the higher position. Plainly it will be necessary when the times comes not merely to find the right man, but to ensure that his powers are sufficient. Persia at the present time is entirely unfitted to cope unaided with its post-war problems; and His Majesty's Government is not without its share of responsibility in having, although of necessity, made more difficult the task of a Government which, it was known, could not govern competently even in normal times.

E. N. R. TRENTHAM,  
Financial Counsellor.

Tehran, 23rd October, 1944.

(\*) Unless the commercial budget, which is irrelevant for this purpose, is taken into account (see the figures in paragraph 5 of this report).

(\*) Ordinary rate 11 per cent. per annum; bazaar rates 15-30 per cent. per annum.

[E 7088/1175/G]

No. 17.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th November.)

(No. 1199.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 15th November, 1944.

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 14721 to the India Office. I think it would be unwise either to increase the strength of our patrols in East Persia or to send them further north than at present. Russians would always be able and ready to outplay us at that game. On the other hand I favour the retention of patrols in spite of their aid to Russia on that side since otherwise the Russians might be tempted to fill the vacuum.

[30547]

F 2



2. I agree with the views expressed in paragraph 3. The recent extension of medical assistance by mobile dispensaries based on consulates [sic] should have a good influence.

3. Nothing but the removal of Russian troops from Khorassan will effect any important improvement in the situation. We must seize the earliest possible moment to reduce to the narrowest limits the area occupied by our troops and must endeavour to ensure that the Russians do the same. It will be interesting to see in what area or areas they consider it essential to retain troops. Perhaps it will be 216,000 square kilom. in which they wish to prospect or 150,000 square kilom. which I understand they would like to exploit for oil eventually. I hope for our part at least we are already beginning to plan for the speediest and most comprehensive reduction possible of area in which we are obliged (if we are obliged) to keep troops until the end of the war with Japan.

[E 7595/1175/G]

No. 18.

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)

(No. 854. Secret.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 18th December, 1944.

I AM arranging for the question of future use of the Persian corridor as supply route to Russia to be examined as soon as possible by the Allied Supplies Executive. The object is to determine how soon this route can be closed down without detriment to Allied war effort and Executive are being asked to take into account possibility of diversion of traffic to other routes. You will, however, appreciate that question is not simple, involving as it does such factors as ability (not yet confirmed) of Black Sea ports to handle cargo now sent via Persian Gulf; possibility of supplying Russia with petroleum products from some other source than Abadan; and possible diversions of cargo from Far East to Persian Gulf in the event of Russia's entering into war against Japan.

2. I think it would be best to defer discussion with local military and air authorities until result of Allied Supplies Executive's examination is known and a closer forecast can be made of date by which Persian supply route may be expected to close.

3. I am very conscious of need for earliest possible decision on this question and will keep you informed of developments.

#### (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

[E 6052/422/34]

No. 19.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th October.)

(No. 374.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 36 for the period of the 18th-24th September, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 25th September, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36, Secret, for the Period the 18th-24th September, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

1. The Government obtained its vote of confidence, but it has neither confidence in itself nor has it the confidence of the public. Its existence depends on the continued unity of the three Majlis groups, who are its supporters, and on its compliance with the dictates of those combined groups. It has not gained

in public esteem by the refusal of General Firuz to accept the Ministry for War. It is strongly opposed by the Russians and the Tudeh party and is not viewed with favour by the Shah, since the Ministers were selected entirely by the Majlis without consideration of his wishes.

2. The press has for some time past been urging the Government to prepare Persia's claims for compensation for the damage she has suffered and sacrifices she has made in putting her territory and her communications at the disposal of the Allies. It is usual now for Persians to refer to Persia as the Bridge of Victory and to claim that it was Persia's contribution that tipped the scale in favour of the Allies. The Ministry of Finance has issued instructions to all departments of the Government to prepare lists of losses and damage incurred since August 1941 as a result of the entry of Allied troops into Persia. In a recent speech to a gathering of Ministers, officials and journalists the Shah stressed the necessity for ensuring that Persia obtained at the Peace Conference the compensation to which she was entitled for her unstinted sacrifices. He deplored the lack of unity evident in the country at such a critical period and hoped that all members of the community would put aside their personal quarrels and combine to secure for Persia the place to which she was entitled.

3. In the same speech the Shah called attention to the hardships from which the majority of the population was suffering. The alleviation of this distress was, he said, the responsibility not only of the Government but of all capable and patriotic people. There must be a better exploitation and a more even distribution of the national resources. The improvement of education and of hygiene was important, but it was more important still to ensure that the people were fed.

4. Taqizadeh and Sepahbudi, Persian Ambassadors in London and Angora respectively, have arrived in Tehran for consultation with their Government. Jam, the Persian Ambassador in Egypt, is expected shortly. Ahi, Ambassador in Moscow, has also been summoned, but is reported to be too ill to travel.

#### Appointments—Civil.

- 5.—(i) Ashrafi, to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister.
- (ii) Nizam un Din Imani to be Persian commercial representative in India.
- (iii) Hussein Muhiman to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance.
- (iv) Abul Qasim Purvali to be Persian Consul-General in Palestine and Transjordan.

#### Economic.

6. Allied successes have brought about a considerable reduction in the wholesale prices of imported goods—as much as 50 per cent. in some cases—but retail prices are not as yet affected.

#### Russian Affairs.

7. A Russian Mission, said to consist of "experts," has arrived in Tehran. It is headed by Kavtarzadeh, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and rumour says that its visit is connected with oil concessions. At a reception given in his honour by the Persian Government, Kavtarzadeh expressed his appreciation of the zeal shown by the Persian Government and nation in assisting the transport of supplies to Russia.

8. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that a considerable number of Russian troops have left that town for Russia.

#### French Affairs.

9. The French Legation has announced that the nine scholarships at the University of Beirut which were allotted to Persian students in 1942 by the Free French authorities will be available again in 1944-45.

Tehran, 24th September, 1944.



[E 6252/422/34]

No. 20.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th October.)*

(No. 384.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 37 of the 1st October, 1944, for the period of the 25th September to the 1st October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 2nd October, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 20.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37 for the Period  
25th September—1st October, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

THE necessity for measures to counteract the effects of Tudeh party propaganda on the workers is being more widely recognised by the governing classes. Moreover, they fear that the departure of Allied troops may result in a large number of unemployed, who will be ready subjects for subversive propaganda. The problem of dealing with these is now engaging the attention of the Government. And, with a view to inducing the working classes to believe that the Government is concerned with their interest, a commission, which includes representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Communications, has been formed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the tasks of collecting information regarding the numbers and conditions of employment of workers in Government factories and industrial establishments; drawing up regulations to avert unemployment among workers; organising centres of technical instruction for workers to increase their output; improving the hygienic condition of factories; preparing plans to attract capital to the development of industry and public works.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 2.—(i) Hussein Mahiman to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.
- (ii) Abdul Rahim Arfa to the Persian Consul in Trebizond.

*Persian Forces.*

3. In July 1943 a Persian detachment of some 900 men suffered a disaster at the village of Semirum (see Summary No. 27, paragraph 7). Various allegations were subsequently made of treachery and cowardice on the part of officers of the garrison and of incompetence and neglect of duty on the part of the divisional commander and his staff. The trial of a number of officers and other ranks has recently been completed and sentences on seven officers have been announced, varying from three years' penal servitude to one month's disciplinary detention. The divisional commander, Sartip Muhammad Nakchevan (now retired), was awarded six months' correctional imprisonment. Eight officers were acquitted. Sipahbod Shahbakhti, commanding the forces of the south at the time of the Semirum incident (now retired), is to be put on trial on charges arising out of the evidence given at the trial.

4. 641 cadets, who have finished their course at the Military School and have qualified for commissions in the army, navy and air force, were inspected by the Shah on the 24th September.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 5.—(i) Sarlashkar Ismail Shafai (F.O. 190; M.A. 261) to be Persian Military Attaché in Moscow.
- (ii) Sarhang Ahmed Vosuq to the second-in-command of the Officers' Cadet School.

*Internal Security.**Kurdistan.*

6. Hama Rashid followed up his occupation of Merivan (see Summary No. 35/44, paragraph 10) by an insolent telegram to the Persian Government which induced them rather reluctantly to agree to operations by Persian troops for the eviction from Merivan of Hama Rashid's followers and the Governor he had set up there. This operation was successfully carried out with little opposition, although the Persian General Staff claim to have captured some twenty of Hama Rashid's men and to have inflicted casualties. Operations against Hama Rashid are to be continued by the advance of a column from Saqqiz to Baneh. More serious opposition is expected here. The object of the operation is to put an end to Hama Rashid's rule at Baneh and to substitute for it an administration under a Persian official, supported by a force of gendarmerie of Kurds officered by officers of the regular gendarmerie. Since Hama Rashid, if driven out of Baneh, can take refuge in Iraq, the Persian Government has requested the Iraqi Government to arrest him if he crosses the frontier. The Minister without Portfolio of the Persian Government is to visit the area to assure the Kurds of the good intentions of the Government, but, since the Government has no definite benefits to promise, and since, even if they had, the Kurds have little faith in Persian promises, his visit is likely to be of limited value.

7. There is some credible evidence that Hama Rashid is acting in agreement with Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad, who is popularly supposed to be the centre of the Kurdish independence movement in Persia. It is definitely known that there is in Mahabad much talk of Kurdish independence and an absence of any sign of recognition by the Kurds of Persian authority. As reported in Summary No. 35/44, paragraph 9, the Russians are suspected of encouraging this movement. There are reports that Russian officers visited Hama Rashid in the latter half of August; and Soviet officials in Kermanshah and Tehran have immediately shown a lively interest in, and some disapproval of, the operations now in progress.

*Khuzestan.*

8. The Bani Turuf are shortly to be invited to surrender their arms on the assurance that one-third of the number they now possess will be returned to reliable chiefs on licence. The invitation is to be backed up by a show of force. The local civil and military Persian authorities are confident that there will be no general disturbance.

*Russian Affairs.*

9. The Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Kaytaradzeh (see Summary No. 36/44, paragraph 7), has made it known to the Persian Government that he is here for the purpose of negotiating a concession for the exploitation of oil in the Semnan area. The prospect of having a Soviet Government concern established in Persia has filled the Persian Government with great alarm.

10. In addition to a hospital, the opening of which was reported in Summary No. 35/44, paragraph 14, the Russians have now opened a school in Tabriz. While it is said to be principally for children of Russian subjects; it has been announced that Persian children will also be accepted, without fees. The curriculum has been designed for a course of study of ten years; the principal language will be Turki, with Russian, Persian and English as subsidiary languages; the teachers will be Soviet Azerbaijanis. For neither the hospital nor the school was the permission of the Persian Government asked, and insult has been added to injury by establishing Turki as the principal language. In Meshed the Russians have opened classes for the teaching of Russian to Persians. These classes are being attended by some 300 Persians.

11. A very active Russian intriguer, Marchenko, who was vice-consul at Tabriz, has recently arrived in Isfahan as vice-consul. While in Tabriz he was shameless in his interference in Persian affairs, unco-operative with his British colleague, and undistinguished for any pro-British sentiments.

*American Affairs.*

12. Two American officers have arrived in Tabriz to arrange for the evacuation from Russia of American air force personnel via Julfa.

*Tehran, 1st October, 1944.*



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st October.)*  
(No. 391.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period 2nd October to 8th October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 9th October, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 21.

(Secret.)

*Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period 2nd October to 8th October, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The Shah recently received the Prime Minister, representatives of the Majlis, journalists and some others. In addressing them he laid stress on the necessity for the development of irrigation, for the preservation of existing forests and the planting of new forests with a view to increasing the rainfall. The speech was reported in the press. Such interviews are meant to be taken as an indication of the Shah's intention to act in a more constitutional and open manner as regards his relations with Deputies and journalists than he has been accused of doing.

2. Speculation about oil concessions has filled much space in the press and in the public mind, and some consternation has been caused by a frank interview given to the press by Kavtaradzeh, the Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs—see Summary No. 37/44, paragraph 9—where he stated that he had come to Persia specially to investigate the possibility of oil exploitation in the north. The report of the experts he had brought with him had been favourable; he was now offering terms for a concession to be given to the Soviet Government and was awaiting an answer. He said that his Government attached great importance to this concession from the point of view of strengthening political, economic and cultural relations with Persia. He gave his assurance that the invaluable co-operation of Persia in bringing help to Russia would have the best results in tightening the bonds between the two nations.

3. The three to four months' grace allowed by the Government to Dr. Millspaugh has now expired. He has written a letter to the Prime Minister, published in the press, in which he claimed that developments during these months provided an effective answer to his critics. Every endeavour had been made to obtain the maximum quantity of imports and to make the best use of the quotas obtained; prices had dropped; monopoly goods were being actively distributed; the road transport service had been progressively improved; revenues had increased and, if expenses did not increase, it might be hoped that next year the budget deficit, if not totally extinguished, would be materially reduced; the Government now held stocks of grain greater than had ever been known in Persia; useful plans had been drawn up for the post-war period. Dr. Millspaugh claimed that there remained only one point which might create dissension between himself on the one hand and the Government and Parliament on the other, and that was the question of the special powers given to him. Suggestions had been made that the law that gave him those powers should be abrogated. That, he thought, would be a grave mistake, but he proposed to surrender by degrees, as the situation allowed, his special powers. In the meantime, as he did not wish to give any pretext to his opponents for accusing him of dictatorial actions, he proposed to exercise those special powers within the framework of the original law sanctioning his engagement as adviser on financial questions—that is to say he would work under the supervision of the Minister of Finance and so restore the constitutional responsibility of that Minister.

The Russian inspired press, however, asserts that the economic position has greatly deteriorated and urges that Dr. Millspaugh should be deprived of his special powers and that the necessity for the retention of the American mission should be seriously considered.

4. An Indo-Iranian Cultural Committee has been formed in Tehran which includes the Prime Minister, a number of Persians distinguished for their cultural

attainments and representatives of the British Council and of His Majesty's Embassy.

5. Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai has been re-elected President of the Majlis, and the Deputies Malik Madani and Dr. Muazzemi have been elected Vice-Presidents.

##### *Economic.*

6. Due in part to the fact that the Government now holds reserves of some 90,000 tons, prices of grain are falling all over the country and in some places are already below the price being paid by the Government to landlords for the surpluses they are bound to surrender. In consequence restrictions on the free movement of grain and flour have been removed. Prices of other commodities are also falling, in some cases even in the retail market.

7. Since the death of Reza Shah there has been much speculation in Tehran regarding alleged large sums which are said to have been lodged by him in foreign banks. The Court has published a letter addressed to the Prime Minister which says that enquiries had been made by Prime Minister Feroughi at the time of Reza Shah's abdication and that no sums in foreign banks had been traced. The Shah now authorised the Prime Minister to make all further enquiries that were necessary to clear up this matter definitely.

8. The Persian press reports that Persia has been invited to send representatives to the International Air Conference to be held in America in November. The representatives selected are Hussein Nawab and Dr. Nasr, commercial representative of Persia in the United States.

9. A commercial mission composed of representatives selected by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce is to attend the American Trade Conference.

##### *Appointments—Civil.*

10. Mahmud Afshar to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education.

##### *Persian Forces.*

11. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis for the grant of an additional credit of 15 million tomans to the Ministry of War for the remaining months of the current financial year. The amount is to be obtained by borrowing from the National Bank. The Bill is likely to meet with some opposition.

##### *Appointments—Military.*

- 12.—(i) Sartip Assadullah Gulshayan to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- (ii) Sarlashkar Rohullah Kaikavusi to be Director of Arsenals and Factories.
- (iii) Colonel Jawadi to be head of the Officers' Personnel Branch of the General Staff.

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *Kurdistan.*

13. The Persian forces operating against Hama Rashid—see Summary No. 37/44, paragraphs 6 and 7—occupied his stronghold at Baneh with little opposition on the 1st October. It is not yet known where Hama Rashid has withdrawn. An emissary from Hama Rashid has visited His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz and stated that Hama Hashid does not wish to fight and asks for British intervention to effect a settlement; if the British do not intervene he will appeal to the Russians and other tribes for support. Qazi Muhammed and other Kurdish chiefs of the Mahabad area have been summoned to Tehran to discuss the general Kurdish situation with the Government. Much is being made in the Tehran press of reports of the miserable condition of the people of Baneh after two years of Kurdish rule. Subscriptions are being asked for, and the Shah has contributed 100,000 rials. As the reports of conditions in Baneh come from the Persian army, who are anxious to show that they have accomplished something meritorious, they may be treated with reserve.

##### *Kuhigalu.*

14. There has been further minor fighting between the Boir Ahmadi tribes which has so far affected only themselves. Abdullah Zarghampur's appeal to Nasir Qashgai for help met with little response as the Qashgai tribes showed no willingness to be involved in this dispute, probably because they feared they might



find themselves in conflict with the Mamassannim who control the migration routes of the important Qashgai sub-tribes, the Kashguli and the Darashuri. Nasir's brother, Malik Mansur, did go some way to the help of Abdullah Zarghampur with 200 or so men, but when his suggestions for a settlement of one of the main causes of the dispute, the rival claims to certain lands, was turned down by Abdullah Zarghampur, he is reported to have withdrawn. The Persian authorities, believing, perhaps rightly, that the Boir Ahmadi united are a greater danger to the peace of others than the Boir Ahmadi quarrelling among themselves, are not discouraging the opposition to Abdullah Zarkhampur's aspirations to make himself paramount chief in Kuhigalu and are prepared to assist if it should show signs of being overcome.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

15. Previous to the advance on Baneh reported in paragraph 13 above a Russian officer visited the Persian general commanding the troops and showed some anxiety about the operation. He asked that the Russians should be informed if there was any prospect of the operations extending to Mahabad and Miandoab.

16. A party of about eight Russians, officers and soldiers, has been making an extended tour through South Persia. It was reported in Bakhtiari—see Summary No. 30/44, paragraph 15—at the end of July, and in August it or a similar party was in the Kerman district north of Kerman. The explanation given of the purpose of their journey is invariably that they are seeking lorries stolen from the Soviet Government.

17. Persian newspapers under Russian influence have for some time past been combating the argument that Persian economy should be based on agriculture and have been urging the initiation of an extensive programme of industrialisation. Regulations issued by the Ministry of Education for the establishment of primary schools in rural districts have met with severe criticism on the grounds that the retention of children for education in rural districts is part of a nefarious design on the part of foreigners to retain Persia as a backward agricultural country, producing raw materials for the benefit of foreign capitalists and providing a market for their manufactured goods. Country children, the argument goes, should be brought to the towns for education.

18. Baqiroff, an important Soviet Commissar from Baku, is reliably reported to have made recently a secret visit to Persian Azarbaijan, including the town of Khoi in the Kurdish area.

[E 6593/422/34]

No. 22.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th October.)*

(No. 399.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period the 9th–15th October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 16th October, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 22.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the period the 9th–15th October, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. The Russian demand for a concession for the right to explore for oil in North Persia dominates the political mind of the capital. The effects on Persia's integrity of the political results that would follow on the invasion of the area in question, which extends from Azerbaijan to Quchan, by an army of Soviet Government officials in the guise of technical experts occupying the places left vacant on the withdrawal of Soviet troops, are widely appreciated; and there is fairly general approval of the Government's reply to the Soviet representative,

Kavtaradze, to the effect that it had been decided to postpone decision on the several applications for concessions for the exploitation of oil until after the war. There are, however, not a few who regard this defiance as dangerous temerity, likely to provoke disagreeable retaliation, a fear which Soviet officials have not failed to exploit; and in the press there is not only an absence of the hostile criticism that was directed against the British and American competitors for concessions but, in certain papers supported by the Russians or inspired for the occasion, much argument as to the necessity for restoring the balance in foreign relations, upset by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in the south, by granting to the Russians a concession in the north; other articles, clearly not written by Persians, would represent the Russian demand as having been dictated not at all in the interests of Russia, Russia having no need of more oil, but solely by the Soviet Government's generous desire to do good to Persia by helping her to develop her resources and to provide profitable employment for her people; others, again, accuse the Persian Government of having been actuated by hostility to Russia in their decision, since they had been considering for months past applications for concessions from British and American companies without coming to the conclusion that a reply should be deferred until after the war.

2. It is possible that Taqizadeh, the Persian Ambassador in London now on a visit to Tehran, may become Prime Minister in the near future. He is held in good repute in the country; but his reputation is founded on his career of some years past, since when he has been absent from Persia. His appointment would, it seems, be unwelcome to the Russians since their subsidised Persian press is now warning the public that he has been brought to Persia by the same influences that brought Seyyid Zia to serve the purpose in which they now realise that Seyyid Zia cannot succeed. Taqizadeh has a reputation for patriotism, and he would not be as compliant with Russian desires in such matters as oil concessions as their candidate for the premiership, Qavam es Sultaneh.

3. Some embarrassment has been caused to the Government and some resentment in the Court by Dr. Millspaugh's summary dismissal, without previous consultation with the Government, of the Governor of the National Bank, an influential and outstanding personality who stands well with the Court. The Government has decided that the dismissal was not within Dr. Millspaugh's competence—a decision which has given much pleasure to Dr. Millspaugh's many enemies and has not enhanced his prestige or his reputation for political wisdom.

4. In Persia the war in Europe now takes second place in popular interest to the conflict that Persians are now convinced is taking place between British and Russian policies—in Poland, in the Balkans, in Persia. In Persia they think they see the British, struggling to preserve the appearance of concord with their powerful ally, yielding, as little as may be perhaps, to Russian anti-British aggressiveness. Attacks on British policy in certain Persian papers are well known to have been inspired by the Russians; and the nature of the enquiries made by Soviet officials of Persian officials leaves no doubt of the discord between Russian and British policies in Persia.

5. Sartip Abdullah Hidayet, Under-Secretary of State for War, has been appointed Acting Minister for War.

##### *Economic.*

6. Dr. Millspaugh has issued a circular instruction to all Ministries notifying them that the special powers given to him in economic and financial matters will in future be exercised under the general supervision of the Minister of Finance. All regulations and correspondence on matters of policy will be signed jointly by Dr. Millspaugh as Administrator-General of the Finances and by the Minister of Finance.

7. The Government has approved the grant of a credit of 1 million rials to the Ministry of the Interior for the reform and improvement of prisons.

8. Some progress has been made with the distribution of monopoly goods—cloth, tea and sugar—in tribal areas. Over 100,000 rations were distributed to the Qashgai; 200,000 rations were available for distribution to the Bakhtiari, but lack of cash prevented the tribesmen from taking more than 60,000. Distribution has also been made in Khuzestan on a wide scale and in Luristan, and it is hoped that a beginning will shortly be made with the Kurds.

##### *Internal Security.*

##### *Kurdistan.*

9. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan reports that during a recent tour west of Lake Rezaieh he found generally a much healthier atmosphere as



regards the Kurds. There was evidence of some slight recognition on their part of Persian authority and of an increasing realisation of the possibility of its re-establishment throughout Kurdish territory. Kurds were talking of the necessity of finding a *modus vivendi* with the Persian authorities, and some Kurds spontaneously expressed loyalty to the Persian Government. Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad, who has been credited with being the protagonist of the Kurdish independence movement in those parts, admitted that all Kurds did not want independence; many would be content with an administration that gave them some consideration: schools where Kurdish would be allowed, health services, better communications; in general more positive help from Government combined with some degree of autonomy in purely local affairs.

The improvement in local atmosphere the consul-general attributes partly to an apparent cessation in Soviet political activity and partly to the personality of the Military Governor-General, Colonel Darakshani.

10. In the Mahabad area the Kurds were said to be fairly orderly, but further north the Jalali, Herki and Shakak were being a pest to their settled neighbours. The Russian authorities had at last agreed to the location of 300 troops at Maku and to their employment for the protection of villages against marauding Kurds.

11. There is no further news from Baneh, nor is it known where Hama Rashid has taken refuge. The Minister without portfolio, Fahimi, is due in Baneh shortly with supplies of tea, sugar and cloth. He will make recommendations to Government regarding the future administration of Baneh district. Qazi Muhammad and other chiefs of the Mahabad district have been summoned to Tehran for a conference with the Government, whose intentions as regards the Kurds are benevolent, although they may not have the capacity to translate them into practice nor the power to control the rapacity of their local officials.

#### South Persia.

12. The downward migration of the tribes has begun, accompanied in the case of the Qashgai, according to reports, by a good deal of levying of tribute from villages. Some 500 families of the Darashuri sub-tribe of the Qashgai are to remain for the winter in their summer quarters in the Semirum area. Whether this will lead to their permanent settlement in that area and be the beginning of the sedentarisation of the tribe is not yet known; but their presence in that area should serve to check the Boir Ahmadi raiding that usually takes place when the Qashgai leave their summer quarters.

#### Russian Affairs.

13. The Soviet authorities are again demanding large quantities of rice from the Persian Government, for which they offer to barter cotton piece-goods and miscellaneous articles. In a similar transaction last year the Persian Government lost heavily, but if they refuse to accommodate the Soviet authorities this year the latter will obtain the rials to pay for the rice by selling piece-goods and other goods on the black market. The Soviet has already obtained rials by selling at high prices on the black market sugar and tyres, commodities which they obtain from the Allies on Lease-Lend. Needless to say no customs duty is paid on any of the goods imported by the Soviet authorities for sale on the Persian market.

14. Transovtrans, the Russian transport organisation corresponding to the U.K.C.C., have now ceased their commercial activities (see Summary No. 35/44, paragraph 14) owing to a drop in freights which has made operation unprofitable. Apart from any political intention they may have had in extending Soviet organisations into South Persia, their main object was to obtain rials. The vehicles used were either Lease-Lend trucks or vehicles hired from Persian owners. They ignored all the rules of the Persian Road Transport Department.

15. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan, after a recent tour west of Lake Rezaieh, reports that there is now much less evidence of Russian political activity among the Kurds. The local Governor-General was positive that the Russians were not now encouraging Kurdish lawlessness. This improvement may be due to a change in the personnel of the Soviet Consulate at Rezaieh, the new consul showing some evidence of a desire to be helpful to the Persian Administration. Three hundred Persian troops had been allowed to Maku to protect the villages against Kurdish brigandage.

16. A Tudeh party demonstration took place in Rezaieh during the consul-general's visit. It was attended by some 2,500 people, mostly Assyrians and Armenians, and was orderly and dull. The party claims to have 12,000-14,000 members in the Rezaieh area.

17. Some 2,000 Russian troops arrived in Meshed on the 7th October. See also Summary No. 36/44, paragraph 8, which reported the departure of a considerable number of troops from Meshed for Russia.

Tehran, 15th October, 1944.

[E 6810/422/34]

No. 23.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th November.)

(No. 405.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 40 for period the 16th to 22nd October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 23rd October, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 23.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the Period  
16th-22nd October, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

#### Political.

THE Russians are trying in a variety of ways to frighten the Prime Minister, the Deputies and the people into reversing the decision of the Government that no concessions for the exploitation of oil should be given until after the war. The greater part of the Tehran press has been mobilised, not only those papers previously dependent on Russian support. The Tudeh press had some difficulty in wriggling out of the position it had adopted, before Kavtaradze appeared on the scene, towards the granting of concessions. It explained, however, that its opposition was only to concessions that might allow foreigners to exercise influence injurious to the integrity and economy of Persia. The war of nerves has been prosecuted by parading through the streets of Tehran lorry-loads of menacingly armed Russian soldiers and by plain threats to prominent Persians and, delivered by the Soviet Ambassador himself, to the few editors who had ventured to support the Government. Rumours are being circulated to the effect that Russia is on the point of breaking off relations; Persians are urged to remember the fate of Finland; the Russian press has claimed that the whole Persian press and public opinion are in favour of accepting Russia's generous offer (in fact, the Russians have as yet given no indication of the terms they are prepared to offer); and a broadcast from the Tehran Broadcasting Station, sponsored nominally by the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society, was used mainly to give extracts from the Russian-inspired Persian press hostile to the Government's decision.

2. Public opinion generally does, in fact, support the Government's decision, but few Persians have the courage to give their support openly. Great Britain, it is hoped, will intervene and save Persia from having to choose between the unpleasant alternatives of surrendering her northern provinces to Russia or incurring Russian hostility. The Shah is reported to be determined to stand firm, and the Prime Minister will probably do so; but a very violent and venomous campaign is being waged against him in the Persian press that is under Russian influence. He is accused of following a one-sided policy in foreign affairs, of being hostile to Russia and of trying to wreck Russo-Persian relations. In a speech in the Majlis he claimed that the decision to postpone consideration of the granting of oil concessions until after the war had been taken by the Council of Ministers before the arrival of Kavtaradze, as was recorded in the minutes of a Cabinet meeting.



*Economic.*

3. Certain changes have lately been made in the Cereals and Bread Regulations, of which the effect is to—

- (a) Give higher exemptions to the smaller landlords.
- (b) Exempt the peasants completely.
- (c) Remove all restrictions on the transport of grain.

These modifications have been made partly because of political pressure, but they can be justified by the improvement in the general situation as regards cereals, which may be summarised as—

- (i) The possession by the Government of considerable reserves of grain.
- (ii) The decreasing tendency to hoard resulting from favourable war news.
- (iii) The recent falls in the price of grain on the free market.

It is expected that the result of permitting the free transport of grain, combined with the fall in prices due to the unloading of hoarded stocks, will be to increase the supply of grain on the free markets in towns, thus lightening the Government's task of collection and distribution. The Government hopes to be able to control the price on the free market by issues from the stocks obtained from the collection of landlords' surpluses. If present trends continue the Government hopes to hold at the end of the current harvest year stocks of 150,000 tons of grain.

4. Colonel Mahmud Khosrovani of the Persian air force has been selected as an additional representative of the Persian Government at the International Air Conference to be held in America in November (see Summary No. 38/44, paragraph 8). Colonel Khosrovani has already been in America purchasing aircraft and made profits from that transaction which were considered to be scandalous even in Persia.

5. The Red Lion and Sun (the Persian Red Cross) Society announces that it has received subscriptions of 600,000 rials for the relief of the inhabitants of Baneh who have suffered from the maladministration of Hama Rashid. Of this amount, the sum of 400,000 rials is said to have been subscribed by officers of the army.

*Persian Forces.**Army.*

6. The debate on the Bill for the grant of an additional credit of 15 million tomans to the army especially for the purpose of increasing the pay of officers has shown little opposition to the Bill in principle, nor has it evoked much criticism of the army. Of several amendments proposed, all were rejected except that for the formation of a special court of two military officers and three judges to investigate the misappropriation of army funds and certain offences of dereliction of duty alleged to have occurred at the time of the entry of Allied troops into Persia in 1941. The debate is not yet finished. A Tudeh Deputy took strong exception to a recent order by the Ministry for War forbidding officers to join political parties or to take part in politics.

7. During a debate in the Majlis certain remarks made by the Acting Minister for War concerning the army's special relation to the Shah evoked an emotional protest from the Deputy, Dr. Musaddiq, who, while asserting that he was more devoted to the Shah than anyone else in the Majlis, felt bound to maintain that, since the Shah carried no responsibility, he had no right to interfere in the affairs of any department of Government.

*Internal Security.*

8. It has been decided in principle to apply the Military Government Law to offences committed on the railway and on certain roads with a view to speeding up the trial of offences against Allied property and legalising the imposition of more severe sentences.

*Kurdistan.*

9. The following information has been given by the Persian General Staff:—

Hama Rashid has taken refuge in Iraq and from there he has made several incursions into Persian territory which have resulted in clashes with Persian

columns and casualties to both sides, including one of Hama Rashid's brothers. The Persian forces are, however, in effective occupation of the Baneh and Merivan areas. Important chiefs, such as Suleiman Jaf and his two sons and the chiefs of the Mangur, have visited the Persian commander at Baneh and promised their co-operation against Hama Rashid, who had made himself unpopular by his exactions. He had destroyed almost everything in Baneh except the mosques before he fled. The people are gradually returning to their homes. The Minister without Portfolio and one of the Kurdish Deputies in the Majlis are due at Baneh on the 22nd October and they will distribute tea, sugar and cloth which has been provided by the Government. The Persian General Staff will be glad if a British official would visit the area to see conditions. Since it seemed unlikely that the Iraqi Government would co-operate to the extent of rounding up Hama Rashid and his followers if they remained in Iraq territory, the Persian Government had had to decide to maintain garrisons of all arms in Baneh and Merivan during the winter.

*Khuzestan.*

10. Three columns of Persian troops are now moving to positions of tactical importance on the outskirts of the Beni Turuf country preparatory to a summons being given to the tribe to surrender its arms. If the summons is obeyed the troops will take no action. The Beni Turuf Arabs are believed to possess about 2,500 rifles, of which about 800 will be returned to them for their own protection.

*Kuh-i-Galu.*

11. It is reported that all the Boir Ahmadi winter quarters are now occupied by the opponents of Abdullah Zarghampur with the exception of Pili, a rather important tactical point, which is occupied by Abdullah himself. Khosrow, his brother and enemy, appealed for the assistance of Persian aircraft to drive out Abdullah, but this request was refused. Relations between Abdullah and Nasir Qashgai are reported to be deteriorating. Nasir is playing for his own hand and Government approval.

*Fars.*

12. Nasir Qashgai has found that his position in Fars and his authority in the Qashgai tribes are weakening. He has written to the Government to the effect that, if it is desired that he and his brothers should maintain order in the tribe, he must be given material and moral support against Kalantars of sub-tribes who are now questioning his authority. He suggests that one of his brothers should live in Tehran and that, of himself and the others, one should be with the tribe and one in Shiraz. The Government is in something of a quandary. Qashgai lawlessness is increasing, whether instigated by Nasir or not, but the Government forces are not yet ready to assume direct responsibility for maintaining order in the tribe. To give Nasir official recognition and support as being responsible for the behaviour of the whole tribe is tantamount to recognising him as Ilkhani—a retrograde measure which the Persian Government has been trying to avoid.

*Russian Affairs.*

13. A team of Soviet footballers is now in Tehran to play a series of matches. Few personages, however important, have been so greatly fêted or been given so much publicity.

14. The Soviet exploration of South Persia, to which reference has been made in previous summaries, continues. A party of Red Army officers has recently been making investigations, of a nature not yet ascertained, in the Zahidan area and along the Zahidan-Birjand road.

Tehran, 22nd October, 1944.



*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th November.)*

(No. 419.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 41 for period the 23rd October to the 29th October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 30th October, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 24.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the Period 23rd October to the 29th October, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.*

*Political.*

1. The Russians have continued their campaign of would-be intimidation of the Persian Government and Majlis. The journalists of Tehran, with a few exceptions, were invited to the Soviet Embassy and there entertained by M. Kavtaradze with an exposition of the altruistic motives that had induced the Soviet Government to offer to exploit Persia's oil and of the advantages—in no case precisely defined—that would accrue to Persia; with veiled threats; and with an attack on the head of their Government with whom, M. Kavtaradze said, the Soviet authorities could have no further relations, although they still cherished the same warm feelings towards the Persian people whom M. Sa'ed was attempting to mislead. The newspapers, supported by the Russians, have increased the violence of their attacks on the Prime Minister, accusing him of deliberately trying to embroil Persia with Russia. They remind their readers that those who opposed the Soviet are to-day being destroyed by the guns of the Red army; that Russia will have much to do with the settlement at the Peace Conference of the conditions of the post-war world. Quite inconsistently with their expressions of regard for the welfare of the Persian people the Soviet authorities have stopped the transport by rail of all grain to the capital from the over-stocked granaries of the north. What was perhaps meant to be a master-stroke of the offensive was the organisation of a demonstration outside the Majlis building by a crowd of some 4,000 to 5,000 workers and others, calling death to the Prime Minister. The demonstrators, some, at least, of whom are known to have been collected in Soviet lorries from their homes with the promise of reward, were quite openly shepherded and protected by Russian troops, well armed.

2. The results of this campaign are not what the Russians expected. It has, indeed, made the Russians look rather ridiculous in Persian eyes. It has rallied increasing support, even of former critics, to the Prime Minister. The crudity of the methods used, the offence to all recognised international conventions in Kavtaradze's public attempt to browbeat the press into attacking the Prime Minister have hardened public opinion against Russia and aroused something of those latent qualities of passive resistance that forced Nasiruddin Shah to cancel the concession given to Tobacco Régie. Newspapers not accepting Russian money have come out with some almost defiant articles; and the sky has not fallen. Persians who considered that the greatest danger from the Russians lay in their insidious propaganda and their appeal to the lower classes now find cause for more confidence in the future since they hold the view that even the common people are being antagonised by Russia's obvious attempts to bully.

3. In his interview with the journalists—referred to in paragraph 1—Kavtaradze stated:—

- (a) That the Soviet Government wished to obtain a concession for the exploration for oil in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan, part of the region of Semnan and some parts of Khorassan.
- (b) After the necessary surveys had been made in this area to establish where oil existed, the concession would be restricted to a definitely limited region. (It is known from other sources that this area may extend to 150,000 square kilom.)

- (c) The Soviet Government would pay royalties according to production and a sum to be agreed upon in lieu of customs dues, and would supply Persia's needs in oil products.
- (d) At the end of the period of the concession all constructions and installations would be surrendered to the Persian Government.
- (e) Employment would be found for thousands of Persian workmen, particularly for those who had helped in the transport of supplies to Russia.
- (f) Persians would be trained in all the technical branches of oil production.
- (g) During the preliminary geological survey it might be expected that other mineral resources would be discovered which would be of benefit to Persia.
- (h) The Soviet Government would accept responsibility for the medical care of all employees and their families.
- (i) The Prime Minister in preliminary discussions had expressed his approval in principle of the Soviet proposals. His subsequent refusal to grant any concessions for oil until after the war had been badly received by the Soviet authorities and his attitude would lead to a deterioration in Russo-Persian relations.

4. Elsewhere the Russians have accused the Prime Minister of having been aware of the purpose of Kavtaradze's mission and of having approved of it before his arrival in Persia. It is believed that the explanation given by the Soviet Embassy of the object of Kavtaradze's mission when it was first proposed to the Persian Government was that it was to discuss the old Khurian oil concession in which the Soviet Government had some share, and to obtain information about mines in North Persia. The Prime Minister, in an interview given to the press, stated that this was his understanding and that as soon as the matter of a new concession was mentioned he had informed Kavtaradze that the Government had already decided to give no concessions until after the war.

5. The press states that the American Ambassador has written to the Persian Government confirming that no promise of a concession had been given to the representative of any American oil company, and that he considered that the Persian Government was fully justified in postponing a decision until after the war.

6. Dr. Millspaugh has apparently refused to accept the decision of the Government that his dismissal of the Governor of the National Bank was *ultra vires* as, subsequent to that decision, he notified all other banks and departments of the Government that Ibtahaj's signature on official documents was not valid.

7. Hassan Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London, has left Tehran on his return to England. Attacks on him continued in the Soviet inspired press up to the time of his departure.

8. Majid Ahi, Persian Ambassador in Moscow, has arrived in Tehran on a visit.

9. The Minister of Roads and Communications, Mahmoud Nariman, has resigned as a protest against the Prime Minister's decision that M. Hussein Nafisi, who had been dismissed from the post of Director-General of Railways, should be reinstated.

*Persian Forces.*

*Army.*

10. The Bill for the grant of an additional credit of 15 million tomans to the army was passed by a substantial majority. An addition made to the Bill was that the period of service for graduates and licentiates should be reduced to one year (see also Summary No. 40/44, paragraph 6).

*Appointments—Military.*

11.—(i) Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30; M.A. 37) to be a Military Governor for the purpose of applying military law to offences committed on the railway and on certain roads not yet specified (see Summary No. 40/44, paragraph 8).

(ii) Sartip Assadullah Gulshayan to be acting commander of the 2nd (Tehran) Division.

(iii) Sarlashkar Amanullah Jahanbani (F.O. 103; M.A. 132) to command the officers' cadet school.



12. Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakchevan (F.O. 159; M.A. 193), commanding the Persian Air Force, has left Tehran to visit England at the invitation of the Air Ministry. He is accompanied by Colonel Bayendor, Persian Air Attaché in London, who has been in Tehran on a short visit.

#### Fars.

#### Internal Security.

13. The Governor-General of Fars, appreciating that the forces at his disposal are not yet capable of controlling the increasing disorder among the Qashgai, has recommended to the Government that Nasir Qashgai should be officially recognised as responsible for the maintenance of order in the tribe, and that for this purpose he should be allowed to draw pay from the Government for about 100 riflemen. The Governor-General argues that Nasir, as a Government official appointed to keep order in the tribe, is not likely to make himself so popular that there would be any difficulty in evicting him when the time came. To judge by the parallel case of Morteza Quli Bakhtiari, this seems at least a possibility.

#### Kurdistan.

14. No further reports of encounters between Persian troops and Hama Rashid's followers have reached Tehran. A British officer is visiting Baneh to see conditions for himself at the invitation of the Persian General Staff. Conversations are taking place between local Persian military officers and Iraqi officials with a view to inducing the Iraqi authorities to take action, if not against Hama Rashid himself, against his family and property now in Iraq territory. According to Persian reports the Iraqi authorities show no disposition to co-operate.

#### Baluchistan.

15. Some time ago a certain Baluch, Madad Ali, a mullah living in the neighbourhood of Bazman, 70 miles north-west of Iranshahr, set himself up as a prophet, collected a number of followers, and started a reign of terror, murdering several persons who ventured to oppose him. After some ineffective operations by the gendarmerie, a military column was sent against him, which killed the prophet and dispersed his followers.

#### Russian Affairs.

16. A modification is required in paragraph 14 of Summary No. 39/44. Iransovtrans are continuing their commercial operations in the so-called Russian zone.

Tehran, 29th October, 1944.

[E 7036/422/34]

No. 25.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th November.)

(No. 430.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 42 for period the 30th October to the 5th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 6th November, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 25.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the period the 30th October to the 5th November, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

#### Political.

1. Until the middle of the week Russian incitement of the press and the Tudeh party to agitate in favour of the granting to Russia of a concession for the exploitation of oil continued. Demonstrations were organised in Tabriz,

Ardebil, Qasvin, Resht, Bandar Shah, Pahlevi, Meshed, Isfahan and Sultanabad—that is, wherever the Tudeh party had the necessary influence. In Tabriz the mob tried to rush the police headquarters and was fired on, one man being killed and a few wounded. Russian troops intervened and allowed neither the police nor Persian military patrols to interfere with the mob; moreover, they prohibited the carrying of arms in the town by any member of the Persian forces, and officers carrying arms were prevented from leaving their barracks. The commander of the Persian troops was given twenty-four hours to leave the town. At Resht also the Persian police were similarly prevented from taking any measures to restore order. In Isfahan and Sultanabad, where there are no Russian troops, the demonstrations were tame and the small crowds, who when they were first collected had no idea that they were to demonstrate in favour of an oil concession to the Russians, soon dispersed. From the other towns concerned reports have not yet been received.

2. Towards the end of the week, however, there were indications that the Russians were shifting their ground, perhaps even seeking means of easing the difficult situation they had created by breaking off relations with the Persian Government. They have perhaps realised that, not only are the mass of the Persian people opposed to the granting of this oil concession, but that they were being antagonised and disillusioned, where there had been illusion, by the methods adopted by the Russians. Twenty-eight of the newspapers published in Tehran, including most of the less reputable ones, have announced their support of the Prime Minister's policy. In spite of the rigorous refusal of the Russian members of the Allied censorship to allow the despatch of any messages giving the Persian Government's version of the matter, the Persian case has been published in London, and this may have had something to do with the change of tone of the Soviet authorities. The Soviet Embassy has perhaps realised that it is unlikely that any Prime Minister dare now suggest compliance with the Russian demand, and that may be why Russian propaganda has now changed its tone. It has ceased to lay stress on the advisability of the Soviet being given the oil concession. Russian displeasure is represented as being, not with the Government's decision to postpone consideration of applications for oil concessions until after the war, but with the Prime Minister's alleged prevarications. Russia, it is said, had asked for this concession to prevent Sa'ed giving it into hands that might prove dangerous to Russia in the future. Sa'ed's policy seemed to be to facilitate the establishment in Persia of a base for Fascist aggression against Russia. Persians must realise that Russia would not allow Persia again to be a link in the chain of hostile countries that the capitalist Powers had tried to put around Russia after the Revolution. It was only the presence of Sa'ed as Prime Minister that prevented the removal of all misunderstandings. Sa'ed was completely under the influence of Seyyid Zia, whose partial policy was notorious. It is perhaps still too early to say that the Russians are prepared to swallow the rebuff over the oil concession and that, realising that they are losing ground with the Persian people, they would be glad to resume relations with the Persian Government if Sa'ed could be got rid of; but there are indications of a tendency that way. More concrete evidence of a change of attitude is that they have now promised to allot wagons for the transport by rail of about 3,500 tons of grain from the north; and that they cancelled a further demonstration which was being prepared for Friday, the 3rd November. This decision may, however, have been influenced by a proclamation by the Military Governor forbidding the assembly in public of more than three persons.

3. In the Majlis there is a certain amount of opinion in favour of Sa'ed's resigning so that relations can be reopened with the Russians. Meetings of representatives of Majlis groups have been held to decide who should be his successor. Dr. Musaddiq is favoured by the majority; but being a Deputy he cannot, according to the law, become a minister unless he resigns his seat. He is willing to become Prime Minister as a temporary measure, provided some method can be found of legalising his resumption of his seat as a Deputy when he withdraws from the Premiership. There is some talk of bringing in a Bill that will prohibit the Government from giving any concessions until after the war. It is argued that after the passing of such a law Sa'ed could resign without giving the impression that he had been obliged to do so through lack of support for his policy.

4. On the 29th October the Deputy, Dr. Musaddiq, made a very lengthy speech in the Majlis which created some impression. His purpose was to show

[30547]



that it was not in the interests of Persia that oil concessions should be given to any foreigners since they upset the political balance and did not profit Persia economically to an extent proportionate to their value. He went over a lot of old history; claimed that the reason why the Russians had occupied North Persia in 1941 had nothing to do with the defence of Persia against the Germans, but was solely to prevent the British establishing themselves there on some pretext in the vicinity of the Baku oilfields. He reviewed the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty with favour, and, at great length, the terms of the A.I.O.C. concession which he criticised as being unjust to Persia. He blamed the Prime Minister for having dallied so long with the American concession-hunters and for not announcing earlier the decision of the Government to postpone consideration of the grant of concessions until after the war. It was natural that the Russians, who were their neighbours, believing that the Government was considering the grant of a concession to the Americans should themselves apply for a concession. The Soviet Government could say one of two things: either that the concession for the northern provinces should be given to them to balance the concession given to the A.I.O.C.; or that Russia needed the concession because she needed oil. In the first case, the Majlis would certainly not approve. In the second case, he urged that the Government should reply that an international company composed of Persians and a limited number of foreign shareholders should be formed to exploit the northern oilfields and that the Government should undertake to sell, for a period to be settled by agreement, the surplus oil of the northern fields.

5. The Tudeh party has published a lengthy manifesto giving the aims of the party in general and in particular as regards workers, peasants, intellectuals, women, tribes, education and health, finance and economics. Among the political aims are: the independence and integrity of Persia; democracy; co-operation with all freedom-loving countries; freedom of thought, speech and pen; educational and religious freedom for minorities; electoral reform; the suppression of corruption in the police and gendarmerie. For the workers it envisages a Utopia to be achieved through legislation. For the peasant it demands an extension of peasant proprietorship by the distribution of Government lands and of the property of large landowners; loans of money and machinery; the establishment of schools and hospitals; the improvement of irrigation; the revision of laws governing the proportion of the crop to be given by the peasant to the landowner. For women it aims at the right to vote in elections to local administration, the reform of the divorce laws and the equality of wife and husband. In education it demands, besides a fundamental reform of the system, the introduction of political teaching and freedom from censorship of all kinds. It lays stress on the necessity for increased industrialisation and for Government control of economic affairs. Membership of the party is open to all Persian nationals over the age of 20 who accept the principles of the party, with the exception of criminals, persons who co-operated with the old régime and members of any other party. Subscriptions vary from 5 rials per month for persons whose income is 1,000 rials per month to 100 rials for persons whose income is 5,000 rials per month. Local committees must meet once a fortnight, and a central congress of members elected from provincial organisations will be held yearly. This congress will be the supreme authority of the party. Youth organisations are to be formed, who will be instructed in Tudeh aims and policy.

6. A step forward has been taken towards the execution of the Law of Compulsory Primary Education, passed by the Majlis in June 1943. A law has now been passed authorising the expenditure of a credit of 50 million rials on the increase of teachers' emoluments, on assistance to existing schools and on the construction of new schools. Further, the Government is to draft a ten-year plan for the construction or purchase of buildings for new primary schools in the capital and the provinces. The Ministry of Education undertakes to co-operate with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in providing facilities for the education of workers in factories.

#### *Economic.*

7. A representative of the British engineering firm of Sir Alexander Gibbs and Company has been for some time in Tehran investigating projects for improving the water supply of Tehran. One of these projects is to bring the water of the Lar River, which flows into the Caspian, to Tehran by tunnelling a canal through the watershed. Another, and much less ambitious, project, which is, however, only a partial solution, is to improve the canal that now brings water from the Kerej River so as to reduce wastage.

8. The Persian representatives to attend the Trade Conference in America have left Tehran. They are Dr. Ali Akbar Akhavi, Ahmad Akhavan and Qazizadeh.

#### *Persian Forces.*

9. Two commissions have been formed to enquire into the accounts of the Ministry for War. One will investigate the accounts for twenty years previous to August 1941; the other the accounts subsequent to that time. The present Acting Minister for War and Chief of the General Staff hope thereby to embarrass senior officers and other rivals who might return to the Shah's favour and oust them from their positions.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

10.—(i) Sarhang Darakshani, lately Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, to command the 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division, *vice* Sartip Khosrovani, relieved.

(ii) Sarhang Najaf Quli Abbasi to be deputy Military Governor of Tehran.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Bakhtiari.*

11. It has been decided to enlist 100 Bakhtiari tribesmen into the gendarmerie for service in Bakhtiari only. They will be armed, clothed and equipped on the usual gendarmerie scale. The bulk of them will be stationed at Deh Diz for the control of Bahmai and Taibi raiding; some will be at the service of the Governor to maintain order in the Bakhtiari tribe.

##### *Kermanshah.*

12. Decorations and rewards have been distributed by the Persian military authorities to the Jawanrudi tribesmen who co-operated in the operations against the Rashid brothers (see Summary No. 35/44, paragraph 11).

##### *Khuzestan.*

13. It is reported that the Sheikhs of the Beni Turuf, when summoned to surrender their arms, agreed to do so, and that 250 rifles have already been handed in without it having been necessary for the Persian army to take any forcible measures.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

14. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that Soviet activities in Khorassan as regards propaganda, cultural work, support of workers' movements and military measures, allegedly for security, have greatly increased lately.

15. The Russians are trying to buy secretly for export to Russia the entire stocks of woollen material, said to be 1 million yards, in the Isfahan mills. All this material is required for Persia's own consumption.

#### *French Affairs.*

16. The French Legation in Tehran, together with its archives, which have been in charge of the Swiss Legation, has now been handed over to M. Lafond, the Minister of the Provisional Government of France.

#### *Turkish Affairs.*

17. The Turkish Ambassador to Persia, M. Husnu Taray, who has been absent for some time, has returned to Tehran.

*Tehran, 5th November, 1944.*



[E 7229/422/34]

No. 26.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th November.)*

(No. 439.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the period of the 6th November to 12th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 13th November, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 26.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the Period  
6th–12th November, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

SA'ED and his Cabinet have resigned. The Russians having to all appearances dropped their demand for an oil concession—in fact, going so far as to pretend that that demand never was the important matter at issue but only Sa'ed's persistently anti-Russian policy—those timorous people, who include the Shah, his intimate advisers, with the exception of the Minister of the Court and many Deputies, who feared that their private interests might be affected by the prolongation of the crisis in Russo-Persian relations and who desired a conciliatory gesture that would make it possible for the Russians to re-establish relations with the Persian Government, prevailed on Sa'ed to resign.

2. Unless the Russians are very ill-informed, they must know that by his refusal of their demand Sa'ed has greatly increased his prestige and is, in fact, a minor national hero; not only that, but that Persian opinion was for the most part strongly opposed to the grant of a concession to the Soviet Government; that world opinion has not been misled by the artificial demonstration of hirelings, nor by the inspired clamour of a certain section of the press; and that not only have they had a considerable rebuff, but also that the Tudeh party is greatly discredited, having plainly shown itself to all to be nothing more than an organisation for the furtherance of Soviet policy in Persia. Moreover, the leaders of the party have realised that their Russian connexion is no guarantee of security; the leading papers of the party have been suppressed, its headquarters occupied by Persian troops and some of the leaders arrested. Persians may well wonder what services the Soviet Ambassador and the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs have rendered to Russia to merit the decorations whose award to them has recently been announced.

3. In broadcasts from Moscow, in the Russian press and in the Russian-inspired Persian press malignant attacks on Sa'ed continued. The similarity of the articles in the Russian and Persian press left no doubt as to their common origin. They included a certain amount of propaganda to the effect that it was only to Russia that the Persian people could look with confidence for protection against colonising Powers and against exploitation. The *Izvestiya* gave as proof of Sa'ed's treachery to his country that he allowed American troops to remain in Persia without any treaty right whatsoever. Reuter's and the B.B.C. were attacked for attempting to mislead world opinion by suggesting that Sa'ed had the support of public opinion in Persia. Certain Persian papers ventured to publish criticisms of Russian policy, usually offering, however, to make allowances for the apparent fact that the Soviet Embassy had been misled as to public opinion by its false Persian friends. One paper published what it claimed was the gist of a letter written by President Roosevelt affirming America's concern for the integrity of Persia and promising that America's treatment of Persia would be a model for all big Powers in their dealings with small nations. The editor of the paper claims that such a letter was written, but some time ago, to General Hurley, in acknowledgment of his report to the President on his visit to Persia, and that it was shown to the Persian Embassy in Washington with the President's permission.

4. The Shah has been considering the despatch of a special mission to Moscow to endeavour to appease the Soviet Government. It is reported that the members of it would be Ibrahim Zand (F.O. 233), Hamid Sayyah (F.O. 202; M.A. 258), General Yazdan Panah and Muhammad Ali Homayunjah (F.O. 87; M.A. 114), Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, all persons believed to be pleasing to the Russians.

5. It seems likely that there will be some delay before a new Government is formed. There are at least fifteen willing candidates for the premiership. Dr. Musaddiq appears to have the largest support in the Majlis, but no way has yet been found to satisfy his condition that he should be allowed to retain a lien on his seat in the Majlis. Failing him, the choice of the Deputies at present seems to lie between two elderly gentlemen, Hassan Isfandiari (Muhtashim-es-Sultaneh) (F.O. 99; M.A. 125) and Hussein Sami'i (Adib-es-Sultaneh) (F.O. 199; M.A. 254).

*Economic.*

6. According to an official statement, the value of notes now in circulation amounts to 6,332,899,160 rials. In addition, the National Bank holds notes to the value of 947,851,440 rials.

7. After a long drought rain has fallen over the greater part of Persia north-west of Isfahan.

8. The Cabinet has approved the promotion of the Baksh of Jahrum in south-east Fars to a Shahrstan. It will include the villages of Samigan, Hazar, Gardian and Kuhak.

*Appointments—Civil.*

- 9.—(i) Sa'ed Sami'i to be Under-Secretary of State for the Interior.  
(ii) Ahmad Ibrahim Zanganeh to be Under-Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry.

*Appointments—Military.*

- 10.—(i) Sartip Ahmad Khosrovani (F.O. 118; M.A. 153) to command the Persian air force. (He was recently bundled unceremoniously out of Tabriz by the Russians, as he wished to take action against Tudeh demonstrators.)  
(ii) Sarhang Neisar to command the 8th (Rezaieh) Brigade.

*Internal Security.**Fars.*

11. It had, it seems, been decided by the Government that they could not go so far as to give to Nasir Qashgai an official decree appointing him Rais-i-Intizam—that is, the authority responsible for the good behaviour of the Qashgai tribes—but they have agreed that he may be asked to accept that responsibility by the Governor-General of Fars. Whether Nasir will accept this ambiguous position is doubtful. See also Summary No. 41/44, paragraph 13.

*Kurdistan.*

12. A British officer who recently visited Baneh confirms that the village has been almost entirely destroyed, that the inhabitants who had dispersed are returning, and that the Persian military authorities are doing their best, with the small resources at their disposal, to relieve distress. From Persian sources it is reported that all the Baneh Begzadehs except Hama Rashid and his near relations have returned and made submission; also, that the Iraqi authorities are showing a better disposition to co-operate, which may lead to the arrest of Hama Rashid. The Persian authorities are anxious to get him out of the way before the winter sets in. Baneh becomes isolated for five to six months from the military stations of Saqqiz and Sanandaj when snow has fallen. Consequently, the size of any garrison left in Baneh depends on the amount of supplies that can be stocked there before the passes become snowbound.

13. Qazi Muhammad, the Kurdish notable of Mahabad, who has for some time been suspected of encouraging ideas of Kurdish autonomy and of being in league with the Russians, has arrived in Tehran, accompanied by three chiefs of the Mangur, one of the Mamesh and one of the Govrik. He is endeavouring to convince the Persian authorities, as yet with incomplete success, that he is a loyal Persian subject. He has in the past been credited with loyal service to the Government.



*Russian Affairs.*

14. The Soviet Embassy did not hold the anniversary celebration of the October Revolution as usual on the 7th November. They announced that the money it would have cost would this year be given to Soviet war charities. The reason for not holding the usual reception was that, having announced that they would have no further dealings with Sa'ed's Government, they could not invite members of the Cabinet, and, fearing perhaps a boycott in the circumstances by all Persians except their own stooges, they decided to hold no reception at all. An attempt to organise a demonstration of sympathetic rejoicing on the occasion by the Tudeh party was nipped in the bud by the action of the Military Governor, who dispersed the small crowd that was gathering at the party headquarters in defiance of the proclamation forbidding public assembly, occupied the head-quarter offices and arrested some of the leaders.

*Tehran, 12th November, 1944.*

[E 7406/422/34]

No. 27.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th December.)*

(No. 447.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the period the 13th November to the 19th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 20th November, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 27.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44, Secret, for the period 13th November to 19th November, 1944.*

*Persian Affairs.**Political.*

1. Persia is still without a Government. The Persians take a childish delight in any such "grown up" disease as a political crisis. Being individualists without loyalty, discipline or cohesion they are loth to sink their differences, fix upon a common policy and elect leaders to carry out that policy. The Majlis has met in secret or open session almost daily. A Bill to except Dr. Musaddiq (if elected as Prime Minister) from the provisions of the constitutional laws and to preserve his parliamentary seat against the time when he might resign from the premiership was defeated by 64 votes out of 91 cast. At subsequent meetings of the Majlis groups on the 15th November, Hussein Samii, Adib-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 199; M.A. 254) was nominated by the Mihan group; Murteza Quli Bayat (Saham-us-Sultan), F.O. 47; M.A. 65, by the Ittehad-i Milli group, and Sadiq Sadiqi (Mushtasha-ud-Dowleh), F.O. 193; M.A. 248, by the Azadi group. The Independents, after some discussion with the other groups, finally advanced three names as candidates for the premiership, Hassan Isfandiari (Muhtashim-us-Saltaneh), F.O. 99; M.A. 125, Sadiq Sadiqi and Samii (Adib-us-Saltaneh). They were subsequently asked to reduce the number of their candidates to two. Nothing original in the way of a policy or vigour in carrying it out can be expected from any of the above and the ideas in the minds of the majority of Deputies are probably that after the recent deterioration of Perso-Soviet relations it is essential to choose a Prime Minister who, though he will not give the Russians their concession, will at least not irritate them further nor be a target for their personal animosity as Sa'ed was, and that as long as the war lasts and foreign troops on Persian soil prevent the Persians from being complete masters of their own house no strongly nationalistic policy or vigorous Prime Minister is indicated or indeed advisable.

2. The Russian-sponsored newspapers and the Freedom Front press have kept up their attacks on Sa'ed, blaming his policy for embittering Perso-Soviet relations, his "Fascist" Government for suppressing certain of the Tudeh group

of newspapers and for oppressive action against Tudeh demonstrators. This Persian habit of kicking a man when he is down or continuing to revile him after he has resigned office suits the Russian book as they hope to obscure their recent defeat over the oil concession by a more concentrated attack on Sa'ed for his mistaken policy and past misdeeds which, they claim, are leading the country to ruin.

3. A further Tudeh demonstration on the 17th November on a small scale and unescorted by Russian troops, was stopped and dispersed by Persian police and military before the demonstrators had proceeded far. Two lorry-loads of bemused and unenthusiastic demonstrators from Sultanabad arsenal was stopped and turned back some 4 miles north of the town.

4. A society of Ulema has been founded in Tehran. The names of several eminent divines are among its members. Among its objects are the translation of the Koran and famous works on Mohammedan theology and the construction of a hostel for prominent clerics visiting the capital.

5. Sardar Akram, the Governor of Hamadan, has been acquitted by the correctional court of the charges made against him of illegally imprisoning certain people in Hamadan.

*Appointments—Civil.*

6. Mahmud Faroughi, fourth son of the late Persian Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Faroughi (Zuka-ul-Mulk), to be first secretary at the Persian Embassy in London.

*Economic.*

7. Reference Summary No. 42/44, paragraph 7, a contract has now been signed between the Persian Government and the British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for the survey of the Lar valley project. The survey is to be topographical and geological and is to cover the feasibility of the construction of the dam, boring of the necessary tunnels and the possibility of combining with the dam an hydro-electric scheme.

8. An anti-locust conference has been in session in Tehran since the 11th November. Representatives of Great Britain, United States, Russia, Afghanistan and Persia attended.

9. Further good rain has fallen over the northern part of Persia.

*Persian Forces.*

10. The Russians seem to have at last agreed to the despatch of Persian troops to disarm the tribes in the Shirwan and Bujnurd areas. Some 120 infantry under Sarhang Beglari left Meshed on the 20th October for Bujnurd. A commission composed of a military officer, the farmandar, the public prosecutor and two well-known citizens of each place will be formed to collect arms from the tribes. It is reported that Ali Khan Bicharanlu is already under guard in Meshed and Farajullah Zafaranlu is to be arrested shortly.

*Internal Security.**Kurdistan.*

11. There is little news of the operations against Hama Rashid and negotiations with the Iraq Government for his arrest and extradition are still in progress. Hama Rashid's followers are still reported to be engaged in guerrilla warfare and in harassing the Persian lines of communication to Baneh, where the garrison numbers about 2,000-3,000 men.

12. Distribution of piece-goods (71,005 metres), sugar (100,073 kilog.) and tea (998 kilog.) has been made in some of the rural areas of the Kermanshah governorate by the Cereals and Bread Department. An offer by the Kurdish chiefs to take delivery themselves in Kermanshah and to superintend the distribution was declined.

*Security—East Persia.*

13. Two U.K.C.C. trucks employed on wheat collection were held up by an armed gang about 15 miles north of Zahidan on the 8th November. Of the four Persian drivers and assistants, two were killed and two seriously injured. The robbers carried away the cash and personal belongings of the drivers. A Persian army detachment sent in pursuit has so far failed to contact the robbers.



### Russian Affairs.

14. A consular report from Meshed states that some eighty Turkoman soldiers of the Red army are said to have deserted and joined the Persian Turkoman tribes in the Bujnurd district. The Soviet military authorities approached the Persian General Officer Commanding in Khorassan for assistance in rounding up the deserters. A party of Persian troops, accompanied by a Soviet officer, surrounded the deserters and after a short fight some thirty-three of them were captured. Twelve Persian Turkomans have been arrested for assisting the deserters.

15. The same source reports that a platoon of Russian infantry has been despatched to Birjand.

16. M. Kavtaradzeh, whose name has become so unpopular in Persia recently that it is now rendered as Kaftarzadeh (hyaena spawn), is reported to be still in Tehran and indisposed.

17. The Russian Military Attaché, who recently visited Khwash and Iranshahr, is now reported to have arrived in Shiraz and to have made contacts with Nasir Khan Qashgai. Further details of this encounter are awaited.

18. The Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has protested against the opening, without prior permission of the Persian Government, by the Russians of a Russian Technical Engineering College in Azerbaijan. Other colleges, medical and agricultural, were to follow.

### Polish Affairs.

19. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 31st October, 1944, was:—

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total.
In Tehran ...	431	1,413	399	2,243
In Isfahan ...	78	488	546	1,112
In Ahwaz ...	157	704	315	1,176
	666	2,605	1,260	4,531

### Turkish Affairs.

20. His Excellency M. Jemal Husnu Taray, the Turkish Ambassador, is reported to have been appointed as ambassador to Rome.

Tehran, 20th November, 1944.

[E 7537/422/34]

No. 28.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 456.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the period the 20th to 26th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 27th November, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 28.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the Period 20th to 26th November, 1944.

### Persian Affairs.

#### Political.

1. At a secret session of the Majlis on the 20th November Mustafa Quli Bayat (Saham-us-Sultan) was elected Prime Minister, receiving fifty votes against forty-five cast for Sadiq Sadiqi (Mushtashar-ud-Dowleh). The latter had previously announced his refusal to stand as a candidate for the premiership, but had

been prevailed upon to withdraw his objections. Samii (Adib-us-Saltaneh) had also refused to stand for the premiership out of disgust, as some say, at the intrigues now being carried on by the Russians with their protégés among the candidates for Cabinet posts, their jackals among the Deputies and their hirelings among the press. It is more likely that, as a reasonably honest patriot (although without much force of character) he felt himself incapable, if elected, of choosing a Cabinet acceptable to himself, the Majlis and the Russians, to say nothing of the other Allies and the Shah. Bayat was subsequently received in audience by the Shah and instructed to form his Cabinet. This he has at last done, and they were due to be presented to the Shah on the 25th November and to the Majlis on the 26th November.

2. The Cabinet is composed as follows:—

Commerce, Industry and Mines: Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk. (F.O. 107; M.A. 140.) (C).

Minister of State (without portfolio): Fahimi, Khalil (Fahim-ul-Mulk). (F.O. 59; M.A. 82.) (B).

Finance: Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik). (F.O. 27; M.A. 33.) (D).

Education: Sadiq, Dr. Issa (Sadiq-i-A'lam). (F.O. 192; M.A. 247.) (D)

Justice: Adl Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh). (F.O. 1; M.A. 1.) (D)

Minister of State (without portfolio): Siasi, Ali Akbar. (F.O. 216.) (D)

Roads and Communications: Intizam, Nasrullah. (F.O. 92; M.A. 121.) (D)

Foreign Affairs: Rais, Muhsin. (F.O. 187; M.A. 239.)

War: Zand, Ibrahim. (F.O. 233.) (D)

Health: Malik, Dr. Said (Luqman-ul-Mulk.) (D)

Interior: Sururi, Muhammad. (F.O. 219.) (B)

Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Arasteh, Nadir. (F.O. 24; M.A. 32.)

The Minister of Agriculture has not yet been appointed, Nuri Isfandiari (Muvaffaq-us-Saltaneh) having been offered and having refused the post.

NOTE.—(A) signifies member of previous Cabinet.

(B) signifies member of previous Cabinet in same post.

(C) signifies member of former Cabinet.

(D) signifies member of former Cabinet in same post.

Thus, the only two newcomers to Cabinet rank are Mohsin Rais and Nadir Arasteh. The former is now Persian Ambassador at Bagdad, and the latter has had a long diplomatic career with, in addition, two posts as provincial governor. In general they may be said to be "a decent set" and more competent than many if given a lead. It was rumoured that the Russians had said they would not accept as a Cabinet Minister any member of Sa'ed's Cabinet. It is difficult to see on what grounds they can object to the only two of that category, viz., Fahimi and Sururi. The former was a Minister without portfolio and had, moreover, been absent on a special mission in Kurdistan during most of the period of the crisis over the oil concession. Sururi is a promoted Under-Secretary, who has had a purely departmental career and has never dabbled in politics.

3. The Freedom Front (Russian-sponsored) press continue their attacks on Sa'ed. They use three main arguments. To the politically-minded they say that Sa'ed's policy was one-sided and that, by wilfully estranging the Russians, he has upset the political balance. To the working classes they say that the refusal by Sa'ed to grant a concession has deprived thousands of workers and thousands about to become unemployed on cessation of their work for the Allies' war effort of the chance of lucrative employment on oil development. To the young *intelligentsia* they say (though not openly) that the British want this concession for themselves and, if they get it, will employ but few educated Persians, whereas under Russian development, the majority of the educated and more highly paid employees would have been Persians.

4. In the provinces the Russians are as active in their efforts as in the capital. From Azarbaijan it is reported that they convene meetings of various guilds, assemble doctors and approach Kurds and endeavour to get them to send telegrams of protest to Tehran against the non-granting of the concession. They even took the occasion of a meeting of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Society in Tehran to make speeches on this subject till the aged ex-president of the Majlis, Haji Muhtasham-us-Saltaneh, got up and said that such utterances were out of place in a cultural meeting.



5. A press statement gives the numbers of the Majlis parties as follows:—

Independents (Mufrid)	58
National Union (Milli)	30
Fatherland (Watan)	25
Popular (Tudeh)	8

#### The Court.

6. The Queen-Mother has left for Egypt to see her fourth child, Prince Ali Reza, who has recently arrived in Cairo from Johannesburg after the death of his father, Reza Shah. Malikeh Turan, Reza Shah's second, and subsequently divorced, consort, left for Cairo some weeks previously to see her only child, Prince Ghulum Reza. It is believed that Ismet-ul-Muluk, Reza Shah's third consort, will also leave for Cairo in the near future to see her eldest son, Prince Abdur Reza.

7. Workers' Insurance Regulations have been passed by the Cabinet on the 8th November, 1944. In brief, the regulations apply to the towns of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and Meshed, and provide for—

- (i) Classification of workers by trades.
- (ii) Medical examination of workers to decide their physical fitness for their present employment.
- (iii) Protection from dangerous machinery, washing facilities, extra milk, suitable clothes, meals, lavatories.
- (iv) Penalties for infringement by factory owners.
- (v) Insurance premia vary according to the nature of the trade from 1½ per cent. of the daily wage to 3 per cent., one-third of the premium to be paid by the employer.
- (vi) Insurance benefits graded according to the degree of disability from death down to minor injuries necessitating temporary stoppage of work.

#### Economic.

8. A new regulation for the monopoly of agriculture has been issued by Dr. Millspaugh. It supersedes the Stabilisation of Prices Regulation No. 140, and is framed to bring under one control the collection, transport, storage and issue of grain, the control of bakeries, and the functions previously performed by the Price Stabilisation Department.

#### Tribal Affairs.

##### Khuzistan.

9. The Acting Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché that up to the 20th November 1,000 rifles had been collected by the columns engaged in disarming the Arabs. One column only, he said, had encountered slight opposition. He said that he hoped the operations would be concluded within a month, as the Ministry for War had no desire to lock up so many troops in that area. (A recent report gives the strength of the Khuzistan Division and its attached troops as 7,555 all ranks.)

##### Kurdistan.

10. Hama Rashid, according to information supplied to the British Military Attaché by the Acting Minister for War, surrendered himself on the 18th November to the Kaimakam of Hallabjeh and the Chief of Police of Penjwin. Hama Rashid is said to have proposed the following terms:—

- (i) His future place of residence to be either Kirkuk or Suleimanieh.
- (ii) The Persian Government should not hold against him any acts of his subsequent to "the events of Shahrivar" (the entry of British and Russian troops into Persia).
- (iii) No acts of his tribe subsequent to his separation from them to be laid at his door.

No mention is made of extradition and the above terms could not be said to be suitable from the Persian Government's point of view. Meanwhile, negotiations between the two Governments are in progress in Bagdad. Another agreement signed, prior to Hama Rashid's surrender, by Colonel Saqafi, the Persian Liaison Officer, and Sayyid Sidqi, the Iraqi Liaison Officer, provides, *inter alia*, for the liberation of the fifteen Jaf tribesmen now in prison, a full enquiry into

frontier incidents where the inhabitants have suffered losses from raiders, negotiations between the two Governments for the handing over of Hama Rashid and the provision of safe-conduct for such of his followers who submit to the Persian authorities and desire to return to Persian territory.

#### Russian Interests.

11. A small party of Russian military has arrived at Gunabad. It is believed that they intend to make a reconnaissance of the road Gunabad-Firdaus-Tebas-Yezd.

#### French Interests.

12. General de Gaulle arrived in Tehran on the 26th November *en route* to Moscow.

Tehran, 26th November, 1944.

[E 7740/422/34]

No. 29.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th December.)

(No. 464.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary, No. 46, of the 27th November to the 3rd December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 4th December, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 29.

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 46, for the period the 27th November to the 3rd December, 1944.

#### Persian Affairs.

##### Political.

1. Mohsin Rais has refused the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, alleging the ill-health of his wife as the reason. He doubtless prefers his ambassadorial post in Bagdad to the uncertainty of tenure of a ministerial post in this Cabinet. So far, no one else has been appointed.

2. The Tudeh continue to try and carry out the orders they receive from the Soviet Embassy and the Military Governor continues to resist them. They announced a large meeting at their headquarters for Friday, the 1st December, but the Military Governor forbade entrance to their premises on the score of the recent emergency proclamation banning as unlawful assemblies any meeting of more than three persons.

3. On Friday, the 1st December, a reception was given at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to celebrate the 1st anniversary of the Tehran Conference, and the issue of the statement confirming Persia's political independence and integrity.

4. On the 2nd December, Dr. Musaddiq entered the Majlis at 9 a.m., and sprung a surprise on the Deputies. He tabled a Bill making it a penal offence for any Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister or government representative to grant any oil concession in Persia at any time to any foreign government or foreign oil company. He was successful in obtaining "double urgency" procedure for his Bill which was passed at 4 p.m. on the same day. (The full text will be given in next Intelligence Summary.) Dr. Musaddiq was probably induced to take this prompt and extreme action by consideration of what many intelligent Persians have been saying and thinking ever since Sa'ed's refusal to grant the oil concession produced the rupture in his relations with the Russians. Most Persians have thought that the Russians would not take this lying down and Kavtaradzeh's continued presence in Tehran supported this view. They agreed that the Shah might be won over or intimidated into promising the



concession, that the Cabinet might be bought or intimidated into granting it, that the Russians might object to and overthrow every successive Cabinet which resisted them until government was reduced to impotency. The one body, not from incorruptibility but from its size, its heterogeneous nature and its internal jealousies which could not be bought in its entirety was the Majlis. The Majlis therefore, garrulous, venal and lazy as it was, represented to them the only obstacle in the Russian path. What was more likely than that the Russians would urge the Shah to close the Majlis as a brake on the government of the country and as a saboteur of every measure of reform? Dr. Musaddiq may have argued thus and seized this moment to record in statute form the opinion of the Majlis.

5. A new governorate of Jahrum in Fars has been formed. It will include the districts of Semkan, Khafar, Kurdiyan and Kuhak.

#### *Appointments—Civil.*

6. Ahmad Divsalar to be acting Governor of Ustan No. 1 (Gilan) *vice* Nadir Arasteh appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.

#### *Economic.*

7. A clause will be inserted in all contracts for labour for the British military authorities whereby the contractor is bound, on the termination of his contract, to transport to their homes any workmen imported from their homes to the place of his contract.

#### *Internal Security.*

##### *Fars.*

8. The Governor-General, for some time past, had been toying with the idea of procuring Nasir Khan Qashgai's election to the vacant Majlis seat of Lar. His objects, he said, were to induce a more stable frame of mind in Nasir and, during his necessarily long absences in Tehran, to allow the influence of the more sensible and tractable Muhammed Hussein Qashgai gradually to oust that of Nasir. As regards the first of Firuz's objects, it is doubtful whether a sense of his parliamentary responsibilities would effect any lasting change in Nasir's unstable mentality. The second object seems equally difficult to achieve since Nasir would not be compelled to spend the greater part of his time in Tehran. A Shiraz Deputy, Muaddil, for instance, has not, to date, registered a single attendance in the Majlis since his election. Nasir Khan's own objects are not difficult to guess. He wants additional representation for his tribe in the Majlis and, should a future government decide to bring him to book for his past misdeeds, he wants parliamentary immunity. However, Nasir's schemes have, for the moment, gone agley as Firuz has had instructions from Tehran not to proceed with the election for the vacant seat, the Persian Government not being willing, by such action in the South, to provoke similar demands from the North to fill those seats rendered vacant by the rejection of the credentials of the Russian sponsored Tudeh Deputies.

9. Reference Summary No. 44/44, paragraph 17, the Russian who contacted Nasir Khan was not the Soviet Assistant Military Attaché but another Russian who had visited Shiraz some ten days previously, though the Soviet Military Attaché did evince considerable interest in tribal affairs and attempted to procure from the Governor, his host, a list of the tribes. As to the truth of the Russian offer of arms, ammunition and money there is only Nasir Khan's statement made to the Governor and to His Majesty's Consul. He might well have been trying to increase his own importance or even have been fool enough to think that British fear of such extension of Russian influence in the South might evoke a similar offer from the British.

10. Better security on the roads round Shiraz is reported as the result of a tail-twisting administered by the Governor to Colonel Khosrowdad, the Chief of Gendarmerie of Fars.

##### *Mamassani.*

11. Hussein Quli Rustam of the Mamassani has made overtures to His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz and has expressed his desire for guidance. If this chieftain, as was reported, is to act as mediator in the dispute between the two Zarghampur cousins, Abdullah and Khosro, this should make for a peaceful outcome.

##### *Khuzistan.*

12. The military operations to disarm the Arab tribes have been hampered by rain and the flight of a large number of the Beni Turuf across the border into Iraq. General Hodayuni asked His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz to intervene with the Iraqi authorities and induce them to disarm or expel the fugitives. He was informed that this was not a matter in which His Majesty's Consul could properly interfere and that it should be dealt with through diplomatic channels between the Governments of Persia and Iraq.

##### *Kurdistan.*

13. No result has yet been published of the discussions between the Persian and Iraqi Governments for the handing over to the former of Hama Rashid. It is probable that the Iraqi Government may decline to do so on the grounds that they have no extradition treaty with Persia, and that his enforced residence in Iraq at a safe distance from the frontier is, in fact, a better solution both in the interests of the Persian Government and Hama Rashid.

#### *Russian Interests.*

14. The Tudeh have now opened a branch in the sugar factory at Mervdasht near Persepolis.

15. There is some evidence to show that Russian propaganda in the Persian army is not without its effect. The chief targets are the warrant officers and the junior officers. With the former the line taken is that, as the backbone of the Persian army and as long-service men, they are shamefully underpaid and badly treated. To the young officers the approach is by an appeal to their professional ambition and by urging them to better their own chances of preferment and promotion by making a clean sweep of their old, corrupt and useless seniors.

16. On the 28th November a gold and marble plaque was unveiled in the Soviet Embassy to commemorate the Tehran Conference. A long speech was made by the Soviet Ambassador and a short speech in Persian by the Persian Prime Minister. It was worth noting that Sururi, the only Cabinet Minister who was also a member of Sa'ed's last Cabinet (apart from Fahimi, who is still absent in Kurdistan), was not invited.

*Tehran, 4th December, 1944.*

[E 7897/422/34]

No. 30.

*Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th December.)*

(No. 472.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for period 4th December to 10th December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

*Tehran, 11th December, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 30.

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the period 4th December to 10th December, 1944.*

#### *Persian Affairs.*

##### *Political.*

1. Dr. Musaddiq's Bill prohibiting the discussion of oil concessions by any member of the Government with the representative of any foreign Government or company (for the text see the appendix to this summary) and its immediate acceptance by the Majlis took the Soviet Embassy and its few supporters in the Majlis completely by surprise. Russian wrath at this further rebuff was evident in the comments of the Tudeh press and was made clear by the Soviet Ambassador in an interview with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.



when the Ambassador stated that the passing of this Bill had increased the dissatisfaction of the Soviet Government with the Persian Government. Kavtaradze returned to Moscow at the first opportunity.

2. Russian counter-action has taken various forms. An attempt was made by a Deputy, Rahimian, who, although not a member of the Tudeh party, owes his seat to Russian assistance, to table a Bill cancelling the A.I.O.C. concession, but for this no support at all was forthcoming. The Soviet Ambassador demanded the suppression of half a dozen papers which had supported Sa'ed and criticised the actions of local Russian officials. Persians, both official and non-official, have been expelled from the northern provinces on the grounds that they were hostile to Russia. Deputies are being subjected to anonymous threats and, to add point to these, a refugee from Soviet Armenia has been shot by terrorists. The Tudeh party has published a manifesto alleged to represent the views of a mass meeting of 50,000 Persians in Tabriz demanding the formation of provincial councils in accordance with the Constitution, the prosecution of Sa'ed, the exile of Seyyid Zia, the abrogation of military governorship, the dismissal from Government service of the "agents of dictatorship" and denouncing the Deputies "elected by force or money" as being unrepresentative of the people. A meeting did actually take place in Tabriz on the 1st December for which the Soviet authorities had attempted to collect in their own transport Kurds, Shahsevans and villagers. The response was poor. The tribes did not come in at all and the total crowd collected did not exceed 5,000, mostly workmen of local Tabriz factories.

3. It may be inferred from the terms of the manifesto that it will now be Soviet policy to work up an agitation in the northern provinces for the establishment of provincial and district councils and some measure of autonomy. Such councils are allowed for in the Constitution, but they have never been formed. It may also be assumed that anyone openly opposing Soviet policy in the northern provinces will be labelled as a Fascist and expelled.

4. The Soviet-inspired Persian press professes to see in the ready acceptance of Dr. Musaddiq's Bill and the rejection of Rahimian's proposal proof of the subservience of the Majlis and the Government to British influence and to the power of A.I.O.C. money. Russia, it is claimed, desires only to protect Persia and herself from the designs of "reactionary and imperialistic Powers." Imperialist Powers were sometimes forced to seek the help of and to profess sympathy with freedom-loving Russia, but once they had achieved their purpose they reverted to type, as witness British support of the reactionaries in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Persia. If the Persian people thought that Great Britain would protect them they should ask the oppressed people of Egypt, Iraq and Palestine what they thought of British protection.

5. To counter the "Freedom Front" formed by papers under Russian influence, an "Independence Front" has been formed by twenty-eight other papers. These include the less disreputable and more or less independent papers. They have made some bold and outspoken attacks on Soviet policy and on its instrument, the Tudeh party. Of the half-dozen whose suppression was asked for by the Soviet Ambassador, three have been suppressed. On the other hand, seven of the pro-Russian papers have been suppressed for attacks on the Government.

6. The debate on the programme of the Government produced criticisms of previous Governments for over-subservience to demands of foreign Powers, an insistence on the preservation of balance in foreign relations and bitter attacks on Dr. Millspaugh. The Prime Minister promised that he would make definite proposals regarding the future of Dr. Millspaugh within ten days—that is, by the 14th December. The Government was given a vote of confidence by 75 Deputies, 9 opposing and 16 abstaining. It is probable that the Prime Minister will insist on the retirement of Dr. Millspaugh or on a drastic curtailment of his powers.

7. Nasrullah Intezam, Minister of Roads and Communications, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

#### *Persian Forces.*

8. Sartip Muhammad Bagher Hushmand Afshar, who directed the recent operations at Merivan and Baneh, has been awarded the 1st class Medal of Merit.

#### *Appointments—Military.*

9. Sartip Mansour Muzayyinni has resumed command of the 2nd (Tehran) Division (see Summary No. 41/44, paragraph 11 (ii)).

#### *Internal Security.*

10. Persian forces have now occupied Sardasht in addition to Baneh. The General Staff profess to be satisfied with the military situation in this area now that Hama Rashid has been detained by the Iraqi authorities. Their desire to occupy Mahabad with an adequate garrison has again been blocked by the Russians, who, after holding out some hope, have recently given a definite refusal. There is, however, some anxiety regarding the supply situation of the Persian garrisons in Baneh and Sardasht. Snow has probably already blocked the roads for motor transport and the amount of supplies now stocked in Baneh is totally inadequate for the needs of the troops until the spring.

#### *Khuzistan.*

11. It is now reported that some 1,500 rifles have been collected from the Beni Turuf. Further operations seem to be hanging fire pending negotiations between the Persian and Iraqi Governments for the surrender or disarmament of certain sections of the tribe who have taken refuge in Iraq.

#### *Fars.*

12. There has been some raiding by Boir Ahmadis of villages in the neighbourhood of Semirum and Shahreza. Flocks of sheep have been carried off, including 300 from the Darashuri families, who had been left by Nasir Qashgai near Semirum for the express purpose of preventing Boir Ahmadi raiding.

#### *East Persia.*

13. The gang of brigands, eleven in all, who carried out the attack on U.K.C.C. trucks, mentioned in paragraph 13 of Summary No. 44/44, have been captured. It is probable that the leaders at least will be executed.

#### *American Affairs.*

14. Mr. Harriman, United States Ambassador in Russia, has passed through Tehran on his way to Moscow.

#### *Chinese Affairs.*

15. A Chinese Consulate has been opened in Meshed.

#### *Russian Affairs.*

16. While recent Russian policy in Persia has confirmed the consistently-held fears of many Persians, it has dispelled the illusions that had been created in others by the generally correct behaviour of Russian troops. Where Russia had gained respect, she has now lost it, and she is now almost universally regarded, and feared, by Persians as an aggressive, grabbing Power. To counter this, the Soviet-inspired Persian press is representing Soviet policy as being defensive, with the object of ensuring that Persia does not become a base for the hostile activities of imperialist Powers. As the source of such arguments is accepted by all Persians to be the Soviet Embassy, more particularly as they are used by Russian officials in conversation with Persians, the harmony of Anglo-Russian relations is not obvious to Persians in spite of the best efforts of British officials.

17. It is reliably reported that a Russian party recently made a reconnaissance of the roads across the Kavir between Gunabad on the Meshed-Zahidan road and Kerman.

18. The report in Summary No. 44/44, paragraph 15, that a platoon of Russian infantry had arrived in Birjand, is not confirmed. Russian officers have, however, been making enquiries about accommodation at Birjand for a detachment which they explained may be required to assist in the movement to Meshed of horses they have purchased in Zabul.

19. Iransovatrans are still operating transport services from Yazd and Isfahan over the roads leading northwards. The report in Summary No. 39/44, paragraph 14, that they had closed down these activities was incorrect.

20. The Russian school has now opened officially in Tabriz with an attendance of about 300 children. The school is divided into two sections, in one of which the language used is Russian, in the other Turki.

*Tehran, 10th December, 1944.*



## Appendix.

Appendix to Intelligence Summary No. 47/44.

Law passed by the Majlis on 2nd December, 1944.

(Summary No. 46/44, paragraph 4, and No. 47/44, paragraph 1.)

## Article 1.

In the matter of oil concessions no Prime Minister, Minister, Acting Minister or Under-Secretary has the right to enter into any conversation having any official or legal effect with any official or unofficial representative of a neighbouring or other Government or with any representative of an oil company or with any other person; nor have they the right to sign any agreement connected with oil.

## Article 2.

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet may discuss the sale of oil or the manner in which the Persian Government should exploit and control Persia's oil deposits, but must inform the Majlis of such conversations.

## Article 3.

Offenders against articles 1 and 2 will be sentenced to solitary confinement for a period of from three to eight years and will be permanently dismissed from Government service.

## CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

## (A) Miscellaneous.

[E 6657/23/89]

No. 31.

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.

(No. 103.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 558 of 1st October, 1944, a copy of a letter to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 16th October, 1944, regarding Franco-Syrian Treaty negotiations.

Beirut, 17th October, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Sir E. Spears to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency,

16th October, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to reply as follows to the message which I transmitted to him from your Excellency on the 22nd September regarding the conclusion of a treaty between the Syrian and French Governments.

2. The intention of His Majesty's Government in suggesting that the time had come to consider negotiating a definitive arrangement with France seems to have been the subject of some misunderstanding. Where a mandate is terminated because the mandated territory is become in every respect a fully independent State, the conclusion of a treaty between the mandatory and the former mandated State to define, for the future, relations between the two parties seems necessary and inevitable. Therefore, when, in 1941, the independence of Syria was promised, the formal termination of the mandate by a treaty was provided for both in General Catroux's proclamation of the 8th June, 1941, and in the simultaneous declaration by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on behalf of His Majesty's Government, as well as in the subsequent proclamations of independence issued by General Catroux later the same year.

3. Owing to the war situation there has not, since 1941, been in existence a French Government which was able to make a treaty of this kind on behalf of France. The question of a treaty has therefore remained an academic one during these years. Now that France is liberated, the situation will very soon be altered, and His Majesty's Government would gladly see the final formal realisation of the independence of the Levant States, in which they have taken such a close, direct and sympathetic interest.

4. The question is, however, more than a matter of pure form. The French authorities in the Levant still possess (by virtue of the mandate, and legally speaking) various rights and functions in some of which British authorities co-operate or are associated with for war reasons. In many cases Syrian authorities participate in these functions. His Majesty's Government have warmly appreciated their co-operation and hope it will be continued till the war is finally won. A great many other functions of government formerly exercised by the French have been handed to the Syrian Government either under the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, or under other arrangements. His Majesty's Government have always been in favour of such arrangements by which the Syrian Government would regulate their own day-to-day affairs by arrangement with the French authorities. They have frequently assisted the conclusion of such arrangements and they were the first foreign Power with the French National Committee to recognise Syria and accredit a diplomatic representative. But there are various questions which still seem to need clearing up and which can only be settled in a treaty or other formal agreement with France. It is not in Syria's true interest to leave them unsettled, and as disinterested friends, His Majesty's Government felt entitled to tell the Syrian Government that this was

[30547]

H 2



their view. Mr. Eden would ask that your Excellency and the President should judge the matter freely according to what you think is your country's real interest.

5. His Majesty's Government do not wish to prejudge what the treaties or agreements should or should not contain. That is for the Syrian and French negotiators to settle. As your Excellency will be aware from public statements made regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government, they do not seek to replace or supplant France or substitute British for French interests in any part of Syria or the Lebanon. Both France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. The Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements of 1941 state that when this essential step has been taken, and without prejudice to it, His Majesty's Government for their part freely admit a predominant position for France in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. As will be seen, this arrangement provides fully for Syrian independence and is in no sense contrary to the Atlantic Charter as is suggested in the Syrian President's letter to Mr. Churchill. Mr. Eden notes from your Excellency's message that the Syrian Government for their part are unwilling to recognise a privileged position for France or any other State.

6. I would add that there are no secret agreements about the Levant States, as hinted in the letter to Mr. Churchill. The policy of His Majesty's Government has been publicly stated on numerous occasions and is as described above.

I avail, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

[E 7238/23/89]

No. 32.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th November.)*

(No. 119.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 66 of the 7th November, 1944, copy of a letter from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 7th November, 1944, regarding Franco-Syrian Treaty negotiations.

*Beirut, 10th November, 1944.*

Enclosure in No. 32.

*Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir E. Spears.*

*Damascus, 7th November, 1944.*

Sir,

IN reply to the representations, both written and verbal, which you made to me on the 16th October, 1944, acting upon instructions from His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to expose to you in the following paragraphs the point of view of the Syrian Government.

2. The Syrian Government wish to thank His Majesty's Government for the interest they have manifested on divers occasions, and to express their high appreciation of their generous attitude towards Syria and her people.

They have also taken note with great satisfaction of the intention of His Majesty's Government not to seek to impose any particular procedure or conditions on the Syrian Government, and of their assurances that there is no question of their going back in any way on their full support for Syrian independence. I believe we can count on British influence to help us, not only in the present favourable circumstances, but always and in all circumstances.

3. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government cannot share the view that the reasons put forward by His Majesty's Government would justify them in entering upon negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with France. The motives which lie behind this attitude have been made clear by the President of the Republic in his letter to Mr. Churchill.

I may add that a treaty between Syria and France seems hardly necessary after the signature of the agreement with General Catroux on the 22nd December, 1943, by which France handed back to Syria the powers and functions which she

exercised until then in Syria's name. Moreover, the unpleasant memory which the Syrians still retain of former attempts to place Franco-Syrian relations on a contractual basis and of the sad events that accompanied and followed them does not seem to encourage the entry into new negotiations.

4. In point of fact, Syria now enjoys complete independence, both internally and externally; for it is in possession of, and effectively exercises, all the attributes of sovereignty, and has gained recognition of its international existence as a sovereign State by France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Arab States and other States; and France's recognition was moreover solemnly confirmed by the above-mentioned agreement with General Catroux, the conclusion of which has placed Syria in a position to fulfil her international obligations. This state of affairs represents the realities of the situation both from the national and the international viewpoint, and leaves no room for technical considerations concerning the Mandate and the League of Nations, which belong rather to the realm of theoretical discussion.

5. As to the effective exercise by the French authorities of certain powers and functions in some of which the British authorities are associated on account of the war, the Syrian Government do not see how these can be held to be inconsistent with the independence of the country, since they have ceded them of their own free will, temporarily and for the necessities of the war, moved by their established policy of full co-operation with the Allies, and their repeatedly declared intentions of placing all the resources of the country at the disposal of the Allied forces until the final victory of the United Nations is assured.

6. His Majesty's Government refer to the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of 1941, which deals with two distinct points:—

- (a) The recognition by the British Government of Syrian independence; and
- (b) The recognition by the British Government of a predominant position for France in Syria over any other European Power, "without prejudice to Syrian independence."

Except in so far as the latter point may be taken to define solely the attitude of the British Government towards the position of France, *vis-à-vis* that of Britain, in Syria and the Lebanon, we cannot see how these two points can be reconciled; for the full independence of Syria is clearly incompatible with the existence in Syria of a predominant position for France. The matter becomes still more complicated by the British stipulation that French predominance should be over "any other European Power"; for what then will the position be as regards non-European Powers, and especially the United States and the Arab States? Moreover, even certain Allied European Powers do not seem to agree to the granting of such a privileged position. It must also be borne in mind that a great change has taken place in the external as well as the internal position of Syria since that agreement was signed in 1941. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government are very glad to note that the British Government understands that the Syrian Government are unwilling to recognise a privileged position for France.

I am well aware, as you were good enough to reaffirm, that the British Government do not seek to replace or supplant France or substitute British for French influence in Syria and the Lebanon.

7. Despite the unfortunate policy exercised by France in Syria for twenty-five years, the Syrian Government are animated by the friendliest sentiments in their relations with the French; yet we cannot consent to tie our fate to that of France or any other nation in cultural, military, economic or political matters. These are questions of supreme importance to us.

The real interests of our country, its future as an independent sovereign State, as well as its geographical position, require that our policy should take into primary consideration the indissoluble ties, cultural, political, economic and historical, which bind us to the other Arab States; indeed, as is laid down in the Protocol of Alexandria, we cannot consent to any arrangement that may not be in their interest; we cannot even afford in any way to remain outside their circle; for the lessons of the present war in this matter have been severe and unforgettable. In short, both our national and our international existence cannot in any respect be separated from that of the other Arab States in war as in peace.

8. After receiving the British reply on the 16th October, and in order to arrive at a solution of all the questions pending with the French, and especially the question of the army, the Syrian Government resumed negotiations with the representatives of France on Tuesday, the 24th October, 1944; and you will



remember that in course of these negotiations, which lasted a week, we kept you informed of all the developments.

The French insisted that all the questions under discussion should be considered as a whole. They gave their desiderata to be as follows:—

- I.—A treaty of alliance.
- II.—A military convention providing for the presence of a French military mission.
- III.—A "convention d'établissement."
- IV.—A "convention universitaire."
- V.—A "convention consulaire."

The negotiations revealed that France's purpose was to ensure for herself a privileged position in Syria, but the Syrian Government made it clear that it was their intention to maintain complete equality in their relations with all the foreign Powers, and pointed out that the mandate itself did not confer upon the mandatory Power any such privileges. Moreover, Syria wishes to remain free from any engagement that may affect her independence, and believes that all matters regulating international relationship must be left over until the peace conference, where the fate of all the nations of the world will be decided. It is significant that the Syrian Chamber and public opinion are at one with the Government in this attitude.

The negotiations also showed that it was not the intention of the French to arrive at a solution of the problems; it was evident that they aimed at imposing certain limitations upon our liberty of action as an independent State by seeking to reserve for themselves certain powers and privileges, and attempting to force upon us a state of isolation which is incompatible with the Government's established Arab policy, a policy enshrined in the Alexandria resolutions. We, therefore, insisted that the army be handed over to us under the terms of the military project of June 1944, which the French had held up pending consultation with their Government. We could not tolerate that the army should remain in foreign hands and be used as a means of pressure to obtain a position which neither the Syrian Parliament nor the Syrian people were willing to concede. The troubles which may arise as a result of the present French policy are of a nature, not only to do harm to the Syrian Government, but will also impede the Allied war effort in Syria, and will inevitably reflect unfavourably upon the position of the united nations in the Middle East.

Desiring as much as possible to avoid this eventuality, and seeing that no agreement could be reached on the subject, the Government informed the French, at the last meeting held on Monday, the 30th October, that it was their intention to have recourse to the good offices of the British Government to arbitrate on the question of the army, since it is they who assume military responsibility in Syria for war purposes.

I have the honour, therefore, to request that our proposal be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government, and will be grateful to receive their reply at an early date.

I avail, &c.,  
JAMIL MARDAM BEY.

[E 7238/23/89]

No. 33.

Mr. Eden to Mr. Shone (Beirut).

(No. 208.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 15th December, 1944.

I HAVE carefully considered Sir Edward Spears's despatch No. 119 of the 10th November, in which was enclosed a copy of a note from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the need for a treaty or agreement between Syria and France to liquidate the questions outstanding under the former mandatory régime.

2. As you will be aware, I disagree in part with the statement of the position in the Syrian note. The Syrian argument seems in outline to be that General Catroux handed over all powers exercised by the French, by the

agreement of the 2nd December, 1943. The Syrians admit that the French have during the war the right to have certain troops in Syria and to exercise certain powers, but state that this is only because the Syrian Government have agreed that they should and they consider that this will all end automatically with the war. Therefore, there is no need for a treaty. The French, they maintain, have no longer any special rights in Syria except those that have been voluntarily accorded for the duration of the war only, and the conclusion of any treaty, therefore, will mean the giving away of something that the Syrians have already got. The type of treaty the French want will, it is further suggested, be prejudicial to the participation of Syria in the Arab Council.

3. In general, the answers to these points seem to be as follows: Whatever the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, may have been meant to cover, its exact scope is not clear from the text and there is a reasonable doubt on the subject. The French admittedly handed over a number of functions to the Syrian Government, so that the Syrian Government can be said now to be enjoying substantial independence, but there is a residue of rights which the French still possess, legally speaking by virtue of the mandate. The French have never given up the right which they have under the mandate to have troops in Syria, though they did promise in various proclamations to relinquish at the end of the war various other powers which they continue to exercise during the war. The reason that they exercise these powers during the war is in fact not that the Syrians have agreed, but because in General Catroux's proclamations of independence the French reserved them to themselves. As regards the reference to the Arab Council, I sympathise with the desire of the Syrian Government not to be hampered in reducing the barriers which divide them from other Arab States, but there is nothing as yet to show that the French are requiring from Syria any treaty rights different in character from those that we enjoy in Egypt or Iraq (even if they go so far) and such treaty rights have not prevented those countries from being independent, nor their participation in the Arab Council.

4. I do not think that it would be useful or desirable for you to take any initiative in rebutting the juridical arguments used in this note at the beginning of your new appointment. It would be far better to state orally that His Majesty's Government have studied the matter carefully, but adhere to the advice which they gave to the Syrian Government in Sir Edward Spears's note of the 16th October and to the statement of the position contained therein. I should indeed prefer to keep the whole question on a purely practical plane, for I am convinced it will serve very little purpose to get engaged in a long series of written notes.

5. I would therefore suggest that you should draw attention to the statements made in paragraph 8 of the Syrian note, which contains the comments of Syrian Government on their communications to the French and an account of how the matter has been left. It would be interesting to know what the French have proposed to the Syrians that the five conventions mentioned in that paragraph should contain. What limitations do the French wish to impose on the Syrians? What powers and privileges do they wish to reserve to themselves which, in the Syrian view, should properly belong to Syria as an independent State? How do the French propose to force a state of isolation on Syria as is here suggested?

6. As regards the Troupes Spéciales, you should reply that, while we do not think it is practicable to arbitrate formally in any way on this question, we have been discussing it with the French Provisional Government, but that the French have so far not agreed to make any progress with it, except as part of the negotiations for liquidating questions outstanding under the mandate.

7. I appreciate that you will not wish to embark on contentious questions at the very outset of your new appointment and that it will be desirable to prepare the ground carefully before taking the treaty question further. It seems to me likely, however, that the Syrians and Lebanese will perhaps raise these questions with you before you have been long in Beirut, and, while I do not wish to hamper your discretion in any way as to the best method of handling these questions, I would suggest that the foregoing line is the most likely to yield results.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.



[E 7753/5178/89]

No. 34

*Mr. Eden to Mr. Shone (Beirut).*(No. 210.)  
Sir,*Foreign Office, 20th December, 1944.*

ON your appointment as H.M. Minister at Beirut, it will, I think, be well if I set forth for your guidance the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards the Levant States.

2. First of all, I wish to confirm that it is the declared policy of His Majesty's Government to support the independence of the Levant States and to encourage its growth. This independence in the view of His Majesty's Government can best be regularised internationally by means of a formal agreement between the Levant States and France, and it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement.

3. The policy of supporting the independence of the Levant States was outlined by the Prime Minister in his speech in the House of Commons on the 9th September, 1941. His Majesty's Government will expect the French to carry out fully the declarations of independence made by General Catroux in 1941 on behalf of General de Gaulle. You will recollect that General Catroux's declaration of the 8th June, 1941, was formally endorsed by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. In addition you should bear in mind that the friendship of the Arab peoples in the Middle East is a matter of deep concern to His Majesty's Government, and that the situation in Palestine renders it very necessary that her neighbours should be peaceful as well as conscious of the value of our support.

4. You should co-operate closely with the Minister Resident in the Middle East and keep him informed of all political and economic developments in the Levant States. You should maintain the closest possible liaison with the British Service authorities and consult them in all matters where their rights and interests are affected. Further it should be your concern at all times to extend your assistance and protection to all legitimate British interests.

5. So far as the French are concerned, the rights and obligations of His Majesty's Government are contained in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements. You should adhere carefully to these Agreements and should refer to me if any departure from them seems to be required. In all matters affecting the territorial command you should be guided by the special directive on the subject contained in my telegram No. 128, Saving, of the 12th October, 1944, to the Minister Resident in Cairo, a copy of which is annexed for convenience of reference.

6. Apart from the duties mentioned above the principal concern of His Majesty's representative in the Levant States must now be to assist in the final liquidation of the questions outstanding between the Levant States and the French. The only apparent means by which these questions can be suitably resolved and the independence of the Levant States finally established is by an agreement or series of agreements between them and the French. The Levant States Governments have not so far been willing to accept this point of view, though it has been urged upon them. But I can see no other satisfactory issue to the present position, and you should therefore continue to prepare the ground for such an agreement or agreements, recommending this course to the Levant States as the best, and indeed the only course to pursue in their own interests. Careful preparation will be required if this policy is to succeed, and in view of the attitude that they have adopted towards the representations made to them both by your predecessor and by the French no immediate results can be hoped for. Nevertheless, I am anxious that the situation should be regularised before the end of the war with Japan. Disputes between the French and the Levant States seem liable to have wide repercussions throughout the Arab world. You will appreciate that our influence to secure a satisfactory settlement in these matters would be greatly diminished if British troops had been withdrawn from the area or much reduced in strength, while French troops remained or had been reinforced without any agreed definition of the French position.

7. It is not my wish or intention to lay down what specific provisions the agreements between the Levant States and the French should contain; still less do I wish to impose any particular conditions upon Syria or Lebanon. Assurances on this point have already been given to them. I cannot admit that the conclusion of agreements to liquidate questions outstanding under the Mandate and to define the relations of the Levant States with France in the future would be

derogatory to the independence of the Levant States. The provision in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements by which, "when this essential step has been taken" (i.e., the grant of independence) "and without prejudice to it, we freely admit that France should have the dominant privileged position in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power," clearly indicates that there is not to be any derogation from that independence. Moreover, the verb "admit" is, in my view, to be construed as meaning that, if the Levant States agree to place their relations with France on a different footing from their relations with Great Britain, then we should not offer any objection (*cf.* the entry of Syria and the Lebanon under certain conditions into the franc *bloc*, which we ourselves supported). It does not, however, mean that we favour a state of affairs in which the French would have predominance over the Syrians or Lebanese themselves. You may find a tendency on the part of the French authorities to interpret our undertakings in a sense more favourable to themselves. They certainly have in mind the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian treaties, and we have not discouraged them from looking to these as precedents for the Treaties they hope to obtain. Nevertheless it looks as if they would now find much difficulty in achieving any agreement so favourable to themselves, and provided no misunderstanding is caused it would be well to see that the French authorities realise this.

8. The provision of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements regarding the privileged position for France does not mean that we favour a state of affairs in which the French would enjoy discriminatory commercial privileges over other Powers. We could not admit that this provision was intended to apply to commercial privileges. The Levant States ought to enjoy independence to direct their commercial policy and no doubt to conclude commercial treaties and agreements with any Power they please, but I should want to consider very carefully any suggestion that they should give preferential commercial treatment to any other Power, and I believe that the American attitude would also be opposed to this.

9. To summarise my views on Anglo-French relations in the Levant: French and British interests in the Levant States are not fundamentally opposed, so long as the French Government follow a policy in accordance with their obligations and promises, and progressively enable the Levant States to exercise the independence which has been affirmed and reaffirmed in the name of France. There is, however, a long heritage of bad relations between France and Great Britain in the Levant. I am anxious to bring this state of affairs to an end and I know that the French Provisional Government share this desire. It will be your duty to endeavour to find means of improving the present far from satisfactory position in co-operation so far as necessary with the French representatives, and to use all your influence with British officials, civil and military, in the Levant States to this end.

10. One consequence of the bad local relations between the French and British authorities has been that complaints and disputes have tended to be referred to the respective Governments to be taken up on a higher level and have had a disproportionate influence on Anglo-French relations. It is most desirable that all such complaints and disputes should be settled locally so far as possible and at the lowest possible level.

11. You should, at your discretion, keep your American colleague informed as to the policy of His Majesty's Government, and the reasons for it, and carry him with you so far as possible, bearing in mind that without a measure of support from the United States your task will be much more difficult.

12. You should preserve correct and friendly relations with your Russian colleague, but I am not anxious to encourage Soviet interference in Arab affairs. I shall wish you to report fully on any symptoms of such interference, and in general I shall be glad to be kept informed regarding the Soviet attitude towards events in the area.

13. Both Russia and the United States of America have recognised the independence of the Levant States without any qualification and have shown no disposition to accord France a privileged position. I am anxious to avoid a situation in which we should find ourselves left alone with the French in opposition to the two nascent Arab States and to our two major partners in the war.

14. As you will see from my despatches Nos. 139 and 152 of the 1st September and the 19th September to Sir E. Spears, I am anxious that His Majesty's Legation should be brought gradually more and more into the foreground in relation to the Spears Mission, so that we may be able to pass in the post-war period into a purely diplomatic relationship without too abrupt a change. I should be glad if you would give this matter



further consideration. It is not in any way my intention that British influence in this area should be reduced or that you should be less adequately informed about the local situation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that reorganisation is necessary and will be beneficial. This may apply, to some extent, to economic questions, but so long as we are ultimately responsible for providing overseas imports to the Levant States, I regard it as reasonable, and indeed essential, that we should exercise our full influence on the economic situation there within the framework of the M.E.S.C., by means of the Five-Power distribution and supply committees that have been set up, through the Office des Céréales Panifiables, and in other ways. It is indeed possible that one of the readiest and least contentious means of maintaining British influence and prestige will be through the disinterested and sympathetic distribution and control of supplies. The French are, however, entitled to be consulted and kept fully informed on all such matters. While we cannot allow them to participate directly in the M.E.S.C., you should endeavour to see that they are kept fully informed on all local M.E.S.C. developments and plans, especially as they are responsible for the supply of the necessary foreign exchange for the purchase of essential imports since the entry of the Levant States into the franc bloc.

15. You should at all times bear in mind the importance of keeping His Majesty's Missions in Cairo, Bagdad and Jedda and the High Commissioner in Jerusalem fully informed of developments in the local situation.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

Enclosure in No. 34.

*Mr. Eden to the Minister Resident (Cairo).*

(No. 128. Saving.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, 12th October, 1944.*

IN view of the recent dispute regarding Levant States gendarmeries, it seems desirable to issue a directive regarding the question of French territorial command for the guidance of British military and civil authorities in the Middle East generally.

2. The position is that under article 4 of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of the 25th July, 1941, the matters covered by the definition of French territorial command, viz., "direction or control of public services, general security, gendarmerie, police, exploitation of local resources, &c." fall primarily to the French authorities to deal with.

3. Special arrangements have been made by which, on account of our military interests, we take a direct concern in some of these questions. Various security questions, the O.C.P., the advisory economic boards, are obvious examples. Our participation in these questions, in so far as they have been the subject of special arrangements agreed with the French, is not affected by this directive.

4. In other cases the control of the public services referred to has passed from the French authorities to the Levant States under the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943 (*e.g.*, customs, various monopolies, &c.) or may (as in the case of the gendarmerie) never have been under direct French control. This does not affect the application of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement as between the French and British authorities.

5. The French are thus responsible to the Allied Command for seeing that the administration of those services is carried on entirely in accordance with Allied war interests. If necessary we may have to back up their representations to the local authorities, but in no circumstances should we take direct action in a matter falling within the definition of territorial command without previous consultation with the French. Nor, except in cases of the greatest importance and urgency, should we act in this class of question without their concurrence. I shall always be prepared to intervene urgently through diplomatic channels if the French are unreasonable, unhelpful or obstructive.

6. It is important that no steps should be taken which go beyond the limits of this directive since to do so would constitute a breach of international commitments for the observance of which I am responsible. Please therefore bring this directive to the attention of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, and

suggest that he may wish to communicate its terms to such of his subordinates as it may affect. The Commander-in-chief is, of course, entitled to expect full assistance from the French authorities in the Levant States in regulating all matters in which they are concerned, including matters falling within the definition of territorial command, so that all matters are co-ordinated for the benefit of the general Allied military interests.

7. The foregoing is agreed with the War Office.

[Copies sent to Mr. Wiltshire and Major Howell.]

[E 7799/23/89]

No. 35.

*Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st December.)*

(No. 135.)

Sir,

*Beirut, 8th December, 1944.*

IN view of my impending departure from this post, I have thought it well to review the present political situation in the Levant States and the developments which have occurred during the last three and a half years in the attitude of the populations towards other nations and, in particular, towards ourselves.

2. In these countries (as, I believe, elsewhere in the Arab world), public opinion on external matters, in so far as it can be said to exist, is formed by the only two classes from which the elected representatives are drawn, namely the intelligentsia of the towns and the large landowners or tribal chieftains of the provinces. The peasants and the mercantile community are, with rare exceptions, concerned only with their personal well-being; industrial workers are relatively few in numbers and are not yet organised as a political force; while the youth movements, though vociferous and possessing a certain nuisance-value in the towns, are too irresponsible to be taken seriously.

3. The Governments, when formulating their external policy, must therefore seek a compromise between the desires and prejudices of the professional politicians, lawyers and journalists of the towns, on the one hand, and of the provincial chieftains, on the other. The interests of the two classes seldom coincide: the latter require above all a form of government which will enable them to sustain their own authority over their followers, while the former, though keenly interested in economic matters, are usually obsessed with those nebulous, undigested, but all-absorbing political ideas which so much appeal to the Semitic mind.

4. One sentiment is prevalent, however, throughout all classes in both countries; namely dislike of the French, individually and collectively. It is not universal, for certain sections of the Christians, particularly the Maronite clergy of Mount Lebanon and their closer adherents, and the minorities of North and East Syria, are imbued with French culture and have an atavistic but uncontrollable fear of Moslem domination which leads them to imagine that a continuance of French control is preferable to independence or to the control of any other Power. But the Moslems, who form some 75 per cent. of the whole, and a large proportion of the Lebanese Christians, are possessed by a determination sooner or later, somehow or other, to be rid of the French. It is necessary to insist on this point, since it is fundamental. No freely-elected Government in either State can do otherwise, in the present state of feeling, than base its policy on this consideration.

5. It should be added here that the opinions expressed in the preceding paragraph are shared by every impartial observer in the country whose views are known to me. The French themselves are, I believe, largely blind to it, or ascribe such anti-French sentiments as they cannot ignore to our own machinations, partly through their remarkable powers of self-deception, partly because practically none of them speak Arabic and their obviously defective information is therefore obtained either through unreliable and sycophantic interpreters or agents, or by contacts with the unrepresentative French-speaking minority elements who alone frequent them.

6. The attitude and activities of local Frenchmen must be held in the main to be the cause of this dislike. The recent affirmation by M. Bidault of France's determination to implement her pledges of independence for the two States is to be welcomed, but is simply not believed here, because there has been no local sign that this spirit is being translated into action since the various transfers of powers earlier this year, and because, on the contrary, all the indications are that the French are determined not only to exploit to the full the powers they still retain, but to force on the States, by any means open to



them, treaties giving France a *de facto* control far greater than that accorded to us in Iraq twelve years ago. The draft Convention Universitaire forwarded under cover of my despatch No. 125 of the 20th November affords a striking example of the mentality still persisting amongst the local French officials; and it would be hard to point to one French official or resident in either country who has evinced the slightest sympathy for the evolution of Syria and the Lebanon.

7. The internal situation is undoubtedly unsatisfactory. The following are the main reasons:—

- (a) National consciousness, after centuries of alien domination, is only now awakening. A sense of civic responsibility, and the willingness to make sacrifices for the good of the State, are consequently lacking. The Parliaments are ill-organised, without parties or policies, and internal politics are too much conditioned by the play of personal rivalries and jealousies.
- (b) War conditions, lack of control in the early stages and the presence of Allied forces, have produced a state of serious inflation which is causing much hardship and which would test the powers of the most efficient administration.
- (c) One of the gravest charges which can fairly be brought against the manner in which the French carried out the mandate is that they made no attempt to train up a team of native administrators against the day when the administration should become the responsibility of the States. On the contrary, they seem systematically to have set aside potentially valuable personnel who showed signs of independence of character. Consequently, now that the States are shouldering the full responsibility for administration in these difficult conditions, the Governments are heavily handicapped by the corruption and incompetence of the executive.
- (d) Finally, the French themselves constitute one of the greatest obstacles in the way of the efficient discharge by the Governments of their responsibilities. In view of the prevailing political atmosphere, it is perhaps not to be expected that the French should seek to lighten their burdens; but there is no reasonable doubt that the attitude of the great majority of local French officials varies between openly expressed scepticism as to the ability of the States to govern themselves, and active attempts to weaken the authority of the Governments in power by constant intrigue and propaganda amongst opposition and disaffected elements and minorities.

8. In the eyes of the people, who only see the results without knowing more than part of the causes, independence has thus so far brought few blessings. It is a tribute to the strength of the comparatively new-born national feeling in both States that so large a proportion of the population, while thoroughly dissatisfied with the shortcomings of their Governments, should still be prepared to rally behind them at the first hint of a conflict with the French likely to threaten a renewal of French control. Furthermore, Western standards of administration cannot be expected here. Security is on the whole good, money is plentiful amongst the agricultural and commercial communities, and, in Syria at least, the Parliament is showing a healthy spirit of criticism and the Government a realisation of its responsibilities. The general state of the people appears, indeed, to compare favourably with that in any neighbouring country.

9. Relations between the two Governments are nowadays characterised by an increasing realisation of the necessity of forming a common front *vis-à-vis* the French. Syrian claims to the "Four Cazas" added to the Lebanon in 1920 are in consequence being soft-pedalled, although the Syrians have made it clear that these claims would be put forward if ever the Lebanon ceased to align herself with Syria in pursuit of liberation from French control. There are undeniable difficulties, actual and potential, to be overcome in the economic field. The abrupt transfer of powers from the French to the States has caused inevitable dislocation. In particular, for the single French economic control there has been substituted two separate controls, representing separate and often mutually conflicting interests, but operating in countries the frontier between which is virtually unsupervised. There have been disputes between the two States over such matters as textile control and the allocation of quotas, and the question of tariff policy is causing difficulties. But in these matters the two Governments have shown a marked determination to reach agreement, and the Syrian President has recently

declared to the Lebanese that there must and shall be no cause for conflict between them due to this cause.

10. I come next to our own position in these countries, which is after all the matter of moment to us. At the time of the Allied occupation in 1941, the population as a whole knew little in favour of the British except that we seemed to have brought stability and wealth to every one of the neighbouring countries under our influence. We were remembered as having abandoned the country to the French in 1920, and our policy in Palestine had aroused strong and actively-expressed resentment. Hitler's victories had bred a conviction of our decadence and a corresponding admiration for the Germans. Having expelled the detested Vichy régime we now imposed another set of French indistinguishable, in the eyes of the people, from their predecessors. Our occupation was followed by a disastrous shortage of wheat and rise in commodity prices. Disappointment at our failure to take over direct control was followed by disappointment at our failure to force the French to implement the promises of independence which they had made and which we had underwritten.

11. It required every effort on the part of myself and my staff to improve this unfavourable situation. Bound as we were by the Lyttleton-de Gaulle agreements, we were unable at first to control the errors and incompetence of the makeshift Free French organisation in the political or economic fields, while the French, though obviously and painfully short of competent personnel, resented all our efforts to co-operate with them or to lend them experts. We had, in consequence, to endure the reproaches of the population, which persisted for long months, despite the intense propaganda put out by the French, in imagining that we were in effective charge behind the scenes.

12. Our position began to improve late in 1941 when I was able to arrange with the Middle East Supply Centre for the importation of 80,000 tons of wheat to avert the seriously threatened possibility of famine, and in the spring of 1942 to promote the O.C.P. scheme which, after a shaky start, proved to be the solution of the wheat problem. In the meantime the War Department, by its employment of thousands of local workers in the constructions of defences and of the H.B.T. Railway, had relieved all fears of unemployment. The gradual improvement in the general war situation began, too, to cause a swing-over in our favour in popular opinion. Later, when the war receded from the Middle East after Alamein and local politics began to rank first in importance, it was generally realised that it was the unremitting pressure of His Majesty's Government on the Free French which finally induced the latter to consent to the restoration of the constitutions and the holding of elections. Our local efforts to prevent the French from rigging those elections when held in August 1943 were likewise highly appreciated, and the Governments which emerged therefrom have paid handsome tribute to them. When, as a result of the determination of the new Lebanese Government to pursue its independence, the inevitable clash with the French came in November 1943, both States freely admitted that British action, both in London and locally, had alone saved the Lebanon, and by implication Syria, from losing all they had gained.

13. During the past year the whole local situation has changed. The successive transfers of powers to which the French felt obliged to consent after the November crisis, for fear lest their whole position should be irremediably lost, have given enormously increased power and responsibilities to the local Governments and a corresponding fillip to national consciousness. The unconditional recognition of their independence by, amongst other countries, the United States and the U.S.S.R. (both of which have specifically declined to concede to France a pre-eminent position here) have been a source of encouragement and have enhanced their sense of national dignity. Our own relations with the two Governments have become proportionately closer, and those Governments have proved their loyalty to us by willingly undertaking, so far as their capabilities allowed, any duties or services which our military needs necessitated. Throughout both countries liking and goodwill for the British are manifest, not only on account of the political and economic advantages which we have been able to confer during our occupation, but on account of the essential decency and disinterestedness of the average British official and soldier, with whom all sections of the population have at one time or another come in contact.

14. The question of their relations with other Middle Eastern countries is looming ever larger in the minds of the populations of both Syria and the Lebanon. All are desirous of closer economic ties, including the suppression of customs barriers and visa restrictions. The Moslems desire in addition some measure at least of cultural and judicial uniformity. Politically, the conception



of Arab unity has been steadily gaining ground, here as elsewhere. It might be argued that the mutual rivalries of Damascus, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo, and the mutual conflicting interests of the different Arab States, will always prevent it from having any practical significance. But the fact is that this conception is to-day the principal pre-occupation of the intelligentsia (see paragraph 3 above). It was given practical expression by the support furnished by the other Arab States to the Lebanon during the crisis of November 1943, and by the instant repudiation, by Christians and Moslems alike, of the pro-Zionist resolutions of American political parties. More recently, the preliminary Arab Conference in Alexandria has been hailed as the most important development yet to occur in the establishment of Arab solidarity. Uneasiness was shown in the more extreme Lebanese Christian circles (see paragraph 4) lest the result of this conference should be to place the Christian communities under Arab domination, but the majority of the Christians have accepted the clause in its Protocol regarding the territorial integrity of the Lebanon as a sufficient guarantee of their rights, and agree with the Moslems that the co-operation of the Arab States represents a powerful force in support of their national aspirations.

15. An important effect of this increased sense of the spirit of Arab unity is to strengthen the resolution of those who are working for the emancipation of these countries from any measure of French control, for it is generally realised that the rest of the Arab world resents any suggestions that the Levant States constitute a French sphere of influence and regards the continued presence of the French as a major obstacle in the path of the development of an Arab bloc.

16. On the future of these two States prophecy is obviously risky in view of the uncertainty of many of the governing factors. The conditions are also far from identical in the two.

17. Syria can, in my opinion, govern herself if left alone politically. She has many obstacles yet to overcome: first and foremost, French political interference amongst her minorities, secondly the absence of cohesion in her outlying provinces, and thirdly, the lack of capable administrators; and she will for many years require economic and technical assistance: such assistance should, however, be provided by neutral advisers freely chosen by her Government and paid for from her own resources. Given these advisers, the necessary equipment for her forces of public order, and freedom from foreign political intrigues, she is sufficiently mature politically to be able to ensure internal security and, judged by Middle-Eastern standards, a reasonable level of administration. In Shukri Kuwatly, whose term of office has still some four and a half years to run, she has a statesman who stands head and shoulders above his countrymen, and who must rank high amongst Arab leaders. Above all, her governing classes have that real desire for independence, within the framework of the so-called Arab world, which can at need induce in her population the resolution necessary to secure their aspirations.

18. Of the Lebanon I am less certain. In this mosaic of creeds, which has so far produced no outstanding personality and where the governing classes, though of high intelligence, lack character, the majority desire is rather for complete internal autonomy under the benevolent protection of one Power or group of Powers, than for complete independence. The Christian (chiefly Maronite) element which desires French protection against the Moslems (in default of protection by any other foreign Power) is in constant conflict with the much larger element (Moslem and Christian), which seeks first and foremost the elimination of the French. Sectarian divisions are already less pronounced amongst the younger generation, and in due time will die away, but at present constitute the main obstacle to Lebanese unity. My impression is that the Lebanon will require some outside stiffening for some considerable time to come, but that that stiffening cannot be exclusively, or even pre-eminently, French, if only because Syria, with whom her relations must inevitably be close, would never accept such a solution.

19. The attitude of the French is the crux. The time when the French could have freely obtained preferential treaties went by in 1937, when they first declined to ratify the treaties they had signed in 1936 and then by allowing the annexation of the Hatay by Turkey, showed themselves incapable of assuring the protection of the States. Since then, and particularly since November 1943, too much water has flowed down the Orontes and Litani, and the current cannot be reversed. The whole trend of French policy in the Levant States since 1920, and particularly its most recent tendencies leads to only one possible conclusion. The Délégation Générale, amplifying through their propaganda loudspeakers the clamant voice of the Christian minority under their influence, will sooner or later raise the cry

of "Protection for the Christians of the Levant" as a pretext for demanding the strengthening of their military forces, and will thereafter demand treaties on terms which will run wholly counter to legitimate Syrian aspirations.

20. I am entirely in agreement with the view expressed in paragraph 10 of Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch No. 517 of the 5th November. In this country, the people as a whole regard the British as the ultimate arbiters of their destinies. The great majority look to us, firstly, to help them to get rid of the French, and secondly, to establish our influence over these States in the same manner as in the rest of the Arab world. The orientation of the Arab States towards Great Britain, reference to which was made by the late Lord Moyne in his letter 48 (2) of the 19th October to you, on the results of the preliminary Arab Conference at Alexandria, is in perfect accord with the prevailing sentiments here; and we cannot refuse to accept the responsibilities which flow therefrom. If the French were to act as suggested in the preceding paragraph, and if we were then to stand aside, I believe that Syria would resist the French pressure, with all or part of the Lebanon, and would call on the Arab States, the United States and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics for assistance. The Lebanon might well be rent by a sectarian convulsion which would put an end to her separate existence; but, if the post-war World Organisation which is our declared aim comes about, Syria could hardly fail, in the long run, to marshal sufficient support to achieve her liberation. In these circumstances, however, our own prestige and influence would have irretrievably vanished here and would, I believe, be seriously weakened in all Arab countries.

21. If, on the other hand, we are prepared to stand firm now and hereafter in support of the States until their aspirations are satisfied, I am convinced that we shall be able to build, on the base of the goodwill already achieved, a solid position for ourselves which will buttress the whole structure of our influence in the Middle East.

22. Throughout my term of office here I have been guided by two main objectives, which must, I submit, be ever present in the mind of His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East: the successful prosecution of the war, and the preservation of our strategic position. How far I have been successful, and how far I have failed, I leave it to others to judge. But the objectives are, I think, unimpeachable; and the policy which I have outlined in the preceding paragraphs is, I submit, the one best calculated to achieve them.

23. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Resident Minister in Cairo, and to His Majesty's Representatives in Bagdad, Jerusalem, Jeddah and Paris.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS.

## (B) Weekly Political Summaries.

[E 6054/23/89]

No. 36.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 129, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th September, 1944.—(Received 4th October.)

### 1. General.

United States recognition of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the consequent elevation of Mr. G. Wadsworth to the position of United States Minister to these States, was announced on the 20th September.

The Syrian Government, since being informed by His Majesty's Minister that His Majesty's Government favoured the conclusion of treaties between the Levant States and France, have stated categorically that they would not in any circumstances make a treaty with France, nor even begin negotiations. The Lebanese Government, who have been in close touch with the Syrian Government, have adopted a similar attitude; they are, however, more perturbed than the Syrians appear to be regarding the effect of the news of these *démarches*, which has already become known, on those Christians who are already susceptible to French influence, and consider that their own already difficult position in the country has been weakened.

The Syrian delegation to the Arab Unity Conference in Cairo, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by two



secretaries, is leaving Damascus on the 23rd September. The Lebanese delegation, comprising the Lebanese Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese representative on the Higher Council of the Funds of Common Interests, is leaving on the same day.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

His Majesty's Consul reports that the Minister of Defence and Education, who, as reported in Summary No. 128, had tendered his resignation and who was understood to say that he would not withdraw it under any circumstances, did, in fact, withdraw it this week.

The Syrian Government is proposing to introduce a uniform programme of teaching in both primary and secondary schools.

The Syrian Department of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones has, it is reported, inaugurated direct telephonic communication between Syria and Palestine. The press state that the department is taking up the question of communication with other neighbouring countries.

### 4. Aleppo.

There have been no further disturbances. The French claim that the Troupes Spéciales who started the trouble in the beginning of September have been severely punished; the civilians arrested by the local authorities have been released.

The French demand for Syrian representation at the re-hoisting of the French flag over the Intendance (see Summary No. 128) has been countered by the Syrian Government's claim that the Troupes Spéciales had desecrated a mosque on the 6th September by chasing and assaulting the worshippers. His Majesty's Consul reports that the weight of evidence seems to show that a few Moslem soldiers did enter a mosque during a *mélée*. The claims are being discussed in Damascus but no decision is yet known.

M. Gault, who was Vichy Consul in Alexandretta until 1942 when he went to Aleppo and was put in charge of French propaganda, is to return as French Consul to Antioch.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

There have been a series of fights in Homs during the week between members of the Shabab Mohamed party and the Communists. On Saturday evening, the 9th September, five people were wounded, and on Sunday night six persons were arrested and a Communist seriously wounded. On Monday night a member of the Atassi family and a speaker in the mosque was attacked by three men as he left his house and severely beaten. One of the assailants was afterwards ascertained to be a member of the Communist party and this led to a general rising of the younger members of the Atassi family on Tuesday, when they searched the coffee houses in bands, routing out and beating any Communists they could find. They were later joined by members of other important families and though several arrests were made, the intervention of the leading members of the families involved secured their release.

On Wednesday, Helmi Atassi arrived in the city and after calling a meeting of all parties induced them to make peace. Since the middle of the week there have been no further disturbances.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

The decision of the Administrative Council of the Jebel Druze to ask the Syrian Government for incorporation in the Syrian Republic has not provoked any reaction from opposing elements, but the Atrash are reported to have been rather disappointed that the Government do not seem to have shown any particular enthusiasm in welcoming their gesture of solidarity.

### 7. Alouite Territory.

Anxiety has been caused by announcements by a son of Suliman Murshid that his father is returning shortly. A fairly influential deputation has gone to the capital to express their support of the Government's policy with regard to Suliman Murshid and of the Mohafez of Lattakia.

[E 1951/23/89]

No. 35A.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 102, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 15th March, 1944.*

### General.

THE crisis which the appointment of General Beynet threatened to precipitate has been averted. At the last moment, as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments still maintained their firm attitude, and as no reply to their protests had been received from Algiers, M. Chataigneau, at the suggestion of His Majesty's Minister, addressed them a letter couched in conciliatory terms, emphasising that the new delegate had definite orders to carry on Catroux's policy. The receipt of this letter brought about a considerable *détente*; and the Lebanese were prevailed upon to send the President's Chef de Cabinet to meet General Beynet on his arrival at the airport.

General Beynet arrived on the 9th March. It transpired that he had finally been given the title of Délégué Général only (not commander-in-chief), but that M. Chataigneau had not been informed of the change. He brought with him letters from General de Gaulle to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents, couched in studiously moderate language, and in order that diplomatic protocol should be observed as far as possible, advance copies of these letters were communicated to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

The general has now paid his official calls in Beirut and Damascus, and has created a favourable impression. His manner has been straightforward and friendly, and he is reported to have remarked that the attempted "Putsch" of last November was a "shocking mistake which must never be repeated."

### Wheat.

Total purchases during the period from the 4th March to the 9th March were 1,476 tons, a daily average of 246 tons.

### Syria—Damascus.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance are still away on their visit to Saudi Arabia, and Lutfi Haffar, the Minister of the Interior, is still in Palestine. The breach between this Minister and the Prime Minister will no doubt be widened by the fact that the Prime Minister has removed Dr. Aractinji (a personal friend of Lutfi Haffar's and a Christian) from his post as Director of Hygiene, and replaced him by Dr. Ahmed Qadri (brother of the Iraqi Minister, Tahsin Qadri). Dr. Aractinji has been given the post of Syrian Delegate on the Pharmaceutical Committee of the Supply Council.

The President of the Republic is leaving Damascus on the 16th March on a tour of northern and eastern Syria. He will visit Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Lattakia, the Jezireh (including the Duck's Bill), Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra, and may subsequently extend his tour to the Hauran and Jebel Druze after returning to Damascus. He is to be accompanied by the President of the Chamber, the Prime Minister, the Secretary-General of the Republic, the Director-General of Hygiene, Police, Gendarmerie and Public Works, and by other officials.

The administrative machinery is undoubtedly creaking badly, and much dissatisfaction is being openly expressed, even within the various departments. The intervention and positive interference not only of the Prime Minister, but also of the President himself, in the affairs of certain Ministries, is causing increasing resentment; and the eventual return of the Minister of the Interior will probably bring matters to a head.

The reopening of Parliament has been postponed until the 21st April, by which date the Government hopes to have composed its differences and to be able to present the Deputies with something tangible in the way of a further transfer of powers.

There were holidays on the 7th March in honour of the Prophet's Birthday, and on the 8th in remembrance of the country's first day of independence and of the proclamation of the late Emir Feisal as King of Syria. No invitations were issued this year to the Diplomatic and Consular Corps to attend the ceremonies on the 7th March.

[30547]

H\*



The visit of an Iraqi students' sports team has been well received. After the first of the matches played against the Damascus students, the president of the Damascus "Nadi al-Ittihad," in his speech of welcome to the Iraqi guests is reported by the pro-consul, who was present, as having said: "We want our Iraqi brothers to know that Feisal is not, and never will be, King of Iraq alone," a sentiment which was not received with unmixed approbation.

Aref Nakad, recently released from internment, has been appointed to his former post of Director-General of the Ministry of Justice. The Prime Minister, in explaining this appointment to the political officer, hinted that Aref Nakad was of Druze origin and that it was hoped to be able to use him as a "go-between" with the Druze in various matters.

#### *Aleppo.*

The two holidays, the Prophet's Birthday and Syrian Independence Day, passed peaceably in Aleppo, with large crowds and processions in the streets. The Mohafez, who held no reception on either holiday, left on the second day for Damascus. It is understood that he wanted to discuss questions connected with future cotton yarn supplies and with the President's forthcoming visit.

At Azaz, Moslem feelings were excited by insults used by a Christian in an Armenian Church during a special ceremony which the French frontier officer attended. Shops were closed by demonstrators, but the incident seems to be at an end.

Government officials and railway workers, who had threatened to strike, have been granted an advance which is, in effect, a present of a month's pay. There are still no signs of any price control.

#### *Corrigendum.*

Summary No. 100, dated the 1st March, referred to the Mohafez as having officially presided at the recent second-degree Frontier Commission meetings in Aleppo. This was based on a statement made to His Majesty's Minister by the Syrian Prime Minister, but is incorrect. It seems that the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, while staying at Aleppo on his way to Riyadh, did, in fact, attempt to insist on the presidency of the Mohafez, but failed, the Vali of Urfa being unwilling to negotiate on this basis. The Mohafez merely attended the meetings and took no real part.

#### *Homs and Hama.*

No detailed report received.

#### *Jebel Druze.*

Members of the Assali and Halabi families have visited the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister to ask for the removal of the Mohafez. The Prime Minister is reported to have told them that this matter did not concern the Government, but was for Soltan Pasha el-Atrash to decide. The latter is believed to favour the removal of the present Mohafez, but cannot make up his mind whether the Emir Hassan should replace him, as the Emir is suspected of pro-French leanings. He is, in fact, alleged to have come to an understanding with General Catroux, when the latter visited the Levant during the Lebanese crisis, that, in exchange for French support for his ambitions, he would advocate the retention of French control in the Jebel. It must be said that there are no signs of his having fulfilled his side of the bargain, if, indeed, any such agreement was ever made. On the other hand, his attitude during the crisis itself was markedly ambiguous. Sultan Pasha intends to call a family council in the near future and thereafter to visit the President of the Republic.

Several native officers of the squadrons of the *Groupement Druze* stationed in Soueida have asked to be transferred, in view of the harshness with which, it is alleged, they are treated by Commandant Monclar. It is also reported that officers of the *Groupement* are being told that General Catroux has insisted, in his talks with the Syrian Government, that under any arrangements which may eventually be made for the transfer of the native levies to Syrian control the *Groupement* must, exceptionally, remain under French command.

#### *Alaouite Territory.*

Tension over the shooting affray referred to in last week's summary has subsided, and the area is now quiet.

The Mohafez reports that the Prime Minister has agreed in principle to settle the outstanding disputes involving Suleiman Murshid by a court of arbitration. The court will be composed of three Syrian judges, whose decisions will be referred automatically to the responsible authority for execution according to ordinary court procedure.

#### *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

The Mohafez of the Euphrates has been given the task of settling the Fedaan-Wulda disputes with the help of a committee of his own choosing (see "Tribal" below), and is thus faced with his first real problem as an administrator.

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has returned from Damascus and his subsequent activities seem to suggest that he is firmly back in the saddle. His first act, carried out on instructions from the central Government, was to send into *résidence forcée* at Aleppo Daoud Shammas, a Syrian Catholic notable of Hasssetche, who has been a disturbing element in the Jezireh, and would have been expelled to Deir ez-Zor with Michel Dom (see Summary No. 100) had he not been absent at the time. According to the Mohafez, the telegram which resulted in the arrest of Dom and the two other minority leaders, was sent by the Prime Minister after the *délégué* in Damascus had shown him petitions by various minorities in the Jezireh requesting French protection against the Syrian Government. Dom has now resigned from his post as president of the Kamichlie municipality.

The reaction of the French authorities in Kamichlie to the arrest of Shammas was to despatch the kaimakam, Philippe Farah, in a French vehicle to plead with the Mohafez at Hasssetche. The result of this intervention is awaited by the local Catholic community, who are resentful at what they consider to be a high-handed action.

#### *Tribal.*

A dispute has broken out between the Shammar and the Jubbour in the Jezireh, and there have been a few casualties. The French authorities are reported to have troops and aircraft on the spot.

Sheikh Nuri, eldest son of the Emir Mujhim, has expressed the opinion that the Government will find no one capable of controlling and administering the tribes, and that what is wanted now is "a son of the Arabs," meaning a Bedouin, such as the Emir Abdullah. There is reported to be considerable feeling in the Euphrates area in favour of the Emir Abdullah.

The Mohafez of the Euphrates has been appointed to settle the Fedaan-Wulda disputes. It is understood that his committee will include a rich sheep-dealer of Deir ez-Zor, the revenue officer from Raqqa representing the new kaimakam not yet arrived, an officer of the Cadastre, a tribal sheikh to represent each party, and Bedouin Control Officer. The Wulda supporters have stated—to the British—that they would not recognise any committee as equitable unless it included a British representative; it was explained that the choice of the committee lay entirely in the hands of the Mohafez.

#### *Frontier.*

Nothing of importance.

#### *The Lebanon.*

The Lebanese Prime Minister stated on the 9th March that he had finally made up his mind to bring the Bill for unseating Emil Eddé before the Chamber at its next sitting, as he was now assured of the necessary majority. This sitting is expected to take place in the course of the next week.

On the 8th March the Prime Minister and Vice-President attended a ceremony in honour of the Prophet's Birthday, held at Kabb Elias in the Bekaa, in the course of which the former made a pointed reference to "certain anti-governmental activities" which had recently been carried on in the Bekaa, and



stressed the Government's intention to preserve their independence. This allusion to the activities of certain French officers and agents in the region was lost on no one present, least of all the French political officer, and did much to restore the Government's waning prestige in the area. Nevertheless, a Mohafez has yet to be appointed at Zahlé.

The Prophet's Birthday was celebrated in Beirut on the 7th March, when the President and Government and Allied representatives attended a ceremony at the principal mosque. Speeches were made by the Mufti and President, the latter's containing a much-appreciated passage of eulogy of Christian-Moslem co-operation.

#### Press and Propaganda.

There has been a marked increase in references to the Palestine question in relation to Arab unity. Field-Marshal Smuts's declarations concerning Palestine have naturally provoked much adverse comment. One newspaper, however, takes the view that, as Palestine is at the moment supporting half a million Jews, mainly on agriculture, and is capable, through industrial development, of supporting millions, the Arabs should combat the Jewish invasion by developing their own industrial resources. The local newspapers express surprise at the attitude shown in the American press at a time when the United States are trying to win the consent of the Arab countries for the exploitation of their oilfields.

The Damascus French paper, *Echos de Syrie*, has again been suspended *sine die*. The reason given is that the editor, George Phares, has continued his campaign against Bishop Farraj (see Summary No. 100) by distributing leaflets with an Arabic version of his diatribe against the bishop.

The universal complaint against the high cost of living continues.

**Enemy Wireless Propaganda.**—Axis propaganda has continued to make much capital out of the Wagner resolution and other signs of pro-Zionist activity in the United States.

#### 10. Frontier.

Difficulties experienced by Syrian cultivators in collecting crops from land they own in Turkey are at least as great this summer as in previous years. There is no sign of a more accommodating attitude by the Turkish officials either towards the Syrians or the French frontier officers.

#### 11. The Lebanon.

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, who has come to open a legation, preparatory to the arrival of the minister, called officially on the Lebanese Government on the 14th September.

Beirut has now been without Arabic newspapers for some days, as a result of a long drawn-out squabble over wage rates between newspaper proprietors and typesetters. Both sides are appealing for support and no solution appears to be in sight.

The visits of senior French officers to the Tripoli area and various military parades held there recently have caused a certain uneasiness which is also partly due to the effect of increased French propaganda and rumours that they intend to extend their hold over the country after the war. The Maronite clergy are blamed for attempting to cause dissension between Christians and Moslems by continually referring to the danger of Moslem domination if French protection were to cease. In general this and other activities have not helped to improve Franco-Lebanese relations in the region.

There has been more trouble in the always lawless region of Hermel, in the North Bekaa, as a result of a decision on the part of the Government to effect the arrest of certain persons wanted in connexion with previous troubles. A large force of gendarmerie was successfully defied by the population which sent telegrams of protest to Lebanese and Allied authorities demanding their immediate withdrawal. It is doubtful whether the Government will be able to impose their authority in this remote area, which even under Turkish rule was constantly in a state of disaffection.

[E 6155/23/89]

No. 37.

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 130, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon*, 27th September, 1944.—(Received 9th October.)

#### 1. General.

THE Syrian Government have returned a categorical refusal to the proposal made by General Beynet for the conclusion of a treaty between Syria and France. His Majesty's Consul in Damascus reports that there is reason to believe that Iraqi political personalities at present in Syria have approved the Syrian refusal and exercised their influence to reinforce the Syrian attitude. His Majesty's Consul also reports that relations between His Majesty's Government and Syria have been overshadowed by the fact that the Syrians consider that our advocacy of a treaty is an attempt by us to impose a treaty with France on the Syrian Government.

The Lebanese Government also, after a special Cabinet meeting and discussions with the Syrians, held fast to their determination not to conclude a treaty with the French. At a meeting with General Beynet on the 22nd September the President informed him in this sense, adding that the Lebanese did not propose to enter into any international obligations until the Peace Conference. The French representatives appear to have tried, without success, to convince them that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. would eventually give them any support. The Lebanese have now stated their intention of explaining their views on the treaty question to the United States and Soviet representatives.

The depression induced on the Lebanese by the notification of His Majesty's Government's views on the treaty question was considerably lightened by the unconditional recognition of the Levant States by the United States Government, which was announced on the 19th September, and particularly by the fact that this announcement made no reference to any recognition by the United States Government of a privileged position of France in the Levant States. The appointment of Mr. Wadsworth as first United States Minister is warmly



welcomed, as he has acquired the reputation of being a convinced partisan of Lebanese and Syrian aspirations.

The news of Mr. Wadsworth's appointment as Minister has also been loudly acclaimed in Syria as evidence of the good relations between the three countries, and of American support for the integral independence of the Levant States.

It was only on the 22nd September that General de Gaulle acknowledged the telegram of congratulation sent to him a month before by the Lebanese President on the occasion of the liberation of Paris (see Weekly Summary No. 126, paragraph 1, and Beirut telegram No. 57, Saving).

### 3. Damascus.

The usual reception for the Diplomatic Corps was held at the Presidency on the Feast of Bairam. General Beynet and His Majesty's Minister took advantage of their joint meeting to inform the President that The King and the French Committee had accorded their agreement to the appointments of Dr. Kayali and Adnan Atassi as Ministers in London and Paris respectively.

### 4. Aleppo.

Throughout the week Government offices have been closed for the feast of Bairam, and His Majesty's Consul reports that the town has been full of peaceful crowds.

On the 19th September a representative of the head of the Armenian Orthodox Church in Soviet Armenia, a certain Dr. Aprahamian, visited Aleppo and his arrival was made the occasion of a considerable welcome by many hundreds outside the town. While his mission was declaredly to enquire into the situation of local branches of the Armenian Orthodox Church, His Majesty's Consul reports that a much wider range of affairs was examined. Certainly, one aim of the visit was the re-establishment of closer ties between Armenia and the very large Armenian community in Aleppo, of which a great part has not yet been absorbed into the local population.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

The Political Officer reports that during a renewed outbreak of the fight between the Communists and members of the Shebab Mohamed party (see Weekly Summary No. 129, paragraph 5) one member of the party was shot and killed. The bazaars were closed on the 24th and also partly on the 25th September. The murderer is under arrest and the local Communist leader has fled to Hama in order to avoid reprisals. Guards are posted at the Serail and round the prison in which the murderer is detained.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

In the Alaouite territory there was trouble between the French and Syrian authorities as a result of a report that three spies had landed on the coast. The French sent out parties to search for the men, but the local authorities and population refused to hand them over, as it transpired that they were local fishermen. The French thereupon used force to capture them and the Mohafez lodged a strong protest, which resulted in their release.

### 8. Euphrates and the Jezirah.

Renewed tension is reported by His Majesty's Consul, Deir ez Zor, between the Fedaan and the Wulda (see Weekly Summary No. 128, paragraph 8) as a result of a further incident which occurred on the 9th September, when a black car drove up to some Fedaan shepherd boys in the desert and shot six of them. It seems probable that the killing was carried out by the Wulda in revenge for previous losses. This is corroborated by the Bedouin Control Officer, who says that when he sent his men to bring in for interrogation Sheikh Nassar el Farraj of the Wulda, who owns a black car, the sheikh made off in the car towards Aleppo, and has not been seen since. The Fedaan are reported to be excited by the incident, but a flight over their territory by the Bedouin Control Officer has disproved stories that they were massing for an attack. The French have suggested that a tribal Majlis should be held shortly to settle all the Fedaan-Wulda disputes. The opportunity is a good one, as the Political Officer has suggested to the French Délégué, to inflict on the Fedaan a severe fine of automatics and rifles.

### 9. Tribal.

His Majesty's Consul, Deir ez Zor, reports that a Majlis will probably be held in Hassatche on the 21st September to consider the recent dispute between the Kikieh and the Baggara tribes (see Weekly Summary No. 128, the 13th September, paragraph 9).

### 11. The Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government were informed by the Persian delegate on the 22nd September that his Government had decided to recognise their independence. This will put an end to the anomalous position under which the Persian representative is accredited to the French Délégation Générale and not to the States' Governments, a position which has already caused protocol difficulties (see Weekly Summary No. 127, paragraph 1).

The Lebanese delegation to the preliminary Arab Conference at Alexandria (see Weekly Summary No. 129, paragraph 1) left Beirut for Egypt on the 23rd September. Before their departure a hastily convened meeting of the Chamber of Deputies was held to consider their terms of reference. Certain Deputies asked for an assurance that the delegates would uphold the principle of complete Lebanese independence and would not commit the Lebanon to becoming part of any sort of Arab federation; the Prime Minister made categorical declarations in this sense, saying that the Government's policy aimed at a completely independent Lebanon within its present boundaries. The House appeared satisfied.

On the 21st September the first anniversary of the election of the President of the Republic was celebrated in Beirut by a military parade and a monster garden-party. The Government was at pains to organise demonstrations, obviously as a counterblast to those which followed the liberation of Paris; a record number of shots must have been fired in the air at both ceremonies and there was a lavish display of Lebanese flags. Much of the enthusiasm, however, appeared genuine, and was displayed as much in the Christian as in the Moslem quarters of the town. During the garden-party the President addressed the nation in a speech which was broadcast appealing for unity amongst all the Lebanese.

A disturbance took place in South Lebanon on the 20th September between adherents of two Deputies, Ahmed el Assad and Khazim el Khalil, who are bitter rivals. There appear to have been three deaths and several wounded. Beyond the arrest of certain persons alleged to be implicated, no strong action has been taken by the Government against the leaders, and the trouble does not appear to be at an end.

At a further meeting of the Chamber on the 25th September the Government were severely heckled by a number of Deputies regarding the arrangement made by them with the Beirut merchants for compounding for arrears of war profits tax. The arrangement was criticised as being unconstitutional and inadequate, and the debate had to be adjourned.

At a large dinner held on the 19th September the Lebanese Prime Minister presented His Majesty's Minister with a cheque representing the value of ten Spitfires as the result of the appeal sponsored by the Lebanese Government earlier in the year. This result, though less than was at one time expected, compares favourably with that obtained in Syria. His Majesty's Minister, in the course of his speech, read a message of thanks from the Minister of Aircraft Production.

The strike of typesetters which has deprived Beirut of its Arabic newspapers has at last been settled.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The local press, welcoming the recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the United States and Persia, also acclaims the Prime Minister's statement to the effect that the Lebanese delegation to the Arab Conference at Alexandria will, in all circumstances, safeguard the independence of the Lebanon.

An interesting report has appeared in several Beirut Arabic papers to the effect that two Catholic bishops resident in Cairo have received instructions from the Vatican to get in touch with the delegates at the preliminary Arab Conference being held at Alexandria, and to tell them that (a) the age of enmity between the Catholic Church and the Moslems has passed; (b) the Catholic religion preaches tolerance; and (c) what the Catholic Church has done for the Jews in this war has been inspired by purely humanitarian motives and that the Papal See will adopt an attitude of absolute neutrality towards the Arab-Jewish question.



*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*

Radio-Berlin on the 19th September broadcast a speech by Haj Amin el Hussein addressed to the Arabs of Palestine and to the Arab delegates attending the Alexandria Conference urging them to defend Palestine against the British and the Jews.

On the 21st September the Free Arab Station, referring to the formation of the Jewish Brigade under British authority, said that it proves that Britain has given way to Jewish claims. The British army has no need whatever of a Jewish Brigade. The speaker urged the Arabs to form ten divisions to show the world that they are capable of defending themselves.

[E 6413/23/89]

No. 38.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 131, Secret—Syria and the Lebanon, 4th October, 1944.—(Received 20th October.)*

1. *General.*

The discussions which have been taking place between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments on the one hand and the British and French representatives on the other, regarding the possibility of treaties, have not become known even in circles normally in close touch with the Governments. The two Governments have not wished to rouse popular feeling by referring to them and the French appear not to have wanted to advertise the rebuff they have received. The Lebanese Government has received assurances from most of the Christian prelates that a treaty with France would be unwelcome to them and these, combined with the American recognition, have served to encourage them in their attitude.

The President of the Syrian Republic informed Colonel Oliva Roget that unless the question of the transfer of the Troupes Speciales had been satisfactorily settled before the opening of the Parliament the Government would be powerless to prevent questions, with the inevitable public repercussions which the Government's reply would cause.

Major-General Giles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army Forces in the Middle East, arrived at Beirut airport on the 29th September to award General Beynet the United States "Legion of Merit" for his work when head of the French Military Mission to the United States. General Giles, who did not leave the airport (where the ceremony took place) made a statement in which he referred to the United States' full recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence and the hope that these countries would accept invitations to the Civil Aviation Conference to be held in Washington.

It has now been confirmed that both Governments intend to send representatives to the conference; the invitations, which are the first extended to the Governments to attend an international conference, have given them great pleasure.

3. *Syria—Damascus.*

The Syrian Chamber has been convened to meet in extraordinary session from the 5th to the 16th of October, when the following are among the matters on the order paper:—

Reform of Income Tax,  
Educational reform, and the  
Taxation of agricultural produce.

The press added that "other subjects of general interest would be raised," and the P.O. in Homs reports that the Deputies there were saying that a public refutation of the idea of a treaty and a declaration about the war would be on the agenda.

There have been celebrations in Damascus on the occasion of the millenary of the blind Arab poet, Aboul Ala al Ma'arri. The proceedings were opened on the 25th of September by the President of the Syrian Republic. Delegations from Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq attended the celebrations and were the guests of the Syrian Arabic Academy. The first banquet was a vegetarian meal in honour of the vegetarian habits of the poet himself. Special postage stamps were issued in connexion with these celebrations.

Dr. Aprahamian (see Weekly Summary No. 130, paragraph 4, and my telegram No. 621, paragraph 7) visited Damascus on the 22nd September. In a speech at the Armenian Church he emphasised the necessity of Armenian collaboration with the Arabs. In an interview to the press he said, when asked for his views on the Armenian Soviet Republic, that he was not prepared to comment on any political question as he was a purely religious delegate. He also denied reports to the effect that the Armenian Republic had instructed him to study the situation of the Armenians with a view to the establishment of an Armenian Legation. He repeated that his visit was of a purely religious nature and when asked whether he had had complaints by the Armenian community regarding the attitude of the Syrians towards them, he replied that on the contrary he had only heard praises of the Arab people.

4. *Aleppo.*

The trial of three sheikhs on charges of inciting the congregations in the mosques to disorder on the 8th September was adjourned after the first sitting of the court on the 26th September. His Majesty's Consul reports that the strength of local feeling against a conviction of the sheikhs may have been largely the cause of this postponement.

No definite decision has apparently yet been reached regarding the French claim over the rehoisting of their flag and the Syrian counter-claim regarding the desecration of the mosques (see Weekly Summary No. 129).

Local political talk has been mainly concerned with the conference in Alexandria and the reopening of the Syrian Parliament next week. His Majesty's Consul reports that confederation or collaboration between the Arab States seems now to have a wider appeal than the idea of Arab unity.

5. *Homs and Hama.*

No further incidents have occurred in Homs between the Communists and members of the Shebab Mohamed party since the murder reported in Weekly Summary No. 130.

There were no repercussions in Hama of the recent disturbance in Homs.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

The Syrian Prime Minister has sent a telegram to the Mohafez expressing his appreciation of the patriotic gesture made by the Druze in renouncing the privileges of their autonomy. (See Weekly Summary No. 129.) The Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior also sent congratulatory messages on the occasion of Ramadan, and the Emir Atrash is delighted with these marks of recognition on the part of the Government.

On the 20th September the President of the Republic received a delegation from the Jebel Druze and, in the course of their visit, informed them that he was pleased to see them working together without distinction of party "for the good of the common cause and their high ideals."

7. *Alaouite Territory.*

The Mohafez, on his return from Damascus, was annoyed to find that, during his absence, the French délégué had been touring his area paying Bairam calls on Alaouite leaders. Such visits are unusual at Bairam in view of the fact that this feast is not celebrated by the Alaouites. Syrian officials had reported that some of them had been ignored during the visits and that French Surete officials had spoken too much about the future power of France in Syria. The Mohafez has informed His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo that he intends to protest against these actions.

A Hama Deputy, who owns a village in the Alaouite territory, has informed the Political Officer in Homs that while staying in his village during Bairam the French delegate arrived and attended a lunch at which he was present. He said that the French delegate made a speech claiming that France was remaining in Syria, that the British were leaving, and that a careful list was being made by each French officer of the names of those who were working against France. The delegate left no doubt in the minds of his hearers that action would be taken against these offenders later.

Another complaint voiced by the Mohafez to the consul in Aleppo is that the French still refuse to hand over for trial by the Syrian authorities offenders arrested for failing to produce identity cards and other similar misdemeanours. The consul understands that the Mohafez is proposing to take this matter up.



### 11. *The Lebanon* (see also under "General").

The P.O. reports that there has been little or no public comment on the treaty question, and any whispers that the British were supporting French attempts to obtain a treaty have been dismissed as incredible.

The incidents in South Lebanon have ceased for the moment, most of the ringleaders having been arrested. The Acting Prime Minister, at a press conference on the 29th September, stressed that these several incidents were not due to any foreign influence and were largely unrelated. It seems, indeed, to be true that the incidents are merely symptoms of a wave of disorder resulting from the weakness of the security services and the unwillingness of the Government to crush disorder in sufficient promptitude and firmness. Other local incidents are therefore likely to occur from time to time.

The Chamber of Deputies, on the 26th September, at last approved the Government's agreement with the Beirut merchants in respect of arrears of the War Profits Tax.

On the 26th September the Chamber sanctioned an additional credit of £LS. 2 million for financing the Kasmieh Irrigation Scheme.

The chauffeurs' syndicate of Beirut, a strong and frequently intransigent body, has threatened to strike as a protest against what they regard as the inadequate and unsatisfactory distribution of tyres for commercial transport.

[E 6501/23/89]

No. 39.

*Extract from Weekly Political Report, No. 132, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 11th October, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd October.)*

#### 1. *General.*

WITH the close of the Alexandria Conference, the Syrian delegation, except for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is still in Cairo, returned by air to Damascus on the 8th and the Lebanese arrived in Beirut by train on the 9th. The Political Officer, Beirut, reports that the Lebanese appear to be very satisfied with the results obtained, particularly with the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Lebanon, which should serve to silence Christian critics of the Government's alleged pan-Arab policy.

The question of the transfer of the army was raised in the Syrian Parliament at its first meeting on the 5th October (see under "Damascus"), and, in spite of a British military "stop," both Governments have already received the report by radio that the French National Committee have formally declined to consider handing over the Troupes Spéciales to the States under the present circumstances.

Damascus newspapers have published articles opposing the conclusion of a treaty with France. One of them contrasts the idea of a Franco-Syrian Treaty with the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The article says that Iraq started off with a treaty with Great Britain a comparatively few years after the imposition of the mandate and adds that the treaty was modified several times subsequently in Iraq's interest. In Syria, on the other hand, the situation has been totally different, as the mandate lasted for some twenty years and was all that time a heavy load on Syria. The article ends by enquiring whether, indeed, the mandate would not have lasted another twenty years had it not been for the international circumstances which led to Syrian independence. The consul in Damascus reports that these articles may well have been Government-inspired as a counterblast to reports from London, quoted by a Damascus paper and the Egyptian *El Akram* alleging that official circles in London favoured the conclusion of a treaty. The consul in Aleppo reports that the reporting of the *El Akram* article in the Aleppo press was followed by protests in numerous papers.

M. Solod, the new Soviet Minister to Syria and the Lebanon, arrived by air in Beirut on the 2nd October.

Arrangements for this year's pilgrimage to Mecca from the Levant States have now been settled. There will be seven sailings which should accommodate nearly 10,000 Syrian and Lebanese pilgrims. This is double last year's figure, but still considerably less than the reported number of applicants.

### 3. *Syria—Damascus.*

The Syrian Government met in extraordinary session on the 5th October. Various speakers criticised the policy of the Government, maintaining that Syria did not really enjoy the full attributions of independence, and in particular referred to the delay in acquiring control of the army. It was argued that unless the army were taken over independence would have no real meaning. The acting Prime Minister (who replied in the absence of the Prime Minister) said that, although the Government had not been able to realise all its aims, independence had in a great part been achieved, as many of the sovereign powers had already been obtained. There remained, however, the question of the army and a special session would have to be devoted to it.

The Damascus press announces that the Syrian Government intends to hold a census in January 1945. The census will for the first time include nomad and semi-nomad tribes and will doubtless be used for the revision of the electoral lists, which in accordance with the Electoral Law, should take place in January each year.

A misprint occurred in section 3, paragraph 2, of Weekly Summary No. 131. The Homs Deputies expected a declaration not about the war but about the army.

#### 4. *Aleppo.*

The cancellation of army contracts and the departure of British units from Aleppo area has increased talk (and, His Majesty's Consul reports, apprehension in most cases) of an increase of French influence. The consul has suggested that with a view to keeping the balance between the Syrians and the French and also the Turks along the frontier, the retention of a British unit would be helpful.

The Syrians have protested to the French that since the British military authorities handed over train guard duties to the French, the latter have been endeavouring to elbow out the officials of the Syrian Sûreté, contrary to the procedure laid down in the protocol on this question.

The French claim over the rehoisting of the flag (see Weekly Summary No. 131) was settled when the Mohafez and the délégué arranged that early on the 5th October, before many people were about, representatives of the Syrian gendarmerie should salute the rehoisting of the flag on the Intendance and a detachment of Troupes Spéciales should march past the Mosque and salute the Cadi and the Mufti.

The British and responsible Syrian authorities have viewed with very grave concern the release by the French, without consultation, of a notorious local gang leader and criminal named Abou Said Barli, who, on the instigation of the S.I.B., was sentenced in Aleppo last year to seven years' imprisonment by the French Military Tribunal for offences including armed resistance to the S.I.B. The consul reports that a protest has been addressed to the French Délégué for the unwarranted French action in this matter, and the British military authorities are understood to be taking the matter up with the French.

On the 9th October a strike began among the workers in two cotton spinning mills as a protest against the imposition of Government control of spinning mills. So far the workers in one mill have returned to work.

#### 5. *Homs and Hama.*

No further moves have been made by either the communists or the Shebah Mohamed after their recent quarrel.

The Political Officer reports that the Homs members of the P.P.S. (Parti Populaire Syrien) have started a new club under the name of the Homs Club. The Mohafez, on hearing of the proposed meetings, sent orders for the first one to be broken up and directed that the party should close the club. The premises of the club have, however, simply been moved and the meetings are reported to be continuing. Among the more moderate elements of the town there is some discussion about the formation of a new party to consist of both Moslems and Christians, with the object of exercising control over the excesses of the extremists of both parties. So far, however, the idea has not proceeded beyond the stage of casual discussion.

#### 6. *Jebel Druze.*

When a French mobile cinema visited Soueida recently the show had to be abandoned owing to a disturbance created by one of the spectators who, in the presence of the Mohafez and the French Délégué, shouted, "Down with the French!"



11. *The Lebanon.*

The chief problem now before the Government is the election of a Speaker to the Lebanese Chamber, which is due to take place on the 18th October. There are two candidates, Sabri Hamadi (the outgoing Speaker) and Joseph Salem; the former is believed to enjoy the support of the Government on account of his close political relations with the President, but the latter, who has recently refused a pressing offer of the post of Lebanese Minister in Cairo, claims to have the support of a large group of deputies normally in opposition to the Government. Much depends on the Government's eventual attitude, which has not yet been clearly defined.

At a meeting of the Chamber on 2nd October a minor storm arose out of a declaration reported to have been made by the new Lebanese Minister in London advocating the holding of a conference in London to consider the questions of Palestine and the Levant States. The Government were questioned as to whether this statement was made with their authority, and if not whether their representative had the right to make personal political declarations; they could only profess ignorance of the facts.

On the 4th October the Chamber, with unusually complete unanimity, passed two measures of judicial reform, the first improving the status of magistrates and decreasing their dependence on the Executive, the second re-defining the competence of the different courts. The measures, though criticised in some quarters for not going far enough, were on the whole welcomed, particularly those clauses which have for effect to abolish any measures of French control over the native courts and to confine the competence of the Mixed Courts to cases actually involving foreign interests.

The threatened chauffeur's strike did not eventuate, as on the 6th October the Acting Prime Minister was able to state the terms of an agreement under which tyres would be distributed this week to taxi drivers approved by their syndicate.

The Mohafez of South Lebanon imposed a curfew on the 5th October in certain areas where disturbances had taken place. The area is reported quiet.

[E 6753/23/89]

No. 40.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Report No. 133, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th October, 1944.—(Received 3rd November.)*

1. *General.*

THE most noteworthy features of the week have been the resignation of the Syrian Government (see under "Damascus") and the Syrian and Lebanese reaction to the protocol of the Alexandria Conference.

In Syria, the Prime Minister, in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies commending the results of the conference to the members, said, that "what many may have considered to be an intangible dream has now become a reality. From the whispers about Arab unity in the past the idea has grown into the speeches made at the conference which proclaimed the Arab unity of to-day." He added that the conference was a complete success and that the Syrian delegation had made it clear that they desired the unity of Syria, that they refused to accept the policy of Zionism, and that they intended to maintain the Syrian Republic of Damascus as its capital.

Popular interest in the results of the conference was, however, rather overshadowed by the announcement of the Prime Minister's resignation and the fall of the Government (see under "Damascus").

In the Lebanon (as reported in Summary No. 132), Government circles were pleased with the results of the conference. Since the return of the delegates, however, a determined attempt has been made by pro-French and anti-Government elements to stir up opposition to acceptance of the protocol both in the Chamber and outside. In particular, they tried to mobilise the Maronite Patriarch as the centre of this opposition and urged him to issue a manifesto condemning the decisions of the conference. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, called on him shortly after his return and believed he had induced him to abandon his intention. Nevertheless, the Patriarch shortly afterwards wrote a letter to the President of the Republic claiming that as the protocol smacked of Arab confederation he could not agree to it, and urged the President not to take any step which might impair the interests of the Lebanese. The

President has now accordingly sent a personal representative to call on the Patriarch in order to dissipate his misapprehensions.

The Maronite Archbishop of Beirut commenting on the Patriarch's letter in conversation with His Majesty's Minister said that these incursions into politics on the part of M. Arida were greatly resented by the Maronite community, the majority of whom did not by any means share the views expressed by the Patriarch and tended to diminish the considerable authority which the Patriarch wields in the mountain villages. The French have, of late, been making considerable efforts to gain his support as has been proved by a statement made privately by his chief vicar to the effect that Count Ostrorog, when he visited the Patriarch at the end of last month, showed him the text of the Lyttleton-de Gaulle Agreement and succeeded in obtaining from the Patriarch a letter to Beynet expressing approval of France's claim for a special position in the Lebanon. Apparently this letter was not judged sufficient by General Beynet, who sent Ostrorog back for a further letter definitely asking for French protection of the Lebanon. This the Patriarch refused to do.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 14th October, to consider the results of the Alexandria Conference and after a tumultuous sitting, passed a vote of thanks to the Government for what they had achieved. Several pro-French deputies, (including Naccache, Ayoub Tabet and Abboud), presented a motion to the President of the Chamber urging that discussion of the protocol should be postponed pending examination by a committee which would report to the Chamber. There was a certain amount of back-biting and recrimination between these Deputies and the Prime Minister which, however, ended in the silencing of the Opposition.

The Prime Minister, expounding the spirit in which the Lebanese representatives had gone to Alexandria, said, "our policy towards the other Arab States is one of collaboration provided such collaboration does not in any way impair our independence and sovereignty . . .". After explaining that "the people of the Lebanon had, by spreading Arab learning and culture, worked not only for the independence of their own country but for that of the surrounding States," the Prime Minister said that "Lebanese independence now has a deeper meaning based on the complete understanding between Moslems and Christians." He went on to say that in discussing the clause in the protocol which stipulated that no State should follow a foreign policy detrimental to the others, he had made it "clear that the Lebanon had concluded no treaty with any Great Power and had no intention of doing so because we wish to arrive at the peace conference free from all bonds." He ended by re-affirming that "we have always sought wherever we have been, and will always seek, complete independence and full collaboration with the other Arab States."

His Majesty's Minister called on the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th October and communicated to him Mr. Eden's reply to the message which Jamil Mardam Bey had sent him on the 22nd September regarding a proposed treaty with France.

In presenting Mr. Eden's note, Sir Edward Spears emphasised that while nothing was further from His Majesty's Government's intention than to impose a treaty on the Syrians, they nevertheless suggested that the Syrians would be well advised to consider whether it was not in their own interest to conclude a treaty now.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that if the French handed over all the Troupes Spéciales, gave an undertaking that at no time would they increase the numbers of their troops in the Levant and would agree that the Syrians should give any other nation the same conditions as they might grant the French, they would be prepared to start negotiating for a treaty.

Mr. Wadsworth also received instructions to present Mr. Cordell Hull's reply to a similar note addressed to him by Jamil Mardam Bey. The reply stated that while the United States Government did not wish to influence the decision of the Syrian Government, they would have no reason to object to the conclusion of a treaty between Syria and France provided it safeguarded their own interests.

Mr. Wadsworth was also instructed to add that the State Department believed there was considerable validity in His Majesty's Government's advice that it would be in the interests of the Levant States to negotiate a treaty now.

Last September, before the United States Government accorded full recognition to the Levant States, the French National Committee presented a note through their representative in Washington to the State Department, urging that recognition should only be accorded within the limits of General Catroux's declaration, i.e., recognising the predominant position of France in the Levant.



In their reply, the State Department, explaining the reasons for which they had decided to accord full recognition, added that they could no possibly agree to allow France and French nationals to enjoy discriminatory privileges in independent Syria and the Lebanon.

On the 13th October General Beynet called on the Lebanese President and informed him substantially that the resolutions of the Alexandria Conference made the conclusion of a treaty with France impossible, and that his Government might, therefore, consider that the declarations of independence made by General Catroux were invalidated. This statement was, according to the French, not made under instructions. The immediate Lebanese reaction to this was sharp, as might be expected; but they subsequently took a steadier and calmer view.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Prime Minister, Saadullah Bey Jabri, resigned suddenly on the 12th October at the end of his first speech in the Chamber after his return from the Alexandria Conference. It is not known what prompted him to take this action, but His Majesty's Consul reports that it is thought probable that he resigned in a moment of pique on finding that his speech, which was intended to be a triumphal vindication of his policy, was coolly received by the Chamber. During his absence the internal and the external policy of the Government had come in for sharp criticism inside and outside the Chamber, and it is said it was the intention of a number of Deputies to raise the question of confidence in the Government at that sitting. This theory is in accordance with the last sentence of his speech in which he said that his resignation would surprise not only his colleagues in the Chamber and his Cabinet, but the President himself. On the other hand, a source intimate with the Prime Minister said that according to Saadullah Jabri's own account, he had made up his mind to resign while walking in the Garden of the Palace in Alexandria, and though it is true that his impending resignation was unknown to his colleagues, it is believed that he had in fact informed the President.

On the morning of the 14th of October the re-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Consul that a Government under the premiership of Faris el Khoury had been formed. The portfolios in this Government are distributed as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Public Works: Faris el Khoury.  
Minister of Finance and Ravitaillement: Khaled el Azm.  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Defence and National Economy: Jamil Mardam Bey.  
Minister of Justice, Education and Wakfs: Dr. Abdul Rahman Kayali.

Normally the management of the Wakfs is held by the Prime Minister, but as Faris el Khoury is a Christian it was thought better to transfer the management to a Moslem.

Two Deputies raised in the Chamber the question of the Government censorship of Deputies' speeches appearing in the press, claiming that, under a régime of liberty of speech and of the press, accounts of speeches should not be subject to censorship. The Speaker replied that it was intended henceforth to issue an official version of Deputies' speeches so that false versions issued by journalists should not be given publicity.

Requests for two credits for £S. 40,000 sterling in respect of expenditure by the Government on the Lawyers' Conference aroused criticism in the Chamber of the Government's habit of spending money and then asking for credits afterwards.

The Damascus press has this week once again reported that lands are being sold to the Jews. One paper referred to a case at present before the courts in which the Wakfs stands as prosecutor and a Jewish society as defendant. The case concerns land in the Deraa district alleged to have been illegally transferred to the Jews. Another paper reports attempts on the part of Jews to buy land in Quneitra, and yet a third mentions other attempts of a similar nature in Northern Syria and Wadi el Ayam.

The press is also urging the immediate formation of a Syrian army, and suggests that Syria should be able to produce without difficulty a national army equivalent to that of Iraq. It is suggested that there is no reason to prevent the formation of an army at once, particularly since the Great Powers "that have recognised Syrian independence and helped to abolish the mandate will be

willing to assist." These Powers, according to the press, would be agreeable to applying lease-lend principles to a country whose importance in safeguarding international communications is so great.

### 4. Aleppo.

His Majesty's Consul reports that at the time of the compilation of his report the news of the formation of the new Government had not become widely known, but that he believed that it would be generally welcomed. The resignation of the Prime Minister did not apparently cause much surprise in Aleppo as there had been considerable criticism of the Government.

The cotton strike continues. The mills have been requisitioned and are under the guard of gendarmes whilst control officials are making every effort to organise staff to operate the machinery. His Majesty's Consul states that there are no appreciable stocks of yarn in the mills and that unless an agreement is reached soon unemployment in the weaving industry will result.

The three sheikhs on trial for having made inflammatory speeches in a mosque on the 8th September (see Weekly Summary No. 131), have got off with light sentences.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

The Political Officer reports that the new Government formed by Faris Khoury has been generally welcomed in Homs and Hama.

In Homs there has been an uneasy calm between the Shebab Mohamed and the Communists. Sheikh Safa Sebai has in speeches avoided all reference to political matters during the last fortnight. The Communists are reported to have engaged seven lawyers to defend the murderer of the member of the Shebab last month.

In Hama the opening of a chemists shop under the auspices of the A.U.B. has led to protests to the Mohafez by the leading pharmacists against the cut prices; drugs are sold at less than half the Hama price, and there has naturally been a rush of customers.

### 9. Tribal.

There has been trouble again in the Syrian desert where at the beginning of the month a large raiding party of the Shammar Khrossa attacked members of the Ageidat some 50 miles east of Deir ez Zor and, after killing six of the tribesmen, drove off about 1,500 of their sheep towards the Iraq border. They were intercepted by the Shammar Feddagh, a tribe friendly to the Ageidat, who recovered some 600 sheep. On the 10th of October the Ageidat were reported to have assembled a large body of horsemen (amounting to as many as 300-500) with the intention of carrying out a counter-attack, but so far no further clash has been reported. The Shammar Khrossa also raided the Afadla on the 6th October near Raqqa.

The dispute between the Baggara and the Kikieh (see Weekly Summary No. 130) is probably settled. The Majlis decided that the Kikieh must pay for the extra nine deaths among the Baggara for which they were responsible.

### 11. The Lebanon.

Apart from the debate in the Chamber on the Alexandria Conference (see "General") the chief event of the week was the election of the new Speaker (see Weekly Summary No. 132). Both candidates did a good deal of canvassing, and meetings of supporters were held in private houses with a view to organising support. It soon became clear that the Government did not intend to withdraw their support from the present Speaker, Sabri Hamadi, the Shia Deputy from the Bekaa, and on the 17th October he was re-elected by thirty-six votes against fifteen for Joseph Salem. There was one blank vote. Demonstrations of Shia supporters took place in the streets of Beirut before and after the election with the usual accompaniment of banners, flags and shots in the air. Though, of course, the demonstrations in no way influenced the results of the election, the reaction has been bad among the Christians who, it is reported, fear that the Moslems will develop the habit of attempting to impose their will through demonstrations of this kind.

A new parliamentary party has been established composed of the so-called Nationalist Deputies, i.e., those who were elected on Edde's list, together with Alfred Naccache, the former President, and Mohamed el Abboud. It has taken



the name of Hisb el Shaab (People's Party), but neither a president nor a secretary has yet been elected.

Abdul Hamid Karami, the Tripoli Moslem leader and Deputy, accompanied by two other Deputies from Tripoli, paid an official call on the Maronite Patriarch on the 11th October. The party was warmly received by the Patriarch, and it is believed that the visit has done much to improve relations between Patriarch and Deputy, who assured one another of their genuine desire to maintain Lebanese independence without any alteration in their frontiers.

[E 6934/23/89]

No. 41.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 134, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 25th October, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 10th November.)*

#### 1. General.

THE week has been marked by discussions between the French authorities and the Syrian and Lebanese Governments regarding their future relations.

When the Lebanese Government first received General Beynet's declaration (see Weekly Summary No. 133) it was their intention to address protests to the Allied Powers, but on further consideration the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for Count Ostrorog and explained to him that it was not true that the Alexandria Conference precluded a free State from making a treaty so long as it was not prejudicial to the interests of the other Arab States. In these circumstances he enquired whether General Beynet would withdraw his communication. Count Ostrorog replied that the question had been referred to Paris, but that he would consult General Beynet and hoped to be able to give an answer in two or three days. During the interview Count Ostrorog was shown by Selim Tacla the exchange of notes between the State Department and the French National Committee (see last paragraph of page 2 of Weekly Summary No. 133).

The Lebanese Government informed the Syrians of the action they proposed taking in the first instance. The Syrians, much excited, discussed the matter with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who was passing through Damascus at the time. As a result the Iraqi Foreign Minister proposed, on his return to Bagdad, to address notes of protest in the name of the Iraqi Government to the Allied representatives there, and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to arrange that the other Arab Powers represented at the Alexandria Conference, including Egypt, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia, should be invited to take such action as they deemed appropriate in protest against General Beynet's declaration. His Majesty's Minister, when he heard that the Lebanese had decided to await the French Government's reply before taking any further action, suggested to the Syrians they might be well advised to avoid doing anything hasty or premature. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly agreed to postpone the arrangements he had made to approach the other Arab Powers. His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, at Sir Edward Spear's request, took similar action with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the 23rd October the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired of Count Ostrorog when he might expect a reply to the Lebanese Government's enquiry, and was told that in all probability the French Government, to whom the matter had been referred, would wish to lay it before the Conseil Juridique and the reply would probably take some little time.

Since then there have been discussions in Damascus between the Syrians and the French regarding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the treaty. By agreement with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he saw beforehand, Jamil Mardam was able to make it clear that the Lebanese Government fully supported the Syrian Government in demanding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. General Beynet definitely bound the transfer of the army up with the conclusion of a treaty. This has resulted in a deadlock which the negotiations have so far not succeeded in resolving. The Syrians repeated that they had no intention of signing any treaty with any country during the war, and pointed out that before the conclusion of treaties with Egypt and Iraq the national forces had been transferred by the British to these Governments. The Syrians also took up with General Beynet his statement to the Lebanese President and enquired whether he had questioned the validity of General Catroux's agreement of the 22nd December. General Beynet replied that he had not done so and that he had

merely made it clear that his Government would be obliged to revise its policy towards the Lebanon. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised the solidarity existing between the two republics. Negotiations are still continuing.

Among the subjects which the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty's Minister his Government had the intention of raising with the French authorities during their negotiations was the attempts being made by the French to create disaffection by distributing arms and pamphlets attacking the Government, disorders which would enable the French to claim that the Syrians were unable to govern their own country.

The Lebanon will be represented at the Conference on Civil Aviation to be held in the United States in November by Camille Chamoun, their Minister in London, assisted by Mr. Fauzi el Hoss. Syria will be represented by the ex-Minister for National Economy, Tewfik Shamieh. Shamieh, according to the press, will also be entrusted with a special mission to point out to the United States authorities the harm done to United States prestige in Syria by their pro-Jewish policy.

The attitude of the Lebanese and Syrian press and public to the United States has been profoundly affected by President Roosevelt's declaration in favour of Jewish immigration. It was known, of course, that every leading American politician had made such declarations, but it was always felt that this was done in an irresponsible effort to catch votes. President Roosevelt's declaration was taken much more seriously and the public and press have been carefully discussing it. Publicity for his declaration is said locally to have been encouraged by the French, and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is known to have been embarrassed at the trend events were taking, has requested the censor to persuade newspaper editors not to discuss this subject further.

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Government met for the first sitting in Ordinary Session on the 17th October and elected parliamentary officers. For some days previously Deputies had been discussing the merits of the candidates for the post of President of the Chamber, which was vacated by Fares el Khoury on his taking office as Prime Minister. The two candidates were Saadullah Jabri, the former Prime Minister, and Rushdi Kekhia of Aleppo, and Saadullah Jabri was elected with 67 votes to 44.

His Majesty's Consul reports that popular opinion sees in this election a division of the Chamber into two parties; the Opposition party, voting for Kekhia, is said to comprise a solid *bloc* of younger Deputies; those who voted for Saadullah Jabri are the Government supporters. They are less co-ordinated than the Opposition and are said to contain a moderate party of some twenty members, who hope to be able to control the majority. The division into parties is something new in Syrian politics, as it has hitherto been the practice of politicians to arrange matters outside the Chamber before putting them to the vote. The new Government of Fares el Khoury have not yet presented their programme to the Chamber.

The new Supply Minister has been criticising the "severe methods" of Zein ed Dinn, the Director-General of Supply, in the handling of the Aleppo spinning factories, and informed him that he proposed in future to have two Directors-General, one for policy and one for administration. On learning of the appointment of a second Director-General, Zein ed Dinn has tendered his resignation and the newly appointed Assistant Director remains in control.

#### 4. Aleppo.

His Majesty's Consul reports that, although the new Government is generally welcomed, some lack of confidence exists, as, in spite of widespread respect for Fares el Khoury, it is felt that he will be unlikely to be able to control for long the preponderating Moslem opinion in Damascus. It also seems to be thought that the present Ministry needs new blood to strengthen it.

On the 19th October the Mohafez was instructed that agreement had been reached in Damascus regarding the cotton yarn control, and that the two requisitioned mills should be freed to permit them to restart and deliver a certain amount of yarn each month to the Government. Since the 8th October, when the Government's latest attempt to enforce control was started, no disturbances have occurred in connexion with the closing of the mills. Yarn prices have, however, risen higher than ever before, for the new scheme is not yet understood and weavers are uncertain about future yarn supplies.



### 5. Homs and Hama.

After three weeks' comparative quiet, the Shabah Mohammed met last Sunday under the presidency of Sheikh Moustapha Sebai in the mosque in Homs and listened to a speech in his best fanatical style, urging the Government to follow the tenets of Islam. He also, during the week, sent out invitations to his colleagues in Damascus and Aleppo to attend the Forty Days' Memorial Ceremony to be held in Homs on the 3rd November, to celebrate their new martyr—the victim of the brawl with the Communists last month. The Political Officer reports that, unless the Mohafez intervenes, this promises to be "a lively gathering."

The Political Officer records a report from Hama that an American representative visited that town on Wednesday to enquire into public reaction to the American declaration regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, and states that, from all accounts, he is believed to have been given a very clear idea of Moslem opinion.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

A report has been received that a meeting was held in the house of Ibrahim Kinj, attended by well-known Alaouite personalities, including members of the Abbas and Yazaji families, presided over by a French officer, stated by one source to be Captain Bossiquet, the French Political Officer in Lattakia.

The object of the meeting apparently was to form a union between the Alaouites and Christians against the Moslems in general and the Syrian Government in particular, with a view to pressing for the continued administrative autonomy of the Alaouite State.

### 11. The Lebanon.

During the week under review there has been no parliamentary activity, save for meetings of the parliamentary commissions, though there has been much unfounded talk of Cabinet reshuffles and speculation about the distribution of Ministries.

The Government has published decrees on judicial reorganisation (the promotion of judges, &c.), and followed them up with decrees reorganising the higher administrative grades in Government offices and creating directors-general.

From Tripoli comes a report of a further demand from the local authorities, following a minor shooting incident, for police reinforcements to fill the vacancies in the local establishment. They have also asked that the Police Commissioner and the Mohafez should remove certain police officials who are considered undesirable. They are accused of disloyalty and are suspected of accepting bribes from members of the Mokaddem gang. They had already once been transferred from Tripoli, but had been posted there again in spite of complaints made by the Police Commissioner.

The shooting incident occurred as a result of a remark made by a night watchman to one of the Mokaddem family, who took exception to it. He next day sent one of his followers, a notorious criminal, to shoot up the watchman, who received a severe bullet wound in the head. The assailant has since escaped. There is a strong suspicion that these incidents, which are deliberate attempts to embarrass the Government, have the support of the French, who are also reported to be paying members of the Omari family to cause trouble in Tripoli.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—The declarations made by leading American statesmen in support of Jewish claims to Palestine have aroused extreme indignation in the Lebanese and Syrian press, which voices determination to defend the Arab cause to the end.

The press welcome the appointment of Fares Khouri, a Protestant Christian, as a step towards abolition of the principle of sectarian appointment, and therefore evidence of Syria's political development. In the Lebanon the press express the view that the election of Salem as Speaker would have gone some way towards the elimination of the same principle here.

*Enemy Wireless Propaganda.*—Talks were mainly devoted to praise of Rommel and his alleged friendship for the Arabs. Nothing else of importance.

[E 7055/23/89]

No. 42.

*Weekly Political Summary, No. 135, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 1st November, 1944.*—(Received in Foreign Office, 16th November, 1944.)

### 1. General.

During the week there have been three meetings between the French and the Syrians to discuss the questions of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and an eventual treaty.

At the first, on the 25th October, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs also attended; General Beynet protested against his presence, on the grounds that insufficient notice has been given of his intention to attend, and stated that the French Government's instructions were that the Troupes Spéciales question should be discussed with each State separately. The Syrians claimed, and General Beynet denied, that the Troupes Spéciales formed part of the question of Common Interests which the two Governments had discussed jointly with General Catroux in December 1943. General Beynet stated that previous proposals for the transfer had been rejected by Algiers because the Syrian Government's attitude towards France had been considered hostile, and that the French Government required assurances regarding the future position of France in Syria before considering the transfer. The Syrians protested friendliness towards France, but declined to bind themselves to give that country a privileged position in a future the conditions of which they could not foresee; they claimed that the Troupes Spéciales question was distinct and should be settled now, since the Chamber was pressing for results.

At the next meeting, on the 26th October, the French representatives, in reply to a Syrian enquiry, stated that the kind of treaty they had in mind would follow the general lines of the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian Treaties, and would include military, educational, consular and establishment conventions. The Syrians continued to press that the Troupes Spéciales question should be settled forthwith, and the French that it should form part of a general settlement.

On the 29th October, both sides, with courtesy but with a good deal of plain speaking, went over much the same ground without making the slightest progress. Finally, the Syrians, who had previously met and reached agreement with the Lebanese, proposed to the French that His Majesty's Government should be invited to arbitrate the Troupes Spéciales question in view of their guarantee of Syrian independence and their interest in security matters in the Levant States. General Beynet agreed to submit the proposal to Paris.

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber on the same day nearly all the speakers demanded the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and repudiated the idea of a treaty.

Despite this deadlock, the Syrian Government have still succeeded in preventing demonstrations in Damascus, though they have expressed fears that they will not be able to do so if a solution is indefinitely postponed. They are apprehensive lest the French may be attempting to drive a wedge between them and the Lebanese preparatory to taking direct action against the latter.

M. Solod, the Soviet Minister, presented his letters of credence to the Syrian President on the 26th October and to the Lebanese President on the 29th October. In conversation with the Lebanese Foreign Minister he said that his Government's attitude towards the States had been clearly stated by M. Novikov, namely, that the Soviet Government wished to see these States completely independent, with no foreign power occupying a privileged position.

The news of the recognition of the French Provisional Government appears to have evoked little enthusiasm amongst the French, who regard it as overdue. Amongst the Lebanese and Syrians it has naturally caused fears that the French position in the Levant States will be proportionately strengthened.

The first special train of Mecca pilgrims left Damascus on the 29th October for Suez.

### 2. Economic.

Total cereal purchases during the period the 16th to 22nd October, 1944, amounted to 4,243 tons, a daily average of 606 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 155,856 tons.



### 3. Syria-Damascus.

The new Syrian Government appeared before the Chamber on the 26th October, when the Prime Minister made his declaration of policy. In the internal field, this promised encouragement and protection for national industries, development of irrigation, the promulgation of labour legislation, the promotion of primary education and increased freedom for the press where military and political security was not concerned. As for external policy, Fares el Khoury stated that his Government would follow the same lines as its predecessor. This policy fell under three heads; firstly complete independence, unfettered except by the principles of international law, the maintenance of peace and security, and good relations especially with those powers which had recognised Syrian independence; secondly, participation in the Allied war effort to the fullest extent of Syria's powers with a view to a voice at the peace settlement; and lastly, close collaboration with the countries represented at the Alexandria Conference, the outcome of which was the formation of a League of Arab Nations. The Prime Minister added that Syria must obtain control of the army, "in accordance with the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943," in order to ensure peace at home; conversations on this point were proceeding and would be resumed at once.

Two subsequent sessions were devoted to discussions of this declaration. No deputy criticised the Government's foreign policy, and most speakers specifically approved it. There was no flamboyant oratory and no fireworks. At the end of the second session, on the 30th October, the Government obtained a vote of confidence without dissentients, but with four abstentions. About 25 per cent. of the deputies were, however, absent from each sitting.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has told the American Chargé d'Affaires at Damascus that his Government continue to protest against American support of Zionism. An anti-Zionist Committee containing Syrians and Lebanese of many shades of opinion has been formed in Damascus. The Syrian members include the Communist leader, Khaled Bagdash.

Taufiq Chamieh, the former Minister of National Economy, who was to have represented Syria at the Conference on Civil Aviation in Chicago (see Weekly Summary No. 134), declined the invitation, and his place has been taken by Nourieddin Kahhaleh, Chief of Hydraulic Services of the Syrian Government.

### 4. Aleppo.

The latest reports received indicate that the area has been quiet and that comment on the new Syrian Government was reserved pending the announcement of its policy.

The two cotton mills (see Weekly Summary No. 134), are now working again under the management of their owners. The result of the month's trial under the new scheme is the subject of speculation, but yarn prices have dropped sharply from their previous record high level.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

Nothing of political interest to report.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

Nothing of political interest to report.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Many of the Alaouite Deputies remained in Lattakia while Parliament was sitting in Damascus. It is probable that their presence is connected with the campaign for the abolition of Alaouite autonomy, which Bedawi el Jebel, the Alaouite Deputy, is sponsoring. The issue may come up before the Administrative Council shortly, in which event the result will depend on the attitude of those members who are of the Alaouite sect. These do not so far seem to favour integration of the territory in Syria.

Moslems in this territory are reported to be extremely bitter against the United States as a result of the declarations of President Roosevelt and Mr. Dewey in favour of Zionism.

### 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Political Officer, Deir-ez-Zor, reports that the Mohafez of the Euphrates is taking strong action to control prices of local food-stuffs and has issued an official price list which he is applying strictly in Deir-ez-Zor.

### 9. Tribal.

The Political Officer reports that as a result of the recent trouble between the Shammar-Khrossa and the Agaiedat (see Weekly Summary No. 133), there is reason to believe that the Agaiedat, the Baggara (who assisted the Agaiedat in their recent troubles with the Shammar) and the Jubur, are prepared to form a common front against the Shammar-Khrossa.

### 10. Frontier.

His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, reports that on a visit to the frontier he found the collaboration between Syrian and French Sûreté officials satisfactory.

On the Turkish side of the frontier, the guards were, he found, pleased with the new British rifles and Bren guns. Apparently, however, their control has been troublesome to the officials on the Syrian side of the frontier owing to their reduction in the number of places at which passavant holders can cross into Syria.

### 11. The Lebanon.

As the main political centre of gravity is at present in Damascus, no important developments have occurred in the Lebanon. Public interest in the Alexandria Conference has by no means died down and both the press and public continue to discuss how far the protocol signed there is to the advantage of the Lebanon.

On the 29th October, Riad Solh convoked the local press and replied to General de Gaulle's reported press statement regarding "artificial difficulties" in the Levant States. He said that the first part of General de Gaulle's statement, regarding the immediate independence of the States, was eminently satisfactory and no more than was to be expected of a recently liberated France; but that he was at a loss to understand the purport of the second part, for no one had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the independent Lebanon, and it was therefore impossible that "artificial difficulties" could be created there.

Joseph Salem, the defeated candidate for the speakership of the Lebanese Chamber (see Weekly Summary No. 134), has now decided to accept the post of Lebanese Minister at Cairo, which he had previously declined.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

The chief interest in the press has been the statement made by General de Gaulle about "artificial difficulties" for France in Syria and the Lebanon, which, with the reply from the Lebanese Prime Minister, has been published in all the newspapers. With the exception of a short article in the Arabic newspaper *Beirut*, no comment on either statement has, however, yet appeared. *Beirut*, alluding to General de Gaulle's reference to the League of Nations, enquired what had become of it.

In the absence of any official communiqué regarding the various meetings held in Damascus between the French and the Syrian authorities, the press has correctly surmised that the Troupes Spéciales and treaty questions have been under discussion.

### Enemy Wireless Propaganda.

Nothing of importance during the week under review.

[E 7165/23/89]

No. 43.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 136, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 8th November, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 22nd November.)*

### 1. General.

NO important political developments have occurred during the week, as the views of Paris—and London—on the proposal for British arbitration in the Troupes spéciales question have not yet been received.

The 2nd November, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, was marked in Damascus by orderly demonstrations and a brief partial closure of the town, while a number of protests against the declaration and against recent statements

[30547]

K



that Palestine would become a Jewish National Home were sent to the British Consulate. There were similar demonstrations at Lattakia, Homs and Tripoli, but not at Aleppo. In Beirut a mass protest meeting was held in a cinema, the speakers at which included several prominent Communists; it was noticeable that Christians were as vehement as Moslems in their denunciations of Zionism and all its works.

The establishment of a Soviet Legation in Beirut has been followed by a number of press announcements of pro-Soviet activities, mostly by the body known as "Friends of the U.S.S.R.," and the 27th anniversary of the Soviet revolution was widely publicised. Russia is, in fact, all the rage at the moment. The Soviet Minister has already had a clash with General Beynet, who induced him to attend a French Consular Mass, though well aware that neither the Lebanese Government nor the Diplomatic Corps would be represented.

Afghanistan has recognised Syrian and Lebanese independence.

At a recent meeting of the Damascus Chamber, a Deputy who called for the return of the Hatay to Syria was loudly applauded. The incident has aroused considerable interest in Aleppo, in which region the loss of the Hatay, and particularly the port of Alexandretta, has been keenly felt, but it is realised that to raise the question now may embarrass the Syrian Government just when they are angling for Turkish recognition.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Vice-President have both called on His Majesty's Minister to express condolences, on behalf of their Governments, on the death of Lord Moyne. The local reaction has been one of sincere regret at the death of one who was generally held to be a good friend of the Levant States, mingled with the hope that this crime will result in the modification of His Majesty's Government's attitude towards Zionism.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Chamber debate on the Government's statement of policy ended on the 31st October, as already reported, in an overwhelming vote of confidence. The debate covered a wide field: official corruption, especially in the Ministry of Supply, came in for criticism, and there were demands for improved labour legislation and for increased pay in the Administration. Speakers raised the question of the foreign participation in the O.C.P.; the Prime Minister, in replying, praised this organisation for its benefit to the country: he hoped, however, to see introduced in its Constitution certain modifications more in consonance with his country's sovereign status. There was general support for the Government's external policy, particularly on the treaty issue, and demands for a more real Syrian control of the services handed over by the French. The Aleppo Deputy usually considered to be the leader of the Opposition elements announced that his group would vote for the Government so long as it faithfully carried out its announced policy.

### 4. Aleppo.

The vote of confidence passed in the new Government by the Damascus Chamber has been generally welcomed, though the Prime Minister's speech is thought to have shown tact rather than strength. The chief local preoccupation is the recent great and quite unjustified rise in commodity prices, which reflect lack of confidence in the supply services. The new Director of Supply, who is shortly to visit Aleppo, is reputed honest, and it is hoped that the Government will endeavour to tackle this urgent problem, which has been aggravated by recent purchases on a vast scale by the French authorities.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

A memorial meeting held by the Shebah Mohammed to commemorate Mustafa Heraki, the victim of the clash between this party and local Communists reported in Weekly Summary No. 130, was attended by all local religious dignitaries and by delegates from Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. All speeches denounced communism and lamented the young man who "had sacrificed himself for Islam," but there was no disorder.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

His Majesty's Minister, paying an official visit to Soueida on the 2nd November, was confronted with an assembly of local notables convoked by the Muhafiz, and was vehemently harangued on the subject of Palestine and the

Syrian army. According to the Muhafiz, the French endeavoured to stage anti-Balfour Declaration demonstrations to coincide with the visit, but the notables declined thus to spoil the occasion.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The new Muhafiz, a Sunni Nationalist, is disturbed at what he describes as French encroachments on Syrian sovereignty in his area. He is also uncertain of what support he will get from the new Government, which he has reason to believe at first intended to allow Suleiman Murshid to return to Lattakia, an action which, if not prevented, might have had serious security repercussions in the area. Whilst the French Délégué appears moderate and co-operative, the French Political Officer, Captain Boussiquet, and even more his interpreter, appear to be continuing intrigues among the separatists, they seem to have spread reports that Murshid would return and to have begun organising a welcome for him. The area is still calm, and the reopening of the British Political Office has caused a genuine feeling of relief in view of widespread reports that the British were leaving the country to the French.

The Muhafiz states that the question of the abolition of Alaouite autonomy is unlikely to be raised in the local council until the Troupes spéciales have been handed over.

### 11. The Lebanon.

In the absence of major political activity, criticism of the Government's administrative inertia has become more vocal, the cost of living being a familiar source of criticism. The Prime Minister on the 7th November told the press that his Government was determined to control prices by underselling the market through co-operative stores.

The Mufti of the Lebanese Republic has addressed a letter to the President expressing the support of his community for the Alexandria Protocol and for the Government's policy of refusing to conclude a treaty with France and contrasting their reasonableness with the fanaticism of certain Christian elements.

The Dandeché, a notoriously unruly tribe in the Northern Bekaa, have recently begun to display a threatening attitude against neighbouring Christian villages. Their activity seems to date from a recent visit paid to them by the French Political Officer at Baalbek. Otherwise the country is quiet.

On the 3rd November the French Sûreté raided a printing press in Beirut on which was being printed a "Narrative of the Lebanese Crisis of November 1943" which the Government had originally commissioned two of its officials to write, and which the French believed contained insulting reference to their troops. The Government, immediately informed, sent police to occupy and seal the press and evict the Sûreté. A tense situation ensued when the French protested strongly at this reaction to their illegal action, and the Lebanese Prime Minister, rather than risk a clash at this juncture, gave way to the extent of having the pamphlet burned against withdrawal of the French note of protest and release of the arrested manager of the press.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—At a meeting of Lebanese and Syrian journalists at Chtaura on the 5th November it was resolved to approach their respective Governments with a view to pressure on the British authorities for increased supplies of newsprint. The internal censorship came in for severe criticism.

In general the press is unanimous in its opposition to American support of Zionist infiltration in the Middle East. The Alexandria Protocol has been approved with certain reserves. The Lebanese press is antagonistic to the Greater Syria movement, whilst both the Syrian and Lebanese papers are awaiting the exact terms of General de Gaulle's declaration before making any comment. On the question of internal reforms the entire press is discontented and has voiced bitter criticism of the two Governments.



Extracts from *Weekly Political Summary* No. 137, *Secret, Syria and the Lebanon*, 15th November, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th November.)

### 1. General.

NO developments having occurred in the major political questions, public attention during the week has become sharply focussed on the recent alarming rise in the cost of living. The press in both States has contained numerous articles calling on the Governments to take effective measures to control prices, and in the Lebanon pamphlets have been circulated by the Falangistes and others attacking the Lebanese Government for its failure to do so. There is no doubt that the increase in the already excessive price level has, in fact, hit wage-earners hard everywhere, and labour troubles have already started as a result.

Information received from many different sources indicates that one of the main causes of this recent rise is the institution by the French civil and military authorities of bulk purchases of food-stuffs and other essential commodities for local storage and eventual shipment to France. The Lebanese Government have already protested on this score to the French authorities, who have admitted that purchases have been made and who claim that they have now been suspended at General Beynet's behest; but they have declined to consider a further suggestion that the goods bought should be returned to the vendors. The question of these purchases was raised in the Lebanese Chamber on the 14th November, when the Government declared that their export from the country would be forbidden.

Apart from this Lebanese *démarche*, neither Government has produced any far-reaching plan for controlling, much less for reducing prices, though both have taken steps to aid their own civil servants, the Syrians by granting each of them a month's pay as a gratuity and the Lebanese by increasing the stocks of commodities to be sold through the co-operatives.

In the Lebanese Chamber on the 14th November a Deputy quoted at length certain reports alleged to have appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* and *The Times* regarding the position of Great Britain and France in the Levant States, including statements attributed to official French sources, that the 1943 Lebanese elections had been vitiated by British interference and that British officials had not observed the Lyttleton-de Gaulle Agreement. He asked whether the Government were aware of the tenor of the Paris discussions, which touched at the root of Lebanese independence, and repudiated the suggestion that the Chamber resulted from falsified elections. The Prime Minister, in reply, said that he had no official cognisance of the discussions referred to, but that he knew that there can be no question of Great Britain going back on her promises as regards Lebanese independence. The Lebanese had acquired independence because they wanted it; that independence had been recognised by Arab and Allied States and could not now be taken away. His Government would not sign a treaty with anyone, so that they could go to the Peace Conference free of all foreign engagements. This reply was loudly applauded.

### 3. Syria—Damascus.

Recent sittings of the Damascus Chamber have been devoted to examination of the budget. Deputies have accused the Government of extravagance on non-essentials, and have criticised them for the decision to grant one month's pay as gratuity to all civil servants. A Bill on the Agricultural Produce Tax, which produced £S.1,350,000 in the first ten months of 1944, was ratified.

A strike of type-setters has deprived Damascus of Arabic newspapers since the 9th November.

### 4. Aleppo.

Certain commodity prices have now decreased, though not to the levels ruling before recent increases. With decreasing employment by the British military authorities and in the textile trade many classes of workers are in real difficulty.

### 5. Homs and Hama.

A strike of weavers in Homs, due to a shortage of cotton yarn, resulted in demonstrations and a general closing of the town. Supplies of yarn promised

from Damascus failed to arrive, and the Mohafez could only control the situation by allowing a deputation to proceed to Damascus. Some 13,000 men are affected. The trouble has been utilised by local factions for their own political ends.

### 6. Jebel Druze.

The failure of the Syrian Government to give effect to the recent decision of the Administrative Council to abandon autonomy in favour of incorporation in the Syrian State has discouraged the promoters of this motion and encouraged their opponents, who are locally thought to be working on behalf of the French. The Emir Hassan el Atrash has gone to Damascus, it is presumed, to discuss this matter.

The Mohafez and the Director of the Bedouin Control have settled a dispute over water rights between the Druzes and the Ruwalla tribes, the former restraining the Druzes whilst the latter ensured that the Ruwalla obeyed the decision jointly given. The French Bedouin Control officer took no part in the settlement.

### 7. Alaouite Territory.

Nothing to report.

### 9. Tribal.

An abortive attempt by some 200 men of the Agaidat tribe to raid the Shammar Khrossa about the 31st October has been reported. The Shammar heard of it and retired into Iraq in time. Two groups of Méhoristes intercepted the raiders and detained four of them.

### 11. The Lebanon.

See under "General" above.

Labour dissatisfaction has again focussed attention on the possibility of a change of Government, and many rumours have been circulating to the effect that Riad Solh intended to resign in order to forestall an adverse vote in the Chamber. He himself has been saying that he wishes to go out, but that no suitable Sunni Moslem can be found prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of office.

A memorial service for the late Lord Moyne was held in the Anglican Church at Beirut on the 11th November. His Majesty's Minister delivered the address.

### 12. Press and Propaganda.

*Internal.*—Reaction in the Syrian press, both Arabic and French, to the news of the assassination of Lord Moyne, was one of horrified astonishment, followed by strong condemnation. Most of the Lebanese Arabic press, while condemning the crime and expressing sympathy with the victim, confined itself to reproducing the comments of the foreign press, to the effect that this stupid and abominable crime would result in a serious set-back to the Zionist movement.

The Lebanese French press strongly condemned the assassination as a detestable and monstrously stupid crime, and one paper hints at tacit complicity in Palestine by a certain section of the community.

All the press maintains its intransigent opposition to any extension of Zionism in the Middle East.

The French-inspired Arabic press is obviously very gratified at the Franco-British talks in Paris and at the admission of France to the European Advisory Commission, whilst the French language press is openly jubilant. The nationalist Arabic press in both countries is awaiting developments.

The Syrian and Lebanese French language press has adopted a very friendly attitude towards Great Britain as a result of Mr. Churchill's Paris visit.

The press in general is pleased with the result of the American presidential elections.

On the question of high prices, the press generally has been somewhat appeased by a downward trend in Syria and an energetic decision taken by the Lebanese Government to combat speculation and control prices.



[E 7465/23/89]

No. 45.

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary*, No. 138, *Secret*, Syria and the Lebanon, 22nd November, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 6th December.)

## 1. General.

THERE have been no further contacts between the Governments and the French regarding the Troupes Spéciales or on the treaty issue. The Syrian President, when informed by His Majesty's Minister on the 18th November that the French Foreign Minister had assured Mr. Eden of France's determination to implement her promises of independence to the States, expressed his Government's willingness to discuss outstanding questions with the French in the friendliest spirit, but also their determination not to sign a treaty with France or to accord her a pre-eminent position.

While public opinion remains generally focussed on the cost of living, speculation is reported in most areas on the probable effect of the recent discussions in Paris on future British and French policy in the Levant States. While the public as yet know little of the outcome, the indications received via Cairo are tending to produce the impression in their minds that French-inspired claims of a radical change of British policy in favour of France are unfounded, and that Great Britain will, in fact, stand by her pledges of support for the States' independence. One result of this is that the Lebanese Government, whose position last week appeared shaky, was able successfully to weather two critical debates in the Chamber and is again, at least temporarily, firm in the saddle.

Meetings between the Syrian and Lebanese supply authorities to discuss textile control and the allocation of quotas for certain imported products led to disagreement, and further meetings are to be held next week, at which the two Prime Ministers will attend, in the hopes of reaching solutions. The absence of some impartial authority to arbitrate on these questions, in which the States often have conflicting interests, is being severely felt.

On the 16th November General Beynet informed the Lebanese Government that he had given orders that the goods purchased in the local market by certain French services for export to France should be resold at controlled prices and that outstanding contracts should be cancelled; and had asked for a Committee of Enquiry to be sent from Paris to investigate the circumstances. The Lebanese Prime Minister was enabled to make an announcement to this effect in the Chamber on the same afternoon.

Mr. George Wadsworth presented his credentials as first United States Minister to the Syrian President on the 16th November, and to the Lebanese President on the 17th November.

Brazil has recognised the independence and sovereignty of Syria and the Lebanon, employing much the same formula as that used by the United States.

## 3. Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Prime Minister has been ill for the past week and is likely to be absent from his office for at least a further week.

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 16th November the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a question, made a statement on the Churchill-de Gaulle conversations in Paris on the same lines as that made by the Lebanese Prime Minister on the 14th November (see *Weekly Summary* No. 137).

The Public Works Department has been under fire in the Chamber, and its Minister, in reply, admitted a lack of competent technicians, though he maintained that only 4½ per cent. of its annual expenditure went on salaries, as opposed to 11 per cent. in the O.C.P., and claimed that the department was undertaking work for the War Department at prices from 30 per cent. to 40 per cent. less than those charged by contractors.

The Director-General of Supply has submitted a scheme for reorganising his department, which is at present being studied by the Judicial Committee of the Chamber. He has refused to accept any salary for his post, over and above what he already receives as Director-General of Justice.

A Government Commission of Enquiry is examining alleged irregularities in the Waqf Department.

A decision of the Ministry of Supply has set up a committee for distribution and clarification of prices of pharmaceutical products.

The strike of type-setters ended on the 17th November, when the owners agreed to pay the men their normal wages during the strike period and the Government granted them certain concessions in the matter of supplies. A strike of tramway employees is threatened, the men demanding the right to purchase supplies at the Government Co-operatives and a month's salary as a gratuity; the Director of Police is refusing to allow the strike to take place but has promised the men that he will take up their case.

The Turkish Consulate at Damascus has been raised to the status of a consulate-general.

## 4. Aleppo.

While prices have somewhat declined, there are threats of strikes amongst tramway employees and difficulties among textile workers.

The Mohafez cancelled a football match between a local Armenian club and a visiting Jewish team from Palestine in deference to certain extremist Moslems who had threatened trouble.

## 6. Jebel Druze.

The Mohafez has returned from Damascus very dissatisfied with the Government, which he states is cold-shouldering him and his family, starving him of gendarmes and failing to put into effect the decision of the local council to annul the autonomy of the district.

The Mohafez has lodged a strong complaint against the French officer commanding the Druze Squadron, accusing him of unwarranted interference in local affairs and of speaking insultingly of the Syrian President and Government. The Prime Minister is understood to have taken the case up with the French.

## 7. Alaouite Territory.

The return of the Hatay to Syria has recently been a subject of local discussion, following the raising of the question in the Damascus Chamber (see *Weekly Summary* No. 136). The impression seems to be current that after the war the Great Powers will merely instruct Turkey to hand it back.

The Mohafez is well in the saddle and is taking a strong line in defence of Syrian sovereignty against any attempted encroachments by the local French authorities.

The high price of olive oil, following a bad crop, is still a serious matter in this region, although the price has recently slightly declined.

## 8. Euphrates and Jezireh.

The French Délégué, Colonel des Essars, has left on transfer for Morocco. During his period in this country he has always entertained cordial relations with his British colleagues, while making every effort to enhance French prestige in the areas he has controlled.

## 10. Frontier.

The Syrian Government is reported to have decided to enforce the payment of certain taxes on crops owned in Syria by Turks who subsequently take the produce over the border. The Syrians have little fear of reprisal as the Turks already made it impossible for Syrians owning land in Turkey to repatriate any profit.

## 11. The Lebanon.

The announcement of the resale of goods bought by the French (see "General" above), coupled with increased activity on the part of the Government's anti-profiteering squad, and the considerable press publicity given to the Government's measures for releasing commodities for sale to the public have for the moment quietened the public outcry on the cost of living, although the fall in prices has so far been slight.

At a meeting of the Chamber on the 21st November the Government's income-tax law was passed *in toto*, with much less difficulty than had been anticipated.



[E 7747/23/89]

No. 46.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 139, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 29th November, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 19th December.)*

#### General.

There has been little political activity in either State owing to the El-Adha Feast, and no further discussions have taken place between the French and the Governments.

The two Presidents, accompanied by some of their Ministers, met on the 27th November at Chtaura to discuss economic matters. The atmosphere of the meeting is reported to have been most cordial; the Syrians offered concessions over the price of wheat, and the Lebanese reciprocated in the matter of textiles. The delegates agreed that they must keep a common front in external policy, and refrain from any dissensions on economic matters which could be exploited by ill-intentioned foreigners.

Talks have taken place between the Turkish consular representatives and both Governments regarding the eventual Turkish recognition of the two States. The Turks appear to have expressed willingness to accord this recognition, provided that they receive assurances that the Syrians would not formulate any inopportune demands for the return of the Hatay.

There have been small strikes in both Beirut and Damascus, and it is generally expected that there will be further labour troubles after the feast as a result of a general unrest amongst the workmen caused by the recent rise in the cost of living.

#### Syria—Damascus.

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber on the 20th November several Deputies pressed the Government to give notice of the termination of the agreement between the Government and the D.H.P. Railway, which is due to expire on the 1st March, 1945, with a view to the Government either taking over the railway or modifying the concession. A motion to this effect was eventually carried unanimously and, according to the press reports, the Government has notified the railway accordingly.

The Director-General of Supplies is reported to have resigned because certain projects put forward by him for the reform of his department had not been supported by the Government.

There appears to have been some fall in prices, which the press in part attributes to the Government's action in controlling the transfer of stocks from one place to another within the country.

The Prime Minister is still indisposed, but is making good progress.

The Government offices are closed from the 23rd November to the 2nd December on the occasion of the feast.

Tramway workers in Damascus struck for a few hours on the 21st November, but returned when their demands for one month's salary as a gratuity were granted. Strikes are threatened amongst employees of the Régie de Tabac, the Customs and the Doummar cement works, who are making similar demands. A strike amongst O.C.P. workers was averted.

#### Aleppo.

On the 23rd November a reception was held to commemorate the death of Ibrahim Hanano, the Syrian Nationalist leader. Saadullah Jabri made a speech calling on Syrians to unite, repudiating any suggestion that a treaty could be signed with France or any other non-Arab country, and declaring that if the *Troupes Spéciales* were not handed over the Syrians would form their own army. The French Délégué did not attend, having foreseen that the tone of the speeches, as last year, would be unpleasant to him.

Students in the Government schools struck on the 19th November in protest against the failure of their authorities to apply certain reforms recently issued in the educational curriculum, but returned after telegraphing a petition to the Minister of Public Instruction.

The two main spinning factories are stated to have delivered a satisfactory portion of the quantity of cotton yarn due to be handed over to the Government. The supply authorities have not yet delivered further quantities of yarn to the weavers.

#### Homs and Hama.

The Homs weavers have been on strike again on account of the lack of cotton yarn, and the town closed in sympathy. A deputation was allowed to proceed to Damascus to protest direct to the supply authorities. Local political parties have been exploiting the unrest, one party supporting the strike, another violently opposing it.

#### Jebel Druze.

The Muhafez, in the hopes of dissipating local uneasiness at the failure of the Syrian Government to legalise the incorporation of the area in the Syrian State, has published a statement he recently made to a deputation to the effect that the Government has welcomed the Provincial Council's decision to demand this incorporation and is preparing the necessary decree. He has added that all necessary legislation is already in force in the Jebel Druze.

The Druze Gendarmerie have seized a quantity of hashish which a Lebanese from Zahlé was bringing from Syria into the Jebel Druze. The Religious Sheikhs have published a statement threatening excommunication of all persons found guilty of selling hashish.

The Political Officer, on visiting notables on the occasion of the El-Adha Feast, found an undercurrent of anxiety lest the end of the war should see the British leaving the country to the French.

#### Alaouite Territory.

A serious quarrel between the Muhafez and the Délégué has been occasioned by the arrest by the Syrian authorities of a Syrian telephonist, employed by the French military authorities, for having shot at an Alaouite. The French demanded his release on the grounds that he had shot because his victim had torn up a portrait of General de Gaulle in a café; this appears to be a fabrication, and the Muhafez has refused his release and insisted that the Syrian courts are competent. The French have moved 200 North African troops into the area and the matter is now being discussed at Damascus.

The land cases brought against Suleiman Murshid by local peasantry are in abeyance pending the passing of a law to annul the registration of the lands. The Muhafez, who has gone to Damascus, hopes to induce the Government to take this step, which they are apparently reluctant to do for fear of setting a precedent elsewhere, by pointing out that if Murshid eventually returns to the area he will be legally entitled to reoccupy his lands and to claim this year's crop from the peasantry, thereby creating a potentially dangerous situation and weakening the Government's authority.

The question of the abolition of Alaouite autonomy has gone no further. The Muhafez maintains that it would be voted by the local council if put up, but that the Syrian President does not wish this step taken at present. If action is not taken soon, it seems probable that the number of adherents of union will diminish and that the measure, which is obviously essential if the unity of Syria is to be achieved, will be more difficult to pass when eventually raised.

#### Euphrates and Jezireh.

Students of the Government school in Deir-ez-Zor have been on strike owing to the failure of the Government to appoint a science master. The town closed on the 18th November in sympathy. The Syrian Government admitted in the Damascus Chamber on the 20th November that the state of affairs was a scandal.

#### The Lebanon.

The anniversary of the return of the Lebanese President and Ministers from internment at Rashaya was celebrated on the 22nd November by a reception at the Government offices in all the principal towns. It was noteworthy that the French authorities attended these receptions and closed their own offices for the day. Little public enthusiasm was shown, but all notables seem to have participated.

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 21st November the Government's Income Tax law was passed without amendment, only one Deputy opposing it. Machinery to collect the tax has yet to be set up.

Discussion at present centres around the suggestion alleged to have been put about recently by the French authorities that the Christians of the Lebanon, if they desire French protection in the future, should press for the reduction of the Lebanon to its pre-1914 size, because the French would not be able to protect



them in a Lebanon constituted as at present. The suggestion has found some favour among the more fanatical Christian elements, but is rejected by most intelligent Lebanese on the grounds that in present world conditions a smaller Lebanon would be economically impracticable. The Maronite Patriarch seems to have been convinced by his entourage that the result of the recent Alexandria Conference was "to sell the Lebanon to the Moslems," and the several attempts made by the Lebanese Government (including a visit by the President in person with a gift of money for Maronite charities) have failed to wean him from this conviction.

There has been a further strike amongst the Shell Company employees which is not yet settled, and a number of other strikes are threatened in the near future unless the cost of living comes down.

The Lebanese Government have issued a decree prohibiting the transport of any merchandise within the Lebanon without a permit from the supply authorities.

There have been further disturbances in the Hermel area where the Government's representatives seem incapable of maintaining order.

[E 7817/23/89]

No. 47.

*Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 140, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 6th December, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 22nd December.)*

#### 1. General.

THE news of the departure of His Majesty's Minister has gradually become known. Rumours have been circulating to the effect that this presages a change in the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Levant States, and that the Ninth Army are also moving out. The communiqué published in London on the 5th December should do something to counter these rumours, and in some quarters a readiness has already been shown to accept the official explanation at its face value. The Governments have not concealed their sorrow and depression at his departure, but are both resolved to maintain their policy of independence.

It is reported from Angora that the Turkish Government have invited the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to visit Angora after the middle of December in order to discuss Turkish recognition of the two States. This recognition would clearly be beneficial from all points of view, not least in connexion with relations on the Turco-Syrian frontier, where the French are tending to reassume more direct control since the departure of British troops; but there appear to be certain outstanding matters to be cleared up before it is accorded, notably that of Syrian claims for the return of the Hatay.

A French suggestion to the Maronites, that the Lebanese Christians should press for a reduction of the Lebanon to its pre-1914 size if they desire French protection in the future, was reported in paragraph 11 of Weekly Summary No. 139. It has now been reported from Damascus that the general line of French propaganda there is that Syria, if she is prepared to sign a treaty with France, can have back the four provinces detached from Syria and added to the Lebanon in 1920. These two linked propaganda lines seem to have had little success, as most Lebanese realise that the pre-1914 Lebanon would be an economic impossibility in post-war conditions, whilst the Syrians are not anxious to raise the question of the four provinces unless the Lebanese cease to align their policy on the question of independence with that of Syria.

The cost of living continues to be the chief preoccupation of both States, and there have been no important political developments.

According to the press the Greek Orthodox Patriarch has received an invitation from the Soviet Government to send a delegation to Moscow for the election of the Orthodox Patriarch. The report adds that the Patriarch and the Archbishop of Beirut will probably go.

#### 2. Economic.

Following the Syro-Lebanese Conference at Chtaura on the 27th November, a series of discussions were held in Beirut last week between the Lebanese Minister of Finance and the Syrian Minister of Supply in order to settle the allocation between the two States of a number of M.E.S.C. quotas for essential commodities.

The Syrians continue to press that these allocations should be on the basis of consumption, and the Lebanese that they should be on the basis of pre-war imports, the greater part of which were effected through Lebanese merchants. The Lebanese further claimed that the relative consumption of the two States could not be determined with accuracy. Neither side would give way, and it was finally agreed to make *ad hoc* arrangements (*i.e.* bargains) in respect of each commodity.

Total cereal purchases during the period the 23rd to the 30th November, 1944, amounted to 1,337 tons, a daily average of 167 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 169,494 tons.

#### 3. Syria—Damascus.

The President of the Republic received the foreign representatives and notables on the 26th November, on the occasion of the Id el Adha, and later entertained the former to lunch. Government offices remained closed throughout the week on account of this feast, and a sitting of the Chamber held on the 2nd December was abandoned owing to lack of a quorum.

The Prime Minister has now recovered and returned to work. Reports in the press that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had arrived in Amman are incorrect, as Jamil Mardam has not left the Levant States. Visitors to Damascus have included the Transjordanian Minister of the Interior and Musa al Alami, the Palestinian representative at the recent Arab preliminary conference at Alexandria; the latter is understood to have come in order to discuss the formation of Arab propaganda bureaux in Washington and London.

The Syrian Government are reported to have abandoned the project of holding a general census on account of the expense involved.

#### 4. Aleppo.

Criticism has been heard of the speech delivered by Saadullah Jabri during the Hanano meeting (see Weekly Summary No. 139) on the grounds that, in exhorting Syrians to unite on essentials and to cease to trouble about trifles, he included amongst the latter the cost of living, which is the greatest local problem. He has been asserting in conversation that only the officials were badly affected but this is far from the truth.

A recent order by the Syrian Ministry of Supply prohibiting the transport of cotton or silk even inside the town without a permit has caused considerable inconvenience to the widely scattered weaving industry, and the Chamber of Industry is urging its cancellation. Dr. Kayali has stated that the measure is only temporary pending the expected arrival of textiles from the United States. A small price fall has, however, resulted. The spinning mills continued to deliver yarn to the Ministry of Supply until they closed down for the feast, but none has yet been passed on to the weavers, apparently because of difficulties of fixing the prices.

#### 5. Homs and Hama.

Some 10,000 weavers are still out of work in Homs and the majority of the town looms are still idle, as the price of cotton, though it has fallen, is still too high to make operation of the looms profitable. The local Communist party, stimulated by the absence in Mecca of the leader of their rivals, the Shebab Mahomed, are holding frequent meetings with the out-of-work weavers and are reported to have encouraged them to start demonstrations.

The drinking water supply of Homs has been condemned as insanitary by both British and French military authorities. It is generally believed that this unfortunate state of affairs arises out of a racket between the President of the Municipality and the contractor who supplied the pipes, which had previously been condemned elsewhere as unusable.

A member of the powerful Barazi family has been arrested after a shooting affray in which a dentist was killed. It remains to be seen whether the family will be able to effect his release, as on a previous occasion.

#### 6. Jebel Druze.

The Mohafez has left for Damascus and is stated to be proceeding to Cairo to claim the estate of his ex-wife, the late Amira Asmahan. Rumours are current that he has resigned, and his family are perturbed lest the Syrian Government should replace him by a Syrian official. They intend to insist either that he should withdraw his resignation or that he should be replaced by another member of the family.



### 7. Alaouite Territory.

The French military authorities appear to have yielded in the matter of the arrested telephonist (see paragraph 7 of Weekly Summary No. 139), but the 200 North African troops are still in the Massiaf area, where the situation therefore remains potentially dangerous. The délégué is understood to have pressed strongly once again for the removal of the notorious Captain Boussiquet and of his interpreter, but so far at least without success. The Mohafez is still in Damascus.

The Syrian Prime Minister has been urged to proceed with legislation cancelling the registration of Suleiman Murshid's lands. He has agreed to study the case, with which he claims to be unfamiliar, but his attitude does not so far suggest that he is prepared to take action. He is, however, retaining Murshid in Damascus.

### 9. Tribal.

Haj Mohamed el Ayesb, Deputy of Deir-ez-Zor, has arrived there on a mission from the Syrian Government to arrange an amicable settlement of the long outstanding dispute between the Baggara, Kikieh and Shammar tribes. He proposes to hold a meeting on the 1st December at Deir-ez-Zor. The Mutessarif of Mosul and the Mohafez of Deir-ez-Zor have been in communication regarding the abortive raid by the Agaidat against the Shammar Khrossa (see paragraph 9 of Weekly Summary No. 137), each accusing the other of not having enforced the conditions of the agreement come to last June. The Mohafez maintains that the Shammar Khrossa broke the agreed truce and are therefore liable to the fine of I.D.2,000 agreed upon by both parties, but seems unlikely to be able to enforce his view.

### 11. The Lebanon.

Sixteen Deputies are understood to have banded themselves together to demand from the Government the setting up of a series of parliamentary commissions to examine the alleged corruption and inefficiency in each department of the Administration. It is possible that this may lead to the ministerial crisis which has been expected for some time.

The Lebanese Prime Minister visited the Maronite Patriarch on the 30th November and, after a three-hour discussion, succeeded, where his President had failed, in convincing the patriarch that the Government's policy was in the best interests of the Lebanon. He is understood to have achieved this result chiefly by threatening the patriarch that, if the Maronites did not abandon their anti-Government, pro-French attitude, the Lebanese and Moslems would abandon the Lebanon and seek incorporation in Syria of the areas where they are predominant.

The Minister of Finance is having difficulty in preparing his budget owing to the dilatoriness of several departments in forwarding their estimates. He is making a laudable attempt to cut down unnecessary expenditure, with a view to filling an anticipated deficit. His task has been made somewhat easier by the recent Syro-Lebanese Economic Conference at Chtaura, one of the results of which was a concession by the Syrians on the price of Syrian wheat delivered to the Lebanon, and he is now more confident that the budget will be balanced.

At a meeting of the Chamber on the 30th November Deputies sharply criticised the Government for having allowed a credit not included in the budget. The Minister of Finance, after justifying the credit, made the question one of confidence, which the Government obtained on a vote by a fair majority.

There is still labour trouble among the Shell Company's employees despite an increase of wages recently accorded by the company. There are threats of strikes in other labour organisations, but nothing serious has yet eventuated.

M. Joseph Salem, the new Lebanese Minister to Cairo, left to take up his post on the 29th November.

The Chinese Government has officially notified its recognition of Lebanese independence.

## CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

[E 6137/41/65]

No. 48.

### Memorandum on Arab Unity Conference.

FOR some months past Nahas Pasha has been carrying on consultations with leaders of various Arab States with a view to finding out what degree of agreement there is on any form of inter-Arab unity, federation or co-operation.

2. Nahas's consultations resulted in the convocation of a preparatory committee to examine the material collected and to prepare the way for an Arab Congress. The preparatory committee met recently in Cairo, being composed of representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Palestinian Arabs were represented by an observer.

3. As regards the general attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to the question of Arab unity, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in the House of Commons on the 24th February, 1943, that His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative in any scheme would have to come from the Arabs themselves. In view of our general sympathy with the growing desire of Arabs for the reduction of national barriers between them, we have confined our own action as regards the present meeting to impressing on the parties concerned the undesirability of making any public statements which would increase tension in the Middle East, particularly over Palestine or the Levant States.

Foreign Office, 12th October, 1944.

[E 6137/41/65]

No. 49.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th October.)

(No. 1997.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, 8th October, 1944.

FOLLOWING is summary of resolutions of protocol of Preparatory Committee for Arab Congress published in the *Journal d'Egypte* this morning:—

Part 1. League of Arab States will be constituted by the independent Arab States who wish to join it. This League will have a Council in which the States will be represented on a footing of equality. Its mission will be to execute agreements which States conclude among themselves to organise periodical meetings in order to strengthen their relations and co-ordinate their political programmes with a view to realising co-operation and to safeguarding by every possible means their independence and sovereignty against aggression and to occupy itself generally with the affairs and interests of Arab countries. The decisions of this Council will bind those accepting them except in the case of a difference between two States of the League which they have referred to the Council for settlement. In this case the decisions of the Council will have to be carried out [*sic*]. In all cases it is forbidden to have recourse to force to settle conflicts between two States of the League. Each State will have the right to conclude with another State, whether or not a member of the League, particular agreements which are not contrary to the text and spirit of these dispositions. In no case will a State be allowed to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or to any one of the member States. The Council will mediate in every difference susceptible of provoking war between a member State and another member or non-member with a view to reconciling them. A commission will be formed of the members of the preparatory committee in order to elaborate the statutes of the Council and to examine political questions which could be the object of agreements to be concluded between Arab countries.

Part 2.—(a) The Arab States represented on the Committee will co-operate in economics, cultural and social questions such as commercial exchanges, customs, currency, agriculture, industry, communications, cultural questions, nationality, passports, social and sanitary questions, &c. A Commission of experts in each category of these questions will be formed of representatives of the Governments which have participated in the Preparatory Committee in order to elaborate projects determining the means of co-operation.



(b) In these matters a commission of co-ordination will be formed to control the workings of these various Commissions and to put their resolutions in the form of draft agreements for submission to the different Governments. When all these Commissions will have completed their work, the Preparatory Committee will meet again to examine results with a view to the convocation of a general Arab Congress.

Part 3. The Committee hopes that the Arab countries will consolidate this first happy result by others, especially if after the present war world events should lead to institutions which will unite States by closer and stronger bonds.

Part 4. The States represented at the Committee unanimously affirm their respect for the independence of the Lebanon within its present frontiers, which their Governments have already recognised, after the Lebanon has followed a policy of independence proclaimed by its Government.

Part 5.—(a) The Committee considers that Palestine constitutes one of the important elements of Arab countries and that the rights of the Palestine Arabs cannot be affected without danger to the peace and stability of the Arab world. The Committee considers that the engagements taken by Great Britain, which involve the stoppage of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to the Arabs and the progress (acheminement) of Palestine towards independence, constitute acquired rights for the Arabs, and that their execution will be a forward step towards the goal, towards the strengthening of peace and stability. The Committee proclaims its support of the Palestine cause for the realisation of its legitimate aspirations and for the safeguarding of its just rights. The Committee declares that as much as anyone it has compassion for the sufferings which Jews have endured in Europe by the action of some dictatorial States, but the case of these Jews must not be confounded with Zionism, for nothing would be more unjust than to wish to settle the question of European Jews by another injustice of which would be the Palestinian Arabs to whatever religion or confession they belong.

(b) The proposal concerning the participation of Arab Governments and peoples in the fund destined to preserve Arab lands in Palestine will be referred to the Commission of Economic and Financial Questions for examination and submission of the result of the Preparatory Committee at its next meeting. The protocol was signed by all the Delegations except Saudi and Yemeni Delegations, who postponed their opinion pending reference to their respective Kings.

[E 6477/41/65]

No. 50.

PROTOCOL SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA ON THE 7TH OCTOBER, 1944, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE ARAB CONGRESS, AS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.

(Translation.)

*Statement by the Committee.*

THE Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress concluded their deliberations, as they began them, in an atmosphere of perfect mutual confidence, friendship and fraternity, and in full appreciation of the mutual responsibility devolving upon them in these important times in which the course of history is about to be changed. They have been animated by a desire to unite their efforts in the direction of the achievement of all that is in the best interests of all the Arab countries with a view to assuring their future and the realisation of their aspirations.

It was the source of great gratification and happiness that the committee should have been joined by Dr. Musa al Alami, the representative member of the Arabs of Palestine, having regard to the importance with which the cause of this Arab territory is regarded by all the Arab peoples without exception.

The committee adopted, by the unanimous vote of the representatives of Syria and Transjordan and Iraq and the Lebanon and Egypt, many vital resolutions concerning political, economic, cultural and social questions and, in evidence of the agreement of these delegations with the above-mentioned resolutions, their chiefs have signed the protocol attached to this statement.

As regards the delegations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, these have postponed an expression of opinion until they shall have been able to refer the above-mentioned resolutions to their Majesties King Abdul Aziz al Saud and the Imam Yahya Hamid ud Din.

The committee are happy to avail themselves of this occasion, which in truth constitutes one of the great pages of Arab history, to address to all the Arab countries their best wishes and congratulations and to submit to their Majesties and Excellencies the Kings and Rulers of the Arab States and to the princes of the Arab world an expression of their deep loyalty and appreciation, being convinced that their endeavours and hopes and the results which they have achieved, and by the grace of God will achieve in the future, merit their highest appreciation and all encouragement and support.

#### PROTOCOL.

The following chiefs and members of the Arab delegations to the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress are signatories to this document:—

President of the Preparatory Committee—

His Excellency Mustapha Nahas Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and chief of the Egyptian delegation.

The Syrian delegation—

His Excellency al Saiyid Jamil Mardam Beg, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Dr. Najib al Armanazi, secretary-general to the President.

His Excellency Dr. Sabari al Assali, Deputy for Damascus.

The Transjordan delegation—

His Excellency Taufiq Abul Huda Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Transjordan and chief of the Transjordan delegation.

His Excellency Sulaiman al Sakkar, secretary to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Iraqi delegation—

His Excellency al Saiyi Hamdi al Pachachi, Prime Minister of Iraq and chief of the Iraqi delegation.

His Excellency al Saiyid Arshad al Umari, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency al Saiyid Nuri al Said, former Prime Minister of Iraq.

His Excellency al Saiyid Tahsin al Askari, Minister Plenipotentiary for Iraq in Egypt.

The Lebanese delegation—

His Excellency Riyadh al Sulh Beg, Prime Minister of the Lebanon and chief of the Lebanese delegation.

His Excellency Salim Taqala Beg, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency al Saiyid Musa Mubarak, principal secretary to his Excellency the President.

The Egyptian delegation—

His Excellency Najib al Hillali Pasha, Minister for Education.

His Excellency Muhammad Sabri ab'Ilm Pasha, Minister of Justice.

His Excellency Muhammad Salah un Din Beg, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The above mentioned, desiring to give proof of the close and various ties which unite all the Arab countries, and seeking to strengthen and confirm these ties and to develop them in such a manner as to benefit the interests of the Arab countries, to ameliorate their conditions, to safeguard their independence and to realise their noble aspirations, met together in Alexandria pursuant to the wishes of the Arab peoples in all the Arab countries on Monday, the 8th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 25th September, 1944), and on Saturday, the 20th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 7th October, 1944), as a Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and reached agreement as follows:—

#### I.—A League of Arab States.

There shall be constituted a League of Arab States consisting of those independent Arab States who agree to join it. This league shall have a council, which shall be called "The Council of the League of Arab States," on which there shall be represented on a basis of equality all the Arab States who participate in the league.



It shall be the task of this council to supervise the execution of such agreements as these States may adopt, to assemble periodic meetings, to strengthen mutual relations and to co-ordinate policies to the end that co-operation may be strengthened and independence and sovereignty safeguarded against all aggression; and to give heed generally to the affairs and interests of all the Arab countries.

The resolutions of this council shall be binding on all those who accept them, except in the event of a difference arising between two States who are members of the council and who refer to the council for a settlement of this difference. In that event the decisions of the council must be accepted by both parties.

In no circumstances shall it be permissible to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between any two States, members of the council. Any State may conclude with another State, member or non-member of the council, an agreement which is not in conflict with the text of this document or with its spirit.

Nor shall it be permissible in any circumstances to pursue a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League of Arab States or to that of any State member of the league.

The council will intervene with a view to the settlement of any dispute arising between a State, member of the council, and any other State, whether a member or a non-member, which may appear likely to lead to war.

A sub-committee will be formed at once from members of the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft regulation for the council of the league and to consider the political questions concerning which it may be possible for agreement to be reached among the Arab States.

## II.—Co-operation in Economic, Cultural, Social and Other Matters.

(a) The Arab countries represented on the council will co-operate sincerely in the following matters:—

- (1) Economic and financial matters, including mutual commerce, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.
- (2) Communications, including roads, railways, air-routes, navigation, posts and telegraphs.
- (3) Cultural matters.
- (4) Matters concerning personal status, passports, visas, the extradition of criminals, and other similar matters.
- (5) Social affairs.
- (6) Public health.

(b) A sub-committee of experts shall be constituted for each class of these matters on which the Governments, members of the Preparatory Committee, shall be represented. The task of this committee shall be to prepare proposals for the manner in which co-operation shall be organised in these matters and the extent to which such co-operation shall be established.

(c) There shall be set up a drafting and co-ordinating committee the task of which shall be to supervise the work of the other sub-committees, to co-ordinate their activities and progressively to cast into due and proper form their proposals and conclusions and to submit them to the different Governments.

(d) When all the sub-committees have completed their labours the Preparatory Committee will reassemble and there will be submitted to it the work of the sub-committees as a preparatory step to the summoning of the general Arab Congress.

## III.—The Strengthening of these Relations in the Future.

Though they are gratified by the progress already made, the committee express the hope that the Arab countries will, in the future, strengthen their mutual ties by further endeavours, especially if international conditions after the present war should lead to the creation, in general, of closer and more sincere international relations.

## IV.—Special Resolution concerning the Lebanon.

The Arab States represented on the Preparatory Committee reaffirm severally their respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon within her present frontiers. The Governments of these States have in fact already

recognised this independence and sovereignty after the Government of the Lebanon had declared their adoption of a policy of independence in a ministerial statement which received the unanimous approval of the Lebanese Parliament on the 7th October, 1943.

## V.—Special Resolution concerning Palestine.

(a) The committee consider that Palestine is one of the principal pillars of the Arab countries, and that no infringement of the rights of the Arabs is possible without prejudice to peace and security throughout the Arab world. Similarly, the committee consider that the undertakings given by Great Britain, which involve the termination of Jewish immigration, the protection of the Arab lands and the realisation of independence for Palestine, constitute established Arab rights and that progress towards the satisfaction of these rights would be a movement in the desired direction and towards the strengthening of peace and the establishment of security.

The committee declare their support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and their struggle for the realisation of their legitimate aspirations and the defence of their just rights.

The committee announce that they share with all others a deep grief for the horrors and sufferings which have been endured by the Jews of Europe at the hands of certain European dictatorships, but they consider that it would be an error to confuse the question of these Jews with that of the Zionists since it would be a great injustice that the question of the Jews of Europe should be made the cause of a further injustice committed against the Arabs of Palestine of whatever creed or religion.

(b) The proposal for the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the creation of an "Arab national fund" for the preservation of the Arab lands of Palestine shall be referred to the Finance and Economic Committee for consideration from all points of view and the result shall be submitted for discussion to the Preparatory Committee at their next meeting.

In proof of what has been written above, this protocol was signed at the Farouk I University in Alexandria on Saturday, the 20th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 7th October, 1944).

[E 6477/41/65]

No. 51.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd October.)

(No. 1179.)

Sir,

Cairo, 10th October, 1944.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1997 of the 8th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith the French version of the Protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress published in the *Journal d'Egypte* of the 8th October, 1944.

2. The Protocol was so fully analysed in the telegram above referred to that I need not dwell on the details in this despatch.

3. It is evident that the resolutions adopted by the Preparatory Committee are of potential importance. Divisions and jealousies as well as the instability of the Arab States concerned may militate against effective implementation of the resolutions, but, nevertheless, it is clear that discussions which have been taking place for over a year between the Arab States have cleared the ground of impracticable ideas such as those of immediate administrative unions or federations and led the Arab States in the more practical direction of Arab co-operation, political as well as economic, cultural and social. Moreover, a machinery has actually been proposed for giving permanency and method to this political co-operation, i.e., the Council of the League of Arab States, whose main purposes will be to consolidate relations between the Arab States and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty against aggression. It will be noted that the committee expressed the hope that this first step will lead to other results, especially in connexion with any post-war institution for uniting States generally. This is perhaps intended as a sop to the Syrians and Iraqis, who hanker after a Greater Syria or Arab Federation.

4. The particular resolution regarding the independence of the Lebanon within its present frontiers appears to have been due to conflict which arose

[30547]

L



during the proceedings between the Lebanese and Syrian delegations. The only reports which I have hitherto received of this incident come from an agent attached to the Palace and from Hassanein Pasha, both naturally prejudiced against Nahas Pasha. According to their accounts, Nahas Pasha, in full meeting, suggested to the delegates that they should produce the *procès-verbaux* of their separate meetings with him previously. He added that, if any of them wished to suppress any part of their *procès-verbaux*, they were at liberty to do so. The Lebanese and Iraqi delegates said that they had nothing to hide and produced their *procès-verbaux*. Saadallah Jabri Bey, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian delegation, looked very embarrassed, but finally said that he was a frank man and would not conceal anything that he had said. He then produced his *procès-verbal*, which contained passages against the Maronites and the Jews and suggesting a Greater Syria and the reduction of the Greater Lebanon to its old Little Lebanon frontiers.

5. Musa Mubarek, head of the Cabinet of the Lebanese President and one of the Lebanese delegates, said that he was the representative of the head of the Lebanese State, who was a Maronite, and that he must protest against this attack on the Maronites. The Lebanese delegates also protested against the proposal to reduce them to their pre-1920 frontiers. A reconciliation was patched up thanks to the intervention of Riad al Sulh, the Lebanese Prime Minister.

6. Subsequently King Farouk received the heads of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations as well as the head of the Transjordan delegation with a view apparently to smoothing over matters between the Syrians and Lebanese. As the head of the Lebanese delegation is a Muslim this step of the Palace seems to have been rather clumsy, for obviously the people who wanted quietening down were the Christian members of the Lebanese delegation. Incidentally, Nahas Pasha, according to Amin Osman Pasha, strongly objected on constitutional grounds to the Monarch's receiving, and discussing political matters with Arab delegates without his Minister for Foreign Affairs being present.

7. The story recorded above may be too highly coloured but its main features were confirmed by the Transjordan Prime Minister in conversation with the Oriental Counsellor. It is suggested that this apparently clumsy intervention of Nahas Pasha may have far-reaching consequences and that the Lebanese will probably now be confirmed in their suspicions that the Syrians are out to devour them. It is further suggested that the Lebanese may revert to the old lines of Christian policy instead of that of the present Sacred Union between Muslims and Christians on the basis of independence. The result of such an orientation would be a reversion of Christian feeling in the Lebanon in favour of France. The fear of Muslim domination is always lurking in the minds of the Lebanese Christians.

8. The references of Jabri Bey to the Lebanese in the *procès-verbal* of his separate discussions with Nahas Pasha are enclosed in Lord Killearn's despatch No. 1129 of the 8th December, 1943. The substance of these passages is that the Greater Lebanon was created by force against the wish of its inhabitants; that all Syrians yearn for a Greater Syria, but that they wish to settle the Lebanese question in a friendly way; that, if the Lebanon remained outside a Greater Syria and again became a focus of colonisation, Syria would have to reclaim the Muslim provinces which had been unjustly added to the Smaller Lebanon. Jabri Bey also referred to the difficulty of the religious, *i.e.*, the Maronite, question. These references to the Lebanese are fairly objective and moderate but they were obviously not suitable for communication to the Lebanese, who are extremely susceptible to any suggestions for the reduction of their present territories. The declaration just made by the Maronite Patriarch, a press telegraphic version of which is enclosed, (\*) would seem to be part of the Lebanese reaction to the incident detailed above.

9. In this connexion, I would invite attention to the resolutions in the first part of the Protocol limiting the right of the Arab States to conclude agreements with non-members to such as would not be contrary to the text or spirit of the Protocol and forbidding foreign policies prejudicial to the policy of the League or any one of its members. These resolutions may be aimed at Franco-Lebanese or Franco-Syrian treaties such as France is anxious to conclude.

10. As indicated in paragraph 3 above, it is not yet certain how much practical effect will be given to these resolutions. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to ignore the fact that the result of this conference constitutes a

(\*) Not printed.

step forward towards the political solidarity of the Egypto-Arab world against European encroachment. This political development will not only affect our position in the Arab countries proper but also in Egypt, which is on the verge of putting forward its claims for treaty revision, complete independence, &c. The terms of these resolutions accentuate the unity of attitude to be adopted by the States of the Egypto-Arab world towards States outside it, of which we are the principal one. We are regarded as having promoted this Arab unity movement, and the general feeling still is that we will welcome its fruition. It is not impossible that this solidarity of the Egypto-Arab world may be conciliated with our essential interests of communications and oil supplies, provided we are able to adapt ourselves to the new conditions quickly enough. If, however, in addition to securing arrangements for the safeguarding of our above-mentioned interests we have also, in the interest of our world policy, to adopt local policies in Syria and Palestine unacceptable to the Arabs, there is little likelihood of our being able to bring a consolidated Middle East into friendly co-operation. In that event, we should have to maintain these essential interests of ours by force against a less disunited Egypto-Arab world.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East; the High Commissioner for Palestine, Jerusalem; His Majesty's representatives at Beirut, Bagdad and Jedda; and the Governor, Aden.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Le Journal d'Egypte, 8th October, 1944.

*Les Résolutions du Comité Préparatoire au Congrès Général Arabe.*

LE Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe a terminé ses travaux, comme il les a commencés, dans une parfaite atmosphère de confiance réciproque, de sincère fraternité, de profonde cordialité conscient de ses responsabilités communes dans ces graves circonstances où l'histoire est en train de changer son cours.

Dans l'accomplissement de sa mission, il a été animé de l'impérieux désir de grouper ses forces et d'unir ses efforts pour les orienter vers le bien-être de tous les pays arabes, afin d'améliorer leur sort, de garantir leur avenir et de réaliser leurs aspirations.

Ce fut un sujet de joie et de satisfaction que M<sup>r</sup> Moussa El-Alamy, représentant des Arabes de Palestine, se soit joint au Comité, étant donné la gravité particulière et l'importance capitale que revêt la cause de ce pays frère pour tous les Arabes sans exception.

Le Comité, à l'unanimité des voix des Délégations syrienne, transjordanienne, irakienne, libanaise et égyptienne, a adopté plusieurs résolutions vitales, des points de vue politique, économique, culturel, social, etc.

En foi de quoi, les chefs et les membres de ces délégations ont signé le Protocole annexé.

Quant aux délégations des Royaumes de l'Arabie Séoudite et du Yemen, elles ont remis leur avis jusqu'à ce qu'elles en aient référé à Leurs Majestés le Roi Abdel Aziz Al-Séoud et le Roi Yehia Hamid Eddine.

Le comité saisit cette heureuse occasion qui constitue une des pages les plus glorieuses de l'histoire des Arabes pour adresser à tous les pays arabes ses meilleurs vœux et ses félicitations et présenter à Leurs Majestés, leurs Altesses et leurs Excellences les Souverains, Chefs d'Etat et Princes Arabes l'expression de son profond loyalisme et de ses vifs remerciements, convaincu que ses travaux et l'espoir et les résultats qu'il a atteints et qu'il atteindra, avec l'aide de Dieu, mériteront toute leur sympathie, tout leur encouragement et tout leur appui.

*Protocole.*

LES soussignés, chefs et membres des Délégations Arabes au Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe, à savoir :

Le Président du Comité Préparatoire : S.E. Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Egypte et Chef de la Délégation Egyptienne.

[30547]

M



*Délégation Syrienne:*

S.E. Saadallah El-Jabry, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Syrie, Chef de la Délégation Syrienne;

S.E. Jamil Mardam Bey, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères;

S.E. le Dr. Neguib El-Armanazi, Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République Syrienne;

S.E. M<sup>r</sup> Sabry El-Assali, Député de Damas.

*Délégation Transjordanienne:*

S.E. Tewfik Aboul Hoda Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Transjordanie et Chef de la Délégation Transjordanienne;

S.E. Soliman El-Soukkar Bey, Secrétaire financier du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

*Délégation Irakienne:*

S.E. Hamdi El-Bajahji, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak et Chef de la Délégation Irakienne;

S.E. Archad El-Omari, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères;

S.E. Noury El-Said Pacha, ancien Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak;

S.E. Tahsin El-Askari, Ministre plénipotentiaire en Egypte.

*Délégation Libanaise:*

S.E. Riad El-Solh Bey, Président du Conseil des Ministres du Liban, Chef de la Délégation Libanaise;

S.E. Selim Takla Bey, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères;

S.E. Moussa Moubarak, Chef du Cabinet de la Présidence de la République.

*Délégation Égyptienne:*

S.E. Ahmed Neguib El-Hilali Pacha, Ministre de l'Instruction publique;

S.E. Mohamed Sabry Abou Alam Pacha, Ministre de la Justice;

S.E. Mohamed Salah Eddine Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères;

Désireux de constater les rapports étroits et les liens nombreux qui unissent tous les pays arabes;

Soucieux de resserrer ces liens, de les consolider et de les orienter vers le bien-être de tous les pays arabes afin d'améliorer leur sort, de garantir leur avenir et de réaliser leurs aspirations;

Répondant à l'appel de l'opinion publique dans tous les pays arabes;

Se sont réunis à Alexandrie entre le lundi 8 Chawal 1363 (25 septembre 1944) et le samedi 20 Chawal 1363 (7 octobre 1944), sous forme de Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe et sont convenus de ce qui suit:

*I.—Ligue des États Arabes.*

Une Ligue des États Arabes sera constituée par les États Arabes indépendants qui voudront en faire partie.

Cette Ligue aura un Conseil qui sera nommé " Conseil de la Ligue des États Arabes," au sein duquel les États membres de la Ligue seront représentés sur un pied d'égalité.

Il aura pour mission d'exécuter les accords que les États concluront entre eux et d'organiser des réunions périodiques pour raffermir leurs relations et coordonner leurs programmes politiques en vue de réaliser la coopération entre eux, de sauvegarder par tous les moyens possibles leur indépendance et leur souveraineté contre toute agression et de s'occuper d'une façon générale des affaires des pays arabes et de leurs intérêts.

Les décisions de ce Conseil obligeront ceux qui les auront acceptées, sauf au cas où un différend aura surgi entre deux États de la Ligue et à l'occasion duquel les deux pays se seront adressés au Conseil pour le régler. Dans ce cas, les décisions du Conseil de la Ligue seront exécutoires et obligatoires.

Dans tous les cas, il est interdit de recourir à la force pour régler les conflits entre deux États membres de la Ligue.

De plus, chaque État aura le droit de conclure avec un autre État, membre ou non membre de la Ligue, des accords particuliers, qui ne seraient pas contraires au texte ou à l'esprit de ces dispositions.

En aucun cas, il ne sera permis de suivre une politique extérieure préjudiciable à la politique de la Ligue des États Arabes ou de l'un quelconque des États membres.

Le Conseil assurera la médiation dans tout différend susceptible de provoquer une guerre entre un État membre de la Ligue, ou un autre membre ou non membre, en vue de les réconcilier.

D'ores et déjà, une commission sera formée de membres du Comité Préparatoire en vue d'élaborer les statuts du Conseil de la Ligue et d'examiner les questions politiques pouvant faire l'objet d'accords à conclure entre les pays arabes.

*II.—Coopération économique, culturelle, sociale, etc.*

(a) Les États Arabes représentés au Comité coopéreront étroitement dans les matières suivantes:

(1) Les questions économiques et financières, y compris les échanges commerciaux, les douanes, la monnaie, l'agriculture et l'industrie;

(2) Les communications, y compris les chemins de fer, les routes, l'aviation, la navigation, les télégrammes et les postes;

(3) Les questions culturelles;

(4) Les questions de nationalité, les passeports, les visas, l'exécution des jugements, l'extradition des délinquants, &c.;

(5) Les questions sociales;

(6) Les questions sanitaires.

(b) Une commission d'experts pour chaque catégorie de ces questions sera formée des représentants des Gouvernements qui ont participé au Comité Préparatoire en vue d'élaborer un projet déterminant les modalités de la coopération dans ces matières, la portée et l'organisme d'exécution de cette coopération.

(c) Une commission de coordination et de rédaction sera formée pour contrôler les travaux des autres commissions, coordonner au fur et à mesure leurs travaux et rédiger leurs résolutions sous forme de projets d'accords pour être soumis aux différents Gouvernements.

(d) Lorsque toutes les commissions auront terminé leurs travaux, le Comité Préparatoire se réunira pour examiner les résultats de leurs études, en vue de la convocation du Congrès Général Arabe.

*III.—Raffermissement de ces Liens.*

Se réjouissant de ce premier résultat heureux, le Comité espère qu'à l'avenir les pays arabes le consolideront par d'autres résultats, surtout si, après la guerre actuelle, les événements mondiaux aboutissent à des institutions qui uniront les États par des liens plus étroits et plus forts.

*IV.—Décision particulière au Liban.*

Les États Arabes, représentés au sein du Comité Préparatoire, affirment à l'unanimité leur respect pour l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban, dans ses frontières actuelles, ce que, d'ailleurs, leurs Gouvernements ont déjà reconnu après que le Liban ait suivi une politique d'indépendance proclamée par son Gouvernement dans le programme ministériel qui lui a valu l'approbation unanime de la Chambre des Députés libanaise à la date du 7 octobre 1943.

*V.—Décision particulière à la Palestine.*

(a) Le Comité estime que la Palestine constitue un des importants éléments des pays arabes et que les droits des Arabes ne sauraient y être touchés sans danger pour la paix et la stabilité du monde arabe.

De même, le Comité estime que les engagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne, qui comportent l'arrêt de l'immigration juive, la sauvegarde des terres appartenant aux Arabes et l'acheminement de la Palestine vers l'indépendance, constituent autant de droits acquis pour les Arabes et que leur exécution serait un pas en avant vers le but visé, vers le raffermissement de la paix et de la stabilité.

Le Comité proclame son appui à la cause de la Palestine pour la réalisation de ses aspirations légitimes et la sauvegarde de ses justes droits.



Le Comité déclare qu'il ne compatit pas moins que quiconque aux horreurs et aux souffrances que les Juifs ont endurées en Europe par le fait de quelques Etats dictatoriaux. Mais il importe de ne pas confondre le cas de ces Juifs avec le Sionisme, car rien ne serait plus arbitraire et plus injuste que de vouloir régler la question des Juifs d'Europe par une autre injustice dont les victimes seraient les Arabes de Palestine, à quelque religion ou confession qu'ils appartiennent.

(b) La proposition concernant la participation des Gouvernements et peuples arabes au "Fonds de la Nation Arabe," destiné à sauver les terres de Palestine, sera renvoyée à la Commission des Questions économiques et financières, pour l'examiner sous tous ses aspects et soumettre le résultat de cet examen au Comité Préparatoire au cours de sa prochaine réunion.

En foi de quoi, le présent Protocole a été signé au siège de la Direction de l'Université Farouk I<sup>er</sup> à Alexandrie, le samedi 21 Chawal 1363 (7 octobre 1944).

[E 6697/41/65]

No. 52.

*Lord Moyne to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st November.)*

*Office of Minister Resident (M.E.),  
Cairo, 19th October, 1944.*

My dear Secretary of State,

IN his despatch No. 1179 of the 10th October Mr. Shone has analysed the protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and commented on the implications of its various clauses. In general I am in agreement with the views expressed by His Majesty's Minister. It may be of use if I add a few comments on my own part, from the general Middle East point of view, based on the interviews which the various delegates had with me during their stay in Cairo, and on conversations with them which have been reported to me.

2. I should like in the first place to endorse the summing up of the outcome of the conference given in paragraph 10 of Mr. Shone's despatch. Whether or not the various resolutions are given immediate practical effect, the result of the holding of the conference and of the formation of the "League" or "Commonwealth" of Arab States cannot fail to tighten the ties joining the various States of the Middle East. The existence and strength of these ties was shown by the spontaneity of the reaction against the attempted French *coup* in the Lebanon in November 1943. To this general feeling of community there has now been added the machinery to give it concrete expression.

3. There is a further fact that emerges from a careful reading of the protocol and from conversations with members of the conference. The protocol envisages that the Arab world (or that part of it with which the protocol deals) should have one orientation, and one only, towards the outside world. This feeling has been expressed more and more in recent years, particularly in regard to the partitions of the Middle East which were carried out after the last war. It is now quite clear that the Arab States are convinced that there is not room for two orientations, taking different parts of the Arab world in different directions. The protocol expresses a growing sense of solidarity among the States composing the "Arab Commonwealth," and a realisation that the deflection of one part of the area from the general line of development must affect the interests of the whole.

4. There is little doubt that the direction envisaged at present is that of co-operation with Great Britain. The Middle East group as a whole is willing, and indeed anxious, to co-operate with Great Britain on a basis of independence and free association. They believe that this will be to the mutual advantage of both, since it gives the best guarantee on the one side of the security of the Arab countries, and on the other side of the maintenance of British imperial communications. All the indications are, however, that a policy of political penetration on the eastern fringe of the Mediterranean, whether by Great Britain herself, or by other Powers with the assistance or acquiescence of Great Britain, would be interpreted as a threat to the essential interests of the whole "Commonwealth." This could not fail to have an effect upon the present inclination of the Arab States to range themselves alongside of us, and might do so to such an extent as to cause them to overcome the misgivings which they probably feel as regards other possibilities and to look elsewhere for the support that they need. In this connexion it is important to recall that the recent recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the U.S.S.R., which gave such satisfaction in the

Levant States, is stated to be conditional on the two States not entering into an agreement which would give a specially favoured or "pre-eminent" position to any one European Power. We must realise, in my view, that, if His Majesty's Government is forced to adopt local policies in any part of the Middle East which are unacceptable to the majority of the Middle Eastern opinion, there is risk of the whole orientation of the Arab *bloc* of countries being changed to some other direction which might or might not be acceptable to us.

5. It is in this light that the special resolutions relating to the Lebanon and Palestine (clauses IV and V) can be read. It is implied in the former that, if there is any "default" on the part of the Lebanon in allegiance to the objects of the League as a whole—that is, if the Lebanon allows itself to be used as a foothold for undesirable European penetration into the Arab world—the other States of the League would no longer recognise the independence of the Lebanon "within its present frontiers," and would support Syria in taking back the predominantly Moslem, non-Maronite districts at present incorporated in the Lebanese State. This interpretation has been confirmed in conversation with several of the delegates. Similarly, as regards Palestine, it should be noted that the protocol speaks of the engagements entered into by Great Britain as involving the stoppage of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of Arab land and the leading of the country towards independence (an oblique reference, it would appear, to the principal clauses of the 1939 White Paper). It follows that, unless we are prepared to ensure those objects, we cannot avoid some measure of difference with the Arab world, and the risk which has been referred to is one that we cannot hope altogether to escape.

6. The delegates have, in conversation, expressed definite hopes that there will be forthcoming from His Majesty's Government some sign of sympathy with their achievement, which they maintain is entirely in accord with the declaration made by you, Sir, in 1941. The reception given to the protocol by His Majesty's Government may well be taken as an important "test case" for our future intentions in this part of the world.

7. It is also fair to say that the conference marks a considerable advance in constructive political thinking on the part of the Middle East States. The protocol looks to the future, not to the past. The era of recriminations over such matters as the MacMahon Correspondence seems at last to be over. The delegates have shown in conversations that they are aware of having made a fresh start and that they look for a response in kind from His Majesty's Government. The general spirit in which the conference appears to have been conducted, and the lines of the protocol itself, show, moreover, that the States of the Middle East have not been slow to learn the new technique of international co-operation developed in war-time United Nations conferences such as those at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks. "Regionalism" is in the air, and it is noteworthy that it should be the newly-developed States of the Middle East who have taken the lead in attempting to work out a practical scheme of regional co-operation. Clause III of the protocol is of interest in this connexion. At the end of the third paragraph of his despatch, Mr. Shone suggests that the reference in this clause to post-war institutions is perhaps intended as a sop to the Syrians and Iraqis. More than one of the delegates, however, has stated in conversation that this clause is intended to leave the door open for the "Commonwealth" as a whole to join in any wider world organisation which may emerge in the post-war period. The Arabic text is obscure on this point, and is capable of either interpretation. A copy of the Arabic, which is the official text, is enclosed<sup>(1)</sup> with this despatch, and will repay comparison with the French translation, which is in some respects misleading.

8. Since the protocol was signed, there has been a change of Government in three of the signatory countries—Egypt, Syria and Transjordan. Although the coincidence has caused some remark, it seems to be beyond doubt that none of these changes was the result, direct or indirect, of the conference, nor do they imply any dissatisfaction in the countries concerned with the policies formulated at Alexandria. The Governments of Egypt, Transjordan and Syria fell on internal domestic issues which had been pending for some time, and in the two former cases it seems probable that the changes were actually held over until after the conclusion of the conference in order not to interfere with it. "Arab unity" is to a large extent a non-party matter in these countries, and the changes should not in practice have any great effect either way on the development of the project. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that these three Governments

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.



should have fallen in such rapid succession immediately after the publication of the protocol, since I am informed that His Majesty's Government have already been accused on the Axis radio of engineering their fall in order to sabotage the Arab unity movement.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad and Jedda, the Acting High Commissioner for Palestine and the Governor of Aden.

Yours sincerely,  
MOYNE.

[E 7213/41/65]

No. 53.

*Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th November.)*

(No. 517.)

Sir,

*Bagdad, 5th November, 1944.*

IN paragraph 11 of my despatch No. 510 of the 31st October, I referred briefly to the reception which had been accorded in Iraq to the decisions of the Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity, which met in Alexandria between the 15th September and the 7th October. It may be of interest if I analyse those reactions more fully.

2. Regarding most matters, it is not possible in this country to predicate any one feeling or view as representing "public opinion"; each community tends to regard affairs, both internal and external, primarily from its own sectional point of view and with an eye to its own advantage. The Shia leaders are naturally not enthusiastic about the Alexandria Protocol. As good Arab patriots, they must at least give it lip-service, but as sectaries they are disturbed by the prospect of the Shias becoming a still smaller minority in a still larger Sunni world. They well know that they cannot enlist the support of their Persian co-religionists without appearing unpatriotic, and they are therefore forced into uneasy acquiescence in the official policy. To the Kurds, any step which strengthens, actually or potentially, their secular opponents, the Arabs, is unwelcome; and the Arab tribes are on the whole quite indifferent to what they no doubt regard as just another manoeuvre of their urban rulers. Nor can the Christian and Jewish communities be expected to acclaim the protocol with genuine satisfaction.

3. The general public (by which I mean the politically-minded, newspaper-reading townsmen), like all general publics, is primarily interested in gaining its daily bread. But next to self-preservation there are few stronger stimuli than national pride; and there is to my mind no doubt that the general public were flattered and pleased by the success which the conference attained. It has made them feel that it is something after all to be an Arab; and Arab Unity undoubtedly appeals to the Iraqis very much as the reunion of Christendom appeals to Christians, namely as an ideal which, if incapable of immediate realisation, is nevertheless devoutly to be wished.

4. The fact that the Iraqi delegation was headed by the Prime Minister and included the forceful, if erratic, personality of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and above all (contrary to the wishes of Nahas and Ibn Saud) General Nuri-al-Said, who is the doyen of living exponents of Arab Unity, has naturally made Iraqis feel, not without reason, that their own country is taking a prominent, if not pre-eminent, part in the realisation of the ideal. Moreover, as I have suggested in my despatch under reference, Iraq has a very practical interest in Arab Unity, because she regards the Levant as her natural economic corridor, and is much concerned to see that the exits for her pipe-lines and her trade routes on the Mediterranean do not come under hostile, *i.e.*, French or Jewish, control.

5. In paragraph 4 of his letter No. 48 (2) of the 19th October to you, Lord Moyne has mentioned that the aim of the conference seems to have been to unite the Arab World in co-operation with Britain. I have every reason to endorse this view. Both Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have said clearly and definitely that this was the aim of the conference, and that it was this which lay behind the clause of the protocol guaranteeing the present Lebanon frontiers. To me this is the most interesting and important aspect of the conference, because it shows that the Arabs have responded whole-heartedly and

practically to the invitation which you, Sir, conveyed to them at the Mansion House on the 29th May, 1941, when you said:—

"The Arab World has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such an appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."

This undertaking you reiterated in February 1942, and it has become known as "The Eden Declaration." At the time when it was made, many must have wondered whether the Arab World would ever unite in any practical way or direction, and still more whether they would be prepared to put themselves under the guidance and leadership of Great Britain. In Iraq it certainly seemed most unlikely; but, as you know, the change of feeling here during the past three and a half years has been deep and marked, and it is true to say to-day that the orientation towards Great Britain is popular here. The revolt of Rashid Ali profoundly shocked the pride and confidence of most thinking Iraqis. With their political instinct, whatever their feelings for Britain might then be, they were quick to see that the revolt, had it been successful, would have ranged them on the wrong side, and would have shattered their political hopes for perhaps a generation.

6. Apart from that, the generous policy of His Majesty's Government in this country, both as regards the armistice terms and in many spheres since, has done much to conciliate the people of Iraq besides causing a great impression in other Arab States and particularly in Syria. The Atlantic Charter and similar declarations of the statesmen of the United Nations have also created a new feeling of confidence, here and throughout the Arab World, in Great Britain and her willingness to help the Arabs, and her determination to stand by her agreements.

7. It was this feeling, I am sure, which led the delegates to refer to the White Paper in dealing with Palestine. The declaration was so phrased, I understand, because it was desired to find a form of words which would be not unacceptable to Jamal Hussaini, who had actually, despite Amin Hussaini's threats, initialled the White Paper (with trifling reservations), together with Musa al Alami in Nuri Pasha's house in May 1940. It was therefore felt appropriate to make a reference to it. It seems to me that this acceptance of Britain's last official statement of policy by and on behalf of the so-called extremist Palestine party, and its endorsement by the conference, is very significant. It means on the one hand that the Palestinian Arabs are now committed to an acceptance of the White Paper, and that we have the general support of the Arab World for the policy it enshrined. But, on the other hand, it means equally that any serious divergence from that policy will confront His Majesty's Government not only with the hostility of the Palestine Arabs, but with that of all the signatories to the Alexandria Protocol. To them, the solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of strictly limited Jewish immigration, like the guarantee of Syria and the Lebanon, is an integral part of their scheme for Arab Unity, a movement which we have undertaken to support. If we oppose, in any important particular, the plan they have formulated, we shall at once be accused of having gone back on our undertakings. We shall lose the confidence that we have so laboriously built up over the past three years, and with it the friendship which has proved such an asset to us.

8. The Arab World, like the Western World, finds it hard to co-operate on cultural and economic matters, or the promotion of an idea, but an external threat will unite them as it unites us. Thousands to whom the theory or ideal of Arab Unity means little or nothing at all will enthusiastically support and share in any action undertaken to protect or preserve Syria or Palestine from what is conceived to be foreign aggression. Already, before the meeting of the Alexandria Conference, the Arab World had shown surprising solidarity on two occasions: first of all over the Lebanon crisis last November, and secondly over the protests to the United States Congress against the "Wagner Resolution" early this year.

9. There is, however, a profound difference between the reaction to the incidents which have so far evoked, and astonishingly evoked, united Arab action,



and that to be expected should we adopt a policy contrary to the protocol. Hitherto the Arabs have been our friends and have remonstrated as friends. If, having assured the Arabs that their aspirations for unity have our sympathetic support, we now oppose their official plan for its attainment, they will be our friends no longer, and their opposition will be hostile and almost certainly violent. At this moment feeling in Iraq on Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon, though it has not so far expressed itself immoderately, is far more effectively mobilised than it ever has been, and there is no doubt that the Iraqi Government would act at once in support of either country if they felt it to be opportune. In the case of Palestine in particular they would have every Arab Iraqi solidly behind them.

10. I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic or minatory, and I realise that far wider issues are at stake than can be bounded within the frontiers of the Arab World. At the same time I agree with the view expressed by Sir Harold MacMichael in the second paragraph of his Secret despatch of the 17th July, that these problems must be considered first and foremost from the point of view of British interests, because, as Sir Harold points out, and as the Arab Unity Conference has admitted, British interests are the shield and protector of the interests of all, and if British influence in the Middle East is overthrown, chaos will ensue. It is, I believe, true to say that ever since Great Britain has concerned herself with the Middle East, our interests have demanded that we should maintain easy communications among friendly peoples. It seems to me that the Arab Unity Conference, certainly so far as Iraq is concerned, presents us with a crisis. If we are ready to support the plan fully and openly, and to respond to the invitation which has been given to us to act as the guide and mentor of the Arab World, then I see every reason to hope that Imperial interests in the Middle East will be maintained and safeguarded more surely than ever before, and that a period of stability and prosperity lies before us. If, on the other hand, we are not willing or able to do so, then, whatever advantages we may reap elsewhere, we shall, I feel, suffer in this part of the world a blow which will not only involve us and the Middle East in unrest, violence and confusion, but in the eyes of its inhabitants will abase our honour and prestige irreparably.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Beirut and Jedda, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Persia/Iraq Force, the Air Officer Commanding and the Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.